22. DaudenqHernaez vs. De Los Angeles, G.R. No. Lq27010, April 23. Cenido vs. Apacionado, G.R. No.

onado, G.R. No. 132474, November 19, 1999. 24. Deloso vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 104805q07, January 13,
30, 1969. FIRST DIVISION 1993.
[G.R. No. 132474. November 19, 1999]
AMOR D. DELOSO, Petitioner, v. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN tFIRST
MARLENE DAUDENqHERNAEZ, petitioner, RENATO CENIDO tdeceasedc, represented by VICTORIA DIVISIONc and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
vs. CENIDOSA, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES AMADEO APACIONADO
HON. WALFRIDO DE LOS ANGELES, Judge of the Court of First and HERMINIA STA. ANA, respondents. FACTS:
Instance of Quezon City, HOLLYWOOD FAR EAST Amor D. Deloso, is the incumbent Governor of the Province of
PRODUCTIONS, INC., and RAMON VALENZUELA, respondents. FACTS: Zambales. Prior to being elected Governor, he was the Mayor of the
Respondent spouses Amadeo Apacionado and Herminia Sta. Ana filed Municipality of Botolan, Zambales. He stands charged with violating,
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Rizal a complaint against sometime in the 1978, Section 3 tec of the AntiqGraft and Corrupt
FACTS:
petitioner Renato Cenido for Declaration of Ownership, Nullity, with Practices Act
Damages.[3] The spouses alleged that: t1c they are the owners of a
Petitioner Marlene DaudenqHernaez, a motion picture actress, had
parcel of unregistered land the Sangguniang Bayan, of Botolan authorized and caused the
filed a complaint against herein private respondents, Hollywood Far
obtention by the Municipality tthrough the mayorc of a loan from the
East Productions, Inc., and its President and General Manager, Ramon
petitioner Renato Cenido, claiming to be the owner of the subject Land Bank of the Philippines, for the explicit purpose of purchasing five
Valenzuela, to recover P14,700.00 representing a balance allegedly
house and lot, filed a complaint for ejectment against them with the t5c farm tractors from the Gregorio Araneta Machines, Inc. to aid the
due said petitioner for her services as leading actress in two motion
Municipal Trial Court, Branch 2, Binangonan, Rizal; t8c through farmers in the area win tilling their respective agricultural land so as to
pictures produced by the company, and to recover damages. Upon
fraudulent and unauthorized means, Cenido was able to cause the undertake full production.w 6
motion of defendants, the respondent court tJudge Walfrido de los
issuance in his name of Tax Declaration No. 02q0368 over the subject
Angeles presidingc ordered the complaint dismissed, mainly because
property, which fact the spouses learned only upon the filing of the However, after acquisition of the tractors in December, 1977, and
the wclaim of plaintiff was not evidenced by any written document,
ejectment case; t9c although the ejectment case was dismissed by the public announcements that the machines were available for lease to
either public or privatew, and the complaint wwas defective on its facew
Municipal Trial Court tMTCc, Branch 2, the tax declaration in Cenidojs farmers on an hourly or daily basis, not one farmer opted to make use
for violating Articles 1356 and 1358 of the Civil, Code of the Philippines,
name was not cancelled and still subsisted; t10c the spouses have thereof. This negative reaction was due, in Delosojs view, to the
referred the matter to the barangay for conciliation but Cenido following circumstances
ISSUE:
unjustifiably refused to appear thereat.
To make the best of a bad situation, and to prevent deterioration of the
WON the contract of services, though not evidenced by a written
Petitioner Cenido answered claiming that: t1c he is the illegitimate son tractors from nonquse, the Sangguniang Bayan conceived a plan to
document is valid?
of Bonifacio Aparato, the deceased owner of the subject property; t2c lease them to waffluent landownersw to be selected by the
as Aparatojs sole surviving heir, he became the owner of the property municipality, who wwould be responsible for maintenance and repair
RULING:
as evidenced by the cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 02q0274 in and . . . tpayment ofc annual rentals equivalent to 1/5 of the annual
Bonifaciojs name and the issuance of Tax Declaration No. 02q0368 in amortization payments payable by the municipality to the Land Bank of
YES. The contractual system of our Civil Code still follows that of the
his name; the Philippines.w
Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and of the wOrdenamiento de Alcalaw 2 of
upholding the spirit and intent of the parties over formalities: hence, in
Respondent spouses replied that: t1c Cenido is not the illegitimate son
general, contracts are valid and binding from their perfection
of Bonifacio, Cenidojs claim of paternity being spurious; t2c the ISSUE:
regardless of form whether they be oral or written. Article 1356 of the
ownership of the property was not the proper subject in Civil Case No.
