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HELD:
The elements of estafa are present, as follows: (1) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or deceit; and (2)
that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third party, and it is essential that
there be a fiduciary relation between them either in the form of a trust, commission or administration. The language of the
receipt could not be any clearer. It indicates that the money delivered to Liwanag was for a specific purpose, that is, for the
purchase of cigarettes, and in the event the cigarettes cannot be sold, the money must be returned to Rosales. Thus, even
assuming that a contract of partnership was indeed entered into by and between the parties, we have ruled that when money
or property have been received by a partner for a specific purpose (such as that obtaining in the instant case) and he later
misappropriated it, such partner is guilty of estafa. Neither can the transaction be considered a loan, since in a contract of loan
once the money is received by the debtor, ownership over the same is transferred. Being the owner, the borrower can dispose
of it for whatever purpose he may deem proper. Since in this case there was no transfer of ownership of the money delivered,
Liwanag is liable for conversion under Art.315, par. l(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in the computation of the interest collected out of the rentals paid for eight years; that such
interest was excessive and violative of the usury Law; and that he neither agreed nor accepted the computation of the
total amount to be deducted.
RULING: contract between the parties is one of lease and not of loan. It is clearly denominated a "LEASE AGREEMENT."
Nowhere in the contract is there any showing that the parties intended a loan rather than a lease. The provision for the
payment of rentals in advance cannot be construed as a repayment of a loan because there was no grant or forbearance of
money as to constitute an indebtedness on the part of the lessor. On the contrary, the defendant-appellee was discharging its
obligation in advance by paying the eight years rentals, and it was for this advance payment that it was getting a rebate or
discount. There is no usury in this case because no money was given by the defendant-appellee to the plaintiff-appellant, nor
did it allow him to use its money already in his possession. There was neither loan nor forbearance but a mere discount which
the plaintiff-appellant allowed the defendant-appellee to deduct from the total payments because they were being made in
advance for eight years. The discount was in effect a reduction of the rentals which the lessor had the right to determine, and
any reduction thereof, by any amount, would not contravene the Usury Law. The difference between a discount and a loan or
forbearance is that the former does not have to be repaid. The loan or forbearance is subject to repayment and is therefore
governed by the laws on usury. To constitute usury, "there must be loan or forbearance; the loan must be of money or
something circulating as money; it must be repayable absolutely and in all events; and something must be exacted for the use
of the money in excess of and in addition to interest allowed by law." It has been held that the elements of usury are (1) a loan,
express or implied; (2) an understanding between the parties that the money lent shall or may be returned; that for such loan a
greater rate or interest that is allowed by law shall be paid, or agreed to be paid, as the case may be; and (4) a corrupt intent to
take more than the legal rate for the use of money loaned. Unless these four things concur in every transaction, it is safe to
affirm that no case of usury can be declared.
ISSUE: WON the failure of Vicar to return the subject property to private respondents would constitute an adverse possession
that would entitle Vicar to have a just title in order for ordinary acquisitive prescription to set in.
RULING: Private respondents were able to prove that their predecessors' house was borrowed by petitioner Vicar after the
church and the convent were destroyed. They never asked for the return of the house, but when they allowed its free use, they
became bailors in commodatum and the petitioner the bailee. The bailees' failure to return the subject matter of commodatum
to the bailor did not mean adverse possession on the part of the borrower. The bailee held in trust the property subject matter
of commodatum. The adverse claim of petitioner came only in 1951 when it declared the lots for taxation purposes. The action
of petitioner Vicar by such adverse claim could not ripen into title by way of ordinary acquisitive prescription because of the
absence of just title. The Court of Appeals found that the predecessors-in-interest and private respondents were possessors
under claim of ownership in good faith from 1906; that petitioner Vicar was only a bailee in commodatum; and that the adverse
claim and repudiation of trust came only in 1951
Petitioners formally consigned the amount of P40,142,518.00 with the Regional Trial Court
Case History:
RTC – issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the foreclosure sale of Marvin Plaza
CA - set aside the assailed orders and upheld PNB’s right to foreclose the mortgaged property
RATIO: The binding effect of any agreement between parties to a contract is premised on two settled principles:
(1)that any obligation arising from contract has the force of law between the parties; and (2) that there must be mutuality
between the parties based on their essential equality. Any contract which appears to be heavily weighed in favor of one of the
parties so as to lead to an unconscionable result is void. Any stipulation regarding the validity or compliance of the contract
which is left solely to the will of one of the parties, is likewise, invalid.
•PNB unilaterally altered the terms of its contract with petitioners by increasing the interest rates on the loan without the prior
assent of the latter. In fact, the manner of agreement is itself explicitly stipulated by the Civil Code when it provides, in Article
1956 that "No interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing." What has been "stipulated in writing"
from a perusal of interest rate provision of the credit agreement signed between the parties is that petitioners were bound
merely to pay 21%interest, subject to a possible escalation or de-escalation, when 1) the circumstances warrant such escalation
or de-escalation; 2) within the limits allowed by law; and 3) upon agreement.
•C.B. Circular No. 905 did not authorize the bank, or any lending institution for that matter, to progressively increase interest
rates. Nothing in the said circular could possibly be read as granting respondent bank carteblanche authority to raise interest
rates to levels which would either enslave its borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets.
The credit agreement specifically requires that the increase be "within the limits allowed by law".
The escalation clause of the credit agreement requires that the same be made "within the limits allowed by law," obviously
referring specifically to legislative enactments not administrative circulars.
Garcia v Thio
FACTS: Respondent Thio received from petitioner Garcia two crossed checks which amount to US$100,000 and US$500,000,
respectively, payable to the order of Marilou Santiago. According to petitioner, respondent failed to pay the principal amounts
of the loans when they fell due and so she filed a complaint for sum of money and damages with the RTC. Respondent denied
that she contracted the two loans and countered that it was Marilou Satiago to whom petitioner lent the money. She claimed
she was merely asked y petitioner to give the checks to Santiago. She issued the checks for P76,000 and P20,000 not as
payment of interest but to accommodate petitioner’s request that respondent use her own checks instead of Santiago’s.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioner. CA reversed RTC and ruled that there was no contract of loan between the parties.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a contract of loan between petitioner and respondent.
HELD: The Court held in the affirmative. A loan is a real contract, not consensual, and as such I perfected only upon the delivery
of the object of the contract. Upon delivery of the contract of loan (in this case the money received by the debtor when the
checks were encashed) the debtor acquires ownership of such money or loan proceeds and is bound to pay the creditor an
equal amount. It is undisputed that the checks were delivered to respondent.
Issues :
1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Art. 1236 of the Civil Code does not apply and in finding that there
is novation.
2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals misconstrued the evidence and the law when it affirmed the trial court decision’s
ordering Land Bank to pay Ong the amount of Php750,000.00 with interest at 12% annum.
Ruling :
The Supreme Court affirmed with modification to the appealed decision that recourse against Land Bank. Land Bank contends
that Art.1236 of the Civil Code backs their claim that Alfredo should have sought recourse against the Spouses Sy instead of
Land Bank. The court agreed with Land Bank on the point mentioned as to the first part of paragraph 1 of Art. 1236. However,.
Alfredo made a conditional payment so that the properties subject of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage which
Land Bank required from him would be approved. Thus, he made payment not as a debtor but as a prospective mortgagor.
Furthermore, the contract between Alfredo and Land Bank was not perfected nor consummated because of the adverse
disapproval of the proposed assumption. The Supreme Court did not agree with the Court of Appeals that there was novation in
the contract between the parties because not all elements of novation were present. The court further stresses that the instant
case would not have been litigated had Land Bank been more circumspect in dealing with Alfredo. The bank chose to accept
payment from Alfredo even before a credit investigation was underway and also failed to informed him of the disapproval. The
court found that there was negligence to a certain degree on the part of Land Bank in handling the transaction with Alfredo. A
bank as a business entity should observe a higher standard of diligence when dealing with the public which Land Bank neglect
to observe in this case. The petitioner’s appeal was denied by the Supreme Court and the decision of the Court of Appeals was
affirmed with modification in that the amount of PhP 750,000 will earn interest at 6% per annum and the total aggregate
monetary awards will in turn earn 12% per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.