RESEARCH WORK

IN

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM

OF

NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

JOHN JEROME G. DIZON

BSEE 5-3
 INTRODUCTION
There are two electric power sources, the offsite power system and the
onsite power system, that can deliver power to the safety equipment in a nu-
clear power plant. The offsite power system, which consist of the power grid,
the main generator, and the equipment that connects them to the nuclear
power plant distribution busses, is defined in the industry standards1 and NRC
regulatory guides2 as %he preferred power system. The onsite power system,
which consists of diesel generators, batteries, and associated equipment, is a
backup power source to the preferred, offsite power system.

In a published document,3 the NRC stated its concern about the relia-
bility of the offsite power system as the preferred emergency source and about
the possible damage to a pressurized water reactor (PWR) that could result
from a rapid decay of power grid frequency. ORNL contracted with NRC to
provide technical assistance to establish criteria that can be used to evaluate
the offsite power system for the licensing of a nuclear power plant. The results
of many of the studies for this contract are recommendations to assess and
control the power grid during operation. This is because most of the NRC regu-
lations pertaining to the offsite power system are related to the design of the
power grid, and we believe that additional emphasis on monitoring the power
grid operation will improve the reliability of the nuclear plant offsite power
supply.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM

1.1 INTRODUCTION
1.2 TRANSMISSION SYSTEM
1.3 SWITCHYARD
1.4 EXAMPLE OF OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM

2 ONSITE POWER SYSTEM

2.1 INTRODUCTION
2.2 DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
2.3 POWER SUPPLIES
2.4 EXAMPLE OF ONSITE POWER SYSTEM

3 GENERAL DESIGN GUIDELINES

3.1 GENERAL
3.2 POSSIBLE ONSITE EVENTS

4 DESIGN BASES OF A NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEM

4.1 GENERAL
4.2 OFFSITE GRID CONNECTION
4.3 NORMAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
4.4 SECURED ALTERNATING CURRENT POWER SYSTEM
4.5 TOTAL LOSS OF ALTERNATING CURRENT POWER
4.6 DIRECT CURRENT POWER SYSTEMS
4.7 MAIN CONTROL ROOM,EMERGENCY CONTORL
POST AND LOCAL CONTROL CENTRES
4.8 UNIT TO UNIT POWER SUPPLY

5 EXAMPLE OF ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM

 INTRODUCTION
The off-site power system is composed of the transmission system
(grid) and switchyard connecting the plant with the grid. The off-site power
system will ideally provide AC power to the plant during all modes of opera-
tion. It also provides transmission lines for out-going power. The border be-
tween on-site and off-site power systems is normally in the high voltage
breakers closest to the plant.

The offsite power system performs an essential role in terms of safety

in order to supply the onsite power systems with reliable power from multiple
off-site generators. The off-site power system is part of the preferred power
supply.

An intrinsically robust grid system provides a highly reliable offsite

power source as it rapidly dampens the effects of grid perturbations during
normal co

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT : OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM

 TRANSMISSION SYSTEM
The central station system of power generation and distribution of a nucle-
ar power plant enables power to be produced at one location for immediate
use at another location many miles or kilometres’ away. Transmitting large
amounts of electric energy over long distances is accomplished most efficiently
by using high voltage transformers.
Without transformer the distribution of electric power would be difficult or
impractical. Transformers are electrical circuit to another by magnetic coupling.
Their purpose in a power distribution system is to convert AC power at one volt-
age level to AC power of the same frequency at another voltage level.
High voltages are used in transmission lines to reduce the amount of current
flow. The power transmitted in a system is proportional to the voltage multi-
plied by the current. If the voltage is raised, the current can be reduced to a
smaller value, while still transmitting the same amount of power. Because of
the reduction of current flow at high voltage, the size and cost of wiring are
greatly reduced. Reducing the current also minimizes voltage drop (IR) and
amount of power lost (I2R) in the lines.
There are certain limitations to the use of high voltage in power transmission
and distribution systems. The higher the voltage, the more difficult and expen-
sive it becomes to safely insulate between the line wires, as well as from line
wires to ground. The use of transformer in power systems allows this voltage to
be changed to a higher and more economical voltage for transmission. At the
load centres transformers allows the voltage to be lowered to a safer voltage
and more suitable for a particular load.
Power Grid Transformers, used to step up or step down voltage, make pos-
sible the conversation between high and low voltages and accordingly between
low and high currents . By use of transformers, each stage of the system can be
operated at an appropriate voltage level. Single-phase three-wire power is
normally supplied to residential customers, while three-phase power is supplied
to commercial and industrial customers.

