i pllosophy and cultural discourse have the character that Derrida ascribes to Plato's ton they con poison and kll,and they can remedy and cue. We ned them to help iden- iyle @ temperament, a set ofcommon concerns and emphases, Fa vsion that has deter ‘ape. But we must aso be wary ofthe ways in which they can Blind us or car refy what id changing. Richard J. Bernstein, “What Is the Difference That Makes a Difference?” 1986 ‘altativeinquiryisthenameforate- as insight from external debates in philosophy Jforinise movement that began in the of science and social science fueled the opposi- sly 1970s in the academy.' The incompassed multiple epistemolo- logical, politcal and ethical cit scientific research in fields and hat favored experimental, quasi- relational, and survey research Immmanent criticism of these method these disciplines and fields as well tion? Over the years, the movement has ac- ‘quited a political as well as an intellectual place inthe academy. Ithas ts own journals, academic associations, conferences, and university posi- tions, as well as the support of publishers, all of which have both sustained and, to some extent, created the movement. Moreover, it is not un- reasonable to claim, given the influesice that Es Special thanks to Batty Bul, Jeffrey Davis, Notman Denzin, Davydd Greenwood, Peter Lincoln, and David Silverman fr thee suggestions on previous drafts ofthis chapter. ors and jgemain here ate probably the result of my not taking al of thee good advice. + 139190 # PARADIGMS AND PERSPECTIVES IN TRANSITION publishers exercise through the promotion and sales of ever more allegedly new and improved accounts of what qualitative inquiry is, that the ‘movement at times looks more like an “indus- ty” Not surprisingly, considerable academic and professional polities are also entailed in the ‘movement, particularly as it has drawn on intel- lectual developments in feminism, postmodern- ism, and poststrucruralism. Current struggles over departmental organization, interdsciplin- ary alliances, what constitutes “legitimate” re- search, who controls the editorship of key jour- nals, and so forth (compare, for example, Denzin, 1997, and rus, 1996; see also Shea, 1998), in part, reflectthe turmoil over what con stitute the appropriate goals and means of hu- ‘man inguiry. Quarrel in university departments lover the meaning and value of qualitative in- uiry often reflect broader controversies in the disciplines of psychology, sociology, anthropol- ogy, feminist seudies, history, and literature about the purpose, values, and ethics of ntellec- ‘ual labor, ‘Thus qualicative inquiry is more comprehen- sible as a site or arena for social scientific ctiti- ism than 2s any particular kind of social theory, methodology, or philosophy. That site is a “home” for a wide variety of scholars who often are seriously at odds with one another but who share a general rejection of the blend of scient- ism, foundationalist epistemology, instrumental reasoning, and the philosophical anthropology cof disengagement that has “marked “main- stream” social science. Yethow one further char- acterizes the site depends, in part, on what one finds of interest there.’ For some researchers, the site isa place where a particular set of laud- able virtues for social research are championed, such as fidelity to phenomena, respect for the life world, and attention to the fine-grained de- tails of daily life. They are thus attracted to the fact that long-standing traditions of fieldwork research in sociology and anthropology have been revitalized and appropriated under the banner of “qualitative inguity” while atthe same time immanent criticism of those traditions has inspited new ways of thinking about the ficld-worker’s interests, motivations, aims, obli- gations, and texts, Others are attracted to the Site asa place where debates about aims of the human sciences unfold and where issues of what itmeansto know the socal world are explored. Stil thers may find social theory of greatest in. terest and hence look tothe site for knowledge of the debate over the merit of symbolic inte. actioniam, social systems theory, etieal theory of society, feminist theory, and sofort. Finally, many curtentreeatchersseem to view the steas 2 place for experimentation with empirical methodologies andextual strategies inspted by Postmodernist and poststructuralist inking. In this chapter I focus onthe steas an arena in wh wie for itten- sion a Poeenal justifications for doing qualita- ive inquiry: Texamine three of the philosop| “Tat in various forms are assumed in the many books that explain the aims and methods of dualitatve inquiry. Imterpretivism, hermenew: ties, and social consructionism embrace differ. ent peespectives on the aim and practice of un- derstanding human action, different ethical commitments and different stances on method ‘logical and epistemological sues of represen- tation, validity, objectivity, and so forth.