Filipino Pipe & Foundry Corp. v.
NLRC
November 16, 1999 | Purisima | Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 |
National Union or Federation
PETITIONER: Filipino Pipe and Foundry Corporation
RESPONDENT: NLRC, NLU and Atty. Eulogio Lerum
SUMMARY: Filipino Pipe Workers Union- National Labor Union, a local
chapter of NLU-TUCP conducted an illegal strike which lasted from March 3,
1986 to June 13, 1986. The petitioner company interposed a petition to
declare the strike illegal with a prayer against the Union, the Federation and
the Federation president for damages caused by the strike. The company
eventually moved for partial dismissal pursuing only the complaint against
the Federation and its president. The LA declared the strike illegal and held
the Federation alone responsible to pay the damages. The NLRC reversed the
decision, dismissing the original complaint against the Federation and its
president.
DOCTRINE: The mother federation is a mere agent and the local chapter/
union is the principal nothwithstanding the failure of the local union to
comply with the procedural requirements that would make it a legitimate
labor organization. The local union, being the principal and sole and exclusive
bargaining agent, and having staged the illegal strike should be held
responsible for any resulting damage sustained by the company as result
thereof.
FACTS:
1. On February 10, 1986, respondent National Labor Union-Trade Union
Congress of the Philippines (NLU), a national federation of labor unions, filed
with the Ministry of Labor and Employment, in behalf of its local chapter, the
Filipino Pipe Workers Union-National Labor Union (the Union), a notice of
strike signed by its national president, Atty. Eulogio R. Lerum, against the
petitioner, Filipino Pipe and Foundry Corporation, alleging as grounds
therefor union busting and non-implementation of the CBA.
2. The initial conciliation conference was set on February 24, 1986 but due to
lack of notice thereof to petitioner company, as well as the failure of the
Union to furnish the latter a copy of the notice of strike, the initial conciliation
conference was re-set to March 3, 1986.
3. In the early morning of March 3, 1986, without waiting for the outcome of
the conciliation conference scheduled on said date, the Union staged the
strike in question which lasted until June 13, 1986, when a return to work
agreement was reached by the Union and petitioner company.
4. On April 8, 1986, petitioner company interposed before the Arbitration
Branch of the then Ministry of Labor and Employment, a petition to declare
the strike illegal with prayer for damages against the Union, NLU and its
national president, Atty. Eulogio Lerum.
5. On December 23, 1988, petitioner company moved for the partial dismissal
of the Complaint against 43 officers and members of the Union, but
maintained the action against the NLU and Atty. Lerum.
6. On August 31, 1992, the Labor Arbiter came out with a decision for
petitioner company, finding that the strike held was illegal and directing NLU
to pay damages, absolving Atty. Lerum.
7. Both parties appealed to the NLRC which dismissed the complaint against
NLU and Atty. Lerum.
ISSUE: WoN NLU, the Federation, should be held responsible for the illegal
strike staged by the Union.
NO
RULING: Petition is DISMISSED, and the Decision of the NLRC is AFFIRMED.
RATIO: The mother union, acting for and in behalf of its affiliate, has the
status of an agent while the local union remained the basic unit of the
association, free to serve the common interest of all its members subject only
to the restraints imposed by the constitution and by-laws of the association.
(Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc., 66 SCRA 512
[1975])
The same is true even if the local union is not a legitimate labor organization.
Conformably, in the abovecited case the Court ruled that the mother
federation was a mere agent and the local chapter/union was the principal,
notwithstanding the failure of the local union to comply with the procedural
requirements that would make it a legitimate labor organization. It would not
affect its status as the principal and basic unit of the association. The
requirement laid down in the Progressive Development case, that the local
union must be a legitimate labor organization, pertains to the conditions
before a union may file a petition for certification election and to be certified
as sole and exclusive bargaining agent. In the present case, there is no dispute
that THE UNION is the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the
rank and file employees of petitioner company. The union's status as a
legitimate labor organization is therefore of no moment in the resolution of
the controversy here. Furthermore, the petitioner company is now estopped
from reneging on the recognition it extended to the FPUW-NLU as the
bargaining representative of its rank and file workers, by belatedly attacking
its status which petitioner company had voluntarily recognized. It should be
noted that even as early as 1981, when the collective bargaining agreement
sought to be implemented by the union was entered into, the latter was
already the bargaining representative of the employees concerned. It is not,
therefore, true that it was respondent NLU which formed FPWU.
At most, the entry into the picture of the private respondent on March 23,
1983, merely affirmed the status of FPWU as the recognized bargaining
representative of the rank and file employees of petitioner company.
Evidently, direct and primary responsibility for the damages allegedly caused
by the illegal strike sued upon fall on the local union FPWU, being the
principal, and not on respondent NLU, a mere agent of THE UNION which
assisted the latter in filing the notice of strike. Being just an agent, the notice
of strike filed by Atty. Eulogio Lerum, the national president of NLU, is
deemed to have been filed by its principal, the THE UNION. Having thus
dismissed the claim for damages against the principal, THE UNION, the action
for damages against its agent, respondent NLU, and Atty. Lerum, has no more
leg to stand on and should also be dismissed.
Sugbuanon v NLRC
FACTS: Petitioner Sugbuanon Rural Bank, Inc., (SRBI, for brevity) is a duly-
registered banking institution with principal office in Cebu City and a branch
in Mandaue City. Private respondent SRBI Association of Professional,
Supervisory, Office, and Technical Employees Union (APSOTEU) is a legitimate
labor organization affiliated with the Trade Unions Congress of the
Philippines (TUCP).1âwphi1.nêt
On October 8, 1993, the DOLE Regional Office in Cebu City granted Certificate
of Registration No. R0700-9310-UR-0064 to APSOTEU-TUCP, hereafter
referred to as the union.
On October 26, 1993, the union filed a petition for certification election of
the supervisory employees of SRBI. It alleged, among others, that: (1)
APSOTEU-TUCP was a labor organization duly-registered with the Labor
Department; (2) SRBI employed 5 or more supervisory employees; (3) a
majority of these employees supported the petition: (4) there was no existing
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between any union and SRBI; and (5)
no certification election had been held in SRBI during the past 12 months
prior to the petition.
On October 28, 1993, the Med-Arbiter gave due course to the petition. The
pre-certification election conference between SRBI and APSOTEU-TUCP was
set for November 15, 1993.
On November 12, 1993, SRBI filed a motion to dismiss the union’s petition. It
sought to prevent the holding of a certification election on two grounds. First,
that the members of APSOTEU-TUCP were in fact managerial or confidential
employees.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the members of the respondent union are managerial
employees and/or highly-placed confidential employees, hence prohibited by
law from joining labor organizations and engaging in union activities.
(2) Whether or not the Med-Arbiter may validly order the holding of a
certification election upon the filing of a petition for certification election by
a registered union, despite the petitioner’s appeal pending before the DOLE
Secretary against the issuance of the union’s registration.
RULING:
(1) Petitioner’s explanation does not state who among the employees has
access to information specifically relating to its labor to relations policies.
Even Cashier Patricia Maluya, who serves as the secretary of the bank’s Board
of Directors may not be so classified.
Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential
capacity, in regard (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate
management policies [specifically in the field of labor relations].9 The two
criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be
considered a confidential employee — that is, the confidential relationship
must exist between the employee and his superior officer; and that officer
must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations.
Art. 245 of the Labor Code does not directly prohibit confidential employees
from engaging in union activities. However, under the doctrine of necessary
implication, the disqualification of managerial employees equally applies to
confidential employees. The confidential-employee rule justifies exclusion of
confidential employees because in the normal course of their duties they
become aware of management policies relating to labor relations. It must be
stressed, however, that when the employee does not have access to
confidential labor relations information, there is no legal prohibition against
confidential employees from forming, assisting, or joining a union.
(2) One of the rights of a legitimate labor organization under Article 242(b) of
the Labor Code is the right to be certified as the exclusive representative of
all employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for purposes of collective
bargaining. Having complied with the requirements of Art. 234, it is our view
that respondent union is a legitimate labor union. Article 257 of the Labor
Code mandates that a certification election shall automatically be conducted
by the Med-Arbiter upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labor
organization.16 Nothing is said therein that prohibits such automatic conduct
of the certification election if the management appeals on the issue of the
validity of the union’s registration. On this score, petitioner’s appeal was
correctly dismissed.
Atlas V Laguesma
FACTS:
On July 16, 1990, the supervisory, administrative personnel, production,
accounting and confidential employees of Atlas Lithographic Services Inc
(ALSI) affiliated with Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipinom a national labor
organization. The local union adopted the name ALSI-SAPPACEA-KAMPIL,
which shall hereafter refer to as the “supervisors” union.
Kampil-Katipunan filed on behalf of the “supervisors” union a petition for
certification election so that it could be the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of the supervisory employees. ALSI opposed the petition claiming that
under Art. 245 of the Labor Code, Kampil-Katipunana cannot represent the
supervisory employees for collective bargaining purposes because it also
represents the rank-and-file employees’ union.
On September 18, 1990, the Med-Arbiter issued an order allowing the
certification election. ALSI appealed but such appeal was denied. Hence, this
petition for certiorari.
ISSUE(S):
1. WON, under Art. 245 of the Labor Code, a local union of supervisory
employees may be allowed to affiliate with a national federation of labor
organization of rank-and-file employees where such federation represents its
affiliates in the collective bargaining negotiation with the same employer of
the supervisors and in the implementation of the CBAs.
HELD: NO, supervisors are not prohibited from forming their own union.
