Doctrines - Sec 2-11

Section 2.
35. Borlongan v. Pena, GR 143591, Nov. 23, 2007
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Bail; The principle that the accused is precluded from
questioning the legality of his arrest after arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea
and participates during trial, without previously invoking his objections thereto.—The earlier
ruling of this Court that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of the right to question the validity of
the arrest has already been superseded by Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Furthermore, the principle that the accused is precluded from questioning
the legality of his arrest after arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and
participates during trial, without previously invoking his objections thereto.
Same; Same; Non-Issuance of Writs; Exceptions; As a general rule, the Court will not issue
writs of prohibition or injunction, preliminary or final, to enjoin or restrain criminal prosecution.—
As a general rule, the Court will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction, preliminary or final, to
enjoin or restrain criminal prosecution. However, the following exceptions to the rule have been
recognized: 1) when the injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused; 2) when it is necessary for the orderly administration of
justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; 3) when there is a prejudicial question
which is sub judice; 4) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; 5) where
the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; 6) when double jeopardy is
clearly apparent; 7) where the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense; 8) where it is a case of
persecution rather than prosecution; 9) where the charges are
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
222
222
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Borlongan, Jr. vs. Peña
manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and 10) when there is clearly no prima
facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied.
Same; Same; Same; Probable Cause; What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable
cause—but the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses.—What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of
the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. But the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and on the
basis thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the existence of probable
cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard the
prosecutor’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Appeals; The general rule is that this Court does not review the
factual findings of the trial court, which include the determination of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest—it is only in exceptional cases when this Court may set aside
the conclusions of the prosecutor and the trial judge on the existence of probable cause, that is,
when it is necessary to prevent the misuse of the strong arm of the law or to protect the orderly
administration of justice.—To accord respect to the discretion granted to the prosecutor and for
reasons of practicality, this Court, as a rule, does not interfere with the prosecutor’s
determination of probable cause. Otherwise, courts would be swamped with petitions to review
the prosecutor’s findings in such investigations. In the same way, the general rule is that this
Court does not review the factual findings of the trial court, which include the determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It is only in exceptional cases when this
Court may set aside the conclusions of the prosecutor and the trial judge on the existence of
probable cause, that is, when it is necessary to prevent the misuse of the strong arm of the law
or to protect the orderly administration of justice. The facts obtaining in the present case warrant
the application of the exception. Borlongan, Jr. vs. Peña, 538 SCRA 221, G.R. No. 143591
November 23, 2007
36. People v. Mamaril, GR 147607, Jan 22 2004
Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; Elements; In determining the existence of probable

cause, it is required that the following are met.—Probable cause for a search has been defined
as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched. In determining the existence of probable cause,
it is required that: (1) the judge must examine the complainant and his witnesses personally; (2)
the examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced in writing in the
form of searching questions and answers.
Same; Search Warrants; Deposition; Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are
thus not sufficient.—Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient.
The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
663
VOL. 420, JANUARY 22, 2004
663
People vs. Mamaril

necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-
existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found
later that his declarations are false.
Same; Same; Searches and Seizures; The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into
his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein.—To constitute a waiver, it
must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual
or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right. (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the
accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a
search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case
of Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin (supra): x x x x x x x x x “x x x As the constitutional guaranty
is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the
position of either contesting an officer’s authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights;
but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent, or an
invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. (56 C.J.,
pp. 1180, 1181)”
Same; Same; In issuing a search warrant, the Judge must strictly comply with the requirements
of the Constitution and the statutory provisions.—Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge
must strictly comply with the requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A
liberal construction should be given in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment
upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. No presumption of
regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it. People
vs. Mamaril, 420 SCRA 662, G.R. No. 147607 January 22, 2004
37. Ortiz v. Palaypayon – 234 SCRA 391
Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Courts; Judges; Respondent judge did not
personally examine the complainant and her witnesses by asking searching questions and
answers to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause as mandated by law.—From the
foregoing factual and legal milieu, it is evident that there was no preliminary investigation
conducted. Respondent judge did not per-sonally examine the complainant and her witnesses
by asking searching questions and answers to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause
as mandated by law. He simply ignored the constitutional requirement of procedural due
process. This Court cannot countenance such blatant practice of disregarding fairly elementary
legal principles and substituting it with an unorthodox and highly irregular practice which
appears convenient only to respondent judge.
Courts; Judges; A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must live
and abide by it and render justice at all times without resorting to short cuts clearly uncalled
for.—A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must live and abide
by it and render justice at all times without resorting to short cuts clearly uncalled for. “Judges
are not common men and women, whose errors men and women forgive and time forgets.
Judges sit as the embodiment of the people’s sense of justice, their last recourse where all
other institutions have failed” (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Bartolome, 203 SCRA 337).
As such, they must show and prove that they are men worthy of their robes.
Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Aside from municipal trial judges, only fiscals and
provincial, city and state prosecutors can conduct preliminary investigation.—Furthermore,
under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, aside from municipal trial judges, only fiscals and
provincial, city, and state prosecutors, can conduct preliminary investigation. A police officer
was, and is not authorized to conduct preliminary investigation, hence, a judge cannot and must
not rely on an inquiry made by a police investigator as the law mandates him to conduct his own
preliminary examination.
_________________
* FIRST DIVISION.
392
392
Ortiz vs. Palaypayon
Same; Same; Preliminary investigation should be conducted in a way that it would conform with
the essential requisites of due process.—We need not underscore the importance of a
preliminary investigation or how the same should be conducted in order for it to conform with the
essential requisites of due process, but for purposes of emphasis and clarity, we reiterate our
ruling in the cases of Salonga vs. Pano, et al. (134 SCRA 438, 461-462) and Geronimo vs.
Ramos (136 SCRA 435, 449-450), where we held that: “The purpose of a preliminary
investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and
to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and
anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials (Trocio v.
Manta, 118 SCRA 241; citing Hashim v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The right to a preliminary
investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress constitutional due
process. (See People v. Oandasan, 25 SCRA 277).
Same; Same; Probable Cause; Probable cause must be decided in the light of the conditions
obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or
opinion of the judge conducting the examination.—In order to satisfy the due process clause it is
not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure that a
transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation serves not only the
purposes of the State. More important, it is a part of the guarantees of freedom and fair play
which are birthrights of all who live in our country. It is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or
the judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once
it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable
cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. Although there is no
general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must be
decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a
large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding
should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reasons
(See La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). xxx”
Same; Same; Same; Had the preliminary investigation been conducted by respondent judge,
the criminal complaint would have been dismissed as the liability is purely civil in nature.—With
respect to the issue of inclusion of herein complainant as one of the accused in the criminal
case, it would suffice to state that had the requisite preliminary investigation been conducted by
respondent judge, the criminal
393
VOL. 234, JULY 25, 1994
393
Ortiz vs. Palaypayon
complaint against Juliana Lu and herein complainant as owner and caretaker of the mini-truck,
respectively, would have been dismissed as their liability, should there be any, is purely civil in
nature. Ortiz vs. Palaypayon, 234 SCRA 391, A.M. No. MTJ-93-823 July 25, 1994
38. People v. Veloso 48 Phil 169
1.CRIMINAL LAW; RESISTANCE OF THE AGENTS OF THE AUTHORITY.— V, the manager

of a club in the City of Manila, forcibly resisted the police when the club was raided as &
gambling house. V bit a policeman on the right forearm and gave him a blow in another part of
,the body. V resisted being placed in the patrol wagon and shouted offensive epithets against
the police department. Held: That V was guilty of the crime of resistance of the agents of the
authority in violation of article 252 of the Penal Code.
2.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; SEARCH WARRANTS; "JOHN
DOE" WARRANTS.—By the eleventh and eighteenth paragraphs of the Philippine Bill of Rights,
as found in the present Organic Act, and by various provisions of the Philippine Code of
Criminal Procedure, the security of the dwelling and the person is guaranteed.
170
170
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Veloso
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the
constitutional and statutory provisions under which it is issued. Otherwise, it is void.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The warrant will always be construed strictly without, however, going the full
length of requiring technical accuracy.
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DESCRIPTION OF PLACE.—A description of a place to be searched is
sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the
place intended.
6.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant described
the building to be searched as "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine
Islands." Held: That this was a sufficient designation of the premises to be searched.
7.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF OFFICER TO TAKE POSSESSION OF PROPERTY FOUND ON
THE PERSON ARRESTED.—An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested
any money or property found upon his person, which was used in the commission of the crime
or was the fruit of the crime, or which may furnish the person arrested with the means of
committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence on the trial of the cause,
but not otherwise. (Moreno vs. Ago Chi [1909], 12 Phil., 439.)
8.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DESCRIPTION OF PERSON.—The warrant for the apprehension of an
unnamed party is void, "except in those cases where it contains a descriptio personae such as
will enable the officer to identify the accused." The description must be sufficient to indicate
clearly the proper person upon whom the warrant is to be served.
9.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The affidavit and the search warrant stated that "John Doe has illegally
in his possession in the building occupied by him, and which is under his control, namely, in the
building numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands, certain devices and
effects used in violation of the Gambling Law." Held: That the police could identify John Doe as
V without difficulty, and that the search warrant is valid. People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169, No.
23051 October 20, 1925
39. Alvarez v. CFI – 64 Phil. 33
1.CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH WARRANT; DEFINITION.—A search warrant is an order

in writing, issued in the name of the People of the Philippine Islands, signed by a judge or a
justice of the peace, and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal
property and bring it before the court (section 95, General Orders, No. 58, as amended by
section 6 of Act No. 2886).
2.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SEARCHES AND SEIZURES.—Of all the rights of a citizen, few
are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of
personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from
the inspection and scrutiny of others (In re Pacific Railway Commission, 32 Fed., 241; Interstate
Commerce Commn. vs. Brimson, 38 Law. ed., 1047; Boyd vs. U. S., 29 Law. ed., 746; Carroll
vs. U. S., 69 Law. ed., 543, 549). While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public
welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional
rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government (People vs. Elias, 147 N. E., 472).
3.ID.; ID.—As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is one
of the highest duties and priv
34
34
Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas
ileges of the court, these constitutional guaranties should be given a liberal construction or a
strict construction in favor of the individual, to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual
depreciation of, the rights secured by them (State vs. Custer County, 198 Pac., 362; State vs.
McDaniel, 231 Pac., 965; 237 Pac., 373). Since the proceeding is a drastic one, it is the general
rule that statutes authorizing searches and seizures or search warrants must be strictly
construed (Rose vs. St. Clair, 28 Fed. [2d], 189; Leonard vs. U. S., 6 Fed. [2d], 353; Perry vs. U.
S., 14 Fed. [2d], 88; Cofer vs. State, 118 So., 613).
4. ID.; ID.; OATH.—In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a
party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is
sometimes defined as an outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or
promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God (Bouvier's Law
Dictionary; State vs. Jackson, 137 N. W., 1034; In re Sage, 24 Oh. Cir. Ct. [N. S.], 7; Pumphrey
vs. State, 122 N. W., 19; Priest vs. State, 6 N. W., 468; State vs. Jones, 154 Pac., 378; Atwood
vs. State, 111 So., 865), The oath required must refer to the truth. of the facts within the
personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to
convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the
issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause (U. S, vs. Tureaud, 20 Fed., 621; U.
S. vs. Michalski, 265 Fed., 839; U. S. vs. Pitotto, 267 Fed., 603; U. S. vs. Lai Chew, 298 Fed.,
652), The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is
whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant
be held liable for dam. ages caused (State vs. Roosevelt County 20th Jud. Dis. Ct., 244 Pac.,
280; State vs. Quartier, 236 Pac., 746).
5.ID.; UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE.—Unreasonable searches and seizures are
a menace against which the constitutional guaranties afford full protection. The term
"unreasonable search and seizure" is not defined in the Constitution or in General Orders, No.
88, and it is said to have no fixed, absolute or unchangeable meaning, although the term has
been defined in general language, All illegal searches and seizures are unreasonable while
lawful ones are reasonable, What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure in
any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the
circumstances Involved, including the
35
VOL. 64, JANUARY 29, 1937
35
question were seized for the purpose of using them us evidence cause, the manner in which the
search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles
procured (Go-Bart Importing Co. vs. U, S., 75 Law. ed., 374; Peru vs. U. S., 4 Fed. [2d], 881; U.
S. vs. Vatune, 292 Fed., 497; Agnello vs. U. S., 70 Law. ed., 145; Lambert vs. U. S. 282 Fed.,
413; U. S. vs. Bateman, 278 Fed., 231; Mason vs. Rollins, 16 Fed. Cas. [No. 9252], 2 Biss., 99).
6.ID.; ID.; NECESSITY OF TAKING THE AFFIDAVITS OF THE WITNESSES.—Neither the
Constitution nor General Orders, No. 58 provides it of imperative necessity to take the
depositions of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the
affidavit of the latter, The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing
else than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if
the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of
other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this ' case was insufficient because
his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it was the duty of the judge to
require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of
probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the
applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is
sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the applicant's
knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having personal
knowledge of the facts is necessary. We conclude, therefore, that the warrant issued is likewise
illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge
of the facts.
7.CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH WARRANT; SERVICE AT NIGHT.—Section 101 of
General Orders, No. 58 authorizes that the search be made at night when it is positively
asserted in the affidavit that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be
searched. As we have declared' the affidavit insufficient and the warrant issued exclusively
upon it illegal, our conclusion is that the contention is equally well founded and that the search
could not legally be made at night.
8.ID.; ID.; DESCRIPTION OF ARTICLES.—Section 1, paragraph (3) of Article III of the
Constitution, and section 97 of General Orders, No. 58 provide that the affidavit to be presented,
which shall serve as the basis for determining whether probable cause
36
36
exists and whether the warrant should be issued, must contain a particular description of the
place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized. These provisions are mandatory and
must be strictly complied with (Munch vs. U. S., 24 Fed. [2(1], 518; U. S. vs. Boyd, 1 Fed. [2d],
1019; U. S. vs. Carlson, 292 Fed., 463; U, S. vs. Borkowski, 268 Fed., 408; In re TriState Coal &
Coke Co., 253 Fed., 605; People vs. Mayen, 188 Cal., 237; People vs. Kahn, 256 III. A., 415);
but where, by the nature of the goods to be seized', their description must be rather general, it is
not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could
issue (People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil., 384; People vs. Kahn, supra).
9.ID.; ID.; ID.—The only description of the articles given in the affidavit presented to the judge
was as follows: "that there are being kept in said premises books, documents, receipts, lists,
chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as money-lender, charging a
usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law." Taking into consideration the nature of the
articles so described, it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could be
given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof.
The description so made substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of
the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him to identify the
articles in question, which he did.
10.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; SEIZURE OF BOOKS AND
DOCUMENTS TO BE USED AS EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL PRO. CEEDINGS AGAINST THE
OWNER OR POSSESSOR THEREOF.—At the hearing of the incidents of the case raised
before the court, it clearly appeared that the books and documents had really been seized' to
enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct an investigation and later use all or some of. the articles
in question as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal cases that may be filed against
him. The seizure of books and documents by means of a search warrant, for the purpose of
using them as evidence in' a criminal case against the person in whose possession they were
found, is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a
violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify
against himself (Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal, 42 Phil., 886; Brady vs. U. S., 266 U. S., 620;
Temperani vs. U. S., 299 Fed., 365; U. S. vs. Madden, 297 Fed., 679; Boyd vs. U. S., 116 U. S.,
616; Carroll vs. U. S., 267 U. S., 132). Therefore, it appearing that at least nineteen of the
documents in
37
VOL. 64, JANUARY 29, 1937
37

question were seized for the purpose of using them as evidence against the petitioner in the
criminal proceeding or proceedings for violation of the Anti-Usury Law, which it is attempted to
institute against him, we hold that the search warrant issued is illegal and that the documents
should be returned' to him.
11.ID.; ID.; WAIVER OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTIES.—The AntiUsury Board
insinuates in its answer that the petitioner cannot now question the validity of the search warrant
or the proceedings had subsequent to the issuance thereof, because he has waived his
constitutional rights in proposing a compromise whereby he agreed to pay a fine of P200 for the
purpose of evading the criminal proceeding or proceedings. We are of the opinion that there
was no such waiver, first, because the petitioner has emphatically denied' the offer of
compromise and, second, because if there was a compromise it referred not to the search
warrant and the incidents thereof but to the institution of criminal proceedings for violation of the
Anti-Usury Law. The waiver would have been a good defense for the respondents had the
petitioner voluntarily consented to the search and seizure of the articles in question, but such
was not the case because the petitioner protested' from the beginning and stated his protest in
writing in the insufficient inventory furnished him by the agents.
12.CIVIL PROCEDURE; MANDAMUS; WHEN IT LIES.—Section 222 of the Code of Civil
Procedure in fact provides that mandamus will not issue when there is another plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. We are of the opinion, however, that an
appeal from said orders would not in this case be a plain, speedy and adequate remedy for the
petitioner because a long time would have to elapse before he recovers possession of the
documents and before the rights, of which he has been unlawfully deprived, are restored to him
(Fajardo vs. Llorente, 6 Phil., 426; Manotoc vs. McMicking and Trinidad, 10 Phil., 119; Cruz
Herrera de Lukban vs. McMicking, 14 Phil., 641; Lamb vs. Phipps, 22 Phil., 456). Alvarez vs.
Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33, No. 45358 January 29, 1937
40. Corro v. Lising – 137 SCRA 541
Certiorari; Motions; Criminal Procedure; No motion for reconsideration of order for issuance of
search warrant necessary before certiorari may be filed where issues raised in Supreme Court
same as those passed upon below.—Respondents contend that petitioner should have filed a
motion for reconsideration of the order in question before coming to Us. This is not always so.
When the questions raised before the Supreme Court are the same as those which were
squarely raised in and passed upon by the lower court, the filing of the motion for
reconsideration in said court before certiorari can be instituted in the Supreme Court is no
longer a prerequisite.
Criminal Procedure; Words and Phrases; “Probable cause” before search warrant may issue,
defined.—Probable cause may be defined as “such reasons, supported by facts and
circumstances, as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his actions, and the means
taken in prosecuting it, are legally just and proper (Burton vs.
________________
* EN BANC.
542
542
Corro vs. Lising
St. Paul, M & M. Ry. Co., 33 Minn. 189, cited in U.S. vs. Addison, 28 Phil. 566).” Thus, an
application for search warrant must state with particularity the alleged subversive materials
published or intended to be published by the publisher and editor of the Philippine Times,
Rommel Corro. As We have stated in Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, 133 SCRA 800, “mere generalization will not suffice.” A search warrant should
particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Same; Same; Conclusions of law of military officers will not satisfy “probable cause”
requirement for issuance of search warrants.—The above statements are mere conclusions of
law and will not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. They can not serve as basis for the
issuance of search warrant, absent of the existence of probable cause.
Same; Constitutional Law; Closure of a publishing house in search warrant issuances is

anathema to a democracy.—Respondents do not deny the fact that the business office of the
“Philippine Times” of which petitioner was the publisher-editor was padlocked and sealed. The
consequence is, the printing and publication of said newspaper were discontinued. In Burgos,
Sr. vs. Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, supra, We held that “[s]uch closure
is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press
guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners’ freedom to
express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic
framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment
and growth of the citizenry.”
Same; Laches; Words and Phrases; Laches defined.—Laches is the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier. The negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it (Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA
35).
Same; Same; Claim that petitioner is guilty of laches in failing to question the validity of the
search warrant till after more than one year is incorrect as petitioner was detained by the military
for a long time.—In his petition, Corro alleged that on October 1, 1983, less than forty-two (42)
hours after the military operatives shut down his
543
VOL. 137, JULY 15, 1985
543
Corro vs. Lising
newspaper on September 29, 1983, he was invited by the Director/General PC/INP, and
subsequently detained. Thereafter, he was charged with the crime of inciting to sedition before
the City Fiscal’s Office in Quezon City, and on October 7, 1983, a preventive detention action
was served upon him. Consequently, he had to file a petition for habeas corpus. It was only on
November 8, 1984 when this Court issued its Resolution in G.R. No. 68976, entitled: In the
Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Rommel Corro; Angie Corro vs. Minister Juan
Ponce Enrile, et al., releasing Rommel Corro on recognizance of his lawyers, Attys. Humberto
B. Basco, Reynaldo Bagatsing and Edilberto Balce. In the same month, November 1984,
petitioner filed his motion to recall warrant and to return the seized documents. When
respondent judge denied the motion, he came to Us. Considering the above circumstances, the
claim that petitioner had abandoned his right to the possession of the seized properties is
incorrect. Corro vs. Lising, 137 SCRA 541, No. L-69899 July 15, 1985
41. Pangandaman v. Casar, 159 SCRA 599 (1988)
Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; In conducting a preliminary investigation of any

crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts, a judge of an inferior Court must observe the
procedure prescribed in Section 3 of Rule 112, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.—There can
be no debate about the proposition that in conducting a preliminary investigation of any crime
cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts, a judge of an inferior court (other than in Metro-Manila
or the
_________________
* FIRST DIVISION.
600
600
Pangandaman vs. Casar
chartered cities, where no authority to conduct preliminary investigation is vested in such

officials) must observe the procedure prescribed in Section 3 of Rule 112, 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. And although not specifically so declared, the procedure mandated by the
Rule actually consists of two phases or stages.
Same; Same; Same; What constitutes the first phase or stage of the investigation.—The first
phase consists of an ex-parte inquiry into the sufficiency of the complaint and the affidavits and
other documents offered in support thereof. And it ends with the determination by the Judge
either: (1) that there is no ground to continue with the inquiry, in which case he dismisses the
complaint and transmits the order of dismissal, together with the records of the case, to the
provincial fiscal; or (2) that the complaint and the supporting documents show sufficient cause to
continue with the inquiry and this ushers in the second phase.
Same; Same; Same; What constitute the second phase or stage of the investigation.—This
second phase is designed to give the respondent notice of the complaint, access to the
complainant’s evidence and an opportunity to submit counter-affidavits and supporting
documents. At this stage also, the Judge may conduct a hearing and propound to the parties
and their witnesses questions on matters that, in his view, need to be clarified. The second
phase concludes with the Judge rendering his resolution, either for dismissal of the complaint or
holding the respondent for trial, which shall be transmitted, together with the record, to the
provincial fiscal or appropriate action.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Procedure must be followed before filing of the complaint in the
Regional Trial Court otherwise there is a denial of due process.—The procedure above
described must be followed before the complaint or information is filed in the Regional Trial
Court. Failure to do so will result in a denial of due process.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Presiding Judge cannot be said to have failed to observe
the prescribed procedure.—Here, no information has as yet been filed with the Regional Trial
Court. There is no pretense that the preliminary investigation has been completed, insofar as
the respondent Judge is concerned, and that he does not intend to undertake the second
phase, In this situation. it cannot be said that he has failed to observe the prescribed procedure,
What has happened is simply that after receiving the complaint and examining the
complainant’s witnesses, and having come to believe, on the basis thereof, that the offenses
charged had been committed, the respon-
601
VOL. 159, APRIL 14, 1988
601
dent Judge issued the warrant now complained of against the fourteen (14) respondents (now
petitioners) named and identified by the witnesses as the perpetrators of the killings and
injuries, as well as against 50 “John Does.”
Same; Same; Warrant of Arrest; Completion of entire procedure for preliminary investigation not
required before a warrant of arrest may be issued.—There is no requirement that the entire
procedure for preliminary investigation must be completed before a warrant of arrest may be
issued. What the Rule provides is that no complaint or information for an offense cognizable by
the Regional Trial Court may be filed without completing that procedure. But nowhere is it
provided that the procedure must be completed before a warrant of arrest may issue. Indeed, it
is the contrary that is true. The present Section 6 of the same Rule 112 clearly authorizes the
municipal trial court to order the respondent’s arrest even before opening the second phase of
the investigation if said court is satisfied that a probable cause exists and there is a necessity to
place the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
Same; Same; Same; Rule on arrest after preliminary examination has been somewhat modified
but authority of the investigating judge to order arrest was not abrogated—The rule on arrest
after preliminary examination has, of course, been modified somewhat since the occurrence of
the facts upon which Mayuga was decided, but not to abrogate the authority of the investigating
judge to order such arrest, and only to prescribe the requirement that before he may do so, he
must examine the witnesses to the complaint, the examination to be under oath and reduced to
writing in the form of searching questions and answers. This modification was introduced by
Republic Act 3838, approved June 22, 1963, amending Section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948,
and the “searching questions and answers” requirement is incorporated in the present Section 6
of Rule 112 already quoted.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Respondent judge did not act with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the warrant of arrest against peti-tioner.—The argument, therefore, must be rejected that
the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant of arrest
against petitioners without first completing the preliminary investigation in accordance with the
prescribed procedure. The rule is and has always been that such issuance need only await a
finding of probable cause, not the completion of the entire procedure of preliminary
investigation.
602
602
Same; Same; Same; Same; Warrant of Arrest in question validly issued against the
petitioners.—Upon the facts and the law, therefore, the warrant of arrest in question validly
issued against the petitioners, such issuance having been ordered after proceedings, to which
no irregularity has been shown to attach, in which the respondent Judge found sufficient cause
to commit the petitioners to answer for the crime complained of.
Same; Same; Same; Warrant issued against fifty (50) “John Does” unconstitutional and void.—
Insofar, however, as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) “John Does” not one of whom the
witnesses to the complaint could or would identify, it is of the nature of a general warrant, one of
a class of writs long proscribed as unconstitutional and once anathematized as “totally
subversive of the liberty of the subject.” Clearly violative of the constitutional injunction that
warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized, the warrant
must, as regards its unidentified subjects, be voided. Pangandaman vs. Casar, 159 SCRA 599,
No. L-71782 April 14, 1988
42. Stonehill v. Diokno (1967)
Constitutional Law; Search warrants; Corporations; Only party affected may contest legality of
seizure effected by search warrants.—Officers of certain corporations, from which documents,
papers and things were seized by means of search warrants, have no cause of action to assail
the legality of the seizures because said corporations have personalities distinct and separate
from those of said officers. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose
rights have been impaired thereby. The objection to an unlawful search is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties.
Same; Evidence: When illegally seized evidence is admissible.—Officers of certain corporations

cannot validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things
seized from the offices and premises of the corporations since the right to object to their
admission in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to which the seized effects
384
384
Stonehill vs. Diokno
belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their
individual capacity.
Same; Requisites for issuing search warrants.—The Constitution provides that no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge, and that the warrant shall
particularly describe the things to be seized.
Same; General search warrants.—Search warrants, issued upon applications stating that the
natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a violation of Central Bank laws,
tariff and customs laws, Tax Code and Revised Penal Code do not satisfy the constitutional
requirements because no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. It was
impossible for the judges, who issued the warrants, to have found the existence of probable
cause, which presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is
sought has performed particular acts or committed specific omissions in violation of a specific
penal provision.
Same; Why general warrants are outlawed.—General search warrants are outlawed because
they place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at
the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers.
Same; Provision of Revised Rules of Court.—To prevent the issuance of general warrants, the
Supreme Court amended the Old Rules of Court by providing in the Revised Rules of Court that
"no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense".
Same; Warrants not describing particularly the things to be seized.—Search warrants

authorizing the seizure of books of accounts and records "showing all the business
transactions" of certain persons, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal,
contravene the explicit command of the Bill of Rights that the things to be seized should be
particularly described and defeat its major objective of eliminating general warrants.
Same; Evidence; Abandonment of Moncado ruling; Illegally seized documents are not
admissible in evidence.—The Moncado ruling, that illegally seized documents, papers and
things are admissible in evidence, must be abandoned. The exclusion of such evidence is the
only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and spirit of the prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures. If there is competent evidence to establish
probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is
intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the constitutional
requirements If he has no such evidence, then it is not possible for the judge to find that there is
a probable cause, and, hence, no justifica-
385
VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967
385
tion for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation for the issuance in that case
is the necessity of fishing for evidence of the commission of a crime. Such a fishing expedition is
indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:
Constitutional Law; Search and Seizure; Lack of standard of petitioners cannot affect illegality of
search and seizure.— That the petitioners have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of
the papers, things, and effects seized from places other than their residences, cannot in any
manner affect, alter, or otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the
intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures made thereunder. Whether or not petitioners
possess legal standing, the said warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and
seizures were illegal and remain illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the
Constitution that "legal standing", or the lack of it, is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a
Search warrant or of the lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.
Same; Provision on search and seizure is derived from Federal Constitution.—Our constitutional
provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and interpretation of
the said constitutional provision, our courts have invariably regarded as doctrinal the
pronouncements made on the Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the Federal
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals. The U.S. doctrines and pertinent
cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of documents, papers and effects,
which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be summarized as follows: (a)
ownership of documents, papers, and effects gives "standing"; (b) ownership and/or control or
possession—actual or constructive—of premises searched gives "standing"; and (c) the
"aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn application for search
warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively 'against the "aggrieved person", gives
"standing". An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting
three, all were directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were
named personally, followed by the designation, "The President and/or General Manager" of the
particular corporation. The three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same
"office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or under the control of the
petitioners in all the other search
386
386

warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the President and/or General Manager" of the
particular corporation. The searches and seizures were to be made, and were actually made, in
the "office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the petitioners.
Same; Ownership of properties seized entitles petitioners to bring motion to return and suppress
and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by unlawful search and seizure.— Ownership of
the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and suppress, and
gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure regardless of their
location at the time of seizure. Under the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and
seizures, a person places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it
his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile.
Same; Control of premises searched gives "standing".— Independent of ownership or other