* The chapter begins with an overview of each philoso- phy.and Lindicatewaysin which they ar elated to and at odds with one another. {then discuss several epistemological and ethical-poliial i. sues tha arte fom these philosophies and that characte contemporary conceens about the purpose and justification of qualitative inguey. Thete is no denying that what follows is a Cook's tour of complicated philosophies that demand more detailed attention ja thir own right aswell ein interaction, | apdleize in ad- vance for leaving the philosophically ninded aghast at the incompleteness of the treatment and for encouraging the methodologically in- clined to scurty to later chapters on tools. But L would be remiss were I not to add thatthe prae- tice of social inguiry cannot be adequately de- fined a5 an atheoretical making that requires only methodological prowess. Socal inquiry isa distncive praxis, a kind of activity (ike teach- ing) than the doing transforms th very theory and aims that gide it. In other words, sone en- sages inthe “practical” activities of generating‘Three Bpistemolog andinterpeeting data to answer questions about ‘the meaning of what others are doing and say~ Ing and then transforming that understanding into public knowledge, one inevitably takes up theoretical” concerns about what constitutes inowledge and how itis to be justified, about the nature and aim of social theorizing, and so forth. In sum, acting and thinking, practice and theory, are linked in a continuous process of critical reflection and transformation. Background: Part 1 Inerpectivism and hermeneutics, generally characterized a8 the Gesteswisenschaflichte fr Verstehen tradition in the human sciences, ‘zose inthe reactions of neo-Kantian German historians and sociologists (ic, Dilthey, Rickert, Windleband, Simmel, Weber) in the late 19th and early 20th centuries to the then-dominant philosophy of posiivsm (and later, logical positivism). At the heat ofthe dis pte was the claim that the human sciences {Geisteswisenchaften) were fundamentally dit ferent in nature and purpose from the nacaral sciences (Naturwissenschaften). Defenders of inverpeetivism argued that the human sciences tim to understand human action. Defenders of positivism and proponents ofthe unity of the ciences held the view that the purpose of any cence (iftis indeed tobe called a science ist offer causal explanations of socal, behavioral, and physical phenomena. “There was, of course, considerable debate among the neo-Kantians about the precise na- ture of the difference between the sciences. And tothe present day theissue of whether theresa ttivcal distinction cobe drawn between the nat- tel andthe haruan sciences on the basi of dit ferent aims-explanation (Erldren) versus un- derstanding (Versteber)—remains more or less tonetled Although i is important to under- sand how apologists for the uniqueness of the human sciences link their respective philoso- pies to this issue inthe interest of space, Iwill forgo that examination here and focus directly con key features of the philosophies themselves ical Stances for Qualitative Inquiry @ 191 begin with a sketch of the interpretivise theory fof human action and meaning and then show how philosophical hermeneutics offers a critique of this view and a different understanding of bu- rman inquiry. + Interpretivist Philosophies From an interpretvit point of view, what distin- gushes human (gil) action from the move- tent of physical objects is tha the forme is in- hetently meaningful. Thus, to understand 2 patiular social action (et friendship, Younes ig), the inquirer must Grasp the To say that action is meaningulieto claim ether that it has a cerain intentional content that indicates the kind of action it is and/or that what an action means canbe grasped only in terms of the system tf meanings to which ie belongs (Fay, 1996s Gathwaite, 1975). Because