What the law prohibits is their membership in a labor organization of rank-
and-file employees or their joining in a federation of rank-and-file employees
that includes the very local union which they are not allowed to directly join.
The basis of the Adamson case is R.A. No. 875 (Industrial Peace Act) where
employees were classified into three groups, namely: 1) managerial
employees; 2) supervisors; and 3) rank-and-file employees. Supervisors who
were considered employees in relation to their employer could join a union
but not a union of rank-and-file employees. With the enactment in 1974 of
the Labor Code (Pres Decree No. 442), employees were classified into
managerial and rank-andfile employees. Neither the category of supervisors
nor their right to organize under the old statute were recognized. So that, in
Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Sanchez (144 SCRA 628 [1986]), the Court
interpreted the superseding labor law to have removed from supervisors the
right to unionize among themselves. The Court ruled:
In the light of the factual background of this case, We are constrained
to hold that the supervisory employees of petitioner firm may not,
under the law, form a supervisors union, separate and distinct from
the existing bargaining unit (BEU), composed of the rank-and-file
employees of the Bulletin Publishing Corporation. It is evident that
most of the private respondents are considered managerial
employees. Also, it is distinctly stated in Section 11, Rule II, of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, that supervisory
unions are presently no longer recognized nor allowed to exist and
operate as such. (pp. 633, 634)
In Section 11, Rule II, Book V of the Omnibus Rules implementing Pres. Decree
No. 442, the supervisory unions existing since the effectivity of the New Code
in January 1, 1975 ceased to operate as such and the members who did not
qualify as managerial employees under this definition in Article 212 (k)
therein became eligible to form, to join or assist a rank-and-file union.
A revision of the Labor Code undertaken by the bicameral Congress brought
about the enactment of Rep. Act No. 6715 in March 1989 in which employees
were reclassified into three groups, namely: (1) the managerial employees;
(2) supervisors; and (3) the rank and file employees. Under the present law,
the category of supervisory employees is once again recognized. Hence, Art.
212 (m) states:
(m) . . . Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the
employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the
exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature
but requires the use of independent judgment. . . .
The rationale for the amendment is the government's recognition of the right
of supervisors to organize with the qualification that they shall not join or
assist in the organization of rank-and-file employees. The reason behind the
Industrial Peace Act provision on the same subject matter has been adopted
in the present statute. The interests of supervisors on the one hand, and the
rankand- file employees on the other, are separate and distinct. The functions
of supervisors, being recommendatory in nature, are more identified with the
interests of the employer. The performance of those functions may, thus, run
counter to the interests of the rank-and-file.
This intent of the law is made clear in the deliberations of the legislators on
then Senate Bill 530 now enacted as Rep. Act No. 6715.
The definition of managerial employees was limited to those having authority
to hire and fire while those who only recommend effectively the hiring or
firing or transfers of personnel would be considered as closer to rank-and-file
employees. The exclusion, therefore, of middle level executives from the
category of managers brought about a third classification, the supervisory
employees. These supervisory employees are allowed to form their own
union but they are not allowed to join the rank-and-file union because of
conflict of interest (Journal of the Senate, First Regular Session, 1987, 1988,
Volume 3, p. 2245).
In terms of classification, however, while they are more closely identified with
the rank-and-file they are still not allowed to join the union of rank-and-file
employees. The peculiar role of supervisors is such that while they are not
managers, when they recommend action implementing management policy
or ask for the discipline or dismissal of subordinates, they identify with the
interests of the employer and may act contrary to the interests of the rank-
and-file.
The Court agrees with ALSI’s contention that a conflict of interest may arise
in the areas of discipline, collective bargaining and strikes. Members of the
supervisory union might refuse to carry out disciplinary measures against
their co-member rank-and-file employees. And also, in the event of a strike,
the national federation might influence the supervisors’ union to conduct a
sympathy strike on the sole basis of affiliation. The Court construes Article
245 to mean that, as in Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act, supervisors shall
not be given an occasion to bargain together with the rank-and-file against
the interests of the employer regarding terms and conditions of work.
The Court emphasizes that the limitation is not confined to a case of
supervisors wanting to join a rank-and-file local union. The prohibition
extends to a supervisors' local union applying for membership in a national
federation the members of which include
local unions of rank-and-file employees. The intent of the law is clear
especially where, as in the case at bar, the supervisors will There is no
question about this intendment of the law. There is, however, in the present
case, no violation of such a guarantee to the employee. Supervisors are not
prohibited from forming their own union. What the law prohibits is their
membership in a labor organization of rank-and-file employees (Art. 245,
Labor Code) or their joining a national federation of rank-and-file employees
that includes the very local union which they are not allowed to directly join.
NOTE: Before this case was resolved, ALSI caved in to the pressure and was
no longer interested to pursue this case. SC just said the employer is free to
grant whatever concession it wishes to give to its employees unilaterally or
through negotiations. However, the resolutions issued by DOLE were still
struck down.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The private respondent is
disqualified from affiliating with a national federation of labor organizations
which includes the petitioner's rank-and-file employees.
DLSUMCCM v BLR
FACTS
The Federation of Free Workers (FFW), a national federation of labor unions,
issued a certificate to DLSUMCCM Supervisory Union Chapter recognizing it
as a local chapter. FFW filed on behalf of the union a petition for certification
election among the supervisory employees of DLSUMCCM. This petition was
opposed by DLSUMCCM on the grounds that several employees who signed
the petition for certification election were managerial employees and that
the Union was composed of both supervisory and rank and file employees in
the company and that the act of supervisory employees in affiliating with FFW
to who the rank and file employees are also affiliated is violative of Article
245 of the Labor Code.
This opposition was repeatedly denied. Thus, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. Whether unions formed independently by supervisory and rank and
file employees of a company may validly affiliate with the same
national federation (YES)
Supervisory employees have the right to self-organization as do other classes
of employees save only managerial ones. The Constitution states that “the
right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations or societies for purposes not contrary to
law, shall not be abridged.”
As held in United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union v. Laguesma, the framers of
the Constitution intended, by this provision, to restore the right of
supervisory employees to self-organization which had been withdrawn from
them during the period of martial law.
Conformably with the constitutional mandate, Art. 245 of the Labor Code
now provides for the right of supervisory employees to self-organization,
subject to the limitation that they cannot join an organization of rank-and-file
employees: Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a
labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form
separate labor organizations of their own.
The reason for the segregation of supervisory and rank-and-file employees of
a company with respect to the exercise of the right to self-organization is the
difference in their interests. Supervisory employees are more closely
identified with the employer than with the rank-and-file employees. If
supervisory and rank-and-file employees in a company are allowed to form a
single union, the conflicting interests of these groups impair their relationship
and adversely affect discipline, collective bargaining, and strikes.
These consequences can obtain not only in cases where supervisory and rank-
and-file employees in the same company belong to a single union but also
where unions formed independently by supervisory and rank-and–file
employees of a company are allowed to affiliate with the same national
federation.
Atlas Lithographic Services Inc. v. Laguesma: To avoid a situation where
supervisors would merge with the rank-and-file or where the supervisors’
labor organization would represent conflicting interests, then a local
supervisors’ union should not be allowed to affiliate with a national
federation of unions of rank-and-file employees where that federation
actively participates in union activities in the company.
It was explained in that case however that such a situation would obtain only
where two conditions concur:
(1) The rank-and-file employees are directly under the authority of
supervisory employees.
(2) The national federation is actively involved in union activities in the
company.
The presence of these 2 conditions distinguished Atlas from the case of
Adamson & Adamson, Inc. vs. CIR where it was held that:
The affiliation of two local unions in a company with the same national
federation is not by itself a negation of their independence since in relation
to the employer, the local unions are considered as the principals, while the
federation is deemed to be merely their agent. This conclusion is in accord
with the policy that any limitation on the exercise by employees of the right
to self-organization guaranteed in the Constitution must be construed
strictly. Workers should be allowed the practice of this freedom to the extent
recognized in the fundamental law.
2. Are the conditions laid down in Atlas met? (NO)
Are the conditions laid down in Atlas met in the present case? (Whether the
rank-and-file employees of DLSUMCCM who compose a labor union are
directly under the supervisory employees whose own union is affiliated with
the same national federation (FFW) and whether such national federation is
actively involved in union activities in the company so as to make the two
unions in the same company, in reality, just one union) NO
Although DLSUMCCMSUC and another union composed of rank-and-file
employees of DLSUMCCM are indeed affiliated with the same national
federation, the FFW, DLSUMCCM has not presented any evidence showing
that the rank-and-file employees composing the other union are directly
under the authority of the supervisory employees.
The fact that the two groups of workers are employed by the same company
and the fact that they are affiliated with a common national federation are
not sufficient to justify the conclusion that their organizations are actually
just one. Their immediate professional relationship must be established.
The fact that the petition for certification election in this case was filed by the
FFW on behalf of the local union, while showing active involvement by the
FFW in union activities at the company, is by itself insufficient to justify a
finding of violation of Art. 245 since there is no proof that the supervisors
who compose the local union have direct authority over the rank-and-file
employees composing the other local union which is also affiliated with the
FFW.
Holy Child Catholic School v Sto Tomas
146, 23 July 2013
FACTS:
A petition for certification election was filed by private respondent Pinag-
Isang Tinig at Lakas ng Anakpawis – Holy Child Catholic School Teachers and
Employees Labor Union (HCCS-TELUPIGLAS). Holy Child Parochial School
raised that members of private respondent do not belong to the same class;
it is not only a mixture of managerial, supervisory, and rank-and-file
employees – as three (3) are vice-principals, one (1) is a department
head/supervisor, and eleven (11) are coordinators – but also a combination
of teaching and non-teaching personnel – as twenty-seven (27) are non-
teaching personnel. It insisted that, for not being in accord with Article 24510
of the Labor Code, private respondent is an illegitimate labor organization
lacking in personality to file a petition for certification election The Med-
Arbiter denied the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for certification election is dismissible on the
ground that the labor organization’s membership allegedly consists of
supervisory and rank-and-file employees.