SWITCHYARD
A switching substation, or switchyard, is a substation without transformers
that operates only at a single voltage level. Switchyards, used mainly for connec-
tions and interconnections, are essential for transmission, distribution, collection,
and controlling the flow of electricity. The switchyard delivers power generated at
the power plant to the electrical grid. Switchyards are generally classified by volt-
age level, circuit breaker and bus arrangements. Switchyards are often located di-
rectly adjacent to or near a power station.

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT : OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM

 TRANSMISSION SYSTEM
The central station system of power generation and distribution of a nucle-
ar power plant enables power to be produced at one location for immediate
use at another location many miles or kilometres’ away. Transmitting large
amounts of electric energy over long distances is accomplished most efficiently
by using high voltage transformers.
Without transformer the distribution of electric power would be difficult or
impractical. Transformers are electrical circuit to another by magnetic coupling.
Their purpose in a power distribution system is to convert AC power at one volt-
age level to AC power of the same frequency at another voltage level.
High voltages are used in transmission lines to reduce the amount of current
flow. The power transmitted in a system is proportional to the voltage multi-
plied by the current. If the voltage is raised, the current can be reduced to a
smaller value, while still transmitting the same amount of power. Because of
the reduction of current flow at high voltage, the size and cost of wiring are
greatly reduced. Reducing the current also minimizes voltage drop (IR) and
amount of power lost (I2R) in the lines.
There are certain limitations to the use of high voltage in power transmission
and distribution systems. The higher the voltage, the more difficult and expen-
sive it becomes to safely insulate between the line wires, as well as from line
wires to ground. The use of transformer in power systems allows this voltage to
be changed to a higher and more economical voltage for transmission. At the
load centres transformers allows the voltage to be lowered to a safer voltage
and more suitable for a particular load.
Power Grid Transformers, used to step up or step down voltage, make pos-
sible the conversation between high and low voltages and accordingly between
low and high currents . By use of transformers, each stage of the system can be
operated at an appropriate voltage level. Single-phase three-wire power is
normally supplied to residential customers, while three-phase power is supplied
to commercial and industrial customers.

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT : OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT : OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM
 INTRODUCTION
The on-site power system is composed of distribution systems and power
supplies within the plant. It includes the AC and DC power supplies needed to bring
a the plant to a controlled state following anticipated operational occurrences or
accident conditions and to maintain it in a controlled state or safe state until off-
site sources can be restored. Stand-alone power supplies, for example separate
power for security systems, are not included. The on-site power systems are separat-
ed into three different categories according to their safety significance.
The major components of the On-site Power System include the plant gen-
erator, plant transformer, auxiliary transformer, standby transformer and the distri-
bution system feeding unit auxiliaries, service auxiliaries, batteries, rectifiers, invert-
ers/UPSs, cables and standby AC power sources. Portions of the On-site Power Sys-
tem are part of the preferred power supply.
The on-site Electrical Power Systems are generally divided into three types
of electrical systems according to the different power requirements of the loads:
 An Alternating Current (AC) power system. The functions of the as-
signed AC loads will tolerate a certain interruption in the power sup-
ply. Usually the AC power system includes a standby AC power
source. The loss of the preferred AC power supply to the Electrical
Power Systems triggers the startup of a standby electrical power
source. In most cases plant safety analyses assume that the standby
AC power source will be available for response to design basis acci-
dents.
 A direct current (DC) power system. This supplies DC loads, without
interruption, from batteries. The DC system includes battery chargers
that are connected to the AC system of the Electrical Power Systems.
Often separate DC power systems will be provided to support loads of
different safety classification.
 A uninterruptible AC power system which supplies power from in-
verters or motor-generator sets that are in turn supplied from a DC
source such as the DC power system or dedicated batteries with rectifi-
ers, and include a bypass circuit to allow feeding safety loads directly
from safety class AC power systems.

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT : ONSITE POWER SYSTEM

 DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
Distribution systems used to distribute power throughout large commercial
and industrial facilities can be complex. Power must be distributed through various
switchboards transformers, and panel boards without any component overheating
or unacceptable voltage drops. This power is used for such applications as lighting,
heating, cooling, and motor driven machinery.
Typically the distribution system is divided into the following sections:
 SERVICE ENTRANCE – This section includes conductors for delivering from
the electricity supply system to the premises being served.

