Royal Institute of Philosophy

Literature and Knowledge

Author(s): Catherine Wilson
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Philosophy, Vol. 58, No. 226 (Oct., 1983), pp. 489-496
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of Philosophy
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Literatureand Knowledge
CATHERINE WILSON

There is probablyno subjectin the philosophyof artwhichhas prompted

more impassionedtheorizingthan the questionof the 'cognitivevalue' of
worksof art. 'In the end', one influentialcritichas stated,'I do not dis-
tinguishbetweenscience and art exceptas regardsmethod.Both provide
us with a view of realityand both are indispensableto a completeunder-
standingof the universe.'1If a man is not preparedto distinguishbetween
science and art one may well wonderwhat he is preparedto distinguish
between,but in all fairnessit should be pointedout that the writingsof
anti-cognitivists contain equally strenuous statementsof doctrine. For
I. A. Richards,poetryconsistsof 'pseudo-statements'which are 'true' if
they'suit and servesome attitudeor linktogetherattitudeswhichon other
groundsare desirable'.2
Here I defendthe view that literaryart can be said to be a source of
knowledge.At the same time,I argue that much previousdiscussionhas
missed the point. In orderto show that one can learn froma novel, or a
poem, or a play,it is not sufficient to show that the workcontainsprop-
ositionsof a general or philosophicalnature,or again that it furnishes
vicariousexperienceswhichcould not be attainedin anyotherway.And in
orderto show thatliteraturedoes not contributeto a person's intellectual
understanding of the world,it is not sufficientto show thatthe knowledge
it is said to impartcould not be foundin the pages of a textbooksuitable
for instructionin any established discipline. The view I should like
ultimatelyto defendshould be viewed as an alternativeto one whichhas
found much favouramong partisansof the cognitivevalue of literature,
namely,the view that literaryworkscontainor implypropositionswhich
the reader is led to accept. The 'proposition-theory', as I shall call it, is
thoroughly indefensiblefora numberof reasons.
The most noted proposition-theorist, Morris Weitz, claims to findin
Proust the revelationthat 'thereare no essences to our emotions': 'that
jealousy, love and suffering manifestthemselvesin different ways and are
recognizedaccordingto different criteria'.3For Peter Jones,Middlemarch

1 Herbert Read, Education ThroughArt. Quoted in M. Rader and B. Jessup,

Art and Human Values (Englewood Cliffs,NJ: PrenticeHall, 1976), 254.
2 I. A. Richards, 'Poetry and Beliefs' in Weitz (ed.), Problemsin Aesthetics,
2nd edn (New York: Macmillan Co., 1970), 569.
3 Morris Weitz, Philosophyin Literature(Detroit: Wayne State University

Press, i963), 78-84.

Philosophy58 I983 489

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CatherineWilson

containsthe implicationthat past desires and presenthopes governour

interpretation of presentsensoryexperience.4Accordingto JohnHospers,
ParadiseLost impliesthat'man's stateafterthe Fall is muchbetter,in that
he has free-willin a sense whichhe lackedbefore'.5And finally,Coleridge
claimsthatin writingHamlet,'Shakespearewishedto impressupon us the
truth,that action is the chiefend of existence'.6Philosopherswho claim
thatit is possibleto learnfroma literarywork,then,typicallyimplythat
the kinds of thingsone learns are that man's state beforethe Fall left
somethingto be desired,thatlove has no singleessence,thatdesiresand
hopes alterthe verycharacterof experience,and so on.
Such a claimis simplyunacceptablefromthestartfortheanti-cognitivist.
Richards, Ayer, and Carnap presumablynever intended to deny that
novels,poetryand playscontainimplicitand explicitstatements. Whatthey
wishedto arguewas thatpropositionslikethoselistedabove are incapable
of communicatingknowledge;theymake no contributionto our under-
standingof theworld,and it is in thissense thattheyare to be regardedas
'meaningless' or as 'pseudo-statements'.When Weitz, then, argues
againstthe 'positivists'that Native Son 'reveals a truthabout the world
which has not been revealedby any othernovelist,sociologist,or philos-
opher' namely,that 'the onlyfreedomleftto modernman is the freedom
to destroy,firstothersabout you and finallyyourself',7his claimis vitiated
by an importantambiguity.If Weitz means that no sociologistand no
philosophercould, in principle,establishthis conclusionbecause of the
inherentlimitationsof sociologyand philosophyas disciplines,one is left
wonderingwhatsortof truthit is whichis establishedneitherby empirical
observationnor by reasoningfroma set of establishedor immediately
plausible assumptions.If, on the otherhand, Weitz means that Richard
Wrighthas alreadyanticipatedwhat sociologyor philosophycan, and so
eventuallywill reveal,one is justifiedin wonderingwhat the difference is
betweenanticipationof thissortand mere conjecture.Whicheverway his
claim is interpreted,it plays directlyinto the hands of his sceptical
opponent.
There are two furtherobjectionsto the proposition-theory which are
worthnoting.First of all, even if it were true that Milton, Proust,Eliot,
and Shakespeare all believed themselvesto have valid sociological or
philosophicaldemonstrations of the propositionstheirworksmay be read

