Heirs of Malabanan

G.R. No. 179987. April 29, 2009.
*
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, petitioner, vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Land Registration Act; Public Lands Act; Notwithstanding the

passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of
Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect.
Both laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest
who „have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.‰·Notwithstanding the passage of the Property
Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the
Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer
to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who „have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.‰ That
circumstance may have led to the impression that one or the other
is a redundancy, or that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has
somehow been repealed or mooted. That is not the case.
Same; Same; Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more
descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor than
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which seems to
presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing the
right itself for the first time.·It is clear that Section 48 of the Public
Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed by
the possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree,
which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than
establishing the right itself for the first time. It is proper to assert
that it is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective
25 January 1977, that has primarily established the right of a
Filipino citizen who has been „in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since
_______________
* EN BANC.
173
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 173

Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic
June 12, 1945‰ to perfect or complete his title by applying with the
proper court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and the
issuance of the corresponding certificate of title.
Civil Law; Prescription; Under the Civil Code that where lands of
the public domain are patrimonial in character, they are susceptible
to acquisitive prescription.·It is clear under the Civil Code that
where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in character, they
are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other hand,
among the public domain lands that are not susceptible to
acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The
Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of timber or
mineral lands.
Same; Land Registration Act; Prescription; Alienable and
disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run.
Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by
Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law.·There must be an express
declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public
dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and
disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run.
Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by
Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law.
Land Registration Act; Prescription; Public Land Act; If a public
land is declared patrimonial by law or proclamation, can the period
of possession prior to such conversion be reckoned in counting the
period of prescription? No.·The limitation imposed by Article 1113
dissuades us from ruling that the period of possession before the
public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for the
purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public
dominion property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the
object of prescription according to the Civil Code. As the application
for
174
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the framework

of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession
during the time that the land was still classified as public dominion
property can be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive
prescription and justify registration. Are we being inconsistent in
applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)? There
is no inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates registration on the
basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration
on the basis of prescription. Registration under Section
14(1) is extended under the aegis of the Property
Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while
registration under Section 14(2) is made available both by
the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Land Registration Act; Public Land Act; Prescription; Lands
belonging to the public domain may not be acquired by prescription.
·Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree clearly and
explicitly refers to „private lands,‰ without mention at all of public
lands. There is no other way to understand the plain language of
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree except that the
land was already private when the applicant for registration
acquired ownership thereof by prescription. The prescription
therein was not the means by which the public land was converted
to private land; rather, it was the way the applicant acquired title to
what is already private land, from another person previously
holding title to the same. The provision in question is very clear and
unambiguous. Well-settled is the rule that when the law speaks in
clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation
or construction, but only for application.
Same; Same; Same; Sec. 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
applies only to what already are private lands, which can be
acquired by prescription.·With the understanding that Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree applies only to what are
already private lands, then, there is no question that the same can
be acquired by prescription under the provisions of the Civil Code,
because, precisely, it is the Civil Code which governs rights to
private lands.
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VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 175

Supreme Court; Judgments; The acquisition of an imperfect title

to a disposable land of the public domain was raised as an issue in
the Herbieto case and passed upon.·It must be emphasized that
the acquisition of an imperfect title to alienable and disposable land
of the public domain under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended, was directly raised as an issue in the Petition in Herbieto
and discussed extensively by the parties in their pleadings. That
the application of Jeremias and David Herbieto could already be
dismissed on the ground of lack of proper publication of the notice of
hearing thereof, did not necessarily preclude the Court from
resolving the other issues squarely raised in the Petition before it.
Thus, the Court dismissed the application for registration of
Jeremias and David Herbieto on two grounds: (1) the lack of
jurisdiction of the land registration court over the application, in
light of the absence of proper publication of the notice of hearing;
and (2) the evident lack of merit of the application given that the
applicants failed to comply with the requirements for judicial
confirmation of an imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended. This is only in keeping with the duty of the
Court to expeditiously and completely resolve the cases before it
and, once and for all, settle the dispute and issues between the
parties. Without expressly discussing and categorically ruling on
the second ground, Jeremias and David Herbieto could have easily
believed that they could re-file their respective applications for
registration, just taking care to comply with the publication-of-
notice requirement.
Land Registration Act; Public Land Act; Requisites for Judicial
Confirmation of an Imperfect Title.·Judicial confirmation and
registration of an imperfect title, under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended, and Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, respectively, should only be granted when: (1)
a Filipino citizen, by himself or through his predecessors-in-
interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural land of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since 12 June
1945, or earlier; and (2) the land in question, necessarily, was
already declared alienable and disposable also by 12 June 1945 or
earlier.
Same; Same; When an individual acquires an imperfect title, he
acquires a right to a grant by operation of law.·Stringency and
prudence in interpreting and applying Section 48(b) of the Public
176

Land Act, as amended, is well justified by the significant

consequences arising from a finding that a person has an imperfect
title to agricultural land of the public domain. Not just any lengthy
occupation of an agricultural public land could ripen into an
imperfect title. An imperfect title can only be acquired by
occupation and possession of the land by a person and his
predecessors-in-interest for the period required and
considered by law sufficient as to have segregated the land
from the mass of public land. When a person is said to have
acquired an imperfect title, by operation of law, he acquires
a right to a grant, a government grant to the land, without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. As such,
the land ceased to be part of the public domain and goes
beyond the authority of the State to dispose of. An
application for confirmation of title, therefore, is but a mere
formality.
BRION, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Land Registration Act; Public Land Act; Any
consideration of lands of the public domain must begin with the
Constitution and its Regalian doctrine and the special laws thereon.
·In light of our established hierarchy of laws, particularly the
supremacy of the Philippine Constitution, any consideration of
lands of the public domain should start with the Constitution and
its Regalian doctrine; all lands belong to the State, and he who
claims ownership carries the burden of proving his claim. Next in
the hierarchy is the PLA for purposes of the terms of the grant,
alienation and disposition of the lands of the public domain, and the
PRD for the registration of lands. The PLA and the PRD are special
laws supreme in their respective spheres, subject only to the
Constitution. The Civil Code, for its part, is the general law on
property and prescription and should be accorded respect as such.
In more concrete terms, where alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain are involved, the PLA is the primary law that should
govern, and the Civil Code provisions on property and prescription
must yield in case of conflict.
Same; Same; Same; Presidential Decree No. 1073 should have
provided January 24, 1947 and not June 12, 1945 as its cut-off date.
·PD 1073 should have thus provided January 24, 1947 and not
177
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 177

June 12, 1945 as its cut-off date, yet the latter date is the express
legal reality. The reconciliation, as properly defined by
jurisprudence, is that where an applicant has satisfied the
requirements of Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended by RA 1942,
prior to the effectivity of PD 1073, the applicant is entitled to perfect
his or her title, even if possession and occupation does not date back
to June 12, 1945. For purposes of the present case, a
discussion of the cut-off date has been fully made to
highlight that it is a date whose significance and import
cannot be minimized nor glossed over by mere judicial
interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns; the full
legislative intent must be respected.
Same; Same; Same; Congress extended the period for filing
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to December
31, 2020.·RA 6940 extended the period for filing applications for
free patent and judicial confirmation of imperfect title to December
31, 2000. The law now also allows the issuance of free patents for
lands not in excess of 12 hectares to any natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who is not the owner of more than 12 hectares and who,
for at least 30 years prior to the effectivity of the amendatory Act,
has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural
public lands subject to disposition. Congress recently extended the
period for filing applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect
and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under RA 9176 from December 31, 2000 under RA 6940 to
December 31, 2020.
Same; Same; Same; The Court acted ultra vires in its
interpretation of Sec. 48(b), as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1073.·This Court acts beyond the limits of the constitutionally-
mandated separation of powers in giving Section 48(b), as amended
by PD 1073, an interpretation beyond its plain wording. Even this
Court cannot read into the law an intent that is not there even your
purpose is to avoid an absurd situation. If we feel that a law already
has absurd effects because of the passage of time, our role under the
principle of separation of powers is not to give the law an
interpretation that is not there in order to avoid the perceived
absurdity. We thereby dip into the realm of policy·a role delegated
by the Constitution to the Legislature. If only for this reason, we
should avoid
178

expanding·through Naguit and the present ponencia·the plain

meaning of Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by PD 1073.
Same; Same; Same; Prescription; A public land, even if alienable
is State property and prescription does not run against the State.·
The purpose is to determine whether a grant or disposition of an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain has been made,
then the PLA primarily applies and the Civil Code applies only
suppletorily. The possession and occupation that the PLA recognizes
is based on its Section 48(b) and, until the requirements of this
Section are satisfied, the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain remains a State property that can be disposed only under
the terms of Section 11 of the PLA. In the face of this legal reality,
the question of whether·for purposes of prescription·an alienable
and disposable land of the public domain is patrimonial or not
becomes immaterial; a public land, even if alienable and disposable,
is State property and prescription does not run against the State.
In other words, there is no room for any hair-splitting that
would allow the inapplicable concept of prescription under
the Civil Code to be directly applied to an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain before this land
satisfies the terms of a grant under Section 48(b) of the PLA.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Public land may become private by the
governmentÊs declaration in which case prescription under the Civil
Code can run.·I agree with this statement as it describes a clear
case when the property has become private by the governmentÊs
own declaration so that prescription under the Civil Code can run.
Note in this regard that there is no inconsistency between this
conclusion and the hierarchy of laws on lands of the public domain
that I expounded on. To reiterate, the PLA applies as a special
and primary law when a public land is classified as
alienable and disposable, and remains fully and exclusively
applicable until the State itself expressly declares that the
land now qualifies as a patrimonial property. At that point,
the application of the Civil Code and its law on prescription
are triggered. The application of Section 14(2) of the PRD
follows.
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VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 179

Same; Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; Stare Decisis; The

ruling in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Naguit (442 SCRA 445)
must be abandoned.·Naguit must be abandoned and rejected for
being based on legally-flawed premises and for being an aberration
in land registration jurisprudence. At the very least, the present
ponencia cannot be viewed as an authority on the effective pos-
session prior to classification since this ruling, by the ponenciaÊs
own admission, is not necessary for the resolution of the present
case.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Fortun, Narvasa & Salazar for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
TINGA, J.:
One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal
is that from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands
are not titled and registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in
the so-called Third World. And it has many consequences.
xxx
The question is: How is it that so many governments, from
SuhartoÊs in Indonesia to FujimoriÊs in Peru, have wanted to title
these people and have not been able to do so effectively? One reason
is that none of the state systems in Asia or Latin America can
gather proof of informal titles. In Peru, the informals have means of
proving property ownership to each other which are not the same
means developed by the Spanish legal system. The informals have
their own papers, their own forms of agreements, and their own
systems of registration, all of which are very clearly stated in the
maps which they use for their own informal business transactions.
If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to
Peru, and you walk by field after field·in each field a different dog
is going to bark at you. Even dogs know what private property is all
180
about. The only one who does not know it is the government. The
issue is that there exists a „common law‰ and an „informal law‰
which the Latin American formal legal system does not know how
to recognize.
- Hernando De Soto1
This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands

currently in possession of persons and entities other than
the Philippine government. The petition, while
unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the Court en
banc in order to provide definitive clarity to the
applicability and scope of original registration proceedings
under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree. In doing so, the Court confronts not only the
relevant provisions of the Public Land Act and the Civil
Code, but also the reality on the ground. The countrywide
phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as the problem of
informal settlement it has spawned, has unfortunately
been treated with benign neglect. Yet our current laws are
hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in addressing the
phenomenon. Still, the duty on our part is primarily to
decide cases before us in accord with the Constitution and
the legal principles that have developed our public land
law, though our social obligations dissuade us from casting
a blind eye on the endemic problems.
I.
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an
application for land registration covering a parcel of land
identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre,2
situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting of
71,324
_______________
1 „Hernando de Soto Interview‰ by Reason Magazine dated 30

November 1999, at http://www.reason.com/news/show/32213.html (Last
visited, 21 April 2009).
2 More particularly described and delineated in Plan CSD-04-017123.
Records, p. 161.
181
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 181
square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased

the property from Eduardo Velazco,3 and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and
continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for
more than thirty (30) years.
The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court
of (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) duly designated the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear
on behalf of the State.4 Apart from presenting documentary
evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes
Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the
property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare
property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco.
Lino had four sons·Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and
Esteban·the fourth being AristedesÊs grandfather. Upon
LinoÊs death, his four sons inherited the property and
divided it among themselves. But by 1966, EstebanÊs wife,
Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the
properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father,
Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son
Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties,
including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his
uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold
by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.5
_______________
3 But see note 5.

4 Id.
5 The trial court decision identified Eduardo Velazco as the vendor of
the property, notwithstanding the original allegation in the application
that Malabanan purchased the same from Virgilio Velazco. See note 3. In
his subsequent pleadings, including those before this Court, Malabanan
or his heirs stated that the property was purchased from Eduardo
Velazco, and not Virgilio. On this point, the appellate court made this
observation:
„More importantly, Malabanan failed to prove his ownership over Lot
9864-A. In his application for land registration, Malabanan alleged that
he purchased the subject lot from Virgilio Velazco. Dur-
182
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not

cross-examine Aristedes Velazco. He further manifested
that he „also [knew] the property and I affirm the truth of
the testimony given by Mr. Velazco.‰6 The Republic of the
Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to
controvert the application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during
trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the
Community Environment & Natural Resources Office,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property
was „verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land
per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under
Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656
on March 15, 1982.‰7
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in
favor of Malabanan, the dispositive portion of which reads:
_______________
ing the trial of the case, however, Malabanan testified that he purchased
the subject lot from Eduardo Velazco, which was corroborated by his
witness, Aristedes Velazco, a son of Virgilio Velazco, who stated that
Eduardo was a brother of his grandfather. As aptly observed by the
Republic, no copy of the deed of sale covering Lot 9864-A, executed either
by Virgilio or Eduardo Velazco, in favor of Malabanan was marked and
offered in evidence. In the appealed Decision, the court a quo mentioned
of a deed of sale executed in 1995 by Eduardo Velazco in favor of
Malabanan which was allegedly marked as Exhibit „I.‰ It appears,
however, that what was provisionally marked as Exhibit „I‰ was a
photocopy of the deed of sale executed by Virgilio Velazco in favor of Leila
Benitez and Benjamin Reyes. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
provides that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to
rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the
evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Thus, Malabanan has not
proved that Virgilio or Eduardo Velazco was his predecessor-in-interest.‰
Rollo, pp. 39-40.
6 Rollo, p. 74.
7 Id., at p. 38. Emphasis supplied.
183
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 183
„WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for

registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496
and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law,
the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and
containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred
Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical
description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition
to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who
is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting
Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the
corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.‰
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of

Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that
the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land
of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in
finding that he had been in possession of the property in
the manner and for the length of time required by law for
confirmation of imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision8 reversing the RTC and dismissing the application
of Malabanan. The appellate court held that under Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of
possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable
and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded
from the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the
appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR
certification had verified that the property was declared
alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the
VelazcosÊ possession prior to that date could not be factored
in the computation of the period of possession. This
interpretation of the Court of Appeals
_______________
8 Penned by Associate Justice Marina Buzon of the Court of Appeals

Fifth Division, and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo Sundiam
and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa.
184

of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree was

based on the CourtÊs ruling in Republic v. Herbieto.9
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the
Court of Appeals;10 hence, it was his heirs who appealed
the decision of the appellate court. Petitioners, before this
Court, rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit,11 which was
handed down just four months prior to Herbieto.
Petitioners suggest that the discussion in Herbieto cited by
the Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum since the
Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had directed the
registration of the property had no jurisdiction in the first
place since the requisite notice of hearing was published
only after the hearing had already begun. Naguit,
petitioners argue, remains the controlling doctrine,
especially when the property in question is agricultural
land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any
possession prior to the declaration of the alienable property
as disposable may be counted in reckoning the period of
possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act and
the Property Registration Decree.
The petition was referred to the Court en banc,12 and on
11 November 2008, the case was heard on oral arguments.
The Court formulated the principal issues for the oral
arguments, to wit:
„1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public

domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as
of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at
any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided
that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continu-
_______________
9 G.R. No. 156117, 26 May 2005, 459 SCRA 183.

10 See Rollo, p. 11.
11 G.R. No. 144507, 17 January 2005, 448 SCRA 442.
12 Through a Resolution dated 5 December 2007. See Rollo, p. 141.
185
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 185

ous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona

fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable
be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by
prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character
either because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest
lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code
on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land
in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree or both?‰13
Based on these issues, the parties formulated their

respective positions.
With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the
analysis of the Court in Naguit is the correct interpretation
of the provision. The seemingly contradictory
pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted, should be
considered obiter dictum, since the land registration
proceedings therein was void ab initio due to lack of
publication of the notice of initial hearing. Petitioners
further point out that in Republic v. Bibonia,14
promulgated in June of 2007, the Court applied Naguit and
adopted the same observation that the preferred
interpretation by the OSG of Section 14(1) was patently
absurd. For its part, the OSG remains insistent that for
Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have been classified
as alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945. Apart from
Herbieto, the OSG also cites the subsequent rulings in
Buenaventura v. Republic,15 Fieldman Agricultural
Trading v. Republic16 and Repub-
_______________
13 Id., at pp. 186-187.

14 G.R. No. 157466, 21 June 2007, 525 SCRA 268.
15 G.R. No. 166865, 2 March 2007, 459 SCRA 271.
16 G.R. No. 147359, 28 March 2008, 550 SCRA 92.
186

lic v. Imperial Credit Corporation,17 as well as the earlier

case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals.18
With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of an
alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years
ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus
placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2). According to
them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be
registered was previously classified as agricultural land of
the public domain so long as, at the time of the application,
the property had already been „converted‰ into private
property through prescription. To bolster their argument,
petitioners cite extensively from our 2008 ruling in
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties.19
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to
Section 14(2) are more extensive. The OSG notes that
under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive
prescription of properties of the State refers to „patrimonial
property,‰ while Section 14(2) speaks of „private lands.‰ It
observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that
presented Section 14(2) as a ground for application for
registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers
to the period of possession under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, and not the concept of prescription under the
Civil Code. The OSG further submits that, assuming that
the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public
lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the
public land was declared alienable and disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect
to the particular factual circumstances surrounding the
subject property and the ownership thereof.
_______________
17 G.R. No. 173088, 25 June 2008, 555 SCRA 314.

18 G.R. No. 85322, 30 April 1991, 178 SCRA 708.
19 G.R. No. 154953, 16 June 2008.
187
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 187

II.
First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree. For a full understanding of the
provision, reference has to be made to the Public Land Act.
A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public

Land Act, has, since its enactment, governed the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain.
The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify
the lands of the public domain into alienable and
disposable, timber, or mineral lands.20 Alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain are further classified
according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential,
commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;
(c) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d)
reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public
uses.21
May a private person validly seek the registration in
his/her name of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain? Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges
that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be
disposed of „by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles‰ through „judicial legalization.‰22 Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the
details and unmistakably grants that right, subject to the
requisites stated therein:
„Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,

occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected
or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the prov-
_______________
20 Section 6, Com. Act No. 141, as amended

21 Section 9, Com. Act No. 141, as amended.
22 Section 11, Com. Act No. 141, as amended.
188
ince where the land is located for confirmation of their claims

and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.‰
Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present

wording in 1977 when the law was amended by P.D. No.
1073. Two significant amendments were introduced by P.D.
No. 1073. First, the term „agricultural lands‰ was changed
to „alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.‰
The OSG submits that this amendment restricted the scope
of the lands that may be registered.23 This is not actually
the case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act,
„agricultural lands‰ are a mere subset of „lands of the
public domain alienable or open to disposition.‰ Evidently,
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are a
larger class than only „agricultural lands.‰
Second, the length of the requisite possession was
changed from possession for „thirty (30) years immediately
preceding the filing of the application‰ to possession „since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.‰ The Court in Naguit explained:
„When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the
period of possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register
their title to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced
_______________
23 OSG Memorandum, p. 13.
189
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 189
from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No.
1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must
have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No.
1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. xxx‰
It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com.

Act No, 141 is virtually the same as Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codified the
various laws relative to the registration of property,
including lands of the public domain. It is Section 14(1)
that operationalizes the registration of such lands of the
public domain. The provision reads:
„SECTION 14. Who may apply.·The following persons may

file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.‰
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property

Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1)
therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both
laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-
interest who „have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.‰ That
circumstance may have led to the impression that one or
the other is a redundancy, or that Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act has somehow been repealed or mooted.
That is not the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act
and Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree warrant
comparison:
190

„Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act].·The following described

citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree].·Who may apply.·
The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
xxx‰
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more

descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed by the
possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration
Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the
right, rather than establishing the right itself for the first
time. It is proper to assert that it is the Public Land Act, as
amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that
has primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who
has been „in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, since June 12, 1945‰ to perfect or complete
his title by applying with the proper court for the
confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance of the
corresponding certificate of
title.
Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-
quoted Section 11 of the Public Land Act, which provides
that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be
disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles, and given the notion that both provisions declare
that it is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily
establishes the substantive ownership of the possessor who
has been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945.
In turn, Section 14(a) of the
191
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 191

Property Registration Decree recognizes the substantive

right granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
as well provides the corresponding original registration
procedure for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect or
incomplete title.
There is another limitation to the right granted under
Section 48(b). Section 47 of the Public Land Act limits the
period within which one may exercise the right to seek
registration under Section 48. The provision has been
amended several times, most recently by Rep. Act No. 9176
in 2002. It currently reads thus:
„Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section

are hereby granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020
within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That
this period shall apply only where the area applied for does not
exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several
periods of time designated by the President in accordance with
Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands
comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall
not be construed as prohibiting any said persons from acting under
this Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the
President.‰24
Accordingly under the current state of the law, the

substantive right granted under Section 48(b) may be
availed of only until 31 December 2020.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended and Section 14(a) of the Property
Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the position that
for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it is not
enough that the applicant and his/her predecessors-in-
interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership since 12 June 1945;
_______________
24 Section 47, Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 9176.
192

the alienable and disposable character of the property must

have been declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the
OSGÊs approach, all lands certified as alienable and
disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered either
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The
absurdity of such an implication was discussed in Naguit.
„Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and

disposable character of the land should have already been
established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by
the plain meaning of Section 14(1). „Since June 12, 1945,‰ as used
in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase „under a bonafide
claim of ownership.‰ Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict
or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately
associated, and not those distantly or remotely located.25 Ad
proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we
adopt petitionerÊs position. Absent a legislative amendment, the
rule would be, adopting the OSGÊs view, that all lands of the public
domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June
12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter
the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such
interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually
inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect
even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable
and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even
be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the
Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.‰
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
„[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it

merely requires the property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration
of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has
_______________
25 R. Agpalo, Statutory Construction (3rd ed., 1995) at p. 182.
193
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 193

not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or

disposition, the presumption is that the government is still
reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to
preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of
adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property
has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in
this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State
to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.‰
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of

Section 14(1) is that which was adopted in Naguit. The
contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in
Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision to
the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands
actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June
1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a
bona fide claim of ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more
possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to avail of
judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than what
would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is
significant, especially considering our forthcoming
discussion on the scope and reach of Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the
contradictory passages from Herbieto are obiter dicta since
the land registration proceedings therein is void ab initio in
the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the
notice of initial hearing. There is no need to explicitly
overturn Herbieto, as it suffices that the CourtÊs
acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used
therein concerning Section 14(1) is indeed obiter.
194

It may be noted that in the subsequent case of

Buenaventura,26 the Court, citing Herbieto, again stated
that „[a]ny period of possession prior to the date when the
[s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable and
disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from
the computation of the period of possession⁄‰ That
statement, in the context of Section 14(1), is certainly
erroneous. Nonetheless, the passage as cited in
Buenaventura should again be considered as obiter. The
application therein was ultimately granted, citing Section
14(2). The evidence submitted by petitioners therein did
not establish any mode of possession on their part prior to
1948, thereby precluding the application of Section 14(1). It
is not even apparent from the decision whether petitioners
therein had claimed entitlement to original registration
following Section 14(1), their position being that they had
been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June
1945.
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling
Buenaventura has any precedental value with respect to
Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is
embedded in Section 14(1), since it precisely involved
situation wherein the applicant had been in exclusive
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership prior to 12
June 1945. The CourtÊs interpretation of Section 14(1)
therein was decisive to the resolution of the case. Any
doubt as to which between Naguit or Herbieto provides the
final word of the Court on Section 14(1) is now settled in
favor of Naguit.
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from
Bracewell v. Court of Appeals27 since in the latter, the
application for registration had been filed before the land
was declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though
pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between the two.
Yet two years after Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed
Justice Consuelo
_______________
26 See note 3.
27 380 Phil. 156; 323 SCRA 193 (2000).
195
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 195

Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza,28

which involved a claim of possession that extended back to
1927 over a public domain land that was declared alienable
and disposable only in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted
extensively from it, and following the mindset of the
dissent, the attempt at registration in Ceniza should have
failed. Not so.
„To prove that the land subject of an application for registration

is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive
act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated
November 25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating
that the lots involved were „found to be within the alienable and
disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per
map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980.‰ This is sufficient
evidence to show the real character of the land subject of private
respondentsÊ application. Further, the certification enjoys a
presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence,
which is true in this case. Worth noting also was the observation of
the Court of Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and
Forestry to contest the application of appellees on the ground
that the property still forms part of the public domain. Nor is
there any showing that the lots in question are forestal
land....‰
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere
possession of public land for the period required by law would
entitle its occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err
in ruling in favor of private respondents as far as the first
requirement in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is concerned,
for they were
_______________
28 Also known as Republic v. Court of Appeals, 440 Phil. 697; 392 SCRA 190
(2002).
196

able to overcome the burden of proving the alienability of the land
subject of their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents
were able to prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject land even before the year 1927. As a rule,
we are bound by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.
Although there are exceptions, petitioner did not show that this is
one of them.‰29
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent

member who authored Bracewell, sanction the registration
under Section 48(b) of public domain lands declared
alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180 days
after 12 June 1945? The telling difference is that in Ceniza,
the application for registration was filed nearly six (6)
years after the land had been declared alienable or
disposable, while in Bracewell, the application was filed
nine (9) years before the land was declared alienable
or disposable. That crucial difference was also stressed in
Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a difference
which the dissent seeks to belittle.
III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis
with respect to Section 14(2). The provision reads:
„SECTION 14. Who may apply.·The following persons may

xxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.‰
_______________
29 Id., at pp. 710-712; pp. 201-202.
197
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 197

The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion

concerning Section 14(2), which we did even then recognize,
and still do, to be an obiter dictum, but we nonetheless
refer to it as material for further discussion, thus:
„Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the

amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration
of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which
commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and
authorizes the application of „those who have acquired ownership of
private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.‰
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under
the Civil Code.30 There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that
properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into
private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive
possession of at least thirty (30) years.31 With such conversion, such
property may now fall within the contemplation of „private lands‰
under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those
who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if
possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later
than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open,
continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to
register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.‰
Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14(2),

unlike in this case where petitioners have based their
registration bid primarily on that provision, and where the
evidence definitively establishes their claim of possession
only as far back as 1948. It is in this case that we can
properly appreciate the nuances of the provision.
_______________
30 See Civil Code, Art. 1113.

31 See e.g., Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
65663, 16 October 1992, 214 SCRA 604, 611; Republic v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 108998, 24 August 1994, 235 SCRA 567, 576; Group
Commander, Intelligence and Security Group v. Dr. Malvar, 438 Phil.
252, 275; 389 SCRA 493, 509 (2002).
198

A.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on
prescription as the possible basis for application for
original registration under Section 14(2). Specifically, it is
Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the
application. It reads:
„All things which are within the commerce of men are

susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of
the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of prescription.‰
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the

public domain are patrimonial in character, they are
susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other hand,
among the public domain lands that are not susceptible to
acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral
lands. The Constitution itself proscribes private ownership
of timber or mineral lands.
There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code
concerning the acquisition of real property through
prescription. Ownership of real property may be acquired
by ordinary prescription of ten (10) years,32 or through
extraordinary prescription of thirty (30) years.33 Ordinary
acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith,34
as well as just title.35
When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
explicitly provides that persons „who have acquired
ownership over private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws,‰ it unmistakably refers to the
Civil Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands. The
Civil Code is the
_______________
32 See Article 1134, Civil Code.

33 See Article 1137, Civil Code.
34 See Article 1117 in relation to Article 1128, Civil Code. See also
Articles 526, 527, 528 & 529, Civil Code on the conditions of good faith
required.
35 See Article 1117, in relation to Article 1129, Civil Code.
199
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 199

only existing law that specifically allows the acquisition by
prescription of private lands, including patrimonial
property belonging to the State. Thus, the critical question
that needs affirmation is whether Section 14(2) does
encompass original registration proceedings over
patrimonial property of the State, which a private person
has acquired through prescription.
The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently
reiterated jurisprudence holding that properties classified
as alienable public land may be converted into private
property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive
possession of at least thirty (30) years.36 Yet if we ascertain
the source of the „thirty-year‰ period, additional
complexities relating to Section 14(2) and to how exactly it
operates would emerge. For there are in fact two
distinct origins of the thirty (30)-year rule.
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957,
which amended Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act by
granting the right to seek original registration of alienable
public lands through possession in the concept of an owner
for at least thirty years.
„The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying

lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
x x x x x x x x x
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
_______________
36 Citing Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 65663,

16 October 1992, 214 SCRA 604, 611; Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
108998, 24 August 1994, 235 SCRA 567, 576; Group Commander, Intelligence
and Security Group v. Dr. Malvar, 438 Phil. 252, 275; 389 SCRA 493, 509
(2002).
200

possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
Chapter. (emphasis supplied)‰37
This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment

of P.D. 1073, which made the date 12 June 1945 the
reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless, applications
for registration filed prior to 1977 could have invoked the
30-year rule introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.
The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at
least by implication, as it applies the rules on prescription
under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation
to Article 1137. Note that there are two kinds of
prescription under the Civil Code–ordinary acquisitive
prescription and extraordinary acquisitive prescription,
which, under Article 1137, is completed „through
uninterrupted adverse possession⁄ for thirty years,
without need of title or of good faith.‰
Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period
rule, Rep. Act No. 1942, became unavailable after 1977. At
present, the only legal basis for the thirty (30)-year period
is the law on prescription under the Civil Code, as
mandated
_______________
37 Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, immediately before its

amendment by Rep. Act No. 1942, reads as follows:
„Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, except as against the Government,
since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
Chapter.‰
201
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 201

under Section 14(2). However, there is a material difference

between how the thirty (30)-year rule operated under Rep.
Act No. 1942 and how it did under the Civil Code.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by
Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer to or call into application
the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It merely set
forth a requisite thirty-year possession period immediately
preceding the application for confirmation of title, without
any qualification as to whether the property should be
declared alienable at the beginning of, and continue as
such, throughout the entire thirty-(30) years. There is
neither statutory nor jurisprudential basis to assert Rep.
Act No. 1942 had mandated such a requirement,38 similar
to our earlier finding with respect to the present language
of Section 48(b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as the point
of reference.
Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-
year possession period as basis for original registration
became Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,
which entitled those „who have acquired ownership over
private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws‰ to apply for original registration. Again, the
thirty-year period is derived from the rule on extraordinary
prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At the
same time, Section 14(2) puts into operation the entire
regime of prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which
does not hold true with respect to Section 14(1).
B.
Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to
the principles on prescription under existing laws.
Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil law concept
of prescription,
_______________
38 Again, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep.

Act No. 1942, was superseded by P.D. No. 1073, which imposed the 12
June 1945 reckoning point, and which was then incorporated in Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
202

as set forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of

Section 14(2). There is no similar demand on our part in
the case of Section 14(1).
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil
Code is thus: „[p]roperty of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription.‰ The identification what consists of
patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and 421,
which we quote in full:
„Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public
use, and are intended for some public service or for the development
of the national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the
character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property.
It is clear that property of public dominion, which

generally includes property belonging to the State, cannot
be the object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the
commerce of man.39 Lands of the public domain, whether
declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of
public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a
declaration by the President or any duly authorized
government officer of alienability and disposability of lands
of the public domain. Would such lands so declared
alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil
Code, from property of the public dominion into
patrimonial property? After all, by connotative definition,
alienable and disposable lands may be
_______________
39 See Villarico v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 136438, 11 November 2004,

442 SCRA 110.
203
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 203

the object of the commerce of man; Article 1113 provides

that all things within the commerce of man are susceptible
to prescription; and the same provision further provides
that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by
prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that
„[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer intended for
public use or for public service, shall form part of the
patrimonial property of the State.‰ It is this provision that
controls how public dominion property may be converted
into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by
prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that
those property „which belong to the State, without being for
public use, and are intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth‰ are public
dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to
the State, although already classified as alienable or
disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if
when it is „intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.‰
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration
by the State that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial.
Without such express declaration, the property, even
if classified as alienable or disposable, remains
property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article
420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription. It is only when such alienable and
disposable lands are expressly declared by the State
to be no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth that the period
of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such
declaration shall be in the form of a law duly
enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation
in cases where the President is duly authorized by
law.
204

It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of

Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree limits its
scope and reach and thus affects the registrability even of
lands already declared alienable and disposable to the
detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants claiming
title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord with
the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that
all lands owned by the State, although declared alienable
or disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by
the Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The
duty of the Court is to apply the Constitution and the laws
in accordance with their language and intent. The remedy
is to change the law, which is the province of the legislative
branch. Congress can very well be entreated to amend
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree and
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the
requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles.
The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be
illustrated by an actual example. Republic Act No. 7227,
entitled „An Act Accelerating The Conversion Of Military
Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, etc.,‰ is more
commonly known as the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law
authorizes the sale of certain military reservations and
portions of military camps in Metro Manila, including Fort
Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For purposes of effecting
the sale of the military camps, the law mandates the
President to transfer such military lands to the Bases
Conversion Development Authority (BCDA)40 which in turn
is authorized to own, hold and/or administer them.41 The
President is authorized to sell portions of the military
camps, in whole or in part.42 Accordingly, the BCDA law
itself declares that the military lands subject thereof are
„alienable and disposable pursuant to the provi-
_______________
40 Rep. Act No. 7227, Sec. 7.

41 Rep. Act No. 7227, Sec. 4(a).
42 Rep. Act No. 7227, Sec. 7.
205
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 205
sions of existing laws and regulations governing sales of

government properties.‰43
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the
subject military lands have become alienable and
disposable. However, said lands did not become
patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly makes the
reservation that these lands are to be sold in order to raise
funds for the conversion of the former American bases at
Clark and Subic.44 Such purpose can be tied to either
„public service‰ or „the development of national wealth‰
under Article 420(2). Thus, at that time, the lands
remained property of the public dominion under Article
420(2), notwithstanding their status as alienable and
disposable. It is upon their sale as authorized under the
BCDA law to a private person or entity that such lands
become private property and cease to be property of the
public dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because

they are declared as such in a duly enacted law or duly
promulgated proclamation that they are no longer intended
for public service or for the development of the national
wealth, would the period of possession prior to the
conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial be
reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the
possessors? We rule in the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us
from ruling that the period of possession before the public
domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for the
purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession of
public dominion property before it becomes patrimonial
cannot be the object of prescription according to the Civil
Code. As the application for registration under Section
14(2) falls wholly within the framework of prescription
under the Civil Code,
_______________
43 Id.
44 Section 2, Rep. Act No. 7227.
206

there is no way that possession during the time that the

land was still classified as public dominion property can be
counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription
and justify registration.
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for
Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)? There is no inconsistency.
Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of
possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration
on the basis of prescription. Registration under
Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of the
Property Registration Decree and the Public Land
Act while registration under Section 14(2) is made
available both by the Property Registration Decree
and the Civil Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between the
thirty-year period under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the thirty-year
period available through Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil
Code. The period under the former speaks of a thirty-
year period of possession, while the period under the
latter concerns a thirty-year period of extraordinary
prescription. Registration under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is
based on thirty years of possession alone without
regard to the Civil Code, while the registration
under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree is founded on extraordinary prescription
under the Civil Code.
It may be asked why the principles of prescription under
the Civil Code should not apply as well to Section 14(1).
Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil Code, it
ultimately is just one of numerous statutes, neither
superior nor inferior to other statutes such as the Property
Registration Decree. The legislative branch is not bound to
adhere to the framework set forth by the Civil Code when it
enacts subsequent legislation. Section 14(2) manifests a
clear intent to interrelate the registration allowed under
that provision with
207
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 207

the Civil Code, but no such intent exists with respect to

Section 14(1).
IV.
One of the keys to understanding the framework we set

forth today is seeing how our land registration procedures
correlate with our law on prescription, which, under the
Civil Code, is one of the modes for acquiring ownership
over property.
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property
of the State may be acquired by private persons through
prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113, which
states that „[a]ll things which are within the commerce of
man are susceptible to prescription,‰ and that [p]roperty of
the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription.‰
There are two modes of prescription through which
immovables may be acquired under the Civil Code. The
first is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under
Article 1117, requires possession in good faith and with just
title; and, under Article 1134, is completed through
possession of ten (10) years. There is nothing in the Civil
Code that bars a person from acquiring patrimonial
property of the State through ordinary acquisitive
prescription, nor is there any apparent reason to impose
such a rule. At the same time, there are indispensable
requisites·good faith and just title. The ascertainment of
good faith involves the application of Articles 526, 527, and
528, as well as Article 1127 of the Civil Code,45 provisions
that more or less speak for themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires
some clarification. Under Article 1129, there is just title for
the purposes of prescription „when the adverse claimant
came into possession of the property through one of the
modes rec-
_______________
45 See Civil Code, Art. 1128.

208

ognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other

real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not
transmit any right.‰ Dr. Tolentino explains:
„Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of
ownership, and which would have actually transferred ownership if
the grantor had been the owner. This vice or defect is the one cured
by prescription. Examples: sale with delivery, exchange, donation,
succession, and dacion in payment.‰46
The OSG submits that the requirement of just title

necessarily precludes the applicability of ordinary
acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The major
premise for the argument is that „the State, as the owner
and grantor, could not transmit ownership to the possessor
before the completion of the required period of
possession.‰47 It is evident that the OSG erred when it
assumed that the grantor referred to in Article 1129 is the
State. The grantor is the one from whom the person
invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription derived the title,
whether by sale, exchange, donation, succession or any
other mode of the acquisition of ownership or other real
rights.
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary
prescription or extraordinary prescription, the period of
possession preceding the classification of public dominion
lands as patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose of
computing prescription. But after the property has been
become patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to
run in favor of the possessor. Once the requisite period has
been completed, two legal events ensue: (1) the patrimonial
property is ipso jure converted into private land; and (2) the
person in possession for the periods prescribed under the
Civil Code acquires ownership of the property by operation
of the Civil Code.
_______________
46 A. Tolentino, IV Civil Code of the Philippines (1991 ed.) at 26; citing
2 Castan 175.
47 Memorandum of the OSG, p. 21.
209
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 209

It is evident that once the possessor automatically

becomes the owner of the converted patrimonial property,
the ideal next step is the registration of the property under
the Torrens system. It should be remembered that
registration of property is not a mode of acquisition of
ownership, but merely a mode of confirmation of
ownership.48
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the
adoption of the Property Registration Decree in 1977, it is
apparent that the registration system then did not fully
accommodate the acquisition of ownership of patrimonial
property under the Civil Code. What the system
accommodated was the confirmation of imperfect title
brought about by the completion of a period of possession
ordained under the Public Land Act (either 30 years
following Rep. Act No. 1942, or since 12 June 1945
following P.D. No. 1073).
The Land Registration Act49 was noticeably silent on the
requisites for alienable public lands acquired through
ordinary prescription under the Civil Code, though it
arguably did not preclude such registration.50 Still, the gap
was lamentable, considering that the Civil Code, by itself,
establishes ownership over the patrimonial property of
persons who have completed the prescriptive periods
ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with the
adoption of the Property Registration Decree in 1977, with
Section 14(2) thereof expressly authorizing original
registration in favor of persons who have acquired
ownership over private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws, that is, the Civil Code as of now.
V.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as
follows:
_______________
48 See Angeles v. Samia, 66 Phil. 44 (1938).

49 Act No. 496.
50 See Section 19, Land Registration Act, which allowed application
for registration of title by „person or persons claiming, singly or
collectively, to own the legal estate in fee simple.‰
210

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property

Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
recognizes and confirms that „those who by themselves or
through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945‰ have acquired ownership
of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length
and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession
since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the
lands should have been alienable and disposable
during the entire period of possession, the possessor is
entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title
thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and
disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by
Section 47 of the Public Land Act.51
(b) The right to register granted under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code,
prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership
of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands
become only patrimonial property not only with a
declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There
must also be an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for
public service or the development of national wealth, under
Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property
has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
_______________
51 See note 24.
211
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 211

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the

government. The person acquires ownership of
patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil
Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which
patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary
and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person acquires ownership of a
patrimonial property through possession for at least
ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a personÊs
uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial
property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of
good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at
bar.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient
to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over
the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that
Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945
or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their
possession, according to their own evidence·the Tax
Declarations they presented in particular·is to the year
1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as
basis for registration. While the subject property was
declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no
competent evidence that is no longer intended for public
use service or for the development of the national evidence,
conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The
classification of the subject
212
property as alienable and disposable land of the public

domain does not change its status as property of the public
dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
VI.
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the
correctness of the legal doctrines established in this
decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the implications of
todayÊs ruling cannot be discounted. For, every untitled
property that is occupied in the country will be affected by
this ruling. The social implications cannot be dismissed
lightly, and the Court would be abdicating its social
responsibility to the Filipino people if we simply levied the
law without comment.
The informal settlement of public lands, whether
declared alienable or not, is a phenomenon tied to long-
standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is common
among the so-called „Third World‰ countries. This
paradigm powerfully evokes the disconnect between a legal
system and the reality on the ground. The law so far has
been unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means of
acquisition of these public domain lands, such as through
homestead or free patent, have proven unattractive due to
limitations imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or
alienation of said properties.52 Judicial con-
_______________
52 See Section 118, Com. Act No. 141, as amended.

„Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or
institutions, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions
shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the
approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the
date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to
the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said
period, but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or
pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five
years and before twenty-five years after issuance of title shall be
213
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 213
firmation of imperfect title has emerged as the most viable,

if not the most attractive means to regularize the informal
settlement of alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, yet even that system, as revealed in this decision,
has considerable limits.
There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have
individually or exclusively held residential lands on which
they have lived and raised their families. Many more have
tilled and made productive idle lands of the State with
their hands. They have been regarded for generation by
their families and their communities as common law
owners. There is much to be said about the virtues of
according them legitimate states. Yet such virtues are not
for the Court to translate into positive law, as the law itself
considered such lands as property of the public dominion. It
could only be up to Congress to set forth a new phase of
land reform to sensibly regularize and formalize the
settlement of such lands which in legal theory are lands of
the public domain before the problem becomes insoluble.
This could be accomplished, to cite two examples, by
liberalizing the standards for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title, or amending the Civil Code itself to ease the
requisites for the conversion of public dominion property
into patrimonial.
OneÊs sense of security over land rights infuses into
every aspect of well-being not only of that individual, but
also to the personÊs family. Once that sense of security is
deprived, life and livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the
political branches to bring welcome closure to the long
pestering problem.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 2007 and
Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
_______________
valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and

Commerce, which approval shall not be denied except on constitutional
and legal grounds.‰
214
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-

Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Peralta and Bersamin, JJ.,
concur.
Puno (C.J.), I join J. Nazario.
Quisumbing, J., On Official Business.
Corona, J., I join the dissent of Mr. Justice Brion.
Chico-Nazario, J., Please See Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion.
De Castro, J., I join the Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion of Justice Nazario.
Brion, J., I Dissent · See Opinion.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
I concur in the majority opinion in dismissing the
application for registration of a piece of land originally filed
by the late Mario Malabanan (Malabanan), petitionersÊ
predecessor-in-interest. The land subject of the instant
Petition, being alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, may not be acquired by prescription under the
provisions of the Civil Code, nor registered pursuant to
At the outset, it must be made clear that the Property
Registration Decree governs registration of land under the
Torrens system. It can only identify which titles, already
existing or vested, may be registered under the Torrens
system; but it cannot be the source of any title to land. It
merely confirms, but does not confer ownership.1
_______________
1 Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108998, 24 August 1994, 235

SCRA 567, 576.
215
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 215

Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree allows
„those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws,‰ to apply
for registration of their title to the lands.
Petitioners do not fall under such provision, taking into
account that the land they are seeking to register is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, a
fact which would have several substantial implications.
First, Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
clearly and explicitly refers to „private lands,‰ without
mention at all of public lands. There is no other way to
understand the plain language of Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree except that the land was
already private when the applicant for registration
acquired ownership thereof by prescription. The
prescription therein was not the means by which the public
land was converted to private land; rather, it was the way
the applicant acquired title to what is already private land,
from another person previously holding title to the same.2
The provision in question is very clear and unambiguous.
Well-settled is the rule that when the law speaks in clear
and categorical language, there is no reason for
interpretation or construction, but only for application.3
With the understanding that Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree applies only to what are
already private lands, then, there is no question that the
same can be acquired by prescription under the provisions
of the Civil Code, because, precisely, it is the Civil Code
which governs rights to private lands.
_______________
2 As in the case where the land was already the subject of a grant by
the State to a private person, but the latter failed to immediately register
his title, thus, allowing another person to acquire title to the land by
prescription under the provisions of the Civil Code.
3 Department of Agrarian Reform v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 1048,
1052; 258 SCRA 404 (1996).
216

Second, Section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,

otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended,
reads:
„Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can

be disposed of only as follows:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).‰
(Emphasis ours.)
The afore-quoted provision recognizes that agricultural

public lands may be disposed of by the State, and at the
same time, mandates that the latter can only do so by the
modes identified in the same provision. Thus, the intent of
the legislature to make exclusive the enumeration of the
modes by which agricultural public land may be disposed of
by the State in Section 11 of the Public Land Act, as
amended, is not only readily apparent, but explicit. And,
undeniably, the enumeration of the modes for acquiring
agricultural public land in the said provision does not
include prescription, in the concepts described and periods
prescribed by the Civil Code.
Neither the Civil Code nor the Property Registration
Decree can overcome the express restriction placed by the
Public Land Act, as amended, on the modes by which the
State may dispose of agricultural public land.
The Public Land Act, as amended, is a special law
specifically applying to lands of the public domain, except
timber and mineral lands. The Public Land Act, as
amended, being a special law, necessarily prevails over the
Civil Code, a general law. Basic is the rule in statutory
construction that „where two statutes are of equal
theoretical application to a particu-
217
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 217

lar case, the one designed therefor specially should

prevail.‰ Generalia specialibus non derogant.4
As for the Property Registration Decree, it must be
stressed that the same cannot confer title to land and can
only confirm title that already exists or has vested. As has
already been previously discussed herein, title to
agricultural public land vests or is acquired only by any of
the modes enumerated in Section 11 of the Public Land
Act, as amended.
And, third, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was
amended several times, changing the period of possession
required for acquiring an imperfect title to agricultural
public land:
„Under the public land act, judicial confirmation of imperfect

title required possession en concepto de dueño since time
immemorial, or since July 26, 1894. Under C.A. No. 141, this
requirement was retained. However, on June 22, 1957, Republic Act
No. 1942 was enacted amending C.A. No. 141. This later enactment
required adverse possession for a period of only thirty (30)
years. On January 25, 1977, the President enacted P.D. No. 1073,
further amending C.A. No. 141, extending the period for filing
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles to December 31, 1987. Under this decree, „the provisions of
Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land
Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall
apply only to alienable and disposable land of the public domain
which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his
predecessor-in-interest under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945.‰5 (Emphasis ours.)
Prior to Presidential Decree No. 1073, imperfect title to

agricultural land of the public domain could be acquired by
adverse possession of 30 years. Presidential Decree No.
1073, issued on 25 January 1977, amended Section 48(b) of
the
_______________
4 See De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 397, 408; 297 SCRA
743, 751 (1998).
5 Public Estates Authority v. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 901, 909-910;
345 SCRA 96, 102 (2000).
218

Public Land Act by requiring possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable land of the public domain since 12
June 1945 or earlier for an imperfect title. Hence, by
virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1073, the requisite period
of possession for acquiring imperfect title to alienable and
disposable land of the public domain is no longer
determined according to a fixed term (i.e., 30 years);
instead, it shall be reckoned from a fixed date (i.e., 12
June 1945 or earlier) from which the possession should
have commenced.
If the Court allows the acquisition of alienable and
disposable land of the public domain by prescription under
the Civil Code, and registration of title to land thus
acquired under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree, it would be sanctioning what is effectively a
circumvention of the amend-ment introduced by
Presidential Decree No. 1073 to Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act. Acquisition of alienable and disposable land of
the public domain by possession would again be made to
depend on a fixed term (i.e., 10 years for ordinary
prescription and 30 years for extraordinary prescription),
rather than being reckoned from the fixed date presently
stipulated by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended.
There being no basis for petitionersÊ application for
registration of the public agricultural land in question,
accordingly, the same must be dismissed.
I, however, must express my dissent to the discussion in
the majority opinion concerning the contradictory
pronouncements of the Court in Republic v. Naguit6 and
Republic v. Herbieto,7 on imperfect titles to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, acquired in
accordance with Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended, and registered pursuant to Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.
_______________
6 G.R. No. 144057, 17 January 2005, 448 SCRA 442.

7 G.R. No. 156117, 459 SCRA 183.
219
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 219

According to Naguit, a person seeking judicial

confirmation of an imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended, need only prove that he and
his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and
occupation of the subject land since 12 June 1945 or earlier,
and that the subject land is alienable and disposable at the
time of filing of the application for judicial confirmation
and/or registration of title. On the other hand, it was held
in Herbieto that such a person must establish that he and
his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and
occupation of the subject land since 12 June 1945 or earlier,
and that the subject land was likewise already declared
alienable and disposable since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
The majority opinion upholds the ruling in Naguit, and
declares the pronouncements on the matter in Herbieto as
mere obiter dictum.
As the ponente of Herbieto, I take exception to the
dismissive treatment of my elucidation in said case on the
acquisition of imperfect title to alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, as mere obiter dictum.
An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion
expressed by a court upon some question of law which is
not necessary to the decision of the case before it. It is a
remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his
decision upon a cause, „by the way,‰ that is, incidentally or
collaterally, and not directly upon the question before him,
or upon a point not necessarily involved in the
determination of the cause, or introduced by way of
illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding
as precedent.8
To recall, the Republic of the Philippines opposed in
Herbieto the registration of certain parcels of land of the
public domain in the names of Jeremias and David
Herbieto, based on two grounds, one substantive and the
other procedural, i.e., (1) the applicants for registration
failed to prove that they
_______________
8 Delta Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 342 Phil. 173, 186; 276
SCRA 212, 223 (1997).
220
possessed the subject parcels of land for the period required

by law; and (2) the application for registration suffers from
fatal infirmity as the subject of the application consisted of
two parcels of land individually and separately owned by
two applicants.
The Court, in Herbieto, addressed the procedural issue
first, and held that the alleged infirmity in the application
constituted a misjoinder of causes of action which did not
warrant a dismissal of the case, only the severance of the
misjoined causes of action so that they could be heard by
the court separately. The Court though took note of the
belated publication of the notice of hearing on the
application for registration of Jeremias and David
Herbieto, the hearing was already held before the notice of
the same was published. Such error was not only
procedural, but jurisdictional, and was fatal to the
application for registration of Jeremias and David
Herbieto.
The Court then proceeded to a determination of the
substantive issue in Herbieto, particularly, whether
Jeremias and David Herbieto possessed the parcels of land
they wish to register in their names for the period required
by law. The Court ruled in the negative. Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, as amended, on judicial confirmation
of imperfect title, requires possession of alienable and
disposable land of the public domain since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. Given that the land sought to be registered was
declared alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963,
and the period of possession prior to such declaration
should not be counted in favor of the applicants for
registration, then Jeremias and David Herbieto could not
be deemed to have possessed the parcels of land in question
for the requisite period as to acquire imperfect title to the
same.
The discussion in Herbieto on the acquisition of an
imperfect title to alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, which could be the subject of judicial
confirmation, was not unnecessary to the decision of said
case. It was not a
221
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 221
mere remark made or opinion expressed upon a cause, „by

the way,‰ or only incidentally or collaterally, and not
directly upon a question before the Court; or upon a point
not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause;
or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or
argument, as to constitute obiter dictum.
It must be emphasized that the acquisition of an
imperfect title to alienable and disposable land of the
public domain under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
as amended, was directly raised as an issue in the Petition
in Herbieto and discussed extensively by the parties in
their pleadings. That the application of Jeremias and
David Herbieto could already be dismissed on the ground of
lack of proper publication of the notice of hearing thereof,
did not necessarily preclude the Court from resolving the
other issues squarely raised in the Petition before it. Thus,
the Court dismissed the application for registration of
Jeremias and David Herbieto on two grounds: (1) the lack
of jurisdiction of the land registration court over the
application, in light of the absence of proper publication of
the notice of hearing; and (2) the evident lack of merit of
the application given that the applicants failed to comply
with the requirements for judicial confirmation of an
imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
as amended. This is only in keeping with the duty of the
Court to expeditiously and completely resolve the cases
before it and, once and for all, settle the dispute and issues
between the parties. Without expressly discussing and
categorically ruling on the second ground, Jeremias and
David Herbieto could have easily believed that they could
re-file their respective applications for registration, just
taking care to comply with the publication-of-notice
requirement.
Of particular relevance herein is the following discourse
in Villanueva v. Court of Appeals9 on what constitutes, or
more appropriately, what does not constitute obiter dictum:
_______________
9 429 Phil. 194, 203-204; 379 SCRA 463, 469-470 (2002).
222
„It has been held that an adjudication on any point within the
issues presented by the case cannot be considered as obiter dictum,
and this rule applies to all pertinent questions, although only
incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in the
regular course of the consideration of the case, and led up to the
final conclusion, and to any statement as to matter on which the
decision is predicated. Accordingly, a point expressly decided does
not lose its value as a precedent because the disposition of the case
is, or might have been, made on some other ground, or even though,
by reason of other points in the case, the result reached might have
been the same if the court had held, on the particular point,
otherwise than it did. A decision which the case could have turned
on is not regarded as obiter dictum merely because, owing to the
disposal of the contention, it was necessary to consider another
question, nor can an additional reason in a decision, brought
forward after the case has been disposed of on one ground, be
regarded as dicta. So, also, where a case presents two (2) or more
points, any one of which is sufficient to determine the ultimate
issue, but the court actually decides all such points, the case as an
authoritative precedent as to every point decided, and none of such
points can be regarded as having the status of a dictum, and one
point should not be denied authority merely because another point
was more dwelt on and more fully argued and considered, nor does
a decision on one proposition make statements of the court
regarding other propositions dicta.‰
An adjudication on any point within the issues

presented by the case cannot be considered a dictum; and
this rule applies as to all pertinent questions, although
only incidentally involved, which are presented and decided
in the regular course of the consideration of the case, and
lead up to the final conclusion, and to any statement in the
opinion as to a matter on which the decision is predicated.
Accordingly, a point expressly decided does not lose its
value as a precedent because the disposition of the case is
or might have been made on some other ground, or even
though, by reason of other points in the case, the result
reached might have been
223
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 223

the same if the court had held, on the particular point,

otherwise than it did.10
I submit that Herbieto only applied the clear provisions
of the law and established jurisprudence on the matter, and
is binding as a precedent.
Section 14(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended,
explicitly requires for the acquisition of an imperfect title to
alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
possession by a Filipino citizen of the said parcel of land
since 12 June 1945 or earlier, to wit:
„Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,

occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing
of the applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented
by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter.‰ (Emphasis ours.)
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, by

substantially reiterating Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended, recognizes the imperfect title thus
acquired and allows the registration of the same, viz.:
_______________
10 1 C.J.S. 314-315, as quoted in the dissenting opinion of Tuason, J.,

in Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71, 125 (1948).
224

„Section 14. Who may apply.·The following persons may file

in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration
of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
1945, or earlier.‰ (Emphasis ours.)
Meanwhile, jurisprudence has long settled that

possession of the land by the applicant for registration
prior to the reclassification of the land as alienable and
disposable cannot be credited to the applicantÊs favor.11
Given the foregoing, judicial confirmation and
registration of an imperfect title, under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended, and Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, respectively, should only be
granted when: (1) a Filipino citizen, by himself or through
his predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural land of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since 12 June 1945, or
earlier; and (2) the land in question, necessarily, was
already declared alienable and disposable also by 12 June
1945 or earlier.
There can be no other interpretation of Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, as amended, and Section 14(1) of the
Prop-
_______________
11 See Almeda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85322, 30 April 1991, 196
SCRA 476; Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 235 Phil. 680, 695-
696; 151 SCRA 679, 690 (1987); and Republic v. Court of Appeals, 232
Phil. 444, 457; 148 SCRA 480, 492-493 (1987), cited in Republic v.
Herbieto (supra note 2). See also Republic v. Court of Appeals, 238 Phil.
475, 486-487; 154 SCRA 476, 480 (1987); Republic v. Bacus, G.R. No.
73061, 11 August 1989, 176 SCRA 376-380; Republic v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 38810, 7 May 1992, 208 SCRA 428, 434; De la Cruz v. Court of
Appeals, 349 Phil. 898, 904; 286 SCRA 230, 235; Republic v. De Guzman,
383 Phil. 479, 485; 326 SCRA 574, 579 (2000).
225
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 225
erty Registration Decree, which would not run afoul of

either the clear and unambiguous provisions of said laws or
binding judicial precedents.
I do not agree in the observation of the majority opinion
that the interpretation of Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended, adopted in Herbieto, would result in
absurdity. Indeed, such interpretation forecloses a person
from acquiring an imperfect title to a parcel of land
declared alienable and disposable only after 12 June 1945,
which could be judicially confirmed. Nonetheless, it must
be borne in mind that the intention of the law is to dispose
of agricultural public land to qualified individuals and
not simply to dispose of the same. It may be deemed a
strict interpretation and application of both law and
jurisprudence on the matter, but it certainly is not an
absurdity.
Stringency and prudence in interpreting and applying
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, is well
justified by the significant consequences arising from a
finding that a person has an imperfect title to agricultural
land of the public domain. Not just any lengthy occupation
of an agricultural public land could ripen into an imperfect
title. An imperfect title can only be acquired by
occupation and possession of the land by a person
and his predecessors-in-interest for the period
required and considered by law sufficient as to have
segregated the land from the mass of public land.
When a person is said to have acquired an imperfect
title, by operation of law, he acquires a right to a
grant, a government grant to the land, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued. As
such, the land ceased to be part of the public domain
and goes beyond the authority of the State to dispose
of. An application for confirmation of title, therefore,
is but a mere formality.12
_______________
12 See National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 4566,

29 January 1993, 218 SCRA 41, 54.
226
In addition, as was emphasized in Herbieto, Section 11 of

the Public Land Act, as amended, has identified several
ways by which agricultural lands of the public domain may
be disposed of. Each mode of disposing of agricultural
public land has its own specific requirements which must
be complied with. If a person is not qualified for a judicial
confirmation of an imperfect title, because the land in
question was declared alienable and disposable only after
12 June 1945, he is not totally without recourse for he
could still acquire the same by any of the other modes
enumerated in the afore-quoted provision.
Regardless of my dissent to the affirmation by the
majority of the ruling in Naguit on Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended, and Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, I cast my vote with the
majority, to DENY the Petition at bar and AFFIRM the
Decision dated 23 February 2007 and Resolution dated 2
October 2000 of the Court of Appeals dismissing, for
absolute lack of basis, petitionersÊ application for
registration of alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
BRION, J.:
I concur with the ponenciaÊs modified positions on the
application of prescription under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree (PRD), and on the denial of
the petition of the Heirs of Mario Malabanan.
I dissent in the strongest terms from the ruling that the
classification of a public land as alienable and disposable
can be made after June 12, 1945, in accordance with this
CourtÊs ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Naguit
(Naguit)1 Effectively, what results from this decision is a
new law, crafted by this Court, going beyond what the
Constitution
_______________
1 G.R. No. 144507, January 17, 2005, 442 SCRA 445.
227
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 227

ordains and beyond the law that the Legislature passed.

Because the majority has not used the standards set by the
Constitution and the Public Land Act (PLA),2 its
conclusions are based on a determination on what the law
ought to be·an exercise in policy formulation that is
beyond the CourtÊs authority to make.
The discussions of these grounds for dissent follow, not
necessarily in the order these grounds are posed above.
Prefatory Statement
Critical to the position taken in this Dissent is the
reading of the hierarchy of laws that govern public lands to
fully understand and appreciate the grounds for dissent.
In the area of public law, foremost in this hierarchy is
the Philippine Constitution, whose Article XII (entitled
National Economy and Patrimony) establishes and fully
embraces the regalian doctrine as a first and overriding
principle.3 This doctrine postulates that all lands belong to
the State,4 and that no public land can be acquired by
private persons without any grant, express or implied, from
the State.5
In the statutory realm, the PLA governs the
classification, grant, and disposition of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain and, other than the
Constitution, is the countryÊs primary law on the matter.
Section 7 of the PLA delegates to the President the
authority to administer and dispose of alienable public
lands. Section 8 sets out the public lands open to
disposition or concession, and the requirement that they
should be officially delimited and classified and, when
_______________
2 Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended (CA 141).

3 See Collado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107764, October 4, 2002,
390 SCRA 343.
4 Constitution, Article XII, Section 2.
5 See Republic v. Herbieto, G.R. No. 156117, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA
182.
228

practicable, surveyed. Section 11, a very significant section,
states that·
„Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed

of only as follows and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease;
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title;
(5) By judicial legalization;
(6) By administrative legalization (free patent).
Section 48 covers confirmation of imperfect title, and

embodies a grant of title to the qualified occupant or
possessor of an alienable public land. This section provides:
„SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the

Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation
of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to
the United States have applied for the purchase, composition or
other form of grant of lands of the public domain under the laws
and royal decrees then in force and have instituted and prosecuted
the proceedings in connection therewith, but have, with or without
default upon their part, or for any other cause, not received title
therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their heirs have
occupied and cultivated said lands continuously since the filing of
their applications.
interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, except
as against the Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the
229
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 229

conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to
a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.‰
Significantly, subsection (a) has now been deleted, while

subsection (b) has been amended by PD 1073 as follows:
„SECTION 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c),

Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the
sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by
the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
Complementing the PLA is the PRD.6 It was enacted to

codify the various laws relating to property registration. It
governs the registration of lands under the Torrens System,
as well as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages.
Section 14 of the PRD provides:
„SECTION 14. Who May Apply.·The following persons may

(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Those who have acquired ownership of private lands
(2)
by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or
abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under the
existing laws.
_______________
6 Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529, amending Act No. 496 that originally
brought the Torrens system into the Philippines in 1903.
230

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other

manner provided for by law.‰
Subsection (1) of Section 14 is a copy of, and appears to
have been lifted from, Section 48(b) of the PLA. The two
provisions, however, differ in intent and legal effect based
on the purpose of the law that contains them. The PLA is
a substantive law that classifies and provides for the
disposition of alienable lands of the public domain.
The PRD, on the other hand, specifically refers to
the manner of bringing registerable lands, among
them alienable public lands, within the coverage of
the Torrens system. Thus, the first is a substantive law,
while the other is essentially procedural, so that in terms of
substantive content, the PLA should prevail.7
Significantly bearing on the matter of lands in general is
the Civil Code and its provisions on Property 8 and
Prescription.9 The law on property assumes importance
because land, whether public or private, is property.
Prescription, on the other hand, is a mode of acquiring
ownership of land, al-
_______________
7 Substantive law is that which creates, defines and regulates rights,

or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of
action, that part of the law which courts are established to administer, as
opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of
enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasion (Primicias v.
Ocampo, 93 Phil. 446.) It is the nature and the purpose of the law which
determines whether it is substantive or procedural, and not its place in
the statute, or its inclusion in a code (Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, Volume I [Ninth Revised Edition], p. 19). Note that Section
55 of the PLA refers to the Land Registration Act (the predecessor law of
the PRD) on how the Torrens Title may be obtained.
8 Civil Code, Book II (Property, Ownership and its Modifications),
Articles 415-711.
9 Civil Code, Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership),
Articles 1106-1155.
231
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 231

though it is not one of the modes of disposition mentioned

in the PLA.
Chapter 3, Title I of Book II of the Civil Code is entitled
„Property in Relation to the Person to Whom it Belongs.‰ On
this basis, Article 419 classifies property to be property of
public dominion or of private ownership. Article 420
proceeds to further classify property of public dominion into
those intended for public use, for public service, and for the
development of the national wealth. Article 421 states that
all other properties of the State not falling under Article
420 are patrimonial property of the State, and Article 422
adds that property of public dominion, no longer intended
for public use or for public service, shall form part of the
patrimonial property of the State. Under Article 425,
property of private ownership, besides patrimonial
property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities,
consists of all property belonging to private persons, either
individually or collectively.
Prescription is essentially a civil law term and is not
mentioned as one of the modes of acquiring alienable public
land under the PLA, (Significantly, the PLA·under its
Section 48 ·provides for its system of how possession can
ripen into ownership; the PLA does not refer to this as
acquisitive prescription but as basis for confirmation of
title.) Section 14(2) of the PRD, however, specifies that
„[t]hose who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws‰ as
among those who may apply for land registration. Thus,
prescription was introduced into the land
registration scheme (the PRD), but not into the
special law governing lands of the public domain
(the PLA).
A starting point in considering prescription in relation
with public lands is Article 1108 of the Civil Code, which
states that prescription does not run against the State and
its subdivisions. At the same time, Article 1113 provides
that „all things which are within the commerce of men are
susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided;
property of the
232

State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character

shall not be the object of prescription.‰ The provisions of
Articles 1128 to 1131 may also come into play in the
application of prescription to real properties.
In light of our established hierarchy of laws,
particularly the supremacy of the Philippine
Constitution, any consideration of lands of the
public domain should start with the Constitution
and its Regalian doctrine; all lands belong to the
State, and he who claims ownership carries the
burden of proving his claim.10 Next in the hierarchy
is the PLA for purposes of the terms of the grant,
alienation and disposition of the lands of the public
domain, and the PRD for the registration of lands.
The PLA and the PRD are special laws supreme in
their respective spheres, subject only to the
Constitution. The Civil Code, for its part, is the
general law on property and prescription and should
be accorded respect as such. In more concrete terms,
where alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain are involved, the PLA is the primary law
that should govern, and the Civil Code provisions on
property and prescription must yield in case of
conflict.11
The Public Land Act
At the risk of repetition, I start the discussion of
the PLA with a reiteration of the first principle that
under the regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, and the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the
conservation of such
_______________
10 See the consolidated cases of The Secretary of the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap, G.R. No. 167707 and Sacay
v. The Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, G.R. No. 173775, jointly decided on October 8, 2008 (the
Boracay cases).
11 Civil Code, Article 18.
233
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 233

patrimony. Otherwise expressed, all lands not otherwise

appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State.12 Thus, all lands that
have not been acquired from the government, either
by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part
of the inalienable public domain.13 We should never
lose sight of the impact of this first principle where a
private ownership claim is being asserted against the
State.
The PLA has undergone many revisions and changes
over time, starting from the first PLA, Act No. 926; the
second public land law that followed, Act No. 2874; and the
present CA 141 and its amendments. Act No. 926 was
described in the following terms:
„The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain.

It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling
and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine
Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons
to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided
for the „issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public
lands,‰ for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein,
for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or
confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands.‰ In
short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that
title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in
the government; and that the governmentÊs title to public
land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent
treaties between Spain and the United States. The term
„public land‰ referred to all lands of the public domain whose title
still remained in the government and are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial
property of the government and the friar lands.‰14
_______________
12 Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development v.

Intermediate Appellate Court and J. Antonio Araneta, G.R. No. 73246,
March 2, 1993, 219 SCRA 339.
13 See the Boracay cases, supra note 8.
14 See the opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno (now Chief Justice) in
Cruz v. Secretary of the Department of Environment and
234

This basic essence of the law has not changed and has
been carried over to the present PLA and its amendments.
Another basic feature, the requirement for open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the alienable and disposable public land
under a bona fide claim of ownership also never changed.
Still another consistent public land feature is the concept
that once a person has complied with the requisite
possession and occupation in the manner provided by law,
he is automatically given a State grant that may be
asserted against State ownership; the land, in other words,
ipso jure becomes private land.15 The application for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title shall then follow,
based on the procedure for land registration.16 It is in this
manner that the PLA ties up with the PRD.
A feature that has changed over time has been the
period for reckoning the required occupation or possession.
In the first PLA, the required occupation/possession to
qualify for judicial confirmation of imperfect title was 10
years preceding the effectivity of Act No. 926·July 26,
1904 (or since July 26, 1894 or earlier). This was retained
up to CA 141, until this law was amended by Republic Act
(RA) No. 1942 (enacted on June 22, 1957),17 which provided
for a simple 30-year prescriptive period for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. This period did not last; on
January 25, 1977, Presidential
_______________
Natural Resources (G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000, 347 SCRA 128)
quoted in Collado (supra note 2).
15 Enunciated in the old case of Susi v. Razon and Director of Lands,

48 Phil. 424 (1925); See Abejaron v. Nabasa, cited on p. 10 of this
Dissent.
16 PLA, Sections 49-56; the reference to the Land Registration Act
(Act No. 496) should now be understood to mean the PRD which repealed
Act 496.
17 An Act to Amend Subsection (b) of Section Forty Eight of
Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Forty One, otherwise
known as the The Public Land Act.
235
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 235

Decree No. 1073 (PD 1073)18 changed the required 30-year

possession and occupation period provision, to possession
and occupation of the land applied for since June 12,
1945, or earlier. PD 1073 likewise changed the lands
subject of imperfect title, from agricultural lands of the
public domain to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. PD 1073 also extended the period for
applications for free patents and judicial confirmation of
imperfect titles to December 31, 1987.
The significance of the date „June 12, 1945‰ appears to
have been lost to history. A major concern raised against
this date is that the country was at this time under
Japanese occupation, and for some years after, was
suffering from the uncertainties and instabilities that
World War II brought. Questions were raised on how one
could possibly comply with the June 12, 1945 or earlier
occupation/possession requirement of PD 1073 when the
then prevailing situation did not legally or physically
permit it.
Without the benefit of congressional records, as the
enactment of the law (a Presidential Decree) was solely
through the PresidentÊs lawmaking powers under a regime
that permitted it, the most logical reason or explanation for
the date is the possible impact of the interplay between the
old law and the amendatory law. When PD 1073 was
enacted, the utmost concern, in all probability, was how the
law would affect the application of the old law which
provided for a thirty-year possession period. Counting 30
years backwards from the enactment of PD 1073 on
January 25, 1977, PD 1073 should have provided for a
January 24, 1947 cut-off date, but it did not. Instead, it
provided, for unknown reasons, the date June 12, 1945.
_______________
18 Extending the Period of Filing Applications for Administrative

Legislation (Free Patent) and Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect and
Incomplete Titles to Alienable and Disposable Lands in the Public
Domain Under Chapter VII and Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No.
141, As Amended, For Eleven (11) Years Commencing January 1, 1977.
236
The June 12, 1945 cut-off date raised legal concerns;

vested rights acquired under the old law (CA 141, as
amended by RA 1942) providing for a 30-year possession
period could not be impaired by the PD 1073 amendment.
We recognized this legal dilemna in Abejaron v. Nabasa,19
when we said:
„However, as petitioner AbejaronÊs 30-year period of

possession and occupation required by the Public Land Act,
as amended by R.A. 1942 ran from 1945 to 1975, prior to the
effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 in 1977, the requirement of said
P.D. that occupation and possession should have started on
June 12, 1945 or earlier, does not apply to him. As the Susi
doctrine holds that the grant of title by virtue of Sec. 48(b) takes
place by operation of law, then upon AbejaronÊs satisfaction of the
requirements of this law, he would have already gained title over
the disputed land in 1975. This follows the doctrine laid down
in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,
that the law cannot impair vested rights such as a land
grant. More clearly stated, „Filipino citizens who by
themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have been,
prior to the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977, in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30
years, or at least since January 24, 1947‰ may apply for
judicial confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title
under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act.‰
From this perspective, PD 1073 should have thus

provided January 24, 1947 and not June 12, 1945 as its
cut-off date, yet the latter date is the express legal reality.
The reconciliation, as properly defined by jurisprudence, is
that where an applicant has satisfied the requirements of
Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended by RA 1942, prior to
the effectivity of PD 1073, the applicant is entitled to
perfect his or her title, even if possession and occupation
does not date back to June 12, 1945. For purposes of the
present case, a discussion of
_______________
19 G.R. No. 84831, June 20, 2001, 359 SCRA 47.
237
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 237

the cut-off date has been fully made to highlight that

it is a date whose significance and import cannot be
minimized nor glossed over by mere judicial
interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns;
the full legislative intent must be respected.
In considering the PLA, it should be noted that its
amendments were not confined to RA 1942 and PD 1073.
These decrees were complemented by Presidential
Decree No. 892 (PD 892)20·issued on February 16, 1976
·which limited to six months the use of Spanish titles as
evidence in land registration proceedings.21 Thereafter, the
recording of all unregistered lands shall be governed by
Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended by Act No. 3344. Section 3 of PD 1073 totally
disallowed the judicial confirmation of incomplete titles to
public land based on unperfected Spanish grants.
_______________
20 Discontinuance of the Spanish Mortgage System of Registration and

of the Use of Spanish Titles as Evidence in Land Registration
Proceedings.
21 Section 1 of PD 892 states:
SECTION 1. The system of registration under the Spanish
Mortgage Law is discontinued, and all lands recorded under said
system which are not yet covered by Torrens title shall be
considered as unregistered lands.
All holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for
registration of their lands under Act No. 496, otherwise known as
the Land Registration Act, within six (6) months from the
effectivity of this decree. Thereafter, Spanish titles cannot be used
as evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings
under the Torrens system.
Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered
under the Spanish Mortgage Law may be recorded under Section
194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act. 3344.
238
Subsequently, RA 694022 extended the period for filing

applications for free patent and judicial confirmation of
imperfect title to December 31, 2000. The law now also
allows the issuance of free patents for lands not in excess of
12 hectares to any natural-born citizen of the Philippines
who is not the owner of more than 12 hectares and who, for
at least 30 years prior to the effectivity of the amendatory
Act, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or
tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition.
Congress recently extended the period for filing
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and
incomplete titles to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under RA 9176 from December 31, 2000
under RA 6940 to December 31, 2020.23
Read together with Section 11 of the PLA (which
defines the administrative grant of title to alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain through
homestead settlement and sale, among others), RA
6940 and RA 9176 signify that despite the cut-off date
of June 12, 1945 that the Legislature has provided,
ample opportunities exist under the law for the
grant of alienable lands of the public domain to
deserving beneficiaries.
Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the
Property Registration Decree
As heretofore mentioned, PD 1529 amended Act No. 496
on June 11, 1978 to codify the various laws relative to
registra-
_______________
22 An Act Granting a Period ending on December 31, 2000 for Filing
Applications for Free Patent and Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title
to Alienable and Disposable Lands of the Public Domain under Chapters
VII and VIII of the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended).
23 R.A. No. 9176, Section 2.
239
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 239

tion of property. Its Section 14 describes the applicants who

may avail of registration under the Decree, among them·
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-

1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provision of existing laws.
These subsections and their impact on the present case are

separately discussed below.
Section 14(1)
Section 14(1) merely repeated PD 1073 which sets a cut-
off date of June 12, 1945 and which, under the conditions
discussed above, may be read to be January 24, 1947.
The ponencia discussed Section 48(b) of the PLA in
relation with Section 14(1) of the PRD and, noted among
others, that „under the current state of the law, the
substantive right granted under Section 48(b) may be
availed of only until December 31, 2020.‰ This is in light of
RA 9176, passed in 2002,24 limiting the filing of an
application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title to
December 31, 2020. The amendatory law apparently refers
only to the use of Section 14(1) of the PRD as a mode of
registration. Where ownership right or title has already
vested in the possessor-occupant of the land that Section
48(b) of the PLA grants by operation of law, Section 14(2) of
the PRD continuous to be open for purposes of registration
of a „private land‰ since compliance with Section 48(b) of
the PLA vests title to the occupant/possessor and renders
the land private in character.
_______________
24 See pp. 14-15 of the ponencia.
240

The ponencia likewise rules against the position of the
Office of the Solicitor General that the public land to be
registered must have been classified as alienable and
disposable as of the cut-off date for possession stated in
Section 48(b)·June 12, 1945. In doing this, it cites and
reiterates its continuing support for the ruling in Republic
v. Court of Appeals and Naguit that held:25
„Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and

disposable character of the land should have already been
established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by
the plain meaning of Section 14(1). „Since June 12, 1945,‰ as used
in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase „under a bonafide
claim of ownership.‰ Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict
or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately
associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. Ad
proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we
adopt petitionerÊs position. Absent a legislative amendment, the
rule would be, adopting the OSGÊs view, that all lands of the public
domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June
12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter
the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such
interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually
inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect
even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable
and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even
be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the
Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section
14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be
registered as already alienable and disposable at the time
the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at
the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to
release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption
is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the
property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State
irrespective of
_______________
25 Supra note 1.
241
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 241

the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if

the property has already been classified as alienable and
disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on
the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the
property.
xxx
This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of
Appeals, wherein the Court noted that while the claimant
had been in possession since 1908, it was only in 1972 that
the lands in question were classified as alienable and
disposable. Thus, the bid at registration therein did not
succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had filed his application
in 1963, or nine (9) years before the property was declared
alienable and disposable. Thus, in this case, where the
application was made years after the property had been
certified as alienable and disposable, the Bracewell ruling
does not apply.‰
As it did in Naguit, the present ponencia as well

discredits Bracewell. It does the same with Republic v.
Herbieto26 that came after Naguit and should have
therefore overtaken the Naguit ruling. In the process, the
ponencia cites with approval the ruling in Republic v.
Ceniza,27 penned by the same ponente who wrote Bracewell.
While the ponencia takes pains to compare these cases,
it however completely misses the point from the
perspective of whether possession of public lands classified
as alienable and disposable after June 12, 1945 should be
credited for purposes of a grant under Section 48(b) of the
PLA, and of registration under Section 14(1) of the PRD.
These cases, as analyzed by the ponencia, merely granted
or denied registration on the basis of whether the public
land has been classified as alienable and disposable at the
time the petition for registration was filed. Thus, except for
Naguit, these cases can be cited only as instances when
registration was denied or granted
_______________
26 G.R. No. 156117, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 183, 201-202.
27 40 Phil. 697 (2002); penned by Mme. Justice Consuelo Ynares-
Santiago.
242
despite the classification of the land as alienable after June

12, 1945.
The ruling in Naguit is excepted because, as shown in
the quotation above, this is one case that explained why
possession prior to the classification of public land as
alienable should be credited in favor of the possessor who
filed his or her application for registration after the
classification of the land as alienable and disposable, but
where such classification occurred after June 12, 1945.
Closely analyzed, the rulings in Naguit that the
ponencia relied upon are its statutory construction
interpretation of Section 48(b) of the PLA and the observed
ABSURDITY of using June 12, 1945 as the cut-off point for
the classification.
Five very basic reasons compel me to strongly disagree
with Naguit and its reasons.
First. The constitutional and statutory reasons.
The Constitution classifies public lands into agricultural,
mineral, and timber. Of these, only agricultural lands can
be alienated.28 Without the requisite classification, there
can be no basis to determine which lands of the public
domain are alienable and which are not; hence,
classification is a constitutionally-required step
whose importance should be given full legal
recognition and effect. Otherwise stated, without
classification into disposable agricultural land, the land
forms part of the mass of the public domain that, not being
agricultural, must be mineral or timber land that are
completely inalienable and as such cannot be possessed
with legal effects. To allow effective possession is to do
violence to the regalian doctrine; the ownership and control
that the doctrine denotes will be less than full if the
possession that should be with the State as owner, but is
elsewhere without any authority, can anyway be
recognized.
_______________
28 Constitution, Article XII, Section 2.
243
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 243
From the perspective of the PLA under which

grant can be claimed under its Section 48(b), it is
very important to note that this law does not apply
until a classification into alienable and disposable
land of the public domain is made. If the PLA does not
apply prior to a public landÊs classification as alienable and
disposable, how can possession under its Section 48(b) be
claimed prior such classification? There can simply be no
imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified
as disposable or alienable because, in the absence of such
classification, the land remains unclassified public land
that fully belongs to the State. This is fully supported by
Sections 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of CA 141.29 If the land is either
mineral or timber and can never
_______________
29 SECTION 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the

Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify
the lands of the public domain into·
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from
one class to another, for the purposes of their administration and
disposition.
SECTION 7.
For the purposes of the administration and
disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the President,
upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, shall from time to time declare what lands are open
to disposition or concession under this Act.
SECTION 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition
or concession which have been officially delimited and classified and,
when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public
or quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any
manner become private property, nor those on which a private right
authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be
claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to
be so. However, the President may, for reasons of public interest, declare
lands of the public domain
244
be the subject of administration and disposition, it defies

legal logic to allow the possession of these unclassified
lands to produce legal effect. Thus, the classification of
public land as alienable and disposable is inextricably
linked to effective possession that can ripen into a claim
under Section 48(b) of the PLA.
Second. The Civil Code reason. Possession is
essentially a civil law term that can best be understood in
terms of the Civil Code in the absence of any specific
definition in the PLA other than in terms of time of
possession.30 Article 530 of the Civil Code provides that
„[O]nly things and rights which are susceptible of being
appropriated may be the object of pos-
_______________
open to disposition before the same have had their boundaries

established or been surveyed, or may, for the same reason, suspend their
concession or disposition until they are again declared open to concession
or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the National
Assembly.
SECTION 9. For the purpose of their administration and

disposition, the lands of the public domain alienable or open to
disposition shall be classified, according to the use or purposes to which
such lands are destined, as follows:
(a) Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar
productive purposes;
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes;
(d) Reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public
uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce, shall from time to time make the classifications provided
for in this section, and may, at any time and in a similar manner,
transfer lands from one class to another.
SECTION 10. The words „alienation,‰ „disposition,‰ or „concession‰
as used in this Act, shall mean any of the methods authorized by this Act
for the acquisition, lease, use, or benefit of the lands of the public domain
other than timber or mineral lands.
30 See: Article 18, Civil Code.
245
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 245
session.‰ Prior to the declaration of alienability, a land of

the public domain cannot be appropriated; hence, any
claimed possession cannot have legal effects. This
perspective fully complements what has been said above
under the constitutional and PLA reasons. It confirms, too,
that the critical difference the ponencia saw in the
Bracewell and Naguit situations does not really exist.
Whether an application for registration is filed before or
after the declaration of alienability becomes immaterial if,
in one as in the other, no effective possession can be
recognized prior to the declaration of alienability.
Third. Statutory construction and the cut-off date
– June 12, 1945. The ponencia assumes, based on its
statutory construction reasoning and its reading of Section
48(b) of the PLA, that all that the law requires is
possession from June 12, 1945 and that it suffices if the
land has been classified as alienable at the time of
application for registration. As heretofore discussed, this
cut-off date was painstakingly set by law and should be
given full significance. Its full import appears from PD
1073 that amended Section 48(b), whose exact wordings
state:
„SECTION 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c),

Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the
sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by
the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.‰
Under this formulation, it appears clear that PD 1073

did not expressly state what Section 48(b) should provide
under the amendment PD 1073 introduced in terms of the
exact wording of the amended Section 48(b). But under the
PD 1073 formulation, the intent to count the alienability to
June 12, 1945 appears very clear. The provision applies
only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
that is described in terms of the character of the possession
required
246

since June 12, 1945. This intent·seen in the direct,

continuous and seamless linking of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain to June 12, 1945
under the wording of the Decree·is clear and should be
respected.
Fourth. Other Modes of Acquisition of lands under
the PLA. NaguitÊs absurdity argument that the ponencia
effectively adopted is more apparent than real, since the
use of June 12, 1945 as cut-off date for the declaration of
alienability will not render the grant of alienable public
lands out of reach. The acquisition of ownership and title
may still be obtained by other modes under the PLA.
Among other laws, RA 6940, mentioned above, now allows
the use of free patents.31 It was approved on March 28,
1990; hence, counting 30 years backwards, possession since
April 1960 or thereabouts may qualify a possessor to apply
for a free patent. The administrative modes provided under
Section 11 of the PLA are also open, particularly,
homestead settlement and sales.
Fifth. Addressing the wisdom·the absurdity·of
the law. This Court acts beyond the limits of the
constitutionally-mandated separation of powers in giving
Section 48(b), as amended by PD 1073, an interpretation
beyond its plain wording. Even this Court cannot read into
the law an intent that is not there even your purpose is to
avoid an absurd situation. If we feel that a law already has
absurd effects because of the passage of time, our role
under the principle of separation of powers is not to give
the law an interpretation that is not there in order to avoid
the perceived absurdity. We thereby dip into the realm of
policy·a role delegated by the Constitution to the
Legislature. If only for this reason, we should avoid
expanding·through Naguit and the present ponencia·the
plain meaning of Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by
PD 1073.
In standing by Naguit, the ponencia pointedly discredits
the ruling in Herbieto; it is, allegedly, either an incorrect
_______________
31 See: pp. 10-11 of this Dissent.
247
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 247

ruling or an obiter dictum. As to legal correctness, Herbieto

is in full accord with what we have stated above; hence, it
cannot be dismissed off-hand as an incorrect ruling.
Likewise, its ruling on the lack of effective legal possession
prior to the classification of a public land as alienable and
disposable cannot strictly be obiter because it responded to
an issue directly raised by the parties. Admittedly, its
ruling on jurisdictional grounds could have fully resolved
the case, but it cannot be faulted if it went beyond this
threshold issue into the merits of the claim of effective
possession prior to the classification of the land as
alienable and disposable.
To be sure, Herbieto has more to it than the Naguit
ruling that the ponencia passes off as the established and
definitive rule on possession under Section 14(1) of the
PRD. There, too, is the undeniable reason that no
definitive ruling touching on Section 14(1) can be
deemed to have been established in the present case
since the applicant Heirs could only prove
possession up to 1948. For this reason, the ponencia
falls back on and examines Section 14(2) of the PRD.
In short, if there is a perfect example of a ruling that
is not necessary for the resolution of a case, that
unnecessary ruling is the ponenciaÊs ruling that
Naguit is now the established rule.
Section 14(2)
Section 14(2), by its express terms, applies only to
private lands. Thus, on plain reading, it does not
apply to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain that Section 14(1) covers. This is the
difference between Sections 14(1) and 14(2).
The ponencia, as originally formulated, saw a way of
expanding the coverage of Section 14(2) via the Civil Code
by directly applying civil law provisions on prescription on
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. To
quote the obiter dictum in Naguit that the ponencia wishes
to enshrine
248

as the definitive rule and leading case on Sections 14(1)

and 14(2):32
„Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under

the Civil Code. There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that
properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into
private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive
possession of at least thirty (30) years. With such conversion, such
property may now fall within the contemplation of „private lands‰
under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those
who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if
possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later
than June 12, 1945, and such possession being open, continuous
and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the
land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.‰
The ponencia then posits that Article 1113 of the Civil Code
should be considered in the interpretation of Section 14(2).
Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides:
„All things which are within the commerce of men are

susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of
the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of prescription.‰
The application of Article 1113 assumes, of course, that (1)

the Civil Code fully applies to alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain; (2) assuming that the Civil
Code fully applies, these properties are patrimonial and are
therefore „private property‰; and (3) assuming that the
Civil Code fully applies, that these properties are within
the commerce of men and can be acquired through
prescription.
I find the Naguit obiter to be questionable because of the
above assumptions and its direct application of prescription
under Section 14(2) to alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain. This Section becomes relevant only
once the ownership of an alienable and disposable
land of
_______________
32 See p. 20 of the ponencia.
249
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 249

the public domain vests in the occupant or possessor

pursuant to the terms of Section 48(b) of the PLA,
with or without judicial confirmation of title, so that
the land has become a private land. At that point,
Section 14(2) becomes fully operational on what had
once been an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.
Hierarchy of Law in Reading PRDÊs Section 14(2)
The hierarchy of laws governing the lands of the public
domain is clear from Article XII, Section 3 of the
Constitution. There are matters that the Constitution itself
provides for, and some that are left for Congress to deal
with. Thus, under Section 3, the Constitution took it upon
itself to classify lands of the public domain, and to state
that only agricultural lands may be alienable lands of the
public domain. It also laid down the terms under which
lands of the public domain may be leased by corporations
and individuals. At the same time, it delegated to Congress
the authority to classify agricultural lands of the public
domain according to the uses to which they may be
devoted. Congress likewise determines, by law, the size of
the lands of the public domain that may be acquired,
developed, held or leased, and the conditions therefor.
In acting on the delegation, Congress is given the choice
on how it will act, specifically, whether it will pass a
general or a special law. On alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, Congress has, from the very
beginning, acted through the medium of a special law,
specifically, through the Public Land Act that by its terms
„shall apply to the lands of the public domain; but timber
and mineral lands shall be governed by special laws.‰
Notably, the Act goes on to provide that nothing in it „shall
be understood or construed to change or modify the
administration and disposition of the lands commonly
called Âfriar landsÊ and those which, being privately owned,
have reverted to or become property of the Commonwealth
of the Philippines, which administration and disposition
shall be governed by laws at present in force or which
250

may hereafter be enacted.‰33 Under these terms, the PLA

can be seen to be a very specific act whose coverage extends
only to lands of the public domain; in this sense, it is a
special law on that subject.
In contrast, the Civil Code is a general law that covers
general rules on the effect and application of laws and
human relations; persons and family relations; property
and property relations; the different modes of acquiring
ownership; and obligations and contracts.34 Its general
nature is best appreciated when in its Article 18, it
provides that: „In matters which are governed by the Code
of Commerce and special laws, their deficiency shall be
supplied by the provisions of this Code.‰
The Civil Code has the same relationship with the PRD
with respect to the latterÊs special focus·land registration
·and fully applies civil law provisions in so far only as
they are allowed by the PRD. One such case where the
Civil Code is expressly allowed to apply is in the case of
Section 14(2) of the PRD which calls for the application of
prescription under existing laws.
As already explained above, the PLA and the PRD have
their own specific purposes and are supreme within their
own spheres, subject only to what the higher Constitution
provides. Thus, the PRD must defer to what the PLA
provides when the matter to be registered is an alienable
and disposable land of the public domain.
Application of the Civil Code
In its Book II, the Civil Code has very clear rules on
property, including State property. It classifies property as
either of public dominion or of private ownership,35 and
property for
_______________
33 CA 141, Section 2.
34 These are the Introductory Chapters and Books I to IV of the Civil
Code.
251
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 251

public use, public service and those for the development of

the national wealth as property of the public dominion.36
All property not so characterized are patrimonial property
of the State37 which are susceptible to private ownership,38
against which prescription will run.39
In reading all these provisions, it should not be
overlooked that they refer to the properties of the State in
general, i.e., to both movable and immovable
properties.40Thus, the Civil Code provisions on
property do not refer to land alone, much less do
they refer solely to alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain. For this specie of land, the PLA
is the special governing law and, under the Civil
Code itself, the Civil Code provisions shall apply
only in case of deficiency.41
This conclusion gives rise to the question – can alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain at the same time
be patrimonial property of the State because they are not
for public use, public purpose, and for the development of
national wealth?
The answer to this question can be found, among others,
in the interaction discussed above between the PLA and
PRD, on the one hand, and the Civil Code, on the other,
and will depend on the purpose for which an answer is
necessary.
If, as in the present case, the purpose is to determine
whether a grant or disposition of an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain has been made, then
the PLA primarily applies and the Civil Code applies only
suppletorily. The possession and occupation that the PLA
recognizes is
_______________
36 Id., Article 420.

40 Article 415 of the Civil Code defines immovable property, while
Article 416 defines movable property.
252

based on its Section 48(b) and, until the requirements of

this Section are satisfied, the alienable and disposable land
of the public domain remains a State property that can be
disposed only under the terms of Section 11 of the PLA. In
the face of this legal reality, the question of whether·for
purposes of prescription·an alienable and disposable land
of the public domain is patrimonial or not becomes
immaterial; a public land, even if alienable and disposable,
is State property and prescription does not run against the
State.42 In other words, there is no room for any
hairsplitting that would allow the inapplicable
concept of prescription under the Civil Code to be
directly applied to an alienable and disposable land
of the public domain before this land satisfies the
terms of a grant under Section 48(b) of the PLA.
Given this conclusion, any further discussion of the
patrimonial character of alienable and disposable public
lands under the norms of the Civil Code is rendered moot
and academic.
From the prism of the overriding regalian doctrine that
all lands of the public domain are owned by the State, an
applicant for land registration invoking Section 14(2) of the
PRD to support his claim must first clearly show that the
land has been withdrawn from the public domain through
an express and positive act of the government.43
A clear express governmental grant or act withdrawing
a particular land from the mass of the public domain is
provided both in the old and the prevailing Public Land
Acts. These laws invariably provide that compliance with
the required possession of agricultural public land (under
the first and second PLAs) or alienable and disposable land
of the public domain (under the prevailing PLA) in the
manner and
_______________
43 Supra note 10, Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court.
253
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 253

duration provided by law is equivalent to a government

grant. Thus, the land ipso jure becomes private land. It is
only at that point that the „private land‰ requirement of
Section 14(2) materializes.44
Prescription
In my original Dissent (in response to the original
ponencia), I discussed ordinary acquisitive prescription as
an academic exercise to leave no stone unturned in
rejecting the ponenciaÊs original conclusion that
prescription directly applies to alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under Section 14(2) of the PRD.
I am happy to note that the present ponencia has adopted,
albeit without any attribution, part of my original academic
discussion on the application of the Civil Code, particularly
on the subjects of patrimonial property of the State and
prescription.
Specifically, I posited·assuming arguendo that the Civil
Code applies·that the classification of a public land as
alienable and disposable does not per se signify that the
land is patrimonial under the Civil Code since property, to
be patrimonial, must not be for public use, for public
purpose or for the development of national wealth.
Something more must be done or shown beyond the fact of
classification. The ponencia now concedes that „[T]here
must also be an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for
public use or the development of the national wealth, under
Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property
has become patrimonial can the prescriptive
_______________
44 At this point, prescription can be invoked, not by the

occupant/possessor who now owns the land in his private capacity, but
against the new owner by whomsoever shall then occupy the land and
comply with the ordinary or extraordinary prescription that the Civil
Code ordains. This assumes that the new owner has not placed the land
under the Torrens system; otherwise, indefeasibility and
imprescriptibility would set in.
254

period for the acquisition of property of the public domain

begin to run.‰
I agree with this statement as it describes a clear case
when the property has become private by the governmentÊs
own declaration so that prescription under the Civil Code
can run. Note in this regard that there is no inconsistency
between this conclusion and the hierarchy of laws on lands
of the public domain that I expounded on. To reiterate,
the PLA applies as a special and primary law when a
public land is classified as alienable and disposable,
and remains fully and exclusively applicable until
the State itself expressly declares that the land now
qualifies as a patrimonial property. At that point, the
application of the Civil Code and its law on
prescription are triggered. The application of
Section 14(2) of the PRD follows.
To summarize, I submit in this Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion that:
1. The hierarchy of laws on public domain must be
given full application in considering lands of the public
domain. Top consideration should be accorded to the
Philippine Constitution, particularly its Article XII,
followed by the consideration of applicable special laws·
the PLA and the PRD, insofar as this Decree applies to
lands of the public domain. The Civil Code and other
general laws apply to the extent expressly called for by the
primary laws or to supply any of the latterÊs deficiencies.
2. The ruling in this ponencia and in Naguit that the
classification of public lands as alienable and disposable
does not need to date back to June 12, 1945 at the latest, is
wrong because:
a. Under the ConstitutionÊs regalian doctrine,
classification is a required step whose full import
should be given full effect and recognition; giving
legal effect to
255
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 255
possession prior to classification runs counter to the

regalian doctrine.
b. The Public Land Act applies only from the time
a public land is classified as alienable and disposable;
thus, Section 48(b) of this law and the possession it
requires cannot be recognized prior to any
classification.
c. Under the Civil Code, „[O]nly things and rights
which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the
object of possession.‰ Prior to the classification of a
public land as alienable and disposable, a land of the
public domain cannot be appropriated; hence, any
claimed possession cannot have legal effects.
d. There are other modes of acquiring alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain under the
Public Land Act; this legal reality renders the
ponenciaÊs absurdity argument misplaced.
e. The alleged absurdity of the law addresses the
wisdom of the law and is a matter for the Legislature,
not for this Court, to address.
Consequently, Naguit must be abandoned and rejected
for being based on legally-flawed premises and for being an
aberration in land registration jurisprudence. At the very
least, the present ponencia cannot be viewed as an
authority on the effective possession prior to classification
since this ruling, by the ponenciaÊs own admission, is not
necessary for the resolution of the present case.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Note.·Factual considerations relating to lands of the

public domain properly rest within the administrative
competence of the Director of Lands and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. (Estrella vs. Robles,
Jr., 538 SCRA 60 [2007]).
··o0o··
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G.R. No. 179987. April 29, 2009.

Land Registration Act; Public Lands Act; Notwithstanding the

VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 173

174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the framework

VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 175

Supreme Court; Judgments; The acquisition of an imperfect title

176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Land Act, as amended, is well justified by the significant

VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 177

178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

expanding·through Naguit and the present ponencia·the plain

VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 179

Same; Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; Stare Decisis; The

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands

1 „Hernando de Soto Interview‰ by Reason Magazine dated 30

square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased

3 But see note 5.

Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not

„WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of

8 Penned by Associate Justice Marina Buzon of the Court of Appeals

184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree was

„1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public

9 G.R. No. 156117, 26 May 2005, 459 SCRA 183.

VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 185

ous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona

Based on these issues, the parties formulated their

13 Id., at pp. 186-187.

186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

lic v. Imperial Credit Corporation,17 as well as the earlier

17 G.R. No. 173088, 25 June 2008, 555 SCRA 314.

VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 187

Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public

„Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,

20 Section 6, Com. Act No. 141, as amended

ince where the land is located for confirmation of their claims

Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present

23 OSG Memorandum, p. 13.

It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com.

„SECTION 14. Who may apply.·The following persons may

Notwithstanding the passage of the Property

190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

„Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act].·The following described

It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more

VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 191

Property Registration Decree recognizes the substantive

„Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section

Accordingly under the current state of the law, the

192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the alienable and disposable character of the property must

„Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and

Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:

„[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it

25 R. Agpalo, Statutory Construction (3rd ed., 1995) at p. 182.

VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 193

not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or

The Court declares that the correct interpretation of

194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

It may be noted that in the subsequent case of

VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 195

Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza,28