BIBLE TRUTH

THE TRUTH
AND

BY CHRISTIAN THEOLOGIANS WHO ARE

BRINGING APOLOGETICS ON STONE TABLETS
DOWN FROM
MOUNT OLYMPUS TO MOUNT RUSHMORE

Edited by jeffperado
BNOresearch Press

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2017
 Contents

A Linguistic Argument For God’s Existence

John R. Baumgardner And Jeremy D. Lyon
Language, Truth, and Revelation, Part 1
By Gordon H. Clark
Language, Truth, and Revelation, Part 2
By Gordon H. Clark
Language, Truth, and Revelation, Part 3
By Gordon H. Clark
Can God create a stone so big that He cannot move it?
By Neil Mammen
Does the Doctrine of the Trinity Hold the Key to a Christian
Theology of Religions? An Evaluation of Three Recent Proposals
by Keith E. Johnson
Can Justice Exist Apart From Truth?
By Bruce A. Little,
Divine Wrath
By Harold R. Booher, Ph.D
The Range of Inerrancy: Correction and Clarifications
The Building Block of Knowledge
By Joe Lombardi
Cheap Grace or Cheap Law?
By Shawn Lazar
Interpreting the Bible and the Sciences
By Brad Doskocil
Are there two Creation stories in Genesis?
By Neil Mammen
God’s Sovereignty and Glory
By Derek Thomas
Clearing up Confusion about Heaven and Hell Revelation 20:11–
21:4
By Bob Wilkin
Judas & Matthias (Acts 1:15-26)
By Zane Hodges
Three Gospel Studies
The Importance of Theology
By Michael Allen
Bible Morality
by Charles Watts
 A Linguistic Argument For
God’s Existence
By John R. Baumgardner And Jeremy D. Lyon *
JETS 58/4 (2015) 771–86

I. INTRODUCTION
Many arguments to demonstrate the reasonableness of God’s existence
have been advanced over past millennia. 1 On this issue, the biblical record
maintains that clear evidence of God’s reality resides in the natural realm all
around us. This evidence is so plain, the record claims, that no human being
can fail to have awareness of God’s existence (Rom 1:20). This paper calls
attention to a category of reality that provides especially powerful support for
God’s existence. Our focus is upon the phenomenon of language. We begin
from our own subjective experience of this phenomenon and then extend our
considerations to the realm of the material world around us. Because
language is so integral to our own mental processes and so intuitive in the
way we relate to other human beings, most of us never pause to analyze just
what is occurring when we think, write, speak, or process what we read or
hear others say. Therefore, a crucial first step in this discussion is to establish
clearly what the term “language” entails.

II. WHAT IS LANGUAGE?

There is an extensive body of scholarly literature, generally under the
category of philosophy of language, that deals with this and related
questions.2 In this article we deliberately narrow our scope to what we deem
to be the most basic aspects of the phenomenon of language. In particular, we
shall focus on the close association of language with meaning. And in regard
to the term “meaning,” we utilize its widely accepted definition in a linguistic
context of “the denotation, referent, or idea associated with a word or
phrase.”3 Although the philosophers of language have written a great deal on
the nature of meaning, we will restrict our use of the term to this standard
definition. Furthermore, in speaking of language we include not only spoken
and written human languages, but also the realms of computer languages and
mathematics, and the message-bearing sequences of nucleotides in DNA and
RNA observed at the molecular level in the biological domain. Hence, our
use of the term language agrees in most essential respects with the term
formal language used in the fields of linguistics, computer science, and
mathematics. Under
 * John Baumgardner is an adjunct instructor at Southern California Seminary, 2075 E.

Madison Ave., El Cajon, CA 92019. Jeremy Lyon is associate professor of OT and Hebrew at
Truett-McConnell College, 100 Alumni Dr., Cleveland, GA 30528.

1 For example, the various forms of the cosmological, teleological, ontological, and moral

arguments.
2 E.g. Scott Soames, Philosophy of Language (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,

2010).

3 The Free Dictionary, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/meaning.

these caveats, what are the essential characteristics of language? We offer a
simple answer that emphasizes two essentials.4

1. Language involves the assignment of meaning to otherwise

meaningless symbols to form a vocabulary. As we have already hinted,
language is intimately associated with meaning. The first elemental
characteristic is that language maps or assigns meaning to a set of symbols.
The symbols in themselves, apart from this assignment, generally have no
meaning. In the case of spoken human languages, sounds, normally referred
to as words, serve as the symbols. For example, in the English language, the
spoken word “dog” encodes for a certain range of meaning. Other spoken
human languages may use entirely different sounds to represent a similar
range of meaning. For instance, Spanish uses the spoken word “perro,”
French “chien,” Italian “cane,” German “Hund,” Russian “sobaka,” and
Chinese “gʼnu.” The sounds, or symbols, are arbitrary. Without meaning
assigned to them within the context of a specific language, the sounds in
themselves carry no meaning. The set of words in a language is usually
referred to as its “vocabulary.” Emphasizing this essential characteristic of
language, namely, of associating meaning with symbols (in this case sounds),
Noam Chomsky, regarded by some as the father of modern linguistics, has
written, “At the crudest level of description, we may say that a language
associates sound and meaning in a particular way.”5

Most human languages today also have a written form that utilizes a set
of characters. In this form, individual characters or strings of characters or
letters represent the words to which meanings are assigned. This written form
of a given language often has a phonetic correspondence with its spoken
form. Many human languages have 100,000 or more distinct words that
comprise their vocabularies.

2. Language involves a set of rules by which elements from the

vocabulary may be joined together to create more complex meaning-bearing
messages. The second essential characteristic of language is that it includes a
set of rules by which elements from its vocabulary may be joined together to
create more complex meaning-bearing messages. Indeed, there is no
effective limit to the complexities of the messages that can be constructed in
this manner. As Chomsky has noted, “A person who knows a language has
mastered a system of rules that assigns sound and meaning in a definite way
 for an infinite class of possible sentences. Each language thus consists (in
part) of a certain pairing of sound and meaning over an infinite domain.” 6
When one considers all the books, articles, and scientific papers that have
ever been written on almost every conceivable topic, the power and
flexibility of human language to describe and represent the rest of reality
dazzles the mind. Not only are individual words the bearers of abstract
meaning, but so also are sequences of words when joined together according
to the grammatical rules of the language. The meaning that se-

4 John Baumgardner, “Language, Complexity, and Design,” in Divine Action and Natural

Selection: Science, Faith and Evolution (ed. Joseph Seckback and Richard Gordon; London:
World Scientific, 2009) 938–54.

5 Noam Chomsky, Language and Mind (enlarged ed.; New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972)

6 Ibid. 103.

quences of words can represent far transcends the meanings of the individual
words by themselves. There is no limit to the diversity or complexity of the
messages that can be created in this manner. The messages may be, for
example, a novel, a Shakespearean play, an encyclopedia, all the libraries of
the world, or all those that might ever be imagined. Regardless of the length
or content, the essence of a linguistic message is its meaning. Language is
the agency by which the message’s meaning is encoded and conveyed.
What is language? In summary, language involves (1) an assignment of
meaning to a set of otherwise meaningless symbols to form a vocabulary;
and (2) a set of rules by which words from the vocabulary may be joined
together to form more complex meaning structures.

III. LANGUAGE IS NON-MATERIAL

1. Meaning itself is non-material.7 Because language is so integral to
our subjective moment-to-moment experience, few of us ever pause to reflect
upon what sort of reality our linguistic expressions belong. Few of us ever
ponder the ultimate essence of our spoken words, our text messages, our
emails, the cards and letters we write, and the books we read. Is their
ultimate essence energy? Is it matter? The answer is no. Their ultimate
essence is entirely distinct from energy and matter.

As we have just outlined, language maps meaning to a set of symbols,

or words, and has a set of rules by which words may be joined together to
form more complex messages. The words are bearers of meaning. Meaning
is inherently an abstract entity, comprised neither of matter nor energy.
Simply stated, meaning is non-material. The linguistic rules likewise are
abstract entities and similarly nonmaterial. This implies that in their
fundamental essence linguistic expressions, consisting of sequences of
meaning-bearing words, logically are also non-material.

Many people find it surprising that something so large a part of their

moment-to-moment experience as the words they use when they think and
speak as well as words they hear from others could possibly belong to the
realm of the nonmaterial. On encountering such a claim, some might respond
by pointing out that we form our spoken words via the material air flowing
through our material voice box and mouth and that the air surrounding us
must be present to carry these acoustic oscillations to allow the person to
whom we may be speaking to hear them. Do such observations not suggest
that linguistic expressions somehow rely on matter for their existence?

2. The intersection of matter with language. When we examine the

context of linguistic messages in the world about us, we find that they are in
fact normally associated with some sort of material carrier, such as physical
sounds produced by the human voice that travel as pressure oscillations
through the air, or as character images that appear on the screen of our
physical smartphone or tablet, or as printed characters on the page of a
physical book we hold in our hand. What effect does

7 We use the term ‘non-material’ to refer to realities distinct from those that can be described

solely in terms of matter and energy.

this association with physical entities have on the meaning that linguistic
expressions convey? We can verify that when the transmission of linguistic
messages is done reliably, their meaning remains unaltered, regardless of the
material carriers which may have been involved. The sounds of the words
produced by our voice may travel as acoustic oscillations a short distance in
the air to our phone, be converted into electronic form, be digitized and
transmitted as gigahertz electromagnetic radiation to a cell phone tower, be
chopped into packets and routed through a complex switching network to its
proper destination where, in the phone of the person we are calling, they are
reconverted into acoustic oscillations which that person can hear and
understand. If all the technology works properly and the signals are
transmitted reliably, the message remains the same despite the many different
transformations, encodings, and decodings it has experienced en route.
Similarly, these days we can order a hard copy book and receive it in
three or four days through the mail, or, with a few clicks of the mouse on our
computer, we can download a digital copy of the same book and be reading it
on our tablet in the span of a minute or so. The words and the meaning they
convey are the same, regardless of whether the book is printed on paper and
arrived through the mail or whether it is displayed on our tablet and arrived
via the Internet. The book’s meaning is independent of the material medium
or the process by which we received it. It is therefore easy to verify that the
meaning encoded in linguistic expressions has a reality of its own and is
genuinely independent of the physical media or processes by which it may
have been stored or transmitted. This observation reinforces the conclusion
that meaning and language actually do reside in the realm of the nonmaterial.
Most of us have been deeply influenced by our culture to think of reality only
in terms of material entities. Therefore, it can come as a surprise to learn that
an activity as routine as conversing with another person or reading an email
message involves the non-material.

3. Einstein recognized the realm of concepts as non-material. For those

who nonetheless might still be uneasy with the notion that non-material
entities are so common and truly part of our everyday experience, it is notable
that Albert Einstein defended this conclusion. Commenting on Bertrand
Russell’s ideas relating to knowledge Einstein states, “We have the habit of
combining certain concepts and conceptual relations so definitely with certain
sense experiences that we do not become conscious of the gulf—logically
unbridgeable—which separates the world of sensory experiences from the
world of concepts and propositions.” 8 The world of sensory experiences to
which Einstein refers is the material realm, and the world of concepts and
propositions includes the realm of language. Linguists, giving due credit to
Einstein for this observation, refer to the “logically unbridgeable” separation
of these two realms as the “Einstein gulf” (see Figure 1). 9 Einstein correctly
recognized that the ‘world of concepts and propositions’ belongs to a
category of reality distinct from that of matter and energy, that is, a non-
material category, despite the fact that we so commonly fail to make that
distinction.

8 Albert Einstein, “Remarks on Bertrand Russell’s Theory of Knowledge,” in The Philosophy

of Bertrand Russell (ed. Paul A. Schilpp; New York: Tudor, 1944) 290.

9John W. Oller Jr., Stephen D. Oller, and Linda C. Badon, Milestones: Normal Speech and
Language Development across the Lifespan (San Diego: Plural, 2006) 168, 223, 226. Figure 1
is adapted from figure 8-1, p. 223.

Figure 1: A bodily thing, such as the dog shown on the left, exists on the
side opposite the Einstein Gulf from the word “dog,” which can be used to
refer to the dog. The two entities are in separate categories of reality. The
word is not a dog and the dog is not a word.

4. The effect of language on matter. Within the totality of the world we

can perceive, including the material world, just how important is the realm of
language? With a small amount of reflection, one can recognize that all our
thoughts and essentially everything we accomplish as human beings involve
language. Language enables all human institutions, indeed all aspects of
human society. Society’s infrastructure—its communication, transportation,
governmental, education, defense, energy, agriculture, manufacturing,
scientific, engineering, financial, and commerce networks, just to list a few of
its components—all relies critically on people using language to relate to one
another. Much of the material reality surrounding us—our homes, cars,
electronics, the highways on which we drive, the jetliners on which we fly,
the skyscrapers that surround us in our cities, for example—depends critically
upon language-based interactions, specifications, and plans. In short, the
meaning conveyed by language plays a critical role in determining and
shaping the material world about us.

5. The power of language in our machines. Language—involving a

vocabulary of words to which distinctive meanings are assigned together with
a set of rules for joining these words to form more complex meaning
structures—includes not only ordinary human languages, but also machine or
computer languages. Software, via the meaning it carries, enables the
complex electronic circuitry in computer chips to perform amazing feats.
Without software, computer hardware could accomplish nothing useful.
Enabled by software, however, the circuitry in our smartphones allows us to
send and receive calls from a good fraction of the earth’s inhabitants, can
provide detailed navigation instructions for driving in a strange city, can
recognize our speech, and can search the Internet to provide verbal answers to
our spoken questions. It can interpret speech from someone with a language
different from ours and almost instantaneously translate it verbally into our
own language. It can tell us where the nearest branch of our bank is located,
where the closest Wendy’s restaurant is to be found, and what star
constellations exist in the sky above us.

Moreover, the meaning carried by the machine language in the software

of computer-controlled manufacturing robots enables these robots to fashion
and assemble most of the parts required in our automobiles, and for that
matter, most of the other machines and appliances we use today. The power of
this non-material encoded meaning to shape the material world around us
almost exceeds what we can imagine. The example of manufacturing robots
illustrates how non-material meaning encoded by language can and does
result in profound tangible consequences in the material realm.

IV. MATHEMATICS AND THE LAWS OF

NATURE
1. Mathematics is language. Noteworthy among the many languages
humans use is a crucially important one that can easily be overlooked. It is
mathematics. Mathematics involves the assignment of meaning to symbols
and has a set of rules for joining symbols together to create arbitrarily
complex meaning-bearing expressions. To illustrate how this works let us
consider a simple example. Suppose we are given the following problem and
asked to solve it using algebra:

An exam has fifteen questions worth 100 points. The exam consists of
true/false questions worth 5 points each and multiple choice questions
worth 10 points each. How many multiple choice questions are on the
exam?

The first step in solving the problem is to assign meaning to some

symbols. Suppose we let the symbol t represent the number of true/false
questions and the symbol m represent the number of multiple choice
questions. We also let the symbols +, -, •, /, and = respectively represent add,
subtract, multiply, divide, and equals. Utilizing these symbols we can then
express the problem in terms of two expressions involving the symbols as
follows:

t+m=
15

and 5•t + 10•m =

100.