4Peter Jones,Philosophy and theNovel (Oxford:ClarendonPress, I975),

47-49.
5 JohnHospers,'ImpliedTruthsin Literature',
in Levich(ed.),Aesthetics
and
thePhilosophy ofCriticism
(New York:RandomHouse, i963), 367.
6 S. T. Coleridge,
Shakespearean quotedin Weitz,op. cit.,59.
Criticism
7 MorrisWeitz,'Does ArtTell theTruth?',Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research m, No. 3 (March1943), 345.

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 Literatureand Knowledge

as implying, thiswouldnotprovidethereaderwithanyreasonforbelief.
No matter howbroadtheirpresumed experience ofhumanity, theycannot
be supposedto speakwithanyparticular authority. Andsecondly, ifwhat
one learnedfromliterature werethepropositions whichare contained in
particularworks,a wideracquaintance withliterature wouldparadoxically
resultin a constriction ofknowledge since,formanyliterary works,a work
can be foundwhichimpliesthe opposite.Hospershimselfadmitsthat
ParadiseLostalso impliesthat'man'sfallis a direcatastrophe, a workof
Satan in defianceof God'. Greektragedyrevealsthe existenceof an
immutable orderin theworldwhichis independent ofhumanhopesand
wishes.Beckett'sMolloy may be said to implythatactionis absurd,
motivation unintelligible.
Unfortunately, theanti-cognitivist'sclaimisnomorecoherent atbottom.
It is the philosopher's afterall, to unmask,or to givean
responsibility,
accountoftheordinary sensein whichwespeakofworksofartas 'illumin-
ating'or 'edifying' If thesedescriptions
or 'revealing'. areused speciously
in connection withworksofart,thephilosopher is in a positionto locate
thesourceoftheerrorand to unraveltheconfusion. Richardsalonehas
struggled to explainwhypoetryis believedto be a sourceof knowledge.
His explanation oftheillusionofintellectual significance wentas follows:
inreading a poema personmaybe struck withanimpression ofdeepimport.
As a resultofa mentalhabitofassociation betweenlearning a factofdeep
theoretical importance and similarfeelingsof significance, he concludes
thathe musthavelearnedsomething. In fact,whathe has experienced is
simplya revision ofhisattitudes, thesumtotalofhisemotional responses
to the world.He regardswithawe, or fear,or tenderness, presumably,
whathe hitherto regardedwithindifference, mildinterest, or repulsion.
This accountis altogether unconvincing. It is unclearhow a moderately
awarereadercould everconfusetheacquisition of information withthe
reorganization of his attitudesif the twothingsare,as Richardsinsists,
reallypolesapart.It is difficult to givea philosophically adequateexplan-
ationof howonemightgettheillusionof learning froma novelas it is to
explainhowonemightactually succeedin doingso. As a result,it is clear
thatalthoughtheproposition theoryis untenable, thetheoryof 'emotive
discourse'whichis supposedto replaceit is equallyso.
In an influential book, DorothyWalsh has attempted to locatethe
cognitive valueofliterature in an altogetherdifferent areabyarguingthat
the philosophical classificationof knowledge into 'knowledge how' and
'knowledge that'is radicallyincomplete.8 A personmaybe said notonly
to know,e.g.howto playchessor ridea bicycle,and that,e.g.theWarof
theRosesbeganin I456, butalsowhatitis liketo,e.g.fallsuddenly inlove,

8DorothyWalsh, Literatureand Knowledge(Middletown,Ct: Wesleyan

University
Press,i969), 96.

