CANON 1 : 107 CASES

Page 9 1. Cobb-Perez v Lantin, No. L-22320, July 29, 1968 [24 SCRA 291]
A civil case was filed by Ricardo Hermoso against Damaso Perez for the latter’s failure to pay a
debt of P17k. Hermoso won and a writ of execution was issued in his favor. The sheriff was to
conduct a public sale of a property owned by Damaso worth P300k. This was opposed by
Damaso as he claimed the amount of said property was more than the amount of the debt.
Judge Lantin, issuing judge, found merit on this hence he amended his earlier decision and so he
issued a second writ this time directing the sheriff to conduct a public sale on Damaso’s 210
shares of stock approximately worth P17k.
Subsequently, Damaso and his wife filed five more petitions for injunction trying to enjoin the
public sale. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court where the SC ruled that the petition
of the Perez spouses are without merit; that their numerous petitions for injunction are
contemplated for delay. In said decision, the Supreme Court ordered petitioners to pay the cost
of the suit but said cost should be paid by their counsels. The counsels now appeal said decision
by the Supreme Court as they claimed that such decision reflected adversely against their
professionalism; that “If there was delay, it was because petitioners’ counsel happened to be
more assertive . . . a quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be condemned.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the counsels for the Spouses Perez are excused.
HELD: No. A counsel’s assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his client’s cause
must be encouraged and is to be commended; what is not tolerated is a lawyer’s insistence
despite the patent futility of his client’s position, as in the case at bar. It is the duty of a counsel
to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or
lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client’s cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden
duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A
lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client’s propensity to
litigate. A lawyer’s oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its
primacy is indisputable.

Page 10 2. Reyes v Gaa, A.M. No. 1048, Jult 14, 1995

•FACTS: Complainant reported to the NBI that he had been the victim of extortion by respondent.
An entrapment was set up by the NBI. Respondent was caught in flagrante delicto in the act of
receiving the marked money from complainant, which resulted in his arrest and the subsequent
filing of administrative and criminal cases against him. In his defense, respondent merely denied
the charge of extortion and retorted that the marked money was planted by complainant.
•ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated his oath as an attorney.
•RULING: Yes. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he
denies the charges against him, he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him.
He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times
is expected of him. The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public
official, which also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer's oath, imposes upon
every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his
obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action

Page 12 3. Donton v Tansingco, A.C. No. 6057, June 27, 2006

Facts:
 Peter Donton filed a complaint against Atty. Emmanuel Tansingco, as the notary public

who notarized the Occupancy Agreement, and against others (Duane Stier, and Emelyn
Manggay) for estafa thru falsification of public document.

A disbarment complaint filed by petitioner on May 20, 2003 against respondent Atty. Emmanual
O. Tansingco for serious misconduct and deliberate violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and 1.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility arose when respondent Atty. Tansingco filed a counter-
charge of perjury against Donton.

Atty. Tansingco in his complaint stated that he prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement
at the request of Mr. Stier, an owner and long-time resident of a real property located at Cubao,
Quezon City. Since Mr. Stier is a U.S. Citizen and thereby disqualified to own real property in
his name, he agreed that the property be transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a Filipino.

Donton averred that Atty. Tansingco’s act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite
knowledge that Stier is a foreign national, constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate
violation of the Code. Donton prayed that Atty. Tansingco be disbarred.

Atty. Tansingco claimed that complainant Donton filed disbarment case against him upon the
instigation of complainant’s counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. Aletajan, because he refused to act
witness in the criminal case against Stier and Manggay.

In Resolution dated October 1, 2003, the court referred the matter to the IBP for investigation,
report and recommendation and for which the latter, through Commissioner Milagros San Juan
of the IBP Commission of Discipline recommended suspension from the practice of law for two
years and cancellation of his commission as Notary Public.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted, with modification, the Report and recommended
respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for six months.

The report was then forwarded to SC as mandated under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules
of Court.

Issue: Whether or Not Atty. Tansingco is guilty of serious misconduct?

Ruling: Yes. Atty. Tansingco is liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code. The
Court ruled that a lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will
involve defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold and obey. A lawyer who assists a client
in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating law commits an act which justifies
disciplinary action against the lawyer.

Atty. Tansingco had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code
when he prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign
ownership of lands. Atty. Tansingco used his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end.
Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended. As such,
respondent is being suspended for six (6) months.

By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified
from owning real property. Yet, in his motion for reconsideration, respondent admitted
that he caused the transfer of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent,
however, aware of the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the title in
complainant’s name. But respondent provided “some safeguards” by preparing several
documents, including the Occupancy Agreement, that would guarantee Stier’s
recognition as the actual owner of the property despite its transfer in complainant’s
name. In effect, respondent advised and aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional
prohibition against foreign ownership of lands by preparing said documents.”

Page 12 4. Balinon v De Leon, 94 Phil 277

PARAS, C.J.:

The Solicitor General has filed a complaint against the respondent Celestino M. de Leon
and Justo T. Velayo, duly qualified members of the bar in active practice, alleging that,
since December, 1948, respondent de Leon, still legally married to Vertudes Marquez,
lived as husband and wife with Regina S. Balinon; the said respondent prepared and
subscribed on February 4, 1948, before respondent Velayo, a notary public, an affidavit
which reads as follows:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

I, Celestino de Leon, of legal age, married, Filipino citizen, after having been duly
sworn to according to law depose and say:

That there exists a contract of separation executed and perfected between my

wife, Vertudes Marquez and myself;

That said contract states among other things that each of us is at liberty and free
to take for himself and herself a lifetime partner with the full consent and
authorization of each other;

That by the same contract our conjugal partnership was dissolved and our
existing property, rights and interests were divided and apportioned;

That in the said contract my wife shall have full control, care and custody of the
children, and as such all of our conjugal property rights and interests were
apportioned to her with the exception of my private personal belongings and
things pertaining to my law profession;
That, besides the dissolution and the apportionment, said contract further states
about my wife's and also my children's share to my current income by way of
alimony and support;

Now, therefore, by virtue of the said contract of separation, I now by these

presents take my new found life-partner Regina S. Balinon, as my true and lawful
wife;

That in order to protect her rights and interests with regards to her personality
and future property rights, I, hereby voluntarily and of my own free will solemnly
swear under oath;

That I will uphold and defend her honor and dignity and prestige as a woman of
the weaker sex as well as any and all members of her family arising by reasons
of said relationship;

That I will remain loyal and faithful to her as a lawful and devoted loving husband
for the rest of my life at all costs;

That I will maintain and preserve the new existing companionship, the love,
respect and goodwill prevailing among the members of her family of which I am
now a member as well as equally mine;

That I will not do any act that may tend to degrade or dishonor her or any
member of her family unbecoming the dignity of said relationship but would
rather take and respect her as my true and lawful wife;

That in case of intentional desertion on my part thereby frustrating the true and
honest intent of my affirmations, the same may be sufficient ground for my
perpetual disbarment upon her instance or any third party in interest;

That except for such minor dues and allowances by way of alimony and support
mentioned above, any and all such future properties, rights and interests that we
shall acquire during such relationship shall exclusively appertain and belong to
her as her due share and shall bear her name in all such titles and documents
thereto, subject to her legal share as such;

That any offspring that we shall bear by reason of said companionship and
relationship shall be acknowledged by me as my true and legal child with all the
rights and privileges accorded by law pertaining to that of a legitimate child;

That this contract of companionship is done of my own accord, freely and

voluntarily without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, So help me
God.
 In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my signature this 4th day of February
1949.

(Sgd.) CELESTINO M. DE LEON

Signed in the Presence of :

...................................................................................................

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES s.s.

City of Bacolod

Personally appeared before me this 4th day of February 1949, Celestino de Leon
with Residence Certificate No. ............ issued at ................ on ............... 1949
who executed the foregoing affidavit with contract of companionship consisting of
two pages, and acknowledged by me that the same is his own free and voluntary
act and deed.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal on the place
and date first written above.

(Sgd.) CELESTINO M. DE LEON

Notary Public
Until December 31, 1948

Doc. No. 484

Page No. 97
Book No. XVI
Series of 1949.

The complaint also alleges that, notwithstanding the unlawful and immoral purposes of
the foregoing affidavit, respondent Velayo knowingly signed the same in violation of his
oath of office as attorney and notary public.

Respondent De Leon admits his continuous cohabitation with Regina S. Balinon during
his subsisting marriage with Vertudes Marquez and the fact the he prepared and
subscribed the affidavit above quoted, but contends that he has not been finally
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; that while the affidavit may be illicit, it is
not an agreement but a mere innocent unilateral declaration of facts; and that while the
execution of said affidavit may be illegal and void ab initio, no specific law has been
violated so as to give rise to an action. Respondent Velayo alleges, on the other hand,
that his participation was limited to the task of notarizing the affidavit, as a matter of
courtesy to a brother lawyer and without knowing its contents, and this allegation is
corroborated by respondent De Leon who further stated that no consideration
whatsoever passed to the former.

This court had heretofore imposed the penalty of suspension upon an attorney who
prepared a document stipulating, among others, that the contracting parties, who are
husband and wife, authorized each other to marry again and that each renounced
whatever right of action one might have against the party so marrying (In re Roque
Santiago, 40 Off. Gaz. [7th Supp.] p. 208). In effect the affidavit prepared and signed by
respondent De Leon has similar implication, in that although it did not bluntly authorize
said respondent to marry another during his subsisting wedlock with Vertudes Marquez,
he made it appear that he could take in another woman as a lifetime partner to whom he
would remain loyal and faithful as a lawful and devoted loving husband and whom he
could take and respect as his true and lawful wife; thereby virtually permitting himself to
commit the crime of concubinage. It is true, as respondent De Leon argues, that the
consent or pardon of either spouse constitutes a bar to a criminal prosecution for
adultery and concubinage, but, as the Solicitor General observes, said crimes are not
thereby legalized, the result being merely that prosecution in such cases would not lie.
The contention that the affidavit is only a unilateral declaration of facts is of no moment,
since it undoubtedly enabled respondent De Leon to attain his purpose of winning over
Regina S. Balinon with some degree of permanence.

It is likewise insisted that the acts imputed to respondent De Leon had no relation with
his professional duties and therefore cannot serve as a basis for suspension or
disbarment under section 25 of Rule 127. It should be remembered, however, that a
member of the bar may be removed or suspended from office as a lawyer on grounds
other than those enumerated by said provision (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil., 567). Moreover,
we can even state that respondent De Leon was able to prepare the affidavit in question
because he is a lawyer, and has rendered professional service to himself as a client. He
surely employed his knowledge of the law and skill as an attorney to his advantage.
(Manalo vs. Gan, Adm. Case No. 72, May 13, 1953.)

With reference with respondent Velayo, there is no question that he did nothing except
to affix his signature to the affidavit in question as a notary public. While, as contended
by his counsel, the duty of a notary public is principally to ascertain the identity of the
affiant and the voluntariness of the declaration, it is nevertheless incumbent upon him at
least to guard against having anything to do with an illegal or immoral arrangement. In
the present case respondent Velayo was somewhat negligent in just affixing his
signature to the affidavit, although his fault is mitigated by the fact the he had relied on
the good faith of his co-respondent.

Wherefore, we hereby decree the suspension from the practice of law of respondent
Celestino M. de Leon for three years from the date of promulgation of this decision.
Respondent Justo T. Velayo is hereby merely reprimanded. So ordered.

Page 12 5. In Re: Santiago, AC No. 923, June 21, 1940 [70 Phil 66]
 Facts:
In this administrative case, the Solicitor General charged the respondent Atty. Roque
Santiago with malpractice and prayedthat disciplinary action be taken against him.
The respondent gave legal advice to one Ernesto Baniquit who was living separately
from his wife for some nine consecutive years and seeking to contract a second
marriage. The respondent assured Baniquit that he could secure a separation from his
wife and marry again. The lawyer prepared a document (Exhibit A) stating that the
contracting parties, husband and wife, were authorized to marry again and at the same
time giving the authorization to renounce or waive each member’s right against the
party marrying.
The notary let the husband and wife execute and acknowledge the document and
declared that they were again single and as such could contract another marriage.
Relying on this document, Baniquit contracted a second marriage.
The respondent, upon realizing his mistake, sent for the parties and let them sign the
deed of cancellation (Exhibit C) a month later but after the second marriage of Baniquit.

Issue:
1. Did the lawyer commit malpractice in his acts regarding the dispensation of such
advice and preparation of document?
2. Is the document regarding separation (Exhibit A) valid?

Held:
1. Yes. The advice given by the respondent and his preparation and acknowledgment
by of the contract constitute malpractice which justifies disbarment from the practice of
law.
2. No. Marriage separation should have should be sanctioned in the proper court and
before the separation (see Selanova). Apart from this, the document subverts the vital
foundation of the family, marriage, and is contrary to law, morals and public policy.

Decision:
Respondent suspended from practice of law for one year.