Code establishes only two exceptions, to wit:
2264 before the MTC, Branch I, nor were the spouses parties in said WON the lease w/o agreement of a govjt property is valid?
case.
a) Contracts for which the law itself requires that they be in
RULING:
some particular form twritingc in order to make them valid
ISSUE: YES. For all the witnesses of the defense as well as of the Government
and enforceable tthe soqcalled solemn contractsc.
WON the Pagpapatunay is a valid contract of sale? uniformly attested to the reality of verbal agreements between the
b) Contracts that the law requires to be proved by some
Municipality and the tractors lessees, i.e., that all said lessees were
writing tmemorandumc of its terms, as in those covered by
RULING: made aware of the obligations they were assuming prior to the delivery
the old Statute of Frauds, now Article 1403t2c of the Civil
To determine whether the Pagpapatunay is a valid contract of sale, it to them of the tractors; and that on their taking delivery thereof, they all
Code.
must contain the essential requisites of contracts, viz: t1c consent of bound themselves in writing wto all the terms and conditions which the
The contract sued upon by petitioner herein tcompensation for
the contracting parties; t2c object certain which is the subject matter of Municipality of Botolan, Zambales may impose . . . .w 48 And the fact
servicesc does not come under either exception. It is true that it
the contract; and t3c cause of the obligation which is established.[22] that the lease agreements were not initially reduced to writing, this
appears included in Article 1358, last clause, providing that wall other
The object of the Pagpapatunay is the house and lot. The consideration having been done only some time later by the Sangguniang Bayan
contracts where the amount involved exceeds five hundred pesos must
is P10,000.00 for the services rendered to Aparato by respondent through a resolution adopted for that purpose, certainly does not make
appear in writing, even a private one.w But Article 1358 nowhere
spouses. According to respondent Herminia Apacionado, this the transactions anomalous or felonious, nor preclude the generation
provides that the absence of written form in this case will make the
P10,000.00 was not actually paid to Bonifacio because the amount of the contractual relation of lessor and lessee between the
agreement invalid or unenforceable. On the contrary, Article 1357
merely quantified the services they rendered to the old man. It was the Municipality and the farmers. It is axiomatic that contracts may be
clearly indicates that contracts covered by Article 1358 are binding and
care the spouses voluntarily gave that was the cause of the sale.[23] entered into in any form, orally or in writing, or parol in part and written
enforceable by action or suit despite the absence of writing.
The cause therefore was the service remunerated.[24] in part, it being needful merely that the essential requisites for their
validity be present q a precept of general application unless wthe law
There must be clear and convincing evidence of what specific acts of requires that a contract be in some form in order that it may be valid or
undue influence[36] or fraud[37] were employed by respondent enforceable, . . .w
spouses that gave rise to said defects. Absent such proof, Bonifaciojs
presumed consent to the Pagpapatunay remains.
25. Zaide vs. CA, G.R. Nos. Lq46715q16, July 29, 1988.
Republic of the Philippines
LEONCIA T. ZAIDE and PRIMITIVO ZAIDE, substituted by SIMEON
TOLENTINO, Guardian ad litem of the Minors PACITA, ALEX,
MARIA ZERLINA all surnamed ZAIDE, etc., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ROBERTO DE LEON and EDITA T.
ZAIDE respondents.