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CatherineWilson

lose a childto death,or undergoreligiousconversion.Accordingto Walsh,

'knowingwhat' rounds out the completepictureof knowledge,and it is
knowledgeof thissortthatliteratureprovides.In the course of readinga
novel, a person may acquire 'knowledgein the formof realization;the
realizationof what anythingmightcome to as a formof lived experience'.
A view rathersimilarto Walsh's, to the effectthat literatureand art
in generalprovide'intuitive'knowledgeor 'knowledgeofessences',has been
criticizedon the ground that merelyhavingthe experienceof x, or living
throughx is only a preconditionof knowledgeand not knowledgeitself.
For Monroe Beardsley,'Acquaintance. . . does not become knowledgein
the strictsense untilthe data are combinedand connectedby reasoning'.9
Walsh's defenceagainstthisline of attackconsistsin pointingout thatwe
recognizea difference betweenthe case of the man of whom it is simply
truethathe has been poor and lonelyin the big city,and the case of the
man who knowswhatit is liketo have been so. There is somethingwhich
thelatterpossesseswhichtheformerdoes not,althoughit is notto be identi-
fied with anythinglike the capacityto say 'what it was like'. 'Knowing
beyond saying', she argues, 'is acceptable in such a case, not because
sayingis impossiblebut because the kindof sayingthatwould be relevant
is a sayingthatrequiresliterarytalent.'10It is appropriateto ask theperson
who claims to know how to extractgold from common table salt for
proof of his expertise,just as it is appropriateto ask the person who
claims to know thatthereare people livingin the centreof the earthfor
proofof his assertion.But in the case of 'knowingwhat it is like to x' the
demand forproofis altogetherinappropriate,and the lack of such proofs
does not impugnthe claim to know.
It mightappearthatWalsh's theorymeetstheobjectionsofthepositivists
while at the same timejustifyingthe applicationof the term'knowledge'
to somethingotherthan a body of doctrine.However,she does not take
the troubleto interpretany particularknowledgeclaim in the lightof her
theory,and when an attemptis made, the theoryrevealsits underlying
weakness. I shall try to illustratethis by consideringa claim made by
D. Z. PhillipsconcerningEdith Wharton'snovel, The Age ofInnocence.11
The novel in question is set in New York of the i88os. The hero,
Newland Archer,is a member of the convention-boundupper-middle
class, and the storyconcernshis love for,and eventualrenunciationof the
brilliant,eccentricEllen Olenska in favourof his mild, conforming, and
altogetherappropriatefiancee,May Welland. While manycriticshave seen
in the novel an indictmentof old New York and its spiritualvalues,

9 lonroe Beardsley,Aesthetics(New York: HarcourtBrace, I958), 383.

10 Walsh,op. cit., 104.
11 Edith Wharton, The Age of Innocence(New York: D. Appleton & Co.,
I920).

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 Literatureand Knowledge

ofthenovelis precisely
Phillipsarguesthatthesignificance thereverse:
'That it hasall beena waste'is a notinfrequent on completing
reaction a
readingof The Age of Innocence. In makingsuch a judgmenthigh
priority is givento the importance of satisfying
genuinelove,talking
outdifficultiesin frank,
opendiscussion, making up one'sownmindon
moralissuesandnotpayingtoomuchattention towhatone'sparentsor
one'sfamily to
have say... what I am againstis theequation
protesting
ofthesebeliefswithintelligence as such.12
He goesontoquotewithapprovalLouisAuchincloss's remark that'Thisis
theclimaxofthemessage;thatunderthethickglassofconvention blooms
thefine,fragile flower ofpatient sufferinganddenial'.13 'The philosophical
consequences', Phillipscontinues,'ofwaiting onEdithWharton's novelare
thattheartificiality ofan abstract conceptofreasonableness is revealed."14
Whatthenovelhasrevealedto him,he claims,is first, thatthe'reasonable
man'of muchof contemporary moralphilosophy is a kindof phantom,
andsecondly, that'thequestionofwhatwemeanby"allegiance andchange
in morality" doesnotadmitofa generalanswer'.
Phillips'sinterpretation of the novelis, as he goes to a good deal of
troubleto pointout,idiosyncratic. However,I amnotconcerned herewith
thejustifiabilityofhisinterpretation, butwithhisclaimthatthenovelpro-
videsa counter-example to certainthesesin philosophy. Anyattempt to
off
slough such a claim as the report of a simplechange in attitudeis
impossible to take seriously,for it is to
impossible say in this case what
attitudeit is thatis supposedto havechanged,or to havegonethrough a
processofreorganization. The claimis,afterall,thatcontemporary moral
philosophers aremistaken. Atthesametime,itwouldbe wrongtosuppose
thatthenovelin anysenseimpliesand justifies thepropositions 'Renun-
ciationisa finething'or'Oldvaluesmaybethebestvalues'.Unlikea philos-
ophicaltreatise on reasonableness, thenovelfailsaltogether to layout the
practicaland spiritual advantages whichmightaccruefromrenunciation.
It simplytellsthe storyof a manwho,as a matterof fact,choosesone
womanoveranother whomhe mighthavechosenwithout physical orlegal
consequences. We do notevensee Archerprospering as a result.
WhatthenofWalsh'sclaim?Can we interpret Phillips'sallegedlearning
as simplytheexperience ofcomingto know'whatit is like'to be a manof
NewlandArcher'stype,in his situation?I thinknot. There is a wide