Dicta:
A. As a response to Baniquit’s question, Santiago remarked that he would tear the
diploma off the wall if the document did not turn out to be valid.
B. Santiago was ignorant of the applicable provision of the law or carelessly negligent in
giving legal advice.
C. The admission to the practice of law dependent on a lawyer’s remaining as a fit-and-
safe person to society. Once he becomes unsafe or unfit to be entrusted
with obligations, his professional privilege should be terminated.

Page 16 6. People v Tuanda, AC No. 3360, January 30, 1990 [181 SCRA 692]
FACTS: Respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this
Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a
decision of the Court of Appeals. In 1983, Atty. Fe Tuanda received from one
Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry with a total value of P36,000
for sale on commission basis. In 1984, instead of returning the unsold pieces
of jewelry worth P26,250, she issued 3 checks. These checks
were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of
funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, Tuanda made no
effort to settle her obligation. Criminal cases were filed, wherein she was
acquitted of estafa but was found guilty of violation of BP 22 (The Anti-
Bouncing CheckLaw). The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial
court and imposed further suspension against Tuanda in the practice of law,
on the ground that the offense involves moral turpitude. Tuanda is now
appealing to the Supreme Court for her suspension to be lifted arguing that
her suspension was a penalty so harsh on top of the fines imposed to her in
violation of the aforementioned law. Arguing further that she intends no
damage to the plaintiff-appellee (Herminia A. Marquez)and she is not guilty of
the offense charged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Tuanda be lifted.

HELD: NO. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which
she is found guilty involved moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138
of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows:
 Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what
grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied)
 Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First
Instance. — The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend
an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding
section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his
profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude relates to and affects the good
moral character of a person convicted of such offense. Herein, BP 22 violation
is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and
public order. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the
private interest of parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interest of the community at large. Putting valueless commercial papers in
circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of
trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the
welfare of society and the public interest. The crimes of which respondent was
convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code
of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the
laws of the land."

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of

Suspension. Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until
further orders from this Court.

Page 16 7. Leda v Tabang [206 SCRA 395 [1992]]

PER CURIAM:

Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue respondent Atty. Trebonian Tabang's good
moral character, in two Complaints she had filed against him, one docketed as Bar Matter No. 78
instituted on 6 January 1982, and the present Administrative Case No. 2505, which is a Petition for
Disbarment, filed on 14 February 1983.

It appears that on 3 October 1976, Respondent and Complainant contracted marriage at

Tigbauan, Iloilo. The marriage, solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro of Tigbauan, was performed
under Article 76 of the Civil
Code1 as one of exceptional character (Annex "A", Petition).

The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Respondent had finished his law
studies (began in l977), and had taken the Bar examinations (in 1981), allegedly to ensure a stable
future for them. Complainantadmits, though, that they had not lived together as husband and wife
(Letter-Complaint, 6 January 1982).

Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter applied to take the Bar. In his application,
he declared that he was "single." He then passed the examinations but Complainant blocked him
from taking his Oath by instituting Bar Matter No. 78, claiming that Respondent had acted
fraudulently in filling out his application and, thus, was unworthy to take the lawyer's Oath for lack of
good moral character. Complainant also alleged that after Respondent's law studies, he became
aloof and "abandoned" her (Petition, par. 5).

The Court deferred Respondent's Oath-taking and required him to answer the Complaint.

Respondent filed his "Explanation," dated 26 May 1982 which was received on 7 June 1982. Said
"Explanation" carries Complainant's conformity (Records, p. 6). Therein, he admitted that he was
"legally married" to Complainant on 3 October 1976 but that the marriage "was not as yet made and
declared public" so that he could proceed with his law studies and until after he could take the Bar
examinations "in order to keep stable our future." He also admitted having indicated that he was
"single" in his application to take the Bar "for reason that to my honest belief, I have still to declare
my status as single since my marriage with the complainant was not as yet made and declared
public." He further averred that he and Complainant had reconciled as shown by her conformity to
the "Explanation," for which reason he prayed that the Complaint be dismissed.
Respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated 2 June 1982. Attached to it was Complainant's
Affidavit of Desistance, which stated that Bar Matter No. 78 arose out of a misunderstanding and
communication gap and that she was refraining from pursuing her Complaint against Respondent.

Acting on the aforesaid Motion and Comment, the Court dismissed Bar Matter No. 78 and allowed
Respondent to take his Oath in a Resolution dated 20 August 1982.

On 14 February 1983, however, Complainant filed this Administrative Case, this time praying for
Respondent's disbarment based on the following grounds:

a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage with
me assuming that our marriage is not valid, and making a mockery of our marriage
institution.

b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he is already married in

his application to take the bar exam.

c. For being not of good moral character contrary to the certification he submitted to
the Supreme Court;

d. For (sic) guilty of deception for the reason that he deceived me into signing of the
affidavit ofdesistance and the conformity to his explanation and later on the comment
to his motion to dismiss, when in truth and in fact he is not sincere, for he only
befriended me to resume our marriage and introduced me to his family, friends and
relatives as his wife, for a bad motive that is he wanted me to withdraw my complaint
against him with the Supreme Court.

Attached to Complainant's Petition for Disbarment, as Annex "F," is an undated and unsigned letter
addressed to Complainant, allegedly written by Respondent after he had already taken his Oath
stating, among others, that while he was grateful for Complainant's help, he "could not force
myself to be yours," did not love her anymore and considered her only a friend. Their marriage
contract was actually void for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code,
among them the minimum cohabitation for five (5) years before the celebration of the marriage, an
affidavit to that effect by the solemnizing officer, and that the parties must be at least twenty-one (21)
years of age, which they were not as they were both only twenty years old at the time. He advised
Complainant not to do anything more so as not to put her family name "in shame." As for him, he
had "attain(ed) my goal as a full-pledge (sic) professional and there is nothing you can do for it to
take away from me even (sic) you go to any court."According to Complainant, although the letter was
unsigned, Respondent's initials appear on the upper left-hand corner of the airmail envelope (Exh.
"8-A-1").

Respondent denied emphatically that he had sent such a letter contending that it is Complainant
who has been indulging in fantasy and fabrications.

In his Comment in the present case, Respondent avers that he and Complainant had covenanted
not to disclose the marriage not because he wanted to finish his studies and take the Bar first but for
the reason that said marriage was void from the beginning in the absence of the requisites of Article
76 of the Civil Code that the contracting parties shall have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five (5) years before the date of the marriage and that said parties shall state the same in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. He could not have abandoned
Complainant because they had never lived together as husband and wife. When he applied for the
1981 Bar examinations, he honestly believed that in the eyes of the law, he was single.
On 7 May 1984, the Court referred the Complaint to the Solicitor General for investigation, report
and recommendation. On 5 March 1990, the Solicitor General submitted his Report, with the
recommendation that Respondent be exonerated from the charges against him since Complainant
failed to attend the hearings and to substantiate her charges but that he be reprimanded for making
inconsistent and conflicting statements in the various pleadings he had filed before this Court.

On 26 March 1990, the Court referred the Solicitor General's Report to the Bar Confidant for
evaluation, report and recommendation. In an undated Report, the latter recommended the indefinite
suspension of Respondent until the status of his marriage is settled.

Upon the facts on Record even without testimonial evidence from Complainant, we find
Respondent's lack of good moral character sufficiently established.

Firstly, his declaration in his application for Admission to the 1981 Bar Examinations that he
was "single" was a gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad faith, for which he
should be made answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of Professional
Responsibility explicitly provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false
statement or suppression of a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the
bar." That false statement, if it had been known, would have disqualified him outrightfrom taking the
Bar Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack of good moral character.

Respondent's protestations that he had acted in good faith in declaring his status as "single" not only
because of his pact with Complainant to keep the marriage under wraps but also because that
marriage to the Complainant was void from the beginning, are mere afterthoughts absolutely wanting
of merit. Respondent can not assume that his marriage to Complainant is void. The presumption is
that all the requisites and conditions of a marriage of an exceptional character under Article 76 of the
Civil Code have been met and that the Judge's official duty in connection therewith has been
regularly performed.

Secondly, Respondent's conduct in adopting conflicting positions in the various pleadings submitted
in Bar Matter No. 78 and in the case at bar is duplicitous and deplorable.

The records show that in Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent had submitted an "Explanation," in
paragraph 1, page 1 of which he admits having been "legally married" to Complainant. Yet, during
the hearings before the Solicitor General, he denied under oath that he had submitted any such
pleading (t.s.n., p. 21) contending instead that it is only the second page where his signature
appears that he meant to admit and not the averments on the first page which were merely of
Complainant's own making (ibid., pp. 59-60). However, in his Comment in this Administrative Case,
he admits and makes reference to such "Explanation" (pars. 3[f]) and [g]; 4[b]).

Again, while in said "Explanation" he admitted having been "legally married" to Complainant (par. 1),
in this case, however, he denies the legality of the marriage and, instead, harps on its being void ab
initio. He even denies his signature in the marriage contract.

In Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent also averred that the fact of marriage was not to be made public
so as to allow him to finish his studies and take the Bar. In this case, however, he contends that the
reason it was kept a secret was because it was "not in order from the beginning."

Thirdly, Respondent denies that he had sent the unsigned

letter (Annex "F," Petition) to Complainant. However, its very tenor coincides with the reasons that
he advances in his Comment why the marriage is void from the beginning, that is, for failure to
comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code.
Fourthly, the factual scenario gathered from the records shows that Respondent had reconciled with
Complainant and admitted the marriage to put a quick finish to Bar Matter No. 78 to enable him to
take the lawyer's Oath, which otherwise he would have been unable to do. But after he had done so
and had become a "full-pledge (sic) lawyer," he again refused to honor his marriage to Complainant.

Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has resorted to conflicting
submissions before this Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in devious tactics with
Complainant in order to serve his purpose. Inso doing, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to
the court" as well as Rule 1001 thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor
consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice." Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing
and pleading before them (Chavez v. Viola, Adm. Case No. 2152, 19 April 1991, 196 SCRA
10). Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of him not only as
a member of the Bar but also as an officer of the Court.

It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good moral character is not only a condition
precedent toadmission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining
in the practice of law(People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA
692). As so aptly put by Mr. Justice GeorgeA. Malcolm: "As good character is an
essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad
in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers ofan
attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933]).

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly unfit and unworthy to continue to
be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law until further Orders, the suspension to take effect
immediately.

Copies of this Decision shall be entered in his personal record as an attorney and served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator who shall circulate the same to all
Courts in the country for their information and guidance.

Page 16 8. Royong v Oblena, 117 Phil 865

FACTS:
§ Josefina Royong, the niece of the common-law wife of Atty. Ariston Oblena, filed a rape case
against the latter.
§ In her complaint, Royong alleged that in 1958 Oblena forced her to have intercourse with her
and that she refrained to report the incident because Oblena threatened to kill her family.
§ As a result of the sexual intercourse, Royong gave birth to a child
§ Oblena denied all the allegations and argued that he and Royong had a relationship and
Royong consented to have intercourse with him.
§ The Solicitor General recommended that Oblena be permanently removed from the roll of
attorney even though the acts of the Royong before and after the rape incident showed that she is
more of a sweetheart than a victim because of the circumstances behind the incident
§ The Solicitor General also charged Oblena of falsifying and deliberately alleging in his
application in the bar in1958 that he is a person of good moral character while having an illicit
and adulterous relationship with Angeles who is not only the aunt of Royong but also has a legal
husband in the province
§ Oblena moved to dismiss the case because the offenses charged are different from those
originally charged in the complaint but the court overruled his petition
§ After the hearing, the investigators concluded that A.) Oblena used his knowledge in law to
commit immoral acts without incurring any criminal liability; B.) he committed gross immorality
by continuously cohabiting with Angeles, his common-law wife, even after he became a lawyer
and C.) Oblena falsified the truth as to his good moral character in his application to take the bar.

ISSUE:
§ W/N the illicit relationship with Royong and the open cohabitation with Angeles, a married
woman, are sufficient grounds to cause Oblena’s disbarment

HELD:
§ YES!
§ Although Oblena is not yet convicted of the crime of rape, seduction or adultery and he is not
guilty of any of the grounds for disbarment enumerated in Sec 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of
Court, the enumeration is not exclusive and the power of the court to exclude unworthy members
of the bar is inherent and is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice and can
be exercised even without any statutory authority, in all cases unless properly prohibited by
statutes.
§ American jurisprudence provides that the continued possession of a good moral character is a
requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law. The loss requires
suspension or disbarment even though the statues do not explicitly specify that as a ground of
disbarment.
§ Oblena’s argument that he believed himself to be a person with good moral character when he
filed his application to take the bar examination is wrong. One’s own approximation of himself
is not a gauge of his moral character. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which
corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is what the person really is and not what he
other people thinks he is.
§ His pretension to wait for the 18th birthday of Royong before having carnal knowledge with
her shows the scheming mind of Oblena and his taking advantage of his knowledge of the law.
§ Also, Royong is the niece of his common-law wife and he enjoyed moral ascendancy over
her. Oblena took advantage of Royong’s trust on him.
§ Oblena’s contention that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in filing the present
complain which is entirely different from the original complaint filed is untenable. There is
nothing in the law requiring the Solicitor General to charge in his complaint the same offence
charged in the original complaint. What the law provides is that if the Solicitor General finds
sufficient grounds to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint
accompanied by the evidence introduced in his investigation.

