Fundamental powers of the State 3.

In terms of where the property

taken would be used or
1. Police power disposed of :
2. Power of eminent domain Police power: Destroyed
3. Power of taxation because it is noxious or
intended for a noxious
purpose.
Similarities
Power of Eminent Domain:
1.They are inherent in the State and Intended for public use and is
may be exercised by it without need of therefore wholesome
express constitutional grant. Power of Taxation: Intended
for public use or purpose and
2.They are not only necessary but is therefore wholesome
indispensable. The state cannot
continue or be effective unless it is able 4. In terms of compensation:
to exercise them. Police power: Intangible
altruistic feeling that he has
3.They are methods by which the State contributed to the general
interferes with private rights. welfare
4.They all presuppose an equivalent Power of Eminent Domain:
compensation for the private rights Full and fair equivalent of the
interfered with. property expropriated
Power of Taxation:
5.They are exercised primarily by the Protection and public
legislature. improvements for taxes paid.

Differences
Police Power
1. In terms of regulation:
Police Power: Liberty and The power of promoting the public
property welfare by restraining and regulating the
Power of Eminent Domain: use of liberty and property. (Professor
property rights Freund)
Power of taxation: property
rights State’s authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or
2. In terms of who can exercise: property in order to promote general
Police Power: Government welfare.
only (Philippine Association of Service
Power of Eminent Domain: Exporters v. Drilon)
may be exercised by some
private entities
Power of Taxation:
Government

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 1
According to the case of (Philippine
Association of Service Exporters v.
Drilon), Police power is consist of :
1. Imposition of restraint upon
liberty or property
2. In order to foster common good
Characteristics
1. Most pervasive
2. Least limitable
3. Most demanding
Origins of Police Power
Salus Populi Est Suprema Lex –
Welfare of the people is the supreme
law. The individual, as a creature of the
society, should be prepared to surrender
part of his freedom for the benefit of the
greater.
Sic utere tuo alienum non laedas-
Call for subordination of individual
benefit to the interests of the great
number
Other characteristics of Police Power
1. Owing to the need to protect the
society from inordinate assertion
of individual liberty, it has been
held that police power may not be
bargained away through a
medium of contract or even a
treaty.
Ichong v. Hernandez
Issue: Republic Act no. 1180 Act to
regulate the retail business is an
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW
invalid exercise of police power because
its exercise is attended by the violation
of the Constitutional requirements of
due process and equal protection of
laws.
Held: The Supreme Court held that the
reason for passing the said law is to
bring about the desired legislative
objective which is to free national
economy from alien control and
dominance. It is within the scope of
Police Power because it protects its own
personality and insures its security and
future. The Supreme Court also held
that even supposing that the law
infringes upon the treaty of China and
the Philippines, the treaty is always
subject to qualification or amendment by
subsequent law and the same may
never curtail or restrict the scope of the
Police Power of the State.
2. It is dynamic, not static and must
move with the moving society it is
supposed to regulate.
3. Police power may sometimes use
the taxing power as an implement
for the attainment of a legitimate
police objective.
Tests of the Police Power
1. Lawful Subject
Interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the exercise
of the police power.
Primacy of the welfare of the many
over the interests of the few.
Page 2
 Department of Education, Culture
and Sports v. San Diego
Issue: Whether a person who has thrice
failed the NMAT is entitled to take it
again?
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the
subject of the challenged provision
Order No.12, Series of 1972 is certainly
within the ambit of the police power. It is
the right and indeed the responsibility of
the State to insure the medical
profession is not infiltrated by
incompetents to whom patients may
unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the
challenged regulation is not irrelevant to
the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary
or oppressive . The three flunk rule is
intended to insulate the medical
schools and ultimately the medical
profession from the intrusion of
those not qualified to be doctors.
Lozano v. Martinez
Issue: Whether or not B.P. 22 or the
Bouncing checks law is unconstitutional
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the
enactment of B.P. 22 is a declaration by
the legislative that as a matter of public
policy, the making and issuance of a
worthless check is deemed a public
nuisance to be abated by the imposition
of penal sanctions. The act of making
and issuing worthless check or a check
that is dishonored upon its presentation
for payment is punishable. An act may
not be considered by society as
inherently wrong, hence not malum in se
but because of the harm that it inflicts on
the community it can be outlawed and
criminally punished as malum
prohibitum. The state can do this in the
exercise of police power.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW
2. Lawful Means
The lawful objective must be
pursued through a lawful method;
that is, both the end and the means
must be legitimate. The means
employed are reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.
Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate
Court
Issue: Executive order 626- A
prohibits the interprovincial
movement of carabaos, carabeef
and slaughtering of carabaos.
Held: The Supreme Court used the
two test;
a. Lawful Subject
The enactment of the provision
was required by the interests of
the public generally. In prohibiting
the slaughter of the carabaos
who are still fit in for agricultural
work was reasonably necessary
to protect the community from the
loss of services of such animals
by their slaughter.
b. Lawful Method
Invalid exercise of police power
because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law and worse, it
is unduly oppressive. The
Supreme Court cannot see how
the prevention of transfer of the
carabaos can prevent the
slaughtering of it considering that
they can be killed anywhere.
Page 3

