1. Roe v. Wade (Due Process: PERSON)
Cagandahan (LIBERTY)
FACTS: Texas statutes made it a crime to procure or attempt an abortion except
when medically advised for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.
Appellant Jane Roe sought a declaratory judgment that the statutes were
unconstitutional on their face and an injunction to prevent defendant Dallas
County District Attorney from enforcing the statutes. Appellant alleged that she
was unmarried and pregnant, and that she was unable to receive a legal abortion
by a licensed physician because her life was not threatened by the continuation
of her pregnancy and that she was unable to afford to travel to another
jurisdiction to obtain a legal abortion. Appellant sued on behalf of herself and all
other women similarly situated, claiming that the statutes were
unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right in the concept of personal
"liberty" embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause; or in
personal, marital, familial, and sexual privacy said to be protected by the Bill of
Rights or its penumbras.
ISSUE: Whether or not a woman’s right to privacy as protected by the
constitution includes the right to abort her child
RULING: The right to personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but the
right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests
in regulation. The abortion laws in effect in the majority of the States are of
relatively recent vintage, deriving from statutory changes generally enacted in the
latter half of the 19th century. At common law abortion performed before
quickening (the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero) was not an
indictable offense, and it is doubtful that abortion was ever a firmly established
common law crime even when it destroyed a quick fetus. Three reasons have been
advanced for the historical enactment of criminal abortion laws. The first is that
the laws are the product of a Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual
conduct, but this argument has been taken seriously by neither courts nor
commentators. The second reason is that the abortion procedure is hazardous,
therefore the State’s concern is to protect pregnant women. However, modern
medical techniques have altered the situation, with abortions being relatively safe
particularly in the first trimester. The third reason is the State’s interest is in
protecting the prenatal life. However, this is somewhat negated by the fact that
the pregnant woman cannot be prosecuted for the act of abortion.
For the stage prior to the approximate end of the first trimester, the abortion
decision must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending
physician, and may not be criminalized by statute.
For the stage subsequent to the approximate end of the first trimester, the State
may regulate abortion in ways reasonably related to maternal health based upon
the State’s interest in promoting the health of the mother. For the stage
subsequent to viability, the State may regulate and even proscribe abortion, except
where necessary for the preservation of the mother’s life, based upon the State’s
interest in the potential of the potential life of the unborn child.
2. Republic v.
FACTS:Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of
Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her
name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from
female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is
sufferingfrom Congenital AdrenalHyperplasia which is a rare medical
condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics.
Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her
petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that
she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued
by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the
Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that
“Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones,
her female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of both male and
female.” The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor
General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a
violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did
not implead the local civil registrar.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth certificate be
changed.
RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The
Supreme Court made use of the availale evidence presented in court including the
fact that private respondent thinks of himself as a male and as to the statement
made by the doctor that Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of
male hormones (androgen), which is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male.” In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court
will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as ones
sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo
medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH.
Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs
the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should
belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of
his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that
respondent is an incompetent and in the absence of evidence to show that
classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are
equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and
justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of being a male.
The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of
nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. That is,
the Supreme Court respects the respondent’s congenital condition and his mature
decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. The Court
added that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to
be exercised in the light of the reasons and the consequences that will follow.
 3. U.S. v. Windsor (LIBERTY)
FACTS: Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer, a same-sex couple residing in New York,
were lawfully married in Toronto, Ontario, Canada, in 2007. Their same-sex
marriage was recognized by the state of New York. Spyer died at the age of 77 in
2009, leaving her entire estate to Windsor. Windsor sought to claim the
federal estate tax exemption for surviving spouses. She was barred from doing so
by Section 3 of DOMA which provided that the term "spouse" only applied to
marriages between a man and woman. The Internal Revenue Service found that
the exemption did not apply to same-sex marriages, denied Windsor's claim, and
compelled her to pay $363,053 in estate taxes. On November 9, 2010, Windsor
sued the federal government seeking a refund because DOMA singled out legally
married same-sex couples for "differential treatment compared to other similarly
situated couples without justification. On February 23, 2011, U.S. Attorney
General Eric Holder announced that the Department of Justice would not defend
the constitutionality of Section 3 in Windsor. On April 18, 2011, Paul Clement,
representing the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG), intervened to defend
the law.
ISSUE: Section 3 of the DOMA defines “marriage” and “spouse” to exclude
same-sex couples. Does violate the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause?