 FEEDERS – A feeder is a set of conductors that originates at a main distri-

bution center and supplies one or more secondary or branch circuit distribu-
tion center. This section includes conductors for delivering the energy from
the service equipment location to the final branch circuit over current de-
vice; this protects each piece of utilization equipment. Main feeder originate
at the service equipment location, and sub feeders originate at panel
boards or distribution centres’ at locations other than the service equipment
location.

 BRANCH CIRCUITS – This section includes conductors for delivering the

energy from the point of the final over current device to the utilization
equipment. Each feeder, sub feeder, and branch circuit conductor in turn
needs its own properly coordinated over current protection in the form of a
circuit breaker or fused switch.

POWER SUPPLIES
The AC and DC power supplies needed to bring a the plant to a controlled
state following anticipated operational occurrences or accident conditions and to
maintain it in a controlled state or safe state until off-site sources can be restored.
Stand-alone power supplies, for example separate power for security systems, are not
included.
The preferred power supplies are the normal supplies for all plant systems im-
portant to safety. They are, if available always the first and best choice of power sup-
ply to the safety electrical power systems. The preferred power supply includes portions
of both the on-site and off-site systems.

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT : ONSITE POWER SYSTEM

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT : ONSITE POWER SYSTEM
 GENERAL DESIGN GUIDELINES

Electrical systems important to safety should fully implement the re-

quirements of their design bases.
The design of the power systems in the plant should consider all pos-
sible events that could occur in the electrical systems associated with the
plant. These events can cause symmetrical and asymmetrical perturbations
in the plant and can be initiated:
a. In the transmission system with the plant on line, off line
and shutdown, or as a consequence of the plant separating
from the grid due to anticipated faults or voltage and fre-
quency variations beyond an acceptable level.

b. By the main generator tripping leaving the on-site power

systems connected to the off-site or on-site power sources.

c. In the on-site power systems as a result of an electrical

event such as motor starting, phase to ground fault or switch-
ing surges.
The impact of such events on all the onsite electrical power systems
(AC and DC) should be evaluated and confirmed that the allowable volt-
age and frequency requirements are not exceeded and the protection sys-
tem is adequate.

POSSIBLE ONSITE EVENTS

Events on the onsite power systems to be considered include, but not limited to,
 Switching and lightning surges Voltage swells caused by loss-of-load scenarios

 Voltage sags caused by motor starts and electrical faults off-site and on-site

 Voltage interruptions caused by electrical faults off-site during shut-down operation;

 Voltage interruptions caused by on-site faults;

 Frequency deviations caused by turbine speed variations;

 Deviating grid voltage and frequency;

 Faults in the on-site power system (all voltage levels) cleared by first step or backup
protection;

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT : GENERAL DESIGN GUIDELINES

 POSSIBLE ONSITE EVENTS
 Voltage sags caused by motor starts and electrical faults off-site and on-site

 Voltage interruptions caused by electrical faults off-site during shut-down

operation;

 Voltage interruptions caused by on-site faults;

 Frequency deviations caused by turbine speed variations;

 Transmission system faults cleared by first step or backup protection;

 Deviating grid voltage and frequency;

 Faults in the on-site power system (all voltage levels) cleared by first step or
backup protection;

 Main generator excitation malfunctions (high and low excitation);

 Open conductors; and

 Solar activity and geomagnetic induced currents.

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT : GENERAL DESIGN GUIDELINES

 EXAMPLE: POWER SYSTEM DESIGN OF A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

The typical system has a net output of 1000 MW. In achieving this station
relies on auxiliary plant and services whose electrical power is supplied from the AC
power systems. The total connected load is in excess of 100 MW. The electrical sys-
tem is the main source of power to the reactor cooling auxiliaries during normal
operation, for the protection system and the safety systems during normal and
fault conditions. This paper will consider the designs of both the Emergency power
supply systems and the Normal power supply systems . Both offsite (grid) and on-
site (Diesel generators) electrical power supply systems are provided and the relia-
bility of both these systems has direct effect on the safety of the plant. The electrical
power supply systems design is as follow:
 Off-site power system(Grid connection)
 Turbo-Generator and its auxiliaries.
 Class IV-Normal AC power supply systems
 Class1E-Emergency power supply systems.
(Class III –AC Emergency power supply system, Class II-AC supply
from battery & Inverter and Class -1 DC supply from batteries.)

NORMAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

The Normal Power supply System connects the power station to the Nation-
al Transmission System (Grid) and distributes power throughout the power station
at system voltages postulated by engineering considerations. This power is used
both for auxiliaries required to operate the power station and to supply the Emer-
gency power supply Systems with its preferred source of power. This power is also
called as Off-site power. The designed system has bus voltage of 11kV.