FACTS:
On January 11, 1965, Edita Zaide executed a public instrument
denominated wDeed of Salew by which, in consideration of P5,000.00
paid to her, she sold the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 69088 to
Leoncia T. Zaide. The deed described both the vendor, Edita Zaide,
and the vendee, Leoncia T. Zaide, as wmarried,w but named neither
of their husbands. The document however did bear the signature of
Editajs husband, Roberto de Leon, indicating his wmarital consent.w
The omission of the name of the vendeejs husband in the deed of sale
gave rise to a problem. Precisely because of it, the Register of Deeds
refused to accept it for registration.
With this lot as collateral, the Zaide spouses thereafter obtained a loan
from the4ojernment service insurance system in the sum of P28500
this was sometime in November, 1967D the proceeds were used to
construct a twostory apartment building on the land.
On June 1, 1969, the house of the De Leons burned down D They
moved to one of the doors of the apartment built by the Zaide Spouses.
They were asked to pay rentals. They refused. Litigation ensued.
the de Leon Spouses filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance
of Rizal against the Zaide Spouses. Briefly, the de Leons alleged that
in June, 1964 they discovered that their title to the land in question had
been cancelled and another issued to the Zaides, on the strength of
wa forged deed of sale supposedly executed in Tagaytay City on the
11th day of January, 1965,w and that they wcould not possibly have
sold their lot for the measly sum of P5,000.00 appearing in the forged
deed ..considering that the market price of the land ... cannot be less
than P20,000.00.ww
ISSUE: WON the sale was valid even if defective inform
RULING:
YES. . Though defective in form, the sale was valid; and the parties
could compel each other to do what was needful to make the document
of sale registrable. The law generally allows a contract of sale to be
entered into in any form, whether win writing, or by word of mouth, or
partly in writing and partly by word or mouth, or vevenp inferred from
the conduct of the parties;w but if the agreement concerns wthe sale
of land or of an interest therein,w the law requires not only that wthe
same, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and
subscribed by the party chargedw in order that it may be enforceable
by action,21 but also that the writing be in the form of a wpublic
document.w 22 The law finally provides that wIf the law requires a
document or other special form, as in the acts and contracts
enumerated in .. vArticle 1358p, the contracting parties may compel
each other to observe that form, once the contract has been perfected
.. vand suchp right may be exercised simultaneously with the action
upon the contract.w 23
26. Dalion vs. CA, G.R. No. 78903, February 28, 1990.
Republic of the Philippines
SPS. SEGUNDO DALION AND EPIFANIA SABESAJEqDALION,
petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND RUPERTO
SABESAJE, JR., respondents.
FACTS:
A land in Southern Leyte was declared in the name of Segundo Dalion.
Sabesaje sued to recover ownership this land based on a private
document of absolute sale, allegedly executed by Segundo Dalion.
Dalion, however, denied the sale, saying that:
 the document was fictitious
 his signature was a forgery, and
 that the land is conjugal property, which he and his wife acquired
in 1960 from Saturnina Sabesaje as evidenced by "Escritura de
Venta Absoluta"
The spouses denied the claims of Sabesaje that after executing a deed
of sale over the parcel of land, they had pleaded with Sabesaje to be
allowed to administer the land because Dalion did not have livelihood.
Spouses Dalion admitted, however, administering 5 parcels of land in
Southern Leyte, which belonged to Leonardo Sabesaje, grandfather of
Sabesaje, who died in 1956. the Dalions never received their agreed
10% and 15% commission on the sales of copra and abaca.
Sabesaje’ss suit, they say, was intended merely to harass and forestall
Dalion’s threat to sue for these unpaid commissions.
Assuming authenticity of his signature and the genuineness of the
document, Dalion nonetheless still impugns the validity of the sale on
the ground that the same is embodied in a private document, and did
not thus convey title or right to the lot in question since "acts and
contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission,
modification or extinction of real rights over immovable property must
appear in a public instrument" (Art. 1358, par 1, NCC).
ISSUE: WON the contract of sale was valid and is a public document
necessary for of transfer of ownership
RULING:
YES. A contract of sale is a consensual contract, which means that the
sale is perfected by mere consent. No particular form is required for its
validity. Upon perfection of the contract, the parties may reciprocally
demand performance (Art. 1475, NCC), i.e., the vendee may compel
transfer of ownership of the object of the sale, and the vendor may
require the vendee to pay the thing sold (Art. 1458, NCC).