Page 17 9. 7 CJS 959, Magdalena Arciga v Atty. Segundino Maniwang, [106 SCRA 591]
Facts:
In 1970, Arciga was a medical technology student and Maniwang was a law student. The two
acquainted and had a sexual relationship. In 1973, Arciga got pregnant.

In 1975, Maniwang passed the bar exams. After which, he stopped communicating with Arciga.
Arciga then found out that Maniwang married another woman. She confronted the wife and
this irked Maniwang to inflict physical injuries upon Arciga.

Arciga filed a disbarment case against Maniwang grounded on gross immoral conduct.
Maniwang admitted that he is the father of Arciga’s child; that he did promise to marry Arciga
many times; that he broke those promises because of Arciga’s shady past because apparently
Arciga had an illegitimate child even before her son with Maniwang was born.

Issue:

W/N Maniwang should be disbarred and be held liable for gross immoral conduct.

Arguments of the Parties:

Arciga, complainant said that Maniwang reassured he many times that he would marry her
once he passed the bar examinations.

She reported that Maniwang inflicted physical injuries upon her and secured medical
treatment in a hospital

Maniwang, respondent contended that the cohabitation with the complainant and his
reneging on his promise of marriage do not warrant his disbarment.

Maniwang admitted that he is the father of Arciga’s child; that he did promise to marry Arciga
many times; that he broke those promises because of Arciga’s shady past because apparently
Arciga had an illegitimate child even before her son with Maniwang was born.

Decision of the Court:

The Supreme Court ruled that Maniwang’s case is different from the cases of Mortel vs Aspiras
and Almirez vs Lopez, and other cases therein cited. Maniwang’s refusal to marry Arciga was
not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. But the Supreme Court did say that
it is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is “grossly
immoral conduct” or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer
unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be
unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants
disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined as “that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community”. The complaint for disbarment against the respondent is hereby
dismissed.

Relevance to the subject (Legal Profession)

The case of Arciga vs Maniwang is important in determining whether the act that the lawyer
has done was immoral or grounds of disbarment. It is very crucial for a lawyer especially in his
profession to maintain his/ her etiquette in order to become an example to the other citizens of
the Philippines. A litigator must be the first one that the people must look up to. Legal
profession does not only apply to the duties of a lawyer to the bar and to his clients but also to
the people surrounding him.

Page 17 10. Emerenciana Reyes v Felipe Wong, [63 SCRA 667]

FACTS: Reyes and Wong were classmates in the college of law at MLQ University in 1960. Wong and
Reyes became sweethearts. Later on, Wong requested Reyes to fill out an application for a marriage
license which the latter did. Later on still, Wong requested Reyes to sign a marriage contract, and
the marriage contract made it also appear that their solemnizing officer was a Supreme Court
justice. Apparently, Reyes believed that she’s already married to Wong by virtue of those papers she
was made to sign. So she gave in to Wong’s request to have sexual intercourse in hotels. Reyes
became pregnant twice and she gave birth to two daughters.
Eventually, Wong became a lawyer while Reyes was still in the college of law. Wong’s engagements
as a lawyer kept the couple apart. But later on, Reyes found out that Wong got married somewhere.
This also led to her discovery that her marriage with Wong was not registered. She now comes
before the Supreme Court asking for Wong’s disbarment on the ground of grave immorality.
ISSUE: Whether or not Wong should be disbarred.
HELD: No. The acts imputed against him may constitute immorality for surely, cohabitation is
immoral for lack of marriage. But the same is not sufficient to disbar him for in order for such result
to take place, the act complained of must not merely be immoral; it must be “grossly immoral” — “it
must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible
to a high degree”. And the same must be established by clear and convincing proof, disclosing a case
that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary power. In the case at
bar, it’s highly impossible that Reyes actually believed that she’s married to Wong. She’s a law
student and as early as the first year of law studies, the essential requisites of marriage is discussed.
She could have not believed that there was a valid marriage considering that no celebration actually
took place plus other infirmities in the alleged “marriage”. Further, the Supreme Court said:
Intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married, is neither so corrupt as to constitute
a criminal act nor so unprincipled as to warrant disbarment or disciplinary action against the man
as a member of the Bar.

Page 17 11. Go v Candoy [21 SCRA 439]

Attorney’s-at-law; Disbarment; Deceit and immoral conduct; Failure to prove charge entitles lawyer to
exoneration.—Where complainant failed to substantiate his charge of deceit and immoral conduct against
respondent, the latter is entitled to exoneration.

Same; Burden of proof.—In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. To be
made the basis for suspension or disbarment of a lawyer, the charge against him must be established by
convincing proof. The record must disclose as free from doubt a case which compels the exercise by the
Court of its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act done as well as of the motivation thereof
must be clearly demonstrated.

Same; Lawyer must satisfy court regarding his fitness to continue as such.—A lawyer, whenever his moral
character is put in issue, should satisfy the Court that he is fit and proper person to enjoy continued
membership in the Bar. He cannot dispense with nor downgrade the high and exacting moral standards of
the law profession.

Same; Lack of interest of complainant does not preclude case.—A case of suspension or disbarment may
proceed “regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainants, if the facts proven so warrant.

MANUEL R. GO, complainant,

vs.ROMULO CANDOY, Admitted to the Philippine Bar: March 9, 1957, respondent.

CASTRO, J.:

This is an administrative case for disbarment instituted by Manuel R. Go on October 24, 1966
against Atty. Romulo Candoy on the basis of acts committed by the latter allegedly constituting
"deceit and grossly immoral conduct".

The complaint recites that by virtue of a "previous agreement" between the complainant Go and the
respondent Candoy over "Lot 11, Block 16 (LRC) Psd-1210 Magallanes Village P-1 with an area of
350 sq. m. located at Makati, Rizal," Go gave to the Makati Development Corporation1 on March 4,
1964 his personal check for P7,140, which sum represents the initial payment on the said lot plus
the required cash bond; that by virtue of this payment, the corporation executed an "Agreement to
Purchase and Sell" in favor of Candoy; that on the same date, "in view of the foregoing consideration
and the additional amount of P2,000 in cash given" by Go to Candoy, the latter executed an
"Agreement to Purchase and Sell" in favor of Go; that on March 31, 1964 Go gave to the corporation
another personal check for P16,337.01, which amount represents the "unpaid balance of the
purchase price of the said lot"; that in view of this last payment, the corporation on the same date
executed a "Deed of Absolute Sale" in favor of Candoy; that on August 30, 1965 Candoy and his
wife, by virtue of a "Contract to Sell", sold the land to the spouses Amado Barrientos and Astrid N.
Barrientos; that to protect his rights, Go instituted a civil case (9047, CFI of Rizal) against Candoy
and his wife, the spouses Barrientos and the corporation, as well as a criminal prosecution
for estafa (15756, CFI of Rizal) against Candoy; and that both cases are now pending adjudication.

In answer to the complaint, Candoy admits the existence of the "Agreement to Purchase and Sell" in
favor of Go as well as the "Deed of Absolute Sale" executed by the corporation in his (Candoy's)
favor. He likewise admits having executed a "Contract to Sell" in favor of the spouses Barrientos, but
avers that he did so only "after the petitioner (complainant) had defaulted and after the respondent
had given him all the opportunity to comply but nevertheless, the petitioner failed, so the respondent
was compelled to rescind his agreement with the petitioner and it was only then that the respondent
sold the lot in question to the spouses Amado Barrientos and Astrid Barrientos". As a special and
affirmative defense, he asserts that there was no deceit, much less any immoral conduct, on his part
in rescinding the sale to Go and selling the land to the spouses Barrientos, because he gave Go "all
the opportunity to comply with their agreement and it was only after the petitioner refused to comply
with their agreement that the respondent decided to rescind the agreement."

The case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. On
January 23, 1967 Candoy, with the conformity of Go, moved to dismiss the case on the ground that
they had reached an amicable settlement. On March 17, 1967 the Office of the Solicitor General,
without any hearing had in the case, submitted his report and recommendation, the pertinent
portions of which read as follows:

Although this case may be disposed of in the light of the joint motion for dismissal filed by the
parties and their counsel, it appears from the very answer of respondent that the double sale
complained of was occasioned by a very trivial alleged violation of the first vendee of the
condition of the sale, namely, the alleged non-payment of association dues in the amount of
around P52.50 which in the mind of the undersigned should not have been taken advantage
of by respondent. Besides, it is hard to believe the denial made under oath by respondent of
receipt of P2,000.00 as additional consideration of the land sale as alleged in paragraph 3 of
the petition;

Under the circumstances, in order that lawyers may be restrained from doing any act which
in any manner may be tainted with some degree of unfairness or oppressiveness, albeit
legal, which, in this case is doubtful because the alleged lesion was not serious, it is
advisable that the respondent be correspondingly admonished.

Commenting on the foregoing recommendation, Candoy in his memorandum expressed surprise "as
to how the Solicitor General has arrived at the conclusion that 'it is hard to believe the denial made
under oath by the respondent of receipt of P2,000.00 as additional consideration' when there was no
investigation whatsoever conducted and the complainant has not presented any evidence to prove
his allegation." Candoy argues that even on the assumption that the violation committed by Go is
trivial, the fact remains that the latter committed a breach of contract justifying rescission of their
agreement; and that such rescission cannot in any manner be regarded as constituting "deceit and
grossly immoral conduct" on Candoy's part.

Notwithstanding the joint motion to dismiss filed by the parties, this Court can still hold the
respondent Candoy accountable for breach of professional conduct, if he has committed any relative
to his contractual relations with the complainants. A lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in
issue, should satisfy this Court that he is a fit and proper person to enjoy continued membership in
the Bar. He can not dispense with nor downgrade the high and exacting moral standards of the law
profession. For this reason, a case of suspension or disbarment may proceed "regardless of interest
or lack of interest of the complainants, if the facts proven so warrant."2 It is of no moment, therefore,
that the parties herein "have considered this matter closed with the termination of the transaction
had" by them. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge
of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven.

It is quite elementary that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant. To be made the basis for suspension or disbarment of a lawyer, the charge against him
must be established by convincing proof. The record must disclose as free from doubt a case which
compels the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act done
as well as of the motivation thereof must be clearly demonstrated.3
Coming back to the case at hand, it is our view that the Solicitor General erred in concluding that "it
is hard to believe the denial made under oath by the respondent of receipt of P2,000 as additional
consideration of the land sale". Apart from the bare allegation that the complainant gave the
respondent "the additional amount of P2,000.00 in cash", which allegation was squarely traversed by
the latter under oath the record is absolutely bereft of any proof that the said amount was in fact paid
to, and received by, the respondent. It was easy enough for the complainant to prove payment of the
amount of P2,000 by the mere tender of the corresponding receipt. Since there was no investigation
conducted in the case, and the complainant has not at all presented any evidence of payment by
him of the said amount, the respondent was under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.

In his report and recommendation, the Solicitor General observed "that the double sale complained
of was occasioned by a very trivial alleged violation of the first vendee of the condition of the sale,
namely, the alleged non-payment of association dues in the amount of around P52.50," and
concluded that the rescission of the contract by the respondent was tainted with some degree of
unfairness or oppressiveness." We disagree. The Solicitor General overlooks the fact that the breach
of the "Agreement to Purchase and Sell" committed by the complainant did not embrace alone "non-
payment of association dues" but as well and, more importantly, failure to pay the fall consideration
of the sale of the lot in question. In the said agreement, the complainant bound himself to "pay to
Makati Development Corporation the balance of P19,460.00 on or before April 1, 1965 including
12% interest per annum on the said balance". The complainant paid the sum of only P16,337.01,
leaving, therefore, the sizeable unpaid balance of P3,122.99. Although the question of rescission is
now academic, the parties having settled their differences amicably, this Court is not prepared to say
that in rescinding the agreement the respondent acted with "unfairness and oppressiveness", as he
merely exercised a power explicitly conferred upon him by the said agreement, this power being one
of the special stipulations and covenants thereof "strict and full compliance" with which the
complainant unequivocally bound himself.

ACCORDINGLY, the complaint for disbarment against Atty. Romulo Candoy is hereby dismissed.