Safety Design Bases

 The MPS provides power to process plant not forming a part of the
essential systems but which may make a significant contribution to
nuclear safety ,their availability is desirable for nuclear operation and
Safety
 To supply power to auxiliary loads with a high reliability and integrity so
as to limit the number of challenges to the EPS
 All supplies are designed to be continuously available during routine
operation s including those associated with a reactor trip with the grid.
reactor trip with the grid.

11 kV System
The connection of the NPS to the grid is in the powerstation's 400kV substa-
tion. The substation is designed to operate with both bus-coupler breakers and
both bus-section breakers closed. Individual circuits supplying the NPS will be se-
lected to either the main busbar or the reserve busbar. The system has two unit
buses and two station buses. This system has generator transformer, unit auxiliary
transformers, station transformer as shown in figure 1.

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT : EXAMPLE

 EXAMPLE: POWER SYSTEM DESIGN OF A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

3.3kV System
The 3.3kV NPS derives its power supply only from the 11 kV NPS. The system
consists of buses termed unit bus and station bus. The unit bus generally supply
auxiliaries and loads directly associated with the turbo-generator operation and
the station bus supply auxiliaries and loads associated with station services.

415V System
The 415V NPS supplies power to non-safety related equipment which is ei-
ther associated with the turbo-generator or required for station services. Generally
all 415V switchboards associated with power generation or station services will be
radially fed and their power sources derived from the 3.3kV NPS. The system con-
sists of two tiers of switchgear types ie. Load centres and motor control centres.
Load centres incorporate a 3.3kVl433V Class 'C' AN transformer fed by a motor
switching device/circuit breaker on a 3.3kV unit

EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

The Emergency power supply systems (EPS) are divided into four separation
groups or trains and provide power to all equipment required to ensure the safety
of the Reactor. To ensure that these systems meet their safety functional require-
ments detailed safety criteria must be satisfied. The following Safety Design Bases
include both general and those specific to the EPS.

Safety Design Bases

 The EPS is designed and qualified to adequately survive external hazards
such as lightning, earthquakes, high winds and floods with consideration
given to extremes of ambient temperature.
 The postulated internal hazard such as fire, internal missiles or pipe break
coincident with loss of grid sufficient equipment in the EES will remain.
 Functional to allow a safe shutdown of the Reactor. The separation segre-
gation and isolation criteria for plant and cabling are applied to preserve
the independence of redundant essential equipment.
 The EPS is divided into four similar trains. Each train is capable of
supplying its connected loads independently of the other three trains. All
auxiliaries and Services required for continued operation of a train are de-
rived from that same train of the EES.
 The EES will operate when power supplies are available from either on-
site or off-site (grid) power sources. Each EES train has its own associated
and independent essential diesel generator. Connections from the Main
Power Systems are made through qualified devices designed to isolate these
connections when necessary.

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT : EXAMPLE

 EXAMPLE: POWER SYSTEM DESIGN OF A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

110V DC Electrical System

The function of the llOV DC Electrical System is to provide battery backed
power, control and switching supplies to the essential switchgear and control equip-
ments. This includes supplies to DC driven Heating, Ventilating and Cooling (HVAC)
plant for the essential switchgear, reactor protection equipment and control gear
rooms located in the control building. The 11OV DC comprises four trains of equip-
ment, each having a battery, charger, switch board and associated distribution fuse
boards for each of the primary and secondary systems within a train. The 110V DC
system is normally energised at all times from the 415V system. 11OV AC Essential
Uninterruptible Power Supply System The function of the 11OV AC Essential Unin-
terruptible Power Supply (UPS) System is to provide battery backed single phase
instrumentation supplies to control cubicles and other essential equipment. The
11OV AC Essential UPS System comprises four trains of equipment each having a
single phase inverter, charger, static switch unit, battery, switchboard and associat-
ed distribution fuseboards for each of the primary and secondary systems within a
train. Essential UPS System is normally energised at all times from the 415V system.
Generally, all electrical plant is located in dedicated rooms with controlled environ-
mental conditions. The Main Electrical Power System..The function of the llOV AC
Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) System is to provide battery backed single
phase instrumentation supplies to the control cubicles associated with the data pro-
cessing system and all other equipment requiring a non-essential UPS .The 11OV AC
UPS System comprises two trains of equipment each having a single phase inverter,
charger, static switch unit, battery, switchboard and associated distribution fuse
boards..
48V DC Power System
The function of the 48V DC Power System is to provide battery backed
power for remote control relays for the main station switchgear. The system is sig-
nificant to safety in that it is used to support restoration of off-site supplies to the
system
250V DC System
The principal function of the 250V DC Main is to provide battery backed
power for the main turbo-generators DC driven plant. These are installed to pre-
vent mechanical damage to the main turbine in the event of loss of normal AC
supplies coincident with a turbine trip.. The 250V DC system comprises two trains of
equipment each having two batteries, two chargers, two switchboards and associ-
ated distribution fuse boards. The system is normally energised at all times from the
415V plant protection.