NO. The provision of Art. 1358 on the necessity of a public document
is only for convenience, not for validity or enforceability. It is not a
requirement for the validity of a contract of sale of a parcel of land that
this be embodied in a public instrument.
27. Heirs of Cornelio Miguel vs. Heirs of Angel Miguel, G.R. No. 158916,
March 19, 2014.
HEIRS OF CORNELIO MIGUEL, Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF ANGEL
MIGUEL, Respondents.
FACTS:
Cornelio Miguel was the registered owner of land He had the property
subdivided into ten smaller lots which were designated as Lots A to J of Psd–
146880. Cornelio sold nine of the lots to his children, with Lot G going to his
son Angel, predecessor–in–interest of the respondents in this case. The
remaining lot, Lot J, Cornelio kept for himself and his wife, Nieves.
In a deed of donation6inter vivos dated December 28, 1973, the spouses
Cornelio and Nieves donated two lots to Angel. One of the lots was
described in the deed of donation
Petitioner Angel M. Miguel testifying for and in his behalf alleged that a parcel
of land has been subdivided and that he has acquired two (2) lots, [letters]
“G” and “J” from his parents; that he could not secure the title to these lots
from the City Register because the latter required him to produce the
owner’s duplicate certificate of title of the mother land; that he then went to
his father to borrow the said owner’s certificate of Mr. Cornelio Miguel went
to get the title from a certain [carton] to his amazement, he found only bits
of [paper], once constituting a solid piece is now completely beyond
recognition and, for all purpose, a complete destruction.
Cornelio filed a complaint for the annulment of the deed of donation on the
alleged ground that one of the properties subject of the donation, Lot 2–J of
Psd–146879, was given the technical description of Lot J of Psd–146880.
While the complaint was supposedly denominated as for the annulment of
the donation, the allegations of the complaint were really for reformation of
instrument because it essentially sought the amendment of the deed of
donation to conform to the alleged true intention of the donors to donate Lot
2–J of Psd–146879 and not Lot J of Psd–146880.
However, the complaint failed to allege that the donation was conditional and
the deed of donation attached as an annex of the complaint showed that no
condition was imposed for the donation. As such, it was a simple donation
that is not subject of reformation under Article 1366
The trial court issued an Order dated February 27, 1987 directing the
Registrar of Deeds of Puerto Princesa City to issue a certificate of title in
Angel’s name over Lot J of Psd–146880.
Petitioners filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of Angel’s title’s as well
as of the respective deeds of donation Angel executed in favor of his sons.
Petitioners claimed that, as the true intention of their parents Cornelio and
Nieves as donors was to donate Lot 2–J of Psd. 146879 and not Lot J of
Psd. 146880, the deed of donation was rendered void by the typographical
error relating to the description of the property
ISSUE: WON the deed of donation is void?
RULING:
Cornelio and the petitioners had no cause of action in connection with the
reformation of the deed of donation executed by the spouses Cornelio and
Nieves in favor of Angel because the said deed of donation is a simple
donation and therefore not a proper subject of an action for reformation. As
there can be no reformation of the deed of donation pursuant to Article 1366
of the Civil Code, the necessary implication and consequence of the Order
dated January 31, 1986 in Civil Case No. 1185 is that the deed of donation
stands and the identity of the property subject of the donation is that parcel
of land which corresponds to the technical description in the deed of
donation. In other words, the property donated under the deed of donation
is that which matches the property whose metes and bounds is particularly
described in the deed of donation. This is because the technical description
of the land is proof of its identity.43 Such technical description embodies the
identity of the land.44 In this case, the technical description in the deed of
donation pertains to Lot J of Psd. 146880.
28. Multi-Ventures Capital and Management Corporation vs.
Stalwart Management Services Corporation, et al., G.R. NO.
157439, July 4, 2007.
FACTS:
On July 10, 1991, Multi-Ventures Capital and Management Corporation filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 134, a Complaint for
Reformation of Instrument with application for attachment against Stalwart
Management Services Corporation and its officers. Petitioner alleged that
on January 11, 1991, respondent obtained from the former a loan in the
amount of P9,000,000.00, with interest, but for purposes of expediency, said
transaction was denominated as a sale whereby petitioner bought from
respondent various Land Bank bonds originally valued at P11,557,972.60 at
discounted price, as shown in a Confirmation of Agreement; that the bonds
serve as a partial collateral for the payment of the loan; that respondent and
some of its officers, however, have plans of defrauding their creditors by
absconding and disposing of its properties, thus constraining petitioner to
file the complaint for reformation in order to express the true intent of the
parties, i.e., that the ostensible sale of the bonds is actually a loan
agreement.[1]
Respondent, together with its co-defendants, filed an Answer denying
petitioner's allegations and claiming, among others, that both petitioner and
respondent are companies engaged in dealing and trading government
securities. According to respondent, the transaction entered into on January
11, 1991 is really a purchase of Land Bank bonds, and there is no mistake,
fraud, inequitable conduct or accident in the preparation of the true
agreement of the parties such that reformation is called for.[2]
ISSUE: WON the contract may be reformed
RULING:
No. Reformation is a remedy in equity, whereby a written instrument is
made or construed so as to express or conform to the real intention of
the parties, where some error or mistake has been committed. In
granting reformation, the remedy in equity is not making a new contract
for the parties, but establishing and perpetuating the real contract
between the parties which, under the technical rules of law, could not
be enforced but for such reformation.[8]
In order that an action for reformation of instrument may prosper, the
following requisites must concur: (1) there must have been a meeting
of the minds of the parties to the contract; (2) the instrument does not
express the true intention of the parties; and (3) the failure of the
instrument to express the true intention of the parties is due to mistake,
fraud, inequitable conduct or accident.[9]
In the present case, there is no question that there was a meeting of
the minds between the parties. What remains to be resolved is whether
the contract expressed their true intention; and, if not, whether it was
due to mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident.
In addition, and more significantly, what militates against petitioners
argument that their agreement was a loan is the fact that subsequent
thereto, petitioner endorsed and transferred the bonds to the AFP
Mutual Benefits Association, Inc., as collateral for an investment.
Petitioner did not rebut or at the very least, offer a plausible explanation
for said transfer which is unmistakably an act of ownership.
29. Tuazon vs. CA, G.R. No. 119794, October 3, 2000.
FACTS:
On July 15, 1987, spouses Tomas S. Tuazon and Natividad S. Tuazon
sold to John Siy Lim (Lim) a 650 square meter conjugal lot
Atty. Crisostomo, lawyer of the Tuazons, drafted the Absolute Deed of
Sale, which was duly registered. By virtue of the said deed, TCT No.
860 in the name of the Tuazons was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT
No. 152621 was issued in the name of John Siy F. Lim.
On October 1, 1990, the Tuazons brought a Complaint for Reformation
of Contract, Quieting of Title with Damages against John Siy F. Lim,
theorizing that the real intention of the parties was to enter into a loan
accommodation.
On November 15, 1990, Lim filed his answer, theorizing that the Deed
of Absolute Sale expressed the true intention of the parties.
The case originated from a contract of mortgage constituted on the
subject lot. On December 18, 1970, Tomas See Tuazon, who was then
the President and General Manager of Universal Rubber Products,
Inc., together with the spouses, See Tiong Cheng and Eng Tang Go
See, mortgaged, together with other properties, subject lot to the
Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBCom),[4] to secure a loan of Four
Million Eight Hundred Thirty Thousand Two Hundred Sixty Five and
90/100 (P4,830,265.90) Pesos. When the mortgagors failed to pay the
mortgage debt, the mortgaged property was foreclosed and sold at
public auction, with PBCom itself as the highest bidder.
Petitioner Tuazon and his daughter persuaded him to redeem for
himself the extrajudicially foreclosed property from PBCom because
Tuazon was financially incapable. The total consideration of the sale
was One Million Three Hundred Eighty Thousand (P1,380,000.00)
Pesos. He (Lim) purchased a managers check from Asian Bank for
One Million (P1,000,000.00) Pesos and tendered the check to PBCom
as the redemption price. On July 16, 1987, Three Hundred Eighty
Thousand (P380,000.00) Pesos was paid directly to the Tuazons.[10]
Atty. Crisostomo, Tuazon's counsel, executed an instrument with the
nomenclature of a deed of sale[11] which by its contents, purported to
convey the subject property to private respondent.