Since both these expressions include the equals symbol =, they are
known as equations. We can then apply two rules that we learn in algebra or
some other mathematics class which are valid for equations. The first rule is
that multiplying or dividing all terms on both sides of an equation does not
alter the equality. The second rule is that adding or subtracting two equalities
yields another equality. Therefore, if we multiply all the terms in the first
equation by 5, we obtain the equality 5•t
+ 5•m = 75. If we then subtract this equality from the second equation, we
obtain the equality 5•m = 25. Dividing both sides of this equation by 5 yields
the equality m = 5, which is the desired answer for our problem, namely, that
there are five multiple choice questions on the exam.

This simple example helps us see that mathematics indeed does satisfy
all the criteria we have been using to define language. It involves assigning
abstract meanings to a set of symbols and then applying a set of rules to
generate more complex meaning structures utilizing these symbols. Like all
other linguistic expressions, mathematical expressions are in the realm of the
non-material. Their ultimate essence is the meaning they convey, and
meaning is non-material.

2. The laws of nature are non-material. The discovery that the material
world behaves in accordance with rules describable in terms of mathematics,
mostly in Europe during the 16th and 17th centuries, resulted in the emergence
of modern science. Most people today, including most scientists, simply take
the laws of nature for granted. Most view the laws of nature simply as
qualities inherent to the material realm itself. Yet we have just shown that
mathematical expressions are linguistic in their ultimate essence and hence
non-material. The laws of nature, because they are mathematical expressions,
are therefore also non-material. This observation implies that the material
realm has linguistic underpinnings. It functions according to them in a
precise and consistent way. These linguistic underpinnings are the
mathematical specifications, commonly referred to as the laws of nature,
which we have discovered mostly over the past 400 years.

An example is the mathematical law, first published by Isaac Newton in

1687, describing the attractive gravitational force observed to exist between
two material bodies such as the earth and the moon.10 Today this law can be
expressed F = Gm1m2/r2, where F is the force between the masses, G is the
universal gravitational constant (experimentally measured in SI or metric
units to be 6.674×10î11 N m2 kgî2), m1 is the mass of the first body, m2 is the
mass of the second body, and r is the distance between the centers of the
mass of the two bodies. It is the application of mathematical laws like this
one which enables the technology today that provides us cell phones, robotic
manufacturing, and rovers on the surface of Mars.

V. LANGUAGE AND NATURALISM

1. Language falsifies naturalism’s foundational truth claim. The claim
that matter, as expressed in various configurations of elementary particles,
together with energy in all its many forms, constitutes the totality of reality is
a widely held outlook today. For example, Carl Sagan famously claimed,
“The cosmos is all that is, or ever was, or ever will be.” 11 This naturalist, or
materialist, view of reality rose to prominence in Western intellectual circles
during the Enlightenment, roughly from the mid-17 th through the 18th
century.12 This view continues to influence deeply, if not dominate, the
outlook of most university educated people in our day. However, in light of
our current knowledge, can one credibly defend the perspective that matter is
all there is? As astonishing as it may be to some people, the answer is no. It is
now clear that as human beings we participate in non-material realities during
every waking moment of our lives. We are immersed in the non-material at
every turn.

10 Isaac Newton, Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica (1687).

11 Carl Sagan, Cosmos (New York: Random House, 1980) 1.
12 The article ‘Enlightenment’ in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy available at

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/enlightenment (accessed 2/23/2015) provides a helpful summary

of this period in the history and culture of Western thought.
What are some of the implications of the recognition that language is a
nonmaterial phenomenon and that language shapes the world around us in
tangible and powerful ways? One implication is that it exposes the
foundational truth claim of philosophical naturalism as false. The
foundational truth claim of philosophical naturalism (hereafter referred to
simply as naturalism) is that there are, categorically, no non-material realities.
Because naturalism’s entire framework depends so critically on this single
assumption, merely a single counterexample is sufficient to falsify it entirely.
Can falsifying naturalism really be so simple? Yes. If indisputable
nonmaterial realities exist—and language certainly qualifies—then
naturalism logically cannot be true. This means that naturalism, which has
been taught as dogma in most of the world’s universities for the past century
or more, is intellectually untenable. An obvious reason is because language
demonstrates that matter is not all there is.
2. Language demands a non-material source. Even though we have
seen that language expressions are non-material because their fundamental
essence is abstract meaning, it is useful to consider whether or not language
expressions can have a material cause. Are there any observations or
theoretical reasons which suggest that matter/energy has such an innate
ability? The short answer is no. The laws of chemistry and physics offer no
clue whatsoever that matter can assign meaning or otherwise deal with
meaning at even the most rudimentary level. Even when matter is organized
in extremely complex ways, such as in electronic networks with trillions of
interconnected transistors, there is no hint, in the absence of software, of any
ability whatsoever to generate meaning-bearing signals or behavior.
Although naturalists once imagined that such behavior might somehow
emerge, there is no observational evidence that suggests that it possibly can.
Indeed, why should atoms, even when organized in complex ways, be able to
assign meaning to otherwise meaningless symbols to form a vocabulary or,
beyond that, invent rules by which words from the vocabulary might be
joined together to form arbitrarily complex meaning-bearing expressions?
The laws of physics offer no indication at all that matter has such capacity.
Furthermore, no theoretical reasons are being offered for how matter
conceivably could behave to allow linguistic capacity to emerge. This state of
affairs argues compellingly that linguistic phenomena require a nonmaterial
explanation.

3. Language ability demonstrates that we as humans possess non-

material attributes. Because of its prominence in institutions of higher
learning since the Enlightenment, naturalism has played a major role in
shaping the way people today view themselves and other human beings.
Naturalism, in excluding non-material reality of any sort, must also insist that
human beings can possess no non-material faculties or attributes. Yet the
observation that language is non-material and that we as humans so readily
use language and even create new languages for our computers should cause
us instantly to question such a limited picture of who we are. Our language
ability demonstrates that we possess obvious and profoundly significant non-
material capacities within ourselves. Our language ability implies that we are
dramatically more than a complex assemblage of atoms, as naturalist
philosophy would have us imagine.

Testable from our own experience, we discover that our capacities to

think, reason, and make choices are all involved in how we form and interpret
language. Indeed, thinking apart from language seems impossible. Chomsky
noted, “When we study human language, we are approaching what some
might call the ‘human essence,’ the distinctive qualities of mind that are, so
far as we know, unique to man and that are inseparable from any critical
phase of human existence, personal or social.”13 We observe that our freedom
to select a particular word and not another with similar meaning when we
compose a message implies that making free choices is an integral aspect of
our language capacity. Because the case is so strong that material causes are
incapable of generating non-material effects, the human use of language
provides compelling support for the conclusion that our mental faculties that
enable us to generate and process language must also be non-material. If our
abilities to think, reason, and make choices are ultimately non-material, it is
plausible to conclude that other aspects of our subjective experience such as
consciousness and self-awareness are as well.
The proposition that we as humans have, in addition to our physical
bodies, a non-material component is referred to in philosophical circles as
substance dualism.14

It is also known as Cartesian dualism in honor of René Descartes who argued

that the mind is a non-physical substance, the seat of consciousness and self-
awareness, and to be distinguished from the brain as the seat of intelligence.
In his Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes describes a quest in which
he called all his previous beliefs into doubt in order to find out of what he
could be certain.15 In so doing, he discovered that he could doubt on whether
he had a body but not on whether he had a mind. 16 This gave Descartes his
first insight that a categorical distinction must exist between mind and body.
We have arrived at this same conclusion via an analysis of language.

VI. LANGUAGE—THE UNDERPINNINGS OF

BIOLOGY
Up to this point we have limited our attention to natural human
languages, man-made computer languages, mathematics, and the laws of
nature. Yet there is a realm where the power of language to shape and specify
material structure and function far transcends what we have considered in
previous examples. This realm is that of biology. Meaning is encoded by
genetic language in the DNA of every living organism in the same manner in
which meaning is encoded by any other type of language. Since meaning is
abstract and non-material, the meaning conveyed by genetic language, as
with any other language, likewise is abstract and non-material. One of the
most striking contrasts between genetic language and languages utilized by
humans is the complexity of the encoding. Because each DNA letter, or
nucleotide, commonly is utilized simultaneously by several overlapping but
distinct messages, the amount of meaning or specification conveyed per letter
far exceeds that of human languages.17 This enables genetic language in a
relatively modest amount of DNA to specify details of the structure,
development, metabolism, repair, and reproduction of an organism,
astonishingly, to the level of the organism’s individual atoms.
 13 Chomsky, Language and Mind 100.

14 The article ‘Dualism’ in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy available at

http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2003/entries/dualism (accessed 2/23/2015) discusses the term

“dualism” in the context of philosophy of mind as the view that the mental and the physical, or
mind and body, or mind and brain, are, in some sense, radically different kinds of reality.
15 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) in The Philosophical Writings of

René Descartes,

vol. 2 (trans. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch; Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press,
1984)
162.
16 Descartes found that he could doubt whether he had a body (it could be that he was

dreaming of it or that it was an illusion created by an evil demon), but he concluded he simply
could not doubt whether he had a mind.
The ability to specify structure at the level of each individual atom
represents the ultimate in nano-technology. And this is precisely what has
been discovered in living systems over the past 60 years. Most cells in all
organisms contain millions of nano-scale machines of astounding complexity,
many of which are mobile and/or contain moving parts. These nano-scale
machines perform the myriads of functions required for the organism to live,
utilize resources from its environment, and reproduce. One example of these
nano-machines is ATP synthase (see Figure 2). ATP synthase is a rotary
machine found in all organisms, from bacteria to humans, and plays a crucial
role in cellular metabolism. This machine is built from approximately a dozen
different proteins and consists of about 90,000 atoms. The details for its
astonishing structure, to the level of each individual atom, are specified
linguistically in the organism’s DNA. It is the power of linguistic encoding of
meaning that makes such detailed specification possible. It has thus become
clearer than ever before that it is life’s linguistic component that makes living
systems possible. Apart from this linguistic component, there would be
nothing but lifeless chemistry and physics on the face of our planet.

17 E. N. Trifonov, “Genetic sequences as products of compression by inclusive superposition

of many codes,” Molecular Biology 31 (1997) 647–54; S. Itzovitz, E. Hodis, and E. Sega,
“Overlapping codes within protein-coding sequences,” Genome Research 20 (2010) 1582–89.
 Figure 2: (Left) Depiction of a molecule of adenosine triphosphate (ATP),
C10H16N7,O13,P3. The three phosphorous atoms are depicted by the lightest
gray, the oxygen by the darkest gray, and the carbon and nitrogen atoms by
intermediate gray. Nitrogen atoms are slightly smaller than the carbon
atoms. Hydrogen atoms are not shown. ATP serves as the “energy
currency” in cells of all organisms, from bacteria to humans, and supplies
the energy for most cellular processes at the molecular level. Energy is
released when the bond holding the leftmost phosphate unit (PO 43-) to the
rest of the molecule is broken. Our bodies have about 50–100 g (2–4
ounces) of ATP. This inventory is utilized and reconstituted about 1500
times per day, or about once per minute. (Image credit:
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AAtp_exp.qutemol-ball.png,
licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Share-Alike 3.0 License.)
(Right) Depiction of the rotary machine known as ATP synthase. ATP
synthase reconstitutes ATP by joining a molecule of adenosine
diphosphate (ADT) with a molecule of inorganic phosphate, P i, via
mechanical and catalytic action. The rotor spins at about 9000 rpm. In
humans the ATP synthase machine is built from some fourteen different
kinds of protein and consists of about 90,000 atoms. ATP synthase differs
little in its structure among bacteria, plants, and animals. Some of our cells
have as many as a million of these rotary machines. The total amount of
ATP reconstituted by ATP synthase per day is approximately equal to our
body weight. (Image credit: http://cellular-respiration.wikispaces. com,
licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Share-Alike 3.0 License.)

Like other examples of formal language, the linguistic elements in DNA

responsible for describing the proteins from which these machines are built
also involves assignment of meaning to words to form a vocabulary and rules
for joining the words together to form more complex linguistic expressions.
Each protein corresponds to a highly specific linear chain or sequence of
molecular units known as amino acids. Most proteins found in living systems
are built from only 20 of these amino acid building blocks. Soon after the
double-helix structure of DNA was elucidated by Watson and Crick in 1953,
it was recognized that the four nucleotide bases, adenosine (A), cytosine (C),
guanine (G), and thymine (T), that link the two helical strands of the DNA
 backbone together, like rungs of a ladder, might serve as the letters in a
genetic alphabet.18 It was later verified that triplets of letters could and indeed
did specify specific amino acids in sequences that matched those found in
actual proteins.19 Three-letter words derived from a four-letter alphabet give a
vocabulary of 43 = 64 possible words. It was found that meaning was assigned
to all 64 of the possible words. In all but two cases multiple DNA words were
found to refer to each of the 20 amino acids. Three words were used for
punctuation to signal stop, like a period in written English. It was later
discovered that the use of more than one word to represent each amino acid is
extremely useful because it

18J. D. Watson and F. H. C. Crick, “Molecular structure of nucleic acids,” Nature 171 (1953) 737–38.
19F. H. Crick, L. Barnett, S. Brenner, and R. J. Watts-Tobin, “General nature of the genetic code for
proteins,” Nature 192 (1961) 1227–32.

allows for multiple overlapping meaning-bearing messages to be encoded

with the same sequence of nucleotide letters.
Let us briefly examine the linguistic coding for just one of the protein
structures on which our bodily functions depend, namely, hemoglobin.
Hemoglobin is what fills our red blood cells and what carries oxygen from
our lungs to every cell in our bodies and returns carbon dioxide from each of
our cells back to our lungs. A unit of hemoglobin is built from four individual
protein strands. Each strand as we mentioned corresponds to a chain of amino
acids that link together like Legos. Pairs of the four chains are identical. The
pair referred to as ‘alpha’ chains are each composed of 141 amino acid units.
The other pair referred to as ‘beta’ chains are also identical and are each
composed of 146 amino acid units. The order and identity of the amino acids
in a given chain determine the precise 3D structure into which the chain folds
and also the precise biological functions that it can perform. Using a separate
letter of the English alphabet to designate each of the 20 different amino
acids, we can express the hemoglobin alpha chain as the following sequence
of 141 letters, here grouped in units of 10 amino acids, as follows:

vlspadktnv kaawgkvgah ageygaeale rmflsfpttk tyfphfdlsh

gsaqvkghgk kvadaltnav ahvddmpnal salsdlhahk lrvdpvnfkl
lshcllvtla ahlpaeftpa vhasldkfla svstvltsky r.20

In a similar way, the hemoglobin beta chain consisting of 146 amino

acids can be expressed:
vhltpeeksa vtalwgkvnv devggealgr llvvypwtqr ffesfgdlst
pdavmgnpky kahgkkvlga fsdglahldn lkgtfatlse lhcdklhvdp
enfrllgnvl vcvlahhfgk eftppvqaay qkvvagvana lahkyh.21

Even a single error in this amino acid sequence can prevent the resulting
chain from folding properly and can have severe medical consequences. For
example, a mutation in the DNA specifying the sixth amino acid in the beta
chain, changing it from glutamic acid (e) to valine (v), results in the genetic
condition known as sickle-cell disease when the defective gene is inherited
from both parents. The disease leads to major health issues.
The alpha and beta chains of hemoglobin represent only two of about
100,000 different proteins that enable our bodies to begin from a
fertilized egg, to develop as an embryo with all the specialized tissues
our many organ systems require, and to display all the amazing
metabolic, sensory, repair, mobility, and other functions we experience as
human beings. Non-material linguistic specifications encoded in our
DNA not only describe the structural details of all these proteins down to
the level of individual atoms, but they also implement and manage the
feedback control mechanisms that allow such complex systems to
operate stably within a changing and dynamic environment. At this point
we have only begun to understand how all this astonishing bio-
informational, biochemical, and biomechanical technology works in such
a seamless manner. Such complexity makes the human technology
underlying our cell phones appear as mere child’s play by comparison.