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT : EXAMPLE

EXAMPLE: POWER SYSTEM DESIGN OF A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT : EXAMPLE

 EXAMPLE: POWER SYSTEM DESIGN OF A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

In nuclear plants there are several levels of electrical power distribution

(other than from the generator to the generator transformer):

 High Voltage (e.g. 4160, 6900, or 13,800 Volts AC, may also be abbrevi-
ated VAC)
 Medium Voltage (e.g. 480 VAC)
 Low Voltage (e.g. 120, 240 VAC, 260 VAC)

High voltage systems are used to supply equipment that have motors with
high horsepower ratings. Examples of these are:
 Feedwater pumps
 Recirculating or Reactor Coolant Pumps
 Circulating Water Pumps
 Condensate Pumps
 Cooling Tower Pumps and Fans
 High Pressure Emergency Makeup Pumps
 Containment Spray Pumps
Medium voltage systems are used to supply equipment that have motors
with moderate horsepower ratings. Examples of these are:

 Auxiliary or Emergency Feedwater pumps

 Heating Ventilating Air Conditioning (HVAC) Fans and Chiller Units
 Control Rod Drive Motor-Generator Sets
 Motor operated valves
Low voltage systems are used to supply equipment that have motors with
low horsepower ratings. Examples of these are:

 Lights
 Small pumps

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT : EXAMPLE

EXAMPLE: POWER SYSTEM DESIGN OF A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT : EXAMPLE

 GENERAL
The electrical power systems and components of the nuclear power plant on
the one hand generate electrical power and supply it to the external grid and on the
other hand supply electrical power to the plant’s systems from external and internal
power supplies. The reliable operation of these systems is important for ensuring plant
safety, accident management and the mitigation of the consequences of accidents.
The Government Resolution (395/1991) presents general safety requirements
for nuclear power plants. This resolution contains both general provisions for all safety
systems and provisions for the electrical power systems of nuclear power plants. These
are stated in more detail in Guide YVL 1.0, which sets forth the safety principles to be
applied in nuclear power plant design.
Guide YVL 1.1 describes how STUK controls the design, construction and opera-
tion of nuclear power plants. Guide YVL 5.2 gives the detailed design bases and safe-
ty requirements pertaining to electrical systems and components at nuclear facilities.
Chapter 6 describes STUK’s regulatory control of a nuclear facility’s electrical systems
and components.
Section 5 of the Government Resolution (395/1991) prescribes that advanced
quality assurance programmes shall be employed in all activities which affect safety
and relate to the design, construction and operation of a nuclear power plant. Guide
YVL 1.4 presents general requirements for quality management systems and Guide
YVL 1.9 for quality management during operation.
Guide YVL 2.0 applies generally to the design and regulatory control of nucle-
ar power plant systems – specifically those assigned to a safety class – and specifies in
more detail the general design requirements presented in Guide YVL 1.0.
The safety importance of the function a system performs is essential in the fo-
cusing of STUK’s control activities. The safety classification of systems, structures and
components affects their control. Paragraph one of section 21 of the Government Res-
olution (395/1991) prescribes that the functions important to the safety of the system,
structures and components of a nuclear power plant shall be defined and the sys-
tems, structures and components safety-classified according to their safety signifi-
cance. Detailed instructions for safety classification are given in Guide YVL 2.1.
In addition, several other YVL guides apply to electrical power systems and compo-
nents. Guide YVL 1.8 describes how STUK controls the modification, repair and pre-
ventive maintenance of systems, components and structures at nuclear facilities dur-
ing operation. The guide also presents the obligations imposed upon licensees regard-
ing this work. Guides YVL 2.2 and YVL 2.8 set forth the requirements for safety goals
and their demonstration. The requirements for failure criteria are given in Guide YVL
2.7. Diesel generators and their auxiliary systems are dealt with in Guide YVL 5.1;
valves and valve actuators in Guide YVL 5.3; instrumentation and control (I&C) sys-
tems in Guide YVL 5.5; air conditioning systems and equipment in Guide YVL 5.6;
pumps in Guide YVL 5.7; and hoisting and transfer appliances in Guide YVL 5.8. Pro-
vision against earthquakes is addressed in Guide YVL 2.6; and fire protection in Guide
YVL 4.3. A nuclear power plant’s radiation monitoring systems and equipment are
dealt with in Guide YVL 7.11; and those radiation protection aspects to be considered
in the design and layout of nuclear power plant systems and components in Guide
YVL 7.18.