No. Before, when the 1989 Rules was still in application, mingling will prevent
an otherwise legitimate and duly registered labor organization from
exercising its right to file a petition for certification election. But then, the
1989 Amended Omnibus Rules was further amended by Department Order
No. 9, series of 1997 (1997 Amended Omnibus Rules). Specifically, the
requirement under Sec. 2(c) of the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules – that the
petition for certification election indicate that the bargaining unit of rank-
and-file employees has not been mingled with supervisory employees – was
removed.
Petitioner argued that, in view of the improper mixture of teaching and non-
teaching personnel in private respondent due to the absence of mutuality of
interest among its members, the petition for certification election should
have been dismissed on the ground that private respondent is not qualified
to file such petition for its failure to qualify as a legitimate labor organization,
the basic qualification of which is the representation of an appropriate
bargaining unit. The Supreme Court disagreed and said that the concepts of
a union and of a legitimate labor organization are different from, but related
to, the concept of a bargaining unit.
In case of alleged inclusion of disqualified employees in a union, the proper
procedure for an employer like petitioner is to directly file a petition for
cancellation of the union’s certificate of registration due to
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances
enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code, as amended. To reiterate,
private respondent, having been validly issued a certificate of registration,
should be considered as having acquired juridical personality which may not
be attacked collaterally.
PLAC v BLR
Fact:
There was an allegation that there was a renewal of the collective bargaining
agreement with a union shop clause between petitioner union and
respondent company to last for another period of three (3) years
incorporating therein new economic benefits to expire on December 31,
1977. The claim was that at that time it was the only bargaining agent of the
respondent company unchallenged by any labor organization. Then came the
assertion that with due notice to all the members of the petitioner union, and
with more than 1,500 of them present, such collective bargaining agreement
was ratified by a
unanimous vote .
It was further alleged that at the time of such certification, there was no
pending request for union recognition by any other labor organization with
management. Thereafter respondent Federation of Free Workers, setting
forth that its members represent more than 60% out of 1,500 members
sought a certification election.
Petitioner union opposed such a move as in its view the collective bargaining
agreement entered into with the respondent company had been certified. It
was sustained, the Secretary of Labor to whom an appeal was taken
concurring with the former National Labor Relations Commission affirming
the dismissal of such petition for certification, on the ground of the existence
of a certified collective
bargaining agreement.
Respondent Federation filed a complaint with the respondent Bureau of
Labor Relations, the present Labor Code having become effective, alleging
that some employees, numbering 848 in all, in a resolution attached to the
complaint disaffiliated from petitioner union and affiliated with it,
characterizing the certified agreement as having been entered into allegedly
to thwart such disaffiliation and seeking a declaration of the nullity thereof.
After both petitioner union and respondent Federation of Free Workers had
filed their pleadings, the Med-Arbiter dismissed the complaint.
Bureau of Labor Relations issued an order setting aside the certification of
the collective bargaining agreement and ordering a certification election.
Motion for reconsideration as well as a verified urgent petition filed with the
Secretary of Labor by respondent Company was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the BLR committed grave abuse of discretion in setting aside
the certification of the collective bargaining agreement and ordering a
certification election.
No. It is indisputable that the present controversy would not have arisen if
there were no mass disaffiliation from petitioning Union. Once the fact of
disaffiliation has been demonstrated beyond doubt,
as in this case, a certification election is the most expeditious way of
determining which labor organization is to be the exclusive bargaining
representative. A different conclusion could have been reached had there
been no decertification. The contract-bar rule could then be invoked by
petitioner. In this controversy, however, such a principle is not applicable.
The collective bargaining agreement entered into by petitioner with
management was decertified in the challenged order. The power to decertify
by respondent Bureau is not disputed. It was the exercise thereof that is now
assailed. If done arbitrarily, there is valid ground for complaint. The due
process clause is a guarantee against any actuation of that
sort. Petitioner was heard by respondent Bureau before the order of
decertification was issued. The denial of its motion for reconsideration came
also after it had an opportunity to present its side.
Procedural due process was thus observed. Nor was there any denial of
substantive due process in the sense of such decertification being an act of
arbitrariness and caprice.
With respect to the complaint of the confirmation of disaffiliation of the
members of respondent Philippine Labor Alliance counsel the same should
be resolved in the most expedient and simple method of determining the
exclusive bargaining representative — the holding of a certification election.
With the decertification of the collective agreement, the representation issue
comes back to the fore. Petitioner wants this resolved by ruling on the
affiliation and disaffiliation of the union, The Bureau holds, however, that
certification election can better resolve the issue. Parenthetically, it should
be stated that a certification election can still be held even if the collective
agreement were certified, considering the peculiar facts of the case. Good
policy and equity demand that when an agreement is renegotiated before
the appointed 60-day period, its certification must still give way to any
representation issue that may be raised within 60-day period so that the right
of employees to choose a bargaining unit agent and the right, of unions to be
chosen shall be preserved."
It would thus appear rather obvious that the attempt to impute arbitrariness
to respondent Bureau cannot be attended with success. The court found no
justification for setting aside its factual findings, which like those of any other
administrative agency, are generally binding on the courts. Petition for
certiorari and prohibition is dismissed.
MSMG-UWP v Ramos
FACTS:
Petitioner MSMS, (local union) is an affiliate of ULGWP (federation). A local
union election was held under the action of the federation. The defeated
candidates filed a petition for impeachment. The local union held a general
membership meeting. Several union members failed to attend the meeting.
The local union requested the company to deduct the union fines from the
wage of those union members who failed to attend the general membership
meeting. The Secretary General of the federation disapproved the resolution
imposing the Php50 fine. The company then sent a reply to petitioner’s
request stating it cannot deduct fines without going against certain laws. The
imposition of the fine became the subject of a bitter disagreement between
the Federation and the local union culminating to the latter’s declaration of
general autonomy from the former. The federation asked the company to
stop the remittance of the local union’s share in the education funds. The
company led a complaint of interpleader with the DOLE. The federation called
a meeting placing the local union under trusteeship and appointing an
administrator. Petitioner union officers received letters from the
administrator requiring them to explain why they should not be removed
from the office and expelled from union membership. The officers were
expelled from the federation. The federation advised the company of the
expulsion of the 30 union officers and demanded their separation pursuant
to the Union Security Clause in the CBA. The Federation filed a notice of strike
with the NCMB to compel the company to effect the immediate termination
of the expelled union officers. Under the pressure of a strike, the company
terminated the 30 union officers from employment. The petitioners filed a
notice of strike on the grounds of discrimination; interference; mass dismissal
of union officers and shop stewards; threats, coercion and intimidation ; and
union busting. The petitioners prayed for the suspension of the effects of
their termination. Secretary Drilon dismissed the petition stating it was an
intra-union matter. Later, 78 union shop stewards were placed under
preventive suspension. The union members staged a walk-out and officially
declared a strike that afternoon. The strike was attended by violence.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the company was illegal dismissal.
Yes. The charges against respondent company proceeds from one main issue
– the termination of several employees upon the demand of the federation
pursuant to the union security clause. Although the union security clause may
be validly enforced, such must comply with due process. In this case,
petitioner union officers were expelled for allegedly committing acts of
disloyalty to the federation. The company did not inquire into the cause of
the expulsion and merely relied upon the federation’s allegations. The issue
is not a purely intra-union matter as it was later on converted into a
termination dispute when the company dismissed the petitioners from work
without the benefit of a separate notice and hearing. Although it started as
an intra-union dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the BLR, to remand
the same to the BLR would intolerably delay the case and the Labor Arbiter
could rule upon it. As to the act of disaffiliation by the local union; it is settled
that a local union has the right to disaffiliate from its mother union in the
absence of specific provisions in the federation’s constitution prohibiting
such. There was no such provision in federation ULGWP’s constitution.
2. Whether or not the strike was illegal.
No. As to the legally of the strike; it was based on the termination dispute and
petitioners believed in good faith in dismissing them, the company was guilty
of ULP. A no-strike, no lockout provision in the CBA can only be invoked when
the strike is economic. As to the violence, the parties agreed that the violence
was not attributed to the striking employees alone as the company itself
hired men to pacify the strikers. Such violence cannot be a ground for
declaring the strike illegal.
3. Whether or not petitioners can be deemed to have abandoned their
work.
As to the dismissal of the petitioners; respondents failed to prove that there
was abandonment absent any proof of petitioner’s intention to sever the
employee-employer relationship.
Phil Skylanders v NLRC
Facts:
In November 1993 the Philippine Skylanders Employees Association (PSEA), a
local labor union affiliated with the Philippine Association of Free Labor
Unions (PAFLU), won in the certification election conducted among the rank
and file employees of Philippine Skylanders, Inc. (PSI). Its rival union,
Philippine Skylanders Employees Association-WATU (PSEA-WATU)
immediately protested the result of the election before the Secretary of
Labor.
Several months later, PSEA sent PAFLU a notice of disaffiliation.
PSEA subsequently affiliated itself with the National Congress of Workers
(NCW), changed its name to Philippine Skylanders Employees Association –
National Congress of Workers (PSEA-NCW), and to maintain continuity within
the organization, allowed the former officers of PSEA-PAFLU to continue
occupying their positions as elected officers in the newly-formed PSEA-NCW.