personal interest in the records and documents seized, the petitioners have standing to move
for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or leasehold interest in many of the
premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests have been sufficiently set forth in
their motion for reconsideration and need not be recounted here. It has never been held that a
person with requisite interest in the premises searched must own the property seized in order to
have standing in a motion to return and suppress. Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383, No. L-
19550 June 19, 1967
43. People v. Martinez – 235 SCRA 171
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Buy-bust Operations; Evidence; Indispensable in every
prosecution for the illegal sale of prohibited drugs is the submission of proof that such a sale
took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof, and the presentation of said
prohibited drug as evidence.—Indispensable in every prosecution
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
172
172
People vs. Martinez
for the illegal sale of prohibited drugs is the submission of proof that such a sale took place
between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof, and the presentation further of said prohibited
drug as evidence in court (People vs. Pacleb, 217 SCRA 92 [1993]). What is important is the
fact that the poseur-buyer received the shabu from appellant and that the contents thereof were
duly presented in court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Absence of the marked money or its non-presentation in court
would not create a hiatus in the prosecution’s evidence.—The allegation of the appellant that
the marked money was not properly identified by the poseur-buyer does not deserve even a
passing consideration. As long as the prohibited or regulated drug given or delivered by the
appellant was presented before the court and the appellant was clearly identified as the
offender, conviction is proper. In fact, the absence of the marked money or its non-presentation
in court would not create a hiatus in the prosecution’s evidence (People vs. Hoble, 211 SCRA
675 [1992]; People vs. Tandoy, 192 SCRA 28 [1990]).
Same; Same; Illegal Possession of Firearms; What the law punishes is the mere possession of
an unlicensed firearm regardless of make, model, or kind.—Appellant reproves the prosecution
for the variance between the testimony of Captain Maruji as to the firearm seized and that
actually presented during the trial. It should be remembered, however, that what the law
punishes is the mere possession of an unlicensed firearm regardless of make, model, or kind.
That an unlicensed firearm was seized from the house of appellant is undisputed, and this is
more than adequate for appellant’s conviction.
Same; Same; Names; Search Warrants; Discrepancy regarding the name of the accused and
that stated in the search warrant cannot militate against his positive identification by the poseur-
buyer.—The discrepancy regarding the name of accused-appellant and that stated in the search
warrant cannot militate against his positive identification by the poseur-buyer. It has been
consistently held that “greater weight is given to the positive identification of the accused by the
prosecution witnesses than accused’s denial concerning the commission of the crime (People
vs. Serdan, 213 SCRA 329 [1992]).
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Names; Search and Warrants; Where the accused was
arrested as a result of a “buy-bust” operation and the ensuing search of the premises was made
as an incident to a lawful arrest, the alleged defect of the search warrant in erroneously
designating his first name is immaterial.—Granting arguendo that the search warrant issued
against accused-appellant
173
VOL. 235, AUGUST 5, 1994
173
People vs. Martinez
was invalid because his true name is Abelardo Martinez and not Alexander Martinez as stated
in the search warrant, the same cannot render the articles seized inadmissible as evidence in
court. As a matter of fact the information filed identify him as “Alexander Martinez alias Abelardo
Martinez y Montesor, accused.” The accused-appellant was arrested as a result of a “buy-bust”
operation and the ensuing search of the premises was made as an incident to a lawful arrest
(Section 12, Rule 116 Rules of Court; People vs. Musa, 217 SCRA 597 [1993], People vs.
Fernandez, 209 SCRA 1 [1992], People vs. Liquen, 212 SCRA 288 [1992], People vs. Li Wai
Cheung, 214 SCRA 504 [1992], People vs. Eligino, 216 SCRA 370, [1992]). It is therefore clear
that regardless of the alleged defect of the search warrant in erroneously designating his first
name, the seized articles may still be used as evidence against accused-appellant, having been
obtained from him and as such, fruits of a lawful search incidental to a valid arrest.
Same; Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; Estoppel; Where the accused failed to raise the
question of his identity either at the time of arraignment or by filing a demurrer based on the
court’s lack of jurisdiction over his person, he is estopped from later raising the same
question.—Furthermore, appellant was arraigned under the name of Alexander Martinez and
when arraigned under said name he entered his plea of “not guilty”. Appellant should have
raised the question of his identity either at the time of arraignment or by filing a demurrer based
on the court’s lack of jurisdiction over his person, inasmuch as he was then considered as
Alexander Martinez alias Abelardo Martinez. Having failed to do so, he is estopped from later
raising the same question (People vs. Narvaes, 59 Phil. 738 [1934]). His identity had been
sufficiently established.
Same; Same; Same; The identification of a person is not established solely through knowledge
of the name of that person.—Finally, as We have held in People v. Reception, (198 SCRA 670
[1991]), “the identification of a person is not established solely through knowledge of the name
of that person”. It is clear from the records that appellant was the same person who sold the
prohibited drug to Pelin on two instances. The claim therefore that his true and correct name is
Abelardo Martinez and not Alexander Martinez cannot overturn the fact of his identity being
established as the peddler of shabu, a prohibited drug.
Same; Same; Penalties; R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659 given retroactive effect.—In the
case of People v. Simon (G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994), this Court gave retroactive application
to the provisions of R.A. 6425 which was further amended by R.A. 7659. People vs. Martinez,
235 SCRA 171, G.R. Nos. 105376-77 August 5, 1994
44. Microsoft Corp. v. Maxicorp (2004)
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court;
Questions of Law vs. Questions of Fact; A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court should cover questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable.—A petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover questions of law. Questions of fact are not
reviewable. As a rule, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and
this Court will not review them on appeal, subject to exceptions as when the findings of the
appellate court conflict with the findings of the trial court.
Same; Same; A question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is
on a certain state of facts. A question of fact exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of
the alleged facts.—The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is settled. A
question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state
of facts. A question of fact exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
Though this delineation seems simple, determining the true nature and extent of the distinction
is sometimes problematic. For example, it is incorrect to presume that all cases where the facts
are not in dispute automatically involve purely questions of law.
Same; Same; There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without
need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. Once it is clear that the issue invites a
review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.—There is a question of law
if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of
the evidence. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given
set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented,
the question posed is one of fact. If
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
225
VOL. 438, SEPTEMBER 13, 2004
225
Microsoft Corporation vs. Maxicorp, Inc.
the query requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of
surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that query is factual.
Civil Procedure; Legal Personality to File Petition for Review under Rule 45; Proper Party; The
general rule is that the proper party in a criminal case is the Office of the Solicitor General as
representative of the People of the Philippines. However, a petitioner-complainant in a petition
for review under Rule 45 could argue its case before the Supreme Court in lieu of the Solicitor
General if there is grave error committed by the lower court or lack of due process.— Maxicorp
argues that petitioners have no legal personality to file this petition since the proper party to do
so in a criminal case is the Office of the Solicitor General as representative of the People of the
Philippines. Maxicorp states the general rule but the exception governs this case. We ruled in
Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals that the petitioner-complainant in a
petition for review under Rule 45 could argue its case before this Court in lieu of the Solicitor
General if there is grave error committed by the lower court or lack of due process. This avoids
a situation where a complainant who actively participated in the prosecution of a case would
suddenly find itself powerless to pursue a remedy due to circumstances beyond its control. The
circumstances in Columbia Pictures Entertainment are sufficiently similar to the present case to
warrant the application of this doctrine.
Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; Probable cause means “such reasons, supported by facts
and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his action and the means
taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper.”—Probable cause means “such reasons,
supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his action
and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper.” Thus, probable cause for a
search warrant requires such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection with
that offense are in the place to be searched.
Same; Determination of Probable Cause; The judge determining probable cause must do so
only after personally examining under oath the complainant and his witnesses. The oath
required must refer
226
226

to "the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses.”—The
judge determining probable cause must do so only after personally examining under oath the
complainant and his witnesses. The oath required must refer to “the truth of the facts within the
personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to
convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the
issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause.” The applicant must have personal
knowledge of the circumstances. “Reliable information” is insufficient. Mere affidavits are not
enough, and the judge must depose in writing the complainant and his witnesses.
Same; Same; The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and
standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As implied by
the words themselves, "probable cause” is concerned with probability, not absolute or even
moral certainty.—The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules
and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As implied
by the words themselves, “probable cause” is concerned with probability, not absolute or even
moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations
of a judge after a full-blown trial.
Law on Intellectual Property; Copyright Infringement and Unfair Competition; What Constitutes;
Copyright infringement and unfair competition are not limited to the act of selling counterfeit
goods. They cover a whole range of acts, from copying, assembling, packaging to marketing,
including the mere offering for sale of the counterfeit goods.—Copyright infringement and unfair
competition are not limited to the act of selling counterfeit goods. They cover a whole range of
acts, from copying, assembling, packaging to marketing, including the mere offering for sale of
the counterfeit goods. The clear and firm testimonies of petitioners’ witnesses on such other
acts stand untarnished. The Constitution and the Rules of Court only require that the judge
examine personally and thoroughly the applicant for the warrant and his witnesses to determine
probable cause. The RTC complied adequately with the requirement of the Constitution and the
Rules of Court.
227
227
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Search Warrants; A search warrant must state particularly
the place to be searched and the objects to be seized. It shall be issued "in connection with one
specific offense.” The articles described must bear a direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is issued.—A search warrant must state particularly the place to be searched and the
objects to be seized. The evident purpose for this requirement is to limit the articles to be seized
only to those particularly described in the search warrant. This is a protection against potential
abuse. It is necessary to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles
they shall seize, to the end that no unreasonable searches and seizures be committed.
Same; Partially Defective Search Warrant; There is no existing provision of law which requires
that a warrant, partially defective in specifying some items sought to be seized yet particular
with respect to the other items, should be nullified as a whole. A partially defective warrant
remains valid as to the items specifically described in the warrant.—No provision of law exists
which requires that a warrant, partially defective in specifying some items sought to be seized
yet particular with respect to the other items, should be nullified as a whole. A partially defective
warrant remains valid as to the items specifically described in the warrant. A search warrant is
severable, the items not sufficiently described may be cut off without destroying the whole
warrant.
Constitutional Law; Evidence; Exclusionary Rule; Section 3(2) of Article III of the Constitution
renders inadmissible in any proceeding all evidence obtained through unreasonable searches
and seizure.—The exclusionary rule found in Section 3(2) of Article III of the Constitution
renders inadmissible in any proceeding all evidence obtained through unreasonable searches
and seizure. Thus, all items seized under paragraph (c) of the search warrants, not falling under
paragraphs a, b, d, e or f, should be returned to Maxicorp. Microsoft Corporation vs. Maxicorp,
Inc., 438 SCRA 224, G.R. No. 140946 September 13, 2004
45. Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP 133 SCRA 800
Criminal Procedure; Constitutional Law; Appeal; While recourse to the Supreme Court should
not be made without first asking for quashal of the search warrant from the court that issued it,
case at bar is being exempted due to serious and urgent constitutional issues raised and the
public interest generated by the said search
_______________
* EN BANC.
801
VOL. 133, DECEMBER 26, 1984
801
Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, AFP
warrants.—Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that
petitioners had come to this Court without having previously sought the quashal of the search
warrants before respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity of the
warrants before this Court, should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that
issued them. But this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in
view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issued raised, not to mention the
public interest generated by the search of the “We Forum” offices, which was televised in
Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special
circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. In the words
of the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, “it is
always in the power of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its rules or to except a particular
case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it x x x”.
Same; Laches; Laches defined.—Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined
to assert it.
Same; Same; Laches may not be imputed to a party who tried to exhaust all extrajudicial efforts
before going to court to ask for quashal of search warrant.—Although the reason given by
petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial system, We find no ground to punish or chastise
them for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts exerted by petitioners
quite evidently negate the presumption that they had abandoned their right to the possession of
the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against them.
Same; Estoppel; Evidence; Use of some documents seized as evidence by person from same
were seized, in the case filed against him, does not estop him from questioning validity of their
seizure.—Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used
and marked as evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q-022872, he is
now estopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not follow the logic of
respondents. These documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do
whatever he pleases with them, within
802
802
legal abounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence does not and cannot in any way
affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this petition.
Same; Typographical error in specifying the address to be search not sufficient to invalidate a
search warrant where the address intended to be searched also appears on the face of the
warrant.—The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search
warrants were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two
distinct premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two
warrants intended for one and the same place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to
be searched were specifically set forth in the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself
who headed the team which executed the search warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen
by reason of the typographical error is more apparent than real. The fact is that the place for
which Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] was applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building,
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, which address appeared in the opening paragraph of the said
warrant. Obviously, this is the same place that respondent judge had in mind when he issued
Warrant No. 20-82 [b].
Same; Constitutional Law; Fact that some of the personal properties seized do not belong to the
person against whom a search warrant was directed, not a sufficient ground to annul the
same.—The above rule (Sec. 1, Rule 126) does not require that the property to be seized
should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not
be owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the
properties that may be seized is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by
one other than the person in whose possession it may be at the time of the search and seizure.
Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom
the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized, as
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized
under the warrants.
Same; Same; Property; Machinery bolted to the ground may be seized under a search warrant if
its owner is not the owner of the land on which it has been placed for then it is classified as
movable property.—Neither is there merit in petitioners’ assertion that real properties were
seized under the disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
“machinery, receptables,
803
803
instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works
which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the
needs of the said industry or works” are considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co.
v. Castillo where this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery which is
movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property
or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a
temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. In the case at bar,
petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries
were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground
remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
Same; Same; Words & Phrases; “Probable cause for search” defined.—We find petitioners’
thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched.
Same; Same; Same; A search warrant against a publisher must particularize the alleged
criminal or subversive material to be seized.—And when the search warrant applied for is
directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive
materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a
specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is
intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col.
Abadilla’s application that petitioner “is in possession or has in his control printing equipment
and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all
continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under
Presidential Decree 885, as amended x x x” is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the
existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search
warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so.
Same; Same, Same; Same.—Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable
cause is the statement contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U.
Tango, “that
804
804
the evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises above-
mentioned and the articles and things above-described were used and are continuously being
used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal
organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6
Movement.”
Same; Same; The persons wearing to or supporting the application for search warrants must
know personally the facts.—In mandating that “no warrant shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge, x x x after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce; the Constitution requires no less than personal
knowledge by the com-plainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a
search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, this Court ruled that “the
oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner
or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of
probable cause.” As couched, the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent
judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez case.
Same; Same; A search warrant in the nature of a general warrant is constitutionally

objectionable.—In Stanford v. State of Texas, the search warrant which authorized the search
for ‘books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other
written instruments concerning the Communist Parties of Texas, and the operation of the
Communist Party in Texas,” was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too
general. In like manner, directions to “seize any evidence in connection with the violation of
SDC 13-3703 or otherwise” have been held too general, and that portion of a search warrant
which authorized the seizure of any “paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197
of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy]” was held
to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. The description of the articles sought to be seized
under the search warrants in question cannot be characterized differently.
Same; Same; Closure of the premises of a news publishing house constitutes a virtual denial of
press freedom.—Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to
the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a
805
805
virtual denied of petitioners’ freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is
patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is
essential for the political enlightment and growth of the citizenry.
Same; Same.—Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the
ground that they have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as
amended, which authorizes “the sequestration of the property of any person, natural or artificial,
engaged in subversive activities against the government and its duly constituted authorities x x x
in accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of
National Defense.” It is doubtful, however, if sequestration could validly be effected in view of
the absence of any implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National
Defense.
Same; Same; Property; President Marcos denied the request of the military to sequester
property.—Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that
no less than President Marcos himself denied the request of the military authorities to sequester
the property seized from petitioners on December 7, 1982.
ABAD SANTOS, concurring:
Criminal Procedure; Constitutional Law; The warrants at bar were issued without probable
cause.—The two search warrants were issued without probable cause. To satisfy the
requirement of probable cause a specific offense must be alleged in the application; abstract
averments will not suffice. In the case at bar nothing specifically subversive has been alleged;
stated only is the claim that certain objects were being used as instruments and means of
committing the offense of subversion punishable under P.D. No. 885, as amended. There is no
mention of any specific provision of the decree. In the words of Chief Justice Concepcion, “It
would be legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody” of violating the decree without
reference to any determinate provision thereof.
Same; Same; The warrants at bar are void for lack of particularity.—The obvious question is:
Why were the documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, etc. subversive? What did they contain to
make them subversive? There is nothing in the applications nor in the warrants which answers
the questions. I must, therefore, con-
806
806

clude that the warrants are general warrants which are obnoxious to the Constitution.
Same; Same; There was nothing subversive in the seized publications.—In point of fact, there
was nothing subversive published in the WE FORUM just as there is nothing subversive which
has been published in MALAYA which has replaced the former and has the same content but
against which no action has been taken. Conformably with existing jurisprudence everything
seized pursuant to the warrants should be returned to the owners and all of the items are
subject to the exclusionary rule of evidence. Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, AFP, 133 SCRA 800,
No. L-64261 December 26, 1984
46. Frank Uy v. BIR , 344 SCRA 36
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Certified True Copies; The submission of a document together
with the motion for reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance with Section 3, Rule 46 of
the Rules of Court, requiring the submission of a certified true copy of material portions of the
record as are referred to in the petition, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto along
with the petition.—The CA should not have dismissed the petition on this ground although, to its
credit, it did touch upon the merits of the case. First, it appears that the case could have been
decided without these pleadings and documents. Second, even if the CA deemed them
essential to the resolution of the case, it could have asked for the records from the RTC. Third,
in a similar case, we held that the submission of a document together with the motion for
reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance with Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court,
requiring the submission of a certified true copy of “material portions of the record as are
referred to [in the petition], and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto” along with the
petition. So should it be in this case, especially considering that it involves an alleged violation
of a constitutionally guaranteed right. The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very
rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a
technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim could be defeated.
Searches and Seizures; Search Warrants; Certiorari; The issuing judge’s disregard of the
requirements for the issuance of a search warrant constitutes grave abuse of discretion, which
may be remedied by certiorari.—The applicable case is Marcelo vs. De Guzman, where we held
that the issuing judge’s disregard of the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant
constitutes grave abuse of discretion, which may be remedied by certiorari.
Same; Same; Requirements for Issuance of Search Warrants.—A search warrant must conform
strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions. These
requirements, in outline form, are: (1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the
probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the
_________________
* FIRST DIVISION.
37
VOL. 344, OCTOBER 20, 2000

37
Uy vs. Bureau of Internal Revenue
applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must
examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may
produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and
persons or things to be seized.
Same; Same; The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer
with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and
distinguish it from other places in the community.—The Constitution requires, for the validity of a
search warrant, that there be a particular description of “the place to be searched and the
persons of things to be seized.” The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is
sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the
place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Any designation or
description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on
inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement. Thus, in Castro
vs. Pabalan, where the search warrant mistakenly identified the residence of the petitioners
therein as Barrio Padasil instead of the adjoining Barrio Maria Cristina, this Court “admitted that
the deficiency in the writ is not of sufficient gravity to call for its invalidation.” In this case, it was
not shown that a street similarly named Hernan Cortes could be found in Cebu City. Nor was it
established that the enforcing officers had any difficulty in locating the premises of petitioner
corporation. That Search Warrant A-1 therefore, inconsistently identified the city where the
premises to be searched is, is not a defect that would spell the warrant’s invalidation in this
case.
Same; Same; Where the warrant was issued not for search of the persons owning or occupying
the premises, but only a search of the premises occupied by them, the search could not be
declared unlawful or in violation of the constitutional rights of the owner or occupants of the
premises, because of the inconsistencies in stating their names.—In Miller v. Sigler, it was held
that the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, from which Section 2, Article III of
our own Constitution is historically derived, does not require the warrant to name the person
who occupies the described premises. Where the search warrant is issued for the search of
specifically described premises only and not for the search of a person, the failure to name the
owner or occupant of such property in the affidavit and search warrant does not invalidate the
warrant; and where the name of the owner of the premises sought to be searched is incorrectly
inserted in the search warrant, it is not a fatal defect if the legal description of the premises to be
searched is otherwise correct so that no discretion is left to
38
38

the officer making the search as to the place to be searched. Since, in the case at bar, the
warrant was issued not for search of the persons owning or occupying the premises, but only a
search of the premises occupied by them, the search could not be declared unlawful or in
violation of the constitutional rights of the owner or occupants of the premises, because of
inconsistencies in stating their names.
Same; Same; Where the apparent intent in issuing another warrant was to supersede an earlier
warrant, the latter should be deemed revoked by the former.—Two warrants, Search Warrants
A-1 and A-2, were actuallyissued by the trial court for the same crime (violation of “SEC. 253” of
the National Internal Revenue Code). It appears, however, that Search Warrant A-2 was issued
merely to correct the inconsistencies in the addressin Search Warrant A-1, as well as to include
Unifish Packing Corporationas a party against whom the warrant was issued. Search Warrant
A-2 was evidently an attempt by the issuing judge to be more precise in the names of the
persons against whom the warrant was issued and in the description of the place to be
searched. Indeed, it would be absurd for the judge to issue on a single occasion two warrants
authorizing the search of a single place for a single offense. Inasmuch as the apparent intent in
issuing Search Warrant A-2 was to supersede Search Warrant A-1, the latter should be deemed
revoked by the former.
Same; Same; Probable Cause; Words and Phrases; “Probable Cause,” Defined.—Probable
cause is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
Same; Same; Same; In the determination of probable cause, the Constitutionand the Rules of
Court require an examination of the witnesses under oath, which must be probing and
exhaustive, not merely routine or pro forma.—In the determination of probable cause, the
Constitution and the Rules of Court require an examination of the witnesses under oath. The
examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routine or pro forma. The examining
magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry
on the intent and justificationof the application. Asking of leading questions to the deponent in
an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a generalmanner, would not
satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant.
Same; Same; Same; The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, be
39
VOL. 344, OCTOBER 20, 2000
39
cause the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making
the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause.—The
witnesses, in turn, must testify under oath to facts of their own personal knowledge. The oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his
witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of
probable cause. Search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor
on mere suspicion or belief.
Same; Same; General Warrants; The use of a generic term or a general description in a warrant
is acceptable only when a more specific description of the things to be seized is unavailable.—
We agree that most of the items listed in the warrants fail to meet the test of particularity,
especially since witness Abos had furnished the judge photocopies of the documents sought to
be seized. The issuing judge could have formed a more specific description of these documents
from said photocopies instead of merely employing a generic description thereof. The use of a
generic term or a general description in a warrant is acceptable only when a more specific
description of the things to be seized is unavailable. The failure to employ the specificity
available will invalidate a general description in a warrant. The use by the issuing judge of the
terms “multiple sets of books of accounts, ledgers, journals, columnar books, cash register
books, sales books or records, provisional & official receipts,” “production record
books/inventory lists, stock cards,” “sales records, job order,” “corporate financial records,” and
“bank statements/cancelled checks” is therefore unacceptable considering the circumstances of
this case.
Same; Same; Same; Where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be
rather general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no
warrant could issue.—As regards the terms “unregistered delivery receipts” and “unregistered
purchase & sales invoices,” however, we hold otherwise. The Solicitor General correctly argues
that the serial markings of these documents need not be specified as it is not possible to do so
precisely because they are unregistered. Where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their
description must be rather general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this
would mean that no warrant could issue. Taking into consideration the nature of the articles so
described, it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could have been
given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof.
Although it appears that photocopies of these unregistered docu-
40
40
ments were among those handed by Abos to the issuing judge, it would be impractical to require
the latter to specify each and every receipt and invoice, and the contents thereof, to the
minutest detail.
Same; Same; Same; General description of most of the documents listed in the warrants does
not render the entire warrant void—the search warrant is severable, and those items not
particularly described may be cut off without destroying the whole warrant.—The general
description of most of the documents listed in the warrants does not render the entire warrant
void. Insofar as the warrants authorize the search and seizure of unregistered delivery receipts
and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, the warrants remain valid. The search warrant is
severable, and those items not particularly described may be cut off without destroying the
whole warrant.
Same; Same; Same; In order to comply with the constitutional provisions regulating the
issuance of search warrants, the property to be seized under a warrant must be particularly
described therein and no other property can be taken thereunder; Seizure of items not specified
in the warrants cannot be justified by the directive to “seize and take possession of other
properties relative to such violation,” which in no way can be characterized as a particular
description of the things to be seized.—The things belonging to petitioner not specifically
mentioned in the warrants, like those not particularly described, must be ordered returned to
petitioners. In order to comply with the constitutional provisions regulating the issuance of
search warrants, the property to be seized under a warrant must be particularly described
therein and no other property can be taken thereunder. In Tambasen vs. People, it was held:
Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the search warrant, the police acted
beyond the parameters of their authority under the search warrant. Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the things to be
seized. The evident purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be seized to
those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant, to leave the officers of the
law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable
searches and seizures may not be made and that abuses may not be committed” (Corro v.
Lising, 137 SCRA 541, 547 [1985]); Bache & Co. [Phil.], Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Uy
Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 [1920]). The same constitutional provision is also aimed at
preventing violations of security in person and property and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of
the home, and giving remedy against such usurpations when attempted (People v. Damaso,
212 SCRA 547 [1992] citing Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, 646 [1946]), x x x The seizure of
41
VOL. 344, OCTOBER 20, 2000
41
the items not specified in the warrants cannot be justified by the directive in the penultimate
paragraph thereof to “seize and take possession of other properties relative to such violation,”
which in no way can be characterized as a particular description of the things to be seized.
Same; Same; Parties; The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights
have been impaired thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.—As regards the articles supposedly
belonging to PIDC, we cannot order their return in the present proceedings. The legality of a
seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties. Uy vs. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 344 SCRA 36, G.R. No. 129651 October 20, 2000
47. Yousex Al-Ghoul v. CA GR 126859 Sept. 4 , 2001
Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizure; The place to be searched cannot be changed,
enlarged nor amplified by the police.—As held in PICOP v. Asuncion, the place to be searched
cannot be changed, enlarged nor amplified by the police. Policemen may not be restrained from
pursuing their task with vigor, but in doing so, care must be taken that constitutional and legal
safeguards are not disregarded. Exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence is the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Hence, we are constrained to declare that the search made at Apartment No. 8 is illegal and the
.45 caliber pistol taken thereat is inadmissible in evidence against petitioners.
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
364
364
Al-Ghoul vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Court concludes that the gun seized in Apartment No. 8 cannot be used in
evidence, but those articles including guns, ammunitions and explosives seized in Apartment
No. 2 are admissible in evidence.—We note that the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners
waived their right to raise any attack on the validity of the search warrants at issue by their
failure to file a motion to quash. But, in conducting the search at Apartment No. 8, not just
Apartment No. 2 as ordered specifically in the search warrants, the police committed a gross
violation we cannot condone. Thus, we conclude that the gun seized in Apartment No. 8 cannot
be used in evidence, but those articles including guns, ammunitions, and explosives seized in
Apartment No. 2 are admissible in evidence.
Same; Same; The two-witness rule applies only in the absence of the lawful occupants of the
premises searched.—Clearly, the two-witness rule applies only in the absence of the lawful
occupants of the premises searched. In the case at bar, petitioners were present when the
search and seizure operation was conducted by the police at Apartment No. 2. More
importantly, petitioner Nabeel Al-Riyami y Nasser admitted being an actual occupant/resident of
Apartment No. 2. Hence, we find here no violation of Section 10, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules
of Court.
Criminal Law; Illegal Possession of Firearm; Evidence; Settled is the rule that actual possession
of firearms and ammunitions is not an indispensable element for prosecution under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1866; The kind of possession punishable under P.D. 1866 is one where the
accused possessed a firearm either physically or constructively with animus possidendi or intent
to possess said firearm.—Petitioners contend that they could not be charged with violation of
P.D. 1866 because the seized items were not taken actually from their possession. This
contention, however, cannot prosper in the light of the settled rule that actual possession of
firearms and ammunitions is not an indispensable element for prosecution under P.D. No. 1866.
In People v. Dela Rosa, 284 SCRA 158, 168-169 (1998), we clarified that the kind of possession
punishable under P.D. 1866 is one where the accused possessed a firearm either physically or
constructively with animus possidendi or intent to possess said firearm. Whether or not the
evidence would show all the elements of P.D. 1866 in this case is a different matter altogether.
We shall not preempt issues properly still within the cognizance of courts below. Al-Ghoul vs.
Court of Appeals, 364 SCRA 363, G.R. No. 126859 September 4, 2001
48. People v. CA – 291 SCRA 400
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Provincial Prosecutor FAUSTINO T. CHIONG,

petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CAESAR CASANOVA, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 80, Malolos, Bulacan, AZFAR HUSSAIN, MOHAMMAD SAGED,
MUJAHID KHAN, MOHAMMAD ASLAM and MEHMOOD ALI, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Search Warrants; The place the police officers have in mind in applying for a
search warrant must be the same place the Judge should have in mind when he issues the
warrant.—The Government insists that the police officers who applied to the Quezon City RTC
for the search warrant had direct, personal knowledge of the place to be searched and the
things to be seized. It claims that one of said officers, in fact, had been able to surreptitiously
enter the place to be searched prior to the search: this being the first of four (4) separate
apartments behind the Abigail Variety Store; and they were also the same police officers who
eventually effected the search and seizure. They thus had personal knowledge of the place to
be searched and had the competence to make a sketch thereof; they knew exactly what objects
should be taken therefrom; and they had presented evidence sufficient to establish probable
cause. That may be so; but unfortunately, the place they had in mind—the first of four (4)
separate apartment units (No. 1) at the rear of “Abigail Variety Store”—was not what the Judge
who issued the warrant himself had in mind, and was not what was ultimately described in the
search warrant.
Same; Same; It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that
stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched—although not that specified
in the warrant—is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had
demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search
is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had
represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the
________________
* THIRD DIVISION.
401
VOL. 291, JUNE 26, 1998
401
People vs. Court of Appeals
warrant.—The case at bar, however, does not deal with the correction of an “obvious
typographical error” involving ambiguous descriptions of the place to be searched, as in Burgos,
but the search of a place different from that clearly and without ambiguity identified in the search
warrant. In Burgos, the inconsistency calling for clarification was immediately perceptible on the
face of the warrants in question. In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant.
The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of minds as to
the place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the
same; and what was done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in the
warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been
done. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated
in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched—although not that specified in the
warrant—is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had
represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the
officers’ theory, in the context of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of
Abigail’s Variety Store would have been fair game for a search.
Same; Same; The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or
modified by the officers’ own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they
adduced in support of their application for the warrant—the particularization of the description of
the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant
itself.—The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by
the officers’ own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support
of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which
requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as
the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the
place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the
door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that
discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the
description of the
402
402
place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it
cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.
Same; Same; Exclusionary Rule; Infringement of the constitutional requirement that a search
warrant particularly describe the place to be searched necessarily brings into operation the
concomitant provision that “(a)ny evidence obtained in violation ** (inter alia of the search-and-
seizure provision) shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.”—It does not suffice,
for a search warrant to be deemed valid, that it be based on probable cause, personally
determined by the judge after examination under oath, or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce; it is essential, too, that it particularly describe the place to be
searched, the manifest intention being that the search be confined strictly to the place so
described. There was therefore in this case an infringement of the constitutional requirement
that a search warrant particularly describe the place to be searched; and that infringement
necessarily brought into operation the concomitant provision that “(a)ny evidence obtained in
violation ** (inter alia of the search-and-seizure provision) shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding.”
Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Motions to Quash Warrant; Where a
search warrant is issued by one court and the criminal action based on the results of the search
is afterwards commenced in another court, it is not the rule that a motion to quash the warrant
(or to retrieve things thereunder seized) may be filed only with the issuing Court—such a motion
may be filed for the first time in either the issuing Court or that in which the criminal action is
pending.—The guidelines have been misconstrued. Where a search warrant is issued by one
court and the criminal action based on the results of the search is afterwards commenced in
another court, it is not the rule that a motion to quash the warrant (or to retrieve things
thereunder seized) may be filed only with the issuing Court. Such a motion may be filed for the
first time in either the issuing Court or that in which the criminal action is pending. However, the
remedy is alternative, not cumulative. The Court first taking cognizance of the motion does so to
the exclusion of the other, and the proceedings thereon are subject to the Omnibus Motion Rule
and the rule against forum-shopping. This is clearly stated in the
403
VOL. 291, JUNE 26, 1998
403
third policy guideline which indeed is what properly applies to the case at bar. People vs. Court
of Appeals, 291 SCRA 400, G.R. No. 126379 June 26, 1998
49. Paper Industries v. Asuncion, GR 122092 May 19, 1998
Constitutional Law; Criminal Law; Searches and Seizures; Requisites of a Valid Search
Warrant.—The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such
presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or
she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation;
(4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and (5) the
warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Same; Same; Same; It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not
merely routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established.—The trial
judge failed to propound questions, let alone probing questions, to the applicant and to his
witnesses other than Bacolod (whose testimony, as will later be shown, is also improper).
Obviously, His Honor relied mainly on their affidavits. This Court has frowned on this practice in
this language: “Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce and attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that
the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable
cause, to hold liable for per-
______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
254
254
Paper Industries Corporation of the Phils. vs. Asuncion
jury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. x x x x x x x x x “It
is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-
forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not
simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and
justification of the application.”
Same; Same; Same; The Constitution and the Rules limit the place to be searched only to those
described in the warrant.—In view of the manifest objective of the constitutional safeguard
against unreasonable search, the Constitution and the Rules limit the place to be searched only
to those described in the warrant.Thus, this Court has held that “this constitutional right [i]s the
embodiment of a spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and person and
to afford it constitutional protection against the long reach of government is no less than to value
human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social
need, and then only under stringent procedural safeguards.” Additionally, the requisite of
particularity is related to the probable cause requirement in that, at least under some
circumstances, the lack of a more specific description will make it apparent that there has not
been a sufficient showing to the magistrate that the described items are to be found in a
particular place.
Same; Same; Same; The place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged or amplified by the
police.—Indeed, the place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged or amplified by the
police, viz.: “x x x. In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity
lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of the minds as to the place to
be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what
was done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the
premises that the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been done. It [was]
neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the
warrant on the claim that the place actually searched—although not that specified in the
warrant—[was] exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had
255
VOL. 307, MAY 19, 1999
255
Paper Industries Corporation of the Phils. vs. Asuncion

represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the
officers’ theory, in the context of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of
Abigail’s Variety Store would have been fair game for a search. “The place to be searched, as
set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers’ own personal knowledge
of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant.
Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to
particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It
would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not
be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process,
and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has
precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to be
searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left
to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.”
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; The exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence is the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.—
Because the search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of
Court, all the firearms, explosives and other materials seized were “inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceed-ing.” As the Court noted in an earlier case, the exclusion of unlawfully
seized evidence was “the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures.”Verily, they are the “fruits of the poisonous tree.” Without
this exclusionary rule, the constitutional right “would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed
from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence x x x.”
Paper Industries Corporation of the Phils. vs. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 253, G.R. No. 122092 May
19, 1999
50. Malalaon v. CA, 232 SCRA 249
Remedial Law; Search Warrants; Venue; Jurisdiction; It is erroneous to equate the application
for and the obtention of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action
in a trial
_______________
12 People v. Jamino, 3 Phil. 102; People v. Abletes, 58 SCRA 241.
* EN BANC.
250
250
Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals
court.—The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the
obtention of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial
court. It would thus categorize what is only a special criminal process, the power to issue which
is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in
specific courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and
purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely different from those for the
institution of a criminal action.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant,
merely constitutes process.—For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search
warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order
in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a
peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. A
search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special
and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Judicial Process defined.—Invariably, a judicial
process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of
law; also the means of accomplishing an end, including judicial proceedings, or all writs,
warrants, summonses, and orders of courts of justice or judicial officers. It is likewise held to
include a writ, summons, or order issued in a judicial proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a
person or his property, to expedite the cause or enforce the judgment, or a writ, warrant,
mandate, or other process issuing from a court of justice.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A search warrant is merely a judicial process
designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case.—It is clear, therefore,
that a search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules to respond only to an
incident in the main case, if one has already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. In the
latter contingency, as in the case at bar, it would involve some judicial clairvoyance to require
observance of the rules as to where a criminal case may eventually be filed where, in the first
place, no such action having as yet been instituted, it may ultimately be filed in a territorial
jurisdiction other than that wherein the illegal articles sought to be seized are then located. This
is aside from the consideration that a criminal action may be filed in different venues under the
rules for delitos continuados or in those instances where
251
VOL. 232, MAY 6, 1994
251
different trial courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over the same criminal offense.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Circular No. 13 and Circular No. 19 were not intended to be of
general application to all instances involving search warrants and in all courts as would be the
case if they had been adopted as part of the Rules of Court.—Firstly, it is evident that both
circulars were not intended to be of general application to all instances involving search
warrants and in all courts as would be the case if they had been adopted as part of the Rules of
Court. These circulars were issued by the Court to meet a particular exigency, that is, as
emergency guidelines on applications for search warrants filed only in the courts of Metropolitan
Manila and other courts with multiple salas and only with respect to violations of the Anti-
Subversion Act, crimes against public order under the Revised Penal Code, illegal possession
of firearms and/or ammunitions, and violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law, in this case Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, not by a procedural law and much less by an administrative order or
circular.—Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law, in this case Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
not by a procedural law and, much less, by an administrative order or circular. The jurisdiction
conferred by said Act on regional trial courts and their judges is basically regional in scope.
Thus, Section 17 thereof provides that “(e)very Regional Trial Judge shall be appointed to a
region which shall be his permanent station,” and he “may be assigned by the Supreme Court to
any branch or city or municipality within the same region as public interest may require, and
such assignment shall not be deemed an assignment to another station x x x” which, otherwise,
would necessitate a new appointment for the judge.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Administrative Order No. 3 and Circulars Nos. 13 and 19,
did not per se confer jurisdiction on the covered regional trial court or its branches such that
non-observance thereof would nullify their judicial acts.—In fine, Administrative Order No. 3 and,
in like manner, Circulars Nos. 13 and 19, did not per se confer jurisdiction on the covered
regional trial court or its branches, such that non-observance thereof would nullify their judicial
acts. The administrative order merely defines the limits of the administrative area within which a
branch of the court may exercise its authority pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129. The circulars only allocated to the three executive judges the
administrative areas for which they may respectively issue search warrants under the special
circumstance contemplated therein, but likewise
252
252
pursuant to the jurisdiction vested in them by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is incorrect to say that only the court which has jurisdiction
over the criminal case can issue the search warrant.—It is, therefore, incorrect to say that only
the court which has jurisdiction over the criminal case can issue the search warrant, as would
be the consequence of petitioners’ position that only the branch of the court with jurisdiction
over the place to be searched can issue a warrant to search the same. It may be conceded, as
a matter of policy, that where a criminal case is pending, the court wherein it was filed, or the
assigned branch thereof, has primary jurisdiction to issue the search warrant; and where no
such criminal case has yet been filed, that the executive judges or their lawful substitutes in the
areas and for the offenses contemplated in Circular No. 19 shall have primary jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It does not mean that a court whose territorial jurisdiction
does not embrace the place to be searched cannot issue a search warrant therefor where the
obtention of that search warrant is necessitated and justified by compelling considerations of
urgency, subject, time and place.—This should not, however, mean that a court whose territorial
jurisdiction does not embrace the place to be searched cannot issue a search warrant therefor,
where the obtention of that search warrant is necessitated and justified by compelling
considerations of urgency, subject, time and place. Conversely, neither should a search warrant
duly issued by a court which has jurisdiction over a pending criminal case, or one issued by an
executive judge or his lawful substitute under the situations provided for by Circular No. 19, be
denied enforcement or nullified just because it was implemented outside the court’s territorial
jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; No law or rule imposes such a limitation on search warrants
in the same manner that no such restriction is provided for warrants of arrest.—No law or rule
imposes such a limitation on search warrants, in the same manner that no such restriction is
provided for warrants of arrest. Parenthetically, in certain states within the American jurisdiction,
there were limitations of the time wherein a warrant of arrest could be enforced. In our
jurisdiction, no period is provided for the enforceability of warrants of arrest, and although within
ten days from the delivery of the warrant of arrest for execution a return thereon must be made
to the issuing judge, said warrant does not become functus officio but is enforceable indefinitely
until the same is enforced or recalled. On the other hand, the lifetime of
253
VOL. 232, MAY 6, 1994
253
a search warrant has been expressly set in our Rules at ten days but there is no provision as to
the extent of the territory wherein it may be enforced, provided it is implemented on and within
the premises specifically described therein which may or may not be within the territorial
jurisdiction of the issuing court.
DAVIDE, JR., J., Separate Opinion
Same; Same; Same; Same; The exception violates the settled principle that even in case of
concurrent jurisdiction the first court which acquires jurisdiction over the case acquires it to the
exclusion of the other.—I submit that the exception violates the settled principle that even in
cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the first court which acquires jurisdiction over the case acquires
it to the exclusion of the other. (People vs. Fernando, 23 SCRA 867, 870 [1968]). This being so,
it is with more reason that a court which does not have concurrent jurisdiction with the first
which had taken cognizance of the case does not also have the authority to issue writs or
processes, including search warrants, in connection with the pending case. Moreover, since the
issuance of a search warrant is an incident to a main case or is an exercise of the ancillary
jurisdiction of a court, the court where the main case is filed has exclusive jurisdiction over all
incidents thereto and in the issuance of all writs and processes in connection therewith.
Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 249, G.R. No. 104879 May 6, 1994
51. People v. Estrada – GR 124461, June 26, 2000
Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizure; If the producer, manufacturer or seller has no permit
or authority from the appropriate government agency, the drugs or medicines cannot be
returned although the search warrants were declared illegal.—Even if the medicines or drugs
seized were genuine and even if they contain the proper chemicals or ingredients for their
production or manufacture, if the producer, manufacturer or seller has no permit or authority
from the appropriate government agency, the drugs or medicines cannot be returned although
the search warrants were declared illegal. It might be the burden of the party seeking issuance
of a
_______________
* SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION.
370
370
People vs. Estrada
warrant to convince the issuing magistrate that probable cause exists, and to procure the proper
admissible evidence to show that the party against whom the warrant is directed is not duly
authorized by the Bureau of Foods and Drugs (BFAD). However, if there is an allegation that the
possession of the goods or things seized were illegal for lack of appropriate permit from the duly
authorized agencies, the party seeking the return of her seized properties must show the
corresponding permits or authority to manufacture, sell or possess the same. The
pharmaceutical genuineness of the drugs or medicines is not a sufficient justification to demand
its return. There must be compliance with requirements of the law regarding permits and
licenses.
Same; Same; Private respondent cannot rely on the statement of the trial court that the
applicant “failed to allege in the application for search warrant that the subject drugs for which
she was applying for search warrant were either fake, misbranded, adulterated, or unregistered”
in order to obtain the return of the drugs.—If the seized 52 boxes of drugs are pharmaceutically
correct but not properly documented, they should be promptly disposed of in the manner
provided by law in order to ensure that the same do not fall into the wrong hands who might use
the drugs underground. Private respondent cannot rely on the statement of the trial court that
the applicant “failed to allege in the application for search warrant that the subject drugs for
which she was applying for search warrant were either fake, misbranded, adulterated, or
unregistered” (Comment on Partial Motion for Reconsideration, p. 3; Rollo, p. 280; Order ofRTC
Dated December 7, 1995) in order to obtain the return of the drugs. The policy of the law
enunciated in R.A. No. 8203 is to protect the consumers as well as the licensed businessmen.
People vs. Estrada, 334 SCRA 369, G.R. No. 124461 June 26, 2000
52. Salazar v. Achcoso, 183 SCRA 145
Labor Law; Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Remedial Law; Only a judge may issue
warrants of search and arrest.—Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written,
was entered as an amendment by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late
________________
* EN BANC.
146
146
Salazar vs. Achacoso
President Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislative
powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. We reiterate that the Secretary of
Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities
must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the
Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Remedial Law; Exception; The President has the power
to order the arrest (of illegal or undesirable aliens) for the purpose of deportation. —The State
has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57
L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be exercised by the Chief Executive “when he
deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation.” Justice
Johnson’s opinion is that when the Chief Executive finds that there are aliens whose continued
presence in the country is injurious to the public interest, “he may, even in the absence of
express law, deport them.” (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil. 534, 568, 569; In
re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41). Salazar vs. Achacoso, 183 SCRA 145, G.R. No. 81510 March
14, 1990
53. Republic (PCGG) v. Sandiganbayan, 255 SCRA 438
Remedial Law; Actions; Dismissal; A direct action in court without prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies, when required, is premature, warranting its dismissal on a motion to
dismiss grounded on lack of cause of action.—Hardly can it be disputed that a direct action in
court without prior exhaustion of administrative remedies, when required, is premature,
warranting its dismissal on a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of cause of action. The
supporting cases cited by the PCGG in its petition indeed spell this out, to wit: “Pestanas v.
Dyogi,” “Aboitiz v. Coll. of Customs,” and “Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato.” And in the case of
“Ocampo v. Buenaventura” likewise cited by PCGG, the Court in essence approves of the filing
of a motion to dismiss based upon failure to state a cause of action at any stage of the
proceedings.
Same; Same; Same; Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court.—“Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. We have repeatedly
stressed this in a long line of decisions. The only effect of non-compliance with this rule is that it
will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If
not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can take cognizance
of the case and try it.”
Same; Same; Same; Laches; PCGG cannot seek refuge in the “Ocampo” case to justify the
marked delay in filing its motion to dismiss; Laches defined.—The length of time the PCGG
allowed to drift away and its decision to file its motion to dismiss only at the homestretch of the
trial hardly qualify as “proper time.” This factual scenario largely differs from the “Ocampo” case
relied upon by the PCGG. In that case and the case of “Community Investment &
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
439
VOL. 255, MARCH 29, 1996
439
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan
Finance Corp. v. Garcia” cited therein, the motions to dismiss involved were filed just after the
filing of the answer, and not at some belated time nearing the end of the trial. The parties in
those cases have not presented any testimonial or documentary evidence yet, as the trial
proper has not commenced, and neither does it appear that the movants concerned took close
to seven (7) years before filing their respective motions to dismiss. The PCGG therefore cannot
seek refuge in the “Ocampo” case to justify the marked delay in filing its motion to dismiss. Such
tarried maneuver made the PCGG guilty of estoppel by laches—the definition and effect of
which this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Regalado, had the occasion to visit anew in the
relatively recent case of “Olizon v. C.A.” “Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for
an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence
could nor should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The leniency extended by the Rules and by jurisprudence in
allowing a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action filed after the answer or at any
stage of the proceedings cannot be invoked to cover-up and validate the onset of laches.—With
its undenied belated action, seven (7) years in the making at that, it is only proper to presume
with conclusiveness that the PCGG has abandoned or declined to assert what it bewailed as the
SIPALAY and ALLIED petitions’ lack of cause of action. More accurately, the PCGG should be
deemed to have waived such perceived defect in line with the “Soto” case, for “proper time”
cannot mean nor sanction an unexplained and unreasonable length of time such as seven (7)
years. The leniency extended by the Rules (Rule 9, Section 2, Rules of Court) and by
jurisprudence (“Ocampo case”) in allowing a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action
filed after the answer or at any stage of the proceedings cannot be invoked to cover-up and
validate the onset of laches—or the failure to do something which should be done or to claim or
enforce a right at a proper time which, in this case, was one of the PCGG’s follies. Indeed, in
matters of timeliness, “indecent waste” is just as reprehensible as “indecent haste.”
Same; Civil Procedure; Evidence; Court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered.—By way of preface, no
440
440
serious objection can be raised insofar as the SANDIGANBAYAN’s exclusive reliance on the
testimonies of the three (3) PCGG witnesses is concerned. The SANDIGANBAYAN had no
other choice, for these testimonies in fact constitute the entire evidence for the PCGG,
inasmuch as no documentary evidence which might have supported the testimonial evidence
were offered by the PCGG below. The Rules of Court and jurisprudence decree that “The court
shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.” There is no doubt that the
testimonies of the PCGG witnesses were formally offered as evidence meriting due appreciation
by the SANDIGANBAYAN, since Section 35, Rule 132 of the Rules requires that the offer of
testimonial evidence “must be made at the time the witness is called to testify.”
Same; Same; Same; Mere identification of documents and the marking thereof as exhibits do
not confer any evidentiary weight on documents not formally offered.—Dr. Doromal was
basically preoccupied with identifying and referring to documents purportedly coming from
Malacañang, the US State Department and other sources. What his testimony essentially yields
is the fact that the prima facie evidence/s supporting the sequestration order issued against
SIPALAY is/are buried and ascertainable in these documents. But, to repeat, any reference
thereto is unwarranted since there was no offer thereof in evidence. And it must be emphasized
at this point that mere identification of documents and the marking thereof as exhibits do not
confer any evidentiary weight on documents not formally offered.
Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; Issue on the existence of prima facie evidence in
support of the issuance of a sequestration order has been laid to rest in the Baseco case.—
There being no evidence, not even a prima facie one, there was therefore no valid sequestration
of the SIPALAY shares in the Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corporation. We hereby re-
emphasize the indispensability of prima facie evidence by adverting to the Court’s
pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,” to wit: “IV. The issue on the existence of prima
facie evidence in support of the issuance of a sequestration order has likewise been laid to rest
in the BASECO case, in this wise: ‘8. Requisites for Validity. What is indispensable is that, again
as in the case of attachment and receivership, there exist a prima facie factual foundation, at
least, for the sequestration, freeze or takeover order, and adequate and fair opportunity to
441
VOL. 255, MARCH 29, 1996
441

contest it and endeavor to cause its negation or nullification. Both were assured under the
executive orders in question and the rules and regulations promulgated by the PCGG.
Same; Same; Arguments that the Freedom Constitution authorizes the issuance of writs of
sequestration without requiring any finding of prima facie evidence to support issuance thereof
clearly without merit in the face of the Court’s pronouncement in the Baseco case.—This
argument is clearly without merit in the face of this Court’s pronouncement in the “Baseco” case,
that: “Parenthetically, even if the requirement for a prima facie showing of ‘ill-gotten wealth’ were
not expressly imposed by some rule or regulation as a condition to warrant the sequestration or
freezing of property contemplated in the executive orders in question, it would nevertheless be
exigible in this jurisdiction in which the Rule of Law prevails and official acts which are devoid of
rational basis in fact or law, or are whimsical and capricious, are condemned and struck down.”
Same; Same; Court agrees that PCGG made use of an unauthorized and constitutionally
defective search warrant to effect the sequestration of ALLIED.—Going now to the case of
ALLIED, the principal objection raised regarding the order issued against it is that the PCGG
made use of an unauthorized and constitutionally defective search warrant to effect the
sequestration. The SANDIGANBAYAN saw and declared it as such. We agree.
Same; Same; Nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 invoked by the PCGG to justify the search and
seizure order was the PCGG expressly empowered to issue such specie of a process.—There
can be no doubt that the order which the PCGG issued against ALLIED typifies a search
warrant (full text of which appears in the early part of this decision). Not only is the order
captioned as SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER, the body thereof clearly enjoined the branch
manager to make available to the PCGG team all bank documents precisely for that purpose. It
is unauthorized because nowhere in the same Executive Order No. 1 (particularly Section 3)
invoked by the PCGG to justify the search and seizure order was the PCGG expressly
empowered to issue such specie of a process in pursuit of its mandated purpose of recovering
ill-gotten/unexplained wealth.
Same; Same; Requisites for a Search Warrant’s Validity.—Supporting jurisprudence thus

outlined the following requisites for a
442
442
search warrant’s validity, the absence of even one will cause its downright nullification: (1) it
must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge
himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause,
the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the
latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be
searched and persons or things to be seized.
Same; Same; Same; Only a “judge” and “such other responsible officer as may be authorized
by law” were empowered by the Freedom Constitution to issue search warrants.—The PCGG
has no authority to issue the order in the first place. Only a “judge” and “such other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law” were empowered by the FREEDOM CONSTITUTION to do
so, and the PCGG is neither. It is not a judge, as clarified by the Court in “Baseco.”
Same; Same; Same; PCGG cannot be considered as “such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law.”—And the PCGG cannot be considered as “such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law” because Executive Order No. 1, to reiterate, did not expressly nor
impliedly grant the PCGG the power to issue search warrants/orders.
Same; Same; The search warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized.—It
expressly refers to “all bank documents” which is too all-embracing, the obvious intent of which
is to subject virtually all records pertaining to all business transactions of ALLIED of whatever
nature, to search and seizure. Such tenor of a seizure warrant is not a particular description,
thus contravening the explicit command of the Constitution that there be a particular description
of things to be seized. Being a general warrant, the SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER is
constitutionally objectionable and to be more precise, void for lack of particularity. Republic vs.
Sandiganbayan, 255 SCRA 438, G.R. Nos. 112708-09 March 29, 1996
54. Morano v. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562
Citizenship; Aliens; When alien woman married to a Filipino citizen becomes a Filipino citizen.—
In order that an alien woman married to a Filipino may acquire Philippine citizenship, the
marriage must be valid and the alien woman herself might be lawfully naturalized. The validity of
the marriage is presumed.
Same; Meaning of "might herself be lawfully naturalized".—The marriage of an alien woman to a

Filipino citizen does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen. She must satisfactorily show that
she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in the Naturalization
Law.
Constitutional Law; Unreasonable searches and seizures; Aliens; Deportation; Arrest of

overstaying alien.—The constitutional provision against unreasonable searches and seizures
does not require judicial intervention in the execution of a final order of deportation issued in
accordance with law. It contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial power as a
step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or proceedings for a given offense or administrative
action, not as a measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a competent official,
such as a legal order of deportation, issued by
563
VOL. 20, JUNE 30, 1967
563
Morano vs. Vivo
the Commissioner of Immigration in pursuance of a valid law. The requirement of probable

cause, to be determined by a judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings.
Same; Deprivation of liberty by agencies other than courts.—There are cases of deprivation of
liberty which are sanctioned by due process and which are effected by means other than by
order of a competent court.
Aliens; Deportation; Nature of dep ortation.—The power to deport aliens is an attribute of

sovereignty. Such power is based on the accepted maxim of international law, that every
sovereign nation has the inherent power, essential to self-preservation, to forbid entrance of
foreigners within its dominions.
Same; Immigration; Deportation of overstaying aliens.—Aliens, admitted as temporary visitors,

who do not depart upon the expiration of the period of stay granted them, are subject to
deportation by the Commissioner of Immigration. They have violated the limitation or condition
under which they were admitted as nonimmigrants.
Constitutional Law; Immigration; Power of Immigration Commissioner to deport overstaying

alien visitors is constitutional.—Section 37 of the Immigration Law, which empowers the
Commissioner of Immigration to issue warrants for the arrest of overstaying aliens, is
constitutional. The arrest is a step preliminary to the deportation of the aliens who had violated
the condition of their stay in this country.
Immigration; Quota immigrant.—An alien woman, admitted to the Philippines as a tourist-

temporary visitor, who married a Filipino citizen, may reenter this country, after the expiration of
her temporary stay, as a quota immigrant, provided that she departs voluntarily to some foreign
country; that she procures from the appropriate consul the proper visa and that she undergoes
examination by the immigration officials at the port of entry to determine her admissibility under
the Immigration Law.
Same; Reasons for the requirements.—The above requisites are intended to discourage entry
under false pretenses and to avoid a circumvention of the Immigration Law.
Citizenship; Naturalization; "Child" in section 15 of Revised Naturalization Law refers to

legitimate child.—The word "child" in section 15 of the Revised Natural ization Law refers to a
legitimate child, not a stepchild. The term "child" in section 1(3) of Article IV of the Constitution
also refers to legitimate child.
Immigration; Change of status to permanent resident.—The status of a temporary visitor cannot

be converted into that of a permanent resident without first complying with section 9 of the
Immigration Law.
Same; Immigration bonds; Effect of lack of approval.—'The provision requiring approval of an

immigration bond is
564
564
Morano vs. Vivo

merely directory. Irregularity or entire failure in this respect does not affect the validity of the
bond. Moreover, the fact that the government has not questioned the form of the bond indicates
that it counts with the approval of the Secretary of Justice as required by law.
Same; Estoppel to question immigration bond.—Equitable consideration estops an alien obligor

from pleading the invalidity of his bond for lack of approval by the Secretary of Justice. He
offered that bond to enable himself to enter and stay in this country, He enjoyed benefits
therefrom. He cannot in law and good conscience be allowed to reap the fruits of that bond and
then jettison it. He is precluded from attacking its validity.
Same; Confiscation of bond.—The bond of an overstaying alien visitor is subject to confiscation.

Morano vs. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562, No. L-22196 June 30, 1967
55. Sy v. Domingo
56. Tron Van Nyhia v. Liway, 175 SCRA 318
Constitutional Law; Warrant of Arrest; Requirement of Probable Cause; Deportation

Proceedings; Due Process; It is essential that there should be a specific charge against the
alien to be deported and arrested.—The aforesaid argument raised by petitioner has been
resolved in the case of Harvey vs. Defensor-Santiago, G.R. No. 82544, June 28, 1988, where
the Court, through Madame Justice Melencio-Herrera, said: “ ‘The requirement of probable
cause to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings.’ (Morano vs.
Vivo, supra, citing Tiu Chun Hai vs. Commissioner, infra). There need be no ‘truncated’
recourse to both judicial and administrative warrants in a single deportation proceeding. “The
foregoing does not deviate from the ruling in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board (G.R. No.
10280, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 27 [1963] reiterated in Vivo vs.
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
319
VOL. 175, JULY 13, 1989
319
Lucien Tran Van Nghia vs. Liwag
Montesa, supra, that ‘under the express terms of our Constitution (the 1935 Constitution), it is
therefore even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by authority other
than a judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to
an administrative investigation.’ What is essential is that there should be a specific charge
against the alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted
(Section 37 [c]) with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be substantiated
by competent evidence. x x x.” The particular circumstances obtaining in the case at bar have
seriously placed on doubt the legality and propriety of petitioner’s apprehension by respondent
Commissioner. For unlike in the Harvey case where the warrantless capture of two suspected
alien pedophiles was based on probable cause ascertained only after close surveillance for a
three-month period during which their activities were monitored, herein petitioner was “invited”
by a combined team of CID agents and police officers at his apartment unit on the strength of a
mission order issued by the Commissioner on Immigration based on a sworn complaint of a
single individual. The essential requisite of probable cause was conspicuously absent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Moot and Academic; Habeas Corpus; General Rule that the
release of a detained person renders the petition for habeas corpus moot and academic;
Exceptions.—But even assuming that the arrest of petitioner was not legal at the beginning,
certain events have supervened to render his petition moot and academic or to otherwise cure
whatever defect there was at the inception of his arrest. Firstly, petitioner is no longer under
confinement. On June 20, 1987, petitioner was released upon the posting and approval of a
personal bailbond on June 19, 1987 in the amount of P20,000.00 during the pendency of the
administrative proceedings by the CID or until further orders of the Court. The general rule in a
number of cases is that the release, whether permanent or temporary, of a detained person
renders the petition for habeas corpus moot and academic, unless there are restraints attached
to his release which precludes freedom of action, in which case the Court can still inquire into
the nature of his involuntary restraint under the Villavicencio vs. Lukban rule. In Moncupa vs.
Enrile, supra, the Court granted the writ of habeas corpus inspite of the fact that petitioner
Moncupa had been temporarily released from detention on orders of the defense minister. In the
Moncupa case, it was shown that attached to his discharge was the prohibition to travel, to
change his abode and to grant interviews
320
320
Lucien Tran Van Nghia vs. Liwag
to members of the mass media without official permission. He was also ordered to report
regularly to the military authorities. The Court subsequently nullified said conditions and ruled:
“Such restrictions limit the freedom of movement of the petitioner. It is not physical restraint
alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus. x x x. Where a person continues to be
unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of
due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and
where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent developments,
become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail
themselves of the privilege of the writ.” Secondly, records show that formal deportation
proceedings have been initiated against petitioner before the Board of Special Inquiry of the
CID. The restraint (if any) against petitioner’s person has therefore become legal. The writ of
habeas corpus has served its purpose. Lucien Tran Van Nghia vs. Liwag, 175 SCRA 318, G.R.
No. 78596 July 13, 1989
57. Board of Commissioners v. Judge De La Rosa, 197 SCRA