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT : DESSIGN BASES OF ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM
 GENERAL
This guide sets forth licensee obligations regarding the design, implementation
and operation of electrical power systems and components at nuclear power plants
as well as STUK’s procedures pertaining to their control and inspection.
In addition to this Guide, the Finnish Electrical Safety Act (410/1996) and De-
cree apply to nuclear facilities. Electrical safety regulations and other corresponding
rules are based on the act and decree. Compliance with the electrical safety legisla-
tion is controlled by the competent authorities.
The quality glossary used in this Guide complies with SFS-EN ISO 9000 .
In accordance with the fourth paragraph of section 18 of the Government Res-
olution (395/1991), a nuclear power plant shall have on-site and off-site electrical
power supply systems. The execution of the most important safety functions shall be
possible by using either of the two electrical power supply systems
In accordance with Guide YVL 1.0, the plant shall be provided with systems,
which enable power supply from the main generator to the plant’s safety significant
systems in case the connection to the external transmission gird is lost.
The plant’s electrical power supply units shall be designed such that the loss of
a single electrical power supply unit followed by the loss of the plant’s other power
supply units, or their loss due to the same cause, is highly unlikely.
The plant’s off-site and on-site electrical power supplies shall be designed such
that each can alone ensure reactor decay heat removal, primary circuit integrity and
reactor sub-criticality.
The electrical power supplies of measuring systems for accident monitoring
and management shall be designed in accordance with the accident instrumentation
requirements of section 2.5 of Guide YVL 5.5.
For severe accident management and monitoring, the nuclear power plant
shall be equipped with monitoring devices, as described in section 3.6 of Guide YVL
1.0, whose electrical power supplies are to be independent of the plant unit’s other
electrical power supply units.
General design requirements for the electrical power systems of nuclear power
plants are set forth in IEEE 308 [1], IEEE 765 [4], KTA 3701 [5] and IAEA DS303 [6],
among others, which are referred to in this Guide.

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT : DESSIGN BASES OF ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM
 OFF-SITE GRID CONNECTION
In accordance with Guide YVL 1.0, for electrical power supply, there shall be
two separate, independent grid connections from the external grid to each parallel
section of the on-site electricity distribution system. These grid connections shall be so
designed that during operational conditions and postulated accidents, the simultane-
ous loss of both is unlikely. It must be possible to start operation of both grid connec-
tions quickly enough after the plant main generator has been separated from the
grid.
Plant design shall consider variations of voltage and frequency that occur in
the external power transmission grid and affect the electrical systems and compo-
nents of the nuclear power plant. The external grid connections and their auxiliary
systems shall be electrotechnically dimensioned as well as physically and functionally
separated from other electrical power systems in such a way that design-basis dis-
turbances in the external power transmission grid do not jeopardise the operation of
safety-classified components during plant operational transients and accidents.
The plant unit’s off-site grid connections shall be electrotechnically dimen-
sioned such that each connection alone has sufficient capacity to ensure the removal
of decay heat, to assure primary circuit integrity and to maintain reactor sub-
criticality. Several units at the plant may share connections to the off-site power
transmission grid. That being the case, each connection alone must have sufficient
capacity to simultaneously carry out the aforementioned safety functions at all plant
units.
The design of off-site grid connections shall make unlikely the simultaneous
failure of both of them from the same cause in consequence of operational transients,
postulated accidents, weather phenomena or other external events. Plant design
shall also consider all component failures and fires that could be caused by short cir-
cuits in the grid connections. In addition, auxiliary systems important for the operabil-
ity of the connections, e.g. auxiliary voltage supplies and automatic switching devices,
shall be designed in a way making the connections as independent as possible.
The plant unit shall be provided with reliable, automatically starting change-
over equipment for change-over switching between off-site grid connections. Change
-over switching shall be designed to not unnecessarily start the plant’s safety systems.
Manual change-over must be possible from the main control room or, in case of the
loss of the main control room, from outside the main control room.