RULING: Yes. Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act’s definitions of
“marriage” and “spouse” that excludes same-sex couples violates the Fifth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Historically, the definition and regulation
of marriage has been considered within the authority of the states. Congress has
passed certain statutes regulating the meaning of marriage in furtherance of
federal policy in the past, but DOMA has a broader reach than those previous
statutes. DOMA impacts a class of persons that New York, as well as other states,
have sought to protect. Examining the validity of DOMA requires discussing the
historical authority of states over marriage. With the exception of certain
constitutional guarantees, the regulation of marriage and families has been left to
the states. This practice dates back to the founding of this country and the
adoption of the Constitution. While marriage laws may vary from state to state,
they are consistent within each state. The state’s decision to give a class of persons
the right to marry granted that class an important status. The federal government
used this state-defined class to instead impose restrictions. The issue is whether
these restrictions amount to a deprivation of a right protected by the Fifth
Amendment. New York’s actions in recognizing Plaintiff’s marriage were a proper
exercise of its authority. DOMA violates due process and equal protection rights
when it seeks to injure a class New York seeks to protect. A congressional desire
to harm a politically unpopular group cannot justify unequal treatment of that
group. DOMA’s unusual deviation from the historical practice of recognizing state
definitions of marriage deprives same-sex couples of the benefits and
responsibilities that come with federal recognition of marriage. DOMA’s stated
purpose and practical effect are to create a separate status upon those who enter
same-sex marriages where those marriages are legal within that state. It deprives
a subset of couples married within a state of rights and responsibilities. DOMA
makes the marriages between same-sex couples second-tier. DOMA is
unconstitutional as a deprivation of liberty guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment
as to lawful same-sex marriages recognized under state law.
4. Quiao v. Quiao (PROPERTY)
FACTS: Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against
petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal
separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of Rita
and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between the spouses subject
to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the
unpaid conjugal liabilities. Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits earned by
the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children because
Brigido is the offending spouse. Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration
and appeal within the period 270 days later or after more than nine months from
the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for
Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.” RTC held
that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the remainder of the properties
of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and
the debts.” It further held that after determining the remainder of the properties,
it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse
does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles
63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code. The petitioner claims that the
court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead o
Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no
other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of
forfeiture as a result of legal separation.
ISSUE: Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights over½of the
properties in the conjugal partnership
RULING: The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the
spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the
Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of
the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which
provides: “All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common
by the husband and wife.” While one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he
may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law
and jurisprudence. The concept of vested right is a consequence of the
constitutional guaranty of due process that expresses a present fixed interest
which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state
action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand
but also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become
vested. Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present
interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. In the
present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was
well-aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal
properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the
trial court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent
as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all
the community properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for legal
separation was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court’s
ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as “net profits,” pursuant to Article
129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his
right to due process.
 5. TERMINAL FACILITIES AND SERVICES CORPORATION V.
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY (PROPERTY)
FACTS: Sometime in 1975 TEFASCO, a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of providing portand terminal facilities as well as arrastre, stevedoring
and other port-related services submitted to PPA aproposal for the construction
of a specialized terminal complex with port facilities and a provision for
portservices in Davao City. To ease the acute congestion in the government ports
at Sasa and Sta. Ana, Davao City, PPA welcomed the proposal and organized an
inter-agency committee to study the plan.The specialized matters intended to be
captured are: (a) bananas in consideration of the rate of spoilage;(b) sugar; (c)
fertilizers; (d) specialized movement of beer in pallets containerized handling
lumber andplywood.On April 21, 1976 the PPA Board of Directors passed
Resolution No. 7 accepting and approvingTEFASCO's project proposal.
Subsequently, the PPA Board passed on October 1, 1976 Resolution No.50 under
which TEFASCO, without asking for one, was compelled to submit an application
for construction permit. Without the consent of TEFASCO, the application
imposed additional significantconditions. The conditions provide that the
construction permit will entitle the applicant to operate thefacility for a period of
fifteen (15) years, without jeopardy to negotiation for a renewal for a period
notexceeding ten (10) years, In the event that the Foreshore Lease Application
expires or isdisapproved/canceled, this permit shall also be rendered null and
void, no general cargo shall be handledthrough the facility, among others.
