Carpio Morales v CA
o Not based on statutory law but on jurisprudence (Pascual v.
Background:
Petitioner Conchita Carpio-Morales filed a petitition for certiorari and prohibition
assailing the Resolution of CA which granted private respondent Jejomar Binay Jr.
prayer for issuance of TRO against the implementation of a joint order of the
Ombudsman (ordering the suspension of Binay Jr. and other officials for 6 months
without pay).
Facts:
 A complaint was filed by Atty. Renato Bondal and Nicolas Enciso before the
Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other gov’t officials of
Makati City Plunder and violation of RA 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act) in connection with the 5 phases of the construction of the
Makati City Hall Parking Building.
 A Special Panel of Investigators, pursuant to the Obudsman’s directive, fileda
complaint against Binay and the gov’t officials charging them with 6
administrative cases (Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service) and 6 criminal cases (violation
of RA3019, malversation of public funds, falsification of public documents)
 OMB complaint alleged that Binay was involved in anomalous activities
involving the construction of the Makati Parking Building.
 Binay filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking the nullification of
the preventative suspension order and prayed for the issuance of a TRO to
enjoin its implementation.
 He argued that he could not be held administratively liable for any anomalous
activity involving the Makati Parking Building since his re-election as City
mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his administrative
liability, rendering any case against him moot and academic.
 Binay, Jr. also claimed that the Ombudsman’s preventive suspension order
failed to show that the evidence of guilt presented against him is strong.
 CA, applying the condonation doctrine (which means because of his re-
election, he can no longer be administratively charged) issued the TRO.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and
eventually, the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation
of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the
condonation doctrine
RULING:
 CA’s basis in issuing injunctive writs is the condonation doctrine, citing
various jurisprudence applying the condonation doctrine.
 Condonation
o treating the offender as if there has been no offense
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija)
o Pascual case posed a novel issue – of whether an elective official
may be discipline for wrongful act committed by him during his
immediately preceding term of office
o Since there was no legal precedent at the time, the Court resorted to
American authorities
o The Court unconvered that there was really no established weight
of authority in the US favoring the doctrine of condonation. In fact,
17 states have already abandoned said doctrine. (nuanced treatment,
not uniformly applied across states)
o “own successor theory” – exception to condonation theory; re-
elected incumbent taken as one continuous term of office.
 these US cases are only of persuasive value in the process of this Court’s
decision-making. “[They] are not relied upon as precedents, but as guides of
interpretation
 Therefore, the ultimate analysis is on whether or not the condonation
doctrine, as espoused in Pascual, and carried over in numerous cases after,
can be held up against prevailing legal norms.
 the doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude the Court from revisiting
existing doctrine.
 Stare decisis rule should not operate when there are powerful countervailing
considerations against its application.
 As the Ombudsman correctly points out, jurisprudence, after all, is not a
rigid, atemporal abstraction; it is an organic creature that develops and
devolves along with the society within which it thrives. In the words of a
recent US Supreme Court Decision, “what we can decide, we can undecided.”
 Court held that since the time Pascual was decided, the legal landscape has
radically shifted. Pascual was a 1959 case decided under the 1935
Constitution, which dated provisions do not reflect the experience of the
Filipino People under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Therefore, the plain
difference in setting, including, of course, the sheer impact of the condonation
doctrine on public accountability, calls for Pascual’s judicious re-
examination.
 Pascual’s Ratio:
o First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term
in which the public officer was elected for each term is separate and
distinct
o Second, an elective official’s re-election serves as a condonation of
previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him
therefor;
 o Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to
have known the life and character of candidates, of their right to
elect officers

 A thorough review of the cases citing Pascual would show that the basis for
condonation under the prevailing constitutional and statutory framework was
never accounted for.
 What remains apparent from the text of these cases is that the basis for
condonation, as jurisprudential doctrine, was – and still remains – the above-
cited postulates of Pascual, which was lifted from rulings of US courts
where condonation was amply supported by their own state laws. With
respect to its applicability to administrative cases, the core premise of
condonation – that is, an elective official’s re-election cuts off the right to
remove him for an administrative offense committed during a prior term –
was adopted hook, line, and sinker in our jurisprudence largely because
the legality of that doctrine was never tested against existing legal norms.
 As in the US, the propriety of condonation is – as it should be – dependent
on the legal foundation of the adjudicating jurisdiction. Hence, the Court
undertakes an examination of our current laws in order to determine if there
is legal basis for the continued application of the doctrine of condonation.
 public office is a public trust
 Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in
this jurisdiction. As can be seen from this discourse, it was a doctrine adopted
from one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from –
and now rendered obsolete by – the current legal regime. In consequence, it
is high time for this Court to abandon the condonation doctrine that originated
from Pascual