On 17 March 1994 PSEA-NCW entered into a collective bargaining agreement
with PSI which was immediately registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment.
Meanwhile, apparently oblivious to PSEA’s shift of allegiance, PAFLU
Secretary General Serafin Ayroso wrote Mariles C. Romulo requesting a copy
of PSI’s audited financial statement. On 30 July 1994 PSI through its personnel
manager Francisco Dakila denied the request citing as reason PSEA’s
disaffiliation from PAFLU and its subsequent affiliation with NCW.
Issue: WON PSEA’s disaffiliation is legitimate.
At the outset, let it be noted that the issue of disaffiliation is an inter-union
conflict the jurisdiction of which properly lies with the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR) and not with the Labor Arbiter.
We upheld the right of local unions to separate from their mother federation
on the ground that as separate and voluntary associations, local unions do
not owe their creation and existence to the national federation to which they
are affiliated but, instead, to the will of their members. Yet the local unions
remain the basic units of association, free to serve their own interests subject
to the restraints imposed by the constitution and by-laws of the national
federation, and free also to renounce the affiliation upon the terms laid down
in the agreement which brought such affiliation into existence.
There is nothing shown in the records nor is it claimed by PAFLU that the local
union was expressly forbidden to disaffiliate from the federation nor were
there any conditions imposed for a valid breakaway. As such, the pendency
of an election protest involving both the mother federation and the local
union did not constitute a bar to a valid disaffiliation.
It was entirely reasonable then for PSI to enter into a collective bargaining
agreement with PSEA-NCW. As PSEA had validly severed itself from PAFLU,
there would be no restrictions which could validly hinder it from
subsequently affiliating with NCW and entering into a collective bargaining
agreement in behalf of its members.
Policy considerations dictate that in weighing the claims of a local union as
against those of a national federation, those of the former must be preferred.
Parenthetically though, the desires of the mother federation to protect its
locals are not altogether to be shunned. It will however be to err greatly
against the Constitution if the desires of the federation would be favored over
those of its members. That, at any rate, is the policy of the law. For if it were
otherwise, instead of protection, there would be disregard and neglect of the
lowly workingmen.
NUBE v PEMA
FACTS:
Respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB) used to be a government-
owned and controlled banking institution. Its rank-and-file employees, being
government personnel, were represented for collective negotiation by the
Philnabank Employees Association (PEMA), a public sector union. In 1996, the
Securities and Exchange Commission approved PNB’s new Articles of
Incorporation and By-laws and its changed status as a private corporation.
PEMA affiliated with petitioner National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE),
which is a labor federation composed of unions in the banking industry,
adopting the name NUBE-PNB Employees Chapter (NUBE-PEC).
Later, NUBE-PEC was certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of the PNB rank-and-file employees. A collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) was subsequently signed between NUBE-PEC and PNB covering the
period of January 1, 1997 to December 31, 2001. Pursuant to Article V on
Check-off and Agency Fees of the CBA, PNB shall deduct the monthly
membership fee and other assessments imposed by the union from the salary
of each union member, and agency fee (equivalent to the monthly
membership dues) from the salary of the rank- and-file employees within the
bargaining unit who are not union members. Moreover, during the effectivity
of the CBA, NUBE, being the Federation union, agreed that PNB shall remit
P15.00 of the P65.00 union dues per month collected by PNB from every
employee, and that PNB shall directly credit the amount to NUBE’s current
account with PNB.5
Following the expiration of the CBA, the Philnabank Employees
Association-FFW (PEMA-FFW) filed on January 2, 2002 a petition for
certification election among the rank-and-file employees of PNB. The petition
sought the conduct of a certification election to be participated in by PEMA-
FFW and NUBE-PEC. While the petition for certification election was still
pending, two significant events transpired – the independent union
registration of NUBE- PEC and its disaffiliation with NUBE.
On June 25, 2003, NUBE-PEC filed a Manifestation and Motion before
the Med-Arbitration Unit of DOLE, praying that, in view of its independent
registration as a labor union and disaffiliation from NUBE, its name as
appearing in the official ballots of the certification election be changed to
"Philnabank Employees Association (PEMA)" or, in the alternative, both
parties be allowed to use the name "PEMA" but with PEMA-FFW and NUBE-
PEC be denominated as "PEMA-Bustria Group" and "PEMA-Serrana Group,"
respectively. On the same date, PEMA sent a letter to the PNB management
informing its disaffiliation from NUBE and requesting to stop, effective
immediately, the check-off of the P15.00 due for NUBE.
Acting thereon, on July 4, 2003, PNB informed NUBE of PEMA’s letter
and its decision to continue the deduction of the P15.00 fees, but stop its
remittance to NUBE effective July 2003. PNB also notified NUBE that the
amounts collected would be held in a trust account pending the resolution of
the issue on PEMA’s disaffiliation. On July 11, 2003, NUBE replied that: it
remains as the exclusive bargaining representative of the PNB rank-and-file
employees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not effective disaffiliation took place.
A local union may disaffiliate at any time from its mother federation, absent
any showing that the same is prohibited under its constitution or rule. Such,
however, does not result in it losing its legal personality altogether. Verily,
Anglo-KMU v. Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawang Nagkakaisa Sa Manila Bar
Spinning Mills At J.P. Coats enlightens:
A local labor union is a separate and distinct unit primarily designed to secure
and maintain an equality of bargaining power between the employer and
their employee-members. A local union does not owe its existence to the
federation with which it is affiliated. It is a separate and distinct voluntary
association owing its creation to the will of its members. The mere act of
affiliation does not divest the local union of its own personality, neither does
it give the mother federation the license to act independently of the local
union. It only gives rise to a contract of agency where the former acts in
representation of the latter.
These and many more have consistently reiterated the earlier view
that the right of the local members to withdraw from the federation and to
form a new local union depends upon the provisions of the union's
constitution, by-laws and charter and, in the absence of enforceable
provisions in the federation's constitution preventing disaffiliation of a local
union, a local may sever its relationship with its parent. In the case at bar,
there is nothing shown in the records nor is it claimed by NUBE that PEMA
was expressly forbidden to disaffiliate from the federation nor were there any
conditions imposed for a valid breakaway. This being so, PEMA is not
precluded to disaffiliate from NUBE after acquiring the status of an
independent labor organization duly registered before the DOLE
Also, there is no merit on NUBE’s contention that PEMA’s
disaffiliation is invalid for non-observance of the procedure that union
members should make such determination through secret ballot and after
due deliberation, conformably with Article 241 (d) of the Labor Code, as
amended. Conspicuously, other than citing the opinion of a "recognized labor
law authority," NUBE failed to quote a specific provision of the law or rule
mandating that a local union’s disaffiliation from a federation must comply
with Article 241 (d) in order to be valid and effective.
Consequently, by PEMA's valid disaffiliation from NUBE, the vinculum
that previously bound the two entities was completely severed. As NUBE was
divested of any and all power to act in representation of PEMA, any act
performed by the former that affects the interests and affairs of the latter,
including the supposed expulsion of Serrana et al., is rendered without force
and effect. Also, in effect, NUBE loses it right to collect all union dues held in
its trust by PNB. The moment that PEMA separated from and left NUBE and
exists as an independent labor organization with a certificate of registration,
the former is no longer obliged to pay dues and assessments to the latter;
naturally, there would be no longer any reason or occasion for PNB to
continue making deductions.
ANGLO v SAMANA
FACTS:
Petitioner ANGLO is a duly registered labor organization while respondent
Union is its affiliate. In representation of SAMANA BAY, ANGLO entered and
concluded a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with Manila Bay Spinning
Mills and J.P. Coats Manila Bay, Inc. (the corporations)
The Executive Committee of SAMANA BAY decided to disaffiliate from ANGLO
in view of the latter’s dereliction of its duty to promote and advance the
welfare of SAMANA BAY and the alleged cases of corruption involving the
federation officers. Said disaffiliation was unanimously confirmed by the
members of SAMANA BAY
A petition to stop remittance of federation dues to ANGLO was filed by
SAMANA BAY with the BLR.The corporations, despite having been furnished
copies of the union resolution relating to said disaffiliation, refused to honor
the same
ANGLO counteracted by unseating all officers and board members of
SAMANA BAY and appointing in their stead, a new set of officers who were
duly recognized by the corporations. Disaffiliation as void considering that a
CBA is still existing and the freedom period has not yet set in
ISSUE: Whether or not the disaffiliation was valid
HELD: YES
RATIO:
All employees enjoy the right to self-organization and to form and join labor
organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining.
This is a fundamental right of labor and derives its existence from the
Constitution. In interpreting the protection to labor and social justice
provisions of the Constitution and the labor laws, rules or regulations, we
have always adopted the liberal approach which favors the exercise of labor
rights.
This Court is not ready to bend this principle to yield to a mere procedural
defect, to wit: failure to observe certain procedural requirements for a valid
disaffiliation. Non-compliance with the procedure on disaffiliation, being
premised on purely technical grounds cannot rise above the fundamental
right of self- organization.
We quote, with approval, the findings of herein public respondent, that:
"x x x the resolution of the general membership ratifying the disaffiliation
action initiated by the Board, substantially satisfies the procedural
requirements for disaffiliation. No doubt was raised on the support of the
majority of the union members on the decision to disaffiliate."
This, to our mind, is clearly supported by the evidence. ANGLO's alleged acts
inimical to the interests of respondent union have not been sufficiently
rebutted. It is clear under the facts that respondent union's members have
unanimously decided to disaffiliate from the mother federation and ANGLO
has nothing to offer in dispute other than the law prohibiting the disaffiliation
outside the freedom period.