TEFASCO heeded to this additional conditions. Two (2) years after thecompletion
of the port facilities and the commencement of TEFASCO's port operations, or on
June 10,1978, PPA again issued to TEFASCO another permit, designated as
Special Permit No. CO/CO-1-067802, under which more onerous conditions were
foisted on TEFASCO’s port operations. It containedprovisions for ten percent
(10%) government share out of arrastre and stevedoring gross income
and onehundred percent (100%) wharfage and berthing charges. Subsequently,
TEFASCO received a cease anddesist order in a letter dated June 1, 1983. On February
10, 1984 TEFASCO and PPA executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) providing
among others for (a) acknowledgment of TEFASCO'sarrears in government share
at Three Million Eight Hundred Seven Thousand Five Hundred Sixty-ThreePesos
and Seventy-Five Centavos (P3,807,563.75) payable monthly, with default
penalized by automaticwithdrawal of its commercial private port permit and permit
to operate cargo handling services; (b)reduction of government share from ten
percent (10%) to six percent (6%) on all cargo handling andrelated revenue (or
arrastre and stevedoring gross income); (c) opening of its pier facilities to
allcommercial and third-party cargoes and vessels for a period coterminous with
its foreshore lease contractwith the National Government; and, (d) tenure of five
(5) years extendible by five (5) more years for TEFASCO's permit to operate
cargo handling in its private port facilities. In return PPA promised to issuethe
necessary permits for TEFASCO¶s port activities. TEFASCO complied with the
MOA and paid theaccrued and current government share. On August
30, 1988 TEFASCO sued PPA and PPA PortManager, and Port Officer in Davao
City for refund of government share it had paid and for damages as aresult of
alleged illegal exaction from its clients of one hundred percent (100%) berthing
and wharfagefees.The TC ruled in favor of TEFACSO. The CA reversed this
decision. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether a vessel engaged in foreign trade, which berths at a privately
owned wharf or pier, is liable to the payment of the berthing charge under
Section 2901 of the Tariff and Customs Code
RULING: The authorization for a Tefasco to construct a port was truly a
binding construct between the parties. It was a 2-way advantage for both parties
which were the consideration for the contract. The right- privilege dechotomy
came to an end when courts realized that individuals should not be subjected to
the unfettered whims of government officials to withhold privileges previously
given them.
In as much as the part is privately owned and maintained, we rule that
applicable rate for imported or exported articles loaded or unloaded thereat is
not more than 100% but only 50%.
As regards berthing charges, the Court’s opinion is that only vessels berthing at
the national ports arte liable for berthing fees. The Berthing fees imposed upon
vessels berthing are national ports are applied by the national government for
the maintenance ports. The national ports does not maintain municipal ports
which are solely maintain by private entities or municipalities. Thus, PPA erred
in collecting berthing fees.
But even assuming arguendo that TEFASCO relied upon a mere privilege granted
by PPA, still the terms and conditions between them as written in the documents
approving TEFASCO's project proposal should indubitably remain the same.
Under traditional form of property ownership, recipients of privileges or largesses
from the government could be said to have no property rights because they
possessed no traditionally recognized proprietary interest therein.
It appears from the record in this case that after the issuance of the initial
certificate the appellant took steps to procure vehicles in addition to the one he
already owned. He changed his position in reliance upon the original certificate
authorizing him to operate an unlimited number of vehicles. xxx For the purpose
of due process analysis, a property interest includes not only the traditional
notions of real and personal property, but also extends to those benefits to which
an individual may be deemed to have a legitimate claim of entitlement under
existing rules and regulations. xxx The right of the appellant in the case at bar to
operate more than one vehicle under the certificate of convenience and necessity,
as originally issued, clearly constituted a benefit to the appellant and that benefit
may be deemed to be a legitimate claim of entitlement under existing rules and
regulations.
 6. BOARD OF MEDICINE v. YASUYUKI OTA (PROPERTY)
FACTS: Yasuyuki Ota (respondent) is a Japanese national, married to a Filipina,
who has continuously resided in the Philippines for more than 10 years. He
graduated from BicolChristian College of Medicine on April 21, 1991 with a degree
of Doctor of Medicine.[5] After successfully completing a one-year post graduate
internship training at the JoseReyes Memorial Medical Center, he filed an
application to take the medical board examinations in order to obtain a medical
license. He was required by the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) to
submit an affidavit of undertaking, stating among others that should he
successfully pass the same, he would not practice medicine until he submits proof
that reciprocity exists between Japan and the Philippines in admitting foreigners
into the practice of medicine.[6] Respondent submitted a duly notarized English
translation of the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan duly authenticated by the
Consul General of the Philippine Embassy to Japan, Jesus I. Yabes;[7] thus, he
was allowed to take the Medical Board Examinations in August 1992, which he
subsequently passed.[8] In spite of all these, the Board of Medicine (Board) of
the PRC, in a letter dated March 8, 1993, denied respondent's request for a license
to practice medicine in the Philippines on the ground that the Board believes that
no genuine reciprocity can be found in the law of Japan as there is no Filipino or
foreigner who can possibly practice there. Respondent argued that it is a clear
contravention of the provision of Section 20 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 2382 (The
Medical Act of 1959), depriving him of his legitimate right to practice his
profession in the Philippines to his great damage and prejudice.