853
Courts; Appeals; Administrative Law; Bureau of Immigration; The Bureau of Immigration is not
of equal rank as the RTC, hence, its decisions may be appealable to, and may be reviewed
through a special civil action for certiorari by, the RTC.—B.P. Blg. 129 did not intend to raise all
quasi-judicial bodies to the same level or rank of the RTC except those specifically provided for
under the law as aforestated. As the Bureau of Immigration is not of equal rank as the RTC, its
decisions may be appealable to, and may be reviewed through a special civil action for certiorari
by, the RTC (Sec. 21 (1), BP 129).
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority and
jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the process, determine also
their citizenship.—True, it is beyond cavil that the Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive
authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the process,
determine also their citizenship (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 756 [1989]. And a
mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board of Commissioners of its jurisdiction
in deportation proceedings (Miranda vs. Deportation Board, 94 Phil. 531 [1954]).
Political Law; Citizenship; Bureau of Immigration; Jurisdiction; The primary jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Immigration over deportation proceedings, admits of exception i.e. judicial
intervention may be resorted to in cases where the claim of citizenship is so substantial that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct.—However, the rule enunciated
in the above-cases admits of an exception, at least insofar as deportation proceedings are
concerned. Thus, what if the claim to citizenship of the alleged deportee is satisfactory? Should
the deportation proceedings be allowed to continue or should the question of citizenship be
ventilated in a judicial proceeding? In Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board (96 Phil. 665 [1955]),
this Court answered the question in the affirmative, and We quote: “When the evidence
submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should
also be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. A citizen
is entitled to live in peace, without molestation from any official or author-
855
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991
855
Board of Commissioners (CID) vs. Dela Rosa
ity, and if he is disturbed by a deportation proceeding, he has the unquestionable right to resort
to the courts for his protection, either by a writ of habeas corpus or of prohibition, on the legal
ground that the Board lacks jurisdiction. If he is a citizen and evidence thereof is satisfactory,
there is no sense nor justice in allowing the deportation proceedings to continue, granting him
the remedy only after the Board has finished its investigation of his undesirability. “x x x. And if
the right (to peace) is precious and valuable at all, it must also be protected on time, to prevent
undue harassment at the hands of illmeaning or misinformed administrative officials. Of what
use is this much boasted right to peace and liberty if it can be availed of only after the
Deportation Board has unjustly trampled upon it, besmirching the citizen’s name before the bar
of public opinion?” (Italics supplied) The doctrine of primary jurisdiction of petitioners Board of
Commissioners over deportation proceedings is, therefore, not without exception (Calacday vs.
Vivo, 33 SCRA 413 [1970]; Vivo vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155 [1967]). Judicial intervention,
however, should be granted only in cases where the “claim of citizenship is so substantial that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct. In other words, the remedy
should be allowed only on sound discretion of a competent court in a proper proceeding (Chua
Hiong vs. Deportation Board, supra; Co vs. Deportation Board, 78 SCRA 107 [1977]). It
appearing from the records that respondent’s claim of citizenship is substantial, as We shall
show later, judicial intervention should be allowed.
Same; Same; Judgments; Res Judicata; The doctrine of res judicata does not apply to
questions of citizenship.—Neither can it be argued that the Board of Commissioners’ decision
(dated July 6, 1962) finding respondent’s claim to Philippine citizenship not satisfactorily proved,
constitute res judicata. For one thing, said decision did not make any categorical statement that
respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese. Secondly, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to
questions of citizenship (Labo vs. Commission on Elections ( supra ); citing Soria vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, 37 SCRA 213; Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 42 SCRA
561 [1971]; Sia Reyes vs. Deportation Board, 122 SCRA 478 [1983]) In Moy Ya Lim vs.
Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA 292 [1971]) and in Lee vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, supra), this Court declared that: “(e)verytime the citizenship of a person is material
or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res
judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.”
856
856
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Res Judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship only if
the following requisites are present; 1) a person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue
in a controversy where said person is a party; 2) the Solicitor General took active part in the
resolution thereof; and 3) the finding of citizenship is affirmed by this Court.—An exception to
the above rule was laid by this Court in Burca vs. Republic (51 SCRA 248 [1973]), viz: “We
declare it to be a sound rule that where the citizenship of a party in a case is definitively
resolved by a court or by an administrative agency, as a material issue in the controversy, after
a full-blown hearing with the active participation of the Solicitor General or his authorized
representative, and this finding or the citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court, the
decision on the matter shall constitute conclusive proof of such party’s citizenship in any other
case or proceeding. But it is made clear that in no instance will a decision on the question of
citizenship in such cases be considered conclusive or binding in any other case or proceeding,
unless obtained in accordance with the procedure herein stated.” Thus, in order that the
doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present: (1)
a person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is
a party; 2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution
thereof; and 3) the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court. Gauged by the foregoing, We
find the pre-conditions set forth in Burca inexistent in the Arocha and Vivo cases relied upon by
petitioners. Indeed, respondent William Gatchalian was not even a party in said cases.
Same; Same; Immigration Laws; Bureau of Immigration; Arrests; A warrant of arrest issued by
the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null
and void for being unconstitutional.—Coming now to the contention of petitioners that the arrest
of respondent follows as a matter of consequence based on the warrant of exclusion issued on
July 6, 1962, coupled with the Arocha and Vivo cases (Rollo, pp. 33), the Court finds the same
devoid of merit. Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise known as
the Immigration Act of 1940, reads: “Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the
purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a
determination by the Board of Commissioner of the existence of the ground for deportation as
charged against the alien.” (Italics supplied) From a perusal of the above provision, it is clear
that in matters of implementing the Immigration Act insofar as deportation of aliens are
concerned, the Commissioner of Immigration
857
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991
857
may issue warrants of arrest only after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. In other words, a warrant
of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose
of executing a final order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and void for being
unconstitutional (Ang Ngo Chiong vs. Galang, 67 SCRA 338 [1975] citing Po Siok Pin vs. Vivo,
62 SCRA 363 [1975]; Vivo vs. Montesa; 24 SCRA 155; Morano vs. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562; Qua
Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 [1963]; Ng Hua To vs. Galang, 10 SCRA 411; see
also Santos vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 74 SCRA 96 [1976]).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Deportation; Deportation shall not be effected unless the
arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause of deportation
arises.—Furthermore, petitioners’ position is not enhanced by the fact that respondent’s arrest
came twenty-eight (28) years after the alleged cause of deportation arose. Section 37 (b) of the
Immigration Act states that deportation “shall not be effected x x x unless the arrest in the
deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause of deportation arises.” In
Lam Shee vs. Bengzon (93 Phil. 1065 [1953]), We laid down the consequences of such
inaction, thus: “There is however an important circumstance which places this case beyond the
reach of the resultant consequence of the fraudulent act committed by the mother of the minor
when she admitted that she gained entrance into the Philippines by making use of the name of
a Chinese resident merchant other than that of her lawful husband, and that is, that the mother
can no longer be the subject of deportation proceedings for the simple reason that more than 5
years had elapsed from the date of her admission. Note that the above irregularity was divulged
by the mother herself, who in a gesture of sincerity, made an spontaneous admission before the
immigration officials in the investigation conducted in connection with the landing of the minor
on September 24, 1947, and not through any effort on the part of the immigration authorities.
And considering this frank admission, plus the fact that the mother was found to be married to
another Chinese resident merchant, now deceased, who owned a restaurant in the Philippines
valued at P15,000 and which gives a net profit of P500 a month, the immigration officials then
must have considered the irregularity not serious enough when, inspite of that finding, they
decided to land said minor “as a properly documented preference quota immigrant” (Exhibit D).
We cannot therefore but wonder why two years later the immigration officials would reverse
their attitude and would take steps to institute deportation
858
858
proceedings against the minor. “Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we believe that
much as the attitude of the mother would be condemned for having made use of an improper
means to gain entrance into the Philippines and acquire permanent residence there, it is now
too late, not to say unchristian, to deport the minor after having allowed the mother to remain
even illegally to the extent of validating her residence by inaction, thus allowing the period of
prescription to set in and to elapse in her favor. To permit his deportation at this late hour would
be to condemn him to live separately from his mother through no fault of his thereby leaving him
to a life of insecurity resulting from lack of support and protection of his family. This inaction or
oversight on the part of immigration officials has created an anomalous situation which, for
reasons of equity, should be resolved in favor of the minor herein involved.” (Italics supplied) In
the case at bar, petitioners’ alleged cause of action and deportation against herein respondent
arose in 1962. However, the warrant of arrest of respondent was issued by Commissioner
Domingo only on August 15, 1990—28 long years after. It is clear that petitioners’ cause of
action has already prescribed and by their inaction could not now be validly enforced by
petitioners against respondent William Gatchalian. Furthermore, the warrant of exclusion dated
July 6, 1962 was already recalled and the identification certificate of respondent, among others,
was revalidated on March 15, 1973 by the then Acting Commissioner Nituda.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Prescription; No prosecution and consequent deportation for
violation of the offenses enumerated in the Immigration Act can be initiated beyond the eight-
year prescriptive period, the Immigration Act, being a special legislation.—It must be noted,
however, that under Sec. 1, Act No. 3326 [1926], as amended, (Prescription for Violations
Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances), “violations penalized by special acts
shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules:
xxx; (c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less
than six years; xxx.” Consequently, no prosecution and consequent deportation for violation of
the offenses enumerated in the Immigration Act can be initiated beyond the eight-year
prescriptive period, the Immigration Act being a special legislation. The Court, therefore, holds
that the period of effecting deportation of an alien after entry or a warrant of exclusion based on
a final order of the BSI or BOC are not imprescriptible. The law itself provides for a period of
prescription. Prescription of the crime is forfeiture or loss of the rights of the State to prosecute
the offender after the lapse of a certain time, while prescription of the penalty is
859
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991
859
the loss or forfeiture by the government of the right to execute the final sentence after the lapse
of a certain time (Padilla, Criminal Law, Vol. 1, 1974, at p. 855).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The power to deport an alien is a police measure
against undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public
good and domestic tranquility of the people.—"The power to deport an alien is an act of the
State. It is an act by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against
undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and
domestic tranquility of the people.” (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, supra). How could one who
has helped the economy of the country by providing employment to some 4,000 people be
considered undesirable and be summarily deported when the government, in its concerted drive
to attract foreign investors, grants Special Resident Visa to any alien who invest at least US
$50,000.00 in the country? Even assuming arguendo that respondent is an alien, his
deportation under the circumstances is unjust and unfair, if not downright illegal. The action
taken by petitioners in the case at bar is diametrically opposed to settled government policy.
Conflicts of Law; Foreign Laws; Marriages; There being no proof of Chinese law relating to
marriage, there arises a presumption that it is the same as that of Philippine law.—Petitioners,
on the other hand, claim that respondent is an alien. In support of their position, petitioners point
out that Santiago Gatchalian’s marriage with Chu Gim Tee in China as well as the marriage of
Francisco (father of William) Gatchalian to Ong Chiu Kiok, likewise in China, were not supported
by any evidence other than their own self-serving testimony nor was there any showing what the
laws of China were. It is the postulate advanced by petitioners that for the said marriages to be
valid in this country, it should have been shown that they were valid by the laws of China
wherein the same were contracted. There being none, petitioners conclude that the aforesaid
marriages cannot be considered valid. Hence, Santiago’s children, including Francisco, followed
the citizenship of their mother, having been born outside of a valid marriage. Similarly, the
validity of the Francisco’s marriage not having been demonstrated, William and Johnson
followed the citizenship of their mother, a Chinese national. After a careful consideration of
petitioners’ argument, We find that it cannot be sustained. In Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil. 867
[1924]; Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472; Yam Ka Lim vs. Collector of
Customs, 30 Phil. 46 [1915]), this Court held that in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
foreign
860
860
laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. In the
case at bar, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises the
presumption that it is the same as that of Philippine law. The lack of proof of Chinese law on the
matter cannot be blamed on Santiago Gatchalian much more on respondent William Gatchalian
who was then a twelve-year old minor. The fact is, as records indicate, Santiago was not
pressed by the Citizenship Investigation Board to prove the laws of China relating to marriage,
having been content with the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was lost or
destroyed during the Japanese occupation of China.
Same; Same; Same; Political Law; Citizenship; William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his
father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter.—Having declared the assailed
marriages as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father
Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter. Francisco, in turn, is likewise a Filipino
being the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen
whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an order dated
July 12, 1960. Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens
contemplated under Sec. 1, Article IV of the Constitution, which provides: “Section 1. the
following are citizens of the Philippines: “(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution. xxx” This forecloses any further question about the
Philippine citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian.
FELICIANO, J., Dissenting:
Political Law; Citizenship; In upholding the validity and legal effect of the July 6, 1962 BOC
decision that the Gatchalian applicants had not substantiated their claim to Philippine
Citizenship, the Supreme Court, in effect, ruled that the Gatchalian applicants were not
Philippine citizens.—In its Decision in Arocha vs. Vivo, the Supreme Court upheld the validity
and legal effect of the 6 July 1962 Decision of the BOC and the Warrant of Exclusion not only
against Pedro Gatchalian, the particular Gatchalian who was taken into custody by immigration
authorities in 1965, but also against Pedro’s co- applicants, which include respondent William
Gatchalian. The validity of the claim to Philippine citizenship by Pedro Gatchalian, as a
supposed descendant of Santiago Gatchalian, allegedly a natural born citizen of the Philippines,
was directly placed in issue in the 1961-1962 proceedings before the BSI and the BOC, and by
the Solicitor General and
861
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991
861
Pedro Gatchalian in Arocha vs. Vivo (supra). In upholding the validity and legal effect of the 6
July 1962 BOC Decision that the Gatchalian applicants had not substantiated their claim to
Philippine citizenship, this Court in effect ruled that the Gatchalian applicants were not
Philippine citizens, whatever their true nationality might be.
Same; Same; Deportation; Exclusion of persons found not to be entitled to admission as

Philippine citizens, must be distinguished from the deportation of aliens, who, after having been
initially, lawfully admitted into the Philippines, committed acts which rendered them liable to
deportation.—What was involved in 1961 when the supposed children and grandchildren of
Santiago Gatchalian first descended upon the Philippines, was the right of a person claiming to
be a Philippine citizen to enter for the first time and reside in the Philippines. On the part of the
Government, what was at stake was the right to exclude from the country persons who had
claimed the right to enter the country as Philippine citizens but who had failed to substantiate
such claimed status. Aliens seeking entry into the Philippines do not acquire the right to be
admitted into the country by the simple passage of time. Exclusion of persons found not to be
entitled to admission as Philippine citizens, must be distinguished from the deportation of aliens,
who, after having been initially lawfully admitted into the Philippines, committed acts which
rendered them liable to deportation. Normally, aliens excluded are immediately sent back to
their country of origin. This is so in cases where the alien has not yet gained a foothold into the
country and is still seeking physical admittance. However, when the alien had already physically
gained entry but such entry is later found unlawful or devoid of legal basis, the alien can be
excluded any time after it is found that he was not lawfully admissible at the time of his entry.
Technically, the alien in this case is being excluded; however, the rules on deportation can be
made to apply to him in view of the fact that the cause for his exclusion is discovered only after
he had gained physical entry.
Same; Same; Same; Immigration Laws; The Immigration Act e x pressly authorizes deportation
“at any time after entry,” of “any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of said
act, who was not lawfully admissible at the time of entry.—My distinguished brother, Bidin, J.,
finally invokes Act No. 3326, and on the basis of Section 1 thereof, would hold that where the
arrest for purpose of deportation is made more than five (5) years after the cause for deportation
arose, the prescriptive period of eight (8) years should be applied. Act No. 3326 which took
effect on 4 December 1926, establishes prescriptive periods in respect of criminal prosecutions
for violations penalized not
862
862
by the Revised Penal Code but rather by special acts which do not otherwise establish a period
of prescription. In other words, Act No. 3326 establishes a statute of limitations for the institution
of criminal proceedings. It is, however, quite settled that deportation proceedings cannot be
assimilated to criminal prosecutions for violation either of the Revised Penal Code or of special
statutes. Moreover, Act No. 3326 purports to be applicable only where the special act itself has
not established an applicable statute of limitations for criminal proceedings. It cannot, however,
be said that Article 37 (b) of the Immigration Act (quoted earlier) has not established an
applicable statute of limitations. For, precisely, Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that
deportation may be effected under certain clauses of Section 37 (a) “at any time after entry.”
One of those instances is, precisely, deportation upon the ground specified in Clause (2) of 37
(a) which relates to “any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this act, who
was not lawfully admissible at the time of entry.” Thus, the Immigration Act, far from failing to
specify a prescriptive period for deportation under Section 37 (a) (2), expressly authorizes
deportation under such ground “at any time after entry.” It is, thus, very difficult to see how Act
No. 3326 could apply at all to the instant case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Respondent William Gatchalian’s claim to Philippine citizenship
rests upon a fragile web constructed out of self-serving oral testimony, a total lack of official
documentation, of negative facts and of invocation of presumptions without proof of essential
factual premises.—I turn to an examination of the underlying facts which make up the basis of
the claim of William Gatchalian to Philippine citizenship. The most striking feature of this claim
to Philippine citizenship is that it rests upon a fragile web constructed out of self-serving oral
testimony, a total lack of official documentation whether Philippine or foreign, of negative facts
and of invocation of presumptions without proof of ess ential factual premises. Put in summary
terms, the claim of William Gatchalian to Philippine citizenship rests upon three (3) premises, to
wit: a. that Santiago Gatchalian was a Philippine citizen; b. the supposed filiation of Francisco
Gatchalian as a legitimate son of Santiago Gatchalian, which leads to the intermediate
conclusion that Francisco was a Philippine citizen; and c. the supposed filiation of William
Gatchalian as a legitimate son of Francisco Gatchalian leading to the final conclusion that
William Gatchalian is a Philippine citizen. I respectfully submit that a careful examination of the
facts made of record will show that the correctness and factual nature of each of these layered
premises are open to very serious doubt, doubts which can only lead to the same conclusion
which the BOC reached on 6 July 1962 when it reversed the
863
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991
863
BSI, that is, that there was failure to prove the Philippine citizenship of William Gatchalian and of
his eight (8) alleged uncles, aunts and brother in 1961 when they first arrived in the Philippines.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The administrative determination by the Bureau of Immigration as
of July 20, 1960 does not constitute res judicata that forecloses the Supreme Court from
examining the supposed Philippine Citizenship of Santiago Gatchalian upon which private
respondent William Gatchalian seeks to rely.—It is suggested in the majority opinion that the
question of citizenship of Santiago Gatchalian is a closed matter which cannot be reviewed by
this Court; that per the records of the Bureau of Immigration, as of 20 July 1960, Santiago
Gatchalian had been declared to be a Filipino citizen and that this forecloses re-opening of that
question thirty (30) years later. I must, with respect, disagree with this suggestion. The
administrative determination by the Bureau of Immigration as of 20 July 1960 certainly does not
constitute res judicata that forecloses this Court from examining the supposed Philippine
citizenship of Santiago Gatchalian upon which private respondent William Gatchalian seeks to
rely. The Court cannot avoid examining the Philippine nationality claimed by Santiago
Gatchalian or, more accurately, claimed on his behalf by William Gatchalian, considering that
one of the central issues here is the tenability or untenability of the claim of William Gatchalian
to Philippine citizenship and hence to entry or admission to the Philippines as such citizen.
Conflicts of Law; Marriages; The rule that a foreign marriage valid in accordance with the law of
the place where it was performed shall be valid also in the Philippines, cannot begin to operate
until after the marriage performed abroad and its compliance with the requirements for validity
under the marriage law of the place where performed are first shown as factual matters.—It is
firmly settled in our jurisdiction that he who asserts and relies upon the existence of a valid
foreign marriage must prove not only the foreign law on marriage and the fact of compliance
with the requisites of such law, but also the fact o f the marriage itself. In Yao Kee vs. Sy-
Gonzales, the issue before the Court was whether the marriage of petitioner Yao Kee to the
deceased Sy Kiat in accordance with Chinese law and custom had been adequately proven. In
rendering a negative answer, this Court, speaking through Cortez, J. , said: “These evidence
may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat. However, the same do
not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage in accordance with Chinese law and custom.
Custom is defined as ‘a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed
(practiced) as a social
864
864
rule, legally binding and obligatory.’ The law requires that ‘a custom must be proved as a fact,
according to the rules of evidence’ [Article 12, Civil Code]. On this score the Court had occasion
to state that ‘a local custom as a source of right can not be considered by a court of justice
unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact’ [Patriarca
vs. Orato, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907)]. The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be
required of a foreign custom. The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil
Code which states that: Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages, as
determined by Philippine Law. Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to
establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the
foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence
[Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922)]. (Italics supplied) In the instant case,
there was absolutely no proof other than Santiago’s bare assertion that a marriage ceremony
between Santiago and Chua Gim Tee had taken place in China in accordance with Chinese
law. The contents of the relevant Chinese law on marriage at the time of the supposed
marriage, was similarly not shown. Should it be assumed simply that the requirements of the
1926 Chinese law on marriage are identical with the requirements of the Philippine law on
marriage, it must be pointed out that neither Santiago nor Francisco Gatchalian submitted proof
that any of the requirements of a valid marriage under Philippine law had been complied with. I
respectfully urge, therefore, that the reliance in the majority opinion upon our conflicts rule on
marriage embodied in Article 71 of the Civil Code (now Article 26 of the Family Code; then
Section 19 of Act No. 3630) is unwarranted. The rule that a foreign marriage valid in accordance
with the law of the place where it was performed shall be valid also in the Philippines, cannot
begin to operate until after the marriage performed abroad and its compliance with the
requirements for validity under the marriage law of the place where performed, are first shown
as factual matters. There is, in other words, no factual basis for a presumption that a lawful
marriage under Chinese law had taken place in 1926 in China between Santiago Gatchalian
and Chua Gim Tee.
Same; Same; Same; No presumption of a lawful marriage between Francisco Gatchalian and
his alleged Chinese wife can be invoked by William Gatchalian, consequently, the latter cannot
invoke any presumption of legitimacy in his own favor.—Francisco Gatchalian stated
865
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991
865
that he had married a Chinese woman, Ong Siu Kiok, in Amoy in 1947 according to Chinese
custom. Once again, we must note that there was no proof submitted that a marriage ceremony
satisfying the requirements of “Chinese custom” had ever taken place in China between
Francisco and Ong Siu Kiok; neither was there any proof that a marriage “according to Chinese
custom” was valid and lawful under Chinese law in 1947 and of factual compliance with the
requirements of the law and custom in China concerning marriage.20 Ong Siu Kiok was alleged
to have died in Macau and never came to the Philippines. It must then follow, once again, that
no presumption of a lawful marriage between Francisco Gatchalian and his alleged Chinese
wife can be invoked by William Gatchalian. It follows still further that William Gatchalian cannot
invoke any presumption of legitimacy in his own favor. As in the case of his putative father
Francisco, William could as well have followed the nationality of his concededly Chinese
mother.
DAVIDE, JR., J., Concurring-Dissenting Opinion:
Jurisdiction; Immigration Laws; The case of William Gatchalian should not be treated as an
exception to the rule that the primary jurisdiction to try and hear cases against alleged aliens
rests in the Bureau of Immigration.—I can easily agree with the summary of antecedent facts in
the ponencia of Mr. Justice Bidin and the reiteration therein of the established doctrine that the
Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against
alleged aliens, and in the process, determine also their citizenship, and that “a mere claim of
citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board of Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation
proceedings.” I also agree with the conclusion that the petitioners in G.R. No. 95122-23, the
Board of Commissioners and Board of Special Inquiry, hereinafter referred to as the Boards, are
quasi-judicial bodies. However, I cannot go along with the view that the case of William
Gatchalian should be treated as an exception to that doctrine and, above all, to the law which
vests upon the Court of Appeals exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the Boards. Neither can I
have solidarity with his opinion that this Court should, in this instance, rule on the citizenship of
Mr. Gatchalian instead of remanding the case to the Regional Trial Court. To grant him these
benefits would do violence to the law, liberally stretch the limits of the exceptions or misapply
the exceptionary rule, and to unduly pollute the settled doctrine. No fact or circumstances exists
to justify the application of the exceptions for the benefit of Mr. Gatchalian. On the contrary,
substantial facts exist to render immutable the unqualified application of the law and the
doctrine.
866
866

Same; Courts; Appeals; The Gatchalians should have invoked the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for appropriate redress instead of filing petition for certiorari
and prohibition with injunction before the RTC of Manila and the RTC of Valenzuela.—Cone-
quently, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, and Our resoltuions
of 15 September 1987 and 2 April 1990 in G.R. No. 79635 (Commissioner of Customs vs. Court
of Tax Appeals, et al.) and G.R. No. 80320 (Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Tax
Appeals, et al.), respectively, and Our decisions of 16 March 1989, 22 December 1989, and 6
June 1990 in G.R. No. 83578 (Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. Court of Appeals,
et al.), 171 SCRA 348, G.R. No. 86625 (Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Tax
Appeals, et al.), 180 SCRA 609, 617, and in G.R. No. L-48113 (Yang vs. Court of Appeals, et
al.), respectively, the Gatchalians should have invoked the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals for appropriate redress instead of filing petitions for certiorari and prohibition
with injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Civil Case No. 90-54214) and before
the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila (Civil Case No. 3431-V-90). The trial
courts should have dismissed the cases. In issuing the questioned orders, respondents Judge
Dela Rosa and Judge Capulong clearly acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.
Same; Same; Forum-Shopping; A party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies
in two different forums.—As to why William Gatchalian filed his petition before the former court
and his wife and minor children filed a separate complaint before the latter has not been
explained. It is to be noted that he is a registered voter of Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he
has long resided and exercised his right of suffrage (Annex 12, Counter-Petition). Therefore, he
should have filed his petition with the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela. His wife and minor
children are not parties to the case before the Comm i ssion on Immigration and Deportation.
Their causes of action are based mainly on their claim that the acts of the Boards against
William tend to deprive plaintiff mother consortium and connubium and the plaintiffs minors
protection and support. At once, the viability of their causes of action is doubtful; however, if
indeed they have valid causes of action, they could have been joined as co-plaintiffs in the case
filed by William. It appears then that their filing of a separate complaint before another court was
part of a strategy to frustrate the proceedings before the Board. As correctly maintained by the
petitioning Boards, we have here a clear case of forum-shopping, especially considering the fact
that on September 4, 1990, or two days before the filing of the case before the Valenzuela court
the government filed a
867
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991
867
motion to dismiss the case before the Manila court. Forum-shopping has long been condemned
and proscribed. In People vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (101 SCRA 450, 463), promulgated on 28
November 1980, this Court held that a party “should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous
remedies in two different forums.” Board of Commissioners (CID) vs. Dela Rosa, 197 SCRA
853, G.R. Nos. 95122-23, G.R. Nos. 95612-13 May 31, 1991
58. Harvey v. Santiago 162 SCRA 840

Constitutional Law; Search Warrant; Right against unreasonable searches and seizures
available to all persons including aliens whether accused of crime or not; A valid search warrant
or warrant of arrest must be based upon probable cause; Definition of probable cause.—There
can be no question that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by
Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, is available to all persons, including aliens,
whether accused of crime or not (Moncado vs. People’s Court, 80 Phil. 1 [1948]). One of the
constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must be based
upon probable cause. Probable cause has been defined as referring to “such facts and
circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to
induce a cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof.”
Same; Same; Existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo
negatives, photographs and posters without
________________
* SECOND DIVISION.
841
VOL. 162, JUNE 28, 1988
841
Harvey vs. Defensor-Santiago
warrant.—In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after
close surveillance for three (3) months during which period their activities were monitored. The
existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives,
photographs and posters without warrant (See Papa vs. Mago, L-27360, February 28, 1968, 22
SCRA 857; People vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal, L-41686, November 17, 1980, 101 SCRA
86, cited in CRUZ, Constitutional Law, 1987 ed., p. 143). Those articles were seized as an
incident to a lawful arrest and, are therefore, admissible in evidence (Section 12, Rule 126,
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure).
Same; Same; Same; Habeas Corpus; The fundamental rule is that a Writ of Habeas Corpus will
not be granted when the confinement is or has become legal although such confinement was
illegal at the beginning.—But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not
valid at its inception, the records show that formal depor-tation charges have been filed against
them, as undesirable aliens, on 4 March 1988. Warrants of arrest were issued against them on
7 March 1988 “for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of
the Administrative Code.” A hearing is presently being conducted by a Board of Special Inquiry.
The restraint against their persons, therefore, has become legal. The Writ has served its
purpose. The process of the law is being followed (Cruz vs. Montoya, L-39823, February 25,
1975, 62 SCRA 543). “Where a person’s detention was later made by virtue of a judicial order in
relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against the detainee, his petition for habeas corpus
becomes moot and academic” (Beltran vs. Garcia, L-49014, April 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 717). “It is
a fundamental rule that a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when the confinement is or
has become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the begin-ning.”
Same; Same; Same; Fact that petitioners were not caught in the act does not make their arrest
illegal; while “pedophilia” is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared
policy of the state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well-being of
our youth.—That petitioners were not “caught in the act” does not make their arrest illegal.
Petitioners were found with young boys in their respective rooms, the ones with John Sherman
being naked. Under those circumstances the CID agents had reasonable grounds to believe
that petitioners had committed “pedophilia” defined as “psycho-sexual perversion involving chil-
dren” (Kraft-Ebbing Psychopatia Sexualis, p. 555; “Paraphilia (or
842
842
unusual sexual activity) in which children are the preferred sexual object” (Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary, 1971 ed., p. 1665) [Solicitor General’s Return of the Writ, on p. 10].
While not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it is behavior offensive to public morals and
violative of the declared policy of the State to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual,
and social well-being of our youth.
Same; Same; Same; Filing by petitioners of a petition for bail considered a waiver of any
irregularity attending, their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity.—At any rate, the
filing by petitioners of a petition to be released on bail should be considered as a waiver of any
irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity.
Same; Deportation; Charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in accordance with

Section 37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code.—The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in
accordance with Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, in relation to Section
69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Section 37(a) provides in part: “(a) The following aliens
shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation or any
other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien.
Same; Same; Same; Section 37(a) not constitutionally proscribed; Nature of deportation
proceedings.—Section 37(a) is not constitutionally proscribed (Morano vs. Vivo, L-22196, June
30, 1967, 20 SCRA 562). The specific constraints in both the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions,
which are substantially identical, contemplates prosecutions essentially criminal in nature.
Deportation proceedings, on the other hand, are administrative in character. An order of
deportation is never construed as a punishment. It is a preventive, not a penal process. It need
not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings.
Same; Same; Same; Ruling in Vivo vs. Montessa is not invocable in the case at bar.—The
ruling in Vivo vs. Montesa (G.R. No. 24576, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 155) that “the issuance of
warrants of arrest by the Commissioner of Immigration, solely for purposes of investigation and
before a final order of deportation is issued, conflicts with paragraph 3, Section 1 of Article III of
the Constitution” (referring to
843
VOL. 162, JUNE 28, 1988
843
the 1935 Constitution) is not invocable herein. Respondent Commissioner’s Warrant of Arrest
issued on 7 March 1988 did not order petitioners to appear and show cause why they should
not be deported. They were issued specifically “for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the
Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.” Before that, deportation
proceedings had been commenced against them as undesirable aliens on 4 March 1988 and
the arrest was a step preliminary to their possible deportation.
Same; Same; Bail; In deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of right but of
discretion on the part of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation.—The denial by
respondent Commissioner of petitioners’ release on bail, also challenged by them, was in order
because in deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of right but a matter of
discretion on the part of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation. Thus, Section 37(e)
of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 provides that “any alien under arrest in a deportation
proceeding may be released under bond or under such other conditions as may be imposed by
the Commissioner of Immigration.”The use of the word “may” in said provision indicates that the
grant of bail is merely permissive and not mandatory on the part of the Commissioner. The
exercise of the power is wholly discretionary (Ong Hee Sang vs. Commissioner of Immigration,
L-9700, February 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 442). “Neither the Constitution nor Section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code guarantees the right of aliens facing deportation to provisional
liberty on bail.” (Tiu Chun Hai, et al vs. Deportation Board, 104 Phil. 949 [1958]). As deportation
proceedings do not partake of the nature of a criminal action, the constitutional guarantee to bail
may not be invoked by aliens in said proceedings (Ong Hee Sang vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, supra).
Same; Same; Power to deport aliens is an act of state, an act done by or under the authority of
the sovereign power; Respondent acted in the interest of the state in instituting deportation
proceedings against petitioners.—Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude
aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or
public interest (Lao Tan Bun vs. Fabre, 81 Phil. 682 [1948]). The power to deport aliens is an
act of State, an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign power (In re McCulloch Dick,
38 Phil. 41 [1918]). It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence
in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the
people (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco, et al., 16 Phil. 534 [1910]).
844
844
Particularly so in this case where the State has expressly committed itself to defend the right of
children to assistance and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development (Article XV, Section 3[2]).
Respondent Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, in instituting deportation
proceedings against petitioners, acted in the interests of the State. Harvey vs. Defensor-
Santiago, 162 SCRA 840, No. L-82544 June 28, 1988
59. Ho vs. People – 280 SCRA 365
Constitutional Law; Warrants of Arrest; Probable Cause; The 1987 Constitution requires the
judge to determine probable cause “personally.”—We should stress that the 1987 Constitution
requires the judge to determine probable cause “personally.” The word “personally” does not
appear in the corresponding provisions of our
______________
* EN BANC.
366
366
Ho vs. People
previous Constitutions. This emphasis shows the present Constitution’s intent to place a greater
degree of responsibility upon trial judges than that imposed under the previous Charters.
Same; Same; Same; The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by
the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper—whether or not there is reasonable ground to
believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he
should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial—is the function of the
Prosecutor.—While affirming Soliven, People vs. Inting elaborated on what “determination of
probable cause” entails, differentiating the judge’s object or goal from that of the prosecutor’s.
“First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial
Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge
alone makes this determination. “Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does
not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make the determination of probable cause. The
Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutor’s
certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits the transcripts of
stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor’s
certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination. “And third,
Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper
which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two
inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no
confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is
made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper—whether or not there is reasonable
ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or
not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial—is the function of
the Prosecutor.”
Same; Same; Same; The warrant issues not on the strength of the certification standing alone
but because of the records which sustain it.—And clarifying the statement in People vs.
Delgado—that the “trial court may rely on the resolution of the COMELEC to file the information,
by the same token that it may rely on the certification made by the prosecutor who conducted
the preliminary investigation, in the issuance of the warrant of arrest”—this Court under-
367
VOL. 280, OCTOBER 9, 1997
367
Ho vs. People
scored in Lim, Sr. vs. Felix that “[r]eliance on the COMELEC resolution or the Prosecutor’s
certification presupposes that the records of either the COMELEC or the Prosecutor have been
submitted to the Judge and he relies on the certification or resolution because the records of the
investigation sustain the recommendation.” We added, “The warrant issues not on the strength
of the certification standing alone but because of the records which sustain it.”
Same; Same; Same; Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of
such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to
believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.—The above
rulings in Soliven, Inting and Lim, Sr. were iterated in Allado vs. Diokno where we explained
again what probable cause means. Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the
existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.
Hence, the judge, before issuing a warrant of arrest, “must satisfy himself that based on the
evidence submitted there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof.” At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the
judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary
investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates such evidence in determining probable
cause.
Same; Same; Same; The judge merely determines the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of
the accused and, in doing so, he need not conduct a de novo hearing. He simply personally
reviews the prosecutor’s initial determination finding probable cause to see if it is supported by
substantial evidence.—In Webb vs. De Leon, we stressed that the judge merely determines the
probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the accused and, in doing so, he need not conduct a de
novo hearing. He simply personally reviews the prosecutor’s initial determination finding
probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of
the offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge,
on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the
accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not
to frustrate the ends of jus-
368
368
Ho vs. People
tice.—In light of the aforecited decisions of this Court, such justification cannot be upheld. Lest
we be too repetitive, we only wish to emphasize three vital matters once more: First, as held in
Inting, the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose different from that
which is to be made by the judge. Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the
accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor
passes upon. The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued against the accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus, even if both should base their findings
on one and the same proceeding or evidence, there should be no confusion as to their distinct
objectives.
Same; Same; Same; The contents of the prosecutor’s report will support his own conclusion
that there is reason to charge the accused of an offense and hold him for trial. However, the
judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the
prosecutor’s bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the existence (or
nonexistence) of probable cause to issue an arrest order.—Since their objectives are different,
the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously and understandably, the contents of the
prosecutor’s report will support his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused of
an offense and hold him for trial. However, the judge must decide independently. Hence, he
must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor’s bare report, upon which to legally
sustain his own findings on the existence (or nonexistence) of probable cause to issue an arrest
order. This responsibility of determining personally and independently the existence or
nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in him by no less than the most basic law of the land.
Parentheti-cally, the prosecutor could ease the burden of the judge and speed up the litigation
process by forwarding to the latter not only the information and his bare resolution finding
probable cause, but also so much of the records and the evidence on hand as to enable His
Honor to make his personal and separate judicial finding on whether to issue a warrant of arrest.
Same; Same; Same; Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of
accuracy, the Constitution commands the judge to personally deter-
369
369
Ho vs. People
mine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest.—It is not required that the complete
or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined
by the judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to examine the
complete records of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an
accused. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents
(such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or
transcripts of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent judgment or, at
the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable
cause. The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor’s recommendation, as
Respondent Court did in this case. Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of
regularity in the performance of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives his report
the presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to personally
determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has consistently held
that a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of the
investigating officer.
Same; Same; Same; Respondent Court’s findings of “the conduct of a due and proper
preliminary investigation” and “the approval by proper officials clothed with statutory authority”
are not equivalent to the independent and personal responsibility required by the Constitution
and settled jurisprudence.—Clearly and ineluctably, Respondent Court’s findings of “the conduct
of a due and proper preliminary investigation” and “the approval by proper officials clothed with
statutory authority” are not equivalent to the independent and personal responsibility required by
the Constitution and settled jurisprudence. At least some of the documentary evidence
mentioned (Contract of Affreightment between National Steel Corporation and National Marine
Corporation, the COA-NSC audit report, and counter-affidavits of Rolando Narciso and NMC
officials), upon which the investigating officials of the Ombudsman reportedly ascertained the
existence of probable cause, should have been physically present before the public respondent
for its examination, to enable it to determine on its own whether there is substantial evidence to
support the finding of probable cause. But it stubbornly stood pat on its position that it had
essentially complied with its responsibility. Indisputably, however, the procedure it undertook
contravenes the Constitution and settled jurisprudence. Respondent
370
370
Ho vs. People
Court palpably committed grave abuse of discretion in ipso facto issuing the challenged warrant
of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutor’s findings and recommendation, and without
determining on its own the issue of probable cause based on evidence other than such bare
findings and recommendation. Ho vs. People, 280 SCRA 365, G.R. No. 106632, G.R. No.
106678 October 9, 1997
60. Board of Commissioners v. Judge De La Rosa, 197 SCRA