and Changein Morality'in Philosophy

12 D. Z. Phillips,'Allegiance and the
Arts,VI (RoyalInstitute Lectures)(NewYork:St Martin's,1973).
ofPhilosophy
54-58.
13 L. Auchincloss, 'Edith Whartonand her New Yorks'in EdithWharton:
A CollectionofCriticalEssays,I. Howe (ed.). Quotedin Phillips,op. cit.,56.
op. cit.,58.
14 Phillips,

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CatherineWilson

logicalgapbetween therealization ofwhatitwouldbe liketohaveNewland

Archer'sexperiences and the realizationthata certainpopularphilo-
sophicalconception of reasonable actionis, in a certainsense,fraudulent.
This is not,as it mightseem,an accidentalfeatureof the case. We are
toldthatJohnStuartMill,themanbroughtup to be 'a merereasoning
machine',was broughtout ofhis nearly-suicidal depression by a reading
of Wordsworth. It mightseemtempting to characterize Mill's transfor-
mationas thereorganization of his attitudes, butsuch a characterization
wouldcaptureonlypartofthestory.A changein attitude may,and typi-
callydoes,comeaboutas a resultof something one has learned.Again,
though, thereis a logicalgap betweentherealization, in Walsh'ssense,of,
forexample,whatit is liketo liveat onewithNature,and therealization
thatsuicideis unwarranted.
One mightmakean effort to fillin thegap by arguingas follows:ifthe
readerreallyunderstands whatit wouldbe liketo have been Newland
Archer,or to feelaboutNatureas Wordsworth did, thatreadercannot
helpbut abandona shallowconception of reasonableness, and he cannot
helpbut perceivethevalueof beingalive.In thelongrun,I thinkthis
argument is successful. In theshortrun,it pointsup a seriousambiguity
in Walsh's formulation.
The examplesoriginally givento fixtheconceptof 'knowing whatx is
like'werepurposely chosen for their simplicity.In an effortto elucidate
the conceptof 'knowing as
how',Ryleoffered examples the of
activities
fly-tying,chess-playing, and so on, and in an effort to elucidatethecon-
ceptof'knowing what',Walshoffered us theexperiences oflosinga child
to death,beinglostin a forest, etc. It nowappears,though,thatthereis
botha 'deep'wayanda 'shallow'wayof'knowing whatx is like'.A reader
mayunderstand 'whatit is like' to be NewlandArcherin the shallow
sense,and hisphilosophical convictions mayundergono revision. But on
theversionofthetheory we arenowconsidering, ifhe understands what
it is liketo be NewlandArcherin the 'strongsense',his philosophical
conceptionswill necessarily be affected. The theoretical resourcesof
Walsh'stheory giveoutatjustthispoint,forthemundaneexamples which
wereusedto fixtheconceptof 'knowing whatx is like'are ofno helpin
understanding the stronger concept.The personwho knowswhatit is
liketo be poorand lonelyin thebig cityhas notnecessarily beenforced
to alterhisconceptions ofpoverty, or loneliness,or anonymity.
The positiveaccountI have to offerat thispointwill be somewhat
brief.Nevertheless, I thinkit comes closestto the 'autobiographical'
accountsof Mill and Phillips,and escapesthe theoretical objectionsto
whichthe'proposition theory' and the'knowing what'theory aresubject.
A personmaylearnfroma novel,I wantto argue,ifhe is forcedto revise
or modify, e.g. his conceptof 'reasonable action'through a recognitionof
an alternative as presented in thenovel.Such a viewcan accountforthe