ISSUE: Whether the court of appeals committed a reversible error in finding that
respondent had established the existence of reciprocity in the practice of medicine
between the philippines and japan
RULING: There is no question that a license to practice medicine is a privilege
or franchise granted by the government.[26] It is a right that is earned through
years of education and training, and which requires that one must first secure a
license from the state through professional board examinations. It must be
stressed however that the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit
of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary,
despotic, or oppressive manner. A political body which regulates the exercise of a
particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and grant such privilege in
accordance with certain conditions. As the legislature cannot validly bestow an
arbitrary power to grant or refuse a license on a public agency or officer, courts
will generally strike down license legislation that vests in public officials discretion
to grant or refuse a license to carry on some ordinarily lawful business, profession,
or activity without prescribing definite rules and conditions for the guidance of
said officials in the exercise of their power. In fine, the only matter being
questioned by petitioners is the alleged failure of respondent to prove that there
is reciprocity between the laws of Japan and the Philippines in admitting
foreigners into the practice of medicine. Respondent has satisfactorily complied
with the said requirement and the CA has not committed any reversible error in
rendering its Decision dated November 16, 2004 and Resolution dated October
19, 2003.
7. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION v.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. (Hierarchy of Rights)
FACTS: Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass
demonstration in front of Malacañang to express their grievances against the alleged
abuses of the Pasig Police. After learning about the planned mass demonstration,
Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO. During
the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was stressed
out that the demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in fact
an exercise of the laborers' inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression,
freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances. The company asked
them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of their business
which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the possibility
that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally. A second
meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers may
be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent
themselves to participate, otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to
cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually
dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of their Collective
Bargaining Agreement. The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of
the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration
was subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.
ISSUE: Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA?
RULLING: The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to
petition are included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people. The
rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but
also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and
to his full and complete fulfillment. While the Bill of Rights also protects property
rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. Because
these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our
society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently
as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive,"
permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and
property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the
Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to
be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the
influential and powerful, and of oligarchs — political, economic or otherwise. In
the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy
a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our
civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity
and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." The superiority of these
freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable
or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or
purpose — that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive —
would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. On the
other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more
stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a
substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.
 8. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS: Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the
Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so
defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the
valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the
effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with
the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the
element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code
saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused.The focal point of the
case is the alleged “vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this
terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner
uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.
ISSUE: W/N the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate
crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process
RULING: No. Sec. 4 (Rule of Evidence) states that: For purposes of establishing
the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act
done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused
always has in his favor the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond
reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.
The “reasonable doubt” standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm
of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof of reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.
Not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element
of the crime charged—the element of the offense.
Relative to petitioner’s contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his
submission that “pattern” is a “very important element of the crime of plunder;”
and that Sec. 4 is “two-pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a
substantive element of the crime, “ such that without it the accused cannot be
convicted of plunder –
We do not subscribe to petitioner’s stand. Primarily, all the essential
elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in
relation to sec. 1 par. (d). Sec. 4 purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of
procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely
procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in
favor of the accused but only operated in furtherance of a remedy.
What is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to
engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
9. White Light Corporation v. City of Manila
FACTS: On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled
“An Ordinance” prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels,
lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of
Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who
sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes
on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It
ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is
valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is
empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of
cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses,
lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides
and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
RULING: NO. The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary
governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of
individuals. The due process guaranty serves as a protection against
arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are
protected by the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.
The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing
two related but distinct restrictions on government, "procedural due
process" and "substantive due process." Procedural due process refers to
the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a
person of life, liberty, or property. Procedural due process concerns itself
with government action adhering to the established process when it
makes an intrusion into the private sphere.
Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the due
process clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient
justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.
Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable
complement to governance, that prerogative is hardly absolute,
especially in the face of the norms of due process of liberty. And while the
tension may often be left to the courts to relieve, it is possible for the
government to avoid the constitutional conflict by employing more
judicious, less drastic means to promote morality.
 10. Secretary of Justice v. Lantion
FACTS: Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the “extradition Treaty Between
the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The
Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty. On June 18, 1999, the Department of
Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No.
0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez
to the United States. On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel
of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the
aforestated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter
to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the
U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after
he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the
request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in
Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United
States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.
ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizen’s basic due process rights or the
governments ironclad duties under a treaty.
RULING: Petitiondismissed.
The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused
guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed
by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve
preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the
government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source
of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law
incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are
confronted with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of
international law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a
reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.
“Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the
law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules
applicable in the domestic sphere. “The doctrine of incorporation is applied
whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there
appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of
the constitution or statute of the local state. “Efforts should first be exerted to
harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that
municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted
principles of international law in observance of the incorporation clause in the
above cited constitutional provision. “In a situation, however, where the conflict
is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law
and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld
by the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal
law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.
“The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does
not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or
municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied
in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal
standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori takes effect – a treaty
may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the
Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the
Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict
with the constitution.
11. Cudia v. Superintendent of the PMA
FACTS: Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of the Philippine Military Academy
(PMA) Siklab Diwa Class of 2014. On November 14, 2013, Cudia’s class had a
lesson examination in their Operations Research (OR) subject the schedule of
which was from 1:30pm to 3pm.However, after he submitted his exam paper,
Cudia made a query to their OR teacher. Said teacher, then asked Cudia to wait
for her. Cudia complied and as a result, he was late for his next class (English).
Later, the English teacher reported Cudia for being late. In his explanation, Cudia
averred that he was late because his OR class was dismissed a bit late. The tactical
officer (TO) tasked to look upon the matter concluded that Cudia lied when he
said that their OR class was dismissed late because the OR teacher said she never
dismissed her class late. Thus, Cudia was meted with demerits and touring hours
because of said infraction. Cudia did not agree with the penalty hence he asked
the TO about it. Not content with the explanation of the TO, Cudia said he will be
appealing the penalty he incurred to the senior tactical officer (STO). The TO then
asked Cudia to write his appeal. In his appeal, Cudia stated that his being late was
out of his control because his OR class was dismissed at 3pm while his English
class started at 3pm also. Later, the TO reported Cudia to the PMA’s Honor
Committee (HC) for allegedly violating the Honor Code. Allegedly, Cudia lied in
his written appeal when he said his class was dismissed late hence, as a result, he
was late for his next class.The Honor Code is PMA’s basis for the minimum
standard of behavior required of their cadets. Any violation thereof may be a
ground to separate a cadet from PMA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PMA can validly dismiss Cudia based on its findings
RULING: YES. One of the arguments raised by PMA is that cadets, when they
enrolled in the PMA, have surrendered parts of their civil and political liberties.
Hence, when they are disciplined and punished by the PMA, said cadets cannot
question the same, much less, question it in the courts. in short, they cannot raise
due process. On this, the SC held that such argument is wrong. It is true that a
PMA cadet, by enrolling at PMA, must be prepared to subordinate his private
interests for the proper functioning of the educational institution he attends to,
one that is with a greater degree than a student at a civilian public school.
However, a cadet facing dismissal from PMA, whose private interests are at stake
(life, liberty, property) which includes his honor, good name, and integrity, is
entitled to due process. No one can be deprived of such without due process of law
and the PMA, even as a military academy, is not exempt from such strictures.
II. Yes. It is within PMA’s right to academic freedom to decide whether or not a
cadet is still worthy to be part of the institution. Thus, PMA did not act with grave
abuse of discretion when it dismissed Cudia. In fact, Cudia was accorded due
process. In this case, the investigation of Cudia’s Honor Code violation followed
the prescribed procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He was notified of
the Honor Report submitted by his TO. He was then given the opportunity to
explain the report against him. He was informed about his options and the entire
process that the case would undergo. The preliminary investigation immediately
followed after he replied and submitted a written explanation. Upon its
completion, the investigating team submitted a written report together with its
recommendation to the HC Chairman. The HC thereafter reviewed the findings
and recommendations. When the honor case was submitted for formal
investigation, a new team was assigned to conduct the hearing. During the formal
investigation/hearing, he was informed of the charge against him and given the
right to enter his plea. He had the chance to explain his side, confront the
witnesses against him, and present evidence in his behalf. After a thorough
discussion of the HC voting members, he was found to have violated the Honor
Code.