Q: Do inherent powers lie in
opposite poles?
A: No. Because traditionally the
exercise of one inherent power
would be the exclusion of the
others. So traditionally the
inherent powers can only be used
alternately. They cannot be used
simultaneously or cumulatively.
Q: Is it still applied in this
jurisdiction? That the exercise of
one would result to the exclusion
of the two other?
A: No. ( Lutz v. Araneta case and
Association of landowners v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform)
 Used as a tool to implement
police power
Cumulative exercise of police
power in power of taxation
Lutz v. Araneta
Issue: Questions the validity of Sec.
2 and 3 of the Sugar Commonwealth
Act imposing tax. Petitioner contends
that the impositions of tax is
unconstitutional and void being
levied for the aid and support of
sugar industry exclusively and is not
for public purpose for which a tax
may be constitutionally levied.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that
the tax imposed under
Commonwealth Act no. 567 is a pure
exercise of Police Power. Primarily it
is an exercise of police power
because under Sec.6 of the said act,
the tax is levied with regulatory
purpose to provide means for the
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW
rehabilitation and stabilization of the
threatened sugar industry.
Q: When can we say that the
government is using only purely the
power of taxation and power of taxation
as a tool to implement police power?
A: As a tool as held in the case of Lutz
v. Araneta, the main objective of the law
is to regulate the sugar industry and the
Supreme Court said that it is an
exercise of police power. If the tax
measure’s purpose is to regulate the
industry that is not an exercise of power
of taxation but instead a valid exercise
of police power.
Q: Supposing the purpose of the law is
to raise revenue what is the character
being discharged in issuing that
legislation?
A: Power of Taxation is being exercised
by government when it issues tax
measures intended for raising of
revenue.
Cumulative exercise of police
power in eminent domain
Small landowners v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform
Issue: Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform is unconstitutional
Held: Supreme Court ruled that like
taxation, the power of eminent
domain could be used as an
implement of the police power. The
expressed objective of the law was
the promotion of the welfare of the
farmers, which came early under the
police power of the State. Top
achieve this purpose, the law
Page 4
 provided for the expropriation of the
agricultural lands to be distributed
among the landless peasantry.
Ponente Justice Isagani Cruz :
“ To the extent that the measures
under challenge merely prescribe
retention limits for landowners, there is
an exercise of the police power for the
regulation of private property in
accordance with the Constitution. But
where to carry out such regulation, it
becomes necessary to deprive such
owners of whatever lands they may own
in excess of the maximum area allowed,
there is definitely a taking under the
power of eminent domain for which the
payment of just compensation is
necessary.
Atty Gabriel: CARP involves two
phases, what are the two phases in
order to determine the appropriate
power being discharged by the
government in these cases?
A: 1. Imposition of retention limit. Every
landowners are only entitled to retain as
much as landholdings, if there is an
excess, the government will take the
property and;
2. Distribute it to the eligible
beneficiaries after payment of just
compensation.
Q: Given these two phases what powers
are in exercised by the government in
the first phase? Second phase?
A: First phase – Police power
Second phase – Power of Eminent
Domain
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW
Atty Gabriel: The present case shows
the simultaneous exercise of the three
inherent powers.
Q: May properties be taken in exercise
of police power?
A: Yes
Q: What kind of property can be taken in
the exercise of police power? Cannot be
taken?
A: Can be taken : confiscate properties
which are noxious and harmful
properties
Cannot be taken: Lawful properties but
they can only be regulated
Discussed in the case of City
Government of Quezon City v. Ericta
Issue: Passed Ordinance no. 6118.
Particularly Section 9 which compel the
respondents to give at least six (6)
hectares of the total area of the land to
be set aside for charity burial of resident
paupers.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that
there is no valid exercise of police
power because the said ordinance is not
a mere regulation but an outright
confiscation. It deprives a person of his
private property without due process of
law and even without just compensation.
Q: Purpose of confiscation of properties
in police power?
A: Destruction. Confiscation of such
properties which is noxious or for
Page 5
noxious purpose. In City Government of
Quezon City v. Ericta, the properties
sought to be taken is not noxious and
not intended for noxious purpose but
wholesome. Therefore it is not a proper
object to be taken in the exercise of
police power.
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
The highest and most exact idea of
property remaining in the government
that may be acquired for some public
purpose through a method in the nature
of compulsory sale to the State.
Limitation of the power:
Art. III Sec.9 “that private property shall
not be taken for public use without just
compensation.”
Given this function , the provision should
therefore be strictly interpreted
against the expropriator and liberally
in favor of the property owner.
The following may exercise the power of
expropriation:
1. Congress
2. President of the Philippines
3. Various local legislative bodies
4. Certain public corporations like
the Land Authority or the National
Housing Authority
5. Quasi- public corporations like
the Philippine National Railways,
Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Co. and Meralco
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW
Necessity of exercise
Conformably to the rule that the power
of eminent domain should be interpreted
liberally in favor of the private property
owner, the judiciary has assumed the
power to inquire into whether the
authority conferred upon such delegate
has been correctly or properly
exercised. This will involve looking into
whether the expropriation contemplated
by the delegate is necessary or wise.
City of Manila v. Chinese Community
Issue: Expropriation of the land of the
private cemetery for the conversion into
an extension of Rizal Avenue is not
necessary.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the
right of expropriation is not an inherent
power in a municipal corporation and
before it can exercise the right, some
law must exist conferring the power
upon it. Even granting that a necessity
exists for the opening of the street in
question, the record contains no proof of
the necessity of the same through the
cemetery. The record shows that
adjoining and adjacent lands have been
offered to the city free of charge.
Properties that can be expropriated:
1. Tangible
2. Intangible
3. Real
4. Personal
5. Property already devoted to
public use provided that it is done
directly by the national legislature
Page 6
 or under a specific grant of
authority to the delegate.
(City of Manila v. Chinese
Community of Manila)
6. Public utilities ( Republic v.
PLDT)
Republic v. PLDT
Facts: Bureau of Telecommunications
set up its own Government Telephone
System to enable the government
offices to call private parties acquiring
the services of PLDT. Director of the
said agency entered into a contract with
RCA, PLDT complained that the
petitioner violated the conditions under
their Private Branch Exchange. PLDT
cut all the lines. The Government now
compels the PLDT to enter into a
contract.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that
while the Republic may not compel
PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the
Republic may, in the exercise of
sovereign power of Eminent Domain
require the telephone company to permit
interconnection of the government
telephone system and that of the PLDT
as the needs of the government service
may require subject to the payment of
just compensation to be determined by
the Court.
Properties that cannot be expropriated:
1. Money – expropriation of money
would be a futile act because the
requirement for payment of just
compensation, usually also in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW
money. (only money in circulation
in the country)
2. Choses in action- personal right
not reduced into possession but
recoverable by a suit of law, a
right to receive, demand or
recover a debt, demand or
damages on a cause of action ex
contractu or for a tort or omission
of duty.
Taking
Imports a physical dispossession
of the owner, as when he is
ousted from his land or relieved
of his watch or his car and is thus
deprived of all beneficial use and
enjoyment of his property. May
include trespass without actual
eviction of the owner, material
impairment of the value of the
property or prevention of the
ordinary uses for which the
property was intended.
People v. Fajardo
Facts: Appellant- accused
convicted for violating Ordinance
7 Series of 1950 for having
constructed a building without
obtaining a permit, the said
building destroys the view of
public plaza.
Held: The Supreme Court held
that the ordinance is
unreasonable and oppressive, in
that it operates to permanently
deprive appellants of the right to
use their own and amounts to a
taking of appellants’ property
without just compensation. While
Page 7
 property may be regulated in
the interest of general welfare,
and in its pursuit, the State
may prohibit structures
offensive to the sight, the State
may not, under the guise of
police power, permanently
divest owners of the beneficial
use of their property and
practically confiscate them
solely to preserve or assure
the aesthetic appearance of the
community.
Requisites of taking in the case of
Republic v. Castellvi
Republic v. Vda. De Castellvi
Facts: Philippine Air force
entered into a lease agrrement
with the land of the respondent
that is renewable every year.
When the petitioner was about to
renew another contract,
respondent refused to continue
extending the lease.
Issue: Whether or not the taking
actually commenced on the day
the petitioner entered into the
lease agreement or on June 26,
1959, the day the petitioner filed
for a complaint of expropriation?
Held: The Supreme Court laid
down requisites of taking eminent
domain:
1. The expropriator must enter
a private property.
In the case, the first requisite
is present. When by virtue of
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW
the lease agreement of the
Republic, through the AFP,
took possession of the land of
the Castellvi.
2. The entry must be for more
than momentary period.
The second requisite is not
present. Momentary means
lasting but a moment. The
lease contract was for a
period of one year, renewable
from year to year. The entry
on the property under the
lease is temporary and
considered transitory.
Although the AFP constructed
some installations of a
permanent nature does not
alter the fact that the entry to
the land is transitory.
Intention cannot prevail
over the clear and express
terms of the lease contract.
3. The entry must be under
warrant or color of legal
authority.
Third requisite is present
because the Republic entered
the property as lessee.
4. The property must be
devoted to public use or
otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously
affected.
The fourth requisite is present
because the property was
used by the AFP.
Page 8
 5. The utilization of property
for public use must be in
such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of
the beneficial enjoyment of
the property.
The last requisite is not present
because the owner was not
ousted out of the property and
deprive of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property.
Castellvi remained as owner and
was continuously recognized as
owner by the Republic as shown
by the renewal of the lease
contract from year to year and by
the provision in the lease contract
whereby the Republic undertook
to return the property when the
lease was terminated.
The owner does not need to file
the usual claim for recovery of
just compensation with the
Commission on Audit if the
government takes over his
property and devotes it to public
use without benefit of
expropriation.
Amigable v. Cuenca
Facts: Victoria Amigable is the
registered owner of a lot in Cebu
City as shown by TCT issued in
1924. No annotation in favor of
the government of any right or
interest in the property appears at
the back of the certificate.
Without prior expropriation or
negotiated sale, the government
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW
used a portion of said lot, for the
construction of the Mango and
Gorordo avenues. It appears that
said avenue were already
existing in 1921 although they
were in bad condition and very
narrow, unlike the wide and
beautiful avenues that they are
now, and the tracing of said
roads was begun in 1924, and
the formal construction in 1925.
In 1958 Amigable’s counsel wrote
the President of the Philippines,
requesting payment of the portion
of her lot which had been
appropriated by the government.
The claim was disallowed by the
Auditor General. Hence this
petition.
Issue: May Amigable sue the
government?
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court
ruled that the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit
cannot serve as instrument for
perpetrating injustice on a citizen.
Had the government followed the
procedure indicated by the
governing law at the time, a
complaint would have been filed
by it and only upon payment of
just compensation fixed by the
judgment or after the tender to
the party entitled to have the
right to enter in and upon the
land so condemned, to
appropriate the same to the
public use defined in the
judgment.
Page 9
 ATTY. GABRIEL: Difference in
the case of PPI v. COMELEC
and Telecommunications and
Broadcast Attorneys of the
Phillipines v. COMELEC
Philippine Press Institute v.
Commision on Elections
Issue: Resolution no. 2272 is an
invalid exercise of power of
eminent domain because
commission shall procure free
print space of not less than one
half page in at least one
newspaper of general circulation
in every province or city for use
as Comelec space.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled
that to compel companies to
donate Comelec free space of
the dimensions specified in
section 2 of Resolution 2272
amounts to taking of private
personal property for public use
or purpose.
Telecommunications and
Broadcast Attorneys of the
Phillipines v. COMELEC
Issue: Validity of Sec. 92 of BP
Blg. 881 requiring radio and
television stations to give free air
time to the respondent to be used
by COMELEC hour for
broadcasting information
regarding the candidates in the
1998 elections.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled
that according to Justice
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 10
Mendoza, “ Radio and television
broadcasting companies, which
are given franchises, do not own
the airwaves and frequencies
through which they transmit
broadcast signals and images.
They are merely given the
temporary privilege of using
them. Since a franchise is a mere
privilege, the exercise of the
privilege may be reasonably be
burdened with the performance
by the grantee of some form of
public service.”
Public Use
Any use directly available to the
general public as a matter of a
right and not merely a
forbearance or accommodation.
Just Compensation
Full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from the private
owner by the expropriator. This is
intended to indemnify the owner
fully for the loss he has sustained
as a result of expropriation.
Atty. Gabriel: How to compute
for Just Compensation
1. Actual or basic value of the
property
2. If the entire property is not
expropriated,
Fair Market Value +
consequential damages –
consequential benefits
 3. If consequential benefits Held: The Supreme Court
exceed consequential ruled that the decrees on just
damages, compensation are
Just Compensation = Fair unconstitutional and void. The
Market value method of ascertaining just
 Fair market value- factors compensation under the
to be considered are the aforecited decrees constitutes
cost of acquisition, current impermissible encroachment
value of like properties, on judicial prerogatives. It
actual or potential uses, tends this Court inutile in a
and in particular case of matter which under the
lands, their size, shape or Constitution is reserved to it
location and the tax for final determination. The
declarations. determination of just
 Consequential damages – compensation in eminent
consist of injuries directly domain cases is a judicial
caused on the residue of function.
the private property taken
Republic v. Lim
by reason of expropriation.
 Consequential benefits – if Issue: Non payment of just
the remainder is as result compensation in an
of the expropriation placed expropriation proceedings
in a better location. Must does not entitle the private
be direct and particular landowners to recover
and not merely shared possession of the
with the rest of the expropriated lots.
properties in the area.
Held: The Supreme Court
Atty. Gabriel: Who can ruled that “Non payment of
determine the amount for just compensation in an
just compensation? expropriation proceedings
does not entitle the private
Export Processing Zone v.
landowners to recover
Dulay
possession of the
Issue: Whether or not P.D. expropriated lots.” does not
1533 which provides the justify the application in the
mode of determining just present case. It bears
compensation repealed Sec. stressing that the Republic
5 and 8 of Rule 67? was ordered to pay just
compensation twice. Fifty
seven (57) years have passed

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 11
 since then. We cannot but payment of just
construe the Republic’s failure compensation?
to pay just compensation as a
deliberate refusal on its part. A: Yes. Every property is
Failure to pay just reserved for the government.
compensation within five No individual can exclude the
years from the finality of the government from
judgment in the appropriating a property
expropriation proceedings, whenever the government
the owners concerned shall needs that property. Every
have the right to recover the private property is reserved
possession of the property. for public use.

Expropriation of lands Q: How is power of Eminent

consists of two stages Domain exercised?

1. Authority of the plaintiff to A: Sec. 1 of Rule 67 of the

exercise the power of revised rules of court, filing a
eminent domain and the verified petition for
propriety of its exercise in expropriation.
the context of facts Q: What is the origin of the
involved in the suit. power of eminent domain
2. Determination by the court according to the case of City
of the just compensation of Manila v. Chinese
for the property sought to Community?
be taken.
A: It originates from necessity.
(Republic v. Lim)
Q: In cases of doubt how
Q: What is eminent domain? should the courts interpret to
A: The inherent power of the take property in the exercise
state to take property for of power of eminent domain
as held in the case of City of
public use upon payment of
Manila v. Chinese
just compensation.
Community?
Q: Does this mean that all
property are reserved for the A: As held by the Supreme
Court in the City of Manila v.
government and when the
Chinese Community of
government need the
Manila, power of eminent
property, the government can
domain must be strictly
compulsory used it upon
interpreted against the

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 12
 expropriator and liberally in
favor of the property owner.
Q: When is question of
necessity is a justiciable
controversy? When is it a
political question when it is
exercised by a delegate?
A: If power of eminent domain
exercised directly by
Congress, question of
necessity is a political
question. If the power of
eminent is exercised through
a delegate, we have to
determine the character of the
delegation. If the power of
eminent domain is exercised
through a specific delegation
the question of necessity is
also a political question. If
the power of eminent domain
is being discharged through
general delegation the
question of necessity is a
justiciable question.
Q: In the case of City of
Manila v. Chinese Community
of Manila wherein the issue is
can the private land devoted
for public use be taken for
further public use?
A: The Supreme Court
answered in the affirmative. If
it is the Congress that directly
exercises the power of
eminent domain and the
delegate exercising through a
specific delegation.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 13
Q: Under sec.1 Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court, in order to
exercise its power of eminent
domain, the expropriator has
to file a verified petition for
expropriation. If the property
which is the subject of
expropriation is registered in
the name of the Republic, it
must be stated in the petition.
Impliedly the Rules of Court
allows the expropriation of a
property registered in the
name of the republic.
How is that possible?
A: when the government
needs its property, if it is
leased to a private person,
the government has to buy
out the lease contract or buy
out the lessee.
Q: Is it possible that a single
property is subject to different
interests? For example, the
land is registered in the name
of the republic is it possible
that land is subject to private
interest?
A: Yes. If the govt. needs its
property, the government
cannot use its property
because it is subject to private
interest. Expropriate the lease
contract. Buy out the lessee.
Q: What kind of private
property can be expropriated?
 A: Real, tangible, intangible,
personal
Q: Supposing there is
insufficient dollar reserves in
the country. The government
decides to expropriate its
people dollars upon payment
of just compensation. Will it
be possible?
A: Yes. Money can be taken
in the exercise of eminent
domain. “Money” as an
exception to properties which
may be expropriated
contemplates only Philiipine
currency or currency in
circulation.
Q: What type of services can
be taken compulsorily in the
power of eminent domain?
A: Only services in the nature
of public utilities. (People v.
PLDT)
Q: In People v. Fajardo, was
there any taking in the
exercise of eminent domain
using police power?
A: Yes. Only this case, there
was no payment of just
compensation.
Q: As Supreme Court held in
People v. Fajardo, that the
appellant’s position is worse
than a person who’s property
is confiscated. Why?
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 14
A: Appellant is the owner and
still possess the property but
he cannot use it and there is a
continuous burden to pay
taxes on the property he
cannot use.
Q: Does size of the property
matter in proper exercise of
the power of eminent domain?
A: No. As held in the case of
Sumulong v. Guerrero the
Supreme Court ruled that the
ruling on Guido v. Rural
Progress Administration which
held that the “test to be
applied for a valid
expropriation of private land
was the area of the land and
not the number of people who
stood to be benefited “ no
longer applies. As long as the
private property is needed by
the government for public use
it may be taken upon payment
of just compensation.
Q: Does public use in eminent
domain means that used by
the public?
A: As held in the case of
Sumulong v. Guerrero, the
housing that will be provided
is for public use. “Housing is a
basic human need. Shortage
in housing is a matter of State
concern since it directly and
significantly affects public
health, safety, the
environment and in sum
 general welfare. The public to pay and not compel to buy.
character of housing projects Price in which the seller
cannot be occupied by all but compels to sell is willing to
only those who satisfy accept.
prescribed qualifications. “
Q: Payment of just
Q: In Manosca v. Court of compensation as to real
Appeals.the petitioner property?
contends that the intended
expropriation was not for A: LGU pays 15% of the
public use and incidentally, assessed value other
the act would constitute an expropriators full assessed
application of public funds, value.
directly or indirectly in favor or *accessories follows the
support of Iglesia ni Cristo principal (Republic v. Lim)
contrary to the provision of
Section 29 (2) Art.6 of the Q: What are the requirements
Constitution. Did the Supreme for the LGUs to exercise
Court agree? power of eminent domain?

