Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
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CASE DIGESTS
Kathryn P. Akmad
Student No. 2012-109470
LLB- 3A
FACTS: Erwin Espinosa and Joselita Salita were married and eventually separated in fact. Subsequently,
Erwin sued for annulment on the ground of Joselita’s psychological incapacity which incapacity existed at
the time of the marriage although the same became manifest only thereafter. Dissatisfied with the
allegation in the petition, Joselita moved for a bill of particulars which the trial court granted.
Subsequently, in his Bill of Particulars, Edwin specified that at the time of their marriage, Joselita was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage in that she
was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession that of a newly qualified Doctor
of Medicine, upon his time and efforts so that she frequently complained of his lack of attention to her
even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job. Petitioner was not contented with
the Bill of Particulars. She insists that the allegations in the Bill of Particulars constitute a legal
conclusion, not an averment of ultimate facts, and fail to point out the specific essential marital
obligations she allegedly was not able to perform, and thus render the Bill of Particulars insufficient if not
irrelevant to her husband’s cause of action. She rationalizes that her insistence on the specification of her
particular conduct or behavior with the corresponding circumstances of time, place and person does not
call for information on evidentiary matters because without these details she cannot adequately and
intelligently prepare her answer to the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the allegations in the petition for annulment of marriage and the subsequent bill
of particulars filed in amplification of the petition is sufficient.
HELD: Ultimate facts refers to acts which the evidence on trial will prove, and not the evidence which
will be required to prove the existence of those facts. These are important and substantial facts which
either directly from the basis of the primary right and duty, or which directly make up the wrongful acts
or omission of the defendant. The Supreme Court ruled that on the basis of the allegations, it is evident
that petitioner can already prepare her responsive pleading or for trial. Private respondent has already
alleged that petitioner was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession. To
demand for more details would indeed be asking for information on evidentiary facts. These facts are
necessary to prove essential or ultimate facts. The additional facts called for by petitioner regarding her
particular acts or omissions would be evidentiary, and to obtain evidentiary matters is not the function of
a motion for bill of particulars.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error, the instant petition is DENIED and the questioned
Resolution of respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
2. TITLE: W-Red Construction and Development Corporation v. CA GR 122648 Aug. 17, 2000
FACTS: On several occasions between May 28, 1980 and May 23, 1981, petitioner W-Red Construction
and Development Corporation purchased from respondent Asia Industries, Inc. various electrical
equipment, covered by eighteen sales invoices. Petitioner was able to pay the sum of P701,877.93,
leaving a balance of P298,183.05, inclusive of interest at the rate of 14% per annum computed as of
January 20, 1982. For petitioner’s failure to settle its remaining obligation despite demands, respondent
instituted on November 8, 1982 an action for sum of money and damages, filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati. Petitioner filed its answer, denying receipt of some of the items stated in the sales
invoices and alleging that certain electrical equipment delivered to it were defective or faulty, for which
proper demands for replacement were ignored by respondent. After respondent, as plaintiff therein, rested
its case, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence which, however, was denied by the trial court in an Order
dated August 28, 1991. Petitioner was given opportunity to adduce evidence but it failed to appear at the
several hearings scheduled therefor. The trial court, thus, declared petitioner as having waived its right to
present evidence. The trial court rendered judgment for respondent ordering petitioner to pay Asia
Industries. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial. Petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner petitions for review
anchoring on the ground that the respondent Court of Appeals as well as the trial court committed a grave
abuse of discretion when they admitted and considered private documents as evidence when said
documents were not authenticated nor identified.
ISSUE: Whether or not the photocopies of the documents are admissible pieces of evidence.
HELD: Yes. Even if only photocopies of documents were submitted to the court, it is not accurate to say
that the original exhibits were not presented where the record shows that the originals of these documents
were presented during the trial.—Petitioner’s claim that the photocopies of the eighteen sales invoices,
marked as Exhibits “A” to “R,” are inadmissible, is untenable. While only photocopies of the documents
are submitted to the court, the record shows that the originals of these documents were presented during
the trial. Hence, it is not accurate to say that the original exhibits were not presented before the trial court.
Notes.—Mere photocopies of documents are inadmissible pursuant to the best evidence rule under
Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. (Gobonseng, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 472 [1995])
The period for filing an appeal commences from receipt of the duplicate original—not photocopy of the
judgment or order. (Villareal vs. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 511 [1998])
Photocopies may be admitted for failure of the other party to tender an appropriate objection to their
admission, though their probative value is nil nevertheless. (Security Bank & Trust Company vs. Triumph
Lumber and Construction Corporation, 301 SCRA 537 [1999])