No Strike, No Lockout Clause in the CBA

The State guarantees the right of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining
and negotiations, as well as peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike, in
accordance with law. The right to strike is not absolute. It has heretofore been held that a “no-
strike, no-lockout” provision of the CBA is a valid stipulation although the clause may invoked
by an employer only when the strike is economic in nature or one which is conducted to force
wage or other concessions from the employer that are not mandated to be granted by the law
itself.

Master Iron Labor Union v. NLRC (219 SCRA 47)

A no-strike clause in a CBA is applicable only to economic strikes. Corollarily, if

the strike is founded on an unfair labor practice of the employer, a strike declared by the
union cannot be considered a violation of the no-strike clause.

An economic strike is defined as one which is to force wage or other

concessions from the employer which he is not required by law to grant. It involves
issues relating to demands for higher wages, higher pension or overtime rates, pensions,
profit sharing, shorter working hours, fewer work days for the same pay, elimination of
night work, lower retirement age, more healthful working conditions, better health
services, better sanitation and more safety appliances. The demands of the petitioners,
being covered by the CBA, are definitely within the power of the Corporation to grant
and therefore the strike was not an economic strike.

Much more than an economic issue, the said practice of the violation of the CBA
or the Corporation's practice of subcontracting workers; discrimination; coercion of
employees; unreasonable suspension of union officials, and unreasonable refusal to
entertain grievance of the Corporation was a blatant violation of the CBA — and unfair
labor practice on the part of the employer under Article 248(i) of the Labor Code.
Although the end result, should the Corporation be required to observe the CBA, may be
economic in nature because the workers would then be given their regular working hours
and therefore their just pay, not one of the said grounds is an economic demand within
the meaning of the law on labor strikes.

Panay Electric Company, Inc v. NLRC (248 SCRA 688)

The no-strike clause in a CBA would be inapplicable to prevent a strike which is

grounded on unfair labor practice. In this situation, it is not essential that the unfair
labor practice act has, in fact, been committed; it suffices that the striking workers are
shown to have acted honestly on an impression that the company has committed such
unfair labor practice and the surrounding circumstances could warrant such a belief in
good faith.

The absence of good faith or the honest belief that the company is committing
Unfair Labor Practice, therefore, is what inclines us to rule that the strike conducted by
the union from January 22 to 25, 1991 is illegal for being in violation of the "no strike, no
 lock-out" proviso and the failure to bring the Union's grievance under the grievance
procedure in the CBA.

Interphil Laboratories Employees Union-FFW v. Interphil Laboratories, Inc.(372 SCRA

658)

The overtime boycott or work slowdown by the employees constituted a violation

of their CBA, which prohibits the union or employee, during the existence of the CBA, to
stage a strike or engage in slowdown or interruption of work.

Respondents' unjustified unilateral alteration of the 24-hour work schedule thru their concerted
activities of "overtime boycott" and "work slowdown" from April 16, 1993 up to March 7, 1994,
to force the petitioner company to accede to their unreasonable demands, can be classified as a
strike on an installment basis, as correctly called by petitioner company. The concerted activity
in question would still be illicit because contrary to the workers explicit contractual commitment
as enunciated in the CBA.