A: No. The Supreme Court A: There must be an

ruled that public use is not
confined to actual use by
public. It is measured in terms
of right of public to used
proposed facilities for which
condemnation is sought as
long as public has right of
use, whether exercised by
one or many members of
public, a public advantage or
public benefit accrues
sufficient to constitute public
use.
Q: What is fair market value
A: Fair market value is the
value or the price which a
buyer who is not compelled to
buy a property and which
price which a buyer is willing
ordinance. (Municipality of
Paranaque v. V.M. Realty
Corporation)
Held: The power of eminent
domain is lodged in the
legislative branch of the
government which may
delegate the exercise thereof
to LGUs , other public entities
and public utilities. An LGU
may therefore exercise the
power of eminent domain only
when authorized by
Congress and subject to the
latter’s control and
restraints, imposed through
the law conferring the
power in other legislations.
In this case Sec.19 of RA
7160 which delegates LGUs

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 15
 the power of eminent domain
also lays down the parameter
of its exercise.
Power of Taxation
Taxes – are the enforced proportional
contributions from persons and property,
levied by the State by virtue of its
sovereignty, for the support of
government and for all public needs.
Power of Taxation – the State is able to
demand from the members of the
society their proportionate share or
contribution in the maintenance of the
government.
 Method of raising revenues to
defray public expenses
It is an attribute of sovereignty. It is the
strongest of all the powers of the
government. (Sison v. Ancheta)
Importance of taxation
Derives from the unavoidable obligation
of the government to protect the people
and extend them benefits in the form of
public projects and services. In
exchange for these, the people are
subjected to the reciprocal duty of
sharing then expenses to be incurred
therefore through the payment by them
of taxes.
Taxes – levied to raise revenues
Licenses – imposed for regulatory
purposes only.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 16
Scope
Chief Justice Marshall of the U.S.
Supreme Court once declared :
“The power to tax includes the power
to destroy.”
Atty. Gabriel: In the dictum of Justice
Marshall, the power of taxation is used
to implement police power.
Rationale: The power to tax may
include the power to destroy if it used
validly as an implement of police power
in discouraging and in effect ultimately
prohibiting certain things or enterprises
inimical to the public welfare.
The dictum of Justice Marshall was later
refuted by Justice Holmes by saying
that “The power to tax does not
include the power to destroy as long
as this Court sits.”
Atty. Gabriel: The dictum of Justice
Holmes, the power of taxation is being
exercised purely for the purposes of
taxation (raise revenue).
Rationale: Where the power to tax is
used solely for the purpose of raising
revenues, the modern view is that it
cannot be allowed to confiscate or
destroy. If this is sought to be done, the
tax may be successfully attacked as an
inordinate and unconstitutional exercise
of the discretion that is usually vested
exclusively in the legislature in
ascertaining the amount of tax.
Limitations of power of taxation
Atty. Gabriel:
Sec. 28(1) Article 6
The rule of taxation shall be uniform
and equitable. The Congress shall
evolve a progressive system of taxation.
Atty Gabriel: In a progressive form of
taxation, the rationale is the principle of
equity. As the income increases, the tax
also increases.
In regressive taxation, the relationship
between the increase in the earning
capacity or value of the property is
inversely proportional to the tax rate. As
the value of the property becomes
higher or the income is higher the
lower the tax rate. What is the wisdom
behind the regressive taxation? The
wisdom behind this is productivity and to
encourage every taxpayer to earn more
so that they will pay less.
Due process
Taxes will not be allowed if they are
confiscatory, except where they are
intended precisely for destruction as an
instrument for police power. From the
procedural viewpoint, due process does
not require previous notice and hearing
before a law prescribing fixed or specific
taxes on certain articles may be
enacted. But where the tax to be
collected is to be based on the value of
the taxable property, the taxpayer is
entitled to be notified of the assessment
proceedings and to be heard therein on
the correct valuation to be given to the
property.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 17
Equal protection
Taxation is subject to the general
requirements of the equal protection
clause. Additionally, it is provided in the
Constitution that “the rule of taxation
shall be uniform and equitable.”
 Uniformity in Taxation
Persons or things belonging to
the same class shall be taxed at
the same rate.
Sison v. Ancheta
Issue: The petitioner herein
assails the validity of Sec. 1
Batas Pambansa Blg. 135 , an
act increasing the tax rates of
citizens
Held: The Supreme Court ruled
that the petition is without merit.
Equality and uniformity in taxation
means that all taxable articles or
kinds of property of the same
class shall be taxed at the same
rate. The taxing power has the
authority to make reasonable and
natural classifications for
purposes of taxation. As clarified
by Justice Tuason, “ Where the
differentiation complained of
conforms to the practical dictates
of justice and equity, it is not
discriminatory within the meaning
of the clause and is therefore
uniform.”
 Equality in taxation
Tax should be strictly proportional
to the relative value of the
property.
 Equitable taxation
 Taxes should be apportioned
among the people according to
their capacity to pay.
Double Taxation
According to Justice Holmes “Double
taxation is no more prohibited than
double taxation.”
Double taxation is present when
additional taxes are laid down on the
same subject by the same taxing
jurisdiction during the same taxing
period for the same purpose. It will not
be allowed if it results in violation of the
equal protection clause.
Punzalan v. Municipal Board of
Manila
Issue: Assailing the validity of
Ordinance no. 3398 of the City of
Manila provides that “imposing a
municipal occupation tax on persons
exercising various professions in the
City of Manila and penalizes non -
payment of tax.” Petitioners contend that
it will constitute double taxation on the
ground that petitioners paid their taxes
under Section 201 of the National
Internal Revenue Code and will be
forced also to pay tax under Ordinance
3398.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the
tax upon every person exercising or
pursuing in the City of Manila naturally
any one of the occupations named, but
does not say that such person must
have his office in Manila. The argument
against double taxation is untenable
where one tax is imposed by the state
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 18
and the other is imposed by the city so it
is clear that there is different taxing
authority or jurisdiction.
Public Purpose
Public purpose in taxation is now given
the broadest interpretation so as to
include even indirect public advantage
or benefit. The mere fact that the tax will
be directly enjoyed by a private
individual does not make it invalid so
long as some link to the public welfare is
established.
Pascual v. Secreatary of Public
Works
Issue: The construction of the feeder
roads were allegedly not for public
purpose an assailing Republic Act No.
920, an act appropriating funds for the
said project.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that it is
a general rule that the legislature is
without power to appropriate public
revenue for anything but for public
purpose. It is the essential character of
the direct object of the expenditure
which must determine its validity as
justifying a tax and not the magnitude of
the interests to be affected nor the
degree to which the general advantage
of the community, and thus the public
welfare may be ultimately benefited by
their promotion. Incidental advantage
to the public or to the State which
results from the promotion of private
interests and the prosperity of private
enterprises or business does not
justify their aid by the use of public
money.
Tax exemptions
1. Constitutional
The Constitutional exemption from taxes
is provided for in Article 6 section 28(3)
complimentary to the main or primary
purpose, educational. The lease of the
first floor thereof to the Northern
Marketing Corporation cannot by any
stretch of the imagination be considered
incidental to the purpose of education.

“Charitable institutions, churches and Rationale for this exemption:

parsonages or convents appurtenant Religious and charitable institutions are
thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, granted exemption because they give
and all lands, buildings, and considerable assistance to the State in
improvements actually, directly and the improvement of the morality of the
exclusively used for religious, people and the care of the indigent and
charitable or educational purposes shall the handicapped.
be exempt from taxation. The added justification in the case of
Abra Valley College v. Aquino religious institutions is the principle of
separation of Church and State and the
Issue: Whether Abra Valley College is necessity to give full rein to the freedom
used exclusively for educational of religious profession and worship.
purposes.
Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the Revenue
phrase “exclusively used of educational
purposes” as provided for in Article VI, Facts: Parish priest accepted a donation
Section 22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 of to be used for the construction of the
Philippine Constitution, reasonable Church. The money was spent for the
emphasis has always been made that purpose specified. Later the Bureau of
exemption extends to facilities which Internal Revenue imposed a donee’s tax
are incidental to and reasonably in his successor, who objected, invoking
necessary for the accomplishment of the constitutional exemption of church
the main purposes. Otherwise stated, properties from taxes.
the use of the school building or lot for Held: The Supreme Court ruled that a
commercial purposes is neither gift tax is not within the exempting
contemplated by law, nor by provisions of Articles 6 section 28(3) of
jurisprudence. The use of the second the Constitution. A gift tax is not a
floor in the case at bar for residential property tax but a n excise tax imposed
purposes of the Director and his family, on the transfer of property by way of gift
may find justification under the concept inter vivos.
of incidental use, which is

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 19
 2. Statutory
Granted in the discretion of the
legislature. However the Constitution
provides that “no law granting any tax
exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all
Members of the Congress.”
Rationale:
Tax exemptions should not be lightly
extended since they will represent
 If the tax exemption is granted
gratuitously, say in pursuance of
economic policy, it may be validly
revoked at will, with or without a
cause.
 If the exemption is granted for
valuable consideration, it is
deemed to partake of the nature
of a contract and the obligation
thereof is protected against
impairment.
Q: How is taxation exercised by the
legislature?
A: By issuing tax measures
Q: in Sumulong v. Guerrero and
Manosca v. Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court categorically ruled that it
is about time to abandon the traditionally
concept of public use in eminent
domain. In the cases, there must be
indirect or incidental public use. Do we
apply the same concept in power of
taxation? Any purpose as long as it is
indirect, incidental use to the public
constitutes public use in power of
taxation?
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 20
A: No. As held in the case of Punzalan
v. Secretary of Public Works, Incidental
advantage to the public or to the
State which results from the
promotion of private interests and
the prosperity of private enterprises
or business does not justify their aid
by the use of public money. There
must be direct public advantage.
Expanded meaning of public use in
Eminent Domain does not apply in
power of taxation.
Q: Is doubled taxation allowed?
A: No. Doubled taxation is an
administrative act; it is the imposition or
collection of the same tax twice.
Q: In Sison v. Ancheta, taxes are the
lifeblood of the government. What does
that mean?
A:
Q: How is exemption interpreted
according to Supreme Court in the case
of Sison v. Ancheta?
A: Strictly construed against the people
and liberally in favor of the exemption.
Q: Constitution provides that enacting
laws providing tax exemption must
Congress act?
A: In granting tax exemptions, the
Congress must observe more stringent
procedure. It must be passed by
majority votes of the Congress, Fifty
percent plus one, ordinary bill. The grant
of tax exemption is stricter.
Q: In the case Province of Abra v.
Fernando(not included on your case
list), the province of Abra assess the
property for real property tax.
Incidentally, the property is owned by
the Roman Catholic Church, the church
in order to contest the assessment is
showed the TCT of the said land. Is the
A: Proof of ownership alone is not
enough in order to vest exemption. It
must be proven as well that the property
is actually, directly and exclusively
used for religious or charitable and
educational purposes.
Q: Supposing that a private person
owns a property for which he usufructs
to the Roman Catholic Church to build a
house of worship in this property, can he
be exempted from tax exemption
because the said land is used for
religious purposes?
A: it is not conferred or vested on the
owner but on the property, so whoever
owns the property is entitled to the
exemption as long as the property is
actually, directly and exclusively used
for religious or charitable and
educational purposes. Ownership is
irrelevant in determining tax exemption.
Q: In the case of Philippine Lung Center
v. Court of Appeals(not included in your
case list), petitioner is incorporated as a
charitable institution, loses its character
because it engages in business
transactions. 60% only used as
charitable for non paying patients while
40% occupied by paying patients .It also
leases out to some private practitioners.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 21
It engages in proprietary activities aside
from charitable activities.
A: Charitable institutions and Religious
institutions are not exempted to income
tax. Only Educational institutions ( non
stock nonprofit) are exempt from income
tax.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
Origin of the due process
Magna Carta
“No man shall be taken or imprisoned or
disseized or outlawed , or in any manner
destroyed; nor shall we go upon him,
nor send upon him, but by the lawful
judgment of his peers or by the law of
the land.”
King Edward III’s Statute 28
“ No man, of what state or condition
whoever he be, shall be put out of his
lands, or tenements, nor taken, nor
imprisoned, nor indicted, nor put to
death without he be brought in answer
by due process of law.
Evolution of Due Process
Darthmouth College Case, Daniel
Webster was to declare that the law of
the land meant “The general law, a law
which hears before it condemns
which proceeds upon inquiry and
renders judgment only after trial.
Dual aspect of the due process
1. Substantive Due Process
 Requires the intrinsic validity of the
law in interfering with the rights of
the person to his life, liberty and
property.
Atty. Gabriel: in determining the
intrinsic validity of the law, we have
to assess all the elements of the
valid exercise of the three inherent
powers.
Police power: If it is discharge in PP,
determine if there’s a lawful means
or lawful subject
Power of eminent domain: necessity
or there is a private property, public
use, just compensation
Power of taxation: uniform, equitable
and progressive
Violation in the intrinsic validity of the
law would result in violation of due
process and ultimately the
declaration of its unconstitutionality.
Rationale:
The inquiry in this regard is not
whether or not the law is being
enforced in accordance with the
prescribed manner but whether or
not, to begin with, it is a proper
exercise of legislative power. The
law must have a valid governmental
objective; the interests of the general
public as distinguished from those of
particular class require the
intervention of the State. It must be
also pursued in a lawful manner.
Ichong v. Hernandez
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 22
Issue: Petitioners sought the
annulment of R.A. 1180 for its
implementation would deprive them
of their liberty and property without
due process of law.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that
the law in question is deemed
absolutely necessary to bring about
the desired legislative objective that
is to free the national economy from
alien control and dominance. It is not
necessarily unreasonable because it
affects private rights and privileges.
The test of reasonableness of a law
is the appropriateness or adequacy
under all circumstances of the
means adopted to carry out its
purpose into effect. The due process
of law clause is not violated because
the law is prospective in operation
and recognizes the privilege of aliens
already engaged in the occupation
and reasonably protects their
privileges.
Atty. Gabriel: let’s apply it in
criminal law, cause: violating the law
effect: imprisonment, applying that in
a cause and effect principle in due
process, what is the consequence or
effect in violating due process?
A: If it is violated, the law will be
declared null and void.
2. Procedural Due Process
The essence of procedural due
process is expressed in the immortal
cry of Themistocles to Eurybiades,
“Strike but hear me first!”
 Supreme Court has held that “the
twin requirements of notice and
hearing constitute the essential
elements of due process and neither
of these elements can be eliminated
without running afoul of the
constitutional guaranty.
Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate
Court
Issue: The penalty is invalid because
it is imposed without according the
owner a right to be heard before a
competent and impartial court as
guaranteed by due process.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that
the minimum requirements of due
process are notice and hearing and
may not be dispensed with because
they are intended as safeguard
against official arbitrariness. The law
which hears before it condemns and
which proceeds upon inquiry and
renders judgment only after trial.
Atty. Gabriel: What will be the effect
in the law if the procedural due
process is violated?
A: Only invalidating the proceedings
violating that right.
Aniag v. Commision on Elections
Issue: Petitioner was indicted without
being impleaded as a party
respondent in the preliminary
investigation. Consequently making
him a respondent in the criminal
information would violate his
constitutional right to due process.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 23
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that
the manner by which COMELEC
proceeded against the petitioner was
counter to the due process clause of
the Constitution. The facts show that
the petitioner was not among those
charged by the PNP in violation of
the Omnibus Election Code. Nor he
was subjected by the city prosecutor
to a preliminary investigation for
such offense. The non disclosure by
the city prosecutor to the petitioner
that he was a respondent in the
preliminary investigation is violative
of due process which requires that
the procedure established by law
should be obeyed.
(1)Judicial Due Process
1. There must be an impartial court
or tribunal clothed with judicial
power to hear and determine the
matter before it.
Due process is intended to
insure that confidence by
requiring compliance with what
Justice Frankfurter calls the
rudiments of fair play. Fair play
calls for equal justice. (sic)
(Javier v. Commission on
Elections)
As to the ponencia of Justice
Isagani Cruz in the case Ynot v. IAC
“The closed mind has no place in an
open society. It is part of the sporting
idea of fair play to hear the other
side before an opinion is formed or a
decision is made by those who sit I
judgment. “(sic)
 2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully executive agreement, law,
acquired over the person of the presidential decree,
defendant and over the property proclamation, order,
which is the subject matter of the instruction, ordinance, or
proceeding. regulation is in question.
2) All cases involving the legality
a. In personam jurisdiction over of any tax, impost
the defendant is acquired by assessment, or toll, or any
the court by his voluntary penalty imposed in relation
appearance or through thereto.
service of summons upon 3) All criminal cases which the
him. penalty is reclusion perpetua
b. In rem or quasi in rem or higher
jurisdiction of the court is 4) All cases in which the
derived from the power it may jurisdiction of any lower court
exercise over the property. is in issue
Jurisdiction over the person is 5) All cases in which only an
not essential; provided the error or question of law is
relief granted by the court is involved
limited to such as can be
enforced against the property Exceptions
itself. a) Nuisances
A nuisance per se is
3. The defendant must be given an objectionable under any and
opportunity to be heard. all circumstances because it
presents an immediate
The right to appeal is not danger to the welfare of the
essential to the right to a hearing. community. This kind of
Except when granted by the nuisance may be abated
Constitution, appeal may be summarily, that is, without the
allowed or denied by the necessity of judicial
legislature in its discretion. authorization.
But as long as the law allows him A nuisance per accidens is
to appeal, denial of that remedy objectionable only under
is denial of due process. As some but not all
stated in Article VIII Sec. 5(2) of circumstances, there being
the Constitution, to wit: situations when it is perfectly
1) All cases in which the legitimate and acceptable.
constitutionality or validity of b) Presumptions
any treaty, international or

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 24
 Would a statutory
presumption deny the right to
a hearing insofar as the
person affected is precluded
from introducing evidence to
rebut the presumption? The
accepted view is that it would
not, provided that there is a
rational or natural connection
between the fact proved and
the fact ultimately presumed
from such fact.
Atty. Gabriel: Presumption is
allowed if it is based on 1.
Human experience 2.Causal
connection established 3.
Fact presumed there from
4. Judgment must be rendered
upon lawful hearing.
Article VIII, Section 14, of the
Constitution provides that “no
decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it is based.”
(2) Administrative Due Process
The requisites of procedural due
process are the following:
The right to a hearing, which includes
the right to present one’s case and
submit evidence in support thereof
1) The tribunal must consider the
evidence presented.
2) The decision must have
something to support itself.
3) The evidence must be substantial
4) The decision must be rendered
on the evidence presented at the
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 25
hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the
parties affected.
5) The tribunal or body or any of its
judges must act on its own
independent consideration of the
law and the facts of the
controversy and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate
in arriving to a decision.
6) The board or body should, in all
controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that
the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issues involved,
and the reason for the decision
rendered.
Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer
v. Torres
Issue: PHILPHOS contends that
they were denied of due process
when respondent Mediator
Arbiter granted the amended
petition of respondent PMPI
without according to PHILPHOS
a new opportunity to be heard.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled
that the essence of due process
is simply an opportunity to be
heard or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one’s side
or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. Wherein in
the instant case, petitioner
PHILPHOS agreed to file its
position paper with the Mediator
Arbiter and to consider the case
submitted for decision on the
 basis of the position papers filed
by the parties, there was
sufficient compliance with the
requirement of due process as
petitioner was afforded
reasonable opportunity to present
its side.
Meaning of Due Process
The constitutional safeguard of due
process is briefly worded thus:
“No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty and property without due process
of law.”
In the case of due process law, there
was no attempt made to spell out its
meaning or to define the concept with
some degree of exactitude. According to
Delegate Jose P. Laurel, “a precise
definition of due process might prove
constricting and prevent the judiciary
from adjusting it to the circumstances of
particular cases and the ever- changing
conditions of the society.”
Due process therefore continues to be
dynamic and resilient, adaptable to
every situation calling for its application.
The very elasticity of the provision
makes this possible and thus enlarges
the rights of the individual to his life,
liberty and property.
According to Justice Fernando,
Due process is merely responsiveness
to the supremacy of the reason,
obedience to the dictates of justice.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 26
According to Justice Frankfurter,
Due process is nothing more and
nothing less than the embodiment of the
sporting idea of fair play.
Due process is a guaranty against any
arbitrariness on the part of the
government, whether committed by the
legislature, the executive, or the
judiciary.
Person
Due process clause protects all
persons, natural as well as artificial.
1. Natural persons include both
citizen and alien.
2. Artificial persons like
corporations and partnerships are
also covered by the protection
but only insofar as their property
is concerned.
Rationale for the narrower scope:
Life and the liberty of artificial person
as a creature of law, are derived
from therefore subject to the control
of the legislature.
Deprivation
To deprive is to take away forcibly, to
prevent from possessing, enjoying or
using something. Deprivation
connotes denial of the right of life,
liberty or property.
Deprivation per se is not necessarily
unconstitutional. What is prohibited
is the deprivation of life, liberty or
 property without due process of
law.
Life
Life connotes in the due process
clause as the integrity of the physical
person. It is not permissible for the
government to deprive the individual
of any part of his body, and this is
true even if it be a punishment for a
crime.
Liberty
According to Mabini, liberty “is the
freedom to do the right and never
wrong.”
Liberty, as guaranteed under the due
process clause, is not unbridled license;
it is liberty regulated by law. A person is
free to act but he may exercise his rights
only in such manner as not to injure the
rights of others. The individual, as a
creature of the society, should be
prepared to surrender part of his
freedom for the benefit of the
greater.(Salus populi est suprema lex)
Property
Anything that can come under the right
of ownership and be the subject of
contract. This will include real, personal,
tangible and intangible that are within
the commerce of man, like lands,
jewelry, automobiles, buildings,
goodwill, inheritance, intellectual
creations, future earnings, works of art,
animals, mortgages, insurance
proceeds.
One cannot have a vested right to a
public office, as this is not regarded as
property. If created by statute, it may be
abolished by the legislature at any time,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 27
even if the term of the incumbent therein
has not yet expired. The salary attached
to it may be reduced or even withdrawn
without violation of due process.
Exception:
If the salary is already earned, in which
case it cannot be reduced or withdrawn
by a retroactive law as the said salary
has already accrued as a property right.
Q: What is due process?
Atty. Gabriel: According to Justice
Fernando, Due process is merely
responsiveness to the supremacy of the
reason, obedience to the dictates of
justice.
Q: Note that due process was not
defined in sufficient specificity right? Is
there any constitutional provision which
specifically defines due process?
A: None
Q: Under the Constitution, the meaning
of due process remains vague and
comprehensive and an indefinite
concept. In the 1934 Constitutional
convention, it was suggested that due
process shall be defined but the
suggestion was rejected by Delegate
Jose P. Laurel, why maintain such
vagueness?
A: Flexibility remains the best virtue of
this constitutional principle. The
Supreme Court said in Ynot v. IAC that
if due process is specifically defined will
result to a legal strait jacket which would
deprive the courts from the elbow room
they may need to vary the meaning of
the clause whenever indicated.
Atty. Gabriel: The Constitution does not
define due process neither the courts
can give the definition of due process.
Q: Prior to this modern day due process
concept, we have an equivalent concept
in Magna Carta, what is their concept of
due process particularly the clause 39 of
the Magna Carta?
A: law of the land
Q: In the Darthmouth College Case,
how is law of the land defined?
A: The general law, a law which hears
before it condemns, which proceeds
upon inquiry and renders judgment only
after trial.
Q: In the Ynot v. IAC case, The
Supreme Court crystallized the concept
of due process in five words
A: “Strike but hear me first!” battle cry of
Themistocles to Eurybiades
Q: There are minimum requirements of
due process and these are?
A: Notice and hearing
Q: Is it mandatory that whenever the
government issues governmental act is
it must undergo notice and hearing
before it can deprive a person on his
life, liberty and property?
A: Yes
Q: In administrative proceedings, is it
also required to follow the twin
requisites of due process?
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 28
A: No. If it is quasi judicial there must be
notice and hearing.
Atty. Gabriel
In Philcomsat v. Alcuaz
Issue: Assailing the validity of the order
of respondent to provisionally decrease
the charge by the petitioner.
Maceda v. Energy Regulatory Board
Prior to the deregulation of the oil
industry, the usufruct is the agency
energy regulatory board, the objective of
this agency is to regulate oil prices. This
ERB, is granted by its charter to fix the
rates of oil prices. The contested order
is that to provisionally increase all the
price in petroleum products because of
the increase in oil prices in the middle
east. This order was issued by ERB
without the use of notice and hearing.
In Philcomsat, the Supreme Court said
that the order of the NTC to decrease
the rate is unconstitutional because the
petitioner was not afforded with the
notice and hearing. In Maceda v. ERB
the Supreme Court ruled that the order
is valid. What’s the difference?
A: In the case of Philcomsat, the order
in question which was issued by
respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains
all the attributes of a quasi judicial
adjudication. Foremost is the fact that
said order pertains exclusively to
petitioner and to no other. Further it is
premised on a finding of fact although
patently superficial, that there is merit in
reduction of some rates charged based
on initial evaluation of petitioner’s
financial statements without affording
the petitioner the benefit of an
explanation as to what particular aspect
or aspects of the financial statements
warranted a corresponding reduction.
No rationalizations was offered nor were
the attending contingencies if any
discussed which prompted respondents
to impose as much as 15% rate
reduction.
RULING IN MACEDA V. ERB
(exercising quasi legislative power)
order applied to all
Q: When do we say that administrative
bodies are in discharge as quasi
judicial? Quasi legislative?
A: Quasi legislative
As held in the case of Vigan light Co.
INC. v. Public Service Commission
“When such rules and / or rates are
meant to apply to all enterprises of a
given kind throughout the Philippines.”
Quasi Judicial
As held in the case of The Central Bank
of the Philippines v. Cloribel et.al.
“Where a public administrative body
acts in a judicial or quasi judicial matter
and its act are particular and immediate
rather than general and prospective, the
person whose rights or property may be
affected by the action is entitled to
notice and hearing. “
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 29
Atty. Gabriel: It is quasi judicial, if it
requires establishment of facts,
application of law based on facts
established and it is only applicable to
the respondents and not to everyone. If
it does not require establishment of facts
and applies to all without discrimination
then we can say that it is in concept of
quasi legislative.
Note: Criminal due process was not
included in the book of Cruz, but
Atty. Gabriel discussed it so here. 
As held in the case of Alonte v.
Savellano, Supreme Court enumerated
therein due process in criminal
proceedings:
1. The court or tribunal trying the
case is properly clothed with
judicial power to hear and
determine the matter before it.
Q: How do courts acquire
jurisdiction to the subject matter
of the controversy?
A: as stated in Sec.2 Article 8 of
the Constitution
“The Congress shall have the
power to define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts but may not
deprive the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5 hereof.”
Therefore, it is conferred by
law. It is the law that confer the
jurisdiction of the courts
2. That jurisdiction is lawfully
acquired by it over person of the
accused.
Q: How?
A: By voluntary surrender of the
accused and to arrest
3. That the accused is given an
opportunity to be heard.
Atty. Gabriel: In Allonte v. Savellano,
the petitioner contends that he’s right to
due process was violated particularly
right to a hearing was unduly deprived
by the trial court.In the case, it was
originally tried in Laguna but because
one of the accused is a local
government officer the prosecution
moved the transfer of trial. The Supreme
Court granted the petition and was
transferred in Manila. Before the RTC of
Manila commenced, the victim executed
an affidavit of desistance and it is a
sworn statement coming from the other
party stating that she is no longer
interested in pursuing the case. The first
thing the trial court did is to determine
the voluntariness in execution of the
affidavit. So during the hearing the
prosecution presented the party and the
public prosecutor in Laguna. After the
presentation of the evidence, the court
asked the accused through his counsel,
“Do you have intent to present
evidence?” the accused through his
counsel said “No your honor, I’m not
going to present any evidence and we
will submit the issue for resolution
without any evidence in our part. “ That
was the manifestation of the accused.
The Court said “ You do not want to
present evidence, so be it will just
decide on the matter” the Court
rendered a decision based on the
evidence at hand, the court rendered
the judgment of conviction. The accused
cried foul. The court said that your right
to present evidence is waived. Is the
right waived?
A: The Supreme Court ruled that the
standard of waiver requires that it must
not only be voluntary, but must be
knowing, intelligent and done with
sufficient awareness of the relevant
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 30
circumstances and likely consequences.
Mere silence of the holder of the right
should not be construed as a waiver
of right, and the courts must indulge
every reasonable presumption
against waiver. In the present case,
As to that matter of the affidavit of
desistance, the accused voluntarily
waived his right in evidence. As to
the matter of his guilt or culpability
as to the crime charged, the waiver of
one stage of the trial does not
necessarily mean a waiver of all the
rights pertaining to the other specs
of the stages in the trial. Waiver of
the defense in presenting evidence
on the issue of voluntary desistance
it should not be taken also as a
waiver of the right to present
evidence to prove their innocence.
Atty. Gabriel: What is the purpose of
trial court in holding a hearing? Why did
the trial court hold a hearing in Allonte v.
Savellano?
A: to determine the due execution of the
affidavit of desistance. Purpose of the
hearing is not to establish the culpability,
guilt or innocence of the accused. The
purpose of the hearing is to only
determine the voluntariness and due
execution of the affidavit of desistance.
As to that matter of the affidavit of
desistance, the accused voluntarily
waived his right in evidence. As to the
matter of his guilt or culpability as to
the crime charged, the waiver of one
stage of the trial does not necessarily
mean a waiver of all the rights pertaining
to the other specs of the stages in the
trial. Waiver of the defense in presenting
evidence on the issue of voluntary
desistance it should not be taken also
as a waiver of the right to present
evidence to prove their innocence.
4. Judgment is rendered only upon
lawful hearing.
Q: What are th Cardinal primary rights
in as mentioned in Ang Tibay v. CIR
1. Right to a hearing
2. The tribunal must consider the
evidence presented.
3. The decision must be supported
by evidence.
4. The evidence must be
substantial.
Substantial evidence – is more
than a mere scintilla. It means
such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support conclusion.
Hierarchy of evidence
 Proof beyond
reasonable doubt – does
not require absolute
certainty hence it requires
moral certainty
 According to the case
Government of U.S v.
Ulalia , Clear and
convincing evidence
 Preponderance of
evidence – the Court will
weigh which of the two
opposing sides presented
the greater evidence.
 Substantial evidence
5. The decision must be rendered
on the evidence presented at the
hearing or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the
parties affected.
6. The court or any of its judges,
therefore must act on its or his
own independent consideration of
the law and facts of the
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 31
controversy and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate
in arriving at a decision.
7. The court should, in all
controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that
the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issues involved
and the reasons for the decision
rendered.
Ateneo De Manila v. Capulong
Issue: Whether or not the students can
still be re admitted. Their right to due
process were violated because they
were not allowed to cross examine the
resource persons.
Q: cross examination essential?
A: the right to confrontation is not part of
due process in school administrative
proceedings. Right may be invoked only
is to demand for the presentation of the
evidence held against them. Right to
rebut but not cross examine.
Requirements of due process in
school administrative
proceedings
1. Right to answer the charges
against them with the assistance
of a counsel
Q: With the assistance of
counsel?
A: If so desired. Optional not
mandatory. Not unlike in
custodial investigation when a
presence of a counsel is
indispensable.
2. Students must be informed of the
nature and cause of accusation
against them. (must be informed
in writing)
3. Right to adduce evidence.
 4. Evidence must be duly
considered by the investigating
committee or official designated
by the school authorities to hear
and decide the case.
5. Informed of the evidence.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
It is embraced in the concept of due
process, as every unfair discrimination
offends the requirements of justice and
fair play. If the particular act assailed
partakes of an unwarranted partiality or
prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it
down is the equal protection clause.
Purpose of the intentional ambiguity
of the definition of the equal
protection clause:
To provide for more adjustability to the
swiftly moving facts of our changing
society.
Definition
Equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed.
Similar subjects should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to
some injustly discriminate against
others.
Equal protection clause is the basic
individual right sheltered by Constitution
as a restraint on all the three grand
departments of the government and on
the subordinate instrumentalities and
subdivision thereof, and on many
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 32
constitutional powers, like the three
inherent powers.
As held by the U.S. Supreme Court,
“Even if the law be fair and impartial on
its face, it will still violate the equal
protection clause if it is administered
with an evil eye and an uneven hand
so as to unjustly benefit some and
prejudice others.”
People v. Vera
Issue: Assailing the validity of Act. No.
4221. It was contended that it is violative
of the equal protection clause for the
reason that it is not uniform throughout
the islands and because Sec.11 of the
said act endows the provincial boards
with the power to make said law
effective or otherwise in their respective
provinces.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that on
the hypothesis, every person coming
with the purview of the Probation Act
would be entitled to avail of the benefits
of the act. Neither there will be any
resulting injury if no province, though its
provincial board should appropriate any
amount for the salary of the probation
officer and also if we accept the
contention that for the purposes of the
Probation Act, the City of Manila should
be considered as province and that the
municipal board of said city has not
made any appropriation for the salary of
a probation officer. These different
situations suggested show indeed that
while inequality may result in the
application of the law and in conferment
of the benefits therein provided,
inequality is not, in all cases is the
necessary result. Whatever may be the
case, it is clear that Sec.11 of the
Probation Act creates a situation in
which discrimination and inequality
are permitted or allowed. We are of
opinion that Sec.11 of Act 4221
permits of the denial of equal
protection of the law and are on that
account, bad. We see no difference
between a law which denies equal
protection and a law which permits
its denial. A law may appear to be fair
on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet if it permits of unjust
and illegal discrimination, it is within
the constitutional prohibition.
Persons protected
The equal protection clause is available
to all persons, natural as well as
juridical. Artificial persons however,
are entitled to the protection only insofar
as their property is concerned.
Classification
The equal protection clause does not
require for equality among all persons if
they are not similarly situated. What the
Constitution requires is equality among
equals.
Accordingly, the legislature is allowed to
classify the subjects of legislation. If the
classification is reasonable, the law may
operate only on some and not all of the
people without violating equal protection
clause.
Classification is defined as grouping of
persons or things similar to each other
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 33
in certain particulars and different from
all others in these same particulars.
Classification in law as in other
departments of knowledge or practice is
the groupings of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars.( Biraogo
v. Philippine Truth Commission)
Atty. Gabriel: The similarity in their
group is their bases to the difference in
other group.
Q: Not all classifications are allowed by
the constitution. What are classification
that is allowed?
A: Only classification which is
reasonable is allowed.
(1) Requirements of a reasonable
classification
a. It must be based upon
substantial distinctions.
Superficial differences do not
make for valid classification. The
distinction to be valid must be
substantial.
Atty. Gabriel: Is a nationality a
substantial distinction? What is
the reason of Supreme Court in
the case of Ichong v. Hernandez
in sustaining the classification?
A: The alien resident owes
allegiance to the country of his
birth or his country; his stay here
is for personal convenience; he is
attracted by the lure of gain and
 profit. His aim or purpose of stay,
we admit is neither illegitimate
nor immoral, but he is naturally
lacking the spirit of loyalty and
enthusiasm for this country where
he temporarily stays and makes
his living, or of that spirit of
regard, sympathy and
consideration for his Filipino
customers as would prevent him
from taking advantage of their
weakness and exploiting them.
There is no doubt the
classification of Filipino nationals
as one group and the foreign
nationals as another group is
based on substantial distinction
under the Retail Trade
Nationalization Law.
Atty. Gabriel: Under the Retail
Trade Nationalization Law, all
foreign nationals are disqualified
in engaging in retail trade except
the Americans. So as to single
out Americans and allow them to
engage in retail trade, I do not
think that it is a substantial
distinction because it unduly
favors a certain group. Retail
Trade Nationalization law is
unconstitutional because it gives
undue advantage to the
American nationals over the
foreign nationals and it
discriminates other foreigner.
Basis of the classification of
distinction? Have you heard the
disparity agreement?
Amendment in the 1935
constitution.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 34
Disparity agreement : American
nationals are given the same
right as any other Filipino citizen
in the administration or
exploitation of natural resources
and engaging in trade.
So which means that American
citizens as provided by the
Constitution is in the same
footing as to other Filipino citizen.
On that basis there is substantial
distinction.
Q: How about sex? How do we
classify persons according to
sex?
Atty. Gabriel: Male or Female.
Not good, better or best. :P
A:
Philippine Association of
Service Exporters v.
Drilon(also passed
reasonableness test)
Held: The Supreme Court ruled
that as a matter of judicial notice,
the Court is well aware of the
unhappy plight that has befallen
our female labor force abroad
especially domestic servants,
amid exploitative working
conditions marked by, in not few
cases, physical and personal
abuse. The sordid fates of
maltreatment suffered by migrant
Filipina workers, even rape and
various forms of torture,
confirmed by testimonies of
returning workers are compelling
 motives for urgent government
action. There is no evidence that
except perhaps for isolated
instances, our men abroad have
been afflicted with an identical
predicament.
Atty. Gabriel: The Supreme Court
presented a data regarding on
the status of the abuses
committed in the Filipina OFWs
who are domestic helpers and
there is a difference between DH
and other professionals. There is
no data to support that the same
happens to male OFWs. The
Supreme Court said that to allow
the banning on deployment of
female OFWs is based on
substantial distinction because
there is a data that supports it.
Q: How about age?
A: Dumlao v. COMELEC
Issue: assailing the validity of
Sec. 4 Batas Pambansa Blg.52
as discriminatory and contrary to
equal protection and due process
as guaranteed by the
Constitution. Sec. 4 provides that
“ Any elective provincial, city or
municipal official who has
received payment of the
retirement benefits to which he is
entitled under the law and who
shall have been 65 years of age
at the commencement of the term
of office to which he seeks to be
elected, shall not be qualified to
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 35
run for the same local office
from which he has retired.”
Held: The Supreme Court ruled
that the assertion that Section 4
BP Blg. 52 is contrary to
safeguard of equal protection is
neither well taken. The
constitutional guarantee of equal
protection of the laws is subject
to rational classification. If the
groupings are based on
reasonable and real
differentiations, one class can be
treated and regulated differently
from another class. For
purposes of public service,
employees 65 years of age
have been validly classified
differently from the younger
employees. Employees
attaining that age are subject
to compulsory retirement while
those of younger ages are not
so compulsory retirable. In the
present case, there is reason
to disqualify him from running
for the same office from which
he had retired as provided for
in the challenged provision.
The need for new blood
assumes relevance. The
tiredness of the retiree for the
government work is present
and what is emphatically
significant is that the retired
employee has already declared
himself tired and unavailable
for the government work, but
by virtue of change of mind, he
would like to assume again. It
 is for this very reason that
inequality will neither result from
the application of the challenged
provision. Just as that provision
does not deny equal protection
neither does it permit of such
denial.
Atty. Gabriel: So we have
learned from Ichong v.
Hernandez when the SC
sustained the validity of
classification according to
nationality, in Philippine
Association of Service
Exporters v. Drilon classification
according to gender and Dumlao
v. COMELEC according to age
and also in one case People v.
Cayat regarding the law which
prohibits non Christians to be
exposed to alcoholic drinks, SC
sustained the validity based on
the stage of education and
cultural minority groups. Can we
say that whenever classifications
in future cause based on these
differences, these four cases will
now serve as judicial precedence
under the doctrine of stare
decisis? So whenever a law
distinguishes a person according
to gender we can say that it is
substantial distinction because of
Philippine Association of
Service Exporters v. Drilon and
as to age Dumlao v. COMELEC
, as to nationality Ichong v.
Hernandez ,and as to stage of
education and cultural minorities
People v. Cayat?
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 36
Atty. Gabriel: Let’s take the case
of International School Alliance
of Educators v. Quisumbing,
this is a case involving professors
in international school. So in the
policy of the school, foreign hired
are paid higher than local hired.
So which means they classified
professors according to their
nationality and it depends on
nationality and it is based on
substantial distinction applying
Ichong v. Hernandez. In the
present case sustained the
classification?
Held: No. the classifications we
have mentioned earlier apply only
on the factual circumstances of
those cases. They cannot be
considered as a judicial
precedence under the doctrine of
stare decisis.
Atty. Gabriel: The Supreme
Court laid down the standard in
determining th valid classification
in Philippine Association of
Service Exporters v. Drilon
quoting Justice Fernando, how
did the Supreme Court determine
the valid classification?
A: Where the classifications is
based on distinctions that make a
real difference as infancy, sex,
stage of civilization of minority
groups, the better rule, it would
seem, is to recognize its validity
only if the young, the women,
and the cultural minorities are
singled out for favorable
 treatment. But if
classification is based
distinction aimed for prejudicial
purpose then it would be
declared unconstitutional. Let’s
compare the case of Philippine
Association of Service
Exporters v. Drilon and
International School Alliance of
Educators v. Quisumbing, in
the former case, the singling out
of female OFWs are aimed to
protect them while in the latter
case, it is prejudicial. The Filiipino
nationals are singled out for
prejudicial treatment that is not
allowed in the equal protection
clause.
b. It must be germane to the
purposes of the law.
Atty. Gabriel: What do you
mean by being germane to
the purpose of the law?
A: It means that the distinction
is in harmony or germane to
what is sought to be achieved.
c. It must not be limited to
existing conditions only.
Classification must be
enforced not only for the
present but as long as the
problem sought to be
corrected continues to exist.
People v. Cayat (also
passed reasonableness
test)
Issue: Assailing the validity of
Act no. 1639 sec. 2 ,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 37
the prohibiting non Christian
on tribes from drinking foreign
liquor on the ground that their
low degree of culture and
unfamiliarity with this kind of
drink rendered them more
susceptible to its effects as
compared to their more
civilized countrymen who
were less affected by it.
Held: The Supreme Court
ruled that the duration is not
limited in its application to
conditions existing at the time
of its enactment because it is
intended to apply for all times
as long those conditions exist.
Atty. Gabriel: We have
learned in your Constitutional
Law 1 that the courts of
justice are passive agencies.
They cannot exercise their
granted powers unless there
is a case. Particularly in
constitutional issues are not
likewise entertain any petition
or resort to judicial
intervention unless four
requisites of constitutional
questions are present. a)
there must be an actual case
of controversy b) there must
be a locus standi c) raised at
the earliest possible
opportunity and lastly
d)constitutional issue is the
lis mota of the controversy. An
actual case of controversy
involves a right granted by law
a remedy for the redress of
 that right. There must be a
right violated in order that may
be considered an actual case
the courts of justice cannot
entertain hypothetical issues.
Do we apply this principle in
equal protection case? That
the courts of justice cannot
entertain issue involving equal
protection unless there is an
actual or direct injury, injury
based on a hypothetical facts
cannot be entertained by the
courts of justice?
Arisa: Yes
Atty. Gabriel: It applies as
well? So which means that in
the case of People v. Vera,
when the probation law is
assailed as unconstitutional is
the law applied differently in
the provinces in the
Philippines at that time? Can
there be a province that
appropriated a salary to the
probation officer at that time?
A: No. there is none. The
probation law does not apply
to all provinces to the
Philippines. In the same
manner in Ormoc Sugar Co.
Inc. v. Treasurer of Ormoc
City, when that local
ordinance being contested
there are no other entities
engaged in the production of
centrifugal sugar. To say that
in the future, another entity
will engage in the production
of centrifugal sugar is based
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 38
on assumption. In the same
manner in People v. Vera, to
say that one province may
appropriate and the others
would not, and that also be
based on assumption. So
basically the courts of justice
will not entertain the
constitutional issue because
there is no actual case or
controversy. Do we apply the
principle in equal protection
cases?
Atty. Gabriel’s answer: No.
as to the existence of actual
case or controversy it is not
applicable insofar
constitutional issues involving
equal protection clause. If the
law is constitutional only but
not when the factual
circumstances changed, that
may be considered as a
classification which is not
reasonable.
d. It must apply equally to all
members of the class.
Ichong v. Hernandez
(passed the reasonableness
test)
Issue: Assailing the validity of
Retail Trade Nationalization
Act
Held: The Supreme Court
ruled that The alien resident
owes allegiance to the country
of his birth or his country; his
stay here is for personal
convenience; he is attracted
 by the lure of gain and profit. present, who may be
His aim or purpose of stay, we indictable.
admit is neither illegitimate Held: The Supreme Court
nor immoral, but he is ruled that the equal protection
naturally lacking the spirit of of the laws clause of the
loyalty and enthusiasm for this constitution allows
country where he temporarily classification. Classification in
stays and makes his living, or law as in other departments of
of that spirit of regard, knowledge or practice is the
sympathy and consideration groupings of things in
for his Filipino customers as speculation or practice
would prevent him from taking because they agree with one
advantage of their weakness another in certain particulars.
and exploiting them. The A law is not invalid because of
faster he makes his pile, the simple inequality; the very
earlier the alien can go back idea of classification is that of
to his beloved country and his inequality, so that it goes
beloved kin and countrymen. without saying that the mere
The experience of the country fact of inequality in no manner
is that the alien retailer has determines the matter of
shown such utter disregard for constitutionality. The
his customers and the people reasonableness test must be
on whom he makes his profit satisfied. Applying the factual
that is found necessary to circumstances or precepts of
adopt the legislation, radical the case, E.O. no. 1 must be
as it may seem. struck down as it is
Biraogo v. The Philippine violative of the equal
Truth Commisission protection clause. The clear
Issue: Executive order no. 1 mandate of the envisioned
creating the PTC is truth commission is to
unconstitutional because it investigate and find out the
violates the equal protection truth concerning the
clause as it selectively targets reported cases of graft and
for investigation and corruption during the
prosecution of officials and previous administration
personnel of the previous ONLY. The intent to single
administration as if corruption out the previous
is their peculiar species even administration is plain,
as it excludes those of other patent and manifest. In this
administrations, past and regard it must be borne in

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 39
 mind that the Arroyo its abuses is deliberate?
Administration is but just a Meaning intentional?
member of a class, that is, a A: only applies if the
class of past deficiency is based on
administrations. It is not a inadvertence. In E.O.no.1’s
class of its own. Not to failure because it is deliberate
include other past therefore underinclusiveness
administrations similarly shall not be applied to the
situated constitutes deficiencies of the law.
arbitrariness which the Q: we have learned in
equal protection cannot Biraogo v. PTC that all the
sanction. Such members of the class shall be
discriminating treated alike. No be sub class
differentiation clearly in a class, can we say that a
reverberates to label the civil service personnel can be
commission as a vehicle for considered as one class and
vindictiveness and selective therefore there must be no
retribution. sub classification within that
Atty. Gabriel: In the case the class. Laws must apply
respondent contends that the equally to all civil service
failure of E.O. no. 1 to correct personnel. If a law is enacted
all the abuses of the previous which imposes indefinite
administrations does not preventive suspensions to
render the law PNP who are civil service
unconstitutional personnel then it is
underinclusiveness. The discriminatory?
principle of A: No. in the case of
underinclusiveness, if the law Himagan v. People
does not correct the evil Issue: Petitioner contends that
sought to be suppressed, that he is covered by civil service
does not mean that the law is law particularly Sec. 42 of
unconstitutional. It may be a P.D. 807 of the Civil Service
bad look, it may not be an decree which limits the
ideal law but it is not maximum periods of the
unconstitutional. Should we suspension to ninety days . he
apply that principle? claims that an imposition of
When does this principle preventive suspension of over
applicable? Is it applicable If 90 days is contrary to the Civil
the failure of the law to correct Service Law and would be a
violation of his constitutional

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 40
 right to equal protection
clause.
Held: The Supreme Court
ruled that members of PNP
shall be considered as one
class apart from other civil
service personnel for the
reason that The reason why
members of the PNP are
treated differently from the
other classes of persons
charged criminally or
administratively insofar as the
application of the rule on
preventive suspension is
concerned is that policemen
carry weapons and the badge
of the law which can be used
to harass or intimidate
witnesses against them, as
succinctly brought out in the
legislative discussions. If a
suspended policeman
criminally charged with a
serious offense is reinstated
to his post while his case is
pending, his victim and the
witnesses against him are
obviously exposed to constant
threat and thus easily cowed
to silence by the mere fact
that the accused is in uniform
and armed. The imposition of
preventive suspension for
over 90 days under Section
47 of
R.A. 6975 does not violate the
suspended policeman's
constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 41
Atty. Gabriel: Can we also
say that a public officers can
be considered a s one class
and therefore laws must be
applied equally to these
officers without regard to their
assumption of office?
Whether elective or appointive
the same look the same
treatment shall be applied to
all officers? In the case of
Quinto v. COMELEC the
petitioner is contending that
the Omnibus Election code is
unconstitutional on the ground
that it treats elective and
appointive officers differently.
Under the code, the filing of a
certificate of candidacy by an
appointive officer produces
the effect of resignation but
not on elective officers. The
petitioner contends that it is
unconstitutional because it
treats differently on the
assumption of office. Did the
Supreme Court agree? No.
The purpose according to
Supreme Court making the
classification is to prevent the
public officers in partisan
political campaigns as it is
prohibited in Sec.2(4) Article 9
of the Constitution that “No
member of a Constitutional
Commission shall, during
his tenure, hold any other
office or employment. (sic).
The purpose of the code is to
 prevent the appointive officers
to violate the constitutional
prohibition in engaging
political partisan campaigns.
Can we also apply that
principle as to elective
purpose?
Atty. Gabriel: Elective
officers cannot be prohibited
to engage in political partisan
activities because it is in their
nature. They are always in
partisan political activities. On
that regard in classification of
public officers in a manner of
public office is based on
substantial distinctions.
Q: In general, what does
equal protection mean?
A: Persons or things similarly
situated must be treated alike
both as to the rights conferred
and liabilities imposed. Equal
Protection requires equality
among equals.
Q: Does equal protection of
the law require that all
persons and things must be
treated alike or universal
equality?
A: The equal protection
clause does not require
absolute equality but legal
equity.
Q: Both the due process and
equal protection of the law are
effective tools in curtailing
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 42
abuses by the government.
But of course specific remedy
that is or available depending
on the infraction or the nature
of the abuses committed by
the government. When can
we say that the particular
abuse by the government the
due process is available?
When can we apply equal
protection on the other hand?
A: Arbitrariness in general
may be challenged through
the due process clause.
When the particular act being
assailed partakes unjust or
illegal discrimination the
sharper weapon to cut it down
is the equal protection
clause.
Q: Is there a difference
between a law that
discriminates and a law that
allows discrimination? Insofar
as the application of the equal
protection clause, do courts
differ in applying this
constitutional principle as to
the law that discriminates and
a law that only allows
discrimination. Definitely a law
that unduly discriminates
violates the equal protection
clause, How about a law that
is not discriminatory but it
allows discrimination? Does it
also violate the equal
protection clause?
A: This is the issue in the
case of People v. Vera the
 particular part of the Probation
law being assailed is not
discriminatory, there’s nothing
discriminatory about it
because that provision only
allows a province to benefit
from the probation law if it
appropriates the salary of a
probation officer? Definitely
there is nothing discriminatory
about that provision. But the
law only says “ A province
which appropriates fund for
the salary of a probation
officer shall benefit from this
law.” So definitely there is
nothing discriminatory about
that. Does it violate the equal
protection clause?
A: Yes. A law may appear to
be fair on its face and
impartial in appearance, yet
if applied with uneven eye
and unequal hand so as to
make unjust
discriminations between
persons in similar
situations material in their
rights, the violation of
substantial justice is
deemed prohibited by the
constitution. As the Supreme
Court held at the case of
People v. Vera, there is no
difference in between a law
that discriminates and a law
that allows discrimination.
Q: Generally the equal
protection clause is invoked if
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 43
a law makes a distinction. It is
invoke if a law is not applied
equally to all. If a law treats
one group different from
another, equal protection
clause is available. May the
equal protection clause be
invoked if the law applies
equally to all? It might sound
ironic right? Can a law be
declared unconstitutional
because it violates the equal
protection clause on the
ground that it applies equally
to all?
Atty. Gabriel : In the case of
Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai
Pao Ho (not included in the
case list) regarding that
employment fee of P50. That
employment fee is imposed
on both aliens. Regardless of
their social standing,
regardless of their nature of
their employment whether
regular or probationary, P50 is
the fixed fee regardless of
their financial condition. The
law applies to all aliens.
A: It violates the equal
protection clause because the
P50.00 fee is unreasonable
not only because it is
excessive but because it fails
to consider valid substantial
differences in situation among
individual aliens who are
required to pay it. Although
the equal protection clause of
the Constitution does not
 forbid classification, it is
imperative that the
classification should be based
on real and substantial
differences having a be searched and the persons or
reasonable relation to the
subject of the particular
legislation. The same
amount of P50.00 is being
collected from every
employed alien whether he is
casual or permanent, part
time or full time or whether he
is a lowly employee or a
highly paid executive.
Atty. Gabriel: To treat all
persons in the same way
would be violative of the equal
protection clause because
equal protection only applies
equally to those who are
equally situated or similarly
situated.
Searches and Seizures
Article III Sec.2 of the Constitution
provides that:
“The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, thing, houses,
papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 44
after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to
things to be seized.”
Scope of protection
The right against unreasonable
searches and seizures and to the
privacy of communication and
correspondence are available to all
persons, including aliens whether
accused of a crime or not. Artificial
persons are also entitled to that
guaranty, although they may be required
to open their books of accounts for
examination by the State in the exercise
of the police power or the power of
taxation. As a rule, their premises
may not be searched nor may their
papers and effects seized except by
virtue of a valid warrant.
The right against unreasonable
searches and seizures is personal and
may be invoked only by the person
entitled to it.
The right to be left alone extends not
only to the privacy of one’s home but
also to his office or business
establishment, including the papers and
effects that may be found there.
Stonehill v. Diokno
Issue: Petitioners herein contest the
validity legality of 42 search warrants
issued against them by the respondent
judges. The subject of offenses, stolen,
embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the
offense or used or intended to be used
as the means of committing the offense
in violation of Central Bank laws, Tariff
and Customs laws, Internal Revenue
Code and Revised Penal Code. The
documents, papers and things seized
under the alleged authority of the
warrants in question may be split in two
major groups;
1. Those found and seized in the
offices of the aforementioned
corporations.
2. Those found and seized in the
residences of petitioner herein.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that
as to the first group of evidences,
we hold that petitioners herein have
no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants
and of the seizures made in
pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have
their respective personalities,
separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners,
regardless of the amount of shares
of stock or of the interest of each of
them in said corporations, and
whatever the offices they hold
therein may be. Indeed, it is well
settled that the legality of a seizure
can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired
thereby, and that the objection to
an unlawful search and seizure is
purely personal and cannot be
availed of by third parties.
Consequently, petitioners herein
may not validly object to the use in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 45
evidence against them of the
documents, papers and things
seized from the offices and premises
of the corporations adverted to
above, since the right to object to the
admission of said papers in evidence
belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized
effects belong, and may not be
invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their
individual capacity.
As to the second group of
evidences, two points must be
stressed in connection with this
constitutional mandate
1) that no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said provision
2) that the warrant shall particularly
describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has
been complied with in the
contested warrants. Indeed, the
same were issued upon
applications stating that the
natural and juridical persons
therein named had committed a
"violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code." In other words, no
specific offense had been alleged
in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to
the offense committed were
abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges
 who issued the warrants to have
found the existence of probable
cause, for the same presupposes
the introduction of competent
proof that the party against whom
it is sought has performed.
Requisites of a valid warrant
1. It must be based upon
probable cause.
Probable Cause referring to
such facts and circumstance
antecedent to the issuance of
the warrant that in themselves
are sufficient to induce a
cautious man to rely on them
and act in pursuance thereof.
Facts or circumstances which
would lead a reasonable,
discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has
been committed and that the
object sought in connection
with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched.
(People v. Malmstedt)
According to Justice Escolin,
Probable cause , facts and
circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been
committed and that the object
sought in connection with the
offense are in the place
sought to be searched.
Requirement of probable
cause: The warrant must refer
to only one specific offense,
thus in Stonehill v. Diokno,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 46
warrants are issued upon
applications alleging a
violation of Central Bank
laws, Tariff and Customs
laws, Internal Revenue
Code and Revised Penal
Code. The Supreme Court
ruled that no specific offense
had been alleged in said
applications. The averments
thereof with respect to the
offense committed were
abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges
who issued warrants to have
found probable cause.
2. The probable cause must be
determined personally by the
judge.
According to Collector of
Customs v. Villaluz, this
power is derived by the judge
directly from the self
executing provisions of Art.3
sec.2 of the Constitution and
therefore may not be limited
much less withdrawn by
legislature.
In Soliven v. Makasiar
The addition of the word
"personally" after the word
"determined" and the deletion
of the grant of authority by the
1973 Constitution to issue
warrants to "other responsible
officers as may be authorized
by law", has apparently
convinced petitioner Beltran
that the Constitution now
requires the judge to
 personally examine the
complainant and his
witnesses in the determination
of probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest.
This is not an accurate
interpretation.
What the Constitution
underscores is the exclusive
and personal responsibility of
the issuing judge to satisfy
himself the existence of
probable cause. In satisfying
himself of the existence of
probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of
arrest, the judge is not
required to personally
examine the complainant and
his witnesses.
Following the established
doctrine and procedure, he
shall:(1) personally evaluate
the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the
fiscal regarding the existence
of probable cause and, on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant
of arrest; or (2) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the
fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid
him in arriving at a conclusion
as to the existence of
probable cause.
In Ho v. People the Supreme
Court distinguished between
the objectives of the
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 47
prosecutor and the judge in
determining the existence of
probable cause.
Prosecutor – determines
whether is a reasonable
ground to believe that the
accused is guilty and should
be held for trial.
Judge – determines if a
warrant of arrest should be
issued to place the accused in
immediate custody so as not
to frustrate the ends of justice.
Judges should not rely on the
recommendations alone of the
prosecutor but must independently
arrive at his own conclusions based
not only on the report of the
prosecutor but also on the relevant
documents. Administrative
authorities – warrants of arrest may be
issued only for the purpose of carrying
out final finding of a violation of a law,
like an order of deportation or an order
of contempt, and not for the sole
purpose of investigation or prosecution.
As held in the case of Morano v. Vivo,
The Supreme Court ruled that Section 1
(3), Article III of the Constitution, we
perceive, does not require judicial
intervention in the execution of a final
order of deportation issued in
accordance with law. The constitutional
limitation contemplates an order of
arrest in the exercise of judicial power
as a step preliminary or incidental to
prosecution or proceedings for a given
offense or administrative action, not as a
measure indispensable to carry out a
valid decision by a competent official,
such as a legal order of deportation,
issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration, in pursuance of a valid
legislation. It has also been held that the
requirement of probable cause is, strictly
speaking, not applicable in
deportation proceedings, which are
not criminal in nature. The order of
deportation is purely administrative,
its purpose being not punishment but
the return to his country of the alien
who has violated the conditions for
his admission to the local state.
In Salazar v. Achacoso,
Issue: Validity of the power of the
Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of
arrest and seizure under Art. 38 of
Labor Code
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the
Sec. of Labor not being a judge may no
longer issue search or arrest warrants.
Hence, the authorities must go to
judicial process. To that extent, we
declare that Art.38 par. C of the Labor
Code is unconstitutional and has no
force and effect. It is only a judge who
may issue warrants of arrest.
3. The determination must be
made after examination under
oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the
witnesses he may produce.
4. According to Rule 126, Sec.4
of the Rules of Court,the
judge , before issuing the
search warrant, must
“personally examine in the
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 48
form of searching questions
and answers, in writing and
under oath the complainant
and any witnesses he may
produce on facts personally
known to them, an attach to
the record their sworn
statements together with
any affidavits submitted.”
The same requirement
applies in preliminary
examination to be conducted
for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest.
In Alvarez v. Court of First
Instance, Inasmuch as the
affidavit of the agent in this case
was insufficient because his
knowledge of the facts was not
personal but merely hearsay, it is
the duty of the judge to require
the affidavit of one or more
witnesses for the purpose of
determining the existence of
probable cause to warrant the
issuance of the search warrant.
When the affidavit of the
applicant or complainant
contains sufficient facts within
his personal and direct
knowledge, it is sufficient if the
judge is satisfied that there
exists probable cause; when the
applicant's knowledge of the
facts is mere hearsay, the
affidavit of one or more
witnesses having a personal
knowledge of the facts is
necessary. We conclude,
therefore, that the warrant issued
is likewise illegal because it was
based only on the affidavit of the
 agent who had no personal
knowledge of the facts.
In Mata v. Bayona it was held
that mere affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses
were not enough to sustain the
issuance of search warrant. The
judge must take depositions in
writing and attach them to the
record as these are necessary to
enable the court to determine the
existence of probable cause.
Deposition – is the testimony of
a witness, put or taken in writing
under oath or affirmation before
a commissioner, examiner or
other judicial officer in answer to
interlocutory and usually
subscribed by witness.
5. It must particularly describe
the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be
seized.
The Constitution requires that
the place to be searched or
the persons or things to be
seized be described with such
particularity as to enable the
person serving the warrant to
identify them. Failure of this
requirement may result in
erroneous or worse, arbitrary
enforcement of warrant.
If the warrant issued is without
a name or name in blank
such that it can be enforced to
any person is void. Thus a
warrant issued aginst John
Doe, whose other true name
is to your complainanrt
unknown, was held as
insufficient and illegal.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 49
Exception: But while John
Doe is generally held invalid,
it will satisfy the constitutional
requirement if there is some
description personae that will
enable the officer to identify
the accused.
As to the nature of articles
to be seized, their description
must be rather general
Alvarez v. CFI – search an
seizure is valid because there
is no other more adequate
and detailed description could
have been give ( violated a
particular law)
Stonehill v. Diokno –
annulled the warrants against
the accused, who had been
charged with violation of
various law in general
Properties subject seizure
1) Property subject of the
offense
2) Property stolen or
embezzled and other
proceeds or fruits of the
offense
3) Property used or intended
to be used as the means
of committing an offense
4) Search and seizure is
made only for fishing
evidence – invalid
But the S&S of a man’s
private papers to be used in
evidence for the purpose of
convicting him of a crime is
totally different from the S&S
 of stolen goods, dutiable
articles on which the duties
have not been paid, and the
like, which rightfully belong to
the custody of the law.
Admissibility of illegally
seized evidence
Articles illegally seized are not
admissible pursuant to
doctrine originally announced
in Stonehill v. Diokno. The
rule has been constitutionally
affirmed in Art.3 sec 3(2)
which provides that such
evidence shall be
inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding” Such
evidence is the fruit of the
poisonous tree.
This reverses the non
exclusionary rule in Moncado
v. People’s Court to the
effect that evidence illegally
seized is still admissible as
long as it is not excluded by
the Rules of Court on the
theory that the criminal
should not be allowed to go
free merely because
constable has blundered.
Exclusionary rule – only
practical means of enforcing
the constitutional injunction
against abuse. This approach
is based on the justification
made by Judge Learned
Hand that “only in case the
prosecution which itself
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 50
controls the seizing
officials, know that it cannot
profit by their wrong, will
the wrong be repressed.
Chief Justice Concepcion
stated further:
“Indeed the non exclusionary
rule is contrary, not only to the
letter, but also, to the spirit of
the constitutional injunction
against unreasonable
searches and seizures. To be
sure, if the applicant for a
search warrant has competent
evidence to establish
probable cause of the
commission of the crime by
the party against whom the
warrant is intended, then
there is no reason why the
applicant should not comply
with the requirement of the
fundamental law. Upon the
other hand, if he has no such
competent evidence, then it is
not possible for the Judge to
find that there is probable
cause, and hence no
justification for the issuance of
the warrant. The only possible
explanation for its issuance is
the necessity of fishing
evidence of the commission of
a crime. But then the fishing
expedition is indicative of the
absence of evidence to
establish probable cause.
Although the properties may
be illegally seized in violation
 of the said provision, it does
not follow that its owner shall
be entitled to recover it
immediately. If the said
property is the subject of
litigation, like a prosecution for
illegal possession of firearms,
it would remain in custodia
legis until the case is
terminated.
Sec.3(2) may be used in
judicial or administrative
action that may be filed
against the officer responsible
for its illegal seizure.
It has also been held that
where the accused did not
raise the issue of the
admissibility of the evidence
against him on the ground
that it had been illegally
seized, such omission
constituted a waiver of
protection granted by this
section, and the illegally
seized evidence could then be
admitted against him. Such
objection shall be made
before arraignment.
Warrantless searches and
seizures
Under the Rules of Court, a
peace officer or even a private
person may, without warrant,
arrest a person
1. When such person has in
just committed, is actually
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 51
committing or is attempting
to commit an offense in his
presence.
2. When an offense has in
fact just been committed
and he has personal
knowledge of facts
indicating that the person
to be arrested has
committed it.
3. When the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal
establishment or place
where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is
pending or has escaped
while being transferred
from one confinement to
another.
When an arrest is effected
by virtue of a valid warrant
or under any of the above
circumstances, a search
warrant may be made as
an incident to lawful
arrest. Individual being
arrested maybe be frisked
fro concealed weapons
that may be used against
the arresting officer and all
unlawful articles found in
his person or within his
immediate control may be
seized.
In Espano v. Court of Appeals the
marijuana seized under the house of the
accused after his arrest on the street
was held inadmissible evidence
because it was unlawfully obtained. (not
within his immediate control)
Reason: in Terry v. Ohio an officer is
justified in believing that the individual
whose suspicious behavior he is
investigating at close may conduct a
limited protective search for concealed
weapons. (1) the general interest of
effective crime prevention and
detection, which underlies the
recognition that a police officer may,
under appropriate circumstances and
in an appropriate manner, approach a
person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even
without probable cause; and (2) the
more pressing interest of safety and
self-preservation which permit the
police officer to take steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he
deals is not armed with a deadly
weapon that could unexpectedly and
fatally be used against the police
officer.
Warrantless S&S are limited to
1) When the right is
voluntarily waived
2) When there is a valid
stop and frisk.
People v. Malacat
In the instant petition, the trial court
validated the warrantless search as a
"stop and frisk" with "the seizure of
the grenade from the accused [as] an
appropriate incident to his arrest,"
hence necessitating a brief discussion
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 52
on the nature of these exceptions to
the warrant requirement. At the
outset, we note that the trial court
confused the concepts of a "stop-and-
frisk" and of a search incidental to a
lawful arrest. These two types of
warrantless searches differ in terms of
the requisite quantum of proof before
they may be validly effected and in
their allowable scope. In a search
incidental to a lawful arrest, as the
precedent arrest determines the
validity of the incidental search, the
legality of the arrest is questioned in a
large majority of these cases, e.g.,
whether an arrest was merely used as
a pretext for conducting a search. In
this instance, the law requires that
there first be a lawful arrest before a
search can be made — the process
cannot be reversed. At bottom,
assuming a valid arrest, the arresting
officer may search the person of the
arrestee and the area within which the
latter may reach for a weapon or for
evidence to destroy, and seize any
money or property found which was
used in the commission of the crime,
or the fruit of the crime, or that which
may be used as evidence, or which
might furnish the arrestee with the
means of escaping or committing
violence. Here, there could have been
no valid in flagrante delicto or hot
pursuit arrest preceding the search in
light of the lack of personal knowledge
on the part of Yu, the arresting officer,
or an overt physical act, on the part of
petitioner, indicating that a crime had
just been committed, was being
committed or was going to be
committed. Having thus shown the
invalidity of the warrantless arrest in
this case, plainly, the search
conducted on petitioner could not
have been one incidental to a lawful
arrest.

3) When the search and

seizure is incidental
to lawful arrest.
See People v. Sucro
and Posadas v.
People
4) Search of vessel and
craft
See People v.
Aminudin
5) Search of moving
vehicle
6) Inspection of
buildings and other
premises for the
enforcement of
sanitary and building
regulations
7) Where prohibited
articles are in plain
view
Please see Unilab v.
Isip
8) S&S under exigent
and emergency
circumstances.

See the case of Valmonte v. De villa ,

establishment of checkpoints
Umil v. Ramos- Continuing crimes, no
need for a warrant of arrest and search
warrant.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF AILA NICKO V. SANTELICES SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW Page 53