Academic freedom of the PMA = Even without express provision of a law, the PMA
has regulatory authority to administratively dismiss erring cadets. Further, there
is a law (Commonwealth Act No. 1) authorizing the President to dismiss cadets.
Such power by the President may be delegated to the PMA Superintendent, who
may exercise direct supervision and control over the cadets.
Further, as stated earlier, such power by the PMA is well within its academic
freedom. Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of
universities and institutions of higher learning has been enshrined in the
Constitution.
The essential freedoms of academic freedom on the part of schools are as follows;
a. the right to determine who may teach;
b. the right to determine what may be taught;
c. the right to determine how it shall be taught;
d. the right to determine who may be admitted to study.
The Honor Code is just but one way for the PMA to exercise its academic freedom.
If it determines that a cadet violates it, then it has the right to dismiss said cadet.
In this case, based on its findings, Cudia lied – which is a violation of the Honor
Code.
But Cudia’s lie is not even that big; is dismissal from the PMA really warranted?
The PMA Honor Code does not distinguish between a big lie and a minor lie. It
punishes any form of lying. It does not have a gradation of penalties. In fact, it is
the discretion of the PMA as to what penalty may be imposed. When Cudia
enrolled at PMA, he agreed to abide by the Honor Code and the Honor System.
Thus, while the punishment may be severe, it is nevertheless reasonable and not
arbitrary, and, therefore, not in violation of due process -also considering that
Cudia, as a cadet, must have known all of these.
44. ROMUALDEZ v. COMELEC (Void for Vagueness)
FACTS: Garay and Apostol filed a complaint against Sps. Romualdez for violation
of the OEC and RA 8189 or Voter’s Registration Act of 1996 for making false
information as to their residence in their applications as new voters in Burauen,
Leyte. The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary
investigation be conducted by the COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the
corresponding Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) for the prosecution of the same. Sps. Romualdez contend that they
intend to reside in Burauen, Leyte since 1989. On May 2000, they took actual
residence in Burauen by leasing for 5 years the house of Renomeron. The
Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be
conducted by the COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the corresponding
Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for
the prosecution of the same.
ISSUE: WoN criminal statute may be challenged considering and following the
void for vagueness doctrine.
RULING: The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application. However, this Court has imposed certain limitations by which
a criminal statute, as in the challenged law at bar, may be scrutinized. This Court
has declared that facial invalidation or an “on-its-face” invalidation of criminal
statutes is not appropriate. Indeed, an “on-its-face” invalidation of criminal
statutes would result in a mass acquittal of parties whose cases may not have
even reached the courts. Such invalidation would constitute a departure from
the usual requirement of “actual case and controversy” and permit decisions to
be made in a sterile abstract context having no factual concreteness. The rule
established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom,
and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may
ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge.
Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim that the
election offenses charged against them by private respondent are entirely
different from those for which they stand to be accused of before the RTC, as
charged by the COMELEC. In the first place, there appears to be no incongruity
between the charges as contained in the Complaint-Affidavit and the
Informations filed before the RTC, notwithstanding the denomination by private
respondent of the alleged violations to be covered by Section 261(y)(2) and
Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 12 of Republic Act
No. 8189. Evidently, the Informations directed to be filed by the COMELEC
against petitioners, and which were, in fact, filed with the RTC, were based on
the same set of facts as originally alleged in the private respondent’s Complaint-
Affidavit. Petitioners were afforded due process because they were granted the
opportunity to refute the allegations in private respondent’s Complaint-
Affidavit. On 2 April 2001, in opposition to the Complaint-Affidavit, petitioners
filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss with the Law Department
of the COMELEC. They similarly filed a Memorandum before the said body.
 45. Serrano v. NLRC
FACTS: Ruben Serrano was the head of the security checkers section of Isetann
Department Store. He was charged with the task of supervising security checkers
in their jobs (apprehending shoplifters and preventing pilfirege of merchandise).