Page 17 12. Nunez v Astorga, 452 SCRA 353, February 28, 2005

Complainants: Eduardo L. Nunez, Eugenio O. Nunez, Eliza Nunez-Alvarico and Imelda Nunez
Respondents: Atty. Arturo B. Astroga
Ponente: Panganiban, J

Administrative Law; Attorneys; Lawyers shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
their fitness to practice law; Neither shall they, whether in public or in private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.—The legal profession exacts a high
standard from its members. Lawyers shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on their
fitness to practice law. Neither shall they, whether in public or in private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Same; Same; Admission of respondent that there are various cases filed or pending against him
does not ipso facto constitute serious misconduct.—The admission of respondent that there are
various cases filed or pending against him does not ipso facto constitute serious misconduct. His
contention that the pending cases against him pose a prejudicial question that will bar the
instant administrative case is untenable. Likewise bereft of merit, however, is the finding of the
IBP investigating commissioner that the mere existence of the same pending cases constitute
serious misconduct on the part of respondent.
Same; Same; Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or
suspension.—Under Section 27 of Rule 138, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a
ground for disbarment or suspension. Suspension or disbarment may follow as a matter of
course, upon a finding that the crime a lawyer has been convicted of involves moral turpitude.
By such conviction, such lawyer has become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and is
no longer possessed of good moral character. In the present case, however, while respondent
has been charged with several criminal cases involving moral turpitude, he has yet to be
convicted of any of them.
Same; Same; The mere existence of pending criminal charges cannot be a ground for
disbarment or suspension of respondent.—Without clear and convincing evidence that he
committed acts that allegedly constituted serious misconduct, the mere existence of pending
criminal charges cannot be a ground for disbarment or suspension of respondent. To hold
otherwise would open the door to harassment of attorneys through the mere filing of numerous
criminal cases against them.

FACTS: In 1968 the late Maria Ortega Vda de. Nunez executed a Sale of a lot OCT 2651 ( Now
8955) with “Right to Repurchase” in favor of Eugenio Nunez within 10 years from date of
execution. The expiration to repurchase expired and was not exercise even up to date and
Eugenio with his children are presently residing in the said lot. The son of Maria Ortega, Ricardo
Nunez extra judicially partitioned his estate. Ricardo appointed Atty. Astorga as administrator
and alleged that complainants have no right over the same lots. Ricardo sold the same lot to
Imelda and Elisa the lot that they were occupying and after which Elisa filed Estafa against
respondent before the Municipal Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte. Another criminal case of which is
grave threat was again filed against Atty. Astroga by Eduardo Nunez for uttering words ipaposil
ta ka' which means 'I'll have you shot.” while in the house of Eduardo
In Atty. Astroga’s defense He denied that he had utilized his profession to circumvent the
law and averred that there were already several pending cases involving the same issues raised
by complainants in the present administrative action. Furthermore, it will only suspend further
hearing.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Astroga is guilt of serious misconduct.
HELD: No, however the Court ruled that the offensive language of Atty. Astroga to
complainants and their counsel is unbecoming an attorney. “The legal profession exacts a high
standard from its members. Lawyers shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on their
fitness to practice law”

He hurled insulting language in describing the opposing counsel and cast doubts on the
latter are integrity by implying that the lawyer had instigated the filing of the so-called baseless
suits, violated the rules on non-forum shopping and committed malpractice. However, there
were no clear evidence that would show proof that Atty. Astroga’s deceit and gross misconduct.
The mere existence of pending cases that constitute of serious misconduct is not a ground that
someone has been behaving in a misconduct manner. Conviction of a crime is needed before it
would be a ground for disciplinary actions. By such conviction, such lawyer has become unfit to
uphold the administration of justice and is no longer is possession of good moral character.
 A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended by violation of his oath which includes gross
misconduct, malpractice, being convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and many more.
But the wise Court said that disbarment and suspension are sever forms of disciplinary action
and must be imposed with great caution. Without clear and convincing evidence that he
committed acts that allegedly constituted serious misconduct, the mere existence of pending
criminal charges cannot be a ground for disbarment or suspension of respondent. To hold
otherwise would open the door to harassment of attorneys through the mere filing of numerous
criminal cases against them.
From the actual ruling:
"A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent
disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. Among the
grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are deceit; malpractice;
gross misconduct in office; grossly immoral conduct; conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to the practice of law; willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; corrupt
or willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The
grounds are not preclusive in nature even as they are broad enough as to cover practically
any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his professional career or in his
private life. A lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber, which are
not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar but are likewise essential
demands for his continued membership therein.

“CANON 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor
toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 — A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which
is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.”

“A lawyer's language may be forceful, but should always be dignified; emphatic, but respectful
as befitting an advocate. Arguments, whether written or oral, should be gracious to both court
and opposing counsel and should use such language as may be properly addressed by one
gentleperson to another.”

WHEREFORE, Atty. Arturo B. Astroga is ACQUITTED of the charge of serious misconduct, but
is held liable for conduct unbecoming an attorney and is FINED two thousand pesos. H

SO ORDERED.

Page 17 13. In Re: Basa, December 7, 1920 [41 Phil 275]

MALCOLM, J.:

The Attorney-General asks that an order issue for the disbarment of Attorney Carlos S. Basa.
Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of California and the
Philippine Islands. Recently he was charged in the Court of Fist Instance of the city of Manila with
the crime of abduction with consent, was found guilt in a decision rendered by the Honorable M.V.
del Rosario, Judge of First Instance, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two years,
eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional. On appeal, this decision was affirmed in a
judgment handed down by the second division of the Supreme Court. 1

The Code of Civil Procedure, section 21, provides that "A member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office of lawyer by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude . . ." The sole question presented, therefore, is whether the crime of
abduction with consent, as punished by article 446 of the Penal Code, involves moral turpitude.

"Moral turpitude," it has been said, "includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, cited by numerous courts.) Although no
decision can be found which has decided the exact question, it cannot admit of doubt that crimes of
this character involve moral turpitude. The inherent nature of the act is such that it is against good
morals and the accepted rule of right conduct. (In re Hopkins [1909], 54 Wash., 569; Pollard vs. Lyon
[1875], 91 U.S., 225; 5 Ops. Atty.-Gen. P. I., 46, 185; decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of
November 30, 1876 and June 15, 1895.)

When we come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which should be taken by the court,
we do so regretfully and reluctantly. On the one hand, the violation of the criminal law by the
respondent attorney cannot be lightly passed over. On the other hand, we are willing to strain the
limits of our compassion to the uttermost in order that so promising a career may not be utterly
ruined.

It is the order of the court that beginning with the day when Carlos S. Basa shall be discharged from
prison, he be suspended from his office of lawyer for one year. So ordered.lawphi1.net

Page 18 14. Zari v Florez, Adm. Matter No. 2170-MC P-1356 [94 SCRA 323]

HON. REMIGIO E. ZARI, Complainant, vs. DIOSDADO S. FLORES, Respondent

Facts:
Hon. Remigio E. Zari, Presiding Judge of Branch VI City Court of Quezon City,
recommended the dismissal from the service of Mr. Diosdado S. Flores, Deputy Clerk of
Court of Branch VI, City Court, on grounds of moral turpitude and persistent attempts to
unduly influence the complainant amounting to undue interest in cases pending before
Branch VI and gross discourtesy to superior officers as manifested by his uncalled for and
unjustified use of strong and contemptuous language in addressing the City Judges.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent’s acts constitute grounds for dismissal from the service.

Held: In his affidavit subscribed and sworn to before then City Judge Oscar A. Inocentes
on June 10, 1969, the respondent stated that I am a person of good moral character and
integrity and have no administrative, criminal or police record. This claim is not true
because the respondent had been convicted of libel in Criminal Case No. Q-7171, of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, in a sentence dated April 28, 1967. This
prevarication in a sworn statement is a ground for serious disciplinary action.
That in his accomplished Civil Service Form No. 212 which was subscribed and sworn to,
the respondent admits having acted as counsel for three companies; and that the giving
of legal advice by notaries and others who are not admitted to the practice of law is
dangerous to the welfare of the community, because such persons have not
demonstrated their capacity by submitting to examinations lawfully established in the
practice of law.
The respondent's conviction for libel shows his propensity to speak ill of others as
reflected in his letter to Judge Minerva C. Genovea, then Executive Judge of the City
Court of Quezon City which contains defamatory and uncalled for language.
The handwritten notes of the respondent regarding different cases pending in Branch VI
of the City Court of Quezon City, presided by the complainant, show that the respondent
had exerted undue influence in the disposition of the cases mentioned therein.
Respondent, Diosdado S. Flores, is dismissed as Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI of the
City Court of Quezon City, with forfeiture of all retirement privileges and with prejudice
to reinstatement in the national and local governments, as well as, in any government
instrumentality or agency including government owned or controlled corporations.

Page 18 15. State Ex. Conklin v Buckingham, 84 P. 2nd 49; 5 AM Jur. Sec 279, pp. 428-429; In Re
Gutierrez, AC No. L-363, July 31, 1962, [5 SCRA 661]

MAKALINTAL, J.:

Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar, admitted to it on October 5,

1945. In criminal case No. R-793 of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro he was convicted
of the murder of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of Calapan, and together with his co-
conspirators was sentenced to the penalty of death. Upon review by this Court the judgment of
conviction was affirmed on June 30, 1956 (G.R. No. L-17101), but the penalty was changed
to reclusion perpetua. After serving a portion of the sentence respondent was granted a conditional
pardon by the President on August 19, 1958. The unexecuted portion of the prison term was
remitted "on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines."

On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder case, filed a
verified complaint before this Court praying that respondent be removed from the roll of lawyers
pursuant to Rule 127, section 5. Respondent presented his answer in due time, admitting the facts
alleged by complainant regarding pardon in defense, on the authority of the decision of this Court in
the case of In re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.

Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime insolving moral turpitude.
Murder is, without doubt, such a crime. The term "moral turpitude" includes everything which is done
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. In re Carlos S. Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in
disbarment statutes, it means an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to the accepted rule of
right and duty between man and man. State ex rel. Conklin v. Buckingham, 84 P. 2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur.
Sec. 279. pp. 428-429.

The only question to be resolved is whether or not the conditional pardon extended to respondent
places him beyond the scope of the rule on disbarment aforecited. Reliance is placed by him
squarely on the Lontok case. The respondent therein was convicted of bigamy and thereafter
pardoned by the Governor-General. In a subsequent viction, this Court decided in his favor and held:
"When proceedings to strike an attorney's name from the rolls the fact of a conviction for a felony
ground for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a
bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted."

It is our view that the ruling does not govern the question now before us. In making it the Court
proceeded on the assumption that the pardon granted to respondent Lontok was absolute. This is
implicit in the ratio decidendi of the case, particularly in the citations to support it, namely. In Re
Emmons, 29 Cal. App. 121; Scott vs. State, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 343; and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 380.
Thus in Scott vs. State the court said:

We are of opinion that after received an unconditional pardon the record of the felony
conviction could no longer be used as a basis for the proceeding provided for in article 226.
The record, when offered in evidence, was met with an unconditional pardon, and could not,
therefore, properly be said to afford "proof of a conviction of any felony." Having been thus
cancelled, all its force as a felony conviction was taken away. A pardon falling short of this
would not be a pardon, according to the judicial construction which that act of executive
grace was received. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 344; Knote v. U.S., 95 U.S. 149, and cases
there cited; Young v. Young, 61 Tex. 191.

And the portion of the decision in Ex parte Garland quoted with approval in the Lontok case is as
follows:

A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the
offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out the existence
of guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed
the offense. It granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities,
consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the
 penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights it makes him, as it were, a
new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.

The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional, and merely remitted the
unexecuted portion of his term. It does not reach the offense itself, unlike that in Ex parte Garland,
which was "a full pardon and amnesty for all offense by him committed in connection with rebellion
(civil war) against government of the United States."

The foregoing considerations rendered In re Lontok are inapplicable here. Respondent Gutierrez
must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the pardon he invokes in
defense. The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in
hand, by taking advantage of his official position (respondent being municipal mayor at the time) and
with the use of motor vehicle. People vs. Diosdado Gutierrez, supra. The degree of moral turpitude
involved is such as to justify his being purged from the profession.

The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid standards
of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only
prescribe a test of academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral
character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer must
continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal. As stated in Ex
parte Wall, 107 U.S. 263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556: "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most
sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to
repudiate and override the laws, to trample them under foot and to ignore the very bonds of society,
argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and
dangerous elements of the body politic.

WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the crime for which
respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered disbarred and his name
stricken from the roll of lawyers.

Page 18 16. Tak Ng v Rep of the Phil, No. L-13017, December 23, 1959 [106 Phil 727]
FACTS:

. (a) The petitioner Tak Ng, born in Manila on January 9, 1922, resided in the
Philippines since birth and has never gone abroad. 


. (b) During his residence and prior to his petition for admission in Philippine
citizenship, he was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila, of
profiteering and was sentenced to pay a fine of P50.00. 


. (c) Also, he cohabited with Leonarda Cabacungan with whom he had 3 children. 


. (d) On June 15, 1956, petitioner Tak Ng filed his petition for naturalization at the
Court of First Instance of Manila which in his declaration of intention and in his
petition for naturalization, 
 the petitioner stated that he was single and that he
did not have any child 

. (e) He married her on May 15, 1957. 


ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner Tak Ng is eligible for naturalization.

HELD:

No. The act of petitioner in profiteering, an offense that raises price above that
authorized by law, involves moral turpitude and causes a great hardship to the country
(profiteering affects the poor people in general, and that any raise in the price above
that authorized by law, causes a great hardship to the country) which indicates lack of
good moral character. More so, he falsely stated in his declaration of intention that he
had no children where in fact he had 3; and, the fact that petitioner cohabitated with
Leonarda Cabacungan without the benefit of marriage indicates his bad character.
Where, the enacted Naturalization Law has expressively mandated a show of good
moral character of the applicant for acquisition of Philippine citizenship be admissible.