A local union has the right to disaffiliate from its mother union when
circumstances warrant. Generally, a labor union may disaffiliate from the
mother union to form a local or independent union only during the 60-day
freedom period immediately preceding the expiration of the CBA. However,
even before the onset of the freedom period, disaffiliation may be carried out
when there is a shift of allegiance on the part of the majority of the members
of the union
A local labor union is a separate and distinct unit primarily designed to secure
and maintain an equality of bargaining power between the employer and
their employee-members. A local union does not owe its existence to the
federation with which it is affiliated. It is a separate and distinct voluntary
association owing its creation to the will of its members. The mere act of
affiliation does not divest the local union of its own personality, neither does
it give the mother federation the license to act independently of the local
union. It only gives rise to a contract of agency where the former acts in
representation of the latter.
By SAMANA BAY's disaffiliation from ANGLO, the vinculum that previously
bound the two entities was completely severed. ANGLO was divested of any
and all power to act in representation of SAMANA BAY. Thus, any act
performed by ANGLO affecting the interests and affairs of SAMANA BAY,
including the ouster of herein individual private respondents, is rendered
without force and effect.
DISPOSITIVE: Respondent WON.
DOCTRINE: All employees enjoy the right to self-organization and to form and
join labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective
bargaining. This is a fundamental right of labor and derives its existence from
the Constitution. In interpreting the protection to labor and social justice
provisions of the Constitution and the labor laws, rules or regulations, we
have always adopted the liberal approach which favors the exercise of labor
rights.
Non-compliance with the procedure on disaffiliation, being premised on
purely technical grounds cannot rise above the fundamental right of self-
organization
Volkschel v BLR
FACTS:
Volkschel Labor Uniion was once affiliated with ALUMETAL.- Both Volkschel
and Alumetal entered into a CBA. They agreed that ALUMETAL will apply
payroll deductions twice a month on the members of the UNION as
membership dues and other fees/fines, as may be duly authorized by the
UNIONAND ITS MEMBERS. They called this check-off authorization.
Subsequently, a majority of Volkschel’s members decided to disaffiliate from
ALUMETAL in order to operate on its own as an independent labor group,
pursuant to *
Art. 241 of the Labor Code
Moreover, the same want to revoke their check-off authorization in favour of
ALUMETAL. On the other hand, ALUMETAL assailed that the disaffiliation is
contrary to law and themembers are still obliged to pay their dues.
ISSUES:
1. (MAIN ISSUE) Can a local union like Volkschel disaffiliate from its
mother union likeALUMETAL?
YES. A local union, being a separate and voluntary association, is free to serve
the interest of all its members including the freedom to disaffiliate. This right
is consistent withconstitutional guarantee of FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION.
(Art. IV, Sec. 7, Phil. Constitution)
2. Should the local union still pay union membership dues even upon
disaffiliation from itsmother union?
NO. The obligation of an employee to pay union dues is coterminous with his
affiliation/membership
Del Monte v Saldivar
FACTS:
Associated Labor Union (ALU) is the exclusive bargaining agent of plantation
workers of petitioner Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (Del Monte) in Bukidnon
Respondent Nena Timbal was a rank-and-file employee of Del Monte and also
a member of ALU
Del Monte and ALU entered into a CBA
o Section 5 of the CBA stipulated that "ALU assumes full responsibility
of any such termination of any member of the bargaining unit who loses his
membership in ALU and agrees to hold Del Monte free from any liability by
judgment of a competent authority for claims arising out of dismissals made
upon demand of ALU, and latter shall reimburse the former of such sums as
it shall have paid therefore.
Timbal, along with four other employees (collectively, co-
employees), were charged by ALU for disloyalty to the union (for encouraging
defections to a rival union, NFL). They allegedly attended seminars.
Disloyalty Board >>> Affidavit of Artajo (turns out there is bad blood
between Artajo and Timbal) >>> Disloyalty Board nonetheless recommended
the expulsion of Timbal from membership in ALU, and likewise her dismissal
from Del Monte in accordance with the Union Security Clause in the existing
CBA >>> ALU Regional VP adopted recommendations >>> ALU President
affirmed the expulsion
Del Monte terminated Timbal and her co-employees, noting that the
termination was "upon demand of ALU
- Timbal and her co-employees filed separate complaints against Del
Monte and/or its Personnel Manager Warfredo C. Balandra and ALU with the
Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and damages.
o The Labor Arbiter affirmed that all five were illegally dismissed and
ordered Del Monte to reinstate complainants, to their former positions and
to pay their full backwages and other allowances >>> NLRC: all validly
dismissed >>> CA: all, except Timbal, validly dismissed
- Before the Labor Arbiter, Del Monte presented its cross-claim against
ALU for reimbursement should it be made liable for illegal dismissal or unfair
labor practice pursuant to the union security clause.
- LA ruled that it cannot validly entertain the cross-claims of
respondent DMPI and Tabusuares against the respondent ALU-TUCP because
of the absence of employer-employee relationship between the two
ISSUE:
WoN the Labor Arbiter could properly pass judgment on the cross-claim--
NO.
• The law precludes the Labor Arbiter from enforcing money claims
arising from the implementation of the CBA
• Del Monte and ALU expressly recognized the jurisdiction of Voluntary
Arbitrators in the CBA
• Article 217 of the Labor Code sets forth the original jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiters. In contrast, Article 261 of the Labor Code indubitably vests on
the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators the "original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising
from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement." Among those areas of conflict traditionally within the
jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators are contract-interpretation and contract-
implementation, the questions precisely involved in Del Monte’s claim.
• In reconciling the grants of jurisdiction vested under Articles 261 and
217 of the Labor Code, the Court has pronounced that "the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter under Article 217(c) for money
claims is limited only to those arising from statutes or contracts other than a
Collective Bargaining Agreement. The Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators will have original and exclusive jurisdiction over money
claims 'arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement and, those arising from the interpretation or
enforcement of company personnel policies', under Article 261.
Facts:
Petitioner Alabang Country Club Inc. (ACCI), is a stock, non-profit corporation
that operates and maintains a country club and various sports and
recreational facilities for the exclusive use of its members. Sometime in 1993,
Francisco Ferrer, then President of ACCI, requested its Internal Auditor, to
conduct a study on the profitability of ACCI’s Food and Beverage Department
(F & B Department). Consequently, report showed that from 1989 to 1993, F
& B Department had been incurring substantial losses.
Realizing that it was no longer profitable for ACCI to maintain its own F & B
Department, the management decided to cease from operating the
department and to open the same to a contractor, such as a concessionaire,
which would be willing to operate its own food and beverage business within
the club. Thus, ACCI sent its F & B Department employee’s individual letters
informing them that their services were being terminated and that they
would be paid separation pay. The Union in turn, with the authority of
individual respondents, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
Issue:
Whether or not the club’s right to terminate its employees for an authorized
cause, particularly to secure its continued viability and existence is valid.
When petitioner decided to cease operating its F & B Department and open
the same to a concessionaire, it did not reduce the number of personnel
assigned thereat. It terminated the employment of all personnel assigned at
the department.
Petitioner’s failure to prove that the closure of its F & B Department was due
to substantial losses notwithstanding, the Court finds that individual
respondents were dismissed on the ground of closure or cessation of an
undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, which is
allowed under Article 283 of the Labor Code.
The closure of operation of an establishment or undertaking not due to
serious business losses or financial reverses includes both the complete
cessation of operations and the cessation of only part of a company’s
activities.
Guijarno v CIR
Facts:
-Three unfair labor practice cases for unlawful dismissal allegedly based on
legitimate union activity were filed against respondent Central Santos Lopez
Co., Inc. and respondent United Sugar Workers Union-ILO, with eight of the
present petitioners as complainants in the first, six of them in the second,
and five, in the third. These three are consolidated.
-Petitioners insist their right to reinstatement as the closed-shop provision (in
the CBA) was incorrectly applied to them since they were in employment long
before the CBA took effect.
-The company said that the only reason for the dismissal of the petitioners is
because their dismissal was asked by the union where the company has a
valid and existing CB contract with a closed-shop provision to the effect that
those laborers who are no longer members of good standing in the union may
be dismissed by the respondent company if their dismissal is sought by the
union; It has never committed acts of unfair labor practice but that it has the
obligation to comply with the terms and conditions of the contract; and that
a closed-shop agreement is expressly allowed under the provisions of RA 875
known as the Industrial Peace Act and the dismissal of complainants is merely
an exercise of a right allowed by said law.
-TC (November 2, 1967) and CIR (January 22, 1968) held the dismissal was
justifiable under the closed-shop provision of the collective bargaining
agreement.
Issue: WON the closed-shop provision could be applied retroactively.
NO. (as held in the leading case of Confederated Sons of Labor v. Anakan
Lumber Co. decided in April of 1960)
However, "The closed-shop agreement authorized under sec. 4, subsec. a(4)
of the Industrial Peace Act apply to persons to be hired or to employees who
are not yet members of any labor organization. It is inapplicable to those
already in the service who are members of another union. To hold otherwise,
i. e., that the employees in a company who are members of a minority union
may be compelled to disaffiliate from their union and join the majority or
contracting union, would render nugatory the right of all employees to self-
organization and to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own
choosing, a right guaranteed by the Industrial Peace Act (sec. 3, Rep. Act No.
875) as well as by the Constitution (Art. III, sec. 1[6])." (Freeman Shirt
Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, January 28, 1961)
The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work."