On October 11, 1991, the management sent him a letter immediately terminating
his services as security section head, effective on the same day. The reason given
by the management was “retrenchment”; they had opted to hire an independent
security agency as a cost-cutting measure. Serrano filed a complaint for ID, illegal
layoff, ULP, underpayment of wages and nonpayment of salary and OT pay with
the LA. The LA rendered a decision in favor of Serrano. It stated that Isetann
failed to establish that it had retrenched its security division, that the petitioner
was not accorded due process, etc. and even stated that the day after Serrano’s
dismissal, Isetann employed a safety and security supervisor with similar duties
to that of the former. The NLRC on the other hand reversed the LA but ordered
Isetann to pay separation pay equivalent to one month per year of service, unpaid
salary, et al. It held that the phase-out of the security section was a valid exercise
of management prerogative on the part of Isetann, for which the NLRC cannot
substitute its judgment in the absence of bad faith or abuse of discretion on the
part of the latter; and that the security and safety supervisor’s position was long
in place prior to Serrano’s separation from the company, or the phase-out of the
Security Section.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner’s dismissal was illegal.
RULING: Valid, but ineffectual (without legal effect) – payment of backwages,
separation pay and other monetary claims. No. The Court held that the dismissal
was due to an authorized cause under Art. 283 of the Labor Code, i.e. redundancy.
However, while an authorized cause exists, Isetann failed to follow the procedural
requirement provided by Art. 283 of LC. For termination due to authorized
causes, the employer must give a written notice of termination to the employee
concerned and to the DOLE at least 30 days prior to its effectivity. This Isetann
failed to do. The question now arises as to whether the failure of Isetann to comply
with the procedural requirements renders the dismissal invalid, or, in the event
that it is valid, what the appropriate sanction or penalty must be meted out. Prior
to the doctrine laid down in the decision rendered in Wenphil Corp. NLRC in
1989, the termination of an employee, even for just cause but without following
the requisite procedure, renders such dismissal illegal, and therefore null and
void. In the Wenphil doctrine, this was reversed; the said rule was unjust to
employers. Instead, the dismissal was held to be still valid but the employer was
sanctioned by way of the payment of indemnity (damages) – in that case, P1,000.
The amount of indemnity will be depended on the circumstances of each case,
taking into account the gravity of the offense committed by the employer. Now,
the Court once again examines the Wenphil doctrine. Puno says that the effect of
the Wenphil doctrine was such that there has been a “dismiss now, pay later”
policy where the employers were able to circumvent the procedural requisites of
termination, which is more convenient than the compliance with the 30-day
notice. Panganiban said that the monetary sanctions were too insignificant,
niggardly, sometimes even late. Both justices are of the opinion that the
deprivation of due process which must be accorded to the employee renders the
dismissal illegal.
46. Agabon v. NLRC
FACTS: Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the
business of selling and installing ornamental and construction materials. It
employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and
cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they were
dismissed for abandonment of work. Thus, Petitioners then filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal and payment of money claims. Petitioners also claim that private
respondent did not comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing.
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that petitioners were not
dismissed but had abandoned their work.
ISSUE: WON petitioners were illegally dismissed.
HELD: Accordingly, petitioners’ dismissal was for a just cause. They had
abandoned their employment and were already working for another employer. To
dismiss an employee, the law requires not only the existence of a just and valid
cause but also enjoins the employer to give the employee the opportunity to be
heard and to defend himself. Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified
refusal of an employee to resume his employment. It is a form of neglect of duty,
hence, a just cause for termination of employment by the employer. After
establishing that the terminations were for a just and valid cause, we now
determine if the procedures for dismissal were observed.
Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the
employer must give the employee two written notices and a hearing or
opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee before terminating the
employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a
hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be
heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on
authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give the
employee and the Department of Labor and Employment written notices 30 days
prior to the effectivity of his separation.
From the foregoing rules four possible situations may be derived: (1) the dismissal
is for a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code, for an authorized cause
under Article 283, or for health reasons under Article 284, and due process was
observed; (2) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause but due process
was observed; (3) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause and there was
no due process; and (4) the dismissal is for just or authorized cause but due
process was not observed.
The present case squarely falls under the fourth situation. The dismissal should
be upheld because it was established that the petitioners abandoned their jobs to
work for another company. Private respondent, however, did not follow the
notice requirements and instead argued that sending notices to the last known
addresses would have been useless because they did not reside there anymore.
Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the
law mandates the twin notice requirements to the employee’s last known
address. Thus, it should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural
requirements of due process.
Petition denied. CA affirmed with modifications.