ISSUE: WON the instrument may be reformed?
RULING:
And for the provisions of law to apply, two requisites must concur: that
the parties entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale
and that their intention was to secure an existing debt by way of
mortgage.
Article 1365 of the New Civil Code on reformation of contracts applies
only if there is evidence, clear and convincing, that the parties did agree
upon a mortgage of subject property. Here, everything appears to be
clear and unambiguous and nothing is doubtful, within the
contemplation of Article 1602. When the words of the contract are clear
and readily understandable, there is no room for construction. The
contract is the law between the parties.
For an action for reformation of an instrument as provided for in Article
1359 to prosper, the following requisites must concur, to wit: (1) there
must have been a meeting of the minds of the parties to the contract;
(2) the instrument does not express the true intention of the parties;
and (3) the failure of the instrument to express the true intention of the
parties is due to mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident.[26]
Here, petitioner has not shown or established the presence of the
aforestated requirements for the reformation of the deed in question.
30. Gonzalez Mondragon vs. Santos, G.R. No. L-1724, October 12, 1950.
FACTS:
It appears that Don Joaquin Gonzales Mondragon, who died on December 16,
1940 in Manila, left a large tract of land known as Hacienda Esperanza. The
deceased had executed a will and codicil in which he provided for the distribution
and disposition of his estate among his widow, Doña Nieves Balmori Vda. de
Gonzales Mondragon, the plaintiff herein, and various children.
In 1941, the widow and her children made a partition of the inheritance, allotting to
each heir separate and specific portions but leaving pro-indiviso the residential lots
and roads in the barrios situated within the estate. They employed a surveyor, and
a sub-division plan, introduced in evidence as Exhibit 10, was drawn, on which the
area of the widow’s approximately one-third share was stated to be 1,023 hectares.
Subsequent to the partition, negotiations were started, or resumed, for the
purchase by Don Roman Santos, the defendant. Offers and counter-offers were
made until, finally, the parties closed the deal and executed the deed.
Sometime after the sale, a new survey was made and the new plan gave the area
of the plaintiff’s approximately one-third share of the hacienda as 1,091.24 instead
of 1,023.
It was the restoration of the difference between these two figures or the payment
of its equivalent in cash that the first complaint was filed, it being alleged that the
plaintiff had sold her land on the basis of P450 per hectare. Explaining why she
signed the deed without objecting to the form in which it was written, the plaintiff
declared that she did not read the document because she was then sick suffering
from a heart ailment. The defendant countered with the allegation that he bought
all the plaintiff’s right and interest to and in the hacienda for lump sum and not for
a specified price for each hectare, as the plaintiff claims.
ISSUE:
WON the error amounts to necessity of reforming the contract?
RULING:
No. The plaintiff has the burden of proof to overcome the strong presumption that
the document she and her co-sellers signed, expressed their true intention. Our
view of the plaintiff’s evidence is that it is neither predominant nor conclusive. The
best that can be said in its favor is that it does not rule out the opposite theory.
Much less does it establish, in order to show that the mistakes was mutual, that
the buyer shared the vendor’s intention and belief that the sale was by the hectare
and not for a sum in gross as stated in the document of sale.
The plaintiff’s evidence being as it is, the integrity of the document Exhibit A will,
of necessity, have to be maintained and equitable relief denied. This would be true
even if there were doubts. Decisions of this court and of American courts abound
in favor of the salutary doctrine that contracts solemnly and deliberately entered
into may not be overturned by inconclusive proof or by reason of mistakes of one
of the parties to which the other in no way has contributed.
Moran’s comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. III, p. 195, summing up the rulings
laid down in various decisions of the court and one of the United States Supreme
Court, says: “Relief by way of reformation of a written agreement will not be granted
unless the proof of mutual mistake is of the clearest and most satisfactory
character. The amount of evidence necessary to sustain a prayer for relief where
it is sought to impugn a fact in a document is always more than a mere
preponderance of the evidence.”