Where does that leave a labor union. Correctly understood, it is nothing but
the means of assuring that such fundamental objectives would be achieved.
It is the instrumentality through which an individual laborer who is helpless
as against a powerful employer may, through concerted effort and activity,
achieve the goal of economic well-being. That is the philosophy underlying
the Industrial Peace Act. 33 For, rightly has it been said that workers
unorganized are weak; workers organized are strong. Necessarily then, they
join labor unions.
To further increase the effectiveness of such organizations, a closed-shop has
been allowed. It could happen, though, that such a stipulation which assures
further weight to a labor union at the bargaining table could be utilized
against minority groups or individual members thereof. There are indications
that such a deplorable situation did so manifest itself here.
Dispositive: CIR reversed. Central Lopez Co., Inc. is ordered to reinstate
petitioners to the positions they occupied prior to their illegal dismissal, with
back wages to be paid by respondent union (for the company would not have
taken the action had it not been for the insistence of the labor union seeking
to give effect to its interpretation of a closed-shop provision), deducting
therefrom whatever wages they may have earned in the meanwhile.
NUWHRAIN vs. NLRC
After the lapse of the 60-day freedom period, but pending the disposition of
the Petition for Certification Election filed by NUWHRAIN, HIMPHLU served
the Hotel with a written demand dated 28 July 2005[10] for the dismissal of
36 employees following their expulsion from HIMPHLU for alleged acts of
disloyalty and violation of its Constitution and by-laws. An Investigation
Report[11] was attached to the said written demand, stating that the 36
employees, who were members of HIMPHLU, joined NUWHRAIN, in
violation of Section 2, Article IV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement,
which provided for a union security clause that reads: [12]
Section 2. DISMISSAL PURSUANT TO UNION SECURITY
CLAUSE. Accordingly, failure to join the UNION within the period
specified in the immediately preceding section or failure to maintain
membership with the UNION in good standing either through
resignation or expulsion from the UNION in accordance with
the UNIONs Constitution and by-laws due to disloyalty, joining
another union or non-payment of UNION dues shall be a ground for
the UNION to demand the dismissal from the HOTEL of the
employee concerned. The demand shall be accompanied by
the UNIONs investigation report and the HOTEL shall act
accordingly subject to existing laws and jurisprudence on the
matter, provided, however, that the UNION shall hold the HOTEL
free and harmless from any and all liabilities that may arise should
the dismissed employee question in any manner the dismissal. The
HOTEL shall not, however, be compelled to act on any such UNION
demand if made within a period of sixty (60) days prior to the
expiry date of this agreement.
Hotel issued Disciplinary Action Notices[13] (Notices) directing the 36
employees to submit a written explanation for their alleged acts of disloyalty
and violation of the union security clause for which HIMPHLU sought their
dismissal. Hotel called the contending unions and the employees concerned
for a reconciliatory conference in an attempt to avoid the dismissal of the 36
employees. NUWHRAIN proceeded to file a Notice of Strike before the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on 8 September 2005 on
the ground of unfair labor practice NUWHRAIN asserted that the Hotel
committed unfair labor practice when it issued the Notices to the 36
employees who switched allegiance from HIMPHLU to NUWHRAIN
ISSUE
WON the HOTEL committed unfair labor practice when it issued the
Notices to the 36 employees, former members of HIMPHLU, who
switched allegiance to NUWHRAIN
 Union security is a generic term which is applied to and comprehends
closed shop, union shop, maintenance of membership or any other form of
agreement which imposes upon employees the obligation to acquire or retain
union membership as a condition affecting employment.[25] Article 248(e) of
the Labor Code recognizes the effectivity of a union shop clause:
Art. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers.
(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work, and
other terms and conditions of employment in order to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization. Nothing in this Code or in any other law shall
prevent the parties from requiring membership in a
recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition for
employment, except of those employees who are already
members of another union at the time of the signing of the
collective bargaining agreementx x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the present case, the Collective Bargaining Agreement includes a
union security provision.[28] To avoid the clear possibility of liability for
breaching the union security clause of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
and to protect its own interests, the only sensible option left to the Hotel,
upon its receipt of the demand of HIMPHLU for the dismissal of the 36
employees, was to conduct its own inquiry so as to make its own findings on
whether there was sufficient ground to dismiss the said employees who
defected from HIMPHLU. The issuance by the respondent of the Notices
requiring the 36 employees to submit their explanations to the charges
against them was the reasonable and logical first step in a fair investigation. It
is important to note that the Hotel did not take further steps to terminate the
36 employees.Instead, it arranged for reconciliatory conferences between
the contending unions in order to avert the possibility of dismissing the 36
employees for violation of the union security clause of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement.
This Court, in Malayang Samahan ng Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield
v. Ramos[29] clearly stated the general rule: the dismissal of an employee by
the company pursuant to a labor unions demand in accordance with a union
security agreement does not constitute unfair labor practice. An employer is
not considered guilty of unfair labor practice if it merely complied in good
faith with the request of the certified union for the dismissal of employees
expelled from the union pursuant to the union security clause in the
Collective Bargaining Agreement.[30] In the case at bar, there is even less
possibility of sustaining a finding of guilt for unfair labor practice where
respondent did not dismiss the 36 employees, despite the insistence of
HIMPHLU, the sole bargaining agent for the rank and file employees of the
Hotel, on the basis of the union security clause of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. The only act attributed to the respondent is its issuance of the
Notices which, contrary to being an unfair labor practice, even afforded the
employees involved a chance to be heard.
DPA v DPA EU
FACTS: Respondent Del Pilar Academy Employees Union (the UNION) is the
certified collective bargaining representative of teaching and non-teaching
personnel of petitioner Del Pilar Academy (DEL PILAR), an educational
institution operating in Imus, Cavite.
On September 15, 1994, the UNION and DEL PILAR entered into a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) granting salary increase and other benefits to
the teaching and non-teaching staff. The UNION then assessed agency fees
from non-union employees, and requested DEL PILAR to deduct said
assessment from the employees’ salaries and wages. DEL PILAR, however,
refused to effect deductions claiming that the non-union employees were not
amenable to it.
In September 1997, the UNION negotiated for the renewal of the CBA. DEL
PILAR, however, refused to renew the same unless the provision regarding
entitlement to two (2) months summer vacation leave with pay will be
amended by limiting the same to teachers, who have rendered at least three
(3) consecutive academic years of satisfactory service. The UNION objected
to the proposal claiming diminution of benefits. DEL PILAR refused to sign the
CBA, resulting in a deadlock. The UNION requested DEL PILAR to submit the
case for voluntary arbitration, but the latter allegedly refused, prompting the
UNION to file a case for unfair labor practice with the Labor Arbiter against
DEL PILAR; Eduardo Espejo, its president; and Eliseo Ocampo, Jr., chairman of
the Board of Trustees.
DEL PILAR denied committing unfair labor practices against the UNION. It
justified the non-deduction of the agency fees by the absence of individual
check off authorization from the non-union employees.
ISSUE: Whether or not the UNION is entitled to collect agency fees from non-
union members, and if so, whether an individual written authorization is
necessary for a valid check off.
The collection of agency fees in an amount equivalent to union dues and fees,
from employees who are not union members, is recognized by Article 248(e)
of the Labor Code, thus:
Employees of an appropriate collective bargaining unit who are not members
of the recognized collective bargaining agent may be assessed reasonable
fees equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by the recognized collective
bargaining agent, if such non-union members accept the benefits under the
collective bargaining agreement. Provided, That the individual authorization
required under Article 241, paragraph (o) of this Code shall not apply to the
non-members of recognized collective bargaining agent.
When so stipulated in a collective bargaining agreement or authorized in
writing by the employees concerned, the Labor Code and its Implementing
Rules recognize it to be the duty of the employer to deduct the sum
equivalent to the amount of union dues, as agency fees, from the employees’
wages for direct remittance to the union. The system is referred to as check
off. No requirement of written authorization from the non-union employees
is necessary if the non-union employees accept the benefits resulting from
the CBA.
The grant of annual salary increase is not the only provision in the CBA that
benefited the non-union employees. The UNION negotiated for other
benefits, namely, limitations on teaching assignments to 23 hours per week,
additional compensation for overload units or teaching assignments in excess
of the 23 hour per week limit, and payment of longevity pay. It also
negotiated for entitlement to summer vacation leave with pay for two (2)
months for teaching staff who have rendered six (6) consecutive semesters
of service. For the non-teaching personnel, the UNION worked for their
entitlement to fifteen (15) days leave with pay.13 These provisions in the CBA
surely benefited the non-union employees, justifying the collection of, and
the UNION’s entitlement to, agency fees.
Accordingly, no requirement of written authorization from the non-union
employees is needed to effect a valid check off. Article 248(e) makes it explicit
that Article 241, paragraph (o), requiring written authorization is inapplicable
to non-union members, especially in this case where the non-union
employees receive several benefits under the CBA.
The employee’s acceptance of benefits resulting from a collective bargaining
agreement justifies the deduction of agency fees from his pay and the union’s
entitlement thereto. In this aspect, the legal basis of the union’s right to
agency fees is neither contractual nor statutory, but quasi-contractual,
deriving from the established principle that non-union employees may not
unjustly enrich themselves by benefiting from employment conditions
negotiated by the bargaining union.