20 Hemoglobin subunit alpha, Homo sapiens, http://www.uniprot.org/uniprot/P69905.

21 Hemoglobin subunit beta, Homo sapiens, http://www.uniprot.org/uniprot/P68871.

VII. LINGUISTIC CODING IN THE

NATURAL REALM— FROM WHENCE DID
IT ARISE?
An obvious issue is the origin of all the encoded DNA specifications in
the living organisms we observe around us, including ourselves. Any credible
explanation must account for the staggering level of the coded specifications
that exist in the DNA of even the simplest bacterium. We have already
considered whether material causes can account for linguistic phenomena at
any level. Our conclusion was no. Human experience, by contrast, points
exclusively to mind as the source of linguistic expressions. In addition, our
own thinking and reasoning seem to rely unequivocally upon language.
Moreover, our ability to use and create language enables us to devise
computer languages, and with these languages all the software required to
operate the computer-enabled machines we also design and build which
influence and shape the material world around us. This reality leads us by
analogy to conclude that the most plausible explanation for the linguistic
content we find in living organisms is an entity with mental faculties
qualitatively similar to our own, but vastly superior, including those of
thinking, reason, and making choices, faculties which we ourselves employ
when we create linguistic content.22 Yet the complexity of the linguistic
messages encoded in the DNA of living organisms so far transcends the
language expressions that humans are able to generate that we can only
shrink back in wonder. The mental abilities required to account for such
messages stagger human imagination. If ever there were tangible evidence for
intellectual capacities far, far exceeding our own, the linguistic messages in
our own DNA surely must qualify. An entity possessing such astonishing
mental powers certainly qualifies as God in the way most people understand
that term. What other rational alternative can there be?

22 Others have made this same deduction. E.g. A. C. McIntosh, “Information and entropy—

topdown or bottom-up development in living systems?” International Journal of Design and

Nature and Ecodynamics 4 (2009) 351–385; A. C. McIntosh, “Information and Thermodynamics
in Living Systems,” in Biological Information: New Perspectives (ed. R. J. Marks II, M. J. Behe,
W. A. Dembski, B. L. Gordon, and J. C. Sanford; Singapore: World Scientific, 2013) 179–201.
We make the deduction via linguistic considerations without reference to entropy or
thermodynamics. Another example is Werner Gitt, Am Anfang war die Information (Neuhausen-
Stuttgart: Hänssler, 1994); ET In the Beginning Was Information (Bielefeld, Germany: Christlich
Literatur-Verbreitung, 1997). Gitt extends the engineering information theory approach pioneered
by Claude Shannon in the late 1940’s by adding four additional levels or dimensions of
information. These ideas, slightly updated, are found in Werner Gitt, Robert Compton, and Jorge
Fernandez, “Biological Information: What Is It?,” in Biological Information: New Perspectives
11–25. We make the same ultimate deduction via linguistic considerations much more directly
without the complexities of engineering information theory.

Let us review the logical steps that lead us to this conclusion. First, we
provided a clear definition of language in terms of encoded meaning. We
demonstrated that because meaning is non-material, linguistic expressions
likewise must be non-material. We further showed that there is no indication
that matter can generate non-material meaning-bearing linguistic expressions.
Why should we expect that even to be possible, given that matter and
meaning are in separate ontological realms? On the other hand, as humans we
are immersed in language realities. We associate our own use of language
with our own mental faculties. It seems indisputable that the source of our
thoughts and other language expressions is our mind. For lack of any other
plausible explanation for linguistic phenomena other than a mind like our
own, the linguistic coding observed in the DNA of every living organism
points to a mind with the capabilities that most people associate with the term
God. The strength of that conclusion depends on the deduction that language
is always a product of mind. But there appears to be no other rational
possibility. In fact, the case is so overwhelmingly strong that rarely in the
history of mankind has there been such clear and unambiguous evidence for
God’s reality as there is today. This evidence consists in what has been
revealed concerning the structure of living things at the molecular level
during the past half century and concerning the mathematical laws of nature
over the past 400 years. The case is so strong that God’s reality ought to no
longer be a topic for debate in scholarly circles.
As we have already noted, the linguistic signature we observe in the
realm of biology extends to matter itself, because the very laws of nature are
linguistic entities. The conclusion is close to inescapable that the whole of
reality testifies to God’s existence. This logic led Antony Flew, the renowned
British philosopher and arguably the best-known atheist in the English-
speaking world during the final half of the 20 th century, to abandon his
atheism and in 2004 to announce an earnest belief in God. 23 Flew stated, “I
now believe that the universe was brought into existence by an infinite
Intelligence. I believe that this universe’s intricate laws manifest what
scientists have called the Mind of God. I believe that life and reproduction
originate in a divine Source.”24

VIII. A GOD WHO SPEAKS

Beyond vastly greater mental and linguistic capacities than our own,
what more might be inferred about this God? Many today acknowledge
evidence for a divine Mind and Designer behind the realm of nature but are
reluctant to go further. We, however, conclude that the linguistic capacity of
such an Intelligent Designer who created the laws of nature as well as earth’s
living organisms ought to draw a person’s attention to the God of the Bible.
The Bible, from its first page to its last, discloses a God who speaks. And
especially in the Bible’s opening verses, when God speaks, things happen.
Ten times in the Bible’s first chapter we find the phrase -'!+N 10N'1 "And God
said …."25 What follows each of these declarations is the creation of light, the
expanse, the dry land, plant life, luminaries in the heavens, marine life and
birds, land animals, humans, the dominion mandate for humans, and the diets
for humans, birds, and land animals. In five of these ten instances, what God
is recorded as speaking is followed immediately by the phrase, 0) '!'1 ("and it
was so").26 Taken at face value, the biblical text indicates that it was God’s
spoken declarations which brought these aspects of His creation into
existence in a miraculous, instantaneous way. 27 Other biblical passages affirm
this inference. Psalm 33:6 declares, "By the word of the LORD the heavens
were made, and all the host of them [that is, all the stars] by the breath of His
mouth." Verse 9 adds, "For He spoke, and it was done; He commanded, and it
stood fast." The book of Hebrews also affirms that, "By faith we understand
that the worlds were framed by the word of God [ģûĸÌÀ ¿¼Çı], so that the
things which are seen were not made of things which are visible" (Heb
11:3).28 Thus, the Bible indicates that God created the physical universe and
life itself through his spoken word. Not only this, according to (cripture, it is
Christ himself who continues to uphold all of creation "by the word of His
power" (Heb 1:3). Furthermore, the Bible throughout its pages reveals a God
who communicates, highlighting one of the attributes of the God of the Bible
—that he is a God who speaks.

IX. CONCLUSION
Language plays an integral role, not only in our own subjective
experience, but also in the material realm around us. This includes its role in
human thought and communication, in the laws of nature, and in the
specifications and function of every living organism. As encoded meaning,
language is non-material in its ultimate essence. Apart from something akin
to the human mind, there are no serious candidates for explaining how
linguistic phenomena might otherwise arise. The only reasonable way to
account for the linguistic aspects of the laws of nature and of DNA is an
intellect with capacities so vast that most people would immediately identify
this entity as God. (uch linguistic capacities draw attention to the God of the
Bible. The paramount role that language plays in the world around us indeed
mirrors the prominent role that God’s spoken word plays in the Bible’s
account of the manner in which God brought this world and all its astonishing
wonder into existence: “Then God said … and it was so.”29

Endnotes
23 Antony Flew, There is a God: How the World’s Most Notorious Atheist Changed His Mind

(New York: HarperCollins, 2007).

24 Ibid. 88.
25 The root 10N (to say) is used 11 times in Genesis 1, with the other occurrence in the Qal
Infinitive construct form (10N+ "saying") in 1:22.

26 ʯʫ '!'1 ("and it was so") is used in Gen 1:7, 9, 11, 15, 30, while the identically functioning
11N '!'1
("and there was light") is used
in 1:3.
27 Even ancient rabbis, from the period of the Tannaim and Amoraim (first to fifth centuries

AD), understood the biblical teMt as teaching instantaneous creation through God’s spoken word.
For eMample, Midrash Rabbah discusses God’s creation of light in Gen 1:3: "Rabbi Berechyah in
the name of Rabbi Yehudah bar (imone opened, By the word of HASHEM [the LORD] the
heavens were made, etc. [Psalm 33:6]. Rabbi Yehudah bar (imone said: not with toil nor with
eMertion did the Holy One, blessed is He, create His world; rather by the word of HASHEM [the
LORD], and already the heavens were made. Here too [Gen
1:3], 've'hayah' fight [11N !'!1] is not written here; rather, 'va'yehi' light [11N '!'1], there was light
immediate-

ly." Also noteworthy is the observation of the use of ʩʤʩʥ "and it was," a wayyiqtof verb (past
tense), instead of !'!1 "and it will be," a weqataf verb (future tense), in Gen 1:3, 7, 9, 11, 15, 30.
28 The root word ģýĸ is understood as "that which is said, word, saying, eMpression, or

statement of any kind." (ee BDAG 905.

29 I, John R. Baumgardner, would like to express earnest appreciation to Professor John W.

Oller Jr. who, some 25 years ago, coached me in the linguistics basics on which this article relies.
I am grateful for his friendship, encouragement, and counsel over these many years. He is
currently Professor of Communicative Disorders at the University of Louisiana.
 Language, Truth, and
Revelation,
Part 1
By Gordon H. Clark
From the Gordon-Conwell Lectures on Apologetics, 1981.