In the case of Joaquin vs. Mitsumine (34 Phil., 858), this court held that “An alleged
defect in a contract perfectly valid and binding on its face, must be conclusively
proved. The validity and fulfillment of contracts can not be left to the will of one of
the parties.”
In the case of Irureta Goyena vs. Tambunting (1 Phil., 490), it appeared that the
defendant bought a piece of land and agreed to pay $3,200 for it. It so happened
that the land was less than what the parties supposed, and the buyer refused to
pay the price agreed upon unless the corresponding reduction was made.
It is to be noted that in the last-cited case, the mistake was caused, intentionally or
innocently, by the agent of the plaintiff who was favored by the shortage, whereas
in the case at bar the error was in the plain of the plaintiff herself who was
prejudiced by the excess.
The judgment dismissing the complaint will be affirmed with costs.
31. Atilano vs. Atilano, G.R. No. L-22487, May 21, 1969.

FACTS:
In 1916 Eulogio Atilano I acquired lot. He had the land subdivided into five parts,
identified as lots Nos. 535-A, 535-B, 535-C, 535-D and 535-E, respectively. On
May 18 of the same year, after the subdivision had been effected, Eulogio Atilano
I, for the sum of P150.00, executed a deed of sale covering lot No. 535-E in favor
of his brother Eulogio Atilano II. Three other portions, namely, lots Nos. 535-B,
535-C and 535-D, were likewise sold to other persons, the original owner, Eulogio
Atilano I, retaining for himself only the remaining portion of the land, presumably
covered by the title to lot No. 535-A. Upon his death the title to this lot passed to
Ladislao Atilano

Desiring to put an end to the co-ownership, Eulogio Atilano II and his children had
the land resurveyed so that it could properly be subdivided; and it was then
discovered that the land they were actually occupying on the strength of the deed
of sale executed in 1920 was lot No. 535-A and not lot 535-E, as referred to in the
deed, while the land which remained in the possession of the vendor, Eulogio
Atilano I, and which passed to his successor, defendant Ladislao Atilano was lot
No. 535-E and not lot No. 535-A.

ISSUE: WON the instrument may be reformed

RULING:
NO. Where the object of the sale, as intended and understood by the parties, was
that specific portion where the vendee was already residing, where he
reconstructed his house at the end of the war, and where his heirs continued to
reside thereafter: namely, lot No. 535-A; and that its designation as lot No. 535-E
in the deed of sale was a simple mistake in the drafting of the document, the
mistake did not vitiate the consent of the parties, or affect the validity and binding
effect of the contract between them. The New Civil Code provides a remedy for
such a situation by means of reformation of the instrument. In this case, however,
the deed of sale executed in 1920 need no longer be reformed. The parties have
retained possession of their respective properties conformably to the real intention
of the parties to that sale, and all they should do is to execute mutual deeds of
conveyance.

The remedy of reformation of the instrument, provided for by the New Civil Code,
is available when, there having been a meeting of the minds of the parties to a
contract, their true intention is not expressed in the instrument purporting to
embody the agreement by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or
accident.

When one sells or buys real property—a piece of land, for example—one sells or
buys the property as he sees it, in its actual setting and by its physical metes and
bounds, and not by the mere lot number assigned to it in the certificate of title. In
the particular case before us, the portion correctly referred to as lot No. 535-A was
already in the possession of the vendee, Eulogio Atilano II, who had constructed
his residence therein, even before the sale in his favor; indeed, even before the
subdivision of the entire lot No. 535 at the instance of its owner, Eulogio Atilano I.
In like manner the latter had his house on the portion correctly identified, after the
subdivision, as lot No. 535-E, even adding to the area thereof by purchasing a
portion of an adjoining property belonging to a different owner. The two brothers
continued in possession of the respective portions for the rest of their lives,
obviously ignorant of the initial mistake in the designation of the lot subject of the
1920 sale until 1959, when the mistake was discovered for the first time.