Belyca v Calleja
FACTS:
In the instant case, private respondent Associated Labor Union (ALU)-TUCP,
seeks direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the
rank-and-file workers of the livestock and agro division of petitioner BELYCA
Corporation engaged in piggery, poultry raising and the planting of
agricultural crops such as corn, coffee and various vegetables. Private
respondents in their petition allege the following:
(1) that there is no existing collective bargaining agreement between the
respondent employer, petitioner herein, and any other existing legitimate
labor unions;
(2) that there had neither been a certification election conducted in the
proposed bargaining unit within the last twelve (12) months prior to the filing
of the petition nor a contending union requesting for certification as the sole
and exclusive bargaining representative in the proposed bargaining unit;
(3) that more than a majority of respondent employer's rank-and-file
employees/workers in the proposed bargaining unit or one hundred
thirtyeight (138) as of the date of the filing of the petition, have
signedmembership with the ALU-TUCP and have expressed their written
consent and authorization to the filing of the petition; and
(4) that in response to petitioner union's two letters to the
proprietor/General Manager of respondent employer, dated April 21, 1986
and May 8, 1986, requesting for direct recognition as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file workers, respondent employer has
locked out 119 of its rank-and-file employees in the said bargaining unit and
had dismissed earlier the local union president, vice-president and three
other active members of the local unions for which an unfair labor practice
case was filed by petitioner union against respondent employer.
Belyca, on the other hand, alleged in its position paper the following:
(1) that due to the nature of its business, very few of its employees are
permanent, the overwhelming majority of which are seasonal and casual and
regular employees;
(2) that of the total 138 rank-and-file employees who authorized, signed and
supported the filing of the petition: (a) 14 were no longer working as of June
3, 1986; (b) 4 resigned after June, 1986; (c) 6 withdrew their membership
from petitioner union; (d) 5 were retrenched on June 23, 1986; (e) 12 were
dismissed due to malicious insubordination and destruction of property and;
(f) 100 simply abandoned their work or stopped working;
(3) that the 128 incumbent employees or workers of the livestock section
were merely transferred from the agricultural section as replacement for
those who have either been dismissed, retrenched or resigned; and
(4) that the statutory requirement for holding a certification election has not
been complied with by the union. The petitioner contends that the bargaining
unit must include all the workers in its integrated business concerns ranging
from piggery, poultry, to supermarts and cinemas so as not to split an
otherwise single bargaining unit into fragmented bargaining units.
ISSUE: WON the proposed bargaining unit by Belyca is an appropriate
bargaining unit.
HELD: No.
According to Rothenberg, a proper bargaining unit maybe said to be a group
of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the
entire body of employees, which the collective interests of all the employees,
consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve
reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law.
This Court has already taken cognizance of the crucial issue of determining
the proper constituency of a collective bargaining unit. Among the factors
considered in Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Co. Inc. (103
Phil 1103[1958]) are: "(1) will of employees (Glove Doctrine); (2) affinity and
unity of employee's interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties
or similarity of compensation and working conditions; (3) prior collective
bargaining history; and (4) employment status, such as temporary, seasonal
and probationary employees".
Under the circumstances of that case, the Court stressed the importance of
the fourth factor and sustained the trial court's conclusion that two separate
bargaining units should be formed in dealing with respondent company, one
consisting of regular and permanent employees and another consisting of
casual laborers or stevedores. Otherwise stated, temporary employees
should be treated separately from permanent employees. But more
importantly, this Court laid down the test of proper grouping, which is
community and mutuality of interest.
It is beyond question that the employees of the livestock and agro division of
petitioner corporation perform work entirely different from those performed
by employees in the supermarts and cinema. Among others, the noted
difference are: their working conditions, hours of work, rates of pay,
including the categories of their positions and employment status. To lump
all the employees of petitioner in its integrated business concerns cannot
result in an efficacious bargaining unit comprised of constituents enjoying a
community or mutuality of interest
DISPOSITIVE: Calleja won. Petition Dismissed.
DOCTRINE:
Factors to consider to determine an appropriate bargaining unit:
(1) will of employees (Glove Doctrine);
(2) affinity and unity of employee's interest, such as substantial similarity of
work and duties or similarity of compensation and working conditions;
(3) prior collective bargaining history; and
(4) employment status, such as temporary, seasonal and probationary
employees".
UP v Ferrer Calleja
University of the Philippines v. Ferrer-Calleja (1992)
Narvasa, C.J.:
FACTS:
 The Organization of Non-Academic Working Personnel of UP
(ONAPUP) filed a petition for certification election with the BLR.
o It claimed to have a membership of 3,236 members—more
than 33% of the 9,617 persons constituting the non-
academic personnel of four UP campuses (Diliman, Manila,
Los Baños, and Visayas).
o UP did not object to the petition.
 Another labor union, the All UP Workers’ Union (All UP) filed a
motion for intervention.
o It alleged that its membership covers both academic and
non-academic personnel, and that it aims to unite all rank-
and-file employees in one union.
o It assented to the holding of the certification election
provided the appropriate organizational unit was first clearly
defined.
o It observed in this connection that the Research, Extension
and Professorial Staff (REPS), who are academic non-
teaching personnel, should not be deemed part of the
organizational unit.
 UP’s General Counsel was of the stand that there should be two
unions—one for the non-academic/administrative, and one for the
academic personnel.
 BLR Director Calleja: The appropriate organizational unit should
embrace all the regular rank-and-file employees.
o No evidence to justify the grouping of non-academic
personnel separate from academic personnel.
o The Director quoted the pertinent provisions of EO 180 and
its IRRs:
Section 9. The appropriate organizational unit shall be the employer unit
consisting of rank-and-file employees, unless circumstances otherwise
require.
Sec. 1, Rule IV. For purposes of registration, an appropriate
organizational unit may refer to:
xxx
d. State universities or colleges, government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.
o General intent of the EO is not to “fragmentize” the
employer unit, as can be gleaned from the definition of the
term “accredited employees’ organization,” which refers to:
“x x x a registered organization of the rank-and-file employees as defined
in these rules recognized to negotiate for the employees in an
organizational unit headed by an officer with sufficient authority to bind
the agency, such as x x x state colleges and universities.”
o She thus ordered the holding of a certification among all
rank-and-file employees, teaching and non-teaching.
 At the pre-election conference, UP sought clarification of the term
“rank-and-file.” It claimed that there were some teaching and non-
teaching employees whose functions were in fact managerial and
policy-determining.
 It sought the exclusion of high-level employees, pursuant to Sec. 3 of
EO 180:
SEC. 3. High-level employees whose functions are normally considered as policy-
making or managerial or whose duties are of a highly confidential nature shall not
be eligible to join the organization of rank-and file government employees;
 It claims that the following should not be considered rank-and-file:
o Those with the rank of Assistant Professor or higher;
o Those administrative employees holding positions Grade 18
or higher.
 The University claims that these employees perform supervisory
functions and are vested with effective recommendatory powers. As
to the professors, UP notes that these academic staff are members
of the University Council, a policy-making body.
 ONAPUP did not oppose UP’s classification. All UP remained firm in
its stance to unite all the rank-and-file employees under a single
organizational unit.
 BLR Director Calleja (Second Order): Declared that the professors are
rank-and-file employees.
 o Sec. 1, Rule I, IRRs of EO 180:
High Level Employee — is one whose functions are normally considered
policy determining, managerial or one whose duties are highly
confidential in nature. A managerial function refers to the exercise of
powers such as:
1. To effectively recommend such managerial actions;
2. To formulate or execute management policies and decisions; or
3. To hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, dismiss, assign or discipline
employees.
o A careful perusal of the University Code shows that the
policy- making powers of the Council are limited to academic
matters, namely, prescribing courses of study and rules of
discipline, fixing student admission and graduation
requirements, recommending to the Board of Regents the
conferment of degrees, and disciplinary power over
students.
o On the other hand, the policies referred to in the definition
of high level employees refers to labor-related policies like
hiring, firing, discipline, labor standards and benefits, and
terms and conditions of employment.
o MR filed by UP was denied.
ISSUES + RULING:
Are the professors, associate professors and assistant professors high-level
employees? NO.
 The matter was correctly resolved by respondent Director.
 The College Academic Personnel Committee, through which the
academic personnel purportedly perform their supervisory functions,
is actually tasked to:
1. Assist the Dean in setting up the details for the implementation
of policies, rules, standards or general guidelines as formulated
by the University Academic Personnel Board;
2. Review the recommendations submitted by the DAPCs with
regard to recruitment, selection, performance evaluation,
tenure, staff development, and promotion of the faculty and
other academic personnel of the College;
3. Establish departmental priorities in the allocation of available
funds for promotion;
4. Act on cases of disagreement between the Chairman and the
members of the DAPC particularly on personnel matters covered
by this Order;
5. Act on complaints and/or protests against personnel actions
made by the Department Chairman and/or the DAPC
(Department Academic Personnel Committee).
 On the other hand, the University Academic Personnel Board
performs the following functions:
1. Assist the Chancellor in the review of the recommendations of
the CAPC'S.
2. Act on cases of disagreement between the Dean and the CAPC.
3. Formulate policies, rules, and standards with respect to the
selection, compensation, and promotion of members of the
academic staff.
4. Assist the Chancellor in the review of recommendations on
academic promotions and on other matters affecting faculty
status and welfare.
 It is clear that the high-level employees are those who comprise the
UAPB. These would refer to the deans, assistants for academic affairs,
and the chief of personnel. They formulate rules, polices and
standards respecting selection, compensation and promotion of
members of the academic staff.
 The functions of the DAPC and UAPB are merely recommendatory.
 Ultimately, the power to hire, fire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall,
dismiss, assign or discipline employees rests with the Board of
Regents.
 It is also clear that ALL academic personnel cannot be considered
high-level employees, because not all of them are members of the
DAPC/UAPB. They must be appointed or elected.