This morning I want to turn to language, language and

theology. The first half of this book has to do with the
Logical Positivists and their view of language. There won’t
be any time to go over that, that’s too bad. Language
philosophy began with vigor with Bertrand Russell, not
that there hadn’t been any at all before. Plato’s dialogue
Cratylus investigated language and JeanJacques Rousseau
tried to and found it impossible. There were some writers
in the nineteenth century, and I’ll mention one in
particular who operated in New England with devastating
effect on conservative Christianity. But mainly, language
theorists are in the twentieth century and most of the time
will be spent on them.
The first one will be Wilbur Marshall Urban, on page 85
of the book, and I hope you can understand what is
written. I think it’s rather easy. And, as I read you will
notice somewhere on page 2 of the chapter, that would be
somewhere page 86, 87, I recommend that you read his
volume on language and reality. It is a very interesting
book. It’s only 750 pages, so you ought to be able to do
that by dinner time this evening. You will enjoy it to no
end. I’m not so sure you will enjoy my account of it, but
don’t let my account of it prevent you from reading it.
And, he has wonderful theories of poetry and things like
this and...
This very interesting author judiciously begins with the
basic Empiricism of John Locke. And, you will find out as I
go on a little bit, he is one of the first men who made a
major attack against the Logical Positivists. That’s the
point I want to make. And we’ll see about it. Come in,
come in. This very interesting author judiciously begins
with the basic Empiricism of John Locke. Locke had been
surprised to find that he could not complete his essays
concerning human understanding without investigating
the relationship between thought and words. Berkley
learned from Locke and concluded that all, or most, I
think he means ‘about all’, confusions in philosophy
resulted from the use of words apart from the ideas that
they symbolised, or should symbolise. “Draw the curtain
of words to behold the fairest tree of knowledge.” Bishop
Berkley could use the English language very well. That’s a
very nice phrase, but if you read the whole paragraph the
aesthetic response should be greater. Urban states the
problem very clearly, this is it. “If all words originate in sense
experience, then when they are carried over into the non-
physical, the problem of their valid reference to nonsensible
ideas is immediately raised.” Or further. “The naturalistic and
ultimately behaviouristic view of language, which has
developed the necessity from Darwinian premises, has brought
with it a scepticism of the word, a distrust of language, more
fundamental than any hitherto experienced. The naturalisation
of language,” by naturalisation he means understanding it in
the philosophy of naturalism, “the naturalisation of language
makes of it, in the last analysis, merely a method of adaptation
to, and control of, environment and denies to it ab initio all
fitness for apprehending and expressing anything but the
physical.” Or more pointedly; Can advanced mathematics be
expressed in words? Or; Is there a gap between the word and
the world? If medieval nominalism denied universals, the new
nominalism denies individuals. Which is not a verbatim
quotation but that is approximately what he says.
Then, Urban asks the questions he intends to answer, and
these four questions are repeated on the last page of the book,
with answers that are tied into the argument. Urban ask the
questions he intends to answer first. How is language a bearer of
meaning? Incidentally it was this question that wrecked Stoicism
in antiquity. They were Materialists, they were not Atomists, but
they were Materialists. And yet, they had to acknowledge that
words symbolised thoughts, and they were forced to modify and
implicitly reject their original Materialism in order to
accommodate a view of language. I don’t suppose that any of you
will look it up, but Bréhier, Émile Bréhier, wrote a very
interesting monograph on La theorie des incorporels dans
l'ancien stoicisme and that’s The Theory of Incorporeals. They
had to have something incorporeal even though they began as
Corporealists. A very interesting development a long time ago.
The question they were faced with, How is language a bearer of
meaning? How is communication possible? Third, What is the
relation of logic to language? Fourth, How can language refer to
things? There are the four questions that Urban takes on.
This monograph, that is the book I am reading from, this
monograph has no intention of summarising his 750 page
answers. A few of his suggestive ideas are all that can be
included here. Isn’t it too bad that this isn’t a two
semester course lasting from August to the following July,
meeting five times a week, for three hours a day? Now we
could cover a little bit in that time. Urban’s material may
be roughly divided into two parts. There are his
refutations, not only of Logical Positivism but of John
Dewey also and a few others, and, second, there are his
own constructive efforts. Some of the former is almost
essential to an understanding of the latter. John Dewey
held that language changed brute animals into thinking
and knowing animals by creating the realm of meaning.
Urban asks, Was there not first a realm of meaning for the
expression of which language was created? If language
created meanings, then obviously things could have no
meaning prior to language. Urban is willing to
acknowledge that some meanings are created by
language, but he’s especially concerned to show that
there must be prelinguistic meaning. One example of this
is the fact that a wolf will refuse to eat a piece of meat in
which poison has been hidden. In some sense, the wolf
senses a meaning. The bait means death. For the animal,
however, the meaning is not detachable from the sensory
thing. While for man, on the other hand, it is.
Although human beings also sense these animal
meanings, for example, when we begin to chew a bad nut
and spit it out, these are for us extrinsic meanings also.
John Dewey may say, as he does say, the clouds mean rain;
but, they do not mean rain in the same way that a bad
taste causes us to spit it out. The clouds are a sign on a
different physical event. If the clouds meant rain, in the
animal sense, they would mean the act of seeking shelter
as the bad nut starts us spitting. But, if the clouds really
mean rain, there must be a certain individuation of both
the sign and the thing indicated which is not present in
animal meaning. When the clouds mean rain, they do not
necessarily mean seeking shelter. We may already be
indoors looking at meteorological instruments. Meanings,
as a cue or stimulus to action, and meaning as a relation
to a sign and the thing signified, are two different
meanings of meaning. Or in other words, the behaviourist
theory that a thing causes a reaction fails to distinguish
mechanical habits from interpretations of signs. If the
sign is merely causal, as an event in chemistry would do
something else, if the sign is merely causal there is no
interpretation. Urban wants to insist on this point. Russell
had said that meaning is an observable property of
observable entities. Others of the same opinion say
meaning is directly perceptible like colour and sound. It is
an object of direct perception. Though he, Urban, though
he acknowledges a sense in which this is true, Urban
takes it as confusing. Russell’s theory assumes things are
given, but if only sensations are given, it is meaning that
transforms sense data into things. Things are ideal
constructions. Meaning is not something that is perceived.
It is understood.
When, however, Urban turns from criticising Russell and
the Positivists, and suggests something constructive, one
must be cautious. He wants sounds to become words
bearing meaning by their similarity to the things they
designate. The word buzz is an imitation of the sound it
signifies. Or, the inherent meaning of the sound ache
turns it into a word. Such onomatopoeic are the first
words of a language. Now, while the double z in the word
buzz may sound like the noise of sawing, what about the
letter b? Why should it not have been fuzz or any other
first letter of the alphabet? Then further, it is hard to see
the similarity between the sound ache and a pain. Later,
when he asserts that ohato, a word in some primitive
language, sounds like and is a symbol of a stream, and
that ohatooo, for the same reason, means ocean, it is hard
to follow him.
There are, of course, onomatopoeic words. And there are also
metaphors. Urban mentions the transference of the word kid, a
young goat, to a human child. In fact he says that metaphor is
the primary law of speech construction. Does this not seem
somewhat of an exaggeration? The introduction of the word its
into the English language is hardly the result of metaphor. Do
you realise that the King James Version of the Bible doesn’t have
the word its in it anywhere from beginning to end? The word its
hadn’t been invented when the King James Bible was translated.
It came into the English language later. But, certainly it didn’t
come in as a metaphor of anything. Nor can the declining use of
cases in Greek as it changed to Koine, with the increasing use of
prepositions, that can’t be explained either. I think it is that New
Testament lexicon by what’shisname, ArndtGingrich, has a list
of changes between Classical Greek and Koine Greek. And the
book is a big book, and there are several pages both of words
that do not appear in Classical Greek or have changed their
meaning, and also to information on how prepositions have
taken the place of case endings in Classical Greek. Koine Greek
is noticeably different from Classical Greek and this is a
development in language. But, I don’t think it is based on any
extension of metaphors. Nor the virtual extinction of the
optative mood. Now, I don’t know how many times the optative
mood occurs in the New Testament, but it’s relatively rare. It
occurs two or three times in maybe Ephesians and Colossians,
and incidentally the form of the optative in Koine is different
from the form you learn when you do Classical Greek, it’s not
the same form but it is an optative. But, the optative is very rare
in the New Testament. And, that can’t be explained by the
method that Urban is doing. However, in spite of those things,
that I consider flaws in Urban’s linguistic theory, Urban’s
opposition to Behaviourism is well based. And, here comes a
quotation that is directed against Logical Positivism:
“In the words of C.S. Lewis, speech is only that part of
behaviour which is most significant of meanings and most useful
for communication (He is describing Logical Positivism). The
inability of the behaviouristic theory to explain even animal
meaning, if in the concept of meaning is included the notion of
understanding or interpretation of signs, would inevitably bring
with it the conclusion that a priori it is unable to explain
linguistic meaning. The causal conception of meaning (let me
indicate again what is meant by the causal conception of
meaning, it is a chemical affair you know, if you drop sodium
into a pan of water it explodes and catches fire and so on. Is
that sodium or what, is that right? I make mistakes sometimes,
well that is ordinarily explains as a causality, that somehow or
other the water sets fire to the sodium, the behaviouristic
theory is that the pronunciation of the word produces a
reaction just as you put to elements together, two chemicals
together, they produce a reaction). The causal conception of
meaning in reductive behaviourism equates both the meaning
of the thing and the meaning of the word with our way of
reacting. All meaning is sufficiently accounted for by causal
relations. The taste of a caterpillar, or the sound of a bell, are,
to be sure, caused by the stimuli. But, unless the notion of
understanding or interpretation a sign, a sign being left out of
the notion of meaning, the possibility of Behaviourism vanishes.
When we come to linguistic meaning it is precisely
understanding, that is the sine qua non , of such meaning. The
sound does not become a linguistic fact at all until it is
detached from its purely causal context. And this detachment
and mobility are not functions of the physical environment (if
you think that quotation is a little meager, get Urban’s book
and read pages 129 to 131).”
Then Urban strengthens his attack on Behaviourism by a
discussion on intention. All this may be, and it is, may be a
valuable refutation of Behaviourism. But, Urban’s view
that words represent, rather than are symbols for things,
has its own difficulties. If you want to work out a theory of
language, you will have to choose between saying words
represent things or words are symbols of things. They’re
two different theories. Previously mentioned was buzz and
ohato. He will, that is Urban, will not have words to be
arbitrary symbols. The symbol is imitative and conjures up
the picture of the thing itself. Well, you know what I say
about pictures of things. Some of you have pictures.
Therefore, picturesque language is more adequate than
conceptual language. For example, theory is grey but life
is green. That is a quotation from... the famous German
Romanticist, Goethe. Theory is grey but life is green
would be less adequately expressed in conceptual terms.
That is Urban’s position. Quite the contrary, so it seems to
me. Such metaphors have to be puzzled out and put in
literal language before their vagueness is dissipated. They
make for good poetry, but not for good understanding.
Ahh you can hardly understand poetry.
Let me see if I can quote some. There was a poet by the
name of Keats, he was a miserable, stupid ass. He said...
oh dear oh dear... it will come to me sometime <response
from audience> No that’s a literal statement... Why I had
it on my tongue just a minute ago. I am so forgetful... you
know, truth is beauty and beauty is truth, that is all we
know and all we need to know. Now, isn’t that stupid? Don’t
read Keats, even though I disagree with Urban, read Urban. I
disagree with him, but even in defending Keats he makes more
sense than Keats does. Of course there is good poetry; Miniver
Cheevy child of scorn, cursed the day when he was born. That’s
good you know. Who wrote that? Well why did you laugh so
funnily? Does anybody know where it comes from? I think he
was an American poet, was he? And, he longed for the medieval
grace of iron clothing. That is in Miniver Cheevy, Edwin
Arlington Robinson. Oh, there are some, another good poet, his
name is Guy Wetmore Carryl. He wrote a volume called Fables
for the Frivolous . They’re superb. But Keats, no no.
Poetry is not good for the understanding. When he says
of analogical predication, “I am bringing to light some
aspect which could not be determined or expressed
except by such a transfer,” he robs analogy of all meaning.
Unless the analogy is based on a literal and univocal
similarity, there could be no analogy at all. And I use this
argument to pay my respects to Thomas Aquinas and
Cornelius Van Til. Urban, indeed, on this very page states
clearly enough of the view of those who oppose him; we
abuse words when we use them metaphorically, the case
of equivocal predication, analogical predication is
ambiguous. He states very clearly the views he opposes.
But, if some people agree with Urban, others think the
view he states so well and rejects so sharply, is the literal,
nonequivocal, truth. Similarly unacceptable is his dictum
that “all words have originally, unquestionably a physical
reference, and words for relations are primarily spatial in
character.” That’s on page 185 and you better read the
sentence 2 or 3 times again. “All words have originally,
unquestionably a physical reference, and words for
relations are primarily spatial in character.” The term
“originally” may push the question so far back into
primitive society that no one could produce evidence for
or against the thesis. But, if God gave Adam language for
the purpose of worship, at least the word “God” did not
have a physical reference. Nor is it evidence how the
relationship “of”, or “whys”, or “more witty” could ever
have been primarily spatial. Or for that matter, what
spatial relationship can be found in “uncle” or “cousin?” It
would seem that sometimes Urban makes very general
assertions without sufficient justification.
Urban returns to these points many pages later. All
words, he says, have a physical origin and a physical
reference. After using such words, someone intuits a value
and by metaphor applies the physical word to a new
reference. We do not first, this is what Urban says, we do
not first intuit an object and then express it. The
expression is a constitutive part of the knowing. Language
creates the world of cognitive meanings. This paragraph,
on page 345, is mainly concerned with values; words such
as generosity, nobility of character, and moral values in
general. Even the word morality, though he does not use
this word as one of his examples, even the word morality
must have had a physical origin which then creates a
cognitive meaning. This sounds implausible and, indeed,
selfcontradictory. It is implausible because without the
intuition of an object there would be no stimulus to
expression. Why or how could anyone invent a word, other
than a nonsense syllable, if he had nothing to express?
The cognitive meaning must come first and a symbol
second. As a science of electricity was being formulated in
early modern times, the experimenters noticed certain
relationships. To that date, no name had been given them,
they had not been known before, so that there was
nothing to give names to. But, when the intuitions
occurred, the scientists took the names of three of their
own number; Volta, Ampere, and Ohm, and assigned these
names to the level of energy, the quantity of current, and
the resistance. Only after a person has a thought, can he
give it a name. Not only is Urban’s theory thus
implausible, but is also selfcontradictory because he
cannot avoid the difficulty that made it implausible. He
has said: “All words are physical in origin. It is through
metaphysical transfer that they acquire their new
references. They become the vehicle of the intuition and
description or expression of a new entities.”
Here we have the intuition or knowledge first and the word
comes second. But, a page and a half later Urban says: “Any
intuition of reality without an element of description is pure
myth. Knowing, in any significant sense of the word, is
inseparable from language. Language creates [and it was he
who italicized this word, that’s not my italicizing] Language
creates the world of cognitive meanings. Intuition is impossible
without expression. The expression is, rather, a constitutive
part of the intuition itself. One does not first possess an object
in knowing and then express the nature of that object in terms
of arbitrary and conventional signs, but the expression is a
constituent part of the knowing itself.”
Aside, now, from the fact, or if you wish the appearance,
of contradiction between pages 145 and 147, aside from
that fact, the latter, that is page 147, seems false. Urban
uses crutchy??? and aesthetics for support. “The artist
does not first intuit or present his object to himself and
then find linguistic or other forms with which to express
it.” The present writer deems this to be false because one
of his hobbies is oil painting, and he always selects his
objects first and then tries to find a form by which to
express it. But, no doubt, Urban would reply, “That is why
you are not much of an artist.” However, the present
writer also writes, and if he does not have the object, the
knowledge, the argument before he puts in words, any
words he should write would be much worse than those
now found in these publications. And, if Urban had not
thought before he wrote, I could not imagine how he could
have completed so interesting a book.
Without doubt, Urban is indeed interesting and a great
deal of what he says is excellent. He tries to alleviate his
notion of spatial reference and pictorial representation by
saying that poetry conveys a meaning not expressible in
any logical picture. Poetry is pictorial, but not spatial.
Now that wouldn’t be true of Baudelaire, would it?
Baudelaire’s poetry isn’t pictorial, is it? Baudelaire’s
poetry stinks. Yes he deals with smells. A map is a spatial
picture but Turner’s painting of Venice is not spatial. Now,
it would seem that a spatial or pictorial theory needs
considerable alleviation. But, Turner’s painting, and all
other landscapes as well, are surely spatial. They may
alter the actual proportions of buildings or trees, they may
disturb perspective, but surely they are spatial
representations. What is better in Urban is his
acknowledgment that symbolic representations, chemical
formulas, and musical scores are not pictorial. Quite so.
But, then why extend the term pictorial so far, rather than
simply abandoning it as a theory of spatial language?
More acceptable, indeed highly commendable, are some
of his remarks and refutations of nominalism. Scholastic
nominalism, he asserts, is inconsistent because it still
retains the reality of individuals. Neonominalism abolishes
all substantives. All is flux and names distort reality. If
universals are unreal, individuals are unreal too. For, the
mere naming of a thing is a minimal universal. Neo-
nominalism, therefore, has no things but only events. But,
this makes nonsense of, first perceptual meanings, second
value meanings, third descriptions, and fourth because it
makes nonsense of metaphysics it makes nonsense of all
empirical meanings. For, the former conditions the latter.
Now we’re getting along pretty well, we got up to page
369. Don’t you think you will finish the book before dinner
tonight?
Further, that is unless you want to read Edwin Arlington
Robinson. Further, in opposition to his opponents, Urban
remarks that it is an assumption of evolutionary
naturalism, not a necessity of logic, that language is
purely practical; even if it had originally been such. It may
have developed other uses since. But even at first,
language was not purely practical. It was made for human
communication and this is wider than mere practicality.
The difficulty in Urban’s extensive material seems to
spring from the opposition between his basic empiricism
and its unwanted implications. Meaning and verifiability
are inseparable, he says, but observation is not the sole
method of the verification. Mere sense data are not
knowledge. No sentence is purely ostensive. Oh dear, read
something about ostensive definitions. I hope you’ve
heard of them before, but maybe you haven’t. Saint
Augustine has a long section on ostensive definitions, and
Bertrand Russell. Of course Augustine is opposed to
ostensive definitions. Bertrand Russell favours ostensive
definitions, he makes them basic, and that is one of the
main flaws in his theory. Direct verification is a myth. It is
one sentence that verifies another sentence. Sentences
are needed to interpret the sense data. For example, an
observation of mercury as verification involves a host of
presuppositions. I’m referring to Einstein of course. The
isolated observations cannot verify. Therefore, also,
perceptual truth is only probable.
Sometime Urban is not only perceptive but witty as well.
The several theories of truth, he says, correspondence,
coherence, and pragmatic cannot be sustained by their
own criteria. Correspondence cannot be shown to
correspond to truth, coherence coheres with nothing, and
the pragmatic theory does not work. Therefore, the neo-
positivists conclude that the meaning of truth is a
meaningless question. For, if meaning is referenced to a
sensory object, truth can have no meaning because it
refers to no object. The truth of the criteria is truth only of
interpretation.
Along with wit and insight, Urban’s constructive theory
contains much that is puzzling. It seems that originally
language, with its onomatopoeic words, was always poetry, or
at least aesthetic expression. Science came later. Even though
he so extends the term poetry to include prose as well, its
languages is neither cognitive nor practical. Its power is the
power to invoke images. The intellectualist fallacy views the
aesthetic symbol as an imperfect substitute for philosophic or
scientific knowledge. On the contrary, Urban asserts, the
symbol contains an unexpressed reference which the abstract
concept cannot express. The question is what is this so. Keats
Ode on a Grecian Urn , though it’s abstract, in the last two
lines are utter nonsense, expresses something about a moment
detached from the flux of time. It does not express it very well,
and we can hardly know what Keats had in mind. Probably he
was somewhat confused. But, had he thought clearly and
expressed himself intelligibly, a reader, no matter how poetical
the poem, could have put the meaning in clear conceptual
prose. What cannot be expressed clearly is not meaningful.
The same is true of all art. Take the painting Angelus . In our
civilization, the attitude of the two persons is recognized as the
attitude of prayer. Presumably, because they are French
peasants, the painting pictures Roman Catholic devotion. But,
the painting does not convey this information. Present such
pictures to people who know nothing about France or Roman
Catholicism, for example a Tibetan Monk or a Japanese Shogun
of last century, and they can only ask “what does it mean”. Now
I had a very poignant example of this. There was a group of
Japanese professors who were visiting universities in this
country on a tour, and the whole group came to
Indianapolis and stayed in the homes of various professors
and we had a gentleman from Kyoto. He was professor of
Irish poetry in the University of Kyoto, Japan; a very nice
gentleman. Well, we were going through the theater there
on the campus and in the lobby there is a tapestry, it is
probably about 20 feet by 20 feet it’s a rather gigantic
affair, and there is a boat, a lake, and some fishermen are
pulling in some fish, and the man who happened to be
with me at the moment and looked at it and he says,
“what is the story”. Well, I told him the case of the
miraculous draft of fishes, this is Christ who told the
disciples to put their net down on the other side of the
boat and bring in a whole net full of fish. Well you see, he
could not get that from the painting. And, if you think you
can get any Christian message from a painting, you are
mistaken; you are imposing on it because you know the
background already. Take a person who does not have a
Christian background, they won’t see anything
particularly Christian in the Angelus or the miraculous
draft of fishes or anything else. Painting can express a few
things, but not too much. That requires a theory of art
doesn’t it? Well, I’m all in favor of a theory of art too.
Painting does not convey the information; a Tibetan Monk
wouldn’t understand it.
The abstract or conceptual statement is far clearer than
any picture can be. One of Urban’s examples is Pascal’s
phrase, “man is a reed, but a thinking reed.” The context
there in Pascal is that a man is a rather fragile creature,
he says the least thing can kill him, a drop of water can
kill him if it gets in the wrong place. So he says man is a
reed in nature, but a thinking reed. Urban continues to
say that man is a reed is biologically grotesque. Yet, it is
by precisely such deviations from the real that certain
aspects of reality, otherwise inexpressible, are actually
expressed. Now Pascal, the mathematical genius, could,
when he wished, use metaphorical and poetic language.
But, to say that his meaning is otherwise inexpressible, is
not biologically but intellectually grotesque. One can say
the man’s bones are more easily cracked than granite, and
a drop of water properly placed can kill him, yet neither
the rock or the water can think, and thinking is infinitely
superior to the mere physical existence. The aesthetic
quality is here missing, but the thought is, nonetheless,
more intelligibly expressed. And the thought is superior to
the mere aesthetic enjoyment. Urban also quotes four
lines from T.S. Elliott as “expressive, or revelatory, to an
extraordinary degree.” The first two lines of Elliott’s
poetry are intelligible, the third may be guessed at, but
the fourth expresses, or reveals, nothing but the
unintelligible confusion of T.S. Elliott’s mind.
Repeating the idea, not otherwise expressible, four
pages later, and after another ten pages of fairly clear
expression of his ideas, Urban defends himself by saying:
“In that symbolic form, an aspect of reality is given
which cannot be adequately expressed otherwise. It
is not true that whatever is expressed symbolically
can be better expressed literally. For there is [and
the italics is Urban’s] no literal expression but only
another kind of symbol.”
To which the intellectualist replies, the cat is black.
Anyone who then says the cat is black is a poetical
metaphor, does not deserve a literal denial.
For the purpose at hand, this monograph cites Urban as a
defender of religious language against the Positivist`s assertion
that religion is meaningless. The reader may now anticipate
how he does so. Religion and poetry are closely related but not
identical. The emotion of religion has the quality of the holy,
which poetry does not necessarily have. Religious language is
not only evocative, but invocative as well. Thus, religion has a
personal god and is, therefore, dramatic and mythic. As the
poet gets something of reality which the scientist has missed,
so the religious person gets something the poet has missed.
Religious language communicates something other language
cannot. These several of Urban`s phrases are at best
ambiguous. Of course the poet gets something the physicist
quo physicist has missed, does not biological language grasp
something chemistry has missed? The language of football gets
and misses, what the language of international diplomacy
misses and gets. The confusion here is between language as
such, and the various subject matters of conversation. Of
course chemistry is not botany, but language, the language of
all of these is the same, the English language. Urban’s
statement, therefore, is true and trivial. What he really means,
as his wording in one place indicates, is that religion is
emotional. Religion has no place for thinking. It is not
intelligible. God can’t be known. Belief has no place. This is
surely not trivial, it’s simply false. If it is not false, then
Christianity is not a religion.
The religions that Urban can identify all speak the same
language, he says, and are immediately friends. He’s not
the only person who said that, that was in the first chapter
of the three R book, wasn’t it? It was the fellow who shot
our missionary enterprise to pieces, you know, what’s his
name now? Hawking, yes. See I don’t have the word but I
have the thought all right. If I didn’t have the thought I
wouldn’t know that one word was the right word. The
religions that Urban can identify all speak the same
language and are immediately friends. But, Christ had
religious enemies. He said, “no man cometh to the Father
but by me.” Christ, of course, was not very religious. Well,
maybe Jesus was religious once in a while, for, Holy
Communion is a simple piece of symbolism to express a
number of spiritual truths too great for ordinary language.
The symbol expresses something too great for words.
Page 586. Now, the present writer, whose theology is
known to a certain public, may not and does not claim to
understand all the logical implications of the Lord’s
Supper. But, unless he had a literal understanding of some
of its intellectual meaning, he would have no reason for
going through the motions. In opposition to
Sacramentarianism, where the magic works apart from
the understanding, the Scripture says, “let a man examine
himself.” An intellectual task. For he that eateth and
drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh damnation unto
himself not discerning the Lord’s body. An intellectual
task. Therefore, the Covenanters and the Calvinists will
not celebrate the supper without a sermon to be
understood. As Calvin said, “an implicit faith, is no faith at
all.”
More broadly, if Adam and Eve, on page 590, are merely
mythological or metaphorical expressions of man’s emotional
alienation from an unknowable god, then Jesus is simply a
character in Aesop’s Fables to represent a fanciful union with
that god. This implication, by itself, does not refute Urban’s
“religion”, but it shows that it is not the Christian religion. The
implication also suggests, in fact Urban’s religious theory
demands, that his religion be irrational. And that to me, of
course, is repulsive. Though he himself has said that God is
personal, this statement must also be mythological and has no
intelligible meaning. Its concrete terms are not what religion
really says. Quoting Brightman with approval, Urban’s idea of
God symbolizes , and again this is Urban’s italicizing not mine,
“the idea of god symbolizes a unity or harmony between
existence and value.” But, no doubt this impersonal harmony is
itself also a literally untrue myth. Urban indeed tries to salvage
religious language from the nonsense of Logical Positivism, but
he empties it of all intelligible meaning, that the result is no
better.
 Language, Truth, and
Revelation, Part 2
A Lecture by Dr. Gordon H. Clark

In the introductory paragraphs to Part Two, it was noted that

Kierkegaard and Barth had a compelling influence over most of
the later authors. The work of E.L. Mascall, however, will
prevent us from assuming that this influence was completely
universal. His only reference to Barth says, "It is not surprising
that Dr. Karl Barth's slogan, Finitum non capax infiniti , (which
means the finite is not capable of the infinite) went together
with a denial not only of the possibility of natural theology (that
is, of any knowledge of God acquirable by man s natural
powers) but also of any rational understanding of revelation" [
Words and Images , p. 104]. We must now outline the matrix,
that is, the theory in which this quotation is embedded. Karl
Barth used that phrase a couple of times. He thought that the
finite could not comprehend the infinite. I think anybody who
has ever studied geometry would disagree with Barth on that
point.
In Mascall's book, Words and Images , the Foreword raises
the question whether “the utterances which we make when. . .
asserting or denying that God exists have any significance
whatever." In anticipation of the Thomistic view that he will
defend, he acknowledges that Christian philosophers "at their
best... had always been willing and indeed anxious to admit
that there was something very peculiar about theological
assertions ... and the medieval theologians had constructed a
department of logic—the doctrine of analogy—expressly to deal
with this fact" [p. viii]. You will find my discussion of analogy in
the Thales to Dewey book as a criticism of Thomas Aquinas’s
cosmological argument, if you want to look it up.
Mascall begins with a long critique of Ayer's verification
principle. His fourth point is...And I guess I discussed Ayer
early in the book, did I? Let me see if I did. Yeah, he is there on
page 43...Mascall’s fourth principle is that point that Ayer
uncritically limited "experience" to sensation. This limitation,
however, cannot be a generalization from experience because
"mystical experience in the broadest sense . . . contradicts it
and [this] certainly ought not to be dismissed without detailed
examination. But in Ayer's book such an examination is
nowhere made” [p. 10]. Mascall defends mystical experience.
This was Mascall's fourth point. His other arguments are also
important, though they are not necessary to an exposition of his
theory of language.
However much Mascall opposes the verification principle
(that’s the principle of the logical positivists), and the restriction
of meaningfulness to tautologies (that is, definitionally true) and
sensorily verifiable statements (meaningful but sometimes true,
sometimes false), he insists on empiricism. Experience is the
sole source of knowledge, but experience is not always sensory.
Even "sense experience itself may consist of something more
than experience of senseobjects" (p. 31). And "there may be
experience which is not expressible in sentences at all, or which
is expressible only in sentences of a very peculiar kind" (p. 31).
Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, in addition to or because of their
sensory definition of experience, denied to the intellect any
activity other than inference from sensation: "the intellect in no
way apprehends, it merely infers" (p. 33). Against this Mascall
asserts, quite apart from any mystical experience, that the
sensible "particular. . . is not the terminus of perception, not the
objectum quod . . . but the objectum quo... And if you don’t
know Latin, or just one person in the class who seems to know
Latin. You want to translate that for us? [female students
responds but audio is not clear] Oh! It’s on page 96. Objectum
quod means the object which. Objectum quo means the object
by which...through which the intellect grasps, in a direct but
mediate activity, the intelligible extramental reality, which is
the real thing" (p. 34).
It is interesting to note that Mascall goes beyond (as he says)
Thomas and refuses to assume that "the real intelligible world
[is] isomorphic with the subjective sensible one" [p. 41]. For
example, relativity and quantum theory are not statements
about sensible phenomena: They are "expressions of the kind of
intelligibility that the real world has."
Then Mascall adds a short defense of mystical experience, the
language of which is entirely unintelligible to all who have not
had the experience. Hence it is useless to discuss it.
Any theory of language depends on a view concerning the
extent of possible knowledge and the methods of learning.
Basic to Mascall's position is the assumption that "the intellect
does not only reason, but also apprehends; it has, as its objects,
not only truths, but things" [p. 63]. Understanding as ratio is
the power of discursive, logical thought, of drawing
conclusions; understanding as intellectus is a simplex intuitus
...You can see what those words are in English. They seem just
about the same...a simple vision to which truth offers itself like
a landscape to the eye. "Intellectus is not concerned simply
with the apprehension of a purely spiritual or ideal realm; it is
concerned equally with the perception of the everyday world of
material things" [p. 64].
In order that the reader may not confuse the position of the
present writer with those of Mascall, Gilkey, or others, it seems
allowable to interpolate into this exposition some preliminary
but basic criticism...People often object to my writing. They say
they can’t tell when I’m talking for myself and when I’m
explaining somebody else. Well you have to read a little
carefully to see which. But, I think it is always indicated. And
certainly it is indicated here.
From the time of Parmenides down to the present, various
philosophers have based their epistemology on an analogy
between eyesight and knowledge...And it strikes me that
between 8 and 10 o’clock this morning that is what some of you
were doing in this room... From the time of Parmenides down to
the present, various philosophers have based their
epistemology on an analogy between eyesight and knowledge.
The object of knowledge, the thing known, has been regarded
as an individual object, somewhat like a tree or a rock. The
object can be "seen" with various degrees of clarity. Poor eye-
sight or fog prevents seeing it clearly, though the field of vision
includes its complete outline with the background around it.
One sees the whole of it, if not the details. Thus God looms up
before us in a fog. Bonaventura described it as a global
representation of which the intuition is lacking. Mascall
presumably wants to preserve some sort of intuition.
But before considering such a difficult object as God, let us
apply Mascall's view to a tree or a rock. He says the intellect
grasps material things: We can know the tree. Now if one should
challenge him to prove that he knows this individual tree, what
could he say but that it is an oak tree, about forty feet tall, with
leaves shaped like those of other oak trees, whose wood is
coarse grained and very hard? Unless he says something like
this, would we not conclude that he does not know this
individual tree? Of course, he could be less botanical and say
simply, the trunk is brown and the leaves are green.
Note that when he tells us what he knows, he gives us
sentences. For the sake of argument, we agree that the
sentences are true. But the words "oak tree" are not true. A
noun all by itself is neither true nor false. Knowledge (and is
not knowledge the possession of a truth?) knowledge always
comes in propositions. Otherwise language could not express a
truth. Therefore the intellect does not grasp individual material
things. It is also impossible to know mental "things," if there
are such. Is the concept of two an individual thing? Whether or
not, the concept of two, all by itself, is unknowable. "One plus
one equals two" can be known, and we assert it as a truth; but
the number two, alone, like the oak tree, is neither true nor
false. The content of knowledge is always propositional. This
view allows the intellect to do something else besides drawing
conclusions. It can know premises as well as conclusions. Call it
simplex intuitus , or contemplation, or understanding, it is
different from drawing an implication. Axioms can never be
conclusions. But all truth comes in propositions. One can
somewhat anticipate how this view of truth can apply to a
theory of language.
After some twenty or more pages of Thomism, Mascall is
ready to discuss "the relation of words to thought and
communication” [p. 88]. First, he repudiates the notion that
language is a code, in the sense that one person puts his
thoughts into a code and the other person decodes them again
into thoughts. We shall not boggle at the necessity of both
persons' knowing the same code. With all the ambiguities of
English, "neither of them will apply the name 'tree' to the
object to which the other will apply the name 'tinopener.' " The
two persons learn the code "by a process in which ostensive
definition by our elders plays a large part"...Really I guess he
should have said the whole part but at least he says a large
part.
This code theory, Mascall continues, is not wholly false, but it
has "only a very limited validity" (p. 91). Its basic defect is the
same as that of the sensationalist theory: It confounds the
objectum quod with the objectum quo . This defect becomes
clear when one inquires as to how the code was originally set
up. Ostensive definitions are impossible unless the learner
already knows that ostensive definition is going on. Dogs don't
know this.
Linguistic formulae, like sensible particulars, are neither
objecta quae of communication (for then they would be mere
flatus vocis, mere sounds in the air) nor are they merely more or
less accurate structural replicas of thought; rather they are
objecta quibus : They are the means by which two minds can
share in a common intellectual life. Cor ad cor loquitur . That
means heart speaks to heart. Mascall as a learned Thomist must
use the Latin code: English says, heart speaks to heart (p. 92).
But neither English, nor Latin, nor Mascall, is very clear on this
point.
This vagueness, because no one knows what hearts speaks to
heart means, this vagueness allows him to say that the
techniques, the codes, of poetry, painting, science, and theology
will all be different. Each is adequate to its particular function.
Nor is the function of art merely to evoke emotion, and not to
communicate truth.
With less vagueness, hopefully, the present writer agrees that
the function of art, even music, which does it the least of all, is
to express truth; but maybe not just as Mascall intends.
Further, Mascall is not so much interested in the languages of
music and painting as he is of theological language where the
transcendent God stands out in sharp conteast with every other
subject of human thought and discourse (p. 93). Maybe not a
verbatim quotation, but essentiall what he says on page 93.
Mascall gives two examples of the theological language. First
is the poetry and prose commentary thereon, of St. John of the
Cross. In spite of the' artificiality of the technique, every
reader, says Mascall, must be struck by the coherence and
profundity of the Carmelite Doctor. What justifies a particular
descriptive technique is not its conformity to a predetermined
criterion, but its simple capacity to get its stuff across" (p. 95).
Some people, however, would say that St. John leaves them
completely baffled as to his meaning.
The second example is that of some "Protestant
controversialists" who have trouble with the epistle to the
Hebrews. They argue that Christ relinquished his office of
priest because after his ascension he sat down on the right
hand of the heavenly majesty. Priests stand; kings are seated.
No one can be both seated and standing at the same time.
Therefore Hebrews is inconsistent because it describes him as
sitting and also as a priest. Mascall, to defend the consistency
of the epistle, argues that analogies are not to be taken
literally. Analogies literally understood may conflict, but yet
convey consistent meanings. To some extent this is true, if
analogies convey enough meaning.
But would it not be better to end this puzzle before it begins?
Sometimes priests sit down and sometimes kings stand in their
chariots as they ride into battle. Of course, it is true that
analogies are not to be taken literally; but here is where the
theory of analogy must engage in mortal combat, rise from its
seat, and be laid low. Mascall himself states the problem: how
"a figure which is used only analogically manages to describe
its object at all" (p. 96). You can find more of my opinions on
analogy in Thales to Dewey where I critique the cosmological
argument. But there is some of it here.
To the critic Mascall's answer seems to be an admission of
complete defeat. The atonement, he says, is variously explained
by Christians and Christian churches. There really is no one
clearcut doctrine of the atonement. Several incompatible
picturesque images are in use, none of which applies univocally.
Each analogy applies only up to a point and no further. Yet
this does not imply "that theological discourse is insufferably
imprecise" (p. 97). The figures of speech may awaken a man to
the realization of his alienation from God. Then when he enters
into the sacramental fellowship of the church, he will
experience the atonement. "The mystery will now be known
obscurely and imperfectly, it is true, but no longer imprecisely."
The atonement is then "known not by description but by
acquaintance." That is someting Bertrand Russell invented, I
think. Well maybe not invented. He used it anyway.
The question was, How does a figure of speech, an analogy,
manage to describe its object at all? Does not Mascall reply, It
doesn't? Since he insists that there is no orthodox doctrine of
the atonement, since therefore several people mean different
things by the term, the analogies apply equally to incompatible
doctrines. Or, better, they apply to nothing, for no one idea is
acknowledged as being pictured.
If the doctrine of the atonement were clearly known, a
preacher might use a pleasing analogy or illustration that
might attract his congregation and help fix the meaning in their
minds. But suppose none of them has the least literal notion of
what doctrine X means. This might not be the case with some
well instructed congregations, but it was certainly true on
many foreign mission fields in the ninth or the nineteenth
century. Now, then, says the missionary, I want to explain to you
doctrine X. None of them had even heard the word X before. So
the missionary says, X is like the dawning of the morning. One
of his audience thinks, X is an event that happens
approximately every twentyfour hours. Another in the audience
thinks, X is something reddishorange. A third guesses that X is
a work of art, though not necessarily reddishorange. A fourth
supposes that X is a method of locating east. But since none of
them has any knowledge of the literal meaning of X, they have
no way of determining in what respects X is like the dawn and
in what respects it is not. Analogies require but do not furnish
information.
Mascall is forced into his otiose theory of analogy by his basic
concept of the origin and use of language. "God is by definition
an infinite and suprasensible being, while all the language that
we have in which to talk about him has been devised in order to
describe and discuss the finite objects of our senseexperience"
(p. 101). But if one rejects this view of the origin and purpose
of language, if one maintains that language is a divine gift for
the purpose of conversing literally with God, as well as for
counting sheep—then he does not entangle himself in
ineffective illustrations in order to talk about God or even the
number two.
A paragraph in the book almost admits this, but Mascall
seems to miss the import of his own words: "We must recognize
that thought about God—knowledge of God—precedes
discourse about him. If we could not know [ital. his] anything
about God, we certainly could not say anything about him. And
the possibility of knowing God is intimately bound up with the
doctrine of creation" (p. 103). Mascall makes this excellent
statement to prepare for his rejection of Barth's view. It is
pertinent. But does it not also, if slightly less obviously, dispose
of Thomism as well?
Mascall then concludes by noting the undeniable fact that the
Bible uses images. It is not so undeniable that such images are
" objecta quibus , in the cognitive process." Further, the
cognitive process Mascall has in mind does not seem to be
cognitive, for he quotes Farrer with approval to the effect that
if we seek theological propositions, if we try to deduce from
Scripture a logical system of doctrine, "we close our ears to the
voice of Scripture" (p. 115). What we need is "the life of
spiritual images." In his own words Mascall continues, "for the
understanding of images it is not necessary for us to get behind
them to a nonmetaphorical understanding of fact. The images
themselves illuminate us" (p. 116). These statements are not
meaningless nonsense as the positivists would claim; they are
just plain false.
Now we’ll leave England and the Thomists in the Anglican
church and the descendants of the Puritans in Boston. And if
you are a little puzzled by what I have read so far, the point of it
all sould become clear in this short chapter.
Some conservative theologians may still dimly remember
Bushnell. How many of you have ever heard him before? Oh,
good. I’m delighted to have a class like this. Of course you
ought to be better than college students. You’ve had four more
years. But anyhow, I’m happy about it. Is that an emotion? No,
it is rational. It is an exhibition of rationality which is of a
greater degree here than it is down on Lookout Mountain. A
rational approval of rationality. Well, I’m delighted to know that
most of you have heard of Horace Bushnell. Some conservative
theologians only dimly remember him, and they usually
remember him as the one who preached the moral influence
theory of the atonement. But few, only those in this class, but
few conservatives, or even liberals have ever heard of his
theory of language until Donald A. Crosby published Horace
Bushnell's Theory ofLanguage (Mouton: The Hague, 1975).
Disagreeing with that author's evaluation, this study will
nonetheless profit by his scholarly investigations.
Language, for Bushnell, begins when some primitive man ...
There was one theologian in the 19th century who undestood
precisely what Bushnell meant. Don’t I mention it here? Well
that is terrible. Remind me when I get to the end of page 104
and then I’ll tell you who it is, if it is not here.
Language, for Bushnell, begins when some primitive man
attached sounds to physical objects. It was essentially a
language of nouns. Verbs begin as nouns denoting actions. All
words originate in physical images. He means physical things.
The word and came from an add. In time—lengthy time is often
used to solve problems that cannot be explained—intellectual
terms came into use. Physical objects furnish the ground for
the symbolism of intellectual discourse.
This development is not so successful as one might wish.
Words cannot properly represent even physical shapes. Words
name species, they don’t name individuals; in fact, they name
only sensations. Hence the inexactitude of the original physical
language increases when applied to the shapeless ideas of the
mind. That is a language which is built out of material objects
now is naming material objects just won’t do for abstract ideas.
 Here an observation may be interpolated. Bushnell raised a
question as to how a code could originate. It is a legitimate
problem. But there is no difficulty in defending the adequacy of
codes. The letters dog and the letters hund and the letters chie-
n are all adequate to represent a certain type of animal.
Symbols are always adequate, just because they are symbols.
It seems useless to question the adequacy of theological
language. If theological thought can be defended, the language
will take care of itself. A person may indeed think of cat or God
at the wrong time; and he may say chien when he means chat,
but this is no defect in language as such. Therefore if one has an
idea of the shapeless number that solves the equation x^2+1 =
0, any symbol will do. Now, of course, they did choose a symbol,
you know the one, I’ll write it on the board for you. The
matematical symbol. But any symbol would do. You can make
some other wiggles on the board and it would do just as well. It
is something that solves the problem of quadratic equations.
What symbol you want to use is imaterial.
However, for Bushnell, the shapes of physical objects are
supposed to represent, poorly, theological and mathematical
objects. Figurative language is clearer than literal. "No turn of
logical deduction can prove anything, by itself not previously
known by inspection or insight" (Crosby, p. 28; Bushnell, God in
Christ, p. 58). Or, conversely, the logical arguments of the
trinitarians are bad and irreligious; but the Unitarians are even
worse because their logic is better. Both should confine
themselves to images.
Bushnell seems to oscillate between language and the
thought it symbolizes, for he explains that logic—not the choice
of symbols —developed from grammar and grammar came from
physical relations in nature.
This is a basic and fatal flaw in all empiricism. Even Aristotle
failed to give Aristotelian logic an acceptable basis. The reason
is that the laws of logic are universal. The syllogism Barbara
(now that is one of the most beautiful syllogisms of all. She was
a nice girl) The syllogism Barbara is always, everywhere, (You
know all the syllogisms have names. Barbara is the name of the
first syllogism. A lovely sweetheart.). The syllogism Barbara is
always, everywhere, and without exception valid. But
experience is never universal. One may observe a thousand
black crows, but this is of no value in supporting the
proposition, All crows are black. The next crow may be an
albino. There are albino crows, you know. But many people
haven’t seen any. And if you were relying on induction, you
would come to the conclusion, All crows are black. And Hence
you would believe a falsehood. Hence physical relations in
nature, if indeed they could produce grammar, would still never
arrive at any principle of logic, mathematics, or theology.
Maybe Bushnell had some vague inkling that this is so, for he
concludes that therefore language can apply to truth only in an
analogical sense. Maybe we’ll get to Van Til before the end of
the semester. But if we don’t, all right. You’ve heard of Van Til,
maybe I don’t need to talk much about him. But you know he
uses a theory of analogy and Thomas... anyhow. As I said
before, you can find out my nasty remarks about analogy in the
Thales to Dewey book. Maybe Bushnell had some vague inkling
that this is so, for he concludes that therefore language can
apply to truth only in an analogical sense. We need poetic
insight. We come closer to the truth only when it is offered
"paradoxically." Paradoxically is Bushnell's own term, some
seventyfive years before Karl Barth. And it is much the same
irrationalism. Poetry is better than prose; the poet's
contradictions are all facets of the truth.
Inconsistency is a positive good, for truth resides in feeling.
The Gospel of John is the best Gospel because it contains the
greatest number of contradictions. Creeds have some value for
their own time, for each one illuminates a given facet. We
should, or can, easily believe them all. The assumption of Mary,
the Swedenborgian heaven, the pronouncements of Brigham
Young, and the unveränderte augsburg confessione . When such
criticisms are directed against Bushnell, a peculiar situation
arises. The author Crosby, in defense of Bushnell, complains that
the critics take Bushnell literally whereas he should be
understood metaphorically. If he says language begins with
nouns attached to physical things, he does not that mean that
this is true literally. If he says that the laws of logic are
abstracted from limited experience, he does not really mean it.
What the critics should have done is take Bushnell’s words
suggestively. To some people Bushnell’s words suggest
nonsense.
When in opposition to Bushnell’s emphasis on feelings, Hodge
says, yes Hodge is mentioned here. He is the one, he is the only
one so far as I know, there may be others, but I don’t know
them, but at any rate, Hodge stands out in the 19th century as
having recognized not only that Bushnell had an unorthodox
theory of the atonement, but this unorthodox theory of the
atonement was based on a theory of language. If you could find
some other theologian who recognizes that, I’d be happy if you
would tell me. As I say, I haven’t read every theologian who
wrote in the 19th century. I’ve read quite a number, but not
every one. And even those I read I might have missed it you
know.
When in opposition to Bushnell’s emphasis on feelings, Hodge
says, “The whole healthful power of the things of God over the
feeling depends on their being true to the intellect. The Bible is
not a cunningly devised fable, a work of fiction addressed to the
imagination.” And when another author asserts that intellect
precedes sense and there is an intelligible world independent
of the universal intellect, Crosby returns to defend the
imagination, fiction, and feeling. Certainty can only be had in
an immediate, imaginative grasping of the truth. Of course,
Crosby does not mean this literally. For him there are two
truths. First, ordinary information. But second, truth is also a
device to create a response. And in this second kind of truth,
the question of truth or falsity does not arise. Crosby and
Bushnell do indeed speak so as to create a response. I feel, I
have an imaginative grasp, I see intuitively, that’s all nonsense.
This is a satisfactory reply because my feelings are mine as
much as his feelings are his.
The twentiethcentury religious language philosophers, as
before stated, seem not to have been influenced by Horace
Bushnell. Langdon Gilkey in Maker of Heaven and Earth
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959; Anchor Books ed., 1965)
makes no mention of him. Yet one will observe several
similarities.
The Vanderbilt and Chicago professor begins by branding the
early chapters of Genesis as fables and myths, reflecting "the
prescientific speculation of the Babylonian and Canaanite
cultures" (p. 27). And there is a footnote on Oswald T. Allis.
Then, to find religious value in Genesis, Gilkey empties it and
most of the Old Testament of intelligible thought.
This is accomplished by his constructing a theory of language
that pretends to preserve some religious significance in "all
these clearly paradoxical anthropomorphisms" (p. 320).
How paradoxical anthropomorphisms, and even Babylonian
mythology, can be religiously important without having any
cognitive content, Gilkey explains by saying that all language
about God is analogical. Or, to quote, "because it is inescapably
analogical in character, theological language points to a
meaning that transcends any clear and precise description" (p.
67). That’s why Niebuhr never said the Apostle’s Creed, he
sang it. This explanation needs to be read carefully. It says,
paradoxical anthropomorphisms are useful in religion because
all religious language is analogical. But if analogical language
has no cognitive content, how can it make anthropomorphisms
comprehensible? How indeed could it make even non-
anthropomorphic language comprehensible? And if all religious
language is analogical, what good is any of it?
Mascall, to whom Gilkey devotes a lengthy footnote on page
162, presumably held to St. Thomas' theory of analogy.
Bushnell and Gilkey apparently use the term vaguely to denote
any kind of similarity. These men do not seem to consider that
the statement of the similarity must be literal, not analogical;
and that without the literal basis no analogy is possible. Now
that’s an argument I put some stress on and you’re supposed
to think about it for a while. What Gilkey expressly says is that
"theological language points to a meaning that transcends any
clear and precise description" (p. 67). This notion of a pointer
Gilkey probably borrowed from Emil Brunner, or some other
source in the socalled neoorthodox or dialectical school. But
pointers are obfuscatory. First, in this connection the verb
point has no meaning. If I put a mathematical problem on the
blackboard, I can point to it, or to a part of it, with my finger,
and explain the difficulty; yet pointing does not explain. But if
there is no blackboard, how can I point to triangularity,
Rosaceae, justice, or relativity? The opposition will reply that I
am taking the verb point too literally. But if I take it as a figure
of speech that means imply, so that the relations among certain
lines and angles imply a theorem, the opposition will like it
even less, for this is an example of reasoning a outrance . What
then do they mean by it? Apparently nothing. Then second,
how can they know that the analogy points to anything? If I
stick out my finger at random toward the empty sky, I am not
pointing at anything. To know that one is pointing, one must
see the object pointed to.
But Gilkey's finger points to "a meaning that transcends any
clear and precise description." So, the impossible pointer gives
us a nonmeaning. Gilkey may say that this is not his meaning.
Maybe it is not; but who can know, for his meaning or, better,
his nonmeaning, is unintelligible. Gilkey constantly emphasizes
the unintelligibility of religion.
It is a "simultaneous affirmation and denial" (p. 335);
Whatever we say of him, that’s God, whatever we say of him,
must be affirmed and denied at the same time. That’s a
verbatim quotation. And then I put it my own example. God is
both merciful and merciless. He is both omniscience and
ignorance. He has no spatial limitations and he is 6 ft tall. “We
cannot hope to discover how this likeness and unlikeness is to
be resolved. Paradoxes are the only way of speaking about God.
He alludes all our words and categories.” Perhaps then we
were wrong in say God is merciful and merciless, both spatial
and nonspatial. We should have that God is neither merciful nor
merciless, neither spatial nor nonspatial, neither conscious nor
unconscious. The name of the object that fits this description is
nothing. But Christians should not be disturbed because to
attempt, therefore, to smooth out the paradox is fatal to the
meaning of the Christian message. You mustn’t try to
harmonize this because if you can explain it you have ruined
the Christian message.
 Language, Truth, and
Revelation,
Part 3
Gordon H. Clark

As the idea of a pointer presumably came from Brunner, and

as smoothing out the paradox is equivalent to Brunner’s
rejection of logic, a paragraph on this background will
emphasize the irrationalism of this school of theology.
Paul Jewett, who was a pupil of mine, a student under me,
wrote a book, Emil Brunner’s Concept of Revelation . Jewett
translates from Die christliche Lehre von Gott as follows: “The
purely rational element of thought in logic has the tendency to
proceed from any given point in a straight line. Faith, however,
constantly bridles this straight line development. Theological
thinking is a rational movement of thought. The logical
consequences of which are constantly at every point, at every
point, through faith turned back, curtailed, or destroyed. Only
by constant breaking of systematic unity and logical
consistency does tought arise which may be designated as
believing thought.”
Now, it might be polite to minimize, as hyperbole, the word
constantly, which Brunner uses three times in this short
quotation. And also the phrase, “at every point.” Surely
Brunner allows a few valid syllogisms. He cannot mean that
faith permits no inference at any point. Then substituting the
words “every once in awhile” and “occasionally,” the polite
critique could give his respectful objections. But the present
critics believes Brunner really meant what he said, and that the
hyperbole cannot reduce at every point to every other point.
How then can faith bridle, curtail, and perhaps destroy its
own logical consequences? Suppose we believe, for pistueo
mean believe, suppose we believe Christ rose from the dead
leaving the tomb as empty as the women said. Suppose further
that this implies, as it does when other Scriptural statements
are added in the premises, suppose this implies we too shall
rise. Is now our belief to curtail this inference and even to turn
back and destroy the original premise? What sort of faith would
this be? If anything, this faith or belief would be unbelief. Yet,
this unbelief, this constant breaking of systematic unity and
logical consistency, Brunner calls, “believing thought.” It is not
believing, and if it thought at all, the less the better.”
Although unintelligibility leaves no message at all, Gilkey as
well as Brunner will not retreat from this fundamental
irrationalism. Let me point out that the word Gospel means
good news. It means information. And of course these people
say Revelation contains no information at all.
So Gilkey as well as Brunner will not retreat from this
fundamental irrationalism. Religious language is without
exception mythological. “Myth is a form of religious language
which unites the three concepts of analogy, revelation, and
paradox. Thus when Christians speak of God as creator, or
when they say ‘he send his son into the world,’ he speaks
through the prophets.” This mythical language is analogical
because it deliberately denies that the language is to be
interpreted literally. So if you say God is the creator, you
mustn’t think that literally. That’s mythological. If you say the
son of God came into the world, you mustn’t understand the
words as they are written, they point to something else that is
unintelligible. Further quote, “Like the symbol of the fall,
creation has no inherent or original factual content.” Neither
the fall nor creation have any original factual content. If the
myth of creation is taken to be literally and simply true, then it
loses all its religious character.
Now they’re verbatim quotations. On the next page, Gilkey
twice repeats his contention that if creation is understood to be
a literal fact, like an eclipse of the sun, it has no religious
character. You remember the eclipse of the sun in 1955? Didn’t
you notice that? Why don’t you take notice of things that
happen?
Audience: I had a diaper rash ???
You know, there came a time in my life when I was
dumbfounded that my students didn’t remember World War 1.
Now my students don’t remember Word War 2. Oh my. Oh my.
Such poor memories you people have.
“This eclipse of the sun, if you take the creation as literally as
you take the eclipse of the sun, creation has no religious
character. As an objective truth about the world’s beginning, it
has no deep reverberating bearing on our own existence and
destiny.”
To this one might reply that a literal creation has most
certainly, if not an analogical and meaningless deep
reverberation, a most important and immediate bearing on
man’s life and destiny. I don’t know what a deep reverberation
is, but they use flowery terms you know, indulging in flights of
poetry as bad as or even worse than Keats.
It has as much bearing on our future hopes and present
conduct as the literal truth of the bodily resurrection. But there
is a more fundamental flaw, or at least omission in these pages.
The quotations assume a knowledge of what religious
characteristics are. Where, or how, did professor Gilkey get his
concept of the religious? If he can clearly state his concept, by
what argument can he maintain it? He gives no argument. He is
of course at liberty to invent any sort of religious he likes. He is
even at some liberty to misuse English and deny that people of
other religions are religious. He may compose, as professor of
psychology have sometimes done, a questionnaire by which to
test the religiosity of a hundred students. In one class, it was a
Lutheran minister who was determined to be the least religious,
I mean the examination showed that he was the least religious
person in the class. But that only meant he diverged the most
widely from the professor’s notion of what religion should be.
And this is all that Gilkey’s language means. Orthodox
Christians are not religious. Gilkey is not a Christian.
In fairness, for there’s no profit in misrepresenting one’s
opponents, I don’t see any reason for misrepresenting my
opponents, they’re all so bad they don’t need to be
misrepresented. If I misrepresented them, they’d appear better
than they are. One must note that in the last four pages of his
book, Gilkey himself seems to have an incipient qua. He asks,
“If all our knowledge is terms of analogy, can we be said to
possess any significant knowledge of God at all?” This is a
good, a very good question, but the answer is pitiful. “The point
where God is most directly known,” he says, “is in historical
revelation.” Naturally, for Gilkey, historical revelation is not the
historical event of God speaking intelligible sentences to Moses
or Isaiah. Nor can it be literal statements describing the
Exodus or the Babylonian Captivity. He must mean
uninterpreted occurrences. We cannot accept Moses’
explanation of the exodus. We can only know there was an
exodus. Perhaps we do not know there was an exodus, for there
is so much inaccuracy in mythology in the Old Testament.
 But let us suppose somehow we know something, like an
eclipse. Know something has happened. Now, somehow or
other, in such events as these, and in particular he mentions
the person of Jesus Christ, if only we could believe the things
the early Christians imagined about him. And you remember, of
course, that whatshisname, not Heidegger, the other fellow. Not
Brunner, but another.
Audience: Bultmann?
Bultmann. Bultmann says we do not know a single thing Jesus
ever said or did. You must keep that in mind when you are
studying neoorthodoxy. And so I have this little phrase here, “if
only we could believe anything the early Christians imagined
about him.” Now, somehow or other, under these conditions, we
see the love of God. We learn that God is love, of course. We see
that God is love. Of course he is also hate. And love is not
symbolic. The personal recreative love of God in Christ is the
one unsymbolic and direct idea of God that Christians possess.
Now, I’m characterizing this admission as a qualm that
appears on the last four pages of his book. Now these
seemingly beautiful words as found in the matrix of Gilkey’s
book are totally without meaning. The apostle John says, “Here
in is love that he sent His son to be the propitiation for our
sins.” But son, sent, and especially propitiation are all
mythological. What Gilkey means by love, if anything at all, is
something else.
Now, if indeed, the love of God is the matrix of Gilkey’s
theory, if that phrase... if indeed the love of God in the matrix of
Gilkey’s theory conveys any modicum of meaning, that meaning
could not have been ascertained by any inspection of
uninterpreted historical occurrences.
Consider two points. First, observation of the historical
process ever produces any ethical or theological ideas. I guess
that is what I was trying to say in my sermon the other morning.
World history, far from showing that God is love, rather
supports Bertrand Russell’s conclusion that the world is
unspeakably horrible. Not only did Hitler exterminate 5 million
Jews, and a number of Mennonites too, Stalin starved 10
million Ukrainians to death. And the Chinese communists
massacred 20 or 30 million Chinese plus nearly all the
population of Tibet.
At this point someone will ask, “What about the person of
Jesus Christ?” A good question, but the answer is not Gilkey’s.
If we have no verbal explanation of the person and work of
Jesus Christ, he is but another instance of the universal reign of
injustice. He was put to death, wasn’t he? Unjustly. And that
simply shows that the world is unjust. The point is that
observation of the historical process does not come near
proving that the love of God is the one unsymbolic and direct
idea that Christians possess.
Therefore, second, this beautiful phrase has no meaning at
all. Besides the impossibility of deriving this idea from history,
and also besides the general rejection of the Scriptures literal
message, there is another reason for saying that the love of
God, as Gilkey explains it, is meaningless. The reason is, that
the alleged idea leads us nowhere. It points to nothing.
Does the love of God imply that as Jesus rose from the dead,
so shall we? How does one find out what faith or repentance or
sanctification is from this vapid phrase.
Does the phrase “God is love” even tell us anything about
God? Of course, if we accept the literal and propositional
revelation of the Bible, we can have an extension philosophy.
But on Gilkey’s view, we have neither a concept of love nor any
notion of why it is important. In the very same paragraph
Gilkey had also said, “In Christ God is not known as he is in
himself, hence nothing that Jesus is supposed to have done
teaches us anything about God.” Is this not sufficient to dispose
of Gilkey’s mythical language and irrational religion?
There are other authors whose theory of language is worked
out in somewhat greater detail than Gilkey’s. Before
considering them, however, it seems proper to sample the great
number of those who fall into the general category without
originating notable improvements in the theory. The purpose is
to take note of types of evidence by which they support their
views. Many of these authors mention the first 11 chapters of
Genesis. And in particular the first three. For example,
Dooyeweerd rejects the first 11 chapters in toto. They’re just
mythology, they’re not true.
When they say that chapter 1 is not a cosmological theory,
they speak the truth if by the phrase they mean a very detailed
description of the formation of the solar system. This however
is an irrelevance just as much so as if one were to say the
invasions of Sennacherib and Nebuchadnezzar in 2nd Kings are
unhistorical because the books gives so little earlier and later
Assyrian and Babylonian history. The mere fact that Genesis
does not state the speed of light does not impune the statement
that he made the stars also. That is a statement which Voltaire
ridiculed as maybe you’ve heard about, but anyhow.
Another instance of poor logic relates to Cain. The author is
interested in finding inconsistencies in the Bible. The author,
that is these various authors who don’t particularly advance the
theory but give additional reasons or evidences for their
position. One author or another. Many authors. The author is
interested in finding inconsistencies in the Bible. So, he argues,
Cain’s expressed fear of being killed by anyone who finds him
implies that there were inhabitants of the Earth who were not
children of Adam and Eve. The gentleman should have taken an
elementary course in logic.
His poor thinking ability is also evident from another angle. If
there were people not descendants of Adam and Eve, especially
if at all numerous, it is not likely that everyone would want to
slay him. That is Cain. Most of them would not have known that
Cain was a murder. But Cain’s brother’s knew. Accordingly, by
the Biblical account, everyone would want to kill him because
everyone had the same parents. Perhaps the modern author
thought that Cain had no brothers at all. Or maybe only Enoch.
He may have had none at that time. Vengeance might be
delayed but it would come because Adam begat sons and
daughters.
The account of the flood also stimulates a liberal to imagine a
major inconsistency. As ordinarily read, the flood began on
February the 17th in the year 600. It rained 24 hours a day for
40 days. After that, the waters prevailed for 150 days. On July
17, year 600, the ark rested. The waters began to recede. On
October 1st the tops of the mountains could be seen. The Noah
on three occasions let loose a bird. The third time the bird did
not return. Things were fairly dry by January 1st, 601. And on
February the 27th they all came out of the ark. So the account
reads.
But somewhere between the lines, this imaginative author
discovers an alternate version that limits the flood to 61 days.
This sort of thing, if it were true, could legitimately be used as
evidence for Wellhausen’s documentary theory. But it is totally
irrelevant to the thesis that Genesis and all religious literature
is written in mythological language. The alleged contradictions
in the Bible are more clearly contradictory if the language is
literal. Then one can plainly say, “this statement is false” or
even that when the two are different rather than contradictory.
Maybe both be false. But inconsistencies never will prove that
the language is mythological.
What then can prove that this or that book is mythology? We
call, now this is sorta a definition of mythology. They talk about
mythology, let’s see if we can know what they are talking about.
What then can prove this book to be mythology? We call Homer
mythological because of a combination of two reasons. He talks
about the Gods, that’s the first part of it. And second, we do not
believe what he says about them. Were we polytheistic
believers, we would not dismiss his stories as myths. And when
he writes on the Trojan War, we may doubt his accuracy, but we
acknowledge that there was a Trojan War.
Now, it is possible to treat the Bible this way. Those who call
the early chapters of Genesis mythological do so because they
do not believe what Genesis says about God and His actions. To
say a religious book is myth simply means “I don’t believe it.”
In this sense, the books of Samuel, Kings, and Chronicles can
also be called mythological. But here some embarrassment
arises. These books, that is Kings and Chronicles, these books
are, or claim to be, history and they are as literal as any history
books can be. From this it follows these books are both literal
and mythological. And this is not what the language
theologians want. For them, mythology is something like fable.
It is an analogy of an inspirational character that produces a
moral or otherwise desirable action. Now, the books of Samuel
and Kings are clearly not fables like Aesop’s, they are history
written in literal language. Because literal, and because one
believes them true, they are as inspirational as, indeed more
stimulating than, a mere fanciful tale.
Now, fanciful tales do produce effects. How many of you have
ever read The Heart of Midlothian ? Ah, nobody? Sir Walter
Scott didn’t like the Covenanters one little bit. And he took a
good many potshots at them. But he could avoid seeing that
they were thoroughly honest. And The Heart of Midlothian is
the story about two sisters one of whom was charged and
convicted of murdering her child. And her sister was put on the
witness stand and asked the question, and the question is
based on Scottish law, “Did you your sister—who is now
accused of child murder—ever tell you that she was pregnant?”
And this girl, knowing very well, the older sister, knowing very
well that her answer would condemn the girl to death,
nevertheless said no, she never told me. And because the
accused girl never told her sister that was enough to condemn
her to death. That was according to Scottish law. And this is
sorta the center part of the plot on which Sir Walter Scott
founds his story. And it’s a very... you ought to read these
things. Read a little bit, you know. Don’t, what was this fellow
at breakfast telling me about? He was playing some crazy
football game. I don’t know, some game, you know. Don’t play
games, read Sir Walter Scott. And if you want to know how the
movement which was initiated by Wycliffe gradually faded out
and caused some good Christians a lot of trouble, read The Fair
Maid of Perth . These are wonderful novels, and memorize your
Hebrews forms then read these novels too. They’re more
interesting than the Hebrew forms.
The numerous unnamed authors referred to in this interlude
differ among themselves in several details. Each one can be
evaluated only on the basis of his own words. But a survey
shows that there range of difference stretches from the easily
understood assertion that the Bible is literal language and often
false to the other extreme that the Bible is mythological
throughout and always true. Always true in a mythological
sense of true.
Those who represent this later extreme face two problems.
First, their own religious writings are not literally true. And this
makes their arguments unintelligible. They write religious
language, don’t they? That is what they claim to do. Well then
all their writings are mythological and you can’t believe them.
And second, since history can be religious, and since
mathematics was a religious and soteric activity for the
Pythagoreans, these authors have a hard time finding anything
literal in English, French, or symbolic logic.
Those in the middle who take Genesis as myth but Kings as
literal face the problem of stating a criterion by which to
maintain this distinction. If they say religious language alone is
mythological, they imply that Kings is not a religious book. As a
matter of fact, they should also say that the first chapter of
Genesis is not religious, for cosmology is as irreligious as history.
A particular example, slightly different in subject matter,
though similar in its logic, may clarify the difficulty. In the
recent past, several writers have said that the purpose of the
Bible is to present salvation in Christ. But since Kings and
Chronicles do not clearly do so, these books are not the word of
God.
Now, I suppose in your theological classes you have come
across the notion of kerygma, and the people who use that
word mean by it to exclude most of what the Bible says and to
pick out of the Bible something that they think particularly has
to do with Christ and salvation, but of course Kings and Moses
and Genesis haven’t anything to do with salvation. And so you
have this kerygma. Of course they never tell you precisely the
extent of this kerygma. That’s one of their difficulties. They
have no criterion for distinguishing between kerygmatic
statements and nonkerygmatic statements. But they all want to
reduce the Christian message to a few little points, unlike Paul
who claimed that he was guiltless of the blood of all men since
he declared the whole counsel of God and didn’t restrict
himself to a kerygma. That in Acts, the what chapter in the
24th verse. No, the 24th chapter and the 27th verse. No, it’s
the 27th chapter... I don’t know where it is. But it’s there.
Where am I? King and Chronicles are not the word of God. No
doubt most of John’s Gospel is the word of God, but very little
of Chronicles. It is right here that the pointed question must be
put. What criterion is used to distinguish religious literature
from nonreligious? What criterion is used to determine that the
purpose of the Bible precludes historical books from being the
word of God. Most of these authors who make these
distinctions offer no criterion at all. If they did, a Moslem or a
Hindu would reply, “That may be your idea of religion, but it’s
not mine.” And a Christian would reply, “That is your notion of
what is excluded from salvation in Christ, but it’s not mine.”
There is indeed a way for these people to avoid logical
difficulties, paradox, and analogy. To quote one of them, “It is
possible to lead a religious life—now remember, it is a religious
life—It is possible to lead a religious life without discussing it
or verbalizing very much about it. If a person never says
anything, he obviously does not flounder in fallacious
applications. No one can refute him, for he says nothing to
refute. What one can truly say of him, however, is that he’s not
a Christian. For Christ commanded his followers to make
disciples, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have
commanded you. Christians must verbalize, to use
contemporary gobbledygook.
Hordern was a professor in Northwestern University in
Evanston, Illinois. He is not an evangelical, he claims to be a
Christian of some sort. We’ll see what he has to say. Speaking
of God , that’s a clever title with a double meaning, Speaking of
God is a most interesting attempt to expose the difficulties of
some modern theories of language. Like his predecessors,
Hordern is more successful, very successful, in refuting anti-
religious views than in establishing a solid base for Christian
truth. The Christian can, however, learn much, both from his
success and from his failure.
Hordern notes that there is a contemporary stress on
communication both in advertising and politics. But with this
there is also a debasement of the language in that words have
become so elastic that no one understands anyone else. And for
the 999th time, let me emphasize the necessity of definition.
Definition is difficult, and a lot of writers avoid it like the
plague with the result you don’t know anything about what they
mean. If you want to communicate, you have to define your
terms. And it’s awfully hard to get some people to do that.
Everybody favors peace, freedom, and democracy including
the Democratic Republic of East Germany. But the words are
used in contradictory senses. Someone said that poor people
are denied psychiatric care not because of their poverty, but
because a psychiatrist cannot understand what they say. One of
the main causes of the debasement of languages, is the sin of
wanting to control the actions of other people which can most
easily be done by propaganda.
And I’ve been carrying on a controversy with Fuller seminary
for some years, challenging them to define the word
evangelical. I can’t get them to do it. They like to use the word,
you know. But they carefully refrain from telling you what they
mean by it. And they certainly don’t mean what the word has
meant in the history from the time of Luther to the early part of
this century, at any rate.
Now, Christianity has a message to be understood, hence
Christians must be concerned about language. The question is,
how can we use words to speak about God? If we have coined
words to speak of earthly things, how can we use those words to
apply to heavenly things? The creeds have an historic strength
as a congregation repeats them. But the terminology is an
offense to modern man. The language alienates him. Candidates
for the ministry have a hard time subscribing to the
denomination’s creed, if they still have any scruples against
perjury. Yet they want to take part in what they consider to be in
harmony with the denominations real purpose. So they pledge
their vows with their fingers crossed.
The fundamentalists resisted this claim to preserve what
somebody supposed was the real purpose of the church to
retain what is essential and disregard miracles in favor of
modern science. The liberals won, but only to be eclipsed by
neoorthodoxy and its myths. But if all is myth and symbol,
where is truth? If people in general found it difficult to discover
what the liberals really believed, it is harder to find out what
the neoorthodox believe. They say they believe in creation, but
that this tells us nothing about the universe. Words, of course,
are symbols. But this is not what the neoorthodox mean when
they say the fall of man is a symbol. Ordinary symbolism and
figures of speech can be put into literal language. But the neo-
orthodox doctrines can not. And these theologians cannot tell
us what the symbols symbolize.
For example, Tillich said that the only nonsymbolic statement
one can make about God is “God is being itself.” Then someone
replied, first, “This too is symbolic.” Second, “Being itself is not
the Christian God.” Third, “The phrase is not a statement but a
definition, and one that is at odds with 95% of religious
tradition.” Tillich then amended his statement about God to
“the only nonsymbolic statement about God is that everything
we say about God is symbolic.”
Theologians have perhaps been dilatory in recognizing
language analysis. Formerly, Christians faced the charge that
their theology was false or untrue. Now they must face the
charge that it is meaningless.
On the other hand, the analysts who claim to examine
language as it is commonly used, ought to be willing to
consider ordinary theological language. For the most part they
slight it or ignore it. Those who ignore it, in that they dismissed
it with disparaging epithets, place themselves in a peculiar
position. Their epithets are emotional. Certainly they are
evaluative. But on their own showing such language is
meaningless. They were talking nonsense. In addition, their
verification principle was itself metaphysical and cannot be
verified. Yet from this nonverifiable principle, they deduce their
system.
After some stimulating analysis of the analytical philosophy,
Hordern begins to prepare for the exposition of his own
position. He does not minimize, rather he very clearly points
out the difficulties in defending theological language.
Predicates such as angry or verbs like know and will have
strange meanings when God is the subject of the sentence.
If we say God made or created the word, the meaning is not
the same as the statement Smith made a chair or a table. For
we can point in distinction to something Smith did not make.
But to nothing that God did not make. In fact, we cannot point
to anything that God made all by himself. For everything now
has been modified by natural processes. Our knowledge, says
Hordern is temporally conditioned. And for this reason does not
apply to the eternal God. See, you can’t say that that tree was
created immediately because that tree grew from some seed or
acorn, or so on, that was produced by another tree and so on.
So we cannot point to anything that God immediately created.
And so our knowledge, and for other reasons also, our
knowledge is temporally conditioned and hence we can’t apply
our knowledge, or our words, to God.
If theological language is not pure nonsense, one must give a
clear answer to the question, “How can theological language
communicate meaning?” The secular philosophers who have
attempted to answer usually have little understanding of
theology and as a result they present a caricature. The
theologians, on the other hand, know very little philosophy and
as a result they are incompetent.
Hordern’s key to the solution is the concept of conviction. As
opposed to emotion. Conviction describes the state of mind of a
religious person better than emotion does. The theologian is
convinced, but further, conviction presupposes a convictor, an
irresistible power outside oneself. Convictional language points
to a reality as much as empirical language does. Even in
science there is conviction about objectivity and also conviction
that science is good. The logical positivist expressed his
convictions by selecting his verification principle. He was
convinced that nothing was important but the spacetime world.
Note on this convictional theory leaves the logical positivist
breathless. He had argued that God and providence are
meaningless because no experiment can invalidate them. When
evil is used as an argument against God, the theist makes some
unprovable assertions that this evil eventually produces greater
good. But though the positivist scorns the theist on this
account, he himself uses the same argument, for he argues
nothing can falsify the scientific principle of order in the
universe, for when a difficulty arises such as the perturbations
of the moon which no scientist has ever been able to manage
yet. Or the fickleness of the weather, and they’re not doing too
well with that either. But when such things are pointed out to
the scientists, he claims that the present experiments are
defective in one way or another. There was an error
somewhere. And then he looks for new experiments until he
finds one which he thinks fits. And that’s just what the
Christian does with the problem of evil. Yet the opposition
wants to ridicule the Christian for having such a theodicy when
he himself has to use exactly the same argument with the
perturbations of the moon.
The later Wittgenstein had spoken of language games.
Unfortunately, he did not define game . And he seems to have
used the word in several senses. But at any rate, if the analytic
philosophy makes use of some concept of games, it cannot, as
Hordern emphasizes, rule out theological language game. See,
Wittgenstein considers language as games. And there is a
scientific language, that is the scientific game. And I suppose
there is political language and that is political game. If you
accept Wittgenstein, and he was a sort of logical positivist but
not a very orthodox one, if you have these different language
games, then if you allow some people to play the scientific
language games, you cannot on principle prohibit a Christian
from using the Christian language game. If the analytic
philosophy makes use of some concept of games, it cannot, as
Hordern emphasizes, rule out the theological language game.
Baseball has its rules. But this does not make football
impossible. As there are different rules for different games, so
too theology establishes its own rules. Science cannot establish
them for it. Yet theology can prescribe some rules to science for
the latter, as was shown earlier, cannot claim any value for
itself. See if you have a scientific view, a modern scientific view,
or the view of scientism, there are no evaluative statements
that mean anything. And hence this precludes the scientist
from saying that science is worth anything. The language of
values is theological language. For this reason, though the
theory of language games embarasses the positivists, for this
reason it does not fit theology. Theology not only evaluates
science, it gives direction to all of life. It does not answer
questions left over by science nor does it offer an explanation of
the universe. Rather it is a means by which a man can give
purpose and direction to his life.
Along with conviction and convictor, Hordern will build his
theory of language on its use in a community. Analytic
philosophy usually ignores the persons who speak and their
community. But even scientific language becomes nonsense
outside the scientific community. The Christian community is
the church. Theology cannot be understood if its church
background is ignored. Of course the gospel must be preached
to those outside the church. Some Christians wish to lay a
foundation for this preaching in the evidence of natural
theology. Then when the evidence becomes weak or exhausted,
faith takes over. Faith is a sign of weakness. But, remarks
Hordern, in the New Testament faith is something strong and
powerful. It is neither emotive nor subjective. It is not a
rational act of choosing the most probable hypothesis. On the
contrary, “Here I stand.” This is grace, not the will to believe.
Wittgenstein himself had admitted that the giving of reasons
must come to an end somewhere. If a person is unwilling to
play the scientific game, no further reasoning can force him to.
On such grounds as these, Hordern can infer that faith is not
belief on insufficient evidence, it is belief without any evidence.
How does one decide what evidence is? What evidence can
one have to prove his evidence is evidence? The very
acceptance of evidence is faith. Ayer admits the same thing in
acknowledging that we cannot logically justify the principle of
induction. Nor that the future will resemble the past. Induction
itself, says Ayer, sets the standard of rationality.
Hordern’s argument in this section of the book is not
altogether clear. Or it is not altogether complete. He seems to
say that one man’s faith is as good as another’s. This, to be
sure, is enough to puncture the arrogance of the positivists. But
the present writer would desire to go further and insist on the
basis of the thousand and first crow that faith in induction is a
very poor type of faith. But to embarrass the positivists, it is
enough to say, as Hordern does, that Western society has
advanced in science because most people believe it to be good
and important. But the Hindus have a different concept of
reality even though they presumably have similar sense organs.
Therefore the Hindus will sleep on a bed of spikes to show that
pain is unimportant.
Returning again to his constructive theory, Hordern reiterates
theological language points to a convictor. This convictor is
known to be a mystery. When a Christian theologian speaks of
God as transcendent he uses the word as a symbol of the
mystery of God. Resembling somewhat Schleiermacher’s
feeling of absolute dependence, this experience of mystery is
the root of religion. A mystery is not a riddle to be solved, says
Hordern, it is a secret. But even when revealed, it does not
become transparent to men. One might say that a mystery is
unknowable. Or better, that mystery is not a matter of
knowledge at all.
I hope you see, of course, that Hordern is not in accordance
with the New Testament because that is not what the New
Testament says. The New Testament says exactly the opposite.
He claims to be a Christian. He doesn’t claim to be an
evangelical at all. I don’t know what church he belongs to. I
don’t know whether it is Greek Catholic or what. I just don’t
know. Does anybody know? I don’t.
Audience: ???
Well he may have lectured there. He’s a professor in
Northwestern University, isn’t he? In Evanston, Illinois.
Audience: ???
Such a defense of religion against scientism is popular in this
last half of the twentieth century. But though a defense of
religion, it is of little value to Christianity. For Christianity a
mystery is indeed a secret. And when God tells us a secret, we
know it. “Behold I tell you a mystery,” Paul writes, “we shall not
all sleep.” No doubt most of the world’s population believes
that all must die. But the Christian on the basis of God’s
revelation know that at Christ’s return some will not die. The
sense of mystery is no proof of God. It is compatible with many
views of God. And even the atheist may be aware of the
mystery of the universe. But it, that is the sense of mystery,
helps us to understand the use of theological language. At this
point one may stand in awe of a mystery that supports
Christianity and atheism equally well. If this aids us in
understanding the use of theological language, have we not
already accepted logical positivism?
Clearly Hordern thinks he is refuting his opponents. Actually
his position is very much the same thing. The theologian must
say the unsayable. In poetry, art, and liturgy we can sing what
we cannot say. The Te Deum is not paying metaphysical
compliments to deity. Language is conditioned by space and
time. The words fail because they are finite. We say what we do
not mean. We must use analogies and then erode them. Yet
fatherhood is a better analogy than cousinhood. But we cannot
find the line that divides the misleading part of analogy from
the good part. Theology is paradoxical. College students reject
theological language, but they are moved by the Lord’s Supper.
But then, college students are often irrational. That happens
to be my comment. Can’t you tell the difference between what
Hordern says and what I say? No maybe you can’t sometimes.
Naturally, Hordern does not look with favor upon the
objections here leveled against him. He tries to avoid them by
the “personal language game.” But some of it seems to
contradict what he has already asserted. Dogmatic theology
and skepticism are both bad. There is a base of knowledge from
which faith can speak. Knowledge, he say. Skeptics say that
until one has nonanalogical knowledge one cannot even know
that something is an analogy. But there is knowledge and there
are analogies, he asserts with emphasis. Evading the skeptics’
as well as the dogmaticians’ point. Equally without support he
asserts that there is a personal language game with its own
logic, a game that points directly to God. God has revealed that
personal language is the key to speaking about him. Science
cannot speak of persons. Mind is only one part of a person. We
want to know not only how someone’s mind works, but what
are his hopes, motivations, and ambitions. For personal
language, we must listen to the existentialists rather than to
the language analysts.
But if we listen to the existentialists, it is not likely that we
should hear anything. Do they explain this personal logic so
different from Aristotelian logic? Does personal logic have 24
valid syllogisms, or none at all? Does it have middle terms,
contraries, subalterns? An assertion that personal language