human action is wn- derstood in this way, one can determine chat a ‘wink is nota wink (tose Byes example pope larized by Geertz), ot tha a smile can be inter preted as wey o¢ loving, or that very different Physical movements can alle interpreted as cts ‘supplication, or that the same physical move- tment of raising one's atm canbe variously inter- preted as voting, hailing a taxi, or asking for pe Inision to speak, depending on the context and oftheator To find meaning in an action, understands what a particular action means re guires that one interpret in a particular way what the actors are doing. This process of interpret: ing or understanding (of achieving Verstehen) is differentially represented, and therein lie some important differences in philosophies of inter pretivism and between interpretivism and philo- tophical hermeneutics. These differences can pethaps be most easly grasped shrough a consid- tration of faaPways of defining (theorizing) the notion of interpretive understanding (Verstchen), three that constitute the interpretive tradition ‘and a fourth that marks the distinction of philo- sophical hermeneutics from that tradition,192 @ PARADIGMS AND PERSPECTIVES IN TRANSITION Empathic Identification One way of defining the notion frst appears in the earlier work of Wilhelm Dilthey and the Lebensphilosophers. Dilthey argued that to un- derstand the meaning of human action requires grasping the subjective consciousness or inten ofthe actor from the inside Vrstebemns en tails a kind of empathic identification with the ‘stor Teisanactof psychological reenactment— Betting inside the head of an actor to understand “What he of she is up to in terms of motives, be Ties sits, ehoughts, and s0 on. This inierpre- tivist stance (also called fiom) is ex- Plained in Collingwood's (1946/1961) account of what constitutes historical know lies atthe heart of what is knows cm e-g., Hirsch, 1976). Both approaches share the general idea that itis possible forthe interpreter to ranscend orb sof her or his historical circumstances in | dero reproduce the meaningor intention ofthe ior. (realize that introducing the e ‘tics here isa bit confusing, given that [stated above that I wish to draw a distinction between inerpretivistand hermeneutic philosophies, But ‘objectvist hemenesics shares the same episte- mology asintezpretivism, whereas philosophical hermeneutics, as I explain below, rejects this epistemology, ‘Whether it is posible to achieve interpretive understanding through a process of grasping an actors intent is widely debated. Geers) (1976) 1979), for example, argues that understanding ‘comes more from the act of Tooking Over the shoulders of actors and trying to figure out (both, bby observing and by conversing) what the actors think they are up to. Nonetheles, the idea of ac- quiring an “inside” vinderstanding—the actors? define of WE eal eoncepe for und Phenomenological Sociology work of phenomenological sociologists and cthnomethodologists, including Cicourel and Garfinkel (C will address mote recent develop- ‘ments in conversation analysis later). Influenced by the work of AlfredSchued (1962, 1932/ 1967), phenomenological analysis is principally concerned with understanding how the every- aay, Aitersubjectiveyworld (the life world, or Leberswelt) is consticuted. The aim is to grasp; how and others} ction as meaningful and to “reconstruct thel sents ofthe objective m intersubject ‘he socal life-world” (Outhwaite, 1975, p.91).. ‘wo conceptual fools often used in that recon- struction ardindexicalit and eilexviry (Porte, 1996). The former signifies thatthe meaning of 4 word or uterance is dependent on ts context ‘of use. The latter directs our attention tothe fact that utterances are not just about something but are also doing somethings an urterance isin part constitutive of a speech act. These two notions are part of the means whereby phenome- nological sociologists and ethnomethodologsts ‘come to understand how social lie, isco @ conversat tion, (Fora faller discussion ofthis perspective, See Gubrium & Holstein, Chapter 18, this vol ume) Language Games AD deinion of inerpreivcundertand. ings cepreiened in analysis of langue 3p prosches that ta eget SPhilosophical Investigations, co arly dhe work of Peter Wine (1988), From ‘Wiagenstcn, Winch borrowed the notion that there are many games played with language (esting hypotheses, giving orders, erecting. and 0 