  Neither can membership in the University Council elevate the
professors to the status of high-level employees.
o The actions of such council are always subject to the approval
of the Board of Regents.
o In addition, the policy-determining functions of the
University Council refer to academic matters, i.e. those
governing the relationship between the University and its
students, and not the University as an employer and the
professors as employees. It is thus evident that no conflict of
interest results in the professors being members of the
University Council and being classified as rank-and-file
employees.
Should the academic employees comprise a bargaining unit separate and
distinct from that of the non-academic employees of UP? YES.
 Bargaining unit – a group of employees of a given employer,
comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees,
which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with
equity to the employer, indicate to be the best suited to serve the
reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective
bargaining provisions of the law.
 Labor laws do not provide criteria for determining the proper
collective bargaining unit.
 Sec. 12 of RA 875 merely required an “appropriate bargaining unit.”
This was retained in the Labor Code.
 Thus, the Court turned to American jurisprudence for guidance.
o Rothenberg:
1. Will of the employees (Globe doctrine);
2. Affinity and unit of employees’ interest, such as
substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of
compensation and working conditions;
3. Prior collective bargaining history; and
4. Employment status, such as temporary, seasonal, and
probationary employees.
o 10 Annual Report of the NLRB:
th
1. History, extent and type of organization of employees;
2. History of their collective bargaining;
3. History, extent and type of organization of employees in
other plants of the same employer, or other employers
in the same industry;
4. The skill, wages, work and working conditions of the
employees;
5. The desires of the employees;
6. The eligibility of the employees for membership in the
union/s involved; and
7. The relationship between the unit/s proposed and the
employer’s organization, management and operation.
o BASIC TEST: “A unit, to be appropriate, must affect a
grouping of employees who have substantial, mutual
interests in wages, hours, working conditions and other
subjects of collective bargaining.”
 Test applied: “community or mutuality of interests” test.
 In the case at bar, the employees can easily be categorized into two
general classes:
o First—non-academic—janitors, messengers, typists, clerks,
receptionists, carpenters, electricians, ground-keepers,
chauffeurs, mechanics, plumbers; and
o Second—academic—full professors, associate professors,
assistant professors, instructors, research, extension and
professorial staff.
 It would seem obvious that teachers would find very little in common
with the University clerks and other non-academic employees as
regards responsibilities and functions, working conditions,
compensation rates, social life and interests, skills and intellectual
pursuits, cultural activities, etc.
 On the contrary, the dichotomy of interests, the dissimilarity in the
nature of the work and duties as well as in the compensation and
working conditions of the academic and non-academic personnel
dictate the separation of these two categories of employees for
purposes of collective bargaining.
DISPOSITION: Order affirmed.
SM v Laguesma
FACTS: Petitioner union filed before DOLE a Petition for Direct Certification
or Certification Election among the supervisors and exempt employees of the
SMC Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis.
Med-Arbiter Danilo L. Reynante issued an Order ordering the conduct of
certification election among the abovementioned employees of the different
plants as one bargaining unit.
San Miguel Corporation filed a Notice of Appeal with Memorandum on
Appeal, pointing out, among others, the Med-Arbiter’s error in grouping
together all three (3) separate plants, into one bargaining unit, and in
including supervisory levels 3 and above whose positions are confidential in
nature.
The public respondent, Undersecretary Laguesma, granted respondent
company’s Appeal and ordered the remand of the case to the Med-Arbiter of
origin for determination of the true classification of each of the employees
sought to be included in the appropriate bargaining unit.
Upon petitioner-union’s motion, Undersecretary Laguesma granted the
reconsideration prayed for and directed the conduct of separate certification
elections among the supervisors ranked as supervisory levels 1 to 4 (S1 to S4)
and the exempt employees in each of the three plants at Cabuyao, San
Fernando and Otis.
ISSUE:
1. Whether Supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees
of the company are considered confidential employees, hence ineligible from
joining a union.
2. If they are not confidential employees, do the employees of the three
plants constitute an appropriate single bargaining unit.
RULING:
(1) On the first issue, this Court rules that said employees do not fall within
the term “confidential employees” who may be prohibited from joining a
union.
They are not qualified to be classified as managerial employees who, under
Article 245 of the Labor Code, are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization. In the very same provision, they are not allowed membership
in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or
form separate labor organizations of their own.
Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential
capacity, (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate
management policies in the field of labor relations. The two criteria are
cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a
confidential employee — that is, the confidential relationship must exist
between the employee and his supervisor, and the supervisor must handle
the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations.
The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in the normal course
of their duties, become aware of management policies relating to labor
relations is a principal objective sought to be accomplished by the
”confidential employee rule.” The broad rationale behind this rule is that
employees should not be placed in a position involving a potential conflict of
interests. “Management should not be required to handle labor relations
matters through employees who are represented by the union with which
the company is required to deal and who in the normal performance of their
duties may obtain advance information of the company’s position with
regard to contract negotiations, the disposition of grievances, or other labor
relations matters.”
The Court held that “if these managerial employees would belong to or be
affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the
Union in view of evident conflict of interest. The Union can also become
company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union
membership.”
An important element of the “confidential employee rule” is the employee’s
need to use labor relations information. Thus, in determining the
confidentiality of certain employees, a key question frequently considered is
the employee’s necessary access to confidential labor relations information.
(2) The fact that the three plants are located in three different places, namely,
in Cabuyao, Laguna, in Otis, Pandacan, Metro Manila, and in San Fernando,
Pampanga is immaterial. Geographical location can be completely
disregarded if the communal or mutual interests of the employees are not
sacrificed.
An appropriate bargaining unit may be defined as “a group of employees of
a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with
equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve the reciprocal
rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of
the law.”
A unit to be appropriate must effect a grouping of employees who have
substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours, working conditions and other
subjects of collective bargaining.
SMF v SMCSEU
FACTS:
In the case of San Miguel Corporation Supervisors and Exempt Union v.
Laguesma, the Court held that even if they handle confidential data regarding
technical and internal business operations, supervisory employees 3 and 4
and the exempt employees of petitioner San Miguel Foods, Inc. are not to be
considered confidential employees, because the same do not pertain to labor
relations, particularly, negotiation and settlement of grievances.
Consequently, they were allowed to form an appropriate bargaining unit for
the purpose of collective bargaining. The Court also declared that the
employees belonging to the three different plants of San Miguel Corporation
Magnolia Poultry Products Plants in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis, having
community or mutuality of interests, constitute a single bargaining unit.
A certification election was conducted. On the date of the election, petitioner
filed the Omnibus Objections and Challenge to Voters, questioning the
eligibility to vote by some of its employees on the grounds that some
employees do not belong to the bargaining unit which respondent seeks to
represent or that there is no existence of employer-employee relationship
with petitioner.
Based on the results of the election, the Med-Arbiter issued the Order stating
that since the Yes vote received 97% of the valid votes cast, respondent is
certified to be the exclusive bargaining agent of the supervisors and exempt
employees of petitioner's Magnolia Poultry Products Plants in Cabuyao, San
Fernando, and Otis.
On appeal, the then Acting DOLE Undersecretary, in the Resolution, affirmed
the Order of the Med-Arbiter.
CA affirmed the Resolution of DOLE Undersecretary with modification stating
that those holding the positions of Human Resource Assistant and Personnel
Assistant are excluded from the bargaining unit.
Hence, this petition by the San Miguel Foods
ISSUE: W/N CA departed from jurisprudence when it expanded the scope of
the bargaining unit.
RULING: No. In San Miguel vs Laguesma, the Court explained that the
employees of San Miguel Corporation Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of
Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis constitute a single bargaining unit, which is
not contrary to the one-company, one-union policy. An appropriate
bargaining unit is defined as a group of employees of a given employer,
comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the
collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the
employer, indicate to be best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties
of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
It held that while the existence of a bargaining history is a factor that may be
reckoned with in determining the appropriate bargaining unit, the same is
not decisive or conclusive. Other factors must be considered. The test of
grouping is community or mutuality of interest. This is so because the basic
test of an asserted bargaining unit’s acceptability is whether or not it is
fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the
exercise of their collective bargaining rights. Certainly, there is a mutuality of
interest among the employees. Their functions mesh with one another. One
group needs the other in the same way that the company needs them both.
There may be differences as to the nature of their individual assignments, but
the distinctions are not enough to warrant the formation of a separate
bargaining unit.
The Court affirms the finding of the CA that there should be only one
bargaining unit for the employees in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis of
Magnolia Poultry Products Plant involved in dressed chicken processing and
Magnolia Poultry Farms engaged in live chicken operations. Certain factors,
such as specific line of work, working conditions, location of work, mode of
compensation, and other relevant conditions do not affect or impede their
commonality of interest. Although they seem separate and distinct from each
other, the specific tasks of each division are actually interrelated and there
exists mutuality of interests which warrants the formation of a single
bargaining unit.

DISPOSITIVE: Respondent won

DOCTRINE: An appropriate bargaining unit is defined as a group of employees

of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with
equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve the reciprocal
rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of
the law.

It held that while the existence of a bargaining history is a factor that may be
reckoned with in determining the appropriate bargaining unit, the same is
not decisive or conclusive. Other factors must be considered. The test of
grouping is community or mutuality of interest. This is so because the basic
test of an asserted bargaining unit’s acceptability is whether or not it is
fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the
exercise of their collective bargaining rights. Certainly, there is a mutuality of
interest among the employees. Their functions mesh with one another. One
group needs the other in the same way that the company needs them both.
There may be differences as to the nature of their individual assignments, but
the distinctions are not enough to warrant the formation of a separate
bargaining unit.