853)
Courts; Appeals; Administrative Law; Bureau of Immigration; The Bureau of Immigration is not
of equal rank as the RTC, hence, its decisions may be appealable to, and may be reviewed
through a special civil action for certiorari by, the RTC.—B.P. Blg. 129 did not intend to raise all
quasi-judicial bodies to the same level or rank of the RTC except those specifically provided for
under the law as aforestated. As the Bureau of Immigration is not of equal rank as the RTC, its
decisions may be appealable to, and may be reviewed through a special civil action for certiorari
by, the RTC (Sec. 21 (1), BP 129).
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority and
jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the process, determine also
their citizenship.—True, it is beyond cavil that the Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive
authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the process,
determine also their citizenship (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 756 [1989]. And a
mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board of Commissioners of its jurisdiction
in deportation proceedings (Miranda vs. Deportation Board, 94 Phil. 531 [1954]).
Political Law; Citizenship; Bureau of Immigration; Jurisdiction; The primary jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Immigration over deportation proceedings, admits of exception i.e. judicial
intervention may be resorted to in cases where the claim of citizenship is so substantial that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct.—However, the rule enunciated
in the above-cases admits of an exception, at least insofar as deportation proceedings are
concerned. Thus, what if the claim to citizenship of the alleged deportee is satisfactory? Should
the deportation proceedings be allowed to continue or should the question of citizenship be
ventilated in a judicial proceeding? In Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board (96 Phil. 665 [1955]),
this Court answered the question in the affirmative, and We quote: “When the evidence
submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should
also be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. A citizen
is entitled to live in peace, without molestation from any official or author-
855
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991
855
ity, and if he is disturbed by a deportation proceeding, he has the unquestionable right to resort
to the courts for his protection, either by a writ of habeas corpus or of prohibition, on the legal
ground that the Board lacks jurisdiction. If he is a citizen and evidence thereof is satisfactory,
there is no sense nor justice in allowing the deportation proceedings to continue, granting him
the remedy only after the Board has finished its investigation of his undesirability. “x x x. And if
the right (to peace) is precious and valuable at all, it must also be protected on time, to prevent
undue harassment at the hands of illmeaning or misinformed administrative officials. Of what
use is this much boasted right to peace and liberty if it can be availed of only after the
Deportation Board has unjustly trampled upon it, besmirching the citizen’s name before the bar
of public opinion?” (Italics supplied) The doctrine of primary jurisdiction of petitioners Board of
Commissioners over deportation proceedings is, therefore, not without exception (Calacday vs.
Vivo, 33 SCRA 413 [1970]; Vivo vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155 [1967]). Judicial intervention,
however, should be granted only in cases where the “claim of citizenship is so substantial that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct. In other words, the remedy
should be allowed only on sound discretion of a competent court in a proper proceeding (Chua
Hiong vs. Deportation Board, supra; Co vs. Deportation Board, 78 SCRA 107 [1977]). It
appearing from the records that respondent’s claim of citizenship is substantial, as We shall
show later, judicial intervention should be allowed.
Same; Same; Judgments; Res Judicata; The doctrine of res judicata does not apply to
questions of citizenship.—Neither can it be argued that the Board of Commissioners’ decision
(dated July 6, 1962) finding respondent’s claim to Philippine citizenship not satisfactorily proved,
constitute res judicata. For one thing, said decision did not make any categorical statement that
respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese. Secondly, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to
questions of citizenship (Labo vs. Commission on Elections ( supra ); citing Soria vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, 37 SCRA 213; Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 42 SCRA
561 [1971]; Sia Reyes vs. Deportation Board, 122 SCRA 478 [1983]) In Moy Ya Lim vs.
Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA 292 [1971]) and in Lee vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, supra), this Court declared that: “(e)verytime the citizenship of a person is material
or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res
judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.”
856
856
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Res Judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship only if
the following requisites are present; 1) a person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue
in a controversy where said person is a party; 2) the Solicitor General took active part in the
resolution thereof; and 3) the finding of citizenship is affirmed by this Court.—An exception to
the above rule was laid by this Court in Burca vs. Republic (51 SCRA 248 [1973]), viz: “We
declare it to be a sound rule that where the citizenship of a party in a case is definitively
resolved by a court or by an administrative agency, as a material issue in the controversy, after
a full-blown hearing with the active participation of the Solicitor General or his authorized
representative, and this finding or the citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court, the
decision on the matter shall constitute conclusive proof of such party’s citizenship in any other
case or proceeding. But it is made clear that in no instance will a decision on the question of
citizenship in such cases be considered conclusive or binding in any other case or proceeding,
unless obtained in accordance with the procedure herein stated.” Thus, in order that the
doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present: (1)
a person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is
a party; 2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution
thereof; and 3) the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court. Gauged by the foregoing, We
find the pre-conditions set forth in Burca inexistent in the Arocha and Vivo cases relied upon by
petitioners. Indeed, respondent William Gatchalian was not even a party in said cases.
Same; Same; Immigration Laws; Bureau of Immigration; Arrests; A warrant of arrest issued by
the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null
and void for being unconstitutional.—Coming now to the contention of petitioners that the arrest
of respondent follows as a matter of consequence based on the warrant of exclusion issued on
July 6, 1962, coupled with the Arocha and Vivo cases (Rollo, pp. 33), the Court finds the same
devoid of merit. Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise known as
the Immigration Act of 1940, reads: “Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the
purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a
determination by the Board of Commissioner of the existence of the ground for deportation as
charged against the alien.” (Italics supplied) From a perusal of the above provision, it is clear
that in matters of implementing the Immigration Act insofar as deportation of aliens are
concerned, the Commissioner of Immigration
857
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991
857
may issue warrants of arrest only after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. In other words, a warrant
of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose
of executing a final order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and void for being
unconstitutional (Ang Ngo Chiong vs. Galang, 67 SCRA 338 [1975] citing Po Siok Pin vs. Vivo,
62 SCRA 363 [1975]; Vivo vs. Montesa; 24 SCRA 155; Morano vs. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562; Qua
Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 [1963]; Ng Hua To vs. Galang, 10 SCRA 411; see
also Santos vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 74 SCRA 96 [1976]).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Deportation; Deportation shall not be effected unless the
arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause of deportation
arises.—Furthermore, petitioners’ position is not enhanced by the fact that respondent’s arrest
came twenty-eight (28) years after the alleged cause of deportation arose. Section 37 (b) of the
Immigration Act states that deportation “shall not be effected x x x unless the arrest in the
deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause of deportation arises.” In
Lam Shee vs. Bengzon (93 Phil. 1065 [1953]), We laid down the consequences of such
inaction, thus: “There is however an important circumstance which places this case beyond the
reach of the resultant consequence of the fraudulent act committed by the mother of the minor
when she admitted that she gained entrance into the Philippines by making use of the name of
a Chinese resident merchant other than that of her lawful husband, and that is, that the mother
can no longer be the subject of deportation proceedings for the simple reason that more than 5
years had elapsed from the date of her admission. Note that the above irregularity was divulged
by the mother herself, who in a gesture of sincerity, made an spontaneous admission before the
immigration officials in the investigation conducted in connection with the landing of the minor
on September 24, 1947, and not through any effort on the part of the immigration authorities.
And considering this frank admission, plus the fact that the mother was found to be married to
another Chinese resident merchant, now deceased, who owned a restaurant in the Philippines
valued at P15,000 and which gives a net profit of P500 a month, the immigration officials then
must have considered the irregularity not serious enough when, inspite of that finding, they
decided to land said minor “as a properly documented preference quota immigrant” (Exhibit D).
We cannot therefore but wonder why two years later the immigration officials would reverse
their attitude and would take steps to institute deportation
858
858
proceedings against the minor. “Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we believe that
much as the attitude of the mother would be condemned for having made use of an improper
means to gain entrance into the Philippines and acquire permanent residence there, it is now
too late, not to say unchristian, to deport the minor after having allowed the mother to remain
even illegally to the extent of validating her residence by inaction, thus allowing the period of
prescription to set in and to elapse in her favor. To permit his deportation at this late hour would
be to condemn him to live separately from his mother through no fault of his thereby leaving him
to a life of insecurity resulting from lack of support and protection of his family. This inaction or
oversight on the part of immigration officials has created an anomalous situation which, for
reasons of equity, should be resolved in favor of the minor herein involved.” (Italics supplied) In
the case at bar, petitioners’ alleged cause of action and deportation against herein respondent
arose in 1962. However, the warrant of arrest of respondent was issued by Commissioner
Domingo only on August 15, 1990—28 long years after. It is clear that petitioners’ cause of
action has already prescribed and by their inaction could not now be validly enforced by
petitioners against respondent William Gatchalian. Furthermore, the warrant of exclusion dated
July 6, 1962 was already recalled and the identification certificate of respondent, among others,
was revalidated on March 15, 1973 by the then Acting Commissioner Nituda.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Prescription; No prosecution and consequent deportation for
violation of the offenses enumerated in the Immigration Act can be initiated beyond the eight-
year prescriptive period, the Immigration Act, being a special legislation.—It must be noted,
however, that under Sec. 1, Act No. 3326 [1926], as amended, (Prescription for Violations
Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances), “violations penalized by special acts
shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules:
xxx; (c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less
than six years; xxx.” Consequently, no prosecution and consequent deportation for violation of
the offenses enumerated in the Immigration Act can be initiated beyond the eight-year
prescriptive period, the Immigration Act being a special legislation. The Court, therefore, holds
that the period of effecting deportation of an alien after entry or a warrant of exclusion based on
a final order of the BSI or BOC are not imprescriptible. The law itself provides for a period of
prescription. Prescription of the crime is forfeiture or loss of the rights of the State to prosecute
the offender after the lapse of a certain time, while prescription of the penalty is
859
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991
859
the loss or forfeiture by the government of the right to execute the final sentence after the lapse
of a certain time (Padilla, Criminal Law, Vol. 1, 1974, at p. 855).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The power to deport an alien is a police measure
against undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public
good and domestic tranquility of the people.—"The power to deport an alien is an act of the
State. It is an act by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against
undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and
domestic tranquility of the people.” (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, supra). How could one who
has helped the economy of the country by providing employment to some 4,000 people be
considered undesirable and be summarily deported when the government, in its concerted drive
to attract foreign investors, grants Special Resident Visa to any alien who invest at least US
$50,000.00 in the country? Even assuming arguendo that respondent is an alien, his
deportation under the circumstances is unjust and unfair, if not downright illegal. The action
taken by petitioners in the case at bar is diametrically opposed to settled government policy.
Conflicts of Law; Foreign Laws; Marriages; There being no proof of Chinese law relating to
marriage, there arises a presumption that it is the same as that of Philippine law.—Petitioners,
on the other hand, claim that respondent is an alien. In support of their position, petitioners point
out that Santiago Gatchalian’s marriage with Chu Gim Tee in China as well as the marriage of
Francisco (father of William) Gatchalian to Ong Chiu Kiok, likewise in China, were not supported
by any evidence other than their own self-serving testimony nor was there any showing what the
laws of China were. It is the postulate advanced by petitioners that for the said marriages to be
valid in this country, it should have been shown that they were valid by the laws of China
wherein the same were contracted. There being none, petitioners conclude that the aforesaid
marriages cannot be considered valid. Hence, Santiago’s children, including Francisco, followed
the citizenship of their mother, having been born outside of a valid marriage. Similarly, the
validity of the Francisco’s marriage not having been demonstrated, William and Johnson
followed the citizenship of their mother, a Chinese national. After a careful consideration of
petitioners’ argument, We find that it cannot be sustained. In Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil. 867
[1924]; Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472; Yam Ka Lim vs. Collector of
Customs, 30 Phil. 46 [1915]), this Court held that in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
foreign
860
860

laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. In the
case at bar, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises the
presumption that it is the same as that of Philippine law. The lack of proof of Chinese law on the
matter cannot be blamed on Santiago Gatchalian much more on respondent William Gatchalian
who was then a twelve-year old minor. The fact is, as records indicate, Santiago was not
pressed by the Citizenship Investigation Board to prove the laws of China relating to marriage,
having been content with the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was lost or
destroyed during the Japanese occupation of China.
Same; Same; Same; Political Law; Citizenship; William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his
father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter.—Having declared the assailed
marriages as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father
Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter. Francisco, in turn, is likewise a Filipino
being the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen
whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an order dated
July 12, 1960. Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens
contemplated under Sec. 1, Article IV of the Constitution, which provides: “Section 1. the
following are citizens of the Philippines: “(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution. xxx” This forecloses any further question about the
Philippine citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian.
FELICIANO, J., Dissenting:
Political Law; Citizenship; In upholding the validity and legal effect of the July 6, 1962 BOC
decision that the Gatchalian applicants had not substantiated their claim to Philippine
Citizenship, the Supreme Court, in effect, ruled that the Gatchalian applicants were not
Philippine citizens.—In its Decision in Arocha vs. Vivo, the Supreme Court upheld the validity
and legal effect of the 6 July 1962 Decision of the BOC and the Warrant of Exclusion not only
against Pedro Gatchalian, the particular Gatchalian who was taken into custody by immigration
authorities in 1965, but also against Pedro’s co- applicants, which include respondent William
Gatchalian. The validity of the claim to Philippine citizenship by Pedro Gatchalian, as a
supposed descendant of Santiago Gatchalian, allegedly a natural born citizen of the Philippines,
was directly placed in issue in the 1961-1962 proceedings before the BSI and the BOC, and by
the Solicitor General and
861
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991
861
Pedro Gatchalian in Arocha vs. Vivo (supra). In upholding the validity and legal effect of the 6
July 1962 BOC Decision that the Gatchalian applicants had not substantiated their claim to
Philippine citizenship, this Court in effect ruled that the Gatchalian applicants were not
Philippine citizens, whatever their true nationality might be.
Same; Same; Deportation; Exclusion of persons found not to be entitled to admission as
Philippine citizens, must be distinguished from the deportation of aliens, who, after having been
initially, lawfully admitted into the Philippines, committed acts which rendered them liable to
deportation.—What was involved in 1961 when the supposed children and grandchildren of
Santiago Gatchalian first descended upon the Philippines, was the right of a person claiming to
be a Philippine citizen to enter for the first time and reside in the Philippines. On the part of the
Government, what was at stake was the right to exclude from the country persons who had
claimed the right to enter the country as Philippine citizens but who had failed to substantiate
such claimed status. Aliens seeking entry into the Philippines do not acquire the right to be
admitted into the country by the simple passage of time. Exclusion of persons found not to be
entitled to admission as Philippine citizens, must be distinguished from the deportation of aliens,
who, after having been initially lawfully admitted into the Philippines, committed acts which
rendered them liable to deportation. Normally, aliens excluded are immediately sent back to
their country of origin. This is so in cases where the alien has not yet gained a foothold into the
country and is still seeking physical admittance. However, when the alien had already physically
gained entry but such entry is later found unlawful or devoid of legal basis, the alien can be
excluded any time after it is found that he was not lawfully admissible at the time of his entry.
Technically, the alien in this case is being excluded; however, the rules on deportation can be
made to apply to him in view of the fact that the cause for his exclusion is discovered only after
he had gained physical entry.
Same; Same; Same; Immigration Laws; The Immigration Act e x pressly authorizes deportation
“at any time after entry,” of “any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of said
act, who was not lawfully admissible at the time of entry.—My distinguished brother, Bidin, J.,
finally invokes Act No. 3326, and on the basis of Section 1 thereof, would hold that where the
arrest for purpose of deportation is made more than five (5) years after the cause for deportation
arose, the prescriptive period of eight (8) years should be applied. Act No. 3326 which took
effect on 4 December 1926, establishes prescriptive periods in respect of criminal prosecutions
for violations penalized not
862
862
by the Revised Penal Code but rather by special acts which do not otherwise establish a period
of prescription. In other words, Act No. 3326 establishes a statute of limitations for the institution
of criminal proceedings. It is, however, quite settled that deportation proceedings cannot be
assimilated to criminal prosecutions for violation either of the Revised Penal Code or of special
statutes. Moreover, Act No. 3326 purports to be applicable only where the special act itself has
not established an applicable statute of limitations for criminal proceedings. It cannot, however,
be said that Article 37 (b) of the Immigration Act (quoted earlier) has not established an
applicable statute of limitations. For, precisely, Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that
deportation may be effected under certain clauses of Section 37 (a) “at any time after entry.”
One of those instances is, precisely, deportation upon the ground specified in Clause (2) of 37
(a) which relates to “any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this act, who
was not lawfully admissible at the time of entry.” Thus, the Immigration Act, far from failing to
specify a prescriptive period for deportation under Section 37 (a) (2), expressly authorizes
deportation under such ground “at any time after entry.” It is, thus, very difficult to see how Act
No. 3326 could apply at all to the instant case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Respondent William Gatchalian’s claim to Philippine citizenship
rests upon a fragile web constructed out of self-serving oral testimony, a total lack of official
documentation, of negative facts and of invocation of presumptions without proof of essential
factual premises.—I turn to an examination of the underlying facts which make up the basis of
the claim of William Gatchalian to Philippine citizenship. The most striking feature of this claim
to Philippine citizenship is that it rests upon a fragile web constructed out of self-serving oral
testimony, a total lack of official documentation whether Philippine or foreign, of negative facts
and of invocation of presumptions without proof of ess ential factual premises. Put in summary
terms, the claim of William Gatchalian to Philippine citizenship rests upon three (3) premises, to
wit: a. that Santiago Gatchalian was a Philippine citizen; b. the supposed filiation of Francisco
Gatchalian as a legitimate son of Santiago Gatchalian, which leads to the intermediate
conclusion that Francisco was a Philippine citizen; and c. the supposed filiation of William
Gatchalian as a legitimate son of Francisco Gatchalian leading to the final conclusion that
William Gatchalian is a Philippine citizen. I respectfully submit that a careful examination of the
facts made of record will show that the correctness and factual nature of each of these layered
premises are open to very serious doubt, doubts which can only lead to the same conclusion
which the BOC reached on 6 July 1962 when it reversed the
863
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991
863
BSI, that is, that there was failure to prove the Philippine citizenship of William Gatchalian and of
his eight (8) alleged uncles, aunts and brother in 1961 when they first arrived in the Philippines.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The administrative determination by the Bureau of Immigration as
of July 20, 1960 does not constitute res judicata that forecloses the Supreme Court from
examining the supposed Philippine Citizenship of Santiago Gatchalian upon which private
respondent William Gatchalian seeks to rely.—It is suggested in the majority opinion that the
question of citizenship of Santiago Gatchalian is a closed matter which cannot be reviewed by
this Court; that per the records of the Bureau of Immigration, as of 20 July 1960, Santiago
Gatchalian had been declared to be a Filipino citizen and that this forecloses re-opening of that
question thirty (30) years later. I must, with respect, disagree with this suggestion. The
administrative determination by the Bureau of Immigration as of 20 July 1960 certainly does not
constitute res judicata that forecloses this Court from examining the supposed Philippine
citizenship of Santiago Gatchalian upon which private respondent William Gatchalian seeks to
rely. The Court cannot avoid examining the Philippine nationality claimed by Santiago
Gatchalian or, more accurately, claimed on his behalf by William Gatchalian, considering that
one of the central issues here is the tenability or untenability of the claim of William Gatchalian
to Philippine citizenship and hence to entry or admission to the Philippines as such citizen.
Conflicts of Law; Marriages; The rule that a foreign marriage valid in accordance with the law of
the place where it was performed shall be valid also in the Philippines, cannot begin to operate
until after the marriage performed abroad and its compliance with the requirements for validity
under the marriage law of the place where performed are first shown as factual matters.—It is
firmly settled in our jurisdiction that he who asserts and relies upon the existence of a valid
foreign marriage must prove not only the foreign law on marriage and the fact of compliance
with the requisites of such law, but also the fact o f the marriage itself. In Yao Kee vs. Sy-
Gonzales, the issue before the Court was whether the marriage of petitioner Yao Kee to the
deceased Sy Kiat in accordance with Chinese law and custom had been adequately proven. In
rendering a negative answer, this Court, speaking through Cortez, J. , said: “These evidence
may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat. However, the same do
not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage in accordance with Chinese law and custom.
Custom is defined as ‘a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed
(practiced) as a social
864
864
rule, legally binding and obligatory.’ The law requires that ‘a custom must be proved as a fact,
according to the rules of evidence’ [Article 12, Civil Code]. On this score the Court had occasion
to state that ‘a local custom as a source of right can not be considered by a court of justice
unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact’ [Patriarca
vs. Orato, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907)]. The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be
required of a foreign custom. The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil
Code which states that: Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages, as
determined by Philippine Law. Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to
establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the
foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence
[Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922)]. (Italics supplied) In the instant case,
there was absolutely no proof other than Santiago’s bare assertion that a marriage ceremony
between Santiago and Chua Gim Tee had taken place in China in accordance with Chinese
law. The contents of the relevant Chinese law on marriage at the time of the supposed
marriage, was similarly not shown. Should it be assumed simply that the requirements of the
1926 Chinese law on marriage are identical with the requirements of the Philippine law on
marriage, it must be pointed out that neither Santiago nor Francisco Gatchalian submitted proof
that any of the requirements of a valid marriage under Philippine law had been complied with. I
respectfully urge, therefore, that the reliance in the majority opinion upon our conflicts rule on
marriage embodied in Article 71 of the Civil Code (now Article 26 of the Family Code; then
Section 19 of Act No. 3630) is unwarranted. The rule that a foreign marriage valid in accordance
with the law of the place where it was performed shall be valid also in the Philippines, cannot
begin to operate until after the marriage performed abroad and its compliance with the
requirements for validity under the marriage law of the place where performed, are first shown
as factual matters. There is, in other words, no factual basis for a presumption that a lawful
marriage under Chinese law had taken place in 1926 in China between Santiago Gatchalian
and Chua Gim Tee.
Same; Same; Same; No presumption of a lawful marriage between Francisco Gatchalian and
his alleged Chinese wife can be invoked by William Gatchalian, consequently, the latter cannot
invoke any presumption of legitimacy in his own favor.—Francisco Gatchalian stated
865
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991
865
that he had married a Chinese woman, Ong Siu Kiok, in Amoy in 1947 according to Chinese
custom. Once again, we must note that there was no proof submitted that a marriage ceremony
satisfying the requirements of “Chinese custom” had ever taken place in China between
Francisco and Ong Siu Kiok; neither was there any proof that a marriage “according to Chinese
custom” was valid and lawful under Chinese law in 1947 and of factual compliance with the
requirements of the law and custom in China concerning marriage.20 Ong Siu Kiok was alleged
to have died in Macau and never came to the Philippines. It must then follow, once again, that
no presumption of a lawful marriage between Francisco Gatchalian and his alleged Chinese
wife can be invoked by William Gatchalian. It follows still further that William Gatchalian cannot
invoke any presumption of legitimacy in his own favor. As in the case of his putative father
Francisco, William could as well have followed the nationality of his concededly Chinese
mother.
DAVIDE, JR., J., Concurring-Dissenting Opinion:
Jurisdiction; Immigration Laws; The case of William Gatchalian should not be treated as an
exception to the rule that the primary jurisdiction to try and hear cases against alleged aliens
rests in the Bureau of Immigration.—I can easily agree with the summary of antecedent facts in
the ponencia of Mr. Justice Bidin and the reiteration therein of the established doctrine that the
Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against
alleged aliens, and in the process, determine also their citizenship, and that “a mere claim of
citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board of Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation
proceedings.” I also agree with the conclusion that the petitioners in G.R. No. 95122-23, the
Board of Commissioners and Board of Special Inquiry, hereinafter referred to as the Boards, are
quasi-judicial bodies. However, I cannot go along with the view that the case of William
Gatchalian should be treated as an exception to that doctrine and, above all, to the law which
vests upon the Court of Appeals exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the Boards. Neither can I
have solidarity with his opinion that this Court should, in this instance, rule on the citizenship of
Mr. Gatchalian instead of remanding the case to the Regional Trial Court. To grant him these
benefits would do violence to the law, liberally stretch the limits of the exceptions or misapply
the exceptionary rule, and to unduly pollute the settled doctrine. No fact or circumstances exists
to justify the application of the exceptions for the benefit of Mr. Gatchalian. On the contrary,
substantial facts exist to render immutable the unqualified application of the law and the
doctrine.
866
866
Same; Courts; Appeals; The Gatchalians should have invoked the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for appropriate redress instead of filing petition for certiorari
and prohibition with injunction before the RTC of Manila and the RTC of Valenzuela.—Cone-
quently, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, and Our resoltuions
of 15 September 1987 and 2 April 1990 in G.R. No. 79635 (Commissioner of Customs vs. Court
of Tax Appeals, et al.) and G.R. No. 80320 (Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Tax
Appeals, et al.), respectively, and Our decisions of 16 March 1989, 22 December 1989, and 6
June 1990 in G.R. No. 83578 (Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. Court of Appeals,
et al.), 171 SCRA 348, G.R. No. 86625 (Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Tax
Appeals, et al.), 180 SCRA 609, 617, and in G.R. No. L-48113 (Yang vs. Court of Appeals, et
al.), respectively, the Gatchalians should have invoked the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals for appropriate redress instead of filing petitions for certiorari and prohibition
with injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Civil Case No. 90-54214) and before
the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila (Civil Case No. 3431-V-90). The trial
courts should have dismissed the cases. In issuing the questioned orders, respondents Judge
Dela Rosa and Judge Capulong clearly acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.
Same; Same; Forum-Shopping; A party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies
in two different forums.—As to why William Gatchalian filed his petition before the former court
and his wife and minor children filed a separate complaint before the latter has not been
explained. It is to be noted that he is a registered voter of Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he
has long resided and exercised his right of suffrage (Annex 12, Counter-Petition). Therefore, he
should have filed his petition with the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela. His wife and minor
children are not parties to the case before the Comm i ssion on Immigration and Deportation.
Their causes of action are based mainly on their claim that the acts of the Boards against
William tend to deprive plaintiff mother consortium and connubium and the plaintiffs minors
protection and support. At once, the viability of their causes of action is doubtful; however, if
indeed they have valid causes of action, they could have been joined as co-plaintiffs in the case
filed by William. It appears then that their filing of a separate complaint before another court was
part of a strategy to frustrate the proceedings before the Board. As correctly maintained by the
petitioning Boards, we have here a clear case of forum-shopping, especially considering the fact
that on September 4, 1990, or two days before the filing of the case before the Valenzuela court
the government filed a
867
VOL. 197, MAY 31, 1991
867

motion to dismiss the case before the Manila court. Forum-shopping has long been condemned
and proscribed. In People vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (101 SCRA 450, 463), promulgated on 28
November 1980, this Court held that a party “should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous
remedies in two different forums.” Board of Commissioners (CID) vs. Dela Rosa, 197 SCRA
853, G.R. Nos. 95122-23, G.R. Nos. 95612-13 May 31, 1991
61. Material Distributions v. Judge, 84 Phil 127 (1989)
1.PLEADING AND PRACTICE; PRODUCTION AND INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS AND

BOOKS, CANNOT BE IDENTIFIED OR CONFUSED WITH UNREASONABLE SEARCHES;
RULE 21 OF RULES OF COURT INTERPRETED.—The orders in question, issued in virtue of
the provisions of Rule 21, pertain to a civil procedure that cannot be identified or confused with
the unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution. But in the erroneous hypothesis that
the production and inspection of books and documents in question is tantamount to a search
warrant, the procedure outlined by Rule 21 and followed by respondent judge place them
outside the realm of the prohibited unreasonable searches. There is no question that, upon the
pleadings in the case, S has an interest in the books and documents in question, that they are
material and important to the issues between him and petitioners, that justice will be better
served if all the facts pertinent to the controversy are placed before the trial court.
2.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; GUARANTY OF PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND
CORRESPONDENCE.—The constitutional guarantee of privacy of communication and
correspondence will not be violated, because the trial court has power and jurisdiction to issue
the order for the production and inspection of the books and documents in question in virtue of
the constitutional guarantee making an express exception in favor of the disclosure of
128
128
Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc., vs. Natividad
communication and correspondence upon lawful order of a court of justice. Material Distributors
(Phil.) Inc., vs. Natividad, 84 Phil. 127, No. L-1716 June 28, 1949
62. Oklahoma Press v. Walling, 327 US 186
63. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 US 523 ( 1967)
64. People v. Aminuddin, 163 SCRA 402
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Warrant of Arrest; Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
inapplicable in arrest without warrant.—Warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court not justified unless the accused was caught in flagrante or a crime was about to be
committed or had just been committed. The evidence of probable caused should be determined
by a judge and not by law-enforcement agents.
Same; Same; Search Warrani; Vessels and aircraft may be searched without search warrant.—
Vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the
Customs Law, because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
before a warrant can be secured.
Same; Same; Same; When a search cannot be considered an incident ofa lawful arrest.—A
search cannot be considered an incident of a lawful arrest if there is no warrant of arrest and the
warrantless arrest does not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Euidence; Presumption of lnnocence; The innocence ofthe accused is

constitutionally presumed.—The constitutional presumption is that the accused is presumed
innocent even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to convict
him.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence obtained in illegal searches, inadmissible.—lt the warrantless
search was illegal, the evidence obtained is inadmissible. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to
use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase.
Same; Same; The extend of the mantle of protection of the Constitution.—The Constitution
covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of
highhandedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions. People vs.
Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402, No. L-74869 July 6, 1988
65. People v. Valdez, 341 SCRA 25
People vs. Valdez
G.R. No. 129296. September 25, 2000.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ABE VALDEZ y DELA CRUZ, accused-
appellant.
Searches and Seizures; Exclusionary Rule; “Fruits of the Poisonous Tree” Doctrine; Evidence
procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for being
the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded.—The Constitution lays down
the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried on the strength of a judicial warrant.
Otherwise, the search and seizure is deemed “unreasonable.” Evidence procured on the
occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit
of a poisonous tree and should be excluded. Such evidence shall be inadmissible in evidence
for any purpose in any proceeding.
Same; Bill of Rights; The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both
innocent and guilty alike against any form of highhandedness of law enforcers, regardless of the
praiseworthiness of their intentions.—In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by
a judge after personal determination of the existence of probable cause. From the declarations
of the police officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least one (1) day to obtain a warrant
to search appellant’s farm. Their informant had revealed his name to them. The place where the
cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed. From the information in their possession, they
could have convinced a judge that there was prob-
_______________
* EN BANC.
26
26
People vs. Valdez
able cause to justify the issuance of a warrant. But they did not. Instead, they uprooted the
plants and apprehended the accused on the excuse that the trip was a good six hours and
inconvenient to them. We need not underscore that the protection against illegal search and
seizure is constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches allowed
without warrants. The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent
and guilty alike against any form of highhandedness of law enforcers, regardless of the
praiseworthiness of their intentions.
Same; Allowable Warrantless Searches.—These instances include: (a) A search as an incident

to a lawful arrest, provided that the search is made contemporaneous to the arrest and within a
permissible area of search. See RULES OF COURT, Rule 126, Sec. 12; People v. Musa, 211
SCRA 59 (1992); People v. Catan, 205 SCRA 235 (1992); Posadas v. Court of Appeals, 188
SCRA 288 (1990); and People v. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220 (1990). (b) Searches of vessels
and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws. See Hizon v. Court of Appeals,
265 SCRA 517 (1996); Roldan v. Arca, 65 SCRA 336 (1975). c.f. People v. Aminnudin, 163
SCRA 402 (1988). (c) Searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders. See
Mustang Lumber v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 450 (1996); People v. Balingan, 241 SCRA
277 (1995); People v. Lo Hoi Wing, 193 SCRA 122 (1991); Valmonte v. De Villa, 185 SCRA 665
(1990), 178 SCRA 211 (1989); People v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 101 SCRA 86 (1980);
and Papa v. Mago, 22 SCRA 857 (1968). (d) Inspection of buildings and other premises to
enforce fire safety, sanitary, and other building regulations, (e) Where the prohibited articles or
contraband are in “plain view.” See People v. Musa, supra; Chia v. Acting Collector of Customs,
177 SCRA 735 (1989).
Same; Same; “Plain View” Doctrine; Elements.—We find no reason to subscribe to Solicitor
General’s contention that we apply the “plain view” doctrine. For the doctrine to apply, the
following elements must be present: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless
arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are;
and (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search.
Same; Same; Same; The seizure of evidence in “plain view” applies only where the police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object.—In the
27
27
People vs. Valdez
instant case, recall that PO2 Balut testified that they first located the marijuana plants before
appellant was arrested without a warrant. Hence, there was no valid warrantless arrest which
preceded the search of appellant’s premises. Note further that the police team was dispatched
to appellant’s kaingin precisely to search for and uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of
evidence in “plain view” applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence
against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Clearly, their
discovery of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent. We also note the testimony of SPO2
Tipay that upon arriving at the area, they first had to “look around the area” before they could
spot the illegal plants. Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not “immediately apparent”
and a “further search” was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question were not in “plain
view” or “open to eye and hand.” The “plain view” doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply.
Same; Dangerous Drugs Act; Not because the marijuana plants are found in an unfenced lot,
that a person could not invoke the protection afforded by the Charter against unreasonable
searches by agents of the State—the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is the
immunity of one’s person, which includes his residence, his papers, and other possessions .—
Nor can we sustain the trial court’s conclusion that just because the marijuana plants were
found in an unfenced lot, appellant could not invoke the protection afforded by the Charter
against unreasonable searches by agents of the State. The right against unreasonable
searches and seizures is the immunity of one’s person, which includes his residence, his
papers, and other possessions. The guarantee refers to “the right of personal security” of the
individual. As appellant correctly points out, what is sought to be protected against the State’s
unlawful intrusion are persons, not places. To conclude otherwise would not only mean
swimming against the stream, it would also lead to the absurd logic that for a person to be
immune against unreasonable searches and seizures, he must be in his home or office, within a
fenced yard or a private place. The Bill of Rights belongs as much to the person in the street as
to the individual in the sanctuary of his bedroom.
Same; Same; Exclusionary Rule; “Fruits of the Poisonous Tree” Doctrine; Marijuana plants
which are the products of an unlawful search and seizure cannot be used as evidence against
the accused—they are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree.—We therefore hold, with respect to
the first issue, that the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an illegal search and
seizure. As to the second issue, which involves the admissibility of the marijuana plants as
evidence for the prosecution, we find that
28
28
People vs. Valdez

said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence against
appellant. They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on
the part of the court a quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants as
evidence to convict appellant.
Custodial Investigations; Rights of Suspects; Right to Counsel; The moment the police tries to
elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a person suspected of having
committed an offense, he should at that juncture be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the
right in writing and in the presence of counsel .—The Constitution plainly declares that any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right: (1) to remain
silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to
be informed of such rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel. An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry but starts to focus on a
particular person as a suspect, i.e. , when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting
a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. The moment the police try
to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a person suspected of having
committed an offense, he should at that juncture be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the
right in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Same; Same; Same; If at the time the police talked to the accused in his farm, he was already
under investigation as a suspect, the questioning by the police was no longer a general
inquiry.—In the instant case we find that, from the start, a tipster had furnished the police
appellant’s name as well as the location of appellant’s farm, where the marijuana plants were
allegedly being grown. While the police operation was supposedly meant to merely “verify” said
information, the police chief had likewise issued instructions to arrest appellant as a suspected
marijuana cultivator. Thus at the time the police talked to appellant in his farm, the latter was
already under investigation as a suspect. The questioning by the police was no longer a general
inquiry.
Same; Same; Same; Exclusionary Rule; Hearsay Rule; A verbal admission allegedly made by
an accused during the investigation, without the assistance of counsel at the time of his arrest
and even before his formal investigation is not only inadmissible for being violative of the right to
counsel during criminal investigations, it is also hearsay .—We find appellant’s extrajudicial
confession flawed with respect to its admissibility For a confession to be admissible, it must
satisfy the following requirements:
29
29
People vs. Valdez
(1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent
counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing. The records show that the
admission by appellant was verbal. It was also uncounselled. A verbal admission allegedly
made by an accused during the investigation, without the assistance of counsel at the time of
his arrest and even before his formal investigation is not only inadmissible for being violative of
the right to counsel during criminal investigations, it is also hearsay. Even if the confession or
admission were “gospel truth,” if it was made without assistance of counsel and without a valid
waiver of such assistance, the confession is inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the
absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.
Presumption of Innocence; Evidence; Words and Phrases; The evidence arrayed against the
accused must not only stand the test of reason, it must likewise be credible and competent;
Competent evidence is “generally admissible” evidence, and admissible evidence, in turn, is
evidence “of such a character that the court or judge is bound to receive it, that is, allow it to be
introduced at trial .”—It is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be
convicted of a crime, the prosecution must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that a
crime was committed and that the accused is the author thereof. The evidence arrayed against
the accused, however, must not only stand the test of reason, it must likewise be credible and
competent. Competent evidence is “generally admissible” evidence. Admissible evidence, in
turn, is evidence “of such a character that the court or judge is bound to receive it, that is, allow
it to be introduced at trial.”
Same; Where the evidence is insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of
the accused, then his “acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law. ”—The
Constitution decrees that, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved . . .” To justify the conviction of the accused, the prosecution must
adduce that quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on its evidence and cannot draw strength from
the weakness of the evidence for the accused. Absent the required degree of proof of an
accused’s guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal. In this case, the seized marijuana plants linking
appellant to the crime charged are miserably tainted with constitutional infirmities, which render
these inadmissible “for any purpose in any proceeding.” Nor can the confession obtained during
the uncounselled investigation be used against appellant, “it being inadmissible in evidence
against him.” Without these proffered
30
30
People vs. Valdez
but proscribed materials, we find that the prosecution’s remaining evidence did not even
approximate the quantum of evidence necessary to warrant appellant’s conviction. Hence, the
presumption of innocence in his favor stands. Perforce, his acquittal is in order. In acquitting an
appellant, we are not saying that he is lily-white, or pure as driven snow. Rather, we are
declaring his innocence because the prosecution’s evidence failed to show his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. For that is what the basic law requires. Where the evidence is insufficient to
overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, then his “acquittal must follow
in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law.” People vs. Valdez, 341 SCRA 25, G.R. No.
129296 September 25, 2000
66. People v. Oliver Edano, GR No. 188133, 729 SCRA 255,

July 7, 2014
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Warrantless Arrests; For a warrantless arrest of an
accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer.—Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when,
in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. This is known an arrest in flagrante delicto. “For a warrantless
arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
256
256
People vs. Edaño
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.”
Criminal Law; Evidence; Trying to run away when no crime has been overtly committed, and
without more, cannot be evidence of guilt.—That the appellant attempted to run away when
PO3 Corbe approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to
charge the police officer with personal knowledge that the appellant had just engaged in, was
actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity. As the Court explained in
People v. Villareal, 693 SCRA 549 (2013): Furthermore, appellant’s act of darting away when
PO3 de Leon approached him should not be construed against him. Flight per se is not
synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt. It is
not a reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances, for even in high crime areas there
are many innocent reasons for flight, including fear of retribution for speaking to officers,
unwillingness to appear as witnesses, and fear of being wrongfully apprehended as a guilty
party. Thus, appellant’s attempt to run away from PO3 de Leon is susceptible of various
explanations; it could easily have meant guilt just as it could likewise signify innocence. In other
words, trying to run away when no crime has been overtly committed, and without more, cannot
be evidence of guilt.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Warrantless Arrests; Illegal Searches and Seizures;
Considering that the appellant’s warrantless arrest was unlawful, the search and seizure that
resulted from it was likewise illegal.—Considering that the appellant’s warrantless arrest was
unlawful, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal. Thus, the alleged
plastic bag containing white crystalline substances seized from him is inadmissible in evidence,
having come from an invalid search and seizure.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs; The existence of dangerous drugs is a condition sine qua non for conviction
for the illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs, it being the very corpus delicti of the
crimes.—Even granting, for the sake of argument, that the appellant’s warrantless arrest was
valid, the latter’s acquittal is still in order due to the prosecution’s failure to establish the
evidence of the corpus delicti with moral certainty. We stress that “[t]he exis-
257
VOL. 729, JULY 7, 2014
257
People vs. Edaño
tence of dangerous drugs is a condition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale and
possession of dangerous drugs, it being the very corpus delicti of the crimes.” Thus, the
evidence of the corpus delicti must be established beyond reasonable doubt. In the present
case, the various lapses — enumerated and discussed below — committed by the police in the
handling, safekeeping and custody over the seized drug tainted the integrity and evidentiary
value of the confiscated shabu.
Same; Same; Marking; Words and Phrases; Marking, as used in drug cases, means the placing
by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the item/s
seized.—Marking, as used in drug cases, means the placing by the apprehending officer or the
poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the item/s seized. “Consistency with the ‘chain
of custody’ rule requires that the ‘marking’ of the seized items — to truly ensure that they are the
same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence — should be
done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.” The
Court clarified in People v. Resurreccion, 603 SCRA 510 (2009), that marking upon immediate
confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team. Thus, while marking of the seized drugs at the police station is permitted,
the marking should be done by the police, and not by the accused. The appellant’s participation
in the marking procedure should only be as a witness. Why the police failed to do a basic police
procedure truly baffles us.
Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) offers some flexibility in complying with the express requirements under
paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, i.e., “noncompliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.”—To be sure, Section 21(a),
Article II of the IRR offers some flexibility in complying with the express requirements under
paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, i.e., “noncompliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by
258
258
People vs. Edaño
the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items[.]” This saving clause, however, applies only where the prosecution recognized
the procedural lapses and thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds, and when the
prosecution established that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been
preserved.
Same; Same; Same; Exclusionary Rule; Although the Supreme Court (SC) has recognized that
minor deviations from the procedures under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 would not
automatically exonerate an accused, it has also declared that when there is gross disregard of
the procedural safeguards prescribed in the substantive law (R.A. No. 9165), serious
uncertainty is generated about the identity of the seized items that the prosecution presented in
evidence.—Although the Court has recognized that minor deviations from the procedures under
R.A. No. 9165 would not automatically exonerate an accused, we have also declared that when
there is gross disregard of the procedural safeguards prescribed in the substantive law (R.A.
No. 9165), serious uncertainty is generated about the identity of the seized items that the
prosecution presented in evidence. This doubt cannot be remedied by simply invoking the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, for a gross, systematic, or
deliberate disregard of the procedural safeguards effectively produces an irregularity in the
performance of official duties.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Fruit of the Poisonous Tree; The Supreme Court (SC)
holds that the appellant’s acquittal is in order since the shabu purportedly seized from him is
inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree.—In sum, we hold
that the appellant’s acquittal is in order since the shabu purportedly seized from him is
inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Corollarily, the
prosecution’s failure to comply with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of
custody requirement of this Act, compromised the identity of the item seized, leading to the
failure to adequately prove the corpus delicti of the crime charged. People vs. Edaño, 729
SCRA 255, G.R. No. 188133 July 7, 2014
67. Dale Grady v. North Carolina, March 30, 2015 (Use of
GPS Tracker)
68. Valmonte v. General de Villa – 178 SCRA 211 (Main)
Constitutional Law; Search and Seizure; Checkpoints; The constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights
have been infringed or threatened to be infringed.—No proof has been presented before the
Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military indeed committed specific
violations of petitioners’ right against unlawful search and seizure or other rights. In a case filed
by the same petitioner organization, Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People’s Right (ULAP)
vs. Integrated National Police, it was held that individual petitioners who do not allege that any
of their rights were violated are not qualified to bring the action, as real parties in interest. The
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable
only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes
a reasonable or unreasonale search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial
question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. Petitioner
Valmonte’s general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a
search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the
details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and
seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of
Valmonte’s right against unlawful search and seizure.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Reasonableness of a search to be determined according to the

facts of each case, not by any fixed formula. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited.—Not
all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A
reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according
to the facts of each case. Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a
vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or
flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search.
_______________
* EN BANC.
212
212
Valmonte vs. De Villa
Same; Same; Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence, and promote public
welfare, and an individual’s right against warrantless search which was reasonably conducted,
the former should prevail.—The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and
probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to
pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order
for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to
destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may
take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement,
so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA “sparrow
units,” not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in
lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most
likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions—which all sum up to what one can
rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to
protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual’s right against a warrantless
search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
Same; Same; Same; Constitutionality of Checkpoints; Checkpoints during abnormal times, if

conducted within reasonable limits, are constitutional.—True, the manning of checkpoints by the
military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental
power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and
even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted
within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful
community.
CRUZ, J., Dissenting:
Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; The Bill of Rights was intended to limit the authority of the
State.—The bland declaration that individual rights must yield to the demands of national
security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the authority of the
State even if asserted on the ground of national security. What is worse is that the searches and
seizures are peremptorily pronounced to be reasonable even without proof of probable cause
and much less the required warrant. The improbable excuse is that they are aimed at
“establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an
atmosphere conducive to the
213
213
social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region.” For these purposes,
every individual may be stopped and searched at random and at any time simply because he
excites the suspicion, caprice, hostility or malice of the officers manning the checkpoints, on
pain of arrest or worse, even being shot to death, if he resists.
SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting:
Constitutional Law; Search and Seizures; Checkpoints; Existence of checkpoints alone, makes
searches done therein unreasonable, and hence, repugnant to the Constitution.—I join Justice
Isagani Cruz in his dissent, delivered so straightforwardly and eloquently. I am agreed that the
existence alone of checkpoints makes search done therein, unreasonable and hence,
repugnant to the Constitution. x x x Checkpoints, I further submit, are things of martial rule, and
things of the past. They first saw the light of day by virtue of General Order No. 66
(AUTHORIZING THE CHIEF OF CONSTABULARY TO ESTABLISH CHECKPOINTS, UPDATE
LISTS OF WANTED PERSONS AND CONDUCT DRAGNET OPERATIONS AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES), a martial law issuance, as amended by General Order No. 67 (AMENDING AND
AMPLIFYING PARAGRAPH 7 OF GENERAL ORDER NO. 66 DATED SEPTEMBER 12, 1980),
yet another martial law issuance. (See O.G. 4224-4226; 4226-4227 [Aug., 1983].) They are, so I
strongly submit, repressive measures, the same measures against which we had fought so
painstakingly in our quest for liberty, a quest that ended at EDSA and a quest that terminated a
dictatorship. How soon we forget. While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures,
as my brethren advance, is a right personal to the aggrieved party, the petitioners, precisely,
have come to Court because they had been, or had felt, aggrieved. I submit that in that event,
the burden is the State’s, to demonstrate the reasonableness of the search. The petitioners,
Ricardo Valmonte in particular, need not, therefore, have illustrated the “details of the incident”
(Resolution, supra, 4) in all their gore and gruesomeness. In any event, the absence alone of a
search warrant, as I have averred, makes checkpoint searches unreasonable, and by itself,
subject to constitutional challenges. (Supra.) As it is, “checkpoints” have become “search
warrants” unto themselves—a roving one at that. Valmonte vs. De Villa, 178 SCRA 211, G.R.
No. 83988 September 29, 1989
and
185 SCRA 655 (MR)
VOL. 185, MAY 24, 1990
665
G.R. No. 83988. May 24, 1990.*
RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLES’S

RIGHTS (ULAP), petitioners, vs. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
DISTRICT COMMAND, respondents
Constitutional Law; Police Power; Under exceptional circumstances, checkpoints may be
allowed and installed by the government.—It should be stated, at the outset, that nowhere in the
questioned decision did this Court legalize all checkpoints, i.e. at all times and under all
circumstances. What the Court declared is, that checkpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under
exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of organized government is on the balance, or
where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril, checkpoints may be allowed and
installed by the government. Implicit in this proposition is, that when the situation clears and
such grave perils are removed, checkpoints will have absolutely no reason to remain.
Same; Same; Same; Checkpoints have been regarded by authorities as a security measure
designed to entrap criminals and insurgents
_______________
* EN BANC.
666
666

and to constitute a dragnet for all types of articles in illegal trade.—Recent and on-going events
have pointed to the continuing validity and need for checkpoints manned by either military or
police forces. The sixth (6th) attempted coup d’ etat (stronger than all previous ones) was
staged only last 1 December 1989. Another attempt at a coup d’etat is taken almost for granted.
The NPA, through its sparrow units, has not relented but instead accelerated its liquidation of
armed forces and police personnel. Murders, sex crimes, hold-ups and drug abuse have
become daily occurrences. Unlicensed firearms and ammunition have become favorite objects
of trade. Smuggling is at an all-time high. Whether or not effective as expected, checkpoints
have been regarded by the authorities as a security measure designed to entrap criminal and
insurgents and to constitute a dragnet for all types of articles in illegal trade.
Same; Same; Same; As long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a
body search and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks
cannot be regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search.—
Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorist’s right to
“free passage without interruption”, but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief
detention of travellers during which the vehicle’s occupants are required to answer a brief
question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a
body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks
cannot be regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search.
Same Same; Same; Same; If vehicles are stopped and extensively searched, it is because of
some probable cause which justifies reasonable belief that either the motorist is a law-offender
or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense.—The checkpoints
are nonetheless attacked by the movants as a warrantless search and seizure and, therefore,
violative of the Constitution. As already stated, vehicles are generally allowed to pass these
checkpoints after a routine inspection and a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and
extensively searched, it is because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief
of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the
vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Warrantless searches and seizures at checkpoints quite similar to
searches and seizures accompanying war-
667
VOL. 185, MAY 24, 1990

667
rantless arrests during commission of a crime or immediately there-after.—Besides these

warrantless searches and seizures at the checkpoints are quite similar to searches and seizures
accompanying warrantless arrests during the commission of a crime, or immediately thereafter.
Same; Same; Same; Court’s decision on checkpoints does not in anyway validate nor condone
abuses committed by the military manning the checkpoints.—Lastly, the Court’s decision on
checkpoints does not, in any way, validate nor condone abuses committed by the military
manning the checkpoints. The Court’s decision was concerned with power, i.e. whether the
government employing the military has the power to install said checkpoints. Once that power is
acknowledged, the Court’s inquiry ceases. True, power implies the possibility of its abuse. But
whether is abuse in a particular situation is a different “ball game” to be resolved in the
constitutional arena.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., Concurring
To completely ban checkpoints as unconstitutional is to lose sight of the fact that the real
objective behind their use is laudable and necessary.—The problem we face in the resolution of
this petition arises from our knowledge that law enforcement officers use checkpoints as
opportunities for mulcting, oppression, and other forms of abuse. However, to completely ban
checkpoints as unconstitutional is to loss sight of the fact that the real objective behind their use
is laudable and necessary. If we say that ALL checkpoints are unconstitutional, we are banning
a law enforcement measure not because it is per se illegal but because it is being used for evil
purposes by the soldiers or police who man it.
CRUZ, J., Dissenting
It is not for the peace officer to decide when a warrantless search and seizure may be made
save in the exceptional instances allowed as when a crime is being committed or before or after
its commission.—Under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, probable cause is determined
“personally by the judge,” not by a soldier or a policeman. It is not for the peace officer to decide
when a warrantless search and seizure may be made save in the exceptional instances
allowed, as when a crime is being committed or before or after its commission. I can hardly
believe that the majority is seriously offering this exception as a continuing situation to justify the
regular warrantless searches at the checkpoints. Valmonte vs. De Villa, 185 SCRA 665, G.R.
No. 83988 May 24, 1990
Section 4.
251.Miller v. California – 37 L. Ed. 2d 419
252. Gonzales v. Kalaw-Katigbak – 137 SCRA 717
Constitutional Law; Motion Pictures; Censorship is, in extreme cases, a sine qua non to the
meaningful exercise of the rights to free speech and press.—Censorship or previous restraint
certainly is not all there is to free speech or free press. If it were so, then such basic rights are
emasculated. It is, however, except in exceptional circumstances a sine qua non for the
meaningful exercise of such right. This is not to deny that equally basic is the other important
aspect of freedom from liability. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this litigation, the emphasis
should rightly be on freedom from censorship. It is, beyond question, a well-settled principle in
our jurisdiction. As early as 1909, in the case of United States v. Sedano, a prosecution
________________
* EN BANC.
718
718
Gonzales vs. Kalaw Katigbak
for libel, the Supreme Court of the Philippines already made clear that freedom of the press
consists in the right to print what one chooses without any previous license.
Same; Same; The power of the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television (BRMPT) is
limited to the classification of films.—It is the opinion of this Court, therefore, that to avoid an
unconstitutional taint on its creation, the power of respondent Board is limited to the
classification of films. It can, to safeguard other constitutional objections, determine what motion
pictures are for general patronage and what may require either parental guidance or be limited
to adults only. That is to abide by the principle that freedom of expression is the rule and
restrictions the exemption. The power to exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed, rather
the presumption is against its validity.
Same; Same; The test to determine whether a motion pictures exceeds the bounds of
permissible exercise of free speech and, therefore, should be censored, is the clear and danger
test.—The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is the
clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has a right to
prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but also present. There should be no doubt that
what is feared may be traced to the expression complained of. The causal connection must be
evident. Also, there must be reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element
cannot be ignored. Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement
of its being well-nigh inevitable. The basic postulate, therefore, as noted earlier, is that where
the movies, theatrical productions, radio scripts, television programs, and other such media of
expression are concerned—included as they are in freedom of expression—censorship,
especially so if an entire production is banned, is allowable only under the clearest proof of a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public safety, public morals, public health or
any other legitimate public interest. There is merit to the observation of Justice Douglas that
“every writer, actor, or producer, no matter what medium of expression he may use, should be
freed from the censor.”
Same; Same; The law frowns on obscenity.—The law, however, frowns on obscenity—and
rightly so. As categorically stated by Justice Brennan in Roth v. United States, speaking of the
free speech and press guarantee of the United States Constitution: “All ideas
719
VOL. 137, JULY 22, 1985
719
having even the slightest redeeming social importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas,
even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full protection of the
guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more important
interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly
without redeeming social importance.” Such a view commends itself for approval.
Same; Same; There is difficulty in determining what is obscene.—There is, however, some
difficulty in determining what is obscene. There is persuasiveness to the approach followed in
Roth: “The early leading standard of obscenity allowed material to be judged merely by the
effect of an isolated excerpt upon particularly susceptible persons. Regina v. Hicklin [1868] LR 3
QB 360. Some American courts adopted this standard but later decisions have rejected it and
substituted this test: whether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.
The Hicklin test, judging obscenity by the effect of isolated passages upon the most susceptible
persons, might well encompass material legitimately treating with sex, and so it must be
rejected as un-constitutionally restrictive of the freedoms of speech and press. On the other
hand, the substituted standard provides safeguards adequate to withstand the charge of
constitutional infirmity.”
Same; Same; Sex and obscenity are not synonymous.—It is quite understandable then why in
the Roth opinion, Justice Brennan took pains to emphasize that “sex and obscenity are not
synonymous.” Further: “Obscene material is material which deals with sex in a manner
appealing to prurient interest. The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is
not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech
and press. Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life, has indisputably been a
subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the ages; it is one of the vital problems of
human interest and public concern.”
Same; Same; Certiorari; The BRMPT abused its discretion in classifying the movie “Kapit sa
Patalim” as “For Adults Only,” but there are not enough votes to maintain that such an abuse
can be considered grave. The classification serves as a warning that Kapit is not fit for the
young.—This being a certiorari petition, the question before the Court is whether or not there
was a grave abuse of discretion. That there was an abuse of discretion by respon-
720
720
dent Board is evident in the light of the difficulty and travail undergone by petitioners before
Kapit sa Patalim was classified as “For Adults Only,” without any deletion or cut. Moreover its
perception of what constitutes obscenity appears to be unduly restrictive. This Court concludes
then that there was an abuse of discretion. Nonetheless, there are not enough votes to maintain
that such an abuse can be considered grave. Accordingly, certiorari does not lie. This
conclusion finds support in this explanation of respondents in its Answer to the amended
petition: “The adult classification given the film serves as a warning to theater operators and
viewers that some contents of Kapit are not fit for the young. Some of the scenes in the picture
were taken in a theater-club and a good portion of the film shots concentrated on some women
erotically dancing naked, or at least nearly naked, on the theater stage. Another scene on that
stage depicted the women kissing and caressing as lesbians. And toward the end of the picture,
there exists scenes of excessive violence attending the battle between a group of robbers and
the police. The vulnerable and imitative in the young audience will misunderstand these
scenes.” Further: “Respondents further stated in its answer that petitioner company has an
option to have the film reclassified to For-General-Patronage if it would agree to remove the
obscene scenes and pare down the violence in the film.” Petitioners, however, refused the “For
Adults Only” classification and instead, as noted at the outset, filed this suit for certiorari.
Same; Same; Radio and Television; This ruling is limited to motion pictures. Television is
subject to a less liberal approach as it reaches its audience freely regardless of age.—All that
remains to be said is that the ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity applicable to
motion pictures. It is the consensus of this Court that where television is concerned, a less
liberal approach calls for observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures where the
patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every home where there is a set. Children
then will likely will be among the avid viewers of the programs therein shown. As was observed
by Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Jerome Frank, it is hardly the concern of the law to deal with
the sexual fantasies of the adult population. It cannot be denied though that the State as parens
patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young. Gonzales vs.
Kalaw Katigbak, 137 SCRA 717, No. L-69500 July 22, 1985
253. Pita v. CA – 178 SCRA 362

Constitutional Law; Press Freedom; Whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene is
to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose
hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall is the test in determining
the existence of obscenity.—The Court states at the outset that it is not the first time that it is
being asked to pronounce what “obscene” means or what makes for an obscene or
pornographic literature. Early on, in People vs. Kottinger, the Court laid down the test, in
determining the existence of obscenity, as follows: “whether the tendency of the matter charged
as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences
and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall.”
“Another test,” so Kottinger further declares, “is that which shocks the ordinary and common
sense of men as an indecency.”
Same; Same; Same; If the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art’s sake but
rather for commercial purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection.—
As the Court declared, the issue is a complicated one, in which the fine lines have neither been
drawn nor divided. It is easier said than done to say, indeed, that if “the pictures here in question
were used not exactly for art’s sake but rather for commercial purposes,” the pictures are not
entitled to any constitutional protection.
Same; Same; There is no challenge on the right of the State in the legitimate exercise of police
power to suppress smut—provided it is smut.—In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the
right of the State, in the legitimate exercise of police power, to suppress smut—provided it is
smut. For obvious reasons, smut is not smut simply because one insists it is smut. So is it
equally evident that individual tastes develop, adapt to wide-ranging influences, and keep in
step with the rapid advance of civilization. What shocked our forebears, say, five decades ago,
is not necessarily repulsive to the present generation. James Joyce and D.H. Lawrence were
censored in the thirties yet their works are considered important literature today.
_______________
* EN BANC.
363
363
Pita vs. Court of Appeals
Goya’s La Maja desnuda was once banned from public exhibition but now adorns the world’s
most prestigious museums.
Same; Same; Obscenity is not a bare matter of opinion.—But neither should we say that
“obscenity” is a bare (no pun intended) matter of opinion. As we said earlier, it is the divergent
perceptions of men and women that have probably compounded the problem rather than
resolved it.
Same; Same; Immoral lore or literature comes within the ambit of free expression although not
its protection; Burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger that would justify
adverse action lies on the authorities.—Undoubtedly, “immoral” lore or literature comes within
the ambit of free expression, although not its protection. In free expression cases, this Court has
consistently been on the side of the exercise of the right, barring a “clear and present danger”
that would warrant State interference and action. But, so we asserted in Reyes v. Bagatsing,
“the burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger that would justify adverse
action . . . lies on the . . . authorit[ies].”
Same; Same; Clear and Present Danger Rule; There must be objective and convincing, not
subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear and present danger.—“There must
be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear
and present danger.” “It is essential for the validity of . . . previous restraint or censorship that
the . . . authority does not rely solely on his own appraisal of what the public welfare, peace or
safety may require.” “To justify such a limitation, there must be proof of such weight and
sufficiency to satisfy the clear and present danger test.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court not convinced that private respondents have shown the
required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which mandatory
injunction had been sought.—The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have
shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which
mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful
court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry
out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Police Power; Fact that the former respondent Mayor’s act
was sanctioned by police power is no license to seize property in disregard of due process;
Police power
364
364
defined.—The fact that the former respondent Mayor’s act was sanctioned by “police power” is
no license to seize property in disregard of due process. In Philippine Service Exporters, Inc. v.
Drilon, we defined police power as “state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.” Presidential Decrees Nos.
960 and 969 are, arguably, police power measures, but they are not, by themselves, authorities
for high-handed acts. They do not exempt our law enforcers, in carrying out the decree of the
twin presidential issuances (Mr. Marcos’), from the commandments of the Constitution, the right
to due process of law and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, specifically.
Same; Same; Searches and Seizures; Searches and seizures may be done only through a
judicial warrant otherwise they become unreasonable and subject to challenge.—It is basic that
searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial warrant, otherwise, they become
unreasonable and subject to challenge. In Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP, We countermanded the
orders of the Regional Trial Court authorizing the search of the premises of We Forum and
Metropolitan Mail, two Metro Manila dailies, by reason of a defective warrant. We have greater
reason here to reprobate the questioned raid, in the complete absence of a warrant, valid or
invalid. The fact that the instant case involves an obscenity rap makes it no different from
Burgos, a political case, because, and as we have indicated, speech is speech, whether political
or “obscene”.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court not ruling out warrantless searches.—The Court is not ruling
out warrantless searches, as the Rules of Court (1964 rev.) (the Rules then prevailing), provide:
SEC. 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.—A person charged with an offense may
be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of the offense. But as the provision itself suggests, the search must have been an incident to a
lawful arrest, and the arrest must be on account of a crime committed. Here, no party has been
charged, nor are such charges being readied against any party, under Article 201, as amended,
of the Revised Penal Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Argument that there is no constitutional nor legal provision
which would free the accused of all criminal responsibility because there had been no warrant
and that violation of penal law must be punished, rejected.—We reject outright the argument
that “[t]here is no constitutional nor legal provision which would
365
365
free the accused of all criminal responsibility because there had been no warrant,” and that
“violation of penal law [must] be punished.” For starters, there is no “accused” here to speak of,
who ought to be “punished”. Second, to say that the respondent Mayor could have validly
ordered the raid (as a result of an anti-smut campaign) without a lawful search warrant because,
in his opinion, “violation of penal laws” has been committed, is to make the respondent Mayor
judge, jury, and executioner rolled into one. And precisely, this is the very complaint of the
petitioner. Pita vs. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 362, G.R. No. 80806 October 5, 1989
254. Barnes v. Glen Theater – 498 US 439

255. FCC v Pacifica Foundation – 438 US 726
256. Renton v. Playtime Theater – 475 US 41
257. Bethel School District v. Fraser – 478 US 675
258. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier – 484 US 260
259. Fernando v. CA, GR 159751, December 6, 2006
Criminal Law; Obscenity; As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the right to
regulate, the State in pursuing its mandate to protect, as parens patriae, the public from
obscene, immoral and indecent materials must justify the regulation or limitation.—As obscenity
is an unprotected speech which the State has the right to regulate, the State in pursuing its
mandate to protect, as parens patriae, the public from obscene, immoral and indecent materials
must justify the regulation or limitation. One such regulation is Article 201 of the Revised Penal
Code. To be held liable, the prosecution must prove that (a) the materials, publication, picture or
literature are obscene; and (b) the offender sold, exhibited, published or
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
352
352
Fernando vs. Court of Appeals
gave away such materials. Necessarily, that the confiscated materials are obscene must be
proved.
Same; Same; The court defined obscenity as something which is offensive to chastity, decency
or delicacy.—Almost a century has passed since the Court first attempted to define obscenity in
People v. Kottinger, 45 Phil. 352 (1923). There the Court defined obscenity as something which
is offensive to chastity, decency or delicacy. The test to determine the existence of obscenity is,
whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose
minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article
charged as being obscene may fall. Another test according to Kottinger is “that which shocks
the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency.” But, Kottinger hastened to say that
whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case, and
that ultimately, the question is to be decided by the judgment of the aggregate sense of the
community reached by it.
Same; Same; No one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene
materials unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive “hard core” sexual
conduct.—There is no perfect definition of “obscenity” but the latest word is that of Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), which established basic guidelines, to wit: (a) whether to the
average person, applying contemporary standards would find the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. But, it
would be a serious misreading of Miller to conclude that the trier of facts has the unbridled
discretion in determining what is “patently offensive.” No one will be subject to prosecution for
the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe patently
offensive “hard core” sexual conduct. Examples included (a) patently offensive representations
or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated; and (b) patently
offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd
exhibition of the genitals. What remains clear is that obscenity is an issue proper for judicial
determination and should be treated on a case to case basis and on the judge’s sound
discretion.
353
353
Fernando vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; The law does not require that a person be caught in the act of selling, giving away
or exhibiting obscene materials to be liable, for as long as the said materials are offered for sale,
displayed or exhibited to the public.—We emphasize that mere possession of obscene
materials, without intention to sell, exhibit, or give them away, is not punishable under Article
201, considering the purpose of the law is to prohibit the dissemination of obscene materials to
the public. The offense in any of the forms under Article 201 is committed only when there is
publicity. The law does not require that a person be caught in the act of selling, giving away or
exhibiting obscene materials to be liable, for as long as the said materials are offered for sale,
displayed or exhibited to the public. In the present case, we find that petitioners are engaged in
selling and exhibiting obscene materials. Fernando vs. Court of Appeals, 510 SCRA 351, G.R.
No. 159751 December 6, 2006
260. Soriano v. Laguardia, GR 164785, April 29, 2009 587 SCRA 79, April 29, 2009
Administrative Law; Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB); Powers of
an administrative agency is ascertained from the law itself which is liberally construed. Movie
and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) has the power to issue a preventive
suspension order.—Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be
administrative, investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five,
as may be conferred by the Constitution or by statute. They have in fine only such powers or
authority as are granted or delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law. And in determining
whether an agency has certain powers, the inquiry should be from the law
_______________
* EN BANC.
80
80
Soriano vs.Laguardia
itself. But once ascertained as existing, the authority given should be liberally construed. A
perusal of the MTRCB’s basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by the agency of
the authority, albeit impliedly, to issue the challenged order of preventive suspension. And this
authority stems naturally from, and is necessary for the exercise of, its power of regulation and
supervision.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Administrative Agencies.—But the mere absence of a provision on
preventive suspension in PD 1986, without more, would not work to deprive the MTRCB a basic
disciplinary tool, such as preventive suspension. Recall that the MTRCB is expressly
empowered by statute to regulate and supervise television programs to obviate the exhibition or
broadcast of, among others, indecent or immoral materials and to impose sanctions for
violations and, corollarily, to prevent further violations as it investigates. Contrary to petitioner’s
assertion, the aforequoted Sec. 3 of the IRR neither amended PD 1986 nor extended the effect
of the law. Neither did the MTRCB, by imposing the assailed preventive suspension, outrun its
authority under the law. Far from it. The preventive suspension was actually done in furtherance
of the law, imposed pursuant, to repeat, to the MTRCB’s duty of regulating or supervising
television programs, pending a determination of whether or not there has actually been a
violation. In the final analysis, Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 IRR merely formalized a power
which PD 1986 bestowed, albeit impliedly, on MTRCB.
Same; Same; Same; Movie and Television Review and Classification Board’s (MTRCB’s) power
to issue a preventive suspension order includes TV programs.—We cannot agree with
petitioner’s assertion that the aforequoted IRR provision on preventive suspension is applicable
only to motion pictures and publicity materials. The scope of the MTRCB’s authority extends
beyond motion pictures. What the acronym MTRCB stands for would suggest as much. And
while the law makes specific reference to the closure of a television network, the suspension of
a television program is a far less punitive measure that can be undertaken, with the purpose of
stopping further violations of PD 1986. Again, the MTRCB would regretfully be rendered
ineffective should it be subject to the restrictions petitioner envisages.
81
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009
81
Same; Same; Due Process; Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB)
issued the assailed order after a hearing.—Just as untenable is petitioner’s argument on the
nullity of the preventive suspension order on the ground of lack of hearing. As it were, the
MTRCB handed out the assailed order after petitioner, in response to a written notice, appeared
before that Board for a hearing on private respondents’ complaint. No less than petitioner
admitted that the order was issued after the adjournment of the hearing, proving that he had
already appeared before the MTRCB. Under Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the IRR of PD 1986,
preventive suspension shall issue “[a]ny time during the pendency of the case.” In this particular
case, it was done after MTRCB duly apprised petitioner of his having possibly violated PD 1986
and of administrative complaints that had been filed against him for such violation.
Evidence; Constitutional Law; Petitioner has not been denied the equal protection of the law as
the Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC) ministers he criticized are not facing any administrative charges.—
Petitioner’s position does not persuade. The equal protection clause demands that “all persons
subject to legislation should be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both in
the privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.” It guards against undue favor and individual
privilege as well as hostile discrimination. Surely, petitioner cannot, under the premises, place
himself in the same shoes as the INC ministers, who, for one, are not facing administrative
complaints before the MTRCB. For another, he offers no proof that the said ministers, in their
TV programs, use language similar to that which he used in his own, necessitating the
MTRCB’s disciplinary action. If the immediate result of the preventive suspension order is that
petitioner remains temporarily gagged and is unable to answer his critics, this does not become
a deprivation of the equal protection guarantee. The Court need not belabor the fact that the
circumstances of petitioner, as host of Ang Dating Daan, on one hand, and the INC ministers,
as hosts of Ang Tamang Daan, on the other, are, within the purview of this case, simply too
different to even consider whether or not there is a prima facie indication of oppressive
inequality.
82
82
Same; Same; Religious Freedom; Plain and simple insults to another person cannot be
elevated to the status of a religious speech.—There is nothing in petitioner’s statements subject
of the complaints expressing any particular religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed
evangelical mission. The fact that he came out with his statements in a televised bible
exposition program does not automatically accord them the character of a religious discourse.
Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious
speech. Even petitioner’s attempts to place his words in context show that he was moved by
anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction. His claim, assuming its
veracity, that some INC ministers distorted his statements respecting amounts Ang Dating Daan
owed to a TV station does not convert the foul language used in retaliation as religious speech.
We cannot accept that petitioner made his statements in defense of his reputation and religion,
as they constitute no intelligible defense or refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a rival
religious group. They simply illustrate that petitioner had descended to the level of name-calling
and foul-language discourse. Petitioner could have chosen to contradict and disprove his
detractors, but opted for the low road.
Same; Same; Same; A TV program rated “G” or for general viewership reaches adults and
children alike. What may not be obscene speech to adults may be considered obscene for
children.—A cursory examination of the utterances complained of and the circumstances of the
case reveal that to an average adult, the utterances “Gago ka talaga x x x, masahol ka pa sa
putang babae x x x. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay
Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba!” may not constitute obscene but merely indecent
utterances. They can be viewed as figures of speech or merely a play on words. In the context
they were used, they may not appeal to the prurient interests of an adult. The problem with the
challenged statements is that they were uttered in a TV program that is rated “G” or for general
viewership, and in a time slot that would likely reach even the eyes and ears of children.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases.—While adults may have understood that the terms
thus used were not to be taken literally, children could hardly be expected to have the same
discernment. Without parental guidance, the unbridled use of such
83
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009

83
language as that of petitioner in a television broadcast could corrupt impressionable young

minds. The term “putang babae” means “a female prostitute,” a term wholly inappropriate for
children, who could look it up in a dictionary and just get the literal meaning, missing the context
within which it was used. Petitioner further used the terms, “ang gumagana lang doon yung
ibaba,” making reference to the female sexual organ and how a female prostitute uses it in her
trade, then stating that Sandoval was worse than that by using his mouth in a similar manner.
Children could be motivated by curiosity and ask the meaning of what petitioner said, also
without placing the phrase in context. They may be inquisitive as to why Sandoval is different
from a female prostitute and the reasons for the dissimilarity. And upon learning the meanings
of the words used, young minds, without the guidance of an adult, may, from their end, view this
kind of indecent speech as obscene, if they take these words literally and use them in their own
speech or form their own ideas on the matter. In this particular case, where children had the
opportunity to hear petitioner’s words, when speaking of the average person in the test for
obscenity, we are speaking of the average child, not the average adult. The average child may
not have the adult’s grasp of figures of speech, and may lack the understanding that language
may be colorful, and words may convey more than the literal meaning. Undeniably the subject
speech is very suggestive of a female sexual organ and its function as such. In this sense, we
find petitioner’s utterances obscene and not entitled to protection under the umbrella of freedom
of speech.
Same; Same; Same; Freedom of Speech; As a standard of limitation on freedom of speech and
press, the clear and present danger test is not a magic incantation.—It was originally designed
to determine the latitude which should be given to speech that espouses anti-government
action, or to have serious and substantial deleterious consequences on the security and public
order of the community. The clear and present danger rule has been applied to this jurisdiction.
As a standard of limitation on free speech and press, however, the clear and present danger
test is not a magic incantation that wipes out all problems and does away with analysis and
judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech and which compels a court to
release a defendant from liability the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent proof of imminent
catastrophic disaster. As we observed in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation vs. Dans, Jr.,
84
84
137 SCRA 628 (1985), the clear and present danger test “does not lend itself to a simplistic and
all embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The State has a compelling interest to protect minors, against
offensive language in TV programs.—The State has a compelling interest in extending social
protection to minors against all forms of neglect, exploitation, and immorality which may pollute
innocent minds. It has a compelling interest in helping parents, through regulatory mechanisms,
protect their children’s minds from exposure to undesirable materials and corrupting
experiences. The Constitution, no less, in fact enjoins the State, as earlier indicated, to promote
and protect the physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being of the youth to better
prepare them fulfill their role in the field of nation-building. In the same way, the State is
mandated to support parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development
of moral character. Petitioner’s offensive and obscene language uttered in a television
broadcast, without doubt, was easily accessible to the children. His statements could have
exposed children to a language that is unacceptable in everyday use. As such, the welfare of
children and the State’s mandate to protect and care for them, as parens patriae, constitute a
substantial and compelling government interest in regulating petitioner’s utterances in TV
broadcast as provided in PD 1986.
Same; Same; Same; The assailed order penalized petitioner for past speech, not future
speeches in a TV program.—Neither can petitioner’s virtual inability to speak in his program
during the period of suspension be plausibly treated as prior restraint on future speech. For
viewed in its proper perspective, the suspension is in the nature of an intermediate penalty for
uttering an unprotected form of speech. It is definitely a lesser punishment than the permissible
cancellation of exhibition or broadcast permit or license. In fine, the suspension meted was
simply part of the duties of the MTRCB in the enforcement and administration of the law which it
is tasked to implement. Viewed in its proper context, the suspension sought to penalize past
speech made on prime-time “G” rated TV program; it does not bar future speech of petitioner in
other television programs; it is a permissible subsequent administrative sanction; it should not
be confused with a prior restraint on speech. While not on all fours,
85
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009
85
the Court, in MTRCB, sustained the power of the MTRCB to penalize a broadcast company for
exhibiting/airing a pre-taped TV episode without Board authorization in violation of Sec. 7 of PD
1986.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Presidential Decree No. 1986 is constitutional; The investiture
of supervisory power would be meaningless if it did not carry with it the power to penalize the
supervised as may be proportionate to the offense proved.—Complementing this provision is
Sec. 3(k) of the decree authorizing the MTRCB “to exercise such powers and functions as may
be necessary or incidental to the attainment of the purpose and objectives of [the law].” As
earlier explained, the investiture of supervisory, regulatory, and disciplinary power would surely
be a meaningless grant if it did not carry with it the power to penalize the supervised or the
regulated as may be proportionate to the offense committed, charged, and proved.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Administrative regulation or subordinate legislation to promote

public interest is a necessity in modern life.—The grant of the rule-making power to
administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an
exception to the non-delegation of legislative powers. Administrative regulations or “subordinate
legislation” calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of “the growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the
increased difficulty of administering the law.” Allowing the MTRCB some reasonable elbow-
room in its operations and, in the exercise of its statutory disciplinary functions, according it
ample latitude in fixing, by way of an appropriate issuance, administrative penalties with due
regard for the severity of the offense and attending mitigating or aggravating circumstances, as
the case may be, would be consistent with its mandate to effectively and efficiently regulate the
movie and television industry.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB)
may suspend a TV program but not its host.—But even as we uphold the power of the MTRCB
to review and impose sanctions for violations of PD 1986, its decision to suspend petitioner
must be modified, for nowhere in that issuance, particularly the power-defining Sec. 3 nor in the
MTRCB Schedule of Administrative Penalties effective January 1, 1999 is the Board
empowered to suspend the program host or even to prevent certain
86
86
people from appearing in television programs. The MTRCB, to be sure, may prohibit the
broadcast of such television programs or cancel permits for exhibition, but it may not suspend
television personalities, for such would be beyond its jurisdiction. The MTRCB cannot extend its
exercise of regulation beyond what the law provides. Only persons, offenses, and penalties
clearly falling clearly within the letter and spirit of PD 1986 will be considered to be within the
decree’s penal or disciplinary operation. And when it exists, the reasonable doubt must be
resolved in favor of the person charged with violating the statute and for whom the penalty is
sought. Thus, the MTRCB’s decision in Administrative Case No. 01-04 dated September 27,
2004 and the subsequent order issued pursuant to said decision must be modified. The
suspension should cover only the television program on which petitioner appeared and uttered
the offensive and obscene language, which sanction is what the law and the facts obtaining call
for. Soriano vs. Laguardia, 587 SCRA 79, G.R. No. 164785 April 29, 2009
261. Navarro v. Villegas – 31 SCRA 730
262. PBM Employees v. PBM – 51 SCRA 189
Political and Constitutional Law; Basic concepts and principles underlying a democracy.—In a
democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human
personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The
inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent in
his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person."
Same; Purpose of Bill of Rights.—The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty,
equality and security "against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour,
the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience
with general principles." The purpose of the Bill of Rights is to "withdraw subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials,
and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts..."
Same; Same.—The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are
included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of
Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as
Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the
majority who refuse to listen. And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one
are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are
protected.
Same; Same.—The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights
but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full
and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the
periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the administration of
public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these
rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress
and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and
employees.
Same; Same; Human rights supreme to property rights.—While the Bill of Rights also protects
property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these
freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the
"threat of sanctions may deter their exercise
191
VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973
191
Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.
almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to
survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property
rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are
extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the
power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of
majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs—political, economic or otherwise.
Same; Same; Same; Freedom of assembly and expression occupy a preferred position.—In the
hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred
position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions;
and such "priority gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious
intrusions."
Same; Same; Same; Why human civil liberties more superior than property rights disclosed.—
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere
reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or
purpose—that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive—would suffice to
validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or
valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely, existence of a
grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. So it
has been stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and
reiterated by the writer of the opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. It should be noted that Mr. Justice
Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, like Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co.
vs. Sullivan, believes that the freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public
officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we
shall be governed," even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the balancing-of-interest test. Chief
Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned
Hand, viz.—whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such
invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the danger.
Same; Same; Same; Labor Law; Workers who joined a demonstration against police abuses did
not violate CBA "no-strike no-lockout" provision.—Tested against the foregoing principles, the
192
192
Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc
conclusion of the Court of Industrial Relations that the petitioners by their "concerted act and the
occurrence of a temporary stoppage of Work," are guilty of bargaining in bad faith and hence
violated the collective bargaining agreement cannot be sustained. The demonstration held by
petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacanang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig
policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm. Said demonstration was
purely and completely an exercise of their freedom of expression in general and of their right of
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental
agency, the Chief Executive, against the police officers of the municipality of Pasig.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the duty of employer to protect employees against police
abuses.—As a matter of fact, it was the duty of herein respondent firm to protect herein
petitioner Union and its members from the harassment of local police officers. It was to the
interest of herein respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and to take up the cudgels for, its
employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as a
consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks to enhance its productivity as well
as profits.
Same; Same; Same; Demonstration against police abuses not a violation of collective
bargaining agreement.—As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights—freedom of
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances—over property rights
has been sustained. Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon—at once the
shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of
our enlightened civilization—becomes Our Duty, if freedom and social justice have any meaning
at all for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can generate happiness
for all. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as
evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees,
stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of
inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional
guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.
Same; Demonstration against police abuses could not have been enjoined by any court.—The
mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally
enjoined by
193
VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973
193
any court, for such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom of expression of the
workers, even if it legally appears to be an illegal picketing or strike.
Same; Labor Law; All employees of a firm and not merely those belonging to a particular shift
may join demonstration.—The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its
employees to participate in the demonstration and that they suggested to the Union that only the
first and regular shift from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. should report for work in order that loss or damage to
the firm will be averted. This stand failed to appreciate the sine qua non of an effective
demonstration especially by a labor union, namely, the complete unity of the Union members as
well as their total presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the maximum
persuasive force that will gain for them not only public sympathy for the validity of their cause
but also immediate action on the part of the corresponding government agencies with
jurisdiction over the issues they raised against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects
of freedom of expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the
circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. ... At any rate, the Union
notified the company two days in advance of their projected demonstration and the company
could have made arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by
reason of the absence of its workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union
requested it to excuse only the day shift employees who will join the demonstration. ... There
was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the
request... And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the
Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer,
which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Employer who refuses its employees to join demonstration against police abuse
guilty of unfair labor practice.—Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit
all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and
the subsequent separation of the eight petitioners from the service constituted an
unconstitutional restraint on their freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom of
petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice
defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of R.A. No. 875, otherwise known as the
Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of R.A. 875 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in
concerted activities for xxx mutual
194
194
aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section
Three." xxx The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the workers for the morning
and regular shifts should not participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal,
was as heretofore state, "a potent means of inhibiting speech."
Evidence; Lack of finding the company did not suffer any loss means not such loss was
sustained.—While the respondent Court found that the demonstration "paralyzed to a large
extent the operations of the complainant company," the said court did not make any finding as
to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can only means
that the firm did not sustain any loss or damage.
Constitutional and Political Law; Labor Law; Dismissal from work of leaders of demonstration
against police abuses constitutes denial of social justice.— Section 5 of Article II of the
Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in
Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to labor xxx".
Respondent Court as an agency of the State is under obligation at all times to give meaning and
substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise these
constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless constitutional patter." Under the
Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law
"to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by
employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the
promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate that said court
failed to implement this policy.xxx
Same; When a court acts against the Constitution, its judgments and orders become null and
void.—Having violated the basic human rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations
ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity.
Same; CIR rules against late filing of a motion for reconsideration cannot prevail over basic
constitutional rights.—Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two days
late defeat the rights of the petitioning employees for their
195
VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973

195
reinstatement? The answer should be obvious in the light of the aforecited cases. To accord
supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights
sheltered by the Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional
government that the Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and regulations,
but also does violence to natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the
constitutional right over the aforesaid court procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed.
Same.—It is thus seen that a procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to
a constitutional right. In the instant case, the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations,
a creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the constitutional rights invoked by herein
petitioners even before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them and in
their defense to the said charge. In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms
sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most compelling reason to deny application of a CIR
rule which impinges on such human rights.
Same; Civil Procedure; Court may suspend its own rules.—It is an accepted principle that the
Supreme Court has inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from
its operation, whenever the purposes of justice requires." Mr. Justice Barredo in his concurring
opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo reiterated this principle and added that "Under this
authority, this Court is enabled to cope with all situations without concerning itself about
procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do justice..." If we can disregard our own
rules when justice requires it, obedience to the Constitution renders more imperative the
suspension of a CIR rule that classes with the human rights sanctioned and shielded with
resolute concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the organic law.
Same; Same; Suspension of CIR rules authorized by C.A. 103.—The suspension of the
application of Section 15 of the CIR rules with reference to the case at bar, is also authorized by
Section 20 of C.A. 103, the CIR charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to "act
according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms." Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 189, No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
263. JBL Reyes v. Mayor Bagatsing – 125 SCRA 553
264. PCIB v. Philnabank Employees, 105 SCRA 314
Criminal Law; Labor Law; Peaceful picketing is part of the freedom of speech. That the
language employed by the picketers is far from being courteous and polite does not give rise to
a cause for libel and damages.—The latest case in point where such a principle was reaffirmed
expressly is Associated Labor Union v. Gomez, a 1980 decision. There is no mention of the
other placards but it is not unlikely that to bolster its claim, mention was likewise made and in
bold letters at that of such alleged failing of its management. That was the aim and intent as
found by the lower court. That could not very well be disputed by plaintiff-appellant.
Unfortunately, the offending imputation, but in the form of a question, was included. It was due
to a former official of plaintiff-appellant’s bank who was thereafter named as President of the
Philippine National Bank. Should there be an automatic attitude of condemnation for such
incident? If the realistic observation of Justice Frankfurter in Milk Wagon Drivers Union of
Chicago v. Meadowmoor Dairies be heeded that labor disputes give rise to strong emotional
response, then the decision reached by the lower court becomes even more acceptable. It is a
fact of industrial life, both in the Philippines as in the United States, that in the continuing
confrontation between labor and management, it is far from likely that the language employed
would be both courteous and polite. Such being the case, there is no affront either to reason or
to the law in the complaint for libel being dismissed. In placing reliance on the constitutional right
of freedom of expression, this Court once again makes manifest its adherence to the principle
first announced by Justice Malcolm as ponente in the leading case of United States v. Bustos.
In no uncertain terms, it made clear that the judiciary, in deciding suits for libel, must ascer-
________________
* SECOND DIVISION
315
VOL. 105, JULY 2, 1981
315
Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank vs. Philnabank Employees’ Association
tain whether or not the alleged offending words may be embraced by the guarantees of free
speech and free press. It cannot be too often said that Bustos was promulgated as far back as
March 8, 1918. A doctrine analogous in character was enunciated by the United States
Supreme Court only thirty-six years later in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. Philippine
Commercial & Industrial Bank vs. Philnabank Employees’ Association, 105 SCRA 314, No. L-
29630 July 2, 1981
265.Malabanan v. Ramento – 129 SCRA 359
Moot and Academic; Constitutional Law; While the instant petition may have become academic,
there is need to resolve it on the merits in view of the constitutional issue raised.—This petition
may be considered moot and academic if viewed solely from the fact that by virtue of the
temporary restraining order issued by this Court petitioners were allowed to enroll in the ensuing
semester, with three of them doing so and with the other two equally entitled to do so.
Moreover, there is the added circumstance of more than a year having passed since October
20, 1982 when respondent Ramento issued the challenged decision suspending them for one
year. Nonetheless, with its validity having been put in issue, for being violative of the
constitutional rights of freedom of peaceable assembly and free speech, there is need to pass
squarely on the question raised.
Constitutional Law; Suspension for one academic year of students who staged a rally within
University premises but outside the place indicated in the permit given and for a longer period
than
______________
* EN BANC.
360
360
Malabanan vs. Ramento
allowed, too severe a penalty.—This Court accordingly rules that respect for the constitutional
rights of peaceable assembly and free speech calls for the setting aside of the decision of
respondent Ramento, the penalty imposed being unduly severe. It is true that petitioners held
the rally at a place other than that specified in the permit and continued it longer than the time
allowed. Undeniably too, they did disturb the classes and caused the work of the non-academic
personnel to be left undone. Such undesirable consequence could have been avoided by their
holding the assembly in the basketball court as indicated in the permit. Nonetheless,
suspending them for one year is out of proportion to their misdeed. The petition must be granted
and the decision of respondent Ramento nullified, a much lesser penalty being appropriate.
Same; Schools and Universities; Authority of school officials over the conduct of their students
cannot go so far as to be violative of the right to free speech and assembly.—Petitioners invoke
their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. They are entitled to do so. They enjoy like
the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate their thoughts to
those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this case. They do not, to borrow from
the opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, “shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” While,
therefore, the authority of educational institutions over the conduct of students must be
recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional safeguards. On a more specific
level, there is persuasive force to this formulation in the Fortas opinion: “The principal use to
which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students during prescribed hours for the
purpose of certain types of activities. Among those activities is personal intercommunication
among the students. This is not only an inevitable part of the process of attending school; it is
also an important part of the educational process. A student’s rights, therefore, do not embrace
merely the classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the
campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial
subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without ‘materially and substantially
interfering] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school’ and
without colliding with the rights of others. * * * But conduct by the student, in class or out of it,
which for any reason—whether it stems from time, place, or type of behaviour—materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or
361
VOL. 129, MAY 21, 1984
361
invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech.”
Same; Same; It is quite understandable for student leaders to let loose extremely critical and, at
times, vitriolic language against school authorities during a student rally.—If in the course of
such demonstration, with an enthusiastic audience goading them on, utterances, extremely
critical, at times even vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite understandable. Student leaders are
hardly the timid, diffident types. They are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be
ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. At
any rate, even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to accord full credence to their fiery
exhortations. They take into account the excitement of the occasion, the propensity of speakers
to exaggerate, the exuberance of youth. They may give the speakers the benefit of their
applause, but with the activity taking place in the school premises and during the daytime, no
clear and present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking
of disciplinary action for conduct, which, to borrow from Tinker, “materially disrupts classwork or
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.”
Same; Same; A one-year suspension is too severe a penalty on student rallyists even if the rally
was held beyond the time permitted and went on to other portions of the University Compound
thus disrupting some classes. Censure or reprimanded or one-week suspension reasonable.—It
does not follow, however, that petitioners can be totally absolved for the events that transpired.
Admittedly, there was a violation of the terms of the permit. The rally was held at a place other
than that specified, in the second floor lobby, rather than the basketball court, of the VMAS
building of the University. Moreover, it was continued longer than the period allowed. According
to the decision of respondent Ramento, the “concerted activity [referring to such assembly] went
on until 5:30 p.m.” Private respondents could thus, take disciplinary action. On those facts,
however, an admonition, even a censure—certainly not a suspension—could be the appropriate
penalty. Private respondents could and did take umbrage at the fact that in view of such
infraction—considering the places where and the time when the demonstration took place—
there was a disruption of the classes and stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel.
They would not be unjustified then if they did take a much more serious view of the
362
362
matter. Even then a one-year period of suspension is much too severe. While the discretion of
both respondent University and respondent Ramento is recognized, the rule of reason, the
dictate of fairness calls for a much lesser penalty. If the concept of proportionality between the
offense committed and the sanction imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness
intrudes. That would give rise to a due process question. To avoid this constitutional objection, it
is the holding of this Court that a one-week suspension would be punishment enough.
Same; Administrative Law; Administrative remedies need not be exhausted where issue is
purely a legal and constitutional one.—The objection was raised that petitioners failed to
exhaust administrative remedies. That is true, but hardly decisive. Here, a purely legal question
is presented. Such being the case, especially so where a decision on a question of law is
imperatively called for, and time being of the essence, this Court has invariably viewed the issue
as ripe for adjudication. What cannot be too sufficiently stressed is that the constitutional rights
to peaceable assembly and free speech are invoked by petitioners. Moreover, there was, and
very likely there will continue to be in the future, militancy and assertiveness of students on
issues that they consider of great importance, whether concerning their welfare or the general
public. That they have a right to do as citizens entitled to all the protection in the Bill of Rights.
Same; Guidelines for holding student rallies within the campus.—The rights to peaceable
assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational institutions. Necessarily, their
exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be
subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear
and present danger to a substantive evil that the state has a right to present. As a corollary, the
utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed or utterances made.
The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder
under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to
correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in school premises, permit
must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request
arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and
place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic
personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be
disproportionate to the offense. Malabanan vs. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359, No. L-62270 May 21,
1984
266. De la Cruz v. CA, GR 126183, March 25, 1999
Constitutional Law; Right to Free Assembly; The mass actions of September/October 1990
staged by Metro Manila public school teachers amounted to a strike in every sense of the
term.—As early as 18 December 1990 we have categorically ruled in the consolidated cases of
Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio, Jr. and Alliance of Concerned Teachers
v. Hon. Isidro Cariño that the mass actions of September/October 1990 staged by Metro Manila
public school teachers “amounted to a strike in every sense of the term, constituting as they did,
a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of or absence from work which it was said teachers’
sworn duty to perform, carried out for essentially economic reasons.
305
VOL. 305, MARCH 25, 1999
305
De la Cruz vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; The rights to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances to be upheld must be exercised within reasonable limits so as not to prejudice the
public welfare.—In Rolando Gan v. Civil Service Commission, we denied the claim that the
teachers were thereby denied their rights to peaceably assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances reasoning that this constitutional liberty to be upheld, like any other
liberty, must be exercised within reasonable limits so as not to prejudice the public welfare. But
the public school teachers in the case of the 1990 mass actions did not exercise their
constitutional rights within reasonable limits. On the contrary, they committed acts prejudicial to
the best interest of the service by staging the mass protests on regular school days, abandoning
their classes and refusing to go back even after they had been ordered to do so. Had the
teachers availed of their free time—recess, after classes, weekends or holidays—to dramatize
their grievances and to dialogue with the proper authorities within the bounds of law, no one—
not the DECS, the CSC or even the Supreme Court—could have held them liable for their
participation in the mass actions.
Same; Same; Court stressed that the teachers were penalized not because they exercised their
right to peaceably assemble but because of the manner by which such right was exercised.—In
Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals we added that the persistent refusal of the striking teachers to
call the mass actions by the conventional term “strike” did not erase the true nature of the mass
actions as unauthorized stoppages of work the purpose of which was to obtain a favorable
response to the teachers’ economic grievances. We again stressed that the teachers were
penalized not because they exercised their right to peaceably assemble but because of the
manner by which such right was exercised, i.e., going on unauthorized and unilateral absences
thus disrupting classes in various schools in Metro Manila which produced adverse effects upon
the students for whose education the teachers were responsible.
Same; Same; Backwages; The issue of whether back wages may be awarded to teachers
ordered reinstated is resolved in the negative on the ground that they were neither exonerated
nor unjustifiably suspended.—The issue of whether back wages may be awarded to teachers
ordered reinstated to the service after the dismissal orders of Secretary Cariño were commuted
by the CSC to six (6) months’ suspension is already settled. In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals
we
306
306
De la Cruz vs. Court of Appeals
resolved the issue in the negative on the ground that the teachers were neither exonerated nor
unjustifiably suspended, two (2) circumstances necessary for the grant of back wages in
administrative disciplinary cases. Like herein petitioners, those in Bangalisan were also
teachers who participated in the 1990 mass actions for which they were dismissed by Secretary
Cariño but ordered merely suspended for six (6) months by the Civil Service Commission. De la
Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 305 SCRA 303, G.R. No. 126183, G.R. No. 129221 March 25, 1999
267. Bangalisan v. CA, GR 124678, July 23, 1997
Civil Service; Administrative Law; Strikes; The right of government employees to organize is
limited only to the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike.—It is
the settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes.
While the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, they are
prohibited from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of
mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public services. The right of
government employees to organize is limited only to the formation of unions or associations,
without including the right to strike.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The mass actions launched by the public school
teachers during the period from September up to the first half of October, 1990 were to all
intents and purposes a strike—they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or
absence from, work which it was the teachers’ duty to perform, undertaken for essentially
economic reasons.—The issue of whether or not the mass action launched by the public school
teachers during the period from September up to the first half of October, 1990 was a strike has
been decided by this Court in a resolution, dated December 18, 1990, in the herein cited case of
Manila Public School Teachers Association, et al. vs. Laguio, Jr., supra. It was there held “that
from the pleaded and admitted facts, these ‘mass actions’ were to all intents and purposes a
strike; they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which
it was the teachers’ duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons.”
______________
* EN BANC.
620
620
Bangalisan vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Same; Same; The fact that the conventional term “strike” was not used by the
striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the
substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.—It is an
undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that petitioners’ purpose was to realize their
demands by withholding their services. The fact that the conventional term “strike” was not used
by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since
the substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling. The
ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. In the absence of statute, public
employees do not have the right to engage in concerted work stoppages for any purpose.
Same; Same; Same; Right of Assembly; The public school teachers who went on strike are
penalized not because they exercised their right of peaceable assembly and petition for redress
of grievances but because their successive unauthorized and unilateral absences produced
adverse effects upon their students for whose education they are responsible.—Further, herein
petitioners, except Mariano, are being penalized not because they exercised their right of
peaceable assembly and petition for redress of grievances but because of their successive
unauthorized and unilateral absences which produced adverse effects upon their students for
whose education they are responsible. The actuations of petitioners definitely constituted
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, punishable under the Civil Service law,
rules and regulations.
Same; Same; Same; Suspension of public services, however temporary, will inevitably derail
services to the public, which is one of the reasons why the right to strike is denied government
employees.—It bears stressing that suspension of public services, however temporary, will
inevitably derail services to the public, which is one of the reasons why the right to strike is
denied government employees. It may be conceded that the petitioners had valid grievances
and noble intentions in staging the “mass actions,” but that will not justify their absences to the
prejudice of innocent school children. Their righteous indignation does not legalize an illegal
work stoppage.
621
VOL. 276, JULY 31, 1997
621
Same; Same; Same; Even in the absence of express statutory prohibition like Memorandum
Circular No. 6, public employees are denied the right to strike or engage in a work stoppage
against a public employer.—As a general rule, even in the absence of express statutory
prohibition like Memorandum Circular No. 6, public employees are denied the right to strike or
engage in a work stoppage against a public employer. The right of the sovereign to prohibit
strikes or work stoppages by public employees was clearly recognized at common law. Indeed,
it is frequently declared that modern rules which prohibit such strikes, either by statute or by
judicial decision, simply incorporate or reassert the common law rule.
Same; Same; Same; To grant employees of the public sector the right to strike, there must be a
clear and direct legislative authority therefor.—To grant employees of the public sector the right
to strike, there must be a clear and direct legislative authority therefor. In the absence of any
express legislation allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or
regulating the exercise of the right, employees in the public service may not engage in strikes,
walkouts and temporary work stoppages like workers in the private sector.
Same; Same; Preventive Suspension; Under Section 51 of Executive Order No. 292, it is the
nature of the charge against an officer or employee which determines whether he may be
placed under preventive suspension.—Section 51 of Executive Order No. 292 provides that
“(t)he proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend any subordinate officer or
employee under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or
employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance
of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would
warrant his removal from the service.” Under the aforesaid provision, it is the nature of the
charge against an officer or employee which determines whether he may be placed under
preventive suspension. In the instant case, herein petitioners were charged by the Secretary of
the DECS with grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of Civil Service law,
rules and regulations, and reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross
insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and absence without
official leave (AWOL), for joining the teachers’ mass
622
622
actions held at Liwasang Bonifacio on September 17 to 21, 1990. Hence, on the basis of the
charges against them, it was within the competence of the Secretary to place herein petitioners
under preventive suspension.
Same; Same; Same; The immediate execution of the Secretary’s decision against erring
employees is authorized by Section 47, paragraph (2), of Executive Order No. 292.—As to the
immediate execution of the decision of the Secretary against petitioners, the same is authorized
by Section 47, paragraph (2), of Executive Order No. 292, thus: “The Secretaries and heads of
agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees
under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension
for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days’ salary. In case the
decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same shall
be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory
only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.”
Same; Same; Due Process; For as long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard
before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met.—Petitioners’
claim of denial of due process must also fail. The records of this case clearly show that they
were given opportunity to refute the charges against them but they failed to avail themselves of
the same. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. For as long as the parties were given the opportunity to be heard before
judgment was rendered, the demands of due process were sufficiently met.
Same; Same; Right to Compensation; The payment of back salaries corresponding to the
period when an employee is not allowed to work may be decreed if he is found innocent of the
charges which caused the suspension and when the suspension is unjustified.—The issue
regarding payment of back salaries during the period of suspension of a member of the civil
service who is subsequently ordered reinstated, is already settled in our jurisdiction. Such
payment of salaries corresponding to the period when an employee is not allowed to work may
be decreed if he is found innocent of the
623
VOL. 276, JULY 31, 1997
623
charges which caused the suspension and when the suspension is unjustified.
Same; Same; Same; To deny an innocent government employee his back wages during his
suspension would be tantamount to punishing him after his exoneration from the charges which
caused his dismissal from the service.—However, the Civil Service Commission, in the
questioned resolution, made a finding that Mariano was not involved in the “mass actions” but
was absent because he was in Ilocos Sur to attend the wake and interment of his grandmother.
Although the CSC imposed upon him the penalty of reprimand, the same was for his violation of
reasonable office rules and regulations because he failed to inform the school of his intended
absence and neither did he file an application for leave covering such absences. Under Section
23 of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and other pertinent civil
service laws, in violations of reasonable office rules and regulations, the first offense is
punishable by reprimand. To deny petitioner Mariano his back wages during his suspension
would be tantamount to punishing him after his exoneration from the charges which caused his
dismissal from the service.
Same; Same; Same; The denial of salary to an employee during the period of his suspension, if
he should later be found guilty, is proper because he had given ground for his suspension.—
The denial of salary to an employee during the period of his suspension, if he should later be
found guilty, is proper because he had given ground for his suspension. It does not impair his
constitutional rights because the Constitution itself allows suspension for cause as provided by
law and the law provides that an employee may be suspended pending an investigation or by
way of penalty.
Same; Same; Same; The general proposition is that a public official is not entitled to any
compensation if he has not rendered any service—as he works, he shall earn.—Moreover, the
general proposition is that a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he has not
rendered any service. As he works, he shall earn. Since petitioners did not work during the
period for which they are now claiming salaries, there can be no legal or equitable basis to order
the payment of such salaries. Bangalisan vs. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 619, G.R. No.
124678 July 31, 1997
268. Ruiz v. Gordon, 126 SCRA 233
Constitutional Law; Local Government; A party applying for a permit to stage a rally should be
interested in finding out if his application has been granted.—As shown both in the
manifestation and the answer, this action for mandamus could have been obviated if only
petitioner took the trouble of verifying on November 23
_________________
* EN BANC.
234
234
Ruiz vs. Gordon
whether or not a permit had been issued. A party desirous of exercising the right to peaceable
assembly should be the one most interested in ascertaining the action taken on a request for a
permit. Necessarily, after a reasonable time or, if the day and time was designated for the
decision on the request, such party or his representative should be at the office of the public
official concerned. If he fails to do so, a copy of the decision reached, whether adverse or
favorable, should be sent to the address of petitioner. In that way, there need not be waste of
time and effort not only of the litigants but likewise of a court from which redress is sought in
case of a denial or modification of a request for a permit.
Same; Same; Litigations involving permits to stage a rally are better started at the trial court
level.—Lately, several petitions of this character have been filed with this Court. It could be due
to the lack of knowledge of the guidelines set forth in the extended opinion. Steps have been
taken to send the Regional Trial judges copies thereof. In the future, therefore, without
precluding the filing of petitions directly with this Court, the interest of justice and of public
convenience would be better served if litigation starts on the trial court level.
Teehankee, J., concurring:
Constitutional Law; Local Governments; Granting of permit to stage rally practically a ministerial
duty absent a clear and present danger.—This Court has after all laid down the clear guidelines
in the J.B.L. Reyes case for the licensing authorities and has taken steps to furnish copies
thereof to all regional trial courts for their information and guidance. It is to be hoped that what
has happened in Manila after the J.B.L. Reyes case, wherein the Mayor as the licensing
authority has in compliance with the guidelines granted all subsequent applications for such
permits, seeing to it only that there be no conflict in the scheduling of such assemblies and
thereby eliminated the need for the applicant's having to go to court, would be emulated by all
other cities and towns concerned. The granting of such permits for the exercise of a
fundamental right, absent any clear and present danger, is after all practically a ministerial duty.
Same; Burden to show presence of danger is on the mayor.—The burden to show the existence
of such grave and imminent danger that would justify an adverse action lies on the mayor as the
licensing authority. There must be objective and convincing, not
235
235
Ruiz vs. Gordon
subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear and present danger. As the Court
stated in its Resolution of October 25, 1983 in the J.B.L. Reyes case, "It is essential for the
validity of a denial of a permit which amounts to a previous restraint or censorship that the
licensing authority does not rely solely on his own appraisal of what public welfare, peace or
safety may require. To justify such a limitation, there must be proof of such weight and
sufficiency to satisfy the clear and present danger test. The possibility that subversives may
infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators is not enough."
Concepcion, Jr., J., separate opinion:
Constitutional Law; Local Government; Guidelines to be followed by local officials in granting