on), and he extended this idea to language zames a consied in different eutores, Each of these games has its own ules or eiteria that take the game meaning Reasonog By anlony, We cn sy that human action ike pesch, ican element in communi tion governed by lex More simply, human a. ian is meaningful hy sce ofthe system of ‘meanings (in Wittgenstein’s terms, the “lan-‘Three Epistemological Stances for Qualitative Inquiry @ 193 guage game”) go which itbelongs. Understand- ing those systems of meanings Gnstitutional and ccaltural norms, action-constituting rules, and $0 on) isthe goal of Verstehen (Giddens, 19935 Habeemas, 1967/1988; Outhwaite, 1975). Shared Features ———— “These first huce ways of conctiving.of the notion of intexpretive understanding constitute the tadition of interpresvism. All three share the following features: (2) They view human ac- tion as meaningful; (b) they evince an ethical ‘ominiment in the form oF Fepeeeforand fi elcy We Tife World ane") Tron arepiate- ological port of view, they shave the neo- antinrdesire woremphasize the Contribution of hhumaa’ subjectivity (oe ro knowl ccge without thereby sactficing the objectivity of Kaowledge] In other words, interpret that iis 30 understand the sub: jective meaning of action (eras beliefs, desites, and s0.on) yet do so! tive manner sThe meaning thatthe reproduces or reconstructs is considered the original meaning ofthe action. So.as not to mis- interpret the original meaning, interpreters mast employ some kind of method that allows them to step outside their historical frames of reference. Method, correctly employed, is means that enables interpreters to claim purely theoretical attitude as observers (Outh- Waite, 1975). The theoretical attude or the at contemplation at a distance te 1c cognitive style of & observes (Schutz, 1962). This, ofcourse, doss ‘not necessarily deny the fact thatin orders dergapd the it anings.of bu-| ‘man action, the inquirer may have 9, 3541 requirement = dite Interpretivism generally embraces two di- mensions of Verstehen as explicated by Schutz (1962, 1932/1967). Vereen is, on a primary level, “the name of a complex process by which allof usin our everyday life interpret the mean- ing of our own actions and those of others with whom we interact” (Bernstein, 1976, p. 139) Yet Verstehen is also “a method peculiar to the social seiences” Schutz, 1962, p. 57), a process by which the social scientist sceks to understand the primary process. Hence interpretivsts ama £0 reconstroct the selunderstandings of actors en- aged in particular actions. Andin so doing, they fssume that the inguiter cannot claim that the sways actors make sense of ther experience areir- felevane to social scientific understanding be- Cause actors ways of making sense of their ac- tions are constitutive of that action (Giddens, 1993; Outhwaite, 1975). Tnterpretivst pistemologies can in one sense be characterized as hermeneutic because they emphasize that one must grasp the situation in ‘which human actions make (or acquire) meaning in order to say one has an understanding of the particular action (Outhwaite 1975). 1 Uraws upon the familiar novion ofthe fermi ri.as.a method or procedure unique to the hhoman sciences In order to understand the part (che specific sentence, utter act, the i nast grasp the whole id desires or the txt, context, practice, fo fe time, and 30 on), and vice versa. Geert's (197611979) oft-cited description of the process ‘ofethnographicundetstanding portrays this com ception of theTegmencutic Gre.as ih.away a8 0 bring both i oy... Hopping back and forth be- faven the whole conceived through the parts that etalize ie and the parte conesived through the “ehole which mosivacee them, we seck t0 torn them, bya sort of itellecual perpetual motion, inno explcatione of one another. (p- 239) Garfinkel’s (1967) claim about understanding how people make sense of their worlds is similar: “Not only is the underlying pattern derived from ins individual documentary evidences, bu the in- dividual documentary evidences, in their tun, are interpreted on the basis of ‘what is known’ about the underlying pattern. Each is used to claborate the other” (p. 78) Finally, interpretvism assumes an episte~ ological understanding of understanding (Ver- stehen). That i, it considers under be194 @ PARADIGMS AND PERSPECTIVES IN TRANSITION relectual process whereby a knower (the 35 subject) gains knowledge about