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT : EVALUATION OF A NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEM
 NORMAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
The plant’s normal power supply systems supply the necessary electrical power
to the plant units’ electrical equipment and I&C systems, either from their own elec-
trical power supplies or from the off-site power transmission grid. Normal power sup-
ply systems refer here to electrical power systems whose operation is not secured by
auxiliary power supply systems.
The design of normal power supply systems shall ensure that the disturbance
or failure of a Safety Class 4 or Class EYT (non-nuclear) normal power supply system
does not endanger the designed operation of a Safety Class 2 or 3 electrical power or
I&C system. The functional separation of Safety Class 4 normal power supply systems
shall be designed to render unlikely the deterioration, or failure, of the operating ca-
pability of its redundant subsystems due to the same electrical disturbance.
The capability of the plant unit’s normal power supply systems shall be elec-
trotechnically dimensioned to supply sufficient electrical power for the fulfilment of
essential safety functions.

SECURED ALTERNATING CURRENT POWER SYSTEMS

The operation of Safety Class 2 and 3 alternating current components shall be assured
by supplying electric power from onsite emergency power supply systems. Those emergency
power supply systems that carry out a safety function only shall be physically separated from
plant sections for normal operation. Systems performing the same safety function, and their
subsystems - whether they are similar to or different from one another - shall also be separat-
ed. The functional separation of safety-classified alternating current power systems shall be
designed such that the deterioration, or failure, of their redundant subsystems due to the same
electrical disturbance is unlikely.
The systems are to automatically engage to ensure uninterrupted power supply, or
power supply if a voltage break of permissible duration has occurred, in case normal power
supply is disrupted in a way endangering the operability of components. The on-site emergen-
cy power supply systems shall be designed to assure the availability of Safety Class 2 and 3 se-
cured alternating current power systems according to the operating time requirements set to
them. It shall be possible to reliably take the emergency power supply systems into service
even from the main control room and from local control centres.
The design of the emergency power supply systems shall make them capable of reliably
starting, engaging, receiving loads and feeding electrical power even during the most de-
manding loading situations (e.g. start-up situations) and operating conditions. The quality of
the alternating current supply shall be kept such that the operating capability of the supplied
components is not compromised. Requirements that apply to the diesel generators of nuclear
facilities are discussed in more detail in Guide YVL 5.1.
The emergency power supply systems shall be provided with sufficiently comprehensive,
alarming condition monitoring systems to promptly detect and locate failures causing unavail-
ability of the systems.
For the duration of their functional testing, maintenance and repair, it shall be possible
to safely disconnect from other electrical power systems those units that belong to the emer-
gency power supply systems. If necessary, it shall be possible to reliably replace the power sup-
ply units of battery-backed alternating current systems with stand-by power supply connec-
tions facilitating the safe fulfilment of measures relating to the power supply units.

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT : EVALUATION OF A NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEM
 TOTAL LOSS OF AC POWER
In accordance with Guide YVL 1.0, in nuclear power plant design, the possibil-
ity of the on-site and off-site power supply units being simultaneously lost shall be
considered. As provision against such a situation, the plant shall have available a
power supply unit which is independent of the electrical power supply units designed
for operational conditions and postulated accidents. It must be possible to introduce
this power supply unit into operation quickly enough and its capability shall be suffi-
cient to remove reactor decay heat, to ensure primary circuit integrity and to main-
tain reactor sub-criticality.
Plant-unit specific, independent alternating current power supply units shall
be dimensioned according to the above capacity requirement. An alternating power
supply unit may be shared by several plant units. The capacity of the unit in question
shall then be sufficient for the simultaneous removal of reactor decay heat, ensuring
of primary circuit integrity and maintenance of reactor sub-criticality for all the nu-
clear facilities on the site.
The design of an independent alternating current power supply unit shall be
such that its failure simultaneously with the external power transmission grid connec-
tions, and due to the same cause, in consequence of weather phenomena or other
external events is unlikely. In addition, auxiliary systems important for the operability
of the supply unit and external grid connections, e.g. auxiliary power supplies and
automatic switching systems, shall be designed such that the independent supply unit
and external grid connections are as independent of each other as possible.
It shall be possible to quickly and reliably take an independent power supply
unit into service, if necessary. The design of the connections shall reliably prevent
plant-to-plant spreading of electrical disturbances via them and their unplanned
taking into service or engaging; also, their design shall reduce the likeliness of human
errors during their planned taking into service and operation.