permits to stage a public rally.—In order that public officials may not be charged, rightly or
wrongly, with dereliction of duty or abuse of powers in the granting or denying of such permits,
the following guidelines are deemed necessary: (a) When a peaceful assembly is to be held in a
private lot, house, or edifice, only the consent of the owner of the place is necessary. No permit
from the government or any public officer is required. (b) When an application to hold a rally,
parade, or peaceful assembly has to make use of public places like parks, plazas, and streets,
the public authority charged with the duty of granting or denying the permit should also consider
the convenience and the right of the rest of the public to use and enjoy these same facilities. (c)
Conditions of peace and order in the locality should be carefully considered and precautionary
steps taken to prevent vandals, hooligans, provocateurs, and other criminals from turning into a
violent one what otherwise should be a peaceful demonstration. Ruiz vs. Gordon, 126 SCRA
233, No. L-65695 December 19, 1983
269. BAYAN v. Ermita – GR 169838, April 25, 2006
Constitutional Law; Right of Assembly; Freedom of Speech; The right to peaceably assemble
and petition for redress of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of
the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection.—The first point to
mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and
228
228
Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) vs. Ermita
petition for redress of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the
press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights
constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights
would be meaningless and unprotected.
Same; Same; Same; While the right to freedom of speech, and to peaceably assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances are fundamental personal rights of the people
recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries, it is likewise a settled
principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights
is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of
others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society.—It must be
remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. In Primicias, this Court said: The
right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress
of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the
constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of
well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so
regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor
injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such
and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign “police power,” which is the power to
prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety,
and general welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by the government
through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional
and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities
and cities by authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal and city councils enact
ordinances for purpose.
Same; Same; Same; Public Assembly Act of 1985 (B.P. 880); Time, Place and Manner
Restrictions; Content-Based Regulations; B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public
assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies;
A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public
assemblies that would use public
229
VOL. 488, APRIL 25, 2006
229
places—it is not a content-based regulation.—B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public
assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies.
This was adverted to in Osmeña v. Comelec, 288 SCRA 447 (1998), where the Court referred
to it as a “content-neutral” regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public
assemblies. A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all
kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to “lawful cause” does
not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise
they would not be “peaceable” and entitled to protection. Neither are the words “opinion,”
“protesting” and “influencing” in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can
refer to any subject. The words “petitioning the government for redress of grievances” come
from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance
is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the
expressions in the rally.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Under B.P. 880, the permit for a public assembly in a
public place can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order,
public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health.—The permit can only be
denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of
the right even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Public”; The law is very clear
and is nowhere vague in its provisions; “Public” does not have to be defined—its ordinary
meaning is well-known.—Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the law is very clear and is nowhere
vague in its provisions. “Public” does not have to be defined. Its ordinary meaning is well-known.
Webster’s Dictionary defines it, thus: public, n, x x x 2a: an organized body of people x x x 3: a
group of people distinguished by common interests or characteristics x x x. Not every
expression of opinion is a public assembly. The law refers to “rally, demonstration, march,
parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place.” So it
does not cover any and all kinds of gatherings.
230
230
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Overbreadth Doctrine; The law is neither overbroad
nor does it impose a prior restraint.—Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of
the right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and
present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent. There is, likewise, no
prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Delegation of Powers; Words and Phrases; B.P. 880
provides a precise and sufficient standard—the clear and present danger test stated in Sec.
6(a); The reference to “imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil” in Sec. 6(c)
substantially means the same thing and is not an inconsistent standard.—As to the delegation
of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and sufficient standard—the clear and
present danger test stated in Sec. 6(a). The reference to “imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil” in Sec. 6(c) substantially means the same thing and is not an inconsistent
standard. As to whether respondent Mayor has the same power independently under Republic
Act No. 7160 is thus not necessary to resolve in these proceedings, and was not pursued by the
parties in their arguments.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Freedom Parks; The degree of observance of B.P. No. 880’s
mandate that every city and municipality set aside a freedom park within six months from its
effectivity in 1985, or 20 years ago, is pathetic and regrettable; Considering that the existence of
such freedom parks is an essential part of the law’s system of regulation of the people’s
exercise of their right to peacefully assemble and petition, the Supreme Court is constrained to
rule that after thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, no prior permit may be required
for the exercise of such right in any public park or plaza of a city or municipality until that city or
municipality shall have complied with Section 15 of the law.—The Solicitor General stated
during the oral arguments that, to his knowledge, only Cebu City has declared a freedom park—
Fuente Osmeña. That of Manila, the Sunken Gardens, has since been converted into a golf
course, he added. If this is so, the degree of observance of B.P. No. 880’s mandate that every
city and municipality set aside a freedom park within six months from its effectivity in 1985, or 20
years ago, would be pathetic and regrettable. The matter appears to have been taken for
granted amidst the swell of freedom that rose from the peaceful
231
VOL. 488, APRIL 25, 2006
231
revolution of 1986. Considering that the existence of such freedom parks is an essential part of
the law’s system of regulation of the people’s exercise of their right to peacefully assemble and
petition, the Court is constrained to rule that after thirty (30) days from the finality of this
Decision, no prior permit may be required for the exercise of such right in any public park or
plaza of a city or municipality until that city or municipality shall have complied with Section 15 of
the law. For without such alternative forum, to deny the permit would in effect be to deny the
right. Advance notices should, however, be given to the authorities to ensure proper
coordination and orderly proceedings.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR); Maximum Tolerance; In
view of the maximum tolerance mandated by B.P. No. 880, Calibrated Preemptive Response
serves no valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if it
means something else.—The Court rules that in view of the maximum tolerance mandated by
B.P. No. 880, CPR serves no valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum tolerance
and is illegal if it means something else. Accordingly, what is to be followed is and should be
that mandated by the law itself, namely, maximum tolerance.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; As a necessary consequence and part of maximum
tolerance, rallyists who can show the police an application duly filed on a given date can, after
two days from said date, rally in accordance with their application without the need to show a
permit, the grant of the permit being then presumed under the law, and it will be the burden of
the authorities to show that there has been a denial of the application, in which case the rally
may be peacefully dispersed following the procedure of maximum tolerance prescribed by the
law.—There is need to address the situation adverted to by petitioners where mayors do not act
on applications for a permit and when the police demand a permit and the rallyists could not
produce one, the rally is immediately dispersed. In such a situation, as a necessary
consequence and part of maximum tolerance, rallyists who can show the police an application
duly filed on a given date can, after two days from said date, rally in accordance with their
application without the need to show a permit, the grant of the permit being then presumed
under the law, and it will be the burden of the authorities to show that there has been a denial
232
232
of the application, in which case the rally may be peacefully dispersed following the procedure
of maximum tolerance prescribed by the law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy
has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds
freedom—it merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses.—
In sum, this Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the fundamental rights of our people,
especially freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. In several policy addresses, Chief
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban has repeatedly vowed to uphold the liberty of our people and to
nurture their prosperity. He said that “in cases involving liberty, the scales of justice should
weigh heavily against the government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized,
the dispossessed and the weak. Indeed, laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights come
to the courts with a heavy presumption against their validity. These laws and actions are
subjected to heightened scrutiny.” For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response
policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds
freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On
the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or
unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and
manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious, “maximum tolerance” is for the benefit of
rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally “permits”
is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound “clear and present danger” standard.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Freedom Parks; If after 30 days from the finality of the decision in
the instant case no freedom parks shall have been designated in accordance with Section 15 of
B.P. 880, all public parks and plazas of the municipality or city concerned shall in effect be
deemed freedom parks and no prior permit of whatever kind shall be required to hold an
assembly therein—the only requirement will be written notices to the police and the mayor’s
office to allow proper coordination and orderly activities.—In this Decision, the Court goes even
one step further in safeguarding liberty by giving local governments a deadline of 30 days within
which to des-
233
VOL. 488, APRIL 25, 2006
233
ignate specific freedom parks as provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no such
parks are so identified in accordance with Section 15 of the law, all public parks and plazas of
the municipality or city concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of
whatever kind shall be required to hold an assembly therein. The only requirement will be
written notices to the police and the mayor’s office to allow proper coordination and orderly
activities. Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) vs. Ermita, 488 SCRA
226, G.R. No. 169838, G.R. No. 169848, G.R. No. 169881 April 25, 2006
270. GSIS v. Kapisanan, GR 170132, December 6, 2006
Administrative Law; Civil Service Law; It should be stressed right off that the civil service
encompasses all branches and agencies of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations (GOCCs) with original charters, like the GSIS, or those cre-
_______________
14 Id., at p. 345.
* SECOND DIVISION.
623

623
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS
ated by special law—as such, employees of covered GOCCs are part of the civil service system
and are subject to circulars, rules and regulations issued by the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) on discipline, attendance and general terms/conditions of employment, inclusive of
matters involving self-organization, strikes, demonstrations and like concerted actions.—It
should be stressed right off that the civil service encompasses all branches and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) with original
charters, like the GSIS, or those created by special law. As such, employees of covered GOCCs
are part of the civil service system and are subject to circulars, rules and regulations issued by
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on discipline, attendance and general terms/conditions of
employment, inclusive of matters involving self-organization, strikes, demonstrations and like
concerted actions. In fact, policies established on public sector unionism and rules issued on
mass action have been noted and cited by the Court in at least a case. Among these issuances
is Executive Order (EO) No. 180, series of 1987, providing guidelines for the exercise of the
right to organize of government employees. Relevant also is CSC Resolution No. 021316 which
provides rules on prohibited concerted mass actions in the public sector.
Same; Same; In Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment (124
SCRA 1 [1983]), a case decided under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution, an en banc Court
declared that it would be unfair to allow employees of the government corporations to resort to
concerted activity with the ever present threat of a strike to wring benefits from Government.—In
Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment, (124 SCRA 1), a case
decided under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution, an en banc Court declared that it would be
unfair to allow employees of government corporations to resort to concerted activity with the
ever present threat of a strike to wring benefits from Government. Then came the 1987
Constitution expressly guaranteeing, for the first time, the right of government personnel to self-
organization to complement the provision according workers the right to engage in “peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.”
Same; Same; Public Officers; Employees in the public service may not engage in strikes or in
concerted and unauthorized stoppage
624
624
of work; that the right of government employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions
or associations, without including the right to strike.—It was against the backdrop of the
aforesaid provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the Court resolved Bangalisan v. Court of
Appeals, 276 SCRA 619 (1997). In it, we held, citing Manila Public School Teachers Association
(MPSTA) v. Laguio, Jr., 200 SCRA 323 (1991), that employees in the public service may not
engage in strikes or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work; that the right of
government employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or associations, without
including the right to strike.
Same; Same; Same; Public employees going on disruptive unauthorized absences to join
concerted mass actions may be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.—And in the fairly recent case of Gesite v. Court of Appeals, 444 SCRA 51 (2004), the
Court defined the limits of the right of government employees to organize in the following wise: It
is relevant to state at this point that the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that employees in the
public service may not engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts, and other forms of mass
action that will lead in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. The right of
government employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or associations only,
without including the right to strike, adding that public employees going on disruptive
unauthorized absences to join concerted mass actions may be held liable for conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The phrase “prohibited concerted activity” refers to any
collective activity undertaken by government employees, by themselves or through their
employees’ organization, with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order
to realize their demands or force concessions, economic or otherwise; it includes mass leaves,
walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature.—With the view we take of the events that
transpired on October 4-7, 2004, what respondent’s members launched or participated in during
that time partook of a strike or, what contextually amounts to the same thing, a prohibited
concerted activity. The phrase “prohibited concerted activity” refers to any collective activity
undertaken by government employees, by themselves or through their employees’ organization,
with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands
or
625
625
force concessions, economic or otherwise; it includes mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts
of similar nature. Indeed, for four straight days, participating KMG members and other GSIS
employees staged a walk out and waged or participated in a mass protest or demonstration
right at the very doorstep of the GSIS main office building. The record of attendance for the
period material shows that, on the first day of the protest, 851 employees, or forty-eight percent
(48%) of the total number of employees in the main office (1,756) took to the streets during
office hours, from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m., leaving the other employees to fend for themselves in an
office where a host of transactions take place every business day. On the second day, 707
employees left their respective work stations, while 538 participated in the mass action on the
third day. A smaller number, i.e., 306 employees, but by no means an insignificant few, joined
the fourth day activity.
Same; Same; The principle of accountability demands that every erring government employee
be made answerable for any malfeasance or misfeasance committed.—To be sure,
arbitrariness and whimsical exercise of power or, in fine, grave abuse of discretion on the part of
petitioner Garcia cannot be simplistically inferred from the sheer number of those charged as
well as the gravity or the dire consequences of the charge of grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, as the appellate court made it to appear. The
principle of accountability demands that every erring government employee be made
answerable for any malfeasance or misfeasance committed. And lest it be overlooked, the mere
filing of formal administrative case, regardless of the gravity of the offense charged, does not
overcome the presumptive innocence of the persons complained of nor does it shift the burden
of evidence to prove guilt of an administrative offense from the complainant.
Same; Same; Judgments; The assailed decision and resolution, if allowed to remain
undisturbed, would likely pave the way to legitimization of mass actions undertaken by civil
servants, regardless of their deleterious effects on the interest of the public they have sworn to
serve with loyalty and efficiency.—We close with the observation that the assailed decision and
resolution, if allowed to remain undisturbed, would likely pave the way to the legitimization of
mass actions undertaken by civil servants, regardless of their deleterious effects on the interest
of the public they have sworn to serve with
626
626
loyalty and efficiency. Worse still, it would permit the emergence of a system where public
sector workers are, as the petitioners aptly put it, “immune from the minimum reckoning for acts
that [under settled jurisprudence] are concededly unlawful.” This aberration would be
intolerable. Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa
sa GSIS, 510 SCRA 622, G.R. No. 170132 December 6, 2006
271. In Re Valmonte, 296 SCRA
272. In Re Petition to Annul 98-7-02 SC
Section 5.
273. Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil 201
1.PROHIBITION; ISSUANCE OF WRIT FOR ACTS PERFORMED WITHOUT

JURISDICTION.—While, generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ will not issue to
restrain or control the performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C. J.,
658), its issuance and enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction may issue to
"* * * inferior tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons, whether exercising functions judicial or
ministerial, which are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board,
or person * * *." (Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.)
2.ID.; ID.; DIRECTOR OF POSTS.—The terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with reference to
"functions" in the statute are undoubtedly comprehensive and include the challenged act of the
respondent Director of Posts in the present case, which act because alleged to be violative of
the Constitution is a fortiori "without or in excess of * * * jurisdiction."
3.ID.; ID.; WRIT NOT CONFINED EXCLUSIVELY TO COURTS OR TRIBUNALS.—The
statutory rule, therefore, in this jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not confined
exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to
prevent them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in
appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his authority.
Not infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is
202
202
Aglipay vs. Ruiz
necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the
law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo
vs. Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)
4.CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES; RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.—What is guaranteed by
our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration. Religious freedom, however, as
a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of
its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest
principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated.
5.ID.; ID.; POSTAGE STAMPS ISSUED UNDER ACT No. 4052.—The respondent Director of
Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the
Philippine Legislature which appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the cost of plates
and' printing of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and
authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often
as may be deemed advantageous to the Government."
6.ID.; ID.; ID.—Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the
Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage
stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to
the Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the
appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a
particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in
question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was
not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. The
stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money
derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church.
7.ID.; ID.; ID.—The only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the
Philippines and attract more tourists to this country." The officials concerned merely took
advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines
and its people." The stamps as actually
203
VOL. 64, MARCH 13, 1937
203
Aglipay vs. Ruiz
designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally
planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and an
inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is
emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as
the seat of that congress.
8.ID.; ID.; ID.—While the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be
inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any,
received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. The
Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results,
more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be
undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its
subordination to mere incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U.
S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.) Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201, No. 45459
March 13, 1937
274. Garces v. Estenzo, 104 SCRA 510
Constitutional Law; Barangays; Churches; A resolution of the Barangay Council for soliciting
contributions to buy a statue of the barangay’s patron saint and the use of such fund for said
purpose does not violate the Constitution’s provision prohibiting use of public funds for religious
purposes.—The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor
abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate public money or property for the benefit of any sect,
priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The
construction of a waiting shed is entirely a secular matter.
Same; Same; Same; Same.—Manifestly puerile and flimsy is petitioners’ argument that the
barangay council favored the Catholic religion by using the funds raised by solicitations and
donations for the purchase of the patron saint’s wooden image and making the image available
to the Catholic church.
Same; Same; Same; Same.—The wooden image was purchased in connection with the
celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the
purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of
the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image
of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated.
Same; Same; Same; There is nothing unconstitutional in holding fiesta.—If there is nothing
unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any
activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display
of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. As noted in the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a
socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta
relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses.
512
512

Garces vs. Estenzo
Same; Same; Same; Property; The statue having been purchased with the use of barangay
funds belongs to the barangay council not to the parish church.—There can be no question that
the image in question belongs to the barangay council. Father Osmeña’s claim that it belongs to
his church is wrong. The barangay council, as owner of the image, has the right to determine
who should have custody thereof.
Same; Same; Same; There will be nothing unconstitutional for the barangay council to give the
image of St. Ferrer to the Catholic Church.—If it chooses to change its mind and decides to give
the image to the Catholic church, that action would not violate the Constitution because the
image was acquired with private funds and is its private property.
Same; Same; Same; Not every governmental activity which involves the use of public funds and
which has some religious tint is unconstitutional.—Not every governmental activity which
involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the
constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and
banning the use of public money or property.
Same; Same; Same; Same.—Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, the founder and head of the
Philippine Independent Church, sought to enjoin the sale of those commemorative postage
stamps. It was held that the issuance of the stamps, while linked inseparably with an event of a
religious character, was not designed as a propaganda for the Catholic Church. Aglipay’s
prohibition suit was dismissed.
Abad, Santos, J., concurring:
Barangays; Churches; A petty dispute of who should have the custody of a religious image, the
barangay or the local parish, should not have taken the time of the Supreme Court. The Church
should be less concerned for inconsequential matters.—I want to add these observations: the
images of saints are not worshipped; they are venerated. “Thou shall not have strange gods.” A
petty dispute on who should have custody of the statue of San Vicente Ferrer should not have
taken up the time of the Supreme Court. There can be no doubt that the statue was bought with
private funds raised by the barangay council which also decided who should have custody of it.
How the cura parroco got it into Ins head that he should have custody
513
VOL. 104, MAY 25, 1981
513
Garces vs. Estenzo
of the statue defies logic. It is not, therefore, suprising to hear statements that religion has no
relevance to current problems. Let there be affirmation action by the churches and less concern
for inconsequential matters. Garces vs. Estenzo, 104 SCRA 510, No. L-53487 May 25, 1981
275. School District v. Schempp, 394 RS 203

276. Board of Education v. Allen, 392 US 236
277. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 US 602
278. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 US 672
279. Country of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 57
LW 504
280. Zobrest v. Catalina, No. 92-94 June 18, 1993
281. Capitol Square Review Board v. Pinetter & Ku Klus Klan,
US No. 94-780, June 29, 1995
282. Lee v. Welsman, US No. 90-1014, June 24, 1992
283.Manosca v. CA, 252 SCRA 412
284. Islamic Dawah v. ES, GR 153888, July 9, 2003
285. Taruc v. Dela Cruz, 453 SCRA 123
286. UCCP v. Bradford, 674 SCRA 92
287. Imbong v. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014
288. Estrada v. Escritor
289. Victoriano v. Elizalde, 59 SCRA 94
290. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 US 296
291. US v. Ballard – 322 US 78
292. American Bible Society v. City of Manila – 104 Phil. 386
293. Ebranilag v. Divison Superintendent – 219 SCRA 256; (MR)
251 SCRA
294.Wisconsin v. Yoder – 406 US 205
295. Goldman v. Weinberger – 54 LW 4298
296. German v. Baranganan – 135 SCRA 514
297. Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance – 249 SCRA 628
298. Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos – 236 SCRA 197
299. Church of the Lukumi v. City of Hialeach – No. 91-948,
June 11, 1993
300. Lamb ’s Chapel v. School Disctrict – No.91-2024, June 7,
1993
301. In re Request of Muslim Employees in the Different Court
of Iligan City, 477 SCRA 648
302. Estrada v. Escritor – AM P-021651, August 4, 2003
(Compelling State Interest Test)
303. Imbong v. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014
304. Capin-Cadiz v. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc., G.R. No.
187417, February 24, 2016
305. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 SCRA 488
306. Pamil v. Teleron – 86 SCRA 413
307.McDaniel v. Paty – 435 US 618
308. Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC, GR 190582, April 8, 2010
309. Austria v. NLRC, 310 SCRA 293
310. Long and Almeria v. Basa, GR 134963, September 7, 2001
311. Taruc v. Dela Cruz, 453 SCRA 123
312. UCCP v. Bradford, 674 SCRA 92
Section 6.
313. Reyes v. CA, GR 182161, December 3, 2009

314.Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668
315. Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil 778
316. Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro
317. Silverio v. CA – 195 SCRA 760
318. Santiago v. Vasquez – 217 SCRA 633
319.Marcos v. Sandiganbayan – 247 SCRA 127
320. Yap v. CA, GR 141529, June 6, 2001
321.Mirasol v DPWH, 490 SCRA 318
322. OAS v. Judge Macarine, 677 SCRA 1
Section 7.
323. Chavez v. PEA, GR 133250, July 9, 2002

324. Chavez v. PCGG, GR 130716, Dec. 9, 1988:
325. In Re: Production of Court Records, 14 February 2012
326. Legaspi v. CSC, 150 SCRA 530
327. Bantay Republic Act v. COMELEC, GR 177271, May 4,
2007
328. Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256
329. Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato, 203 SCRA 515
330. Echegaray v. Sec. of Justice, GR 132601, Oct. 12, 1988

Doctrines - Sec 2-11

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Doctrines - Sec 2-11

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Section 2.

35. Borlongan v. Pena, GR 143591, Nov. 23, 2007

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Borlongan, Jr. vs. Peña

36. People v. Mamaril, GR 147607, Jan 22 2004

Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; Elements; In determining the existence of probable

VOL. 420, JANUARY 22, 2004

People vs. Mamaril

37. Ortiz v. Palaypayon – 234 SCRA 391

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ortiz vs. Palaypayon

VOL. 234, JULY 25, 1994

Ortiz vs. Palaypayon

38. People v. Veloso 48 Phil 169

1.CRIMINAL LAW; RESISTANCE OF THE AGENTS OF THE AUTHORITY.— V, the manager

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Veloso

39. Alvarez v. CFI – 64 Phil. 33

1.CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH WARRANT; DEFINITION.—A search warrant is an order

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas

VOL. 64, JANUARY 29, 1937

Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas

VOL. 64, JANUARY 29, 1937

Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas

40. Corro v. Lising – 137 SCRA 541

Corro vs. Lising

Same; Constitutional Law; Closure of a publishing house in search warrant issuances is

VOL. 137, JULY 15, 1985

Corro vs. Lising

41. Pangandaman v. Casar, 159 SCRA 599 (1988)

Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; In conducting a preliminary investigation of any

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pangandaman vs. Casar

chartered cities, where no authority to conduct preliminary investigation is vested in such

VOL. 159, APRIL 14, 1988

Pangandaman vs. Casar

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pangandaman vs. Casar

42. Stonehill v. Diokno (1967)

Same; Evidence: When illegally seized evidence is admissible.—Officers of certain corporations

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Stonehill vs. Diokno

Same; Warrants not describing particularly the things to be seized.—Search warrants

Stonehill vs. Diokno

CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Stonehill vs. Diokno

Same; Control of premises searched gives "standing".— Independent of ownership or other

43. People v. Martinez – 235 SCRA 171

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Martinez

VOL. 235, AUGUST 5, 1994

People vs. Martinez

44. Microsoft Corp. v. Maxicorp (2004)

VOL. 438, SEPTEMBER 13, 2004

Microsoft Corporation vs. Maxicorp, Inc.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 438, SEPTEMBER 13, 2004

Microsoft Corporation vs. Maxicorp, Inc.

45. Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP 133 SCRA 800

VOL. 133, DECEMBER 26, 1984