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 and Knowledge
Literature

impression of writerslike Weitzthatparticular workscan revealsuch

thingsas thattheonlyfreedom leftin theworldis thefreedom to destroy
yourself. But to insistthatwhathas been learnedhereis thata certain
statement is trueis to truncate,in a radicallyunacceptable way,themore
complexprocess.I wantnow to arguebriefly thatthe term'learning'
appliesprimarily to a modification of a person'sconcepts,whichis in
turncapableof altering his thoughtor conduct,and notprimarily to an
increaseddisposition to utterfactually correctstatements or to display
technical prowess.
Let us takeas unarguably centralthecaseofthepersonwhohaslearned
theprinciples ofcivilengineering orwhohassuccessfully studiedmedieval
history. Such a person should be able to statefactsand theorems, and it
would be reasonable to expectof the that
civilengineer he couldactually
build. But we shouldexpectthe engineerto be able as well to solve
engineering problemsof a novelsort,and to be able to evaluateand
criticizenovelengineering proposals.We shouldexpectthehistorian to
be abletoextrapolate from whathehaslearnedtomoregeneralconclusions
aboutauthority, rebellion,socialchange,reform, and so on. The ability
togo beyondwhathasactually beenfedinintheteaching processstems,in
eachcase,froma morefundamental-and perhapsevenradical-alteration
inthewayinwhichthelearner perceives, inonecase,thephysical environ-
ment,in the other,a periodof history. The engineer mustcometo see
buildingsand materialsin termsof theirpotentialfor integrity and
stability. The historian mustrevisethewayin whichhe oncethought of
war,classstructure, religion,and so forth. These changesmaylie,in one
sense,behindthescenes:a personmaybe quiteincapableof explaining
how he perceivesthingsnow. But his learningmustamountto some
difference in whathe is preparedto do or sayundercertainconditions;
hisnewknowledge mustbe expressible insomewayevenifnotintheform
ofone ofthegrander pronouncements oftheproposition-theorists.
It is tempting, although I thinkultimately a mistake, to raisequestions
at thispointaboutthemechanics oftheinfluence of literaryworks.One
person, letus say,readsa Japanese novelinwhichalienandremote concep-
tionsofhonouror sacrifice aredepicted.(Thereshouldultimately be no
moreofa problemabouthowa novelcan depict'honour'thanabouthow
a portrait can depict'gentleness', or a film'horror'.)He laterclaimsto
have learnedsomething fromit. Anotherpersonreadsthe same novel,
eithernotesor failsto notethethemesofhonourand sacrifice, butclaims
thathe learnednothing fromit. Whatis thedifference betweenthetwo?
Whathappenswhenthe firstperson(a) recognizes the conception pre-
sentedin thenovelas superior to hisownand(b) adoptsit,in recognition
ofitssuperiority, so thatit comesto serveas a kindofstandard bywhich
he reviewshisownconductand thatofothers?
The spuriousness of thesequestionscan be seen as soon as theyare

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Catherine
Wilson

shiftedoutoftherealmoffiction. Considerthecaseoftheyoungmanwho
learnsaboutkindness fromhisagedaunt.Thereneedbe no moment when
theyoungman realizesthatthereis something defectiveabouthis con-
ceptionofkindness; he neednoteventhinkofhimself as possessing sucha
conception. Norneedtherebe a moment whenhe weighsthebehaviour of
hisauntagainsthisownanddecidesin favourof hisaunt.The difference
betweentheyoungmanwholearnsfromtheexampleofhis auntand a
similarlysituatedyoungmanwhodoesnot,doesnotamountto a kindof
mechanical failurein thelattercase, but to a differencein thewaythey
regardtheiraunts.For the secondman,she is 'too kind'or 'impossibly
kind'or 'kindness isn'teverything'-or he mayhavefailedto be struck by
herkindness in thefirstplace.The essentials
areno differentin thecaseof
thereaderwhois leftunmoved by,e.g.,Japanese orExistentialistliterature.
Thereis a gooddeal thatremainsto be filledin in theaboveaccount,
notablytheveryidea ofa person'spossessing a conceptofhonour,kind-
ness,reasonableness, orevenof'causalinfluence'. Nevertheless, itsuggests
one wayofpreserving theinsightsofbothproposition-theorists and their
emotivistopponents without reproducing theirincoherencies. The kindof
understanding whichliterature affordscannotbe represented as a bodyof
statements occupying a particularlocationin thenexusof historical and
doctrine.But, as I have triedto show,by 'knowledge'we do
scientific
notmeanthatbodyofdoctrine.

University
ofOregon

15 This paperwas orignially

readat thei980 sessionsoftheAmericanSociety
forAestheticsin Milwaukee,USA.

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