DIRECT CURRENT POWER SYSTEM

To assure the operation of Safety Class 2 and 3 direct current equipment, their electrical
power supplies shall be ensured by reliable and sufficiently efficient batteries to ensure an unin-
terrupted supply of direct current power in case of a disturbance in the supply of alternating
current power, which endangers their operability.
The batteries and their charging devices shall be dimensioned to reliably assure the op-
erating capability of Safety Class 2 and 3 direct current power systems in accordance with sys-
tem-specific operating time requirements. Guide YVL 1.0 prescribes that batteries backing up
the operation of electrical systems important to safety shall maintain their capability to operate
at least for two hours under any circumstances. The design bases of start-up batteries for com-
bustion engines and of other special-purpose batteries shall be given case-by-case.
Charging devices shall be capable of simultaneously feeding direct current to the loads
and of charging storage batteries. A charging device shall be dimensioned such that its perfor-
mance is not endangered even during the most demanding loading situations (e.g. start-up)
and operating conditions. It shall be capable of feeding the necessary direct current to the loads
even if the storage battery has been disconnected. Even then, the quality of the direct current
supplied must not cause malfunctioning of the loads. Charging devices shall be designed to reli-
ably prevent the passing of potential disturbances from alternating current power systems to a
direct current power system via them.

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT : EVALUATION OF A NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEM
 DIRECT CURRENT POWER SYSTEM
Direct current systems performing a safety function only shall be physically
separated from plant sections for normal operation. Systems and subsystems for the
same safety function, whether they are similar or not, shall be separated from each
other. The functional separation of safety-classified alternating current power systems
shall make unlikely the operational weakening or malfunctioning of redundant sub-
systems due to the same electrical disturbance.
Safety Class 2 and 3 direct current power systems shall be designed to be as
independent of other systems as possible. Automatic features essential for the opera-
tion of redundant subsystems (e.g. protection and possible automatic switching sys-
tems), and auxiliary systems (e.g. auxiliary voltage and air conditioning) shall be de-
signed according to the same principles as the subsystems proper. The auxiliary sys-
tems shall be dimensioned such that they are, in accordance with the set operating
time requirements, capable of assuring the operating capability of Safety Class 2 and
3 secured alternating current systems in all plant operational conditions and postu-
lated accidents.
The design of direct current power supply systems shall ensure that the dis-
turbance or failure of a Safety Class 4 or Class EYT (non-nuclear) direct current pow-
er supply system does not endanger the designed operation of a Safety Class 2 or 3
electrical or I&C system.
Safety-classified direct current power systems shall be equipped with extensive
enough alarming condition monitoring devices by which the operability of the sys-
tems can be continuously reliably monitored and failures causing their unavailability
immediately detected and located.

MAIN CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY,

CONTROL POST AND LOCAL CENTRES
The main control room of a nuclear power plant shall be equipped with devices providing infor-
mation about the operational state, and deviations from it, of the plant’s electrical systems and the off-
site power transmission grids; as well as with systems monitoring the operation of the plant’s electrical
systems during operational transients and accidents. The need for emergency control operations from
outside the main control room for normal and emergency power systems shall be analysed. The design
bases for a nuclear facility’s main control room and emergency control posts are given in sections 2.3 and
2.4 of Guide YVL 5.5.
Power supplies for the I&C systems of the main control room, the emergency control post and
local control centres, which are needed to manage the nuclear power plant unit during operational con-
ditions and accidents, shall be ensured by internal emergency power supply systems. In the main control
room, the power supplies of the various subsystems of safety systems shall be reliably functionally sepa-
rated to make unlikely their simultaneous failure from the same electrical disturbance.
The power supplies for an emergency control post outside the main control room shall be sepa-
rated from those for the main control room such that the total destruction in a fire of components con-
tained in one fire compartment does not damage both power supplies so much as to prevent the fulfil-
ment of safety functions.
Guide YVL 4.3 prescribes that cables from the safety-related redundant subsystems to the main
control room shall be routed through separate fire compartments. In case the cables from different re-
dundant systems must exceptionally be situated in the same fire compartment, they shall be separated
inside the compartment by means of distance, fire-resistant materials and fire insulation. The cable space
below the main control room is an example of such a compartment.

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT : EVALUATION OF A NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEM
 UNIT TO UNIT POWER SUPPLY
The design of the alternating current power supply systems of nuclear power
plant units shall enable unit-to-unit supply of electrical power within the site such
that, where necessary, one unit can be maintained in a safe state in case of the loss of
the off-site grid. The design of the power supply connection shall make unlikely the
unit-to-unit propagation of an electrical disturbance via it and also the connection’s
unplanned taking into service and engaging. The connection shall be available
promptly and reliably enough where necessary. The control and switching actions of
the connection shall be designed to minimise the probability of human error.

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT : EVALUATION OF A NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEM