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REPORTON READINGS

FOR: Dr. Money

BY: PatrickMcEvoy-Halston
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 Historiansfor this week's readingusecourtrecordsnot simply asa sourcefor

exploring communitylife, but alsoto countertwo possibleeffectsofusing conduct

manualsasa source:a conclusionthat the socialworld ofthe conductmanualrepresented

collectively sharedsocialnorms;andasa corollary to acceptinga shared,benevolent,

conceptionof advicemanualprescriptionsassocietalnorms1 the possibility that using

conductmanualsas a sourcemay inculcatea readiness,in the historian,to imaginea one

betweenthe conceptionof the socialworld offeredby conduct

to one correspondence
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ha ,-!o./al book writers andthe mental,andbehavioralworld oftheir intendedaudience,which

assumesa passivesubject,andthus doesnot le,ndtowardsan explorationof the natureof

the 'teception" of thesenorms- e.g. werethey ignored?;did they wen reachtheir

audience? My termsaremodem,the conceptionsappearsociological,but these

historiansarenot simply "showingup" the ungroundedconclusionsof sociologically

mindedhistorians,but alsooonceptionsof shmedculture(not 'sub' - cultures)nurtured

by early modemthinkerslike Hume (andlater, especially,Burke). The overall ')

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impressionwe get4! the individual is certiinly akin t6 HobbesandLocke's self moving

f. "atoms", but by characterizingearlymodemEnglandasa patriarchy,authoritybecomes

rll ittegitimatepower,andthusthe '!ubliC' concernfor anarchicpotentialof atomistic
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societVhanslatesinto a privatewish for the historian: At last,the repressedareshaking

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losettreir shackles! So if eventhe local courtbecomesa playhouse,if self-promotion
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I still do not look to Mandeville andconsiderthe possibility that he may havegot people
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 2

that when you get a charactenzationof public behavior and public motivation that seems

to match that depicted by concernedcontemporariesthat there isn't some dissonancewith

the simple, stereotypedcorollary of a conceptionof a society as apatiarchy - that the

repressedare moral agents. I believe, glveo certain amount of empathyby the mother in

your early years,that a person can be entirely "good", so I appreciateany theory that can

at least conceive of people in this w&y, but when a historian as fine as Laura Gowing can

look to court records to burst conceptionsof gossip as part of a benevolent sharedsub-

culture, so that gossip becomesmerely the weapon used in the inspired personal affempt

to hurt anotherperson, yet still leavespatriarchy standing in a simple, stereotlped

construction, there is reasonto think we need a shift out of presenthistoriography. An

accumulation of counter-evidenceis supposedto produce this, right? But the

historiographical evidencewe get of community life from court records, suggestthat if

we can overlook conflicting evidenceto maintain conceptualmodels we like, this may be

an old problem that still has modern legs.

Simple conceptualmodels are what looking to court records are supposedto implode.

Alexandra Shepardbegins her article on manhood and credit by citing a passageby

advice manual writers Dod and Cleaver "exhorting" a clear-cut division of labour

between the sexes. Her concernis to show that the portrayals of women in advice

manuals do not match their own experiencesin life. She writes that the "links between

masculinity and economic autonomy has been assumedrather than tested, and risks being

renderednormative as much by genderhistorians as by early modern experience"(77).

So she usesthe court records as a test, to seewhat effect the "independent variable"

conduct manual nonns had on its intended audience. She discoversthat although women
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at times claim no worth in termsof cedit, at othersthey quantiff their own value,and

evenascribeto thernselveshonourfor'their marketactivities. The mentalworld ofthe

advicemanuals,with their cleardelineationof the world of financeto men, was out of

syncwith the behavioralworld of community,family life wherework, finance,and

certainly consumerpurchasing,was a family affair with little cleardelineationof activity

accordingto gender. Shewrites: "for the majority of marriedm€n andwomen,the

maintenanceand survival of their householdwastheir predominant,and - most .q I

importantly - their mutual, concern,which requiredadaptabilityandthe bestpossibleuse
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of resourcesratherthan adherenceto a pakiarchalblueprint" (95). So marriedwom*
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claimedworth in termsof credit - thusrejectingconductmanualnorms- because jrt
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"ordinary socialpractice" (95) ditreredfrom prescriptivediscourse. " "
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The conclusionthat ordinarysocialpracticediffered from prescriptivediscourse ' *-
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wouldn't have surprisedthe "prescribers" - advice manual writers - this was likely the

primary reasonthat they wrote their advice- but what would is Shepard'sconclusion that

the only way advice manuals would have any influence, is if their was a match between

their conceptualworld and the world as it existed in everyday experience;thereby she

appearsto limit any conceptualizationof their social role to being no more than that of an

"echo". Sheparddoes not explore why many of thesewives describedthemselvesin a

way thatfit with the prescribedroles - despitethe incompatibility with this role and their

everyday life experiencs. Were they prescribedto? Did they internalizethe conduct book

nonns as a kind of an ideal, even if they didn't neatly match their own activities? These

are questionsthat never come up - obviously, thesewomen must have been canny enough

to mouth the appropriatewords in the appropriatecontexts. Hindle suggestsin his

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 4

exploration of the public shaming of Margaret Knowsley that self-presentationwas

linked to self- preservation.Knowsley knew enough,even though female modesty may

not have been a matter of everyday experience,to know that it was expectedin court. So

court depositions,including hers, required playing roles. To have any real chanceof

avoiding a public punishment, it was crucial for Knowsley to presentherself as virtuous -

defined as behaving in accordanceto the kind of norms coming out of advice manuals.

As even appearingin court, making accusationseven in self-defense,was problematically

assertive,she makes sure that she gives a public recognition of this in her deposition,
o'suchrigorous opposition".
explaining her reluctant need to do so as a consequenceof

In Knowsley's case,the carefulmolding of her self-presentationin court is best

charactenzedas a matter of self -preservation- as a member of an illiterate, marginalized

sub-group, the odds were stackedagainsther. However, Hindle also explores how

Knowsley aimed to use the court not simply for self-defense,but also as a potential forum

)d'humiliate StephenJerome. Added to the mix here then, is the use of conduct book
,/
-/ noffns assertivelyby women. So the answerto why many women describedthemselves

according to conduct manual nonns can, perhaps,be found in the exact way in which

they did so - which becomes,for thesehistorians,becausethey could be used as a means

of self-assertion.

Garthine Walker agreeswith Shepard'scontention that advice manual nonns did not

match everyday reality, and sharesShepard'sconcernthat this hasn't been recognized

within historiography. The concern, again,is with the consequencesof constructing

historyout of advicemanualprescriptionsandhefiemedy6is the world openedup with

the use of court records. She aims to refute the oppositional definition of gendered
 5

hasitself frequentlyled to the

honour. Shewrites:" thepotencyof this discourse

selectionof sourcesin which sexualconductandreputationarecentralissues,andin

which sexualconstructionof femaledishonourareimmediatelyvisible" (235). Oneof

tS llot'
her conclusions from the court record$ 'fuhen women emphasized their household
I
position in refuting sexual dishonour, they did not do so merely as a means of ascribing

innocenceto themselves. . . [t] hey also laid claim to an honourability which was defined

by what women did rather than what was done to them " (239; emphasismine). So

although they did considerably more than prescriptive norms allowed, women promoted

themselvesfor the work they did that did correspond:daily labour in the household.

Women were using the ideology of separatespheresfor puqposesof self-empowerment.

Laura Gowing notes that " underneathstraightforward models of women's

responsibilities in householdpresentedby the advice writers were considerableanxieties

about the powers this gave women" (97). She offers examplesfrom court records of

women taking pains to point out that when they hurled insults, they did so from their own

house's doorsteps.And, accordingto BernardCapp,women were also able to use

's
prescriptive norms of men morality as an effective weapon to "seize the imitative;

turning the tableson [men] who had wronged [them]" (99). He adds:"[t]he exploitation

of male sexual reputation should perhapsbe addedto arson and witchcraft among the

weaponsof the weak, in the 'infrapolitics' of subordinategroups" (99).

As much as thesehistorians are concernedto show that court records demonstratethat

role boundaries,conceptionsof public and private, were constantly crossedby both

gendersin everyday life, they prefer to keep the border between elite, and subordinate

cultures, firm and intact (There is irony here: the "elite" were supposedlywriting these
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advicemanualsout of a fearthat this borderwasbecominginoeasingly perrneable).If

thete were similaritiesbetween"elite" and'llebeian" cultures,it would seernlegitimate

to talk abouta generalpublic, anda "shared"culture. But conceivingof early modem

Englandasa patriarchy,any kind of conceptionofa cultureasshared,suggestspassive

I f u"""pt^"e or ignoranceof the consciousattemptby elite malesby their femaletargetsof

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,. making useof advicemanualnormsfor their own purposes,andmakeclearthat these
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womenknew they were dealingwith an idiom that was a potentiallyoppressive"other",
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E 4 The exceptioncomesfrom Gowing's work. Gowingusescourtrecordsasher source

as well, but the "simple" constructionsof historiography that shebusts, are not only those

by historians constructing models from their use of advice manuals,but also those from

someof thesehistorianswho use court records. For example,Gowing believesthat the

use of gossip should not be conceived as part of the subordinategroup oral culture with

collective, constructive, functions. Instead,gossip is a meansfor an individual woman to

humiliate anotherwoman. Shemaintains that there were rituals used by women, because

men had other outlets, but what is missing is the usual corollary that women, therefore,

"shared", their own common sub-culture. Instead,Gowing talks about women using the

'whore' in every sort of local and personal

"broad and powerful possibilities of the word

conflict. They called other women whores as one weapon in disputesabout money,

goods,or territory' (109). Shewrites: "It was women, most of all, who hunted out

whores and called for their punishment"(101). Gowing doesexplain "thatthe culture

and legal practice of early modern society containedfew avenuesfor condemning male
 sexualmisconduct,andinsteadsomewomentumedto public confrontationsandthreats,

directing the blameconvenientlyoutsidetheir marriageson to otherwomen" (103),but

sheis, I believe,the only onewho errphasizes- whetheror not part ofinsulting another

womanwasto eet at her husband- that confrontationsbetweenwomenwere often

oppositional.

Her work is interestingbecauseher orientationis different from the otherhistorians-

, <n'
'l- '
e ( her focus is on the "individual" womanandnot the "collective worten" - and,as an
qffi-f
apparent soareherconclusions:
corollary, andmorepersonal
fiomtracing"a deeper
,,o/ t
\ , pr4-" l massof meanings.. . from which defamersspoke[including] the mannerof their speecll
-pt\
andtheir intentions[you discoverthat g] ossipcanhaveconsiderablesocialpower,but its

\n opr force is shapedby theway individualsuseit"(l19); which wasto: "developa goodtale:

, lr/-
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rw
.tk malice andhumourweremore importantthanreprimand"(l2l). So althoughshe
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fidd* recogrrizesa patriarchicaldivision in power,which offered differenl andoften
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imbalancedavenuesandstrategiesfor the utilization ofpower, shedoesnot then expand

this into a collective,sharedexperience,of exploitation. Her focusis on the individual,

andthe motivesthat madeher move - preciselythe concemof contemporariesconcemed

with the "atoms" in an "atomic" society. At leastin this respect,when GarthineWalker

the
writes, in responseto an "oppositionalmodel of honour [which] rmderestimates

extentto which women'shonourwaspublic, collective,. . . andconnected"(245)thereis

at leasta concqltualizationofa public - ratherthan simply self- orientationthat was

similar to what advicemanualwriters werehopingto inculcate.

Gowing's work suggeststhat what you take from exploringcourtrecordsmight differ

dependingon the degreeto which you areinterestedin exploring"the deeperandmore

 8

personalmassof meanings". For example,if your focus is on the degreeto which advice

manual nonns coffespondedwith everyday life as lived, as Shepardis, the dissonance

you discover might lead to you to assumecertain motivations that you imaglne

coffespond to dealing with an "other". Or, if the world as lived is one of marginalization,

this too leads to certain assumptionsabout the motivations of those marginalized.

However, if your focus is on the world as experiencedrather that the world of experience,

it is not enoughto show that people crossedgenderborders to prove that people did not

think of themselvesin a stereotlpical fashion. You cannot assumedissonance. The same

is true of being marginalized: you would not simply assumethe experiential world of

thosemarginalized. For example,in Hindle's article, we have an exampleof a

pt€d felt angerasresultof her

marginalizedwomanthat Hindle is willing to saV
'recovery of
marginahzation. He notes the "increasing concernwith the

experience"(393)in modern historiography,but also that "experience[becomes]

comprehensibleonly in the context of 'power networks and public life"' (394). Unlike

Gowing, Hindle rsprimarily interestedin o'sharedassumptionsof society''; where society

here is "subaltern culture, the dissident politics of subordinategroups"(394). He notes,

but passesover, Gowing's conceptionof gossip,in preferenceof a concernfor "gossip as

a stapleof women's lives, [as a]studyof womens' concernsand values, [as a]keyto the

female subculture"(393). So as much as he is clearly interestedin Margaret Knowsley,

her private motives seembest understoodthrough her public role as a member of a

marginalized subgroup.

What happensif you do not imagine an individual's experienceby quickly leaping to

the outer context of political placement,and insteadprobe deeperand deeperinto an

 9

individual's mental world? The answeris that you end up needing to consider the larger

political context so that Gowing's humiliations, Dodd's accountof women's false

accusationsby women of men fathering children, ffe actions in responseto an oppressive

environment, so that you do not understandthem as internally generatedas part of their

nature. As I understandit. the historian must decide whether to assumea Lockean sense

of human nature or a Kantian one. If you hold a Kantian view of human nafure, you are

not as likely to be interestedin the sensual,or oppressive,world of nature, or the way the

world really was, but insteadthe way that individuals cognitively understoodand shaped

their environment. And from this viewpoint, the aspectof Hindle's article that deserves

consideration,is his noting that "gossip" became"scandal" only though the gradual

assimilation of trivia to existing cultural stereotypes. He says: "[t]he story was retold in
'truth' of what was already
ways that were plausible, that traded registerswith the

'known' or suspected"(401). But if you acceptthat peoplein communitiesactively

transformed what was into what they wanted to be true, then trivia, or the complicated,

unique, non codified world as it ,s, may have little to do with how their world was

perceived, i.e. you simply can't go to the court records, show how everyday life did not

match conduct book prescriptions, and then infer experience. And, as well,

demonstratingthe unequal mechanismsof patriarchy, as Hindle does,is not enoughto

say anything conclusive about the "experience of authority in early modern

England"(391): including, possibly, assumingthat the experienceof authority as felt as

oppressive(did the "shaming of Margaret Knowsley'' shameMargaret Knowsley?). If

people thought in terms of stereotypes,and this was the "construction" of the world that

conduct books offered, then perhapsconduct books were written in an easily digestible
 l0

way - maybe they bridged pretty well the chasmbetween oral and written culture, or

suggestthat this chasmwas more easily crossedthan we might assume.

Gowing, in fact, suggestsan eagernesson the part of people in the community not to

resist conductbook norrns,but to enhancethem. Shementionsthat "images of

whoredom that were promulgated in popular and prescriptive literature proved a useful

sourcefor somepowerful insults"(l14). That: "[m]ore than the absorptionof

contemporarymoral teaching, sexual slandertestifies to a use of the ideas and targets that

popular, elite, and ecclesiasticalculture set up" (114). And shemeans,at least partially,

that when "[i]nsults played on the ideas of honour presentedin contemporary oral and

printed culture, but did not entirely reproducethem" (114) that, at the community level,

the notion, that some conduct book writers ascribedto, that both genderswere

responsiblefor their sexual activity, becamean obsessionwith the dangerous"whore"

(114). There is a senseof a hungry, populace,eagerto consumeprescriptivebook nonns

as much as they might the new "groceries" making their way into modern diets - with the

conductbook "groceries" being kind of like tofu burgers:giving people what they

wanted, and*vhatthey neededvia somestealth. The clear delineationof roles, even

while assigningto men all "public" activity, by rccognizing to some degreethat both men

and women could be guilty of transgressingrole boundaries,becomesalmost an

improvement over a local, oral obsessionwith the dangerousfemale.

It is also interesting that one of her conclusionsfrom her study of local court records is

that people used the forum of the court as a kind of play - for fun. She remarks that most

of the time, suits in court were dropped after there was an opporfunity for public

accusations,and self-promotion, and that, as a couple of other historians here note, that
 11

the legal consequences weregenerallynot asharshasonemight

for transgressions

imagine. With Gowing,the court,in a way, canbe imaginedasa kind of playhouse,with

oppositionalpartiesplaying"roles" for personaladvantage.Hindle'sconceptionof the

though
defensiveactionby legallysophisticated,
useof rolesasa kind of retroguard,

illiteratewomen,is not asvisiblein herwork. Theideaof a courtasa playhouseis an

between
extremetry.t":tr18 constructionbecauseit leadsto imaginga correspondence

the concern{mod t)/afor the comrptionof the King's courtwith the comrptionof
"
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court at a locallevel. Advice manuals intended for public consumption were aimed to

tame the samebeast as earlier advice manualswritten for gentry. It ls possible to

conclude from local court recordsthat the concern contemporarieshad that society

neededto reconce,ptualizedwas not motivated in order to protect patriarchical or elite

privilege, but truly out of fears of anarchicpassionswhich existed in all men, from the

gentry on down. The court evidencedoesnot disprove the legitimacy of their concern,

and if you view the evidencewithout consideringpolitical context (oppression)it isn't

6r{ obvious, even if advice manuals did not prescribewith the moral authority of a societal
v,f super-ego,that they may did not play the part of the ego - helping channel natural

passionsinto healthier avenues( or, if you prefer, substitutein the Enlightenment concept

of reasonas a guiding passion). However it worked, if you can considerthis possibility,

you can read people like Mandeville or Shaftesbury,in a way that you cannot if you look

at texts as sitesof power contestation.

Again, I'll finish by saying, that I certainly do not hold a Hobbesianview of human

nature (I believe our nature varies according to our family environment - phenotype, not

simply genotype), I am interestedin reading history that imagines complex motivations

 12

for human behaviour, that, by and large, just isn't coming from historiography that sniffs

out power relations (Gowing, in particular, is an exception). I hope this becomesa shared

concern,becauseif the way in which many of thesehistorians use court records is any

evidence - a sourcewhich is supposedto unearth experiential life - it isn't clear that any

kind of empirical evidenceis going to challengefavoured models of construing

motivations. Anthropology has shown evidenceof this for years. Clifford Geertz,in

describing Balinese cock-fights by joining Balinesemen in their ritual, intuited that men

enjoyedviolence for violence sake,and that this was the reasonthey had cock-fights i.e.

becauseviolence was meaningful. In response,critics said that their violence could only

be understoodin the context of oppressivewestern-colonization;get rid of the

Westerners,and you'll eliminate cock-fighting. In my opinion, the only way that

empirical evidence can overfurn theory ridden history - as the historians I have covered

here have hoped to do by using court records as a source- is if historians are not inclined

to transform "trivia" which may not easily conform to a stereotlped point of view (i.e.,

all those who are dis-empoweredare moral agents- a Mamist concept?)into something

more digestible - e.g., more than likely, into anotherweapon of legitimate resistance. It is

possible that the only way you get there, is through a successfulDescartian conflict

between clear, soulful reasonand the passions: we have to get past needing for the past,

and its actors,to be a certain wdy, before we'll be able to imagine them otherwise.