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Requirement of the 1st player to optimal mixed strategy ~x0 = (x01 , . . . , x0m )
earned him middle win at least in the value of the price of the game v , no
matter what strategy will choose the 2nd player, can be expressed as a set of
inequalities
a11 x01 + a21 x02 + · · · + am1 x0m ≥ v ,
a12 x01 + a22 x02 + · · · + am2 x0m ≥ v ,
.................................. .
a1n x01 + a2n x02 + · · · + amn x0m ≥ v ,
where x0i ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , m, x01 + x02 + · · · + x0m = 1.
To all elements of the payment matrix we add some (arbitrary) number c ≥ 0
so such that
bij = aij + c ≥ 0.
The optimal strategy of the MG with payment matrix B are the same as in the
MG with matrix A, only the prices of the game is
v 0 = v + c > 0.
In doing so m m
X X 1
x01 + x02 + · · · + x0m = v 0 · ti = 1 =⇒ ti = .
i=1 i=1
v0
Maximize the price of the game v (resp. v 0 ) is the same as minimizing the value
1
= t1 + t2 + · · · + tm (= t).
v0
Summary 1:
Solving of any MG in terms of the 1st player can be found using minimization
LP problem
t = t1 + t2 + · · · + tm −→ min
The optimal strategy of the 1st player ~x0 = (x01 , . . . , x0m ) we determine of the
relations
x0i = ti v 0 , i = 1, 2, . . . , m.
The optimal strategy of the 2nd player ~y0 = (y01 , . . . , y0n ) we determine of the
relations
y0j = zj v 0 , j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Conclusion:
Both LP problems that we have created (see Summary 1, respectively.
Summary 2) are dually associated problems.
This means that the solution of one of them can be solved the other, i.e. to
determine the optimal strategies of both players, also to determine the price of
the game, it is sufficient to solve one (any) of the LP problems.
In terms of efficiency solution it is more appropriate to take a position of the
2nd player, ie, solving the maximization problem, see Summary 2.
Example:
„ «
1 −2
MG with payment matrix A = solve by converting to the
−1 2
problem of linear programming.
Solution:
For each element of the array A we add the number c = 3. We obtain the
matrix
„ «
4 1
B= .
2 5
z10 4 1 1 0 1 1
z20 2 (5) 0 1 1 1
5
z −1 −1 0 0 0 max
z10 ( 18
5
) 0 1 − 51 4
5
2
9
2 1 1 1
z2 5
1 0 5 5 2
z − 35 0 0 1
5
1
5
max
5 1 2
z1 1 0 18
− 18 9
z2 0 1 − 19 2
9
1
9
1 1 1
z 0 0 6 6 3
MAX
1 1
zmax = ⇒ v0 = =3 ⇒ v = v 0 − c = 3 − 3 = 0,
3 zmax
„ « „ «
2 1 2 1 2 1
z1 = , z2 = ⇒ ~y0 = · 3, · 3 = , ,
9 9 9 9 3 3
„ « „ «
1 1 1 1 1 1
t1 = , t2 = ⇒ ~x0 = · 3, · 3 = , .
6 6 6 6 2 2