Is profiteering a crime involving moral turpitude which disqualifies

petitioner from admission to Philippine citizenship? We think so. "Moral
turpitude" has been defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in
the private and social duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society
in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and
duty between man and man (Traders & General Ins. Co. vs. Russell, Tex.
Civ. App., 99 S.W. [2d] 1079) or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals (Marah vs. State Bar of California, 210 Cal.
303, 291 P. 583).

There can be no doubt that profiteering, an offense which is severely and

heavily penalized with imprisonment of not more than 10 years, or by a fine
of not more than P10,000.00, or by both,[2] involves moral turpitude,
inasmuch as it affects the price of prime commodities and goes to the life of
the citizens, especially those who are poor and with hardly the means to
sustain themselves.[3] Having been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude, petitioner is disqualified from naturalization as a Filipino
citizen.[4]

In respect of the second ground, petitioner claims that he failed to marry

Leonarda Cabacungan in 1951, because she was then only 17 or 18 years of
age, and her parents objected to their marriage because he was a Chinese
citizen.

The contention deserves no serious consideration. Assuming that

Leonarda's parents disapproved of petitioner's marriage to her, he could
have legally married her had he really wanted to, when Leonarda was
already 18 years of age, since under the law,[5] only the advice of her parents
is required which, if not given, does not prevent the celebration of the
marriage, 3 months after the completion of the publication of the
application for marriage license, Petitioner never made any attempt or
effort to marry Leonarda, but chose instead to live with her openly for 6
years without the benefit of marriage, begetting with her 3 children, all out
of wedlock. It was not until May 15, 1957, that is, almost 1 year after he had
filed his petition for naturalization in court that he decided to marry her
which, according to the Solicitor General, was, evidently, entered into
merely "for convenience and with the avowed purpose of circumventing the
provisions of our naturalization laws regarding irreproachable character
and good moral conduct."

Needless to say, the act of petitioner in cohabiting with Leonarda for 6

years without the benefit of marriage, clearly indicates his bad moral
character, which disqualifies him from becoming a Filipino citizen.[6] The
fact that petitioner married her on May 16, 1957, did not thereby cure his
disqualification for lack of good moral character.[7]

We agree with the trial court and the Solicitor General that petitioner's
statement in his declaration of intention and in his petition for
naturalization that he was single and that he did not have any child at all,
when in truth and in fact, he had then already 3 children with Leonarda
Cabacungan, is a deliberate falsehood amounting to perjury, as he
concealed his true status under oath and, likewise, shows petitioner's
wanton disregard for truth, hence, lack of good moral character disabling
him from acquiring Philippine citizenship.

Wherefore, finding no error in the judgment of the court a quo, the

same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner appellant. So
ordered.
Page 18 17. Soriano v Dizon, AC No. 6792, January 25, 2006
Roberto Soriano vs. Atty. Manuel Dizon
AC 6792
January 25, 2006
FACTS:
Atty. Manuel Dizon was driving his car under the influence of liquor when along Abanao Street,
Baguio City, a taxi driver overtook him. Incensed, Dizon tailed the taxi, pulled it over, and berated
Roberto Soriano, the taxi driver, and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, Soriano forced
open his door, causing Dizon to fall to the ground. Soriano tried to help Dizon get up, but the
latter was about to punch him so Soriano punched Dizon first to fend off an impending attack.
Soriano prevented another attempt by Dizon to hit him. Dizon went back to his car and got his
revolver with the handle wrapped in a handkerchief. As Soriano was handing Dizon’s eyeglasses,
which he just picked up from the pavement, Dizon fired and shot him. Soriano fell on the thigh
of the accused, and the latter merely pushed him out and sped off. The bullet hit Soriano’s neck
and lacerated his carotid artery. According to the doctors who treated him, he would have died if
not for the timely medical assistance. Soriano sustained spinal cord injury causing the left side of
his body to be paralyzed, disabling him for his job as a taxi driver.

Dizon was eventually convicted for frustrated homicide but was allowed probation, conditioned
on payment of civil liabilities. However, four years after judgment was rendered, Dizon has not
yet fulfilled his civil obligation.

Soriano filed complaint before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP for Dizon’s disbarment.
The Commissioner of the CBD recommended that respondent be disbarred for having been
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and for violating Rule. 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. The IBP adopted the recommendation of the CBD and sent their
resolution to the Supreme Court for review.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the crime of frustrated homicide committed by Atty. Dizon involved moral
turpitude.
2. Whether or not Atty. Dizon’s guilt warrants his disbarment.

HELD:
1. The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the CBD that the crime of frustrated
homicide committed by Atty. Dizon involved moral turpitude. The court defined moral
turpitude as “everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an
act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes
his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.” Moral turpitude was shown when Atty. Dizon shot a taxi driver for no justifiable
reason. His act definitely did not constitute self-defense. It was he who was the aggressor
because he first tried to punch Soriano. The latter was merely defending himself when he
counterpunched Dizon. Moreover, Dizon’s act was aggravated with treachery when he
shot Soriano when the latter was not in a position to defend himself. Soriano was handing
Dizon’s eyeglasses, which he just picked up, when he was shot. Furthermore, Dizon tried
to escape punishment by wrapping the handle of his gun in handkerchief in order not to
leave fingerprints on the gun used. Dizon’s violent reaction to a simple traffic incident
indicated his skewed morals.
 2. The Supreme Court held that Dizon also violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that “A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.” Dizon failed to obey the
laws of the land through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm. He failed to respect
legal processes through his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities, the condition for his
probation.

Dizon also violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides
that “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”
Dizon’s violation was exhibited when he tried to reach an out-of-court settlement with the
family of Soriano but when the negotiations failed, he made it appear as if it was the
family who approached him to get a referral to a neurosurgeon. In addition, Dizon
fabricated a story that it was Soriano and two other persons who mauled him. According
to the three doctors who examined Dizon, his injuries were so minor that his allegation
was so improbable.

The court ruled that the appalling treachery and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly
showed his unfitness to continue as a member of the bar. Membership in the legal
profession is a privilege demanding a high degree of good moral character, which is not
only a condition precedent to admission, but also a continuing requirement for the practice
of law. While the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and that
disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish the end
desired, the court held that meting out a lesser penalty would be irreconcilable with the
lofty aspiration that every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and justice. Atty. Dizon
was disbarred.

Page 18 18. International Rice Research Institute v NLRC [221 SCRA 760]

Labor Law; Security of Tenure; The employment of a regular employee may be terminated only for
just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Labor Code and conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude is definitely not one of the just causes enumerated therein.—It should be recalled,
however, that Micosa was issued an appointment with an assurance from the IRRI’s Director
General that as regular core employee he “may not be terminated except for justifiable causes as
defined by the pertinent provisions of the Philippine Labor Code.” Thus, IRRI could not remove him
from his job if there existed no justifiable cause as defined by the Labor Code. Article 282 of the
Labor Code enumerates the just causes wherein an employer may terminate an employment. Verily,
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is not one of these justifiable causes. Neither may
said ground be justified under Article 282 (c) nor under 282 (d) by analogy.

Criminal Law; Homicide; Conviction of the crime of homicide, resulting from an act of incomplete
self-defense from an unlawful aggression by the victim, does not, in itself, involve moral turpitude.—
As to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine. Thus, the
precipitate conclusion of IRRI that conviction of the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude is
unwarranted considering that the said crime which resulted from an act of incomplete self-defense
from an unlawful aggression by the victim has not been so classified as involving moral turpitude.

Same; Same; Same; Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of
the crime committed, taking into account all the surrounding circumstances.—This is not to say that
all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral turpitude. Homicide may or may not
involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in
every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether
any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends
on all the surrounding circumstances. While xxx generally but not always, crimes mala in se involve
moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, it cannot always be ascertained whether moral
turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since
there are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes
which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is
somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial
inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached.

NOCON, J.:

Posed for determination in this petition for certiorari is the question of whether a conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude is a ground for dismissal from employment and corollary, whether a
conviction of a crime of homicide involves moral turpitude.

International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) is an international organization recognized by the

Philippine government and accorded privileges, rights and immunities normally granted to
organizations of universal character. In 1977, it hired private respondent Nestor B. Micosa as
laborer, who thereby became bound by IRRI Employment Policy and Regulations, the Miscellaneous
Provisions of which states viz:

C. Conviction and Previous Separation

l. . . .

2. An employer who has been convicted of a (sic) criminal offense involving moral
turpitude may be dismissed from the service.1

On February 6, 1967, Micosa stabbed to death one Reynaldo Ortega inside a beer house in Los
Baños, Laguna.

On September 15, 1987, Micosa was accused of the crime of homicide. During the pendency of the
criminal case, Micosa voluntarily applied for inclusion in IRRI's Special Separation Program.
However, on January 9, 1990, IRRI's Director General, Klaus L. Lampe expressed deep regret that
he had to disapprove Micosa's application for separation because of IRRI's desire to retain the skills
and talents that persons like him possess.2

On January 23, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision fending Micosa guilty of homicide, but
appreciating, however, in his favor the presence of the mitigating circumstances of (a) incomplete
self-defense and (b) voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance.

Subsequently, Micosa applied for suspension of his sentence under the Probation Law.

On February 8, 1990, IRRI's Director General personally wrote Micosa that his appointment as
laborer was confirmed, making him a regular core employee whose appointment was for an
indefinite period and who "may not be terminated except for justifiable causes as defined by the
pertinent provisions of the Philippine Labor Code.3
On March 30, 1990, IRRI's Human Resource Development Head, J.K. Pascual wrote Micosa urging
him to resign from employment in view of his conviction in the case for homicide.

On April 4, 1990, the Laguna Parole and Probation Office No. II wrote IRRI informing the latter that
said office found Micosa's application for probation meritorious as he was evaluated "to possess
desirable social antecedents in his life."4

On April 6, 1990, Micosa informed J.K. Pascual that he had no intention of resigning from his job at
IRRI.

On April 22, 1990, J. K. Pascual replied to Micosa's letter insisting that the crime for which he was
convicted involves moral turpitude and informing him that he is thereby charged of violating Section
I-AA, Par VII, C-2 of the Institute's Personnel Manual.

On April 27, 1990, Micosa explained to J.K. Pascual that the slaying of Reynaldo Ortega on
February 6, 1987 arose out of his act of defending himself from unlawful aggression; that his
conviction did not involve moral turpitude and that he opted not to appeal his conviction so that he
could avail of the benefits of probation, which the trial court granted to him.

On May 7, 1990, Micosa sought the assistance of IRRI's Grievance Committee who recommended
to the Director General, his continued employment. However, on May 21, 1990, J.K. Pascual issued
a notice to Micosa that the latter's employment was to terminate effective May 25, 1990.

On May 29, 1990, Micosa filed a case for illegal dismissal.

On August 21, 1990, Labor Arbiter Numeriano D. Villena rendered judgment finding the termination
of Micosa illegal and ordering his reinstatement with full backwages from the date of his dismissal up
to actual reinstatement. The dispositive portion of the same is hereunder quoted:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the following orders are hereby entered:

1. Finding the termination of complainant's services illegal;

2. Ordering respondent International Rice Research Institute to reinstate complainant

Nestor B. Micosa to his former position without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges appurtenant, thereto immediately upon receipt hereof;

3. Ordering respondent International Rice Research Institute to pay complainant

Nestor B. Micosa his full backwages computed from the date of his dismissal on May
25, 1990 up to actual reinstatement based on his latest salary rate of P41,068.00 per
month.

4. Ordering respondent International Rice Research Institute, to pay complainant's

counsel the amount of Five Thousand Pesos P5,000.00, representing his attorney's
fees; and.

5. Dismissing the claim for damages for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.5
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission was basically in agreement with the findings
and conclusions of the Labor Arbiter. Hence, in a resolution dated January 31, 1991, it affirmed the
appealed decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with modification deleting the

award of attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED.6

Accordingly, petitioner filed this instant petition raising the following issues:

1. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION HAS ACTED WITH GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT IRRI HAD NO RIGHT NOR
AUTHORITY TO PRESCRIBE ANY OTHER CAUSE/S FOR DISMISSAL IF THE
SAME IS NOT AMONG THOSE ENUMERATED IN ARTICLE OF THE LABOR
CODE.

2. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT "THERE IS NO BASIS TO APPLY
PETITIONER'S INSTITUTE PERSONNEL MANUAL IN DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINANT ON THE SOLE GROUND THAT HIS CONVICTION OF HOMICIDE
CONSTITUTE MORAL TURPITUDE.7

The basic premise of petitioner is that Micosa's conviction of the crime of homicide, which is a crime
involving moral turpitude, is a valid ground for his dismissal under the Miscellaneous Provisions of
IRRI's Employment Policy Regulations.

In addition to its claim that it has the prerogative to issue rules and regulations including those
concerning employee discipline and that its employees are bound by the aforesaid personnel
manual, petitioner justifies its action as a legitimate act of self-defense. It admits that Micosa's
interests — in his employment and means of livelihood — are adversely affected; that a convict
should not be discriminated against in society and that he should be given the same opportunities as
those granted to other fellow citizens but claims that at times, one's right is deemed superior than
that of another. In this case, petitioner believes that it has a superior right to maintain a very high
degree or standard not only to forestall any internal problem hampering operations but also to
prevent even the smallest possibility that said problems could occur considering that it is an
international organization with concomitant obligation to the host country to avoid creating
disturbance or give occasion for such disturbance.

It should be recalled, however, that Micosa was issued an appointment with an assurance from the
IRRI's Director General that as regular core employee he "may not be terminated except for
justifiable causes as defined by the pertinent provisions of the Philippine Labor Code."8 Thus, IRRI
could not remove him from his job if there existed no justifiable cause as defined by the Labor Code.

Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes wherein an employer may terminate an
employment. Verily, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is not one of these justifiable
causes. Neither may said ground be justified under Article 282 (c) nor under 282 (d) by analogy.
Fraud or willful breach by the employees of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorized representative under Article 282 (c) refers to any fault or culpability on the part of the
employee in the discharge of his duty rendering him absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence
demanded by his position. It cannot be gainsaid that the breach of trust must be related to the
performance of the employee's function.9 On the other hand, the commission of a crime by the
employee under Article 282 (d) refer to an offense against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative. Analogous causes must have
an element similar to those found in the specific just cause enumerated under Article 282. Clearly
lacking in the ground invoked by petitioner is its relation to his work or to his employer.

In the case at bar, the commission of the crime of homicide was outside the perimeter of the IRRI
complex, having been committed in a restaurant after office hours and against a non-IRRI employee.
Thus, the conviction of Micosa for homicide was not work-related, his misdeed having no relation to
his position as laborer and was not directed or committed against IRRI or its authorized agent.

Besides, IRRI failed to show how the dismissal of Micosa would be in consideration of the safety and
welfare of its employees, its reputation and standing in the community and its special obligations to
its host country. It did not present evidence to show that Micosa possessed a tendency to kill without
provocation or that he posed a clear and present danger to the company and its personnel. On the
contrary, the records reveal that Micosa's service record is unblemished. There is no record
whatsoever that he was involved in any incident similar to that which transpired on that fateful night
of February 6, 1987. In fact, even after his conviction, the IRRI's Director General expressed his
confidence in him when he disapproved his application for special separation in a letter dated
January 8, 1990 and when he conveyed to him IRRI's decision to promote him to the status of a
regular core employee, with the commensurate increases in benefits in a letter dated February 1990.
Respondent IRRI derogates the letters' significance saying that they were mere pro-
forma communications which it had given to numerous other workers. But whether or not such
letters were "form letters, they expressed the message that were meant to be conveyed,i.e., that
Micosa is fit for continued employment. In addition, the employees at IRRI's Grievance Committee
interceded favorably in behalf of Micosa when they recommended his retention despite his
conviction showing that the very employees which IRRI sought to protect did not believe that they
were placing their very own lives in danger with Micosa's retention.

Likewise, noteworthy is the fact that Micosa, although found guilty as charged, was also found
worthy of probation. This means that all the information regarding his character, antecedents,
environment, as well as his mental and physical condition were evaluated as required under Section
8 of the Probation Law and it was found that there existed no undue risk that Micosa will commit
another crime during his period of probation and that his being placed on probation would be to the
benefit of society as a whole.

In the face of all these, IRRI remained adamant and insisted on Micosa's termination. Certainly, said
termination cannot be upheld for it lacked not only a legal basis but factual basis as well.

Even under IRRI's Employment Policy and Regulations, the dismissal of Micosa's on the ground of
his conviction for homicide cannot be sustained. The miscellaneous provisions of said personnel
manual mentions of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude as a ground for dismissal. IRRI
simply assumed that conviction of the crime of homicide is conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. We do not subscribe to this view.

Moral turpitude has been defined in Can v. Galing 10 citing In Re Basa11 and Tak Ng v. Republic12 as
everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness
or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in
general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals.

As to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to

determine.13 Thus, the precipitate conclusion of IRRI that conviction of the crime of homicide involves
moral turpitude is unwarranted considering that the said crime which resulted from an act of
incomplete self-defense from an unlawful aggression by the victim has not been so classified as
involving moral turpitude.

IRRI argues that the crime of homicide committed by Micosa involves moral turpitude as the killing of
a man is conclusively an act against justice and is immoral in itself not merely prohibited by law. It
added that Micosa stabbed the victim more than what was necessary to repel the attack.

IRRI failed to comprehend the significance of the facts in their totality. The facts on record show that
Micosa was then urinating and had his back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face;
that the victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the
victim to stop the attack but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he
drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released
his hold on Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that
Micosa's intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his
favor of the mitigating circumstances of self- defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence
of any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were not
inherently vile, immoral or unjust.

This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral turpitude.
Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime.14 Moral
turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional
violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question
of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances.15While . . . generally but not
always, crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, it, cannot
always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a crime
as malum in seor as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala in se and yet but
rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala
prohibita only.16 It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the
meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are
reached.

In fine, there is nothing in this case to show any abuse of discretion by the National Labor Relations
Commission in affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter finding that Micosa was illegally dismissed.
For certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very
antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil and common
traditions.17 The abuse of discretion must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that the
discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically.18

WHEREFORE, the petition, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Page 19 19. In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v Narciso N. Jaramillo [AC No. 229, 20 April
1957, 101 Phil 323]

PARAS, C.J.:

The respondent was prosecuted for and convicted of estafa in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan and, on appeal, was finally sentenced by the Court of appeals to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from two months and one day of arresto mayor to one year and one day of prision
correccional in its decision promulgated on April 17, 1954. On August 5, 1955, while the respondent
was serving sentence for said conviction, the Solicitor General filed in this Court the present
complaint for respondent's disbarment.

In his answer respondent contends that his conviction was a judicial error; that it was unfortunate on
his part that the trial court did not believe his explanation of the loss of the amount involved in the
criminal case; that his imprisonment and the sufferings and mental anguish he has suffered since
the commencement of the criminal of the criminal case constitute more than sufficient punishment;
that for this Court to further disbar him is excessively inhuman, humiliating and cruel.

There is no question that the crime of estafa involves moral turpitude. The review of respondent's
conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has become final but has been executed.
No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on
him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved
himself unfit to protect the administration of justice.

Wherefore, the respondent is hereby disbarred and ordered to surrender to this Court, within fifteen
days from notice hereof, the lawyer's certificate heretofore issued to him. So ordered.

Page 19 20. Abesamis, 102 Phil 1182, In Re: Jaramillo

Respondents conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude (estafa and/or violation
of BP Blg. 22) clearly shows his unfitness to protect the administration of justice and
therefore justifies the imposition of sanctions against him.

Page 19 21. In Re: Vinzon, AC No. 561, April 27, 1967 [19 SCRA 815]

DIZON, J.:

This is a disbarment proceeding against Atty. Isidro P. Vinzon of Cavite City referred to Us by the
Solicitor General on January 7, 1963 pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 02243-CR promulgated on October 1, 1962 affirming the one rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Manila convicting said respondent and his wife, Filomena D. Vinzon, of the crime of
estafa. The pertinent portion of the former reads as follows:

In an information filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila, that spouses Isidro P.
Vinzon and Filomena B. Vinzon were charged with the crime of estafa for having failed to
deliver and for misappropriating the sum of P7,000.00 which represented a portion of the
total amount of P9,621.60 of U.S. Depositary check numbered 685891 belonging and
payable to Felicidad M. Bagtas as unremarried widow of the deceased veteran Maximino C.
Bagtas. After the prosecution had rested its case the defense, filed a motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of evidence, which motion was however, denied for lack of merit. Thereafter, the
accused waive the right to present their evidence and instead submitted the case for
decision. Thus decision was rendered below finding both accused guilty as charged and
sentencing them, each to undergo an indeterminate penalty of from 3 months and 11 days
of arresto mayor, to 1 year, 8 months and 21 days of prison correccional with the accessory
penalties; to indemnify the offended party Felicidad M. Bagtas in the amount of P7,000.60,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and each to pay one-half of the costs.

xxx xxx xxx

 Wherefore, finding no reversible error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby affirmed,
with the costs against the appellants. The attention of the Solicitor General is invited to
decision herein for the purpose of instituting disbarment proceedings against the appellant
Isidro P. Vinzon, who, it appears from the record, is a member of the Philippine Bar.

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

The evidence on record reveals that Felicidad M. Bagtas was found to be mentally
incompetent, suffering from schizophrenic reaction, hebephrenic type, upon examination by
a psychiatrist of the U.S. Veterans Administration (U.S.V.A.) in the course of the investigation
conducted in connection with her application for benefits as the unremarried widow of the
late veteran Maximino C. Bagtas (Exh. E). In the same application Felicidad M. Bagtas was
assisted by the herein appellant Atty. Isidro P. Vinzon, who on various occasions had asked
her to thumbmark serial papers in connection with the application. On April 22, 1955, the
appellant above named, as attorney for the widow Bagtas and through a letter which he had
thumbmarked by the latter, caused the alteration of the applicant widow's address on record
with the U.S.V.A., from San Dionisio, Parañaque, Rizal, to 41 Interior, P. Burgos St., Cavite
City (Exh. A-2). Actually, Bagtas continued to reside in Parañaque, the new recorded
address was really that of the herein appellants.

Sometime in June, 1955 the appellant Filomena B. Vinzon fetched the widow Bagtas and her
mother, Susana Osio, together with one Juliet Oliva, from their abode in Parañaque and
brought them to the appellants' residence in Cavite where they were supposed to meet an
investigator of the U.S.V.A. While there, Osio and Bagtas were asked to sign several papers,
the contents of which they did not know, but which the appellants said were in connection
with the widow's benefit claim. Then Osio and Oliva were invited by, the appellant Isidro P.
Vinzon to go to the municipal building, leaving Bagtas in the company of Mrs. Vinzon. From
their tour of the municipal building, Osio and Oliva were brought by Isidro P. Vinzon to a
restaurant before they returned to the Vinzon residence. Upon their arrival thereat Osio and
Oliva noticed Felicidad Bagtas wiping ink from her thumb, and upon their inquiry, the widow
informed them that Mrs. Vinzon had asked her (Bagtas) to thumbprint several times. Shortly
thereafter, Bagtas and her companions went home, because the alleged, investigator did not
arrive.

Later in that same day Mrs. Vinzon reappeared at Parañaque, and told Osio that they would
proceed to Manila in order to "get the benefits as early as possible." So once again, Osio and
Bagtas went out with Mrs. Vinzon, and in front of the U.S.V.A. building on the Escolta they
met a man whom Osio and the widow took to be an agent of the U.S.V.A. This man inquired
of Mrs. Vinzon if Felicidad Bagtas was "the one," and upon an affirmative answer the same
person brought them to an eatery where Osio was asked to sign something, after which the
amount of P2,421.00 and some centavos' were delivered to her. Upon Vinzon's suggestion
Osio gave that unnamed man P50.00, and when they were already at the bus terminal on
their way home, Osio gave Mrs. Vinzon another amount, making her total disbursement for
that afternoon P200.00.

In his answer filed on April 22, 1963, respondent alleges the following:

1. That he admits that there is a final decision of the Court of Appeals, a portion of which is
quoted in the letter of the Solicitor General dated Dec. 28, 1962;

2. That he, however denies, that a conviction for any crime per se is sufficient ground
following suspension or disbarment:
 3. That while the decision of the Court of Appeals became final for lack of appeal to the
Supreme Court, it does not necessarily follow that the said conviction is absolutely binding
on this Hon. Supreme Court if upon hearing of the instant proceedings, turns out to be not
legal nor valid under the law and facts, for, in parenthesis, we state that the records of the
Hon. Supreme Court can attest to the fact that there is quite a number of Court of Appeals
decisions which have been reversed for being illegal and contrary to law by the Supreme
Court, which is the highest Tribunal;

4. That the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals and its stand on the legal questions
raised, are not in accordance with the doctrines cited in Appellant's Brief;

5. That the testimonies of prosecution witnesses viewed in their proper light do not prove any
estafa, for nowhere in their evidence to the effect that this respondent had ever cashed the
check in question, on the contrary, the evidence of the prosecution simply pointed to an
unknown person who delivered certain sum of money to the offended party in the presence
of the wife of respondent, and there is even no proof that respondent and said unknown
person knew each other at anytime before or after the alleged delivery;

6. That it is respectfully submitted that respondent is innocent of the alleged estafa for (1)
there is no evidence that he ever received and cashed the US check involved; (2) no
evidence that he ever received the proceeds thereof; (3) no evidence that he had any
connivance or connection with the unknown person who according to prosecution evidence
was the one who gave a sum of money to offended party; (4) and finally assuming that there
was such a check and respondent received the proceeds, in the absence of demand; estafa
does not lie.

The case has set for hearing at 9:30 A.M. on June 21, 1963 but neither the Solicitor General nor the
respondent appeared notwithstanding notice served upon them. Consequently, the case was
deemed submitted for decision.

The only point to be determined is whether upon conviction for the crime of estafa the respondent
may be disbarred.

In his answer to the petition for disbarment, respondent prayed that a proper hearing be held, but
this notwithstanding he failed to appear at the hearing scheduled to be held on June 21, 1963. This
amounts to a waiver of his right to be heard (Arellano Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266, April 27, 1963). 1äwphï1.ñët

Upon the other hand, and dealing now with the merits of the case, there can be no question that the
term "moral turpitude" includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals.
In essence and in all respects, estafa, no doubt, is a crime involving moral turpitude because the act
is unquestionably against justice, honesty and good morals (In re Gutierrez, Adm. Case No. 263,
July 31, 1962; Bouvier's Law Dictionary; In re Basa, 41 Phil. 275-76). As respondent's guilt can not
now be questioned, his disbarment is inevitable.

Wherefore, respondent Isidro P. Vinzon is hereby disbarred.

Page 19 22. Medina v Bautista, 12 SCRA

MARCOS MEDINA, complainant,

vs.
LORETO U. BAUTISTA, Respondent.
 BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

In a complaint filed on September 15, 1954, Marcos Medina charged

respondent Atty. Loreto U. Bautista with the commission of certain acts
constituting malpractice and conduct unbecoming a member of the bar. To
this complaint respondent filed an answer on October 19, 1954. The case
was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. This official in turn referred the case to the provincial fiscal
of Cagayan for investigation and report. Later after the reception of the
corresponding evidence, the Solicitor General submitted his report to this
Court finding respondent guilty of the acts of malpractice complained of and
recommending his disbarment. Together with this report he submitted a
complaint formally charging respondent with acts constituting the alleged
malpractice as found in his investigation with the prayer that the name of
respondent be stricken off from the roll of attorneys. c hanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

A copy of this formal complaint was served on respondent so that he

may answer it if he so desires in accordance with the rules. Thereupon, he
answered the complaint denying the material allegations thereof and praying
that it be dismissed. He, however, also prayed that he be allowed to
introduce additional evidence. This was allowed and the case was set for
hearing. The first hearing was set on May 4, 1964, which, by agreement of
the parties was postponed to June 22, 1964. On this last date, however, no
hearing was held, and so it was again postponed to July 22, 1964. And
having neither respondent nor his counsel appeared on the last date set,
complainant and his counsel submitted additional evidence consisting of
several decisions of the Court of Appeals showing that respondent was found
guilty of estafa. Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision. c hanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s virtual law lib rary

It appears that sometime in 1953, Maria Ragsac Cabel filed a

complaint for reconveyance of a parcel of land before the Court of First
Instance of Cagayan against complainant Marcos Medina. In the early of
January, 1954, complainant Medina approached the plaintiff seeking a
compromise of the case. Plaintiff told him to see her lawyer Loreto Bautista,
respondent herein, whereupon he went to see the latter in his office at
Aparri, Cagayan. Respondent demanded P500.00 as a consideration for the
amicable settlement, and as complainant had no ready cash then, he asked
to be allowed to pay the same in small installments paying on that occasion
the sum of P35.00. Respondent agreed and thereupon prepared a motion for
an extension of time to file his answer in the case. Complainant returned to
his hometown. chan roble svi rtualawl ib raryc hanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

One month later, complainant received an order declaring him in

default and so he went to respondent to ask him why in spite of their
agreement he was declared in default. Respondent assured him that he had
nothing to worry about, and on that occasion respondent again asked for
P50.00 which then and there complainant gave. Before complainant left
respondent told him to look for more money. chan roblesv irt ualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

It turned out that respondent opposed his own motion for an

extension of time to file an answer for, in lieu thereof, he filed a motion to
declare complainant in default. Consequently, a decision was rendered
detrimental to complainant since the court allowed plaintiff to repurchase the
property in litigation for the sum of P1,200.00. chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

On March 2, 1954, complainant again went to the office of respondent

in Luna, Mt. Province apparently with the purpose of having the papers for
the amicable settlement of the case prepared, but on this occasion
respondent prepared two documents, Exhibits C and D, wherein, on one
hand, it was made to appear that Maria Ragsac Cabel sold the property to
complainant in consideration of the sum of P8,000.00 and, on the other, the
latter reconveyed the same property to the former for the sum of P1,200.00.
Both documents were witnessed by respondent. Both documents were also
found to be fictitious in the sense that the considerations mentioned therein
were never received. Maria Ragsac Cabel was asked by respondent to sign
Exhibit C without knowing its contents upon the assurance that it was
necessary in order that she could recover the land. chan roble svirtualawl ibra ryc hanro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

Sometime later, complainant received a letter from Atty. Bienvenido

Jimenez, co-counsel of respondent in the civil case, requesting him to bring
the title of the property pursuant to the decision of the court, and complying
with this request complainant went to see Atty. Jimenez but instead of
bringing the title he showed him the document which he was made to sign
purporting to be a deed of sale by Maria Ragsac Cabel in his favor of the
property for the consideration of P8,000.00. Atty. Jimenez asked Mrs. Cabel
if she received the amount mentioned therein, which she denied. Instead
Mrs. Cabel told Atty. Jimenez that she had given P800.00 to respondent to
be deposited in court with the understanding that said respondent would
raise the additional P400.00 to complete the sum of P1,200.00 which was
fixed by the court as the consideration of the reconveyance of the property.
After inquiry, Atty. Jimenez found that there was no such amount deposited
in court, and in order to correct the wrong generated by the two fictitious
documents, Atty. Jimenez prepared another document embodying the terms
of the amicable settlement which they agreed would be submitted in the civil
case. This settlement having been carried out, it put an end to the
controversy. According to complainant, he paid all in all to respondent the
sum of P500.00. chanro blesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual l aw libra ry
 From the foregoing narration, the following facts are deemed to have
been established: (1) respondent after agreeing with complainant to settle
the case amicably prepared a motion for extension of time to file an answer,
but instead he filed a motion to declare the latter in default; (2) being fully
aware of the decision rendered in the civil case, respondent prepared two
fictitious deeds of sale in the sense that the consideration in either was
never in fact received; (3) pretending to arrange an amicable settlement of
the case, respondent received on different occasions from complainant
several sums totalling P500.00. (4) respondent, taking advantage of the
ignorance of his client Maria Ragsac Cabel, ask her to sign a document
wherein it was made to appear that she received P8,000.00 when in truth
and in fact she did not receive said amount; and (5) respondent received
from his client Mrs. Cabel the amount of P800.00 with the understanding
that the amount was to be deposited in court for the repurchase of the
property, but instead of depositing it he misappropriated the money. These
facts constitute malpractice and conduct unbecoming a member of the
bar.chan roble svi rtualawl ib raryc hanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

In addition, the record shows that in CA-G.R. No. 18560-R,

respondent was convicted of estafa and sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from 4 months of arresto mayor to 1 year and 1 day
of prision correccional, with the accessories of the law, and to indemnify the
offended party in the sum of P800.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency. And in CA-G.R. No. 21796-R, the Court of Appeals made the
following derogatory comment against respondent:

A lengthy discourse of the relationship of attorney and client need not

be indulged in. Suffice it to say that a lawyer should be scrupulously careful
in handling money entrusted to him in his professional capacity. A high
degree of fidelity and good faith on his part is exacted. (Alindogan v. Gerona
Adm. Case No. 221, May 21, 1958). Here, appellee (herein respondent
Bautista) violated the trust. He was bound to deposit the P800.00 in court.
But he did not; he converted it to his own use and benefit to the damage of
appellant. Indeed, he was convicted of estafa. Not only that. The confidence
reposed in him by appellant was once again infringed when he lent his
signature to Exhibits 2 and 3 which he knew to be spurious. Upon these
documents, appellant - for nothing - lost the land already won in court. She
had to compromise with the defeated suitor. But she got the very short end
of the bargain. And yet, appellee had the temerity to come to court for
attorney's fees. Good morals and sound public policy bar the portals of
justice to him. Guilty of fraud on one count and bad faith on another, he has
forfeited all legal claims for services in procuring the judgment in Case No.
634-A of the Cagayan Court (6 C.J. 725; C.J.S. 1025; 5 Am. Jur. 363;
Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 2nd Ed. [1961], p. 99).
 There is no question that the crime of estafa is one which involves
moral turpitude within the purview of Section 27, Rule 138, of the Rules of
Court. chan roble svirtualawl ibra rycha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

WHEREFORE, respondent Loreto U. Bautista is hereby disbarred and,

as a consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the roll of attorneys.

Page 19 23. People v Tuanda, AC No. 3360, January 30, 1990

FACTS:
Atty. Fe Tuanda was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Manila in violation of B.P. 22 with
a fine and subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant
Herminia Marquez. Respondent appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision
of the trial court and imposed upon Atty. Fe Tuanda, in addition, the suspension from the
practice of law until further orders from the Supreme Court. The respondent filed a Notice of
Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals noted respondent’s Notice of Appeal
and advised her “to address her Notice of Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper
forum.” In the said motion, responded stated:
that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful penalty aggravating
the lower court’s penalty of fine considering that accused-appellant’s action on the case during
the trial on the merits at the lower court has always been motivated purely by sincere belief that
she is innocent of the offense charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the herein plaintiff-
appellee.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the imposed suspension for Atty. Tuanda may be lifted.

HELD:
NO. Motion to Lift Order of Suspension denied.

RATIO:
[T]he crimes of which respondent was convicted [also] import deceit and violation of her
attorney’s oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was
bound to “obey the laws of the land.” Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might
not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the
profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of
a person convicted of such offense.

Page 19 24. Villaber v Commission on Elections [GR No. 148326, 15 November 2001, 369 SCRA
126
Facts: Both petitioner Pablo Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were rival candidates for
a congressional seat in the First District of Davao del Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections.
Cagas filed with the COMELEC, a consolidated petition to disqualify Villaber and to cancel the
latter’s certificate of candidacy, alleging that Villaber was convicted for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22. Cagas further alleged that this crime involves moral turpitude; hence, under
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, he is disqualified to run for any public office.

COMELEC issued the resolution declaring Villaber disqualified as a candidate. The latter filed a
motion for reconsideration but was denied.

Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude, which would disqualify
Villaber as a candidate for and from holding any public office.

Held: COMELEC believed it is, applying Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code that any person
who has been sentenced by final judgment for any offense for which he has been sentenced for
a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office.

Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man
owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of
right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals.

In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and circumstances surrounding the
commission of the crime. In effect, he admits all the elements of the crime for which he was
convicted. There was no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent COMELEC in issuing
the assailed Resolutions.

Page 19 25. In Re: Dalmacio De Los Angeles [AC No. 350, August 7, 1959 [106 Phil 1]

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Atty. Dalmacio de los Angeles was convicted of the crime of attempted bribery in a final decision
rendered by the Court of Appeals and was sentenced to two (2) years, four (40 months, and one (1)
day of destierro, and to pay a fine of P2,300, with subsidiary destierro in case of insolvency (CA-
G.R. No. 11411-R), and under section 1, Rule 128, of the Rules of Court, he was required to show
cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of his profession.

In his written explanation he appealed to the sympathy and mercy of this Court considering that he
has six children to support the eldest being 16 years old and the youngest 4 years who will bear the
stigma of dishonor if disciplinary action be taken against him. He made manifest to this Court that if
he ever committed what is attributed to him, it was merely due to an error of judgment which he
honestly and sincerely deplores.

Under section 25, Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed from his office as attorney if he is
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude the reason behind this rule being that the continued
possession of a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance of the
lawyer in the practice of law with the result that the loss of such qualification justifies his disbarment
(Mortel vs. Aspiras 100 Phil., 586; 53 Off. Gaz., No. 3, 628). And since bribery is admittedly a felony
involving moral turpitude (7 C.J.S., p. 736; 5 Am. Jur. p. 428), this Court, much as it sympathizes
with the plight of respondent, is constrained to decree his disbarment as ordained by section 25 of
Rule 127.

It is therefore ordered that respondent be removed from his office as attorney and that his name be
stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys. So ordered.

Page 19 26. Ledesma De Jesus-Paras v Quinciano Vailoces [AC No. 439, April 12, 1961 [111 Phil
569]]
1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; DISBARMENT; CONVICTION INVOLVING MORAL
TURPITUDE. — A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney if it appears that he has been convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude.

2. ID.; WORDS AND PHRASES; MORAL TURPITUDE. — Moral turpitude as

used in section 25, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, includes any act deemed
contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals.

3. ID.; MORAL TURPITUDE; FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT. —

Conviction of the crime of falsification of public document is clearly contrary
to justice and good morals. Hence such crime involves moral turpitude.

4. ID.; ID.; CRIMES THAT INVOLVE MORAL TURPITUDE. — "Embezzlement,

forgery, robbery and swindling are crimes which denote moral turpitude and
as general rule, all crimes of which fraud is an element are looked on as
involving moral turpitude." (58 C.J.S., 1266)

5. ID.; DISBARMENT PROCEEDING; NATURE. — The disbarment of an

attorney does not partake of a criminal proceeding. Rather, it is intended "to
protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the
court." (In re Montagne and Dominquez, 3 Phil., 588)

6. ID.; ID.; PURPOSE. — The purpose of disbarment proceeding is "to

protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise
this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable; men in
whom courts and clients may repose confidence." (In re McDougall, 3 Phil.,
77.)

DECISION

ANGELO, J.:
This concerns the disbarment of Quinciano Vailoces as member of the
Philippine bar.

It appears that as member of the bar and in his capacity as a notary public,
Vailoces, on December 14, 1950, acknowledged the execution of a document
purporting to be the last will and testament of one Tarcila Visitacion de
Jesus. Presented for probate before the Court of First Instance of Negros
Oriental, the will was impugned by her surviving spouse and daughter.
Consequently, the probate court, finding that the will was a forgery,
rendered decision denying probate to the will. This decision became final. On
the basis of this decision a criminal action for falsification of public document
was filed against Vailoces and the three attesting witnesses to the will before
the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental where, after trial, they were
found guilty and convicted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision with regard to Vailoces but modified it with regard to his co-
accused. As finally adjudged, Vailoces was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of falsified of public document defined and penalized in
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and was sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from 2 years 4 months and 1 day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 8 years 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum,
with the accessories of the law, fine and costs. This sentence having become
final, Vailoces began serving it in the insular penitentiary. As a consequence,
the offended party instituted the present disbarment proceedings.

In his answer, respondent not only disputes the judgment of conviction

rendered against him in the criminal case but contends that the same is
based on insufficient and inconclusive evidence, the charge being merely
motivated by sheer vindictiveness, malice and spite on the part of herein
complainant, and that to give course to this proceeding would be
tantamount to placing him in double jeopardy. He pleads that the complaint
be dismissed.

Under Section 25, Rule 127, of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may
be removed or suspended from his office as attorney if it appears that he
has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude, as
used in this section, includes any act deemed contrary to justice, honesty or
good morals. 1 Among the examples given of crimes of this nature by former
Chief Justice Moran are the crime of seduction and the crime of concubinage.
2 The crime of which respondent was convicted is falsification of public
document, which is indeed of this nature, for the act is clearly contrary to
justice, honesty and good morals. Hence such crime involves moral
turpitude. Indeed it is well-settled that "embezzlement, forgery, robbery,
swindling are crimes, which denote moral turpitude and, as a general rule,
all crimes of which fraud is an element are looked on as involving moral
turpitude" (53 C.J.S., 1206).

It appearing that respondent has been found guilty and convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude it is clear that he rendered himself amenable to
disbarment under Section 26, Rule 127, of our Rules of Court. It is futile on
his part much as we sympathize with him to dispute now the sufficiency of
his conviction, for this is a matter which we cannot now look into. That is
now a closed chapter insofar as this proceeding is concerned. The only issue
with which we are concerned is that he was found guilty and convicted by a
final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude. As this Court well
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The review of respondent’s conviction no longer rests upon us. The

judgment not only has become final but has been executed. No elaborate
argument is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege
bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his
conviction, the respondent has proved, himself unfit to protect the
administration of justice." (In the Matter of Disbarment Proceedings against
Narciso N. Jaramillo, Adm. Case No. 229, April 30, 1957).

The plea of respondent that to disbar him now after his conviction of a crime
which resulted in the deprivation of his liberty and of his office as Justice of
the Peace of Bais, Negros Oriental would be tantamount to placing him in
double jeopardy is untenable, for such defense can only be availed of when
he is placed in the predicament of being prosecuted for the same offense, or
for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense
necessarily included therein, within the meaning of Section 9, Rule 113.
Such is not the case here. The disbarment of an attorney does not partake
of a criminal proceeding. Rather, it is intended "to protect the court and the
public from the misconduct of officers of the court" (In re Montagne and
Dominguez, 3 Phil., 588), and its purpose is "to protect the administration of
justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be
competent, honorable and reliable; men in whom courts and clients may
repose confidence" (In re McDougall, 3 Phil., 77).

WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby removed from his office as attorney and,

to this effect, our Clerk of Court is enjoined to erase his name from the roll
of attorneys.

Page 19 27. Disbarment Proceedings Against Atty. Diosdado Q. Gutierrez [AC No. 363 July 31,
1962 [115 Phil 647]
Facts: Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez, was convicted of the murder of Filemon Samaco former
municipal mayor of Calapan, and together with his co-conspirators was sentenced to the penalty
of death. After serving a portion of the sentence respondent was granted a conditional pardon by
the President on August 19, 1958. Subsequently, the widow of Samaco filed a disbarment case
against Gutierrez by reason of the latter’s conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.

Issue: Whether or not Gutierrez may be disbarred considering the fact that he was granted pardon.

Ruling: Yes, The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional, and merely
remitted the unexecuted portion of his term.
Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Murder is, without doubt, such a crime. The term "moral turpitude" includes everything which is
done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals.

Pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the crime for which respondent
Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered disbarred and his name stricken from the
roll of lawyers.

Carlos Basa is a young lawyer convicted of the crime of abduction with consent. He was sentenced to two
years, eleven months, and eleven days of imprisonment. The Solicitor General asked for Basa’s disbarment
based on his commission of a crime involving moral turpitude.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime abduction with consent involves moral turpitude.
HELD: Yes. Crimes of this character do involve moral turpitude. The inherent nature of the act is such that
it is against good morals and the accepted rule of right conduct. Moral turpitude includes everything which
is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. Basa was declared to be suspended for one
year immediately after he finished serving his sentence.

In re Basa
Facts: Carlos Basa is a young lawyer convicted of the crime of abduction with consent. He was sentenced to two years,
eleven months, and eleven days of imprisonment. The Solicitor General asked for Basa’s disbarment based on his
commission of a crime involving moral turpitude.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime abduction with consent involves moral turpitude.
HELD: Yes. Crimes of this character do involve moral turpitude. The inherent nature of the act is such that it is against
good morals and the accepted rule of right conduct. Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. Basa was declared to be suspended for one year immediately after he
finished serving his sentence.

Page 20 28. Villanueva v Sta Ana, CBD Case No, 251, Jult 11, 1995 [245 SCRA 707]

PER CURIAM:
Complainant Adelina T. Villanueva has sought the disbarment of respondent Attorney
Teresita Sta. Ana.
From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline and the
records of the case, it would appear that complainant first met respondent lawyer some
time in April 1992 when the former brought certain documents to the latter for
notarization. Respondent later learned that complainant had planned to borrow a
substantial sum from a bank or lending institution. Respondent represented that she
could facilitate the loan if complainant could put up a land collateral and provide a
"guaranty deposit" of P150,000.00. Evidently convinced that respondent could help,
complainant handed over and entrusted to respondent the amount of P144,000.00, as
well as various documents, e.g., a special power of attorney, deed of sale, tax declaration
and land title (in the name of complainant's father), required for the loan
application. Respondent later told complainant that an additional amount of
P109,000.00 was needed for withholding and documentary stamp taxes, plus
surcharges. Complainant thereupon decided to forego the loan application. She
demanded from respondent the return of her money; however, the latter not only failed
to heed the request but also then began to avoid complainant.

Complainant finally sought assistance from the Office of the Vice-President of the
Philippines; which referred the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI").
Respondent was subpoenaed twice by the agent-on-case but she failed in both instances
to appear. The investigation, nonetheless, went through; thereafter, the NBI
recommended that respondent be criminally charged with estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b), of the Revised Penal Code and that disbarment proceedings be taken
against her. In a letter-referral, dated 03 May 1993, then NBI Director Epimaco A.
Velasco transmitted to the Commission on Bar Discipline ("Commission") of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") the Bureau's evaluation.

The Commission required respondent to respond to the charges but respondent neither
complied nor appeared at any of the hearings scheduled by it.

In the course of its proceedings, the Commission noted several criminal charges filed
against respondent; viz:

(1) Criminal Case No. 92-8849 for Falsification of Private Document, pending before
the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Branch 73;

(2) Criminal Case No. 93-9289 for Estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Branch 72;

(3) Criminal Case No. 93-118159 for Estafa through Falsification of Public Document
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 15, which resulted in her
conviction. The dispositive portion of the decision, dated 24 March 1994, read:

"WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of Estafa thru falsification of public document and hereby imposes upon
said accused an indeterminate penalty of 2 years 4 months of prision correccional as
minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporalas maximum and indemnify the offended
party the sum of P136,000.00 and to pay the cost."[1]

(4) Criminal Cases Nos. 8015 and 8019 for Violation of Section 3(c), Republic Act No.
3019, pending before the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan;

(5) Criminal Cases Nos. 7351 and 7354 also for Violation of Section 3(c), Republic Act
No. 3019, pending before the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan;

(6) Criminal Case No. 7036 for Violation of Section 3(c), Republic Act No. 3019,
pending before the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan; and

(7) Criminal Case No. 6731 for Violation of Section 3(c), Republic Act No. 3019, pending
before the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.

In the Commission's Report and Recommendation, dated 25 July 1994, Investigating

Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez recommended that "the respondent be disbarred for
being totally unfit to be a member of the legal profession."[2] In its Resolution No. XI-
94-219, dated 14 January 1995, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines ("IBP") resolved to adopt and approve the report of the Investigating
Commissioner.

We also agree.

Well-settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to an
admission to the legal profession but it must also remain extant in order to maintain
one's good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity.[3] The Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates:

"CANON 1 - x x x.

"Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

"CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that
may come into his possession.

"Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client."

Despite all the opportunities accorded to her, respondent has failed to present her
defense and to refute the charges or, at the very least, to explain herself. The Court is
thus left with hardly any choice other than to accept the findings and recommendations
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Commission on Bar Discipline.

WHEREFORE, respondent Teresita Sta. Ana is DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is

directed to strike out her name from the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

Page 20 29. In Re Basa, December 7, 1920 [41 Phil 275]

Carlos Basa is a young lawyer convicted of the crime of abduction with consent. He was sentenced
to two years, eleven months, and eleven days of imprisonment. The Solicitor General asked for
Basa’s disbarment based on his commission of a crime involving moral turpitude.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime abduction with consent involves moral turpitude.
HELD: Yes. Crimes of this character do involve moral turpitude. The inherent nature of the act is
such that it is against good morals and the accepted rule of right conduct. Moral turpitude includes
everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. Basa was declared
to be suspended for one year immediately after he finished serving his sentence.

Page 20 30. In Re: Isada, November 16, 1934 [60 Phil 915]
1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; SUSPENSION OR DISBARMENT; CRIMES
INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE. — The crime of concubinage involves moral
turpitude, and a member of the Philippine bar may be disbarred or
suspended for conviction of this crime.
MALCOLM, J.:

Juan C. Isada, a member of the Philippine bar, was convicted of the crime of
concubinage and is now serving his sentence in Bilibid Prison. The Code of
Civil Procedure, in its section 21, provides that a member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office of lawyer by the Supreme Court by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. It is held that
the crime of concubinage involves moral turpitude. (In re Basa [1920], 41
Phil., 275.)

It is the order of the court that beginning with the day when Juan C. Isada
shall be discharged from prison, he be suspended from his office of lawyer
for one year.

Page 20 31. In Re: Rovero, AC No. 126, October 24, 1952 [ 92 Phil 128]

PARAS, C.J.:

The Solicitor General has filed the present complaint for disbarment against Atty. Tranquilino
Rovero, on the grounds that on March 31, 1947, "respondent Tranquilino Rovero, having been found
in a final decision rendered by then Insular Collector of Customs to have violated the customs law by
fraudulently concealing a dutiable importation, was fined in an amount equal to three times the
customs duty due on a piece of jewelry which he omitted to declare and which was subsequently
found to be concealed in his wallet", and that on October 28, 1948, "respondent Tranquilino Rovero
was convicted of smuggling by final decision of the Court of Appeals in Criminal Case No. CA-G.R.
No. 2214-R, affirming a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila sentencing him to pay a
fine of P2,500 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, said case involving a fraudulent
practice against customs revenue, as defined and penalized by Section 2703 of the Revised
Administrative Code." The respondents admits the existence of the of the decision of the Collector of
Customs, and his conviction by the Court of Appeals, but sets up the defense that they are not
sufficient to disqualify him from the practice of law, especially because the acts of which he was
found guilty, while at most merely discreditable, had been committed by him as an individual and not
in pursuance or in the exercise of his legal profession.

Under section 25, Rule 127, of the Rules of court, a member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney for a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, and this
ground is apart from any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in office as lawyer. Moral
turpitude includes any act done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. (In re Basa, 41
Phil., 275.)

Respondent's conviction of smuggling by final decision of the Court of Appeals certainly involves an
act done contrary at least to honesty or good morals. The ground invoked by the Solicitor General is
aggravated by the fact that the respondent sought to defraud, not merely a private person, but the
Government.

Wherefore, the respondent Tranquilino Rovero is hereby disbarred from the practice of law, and he
is hereby directed to surrender to this Court his lawyer's certificate within 10 days after this resolution
shall have become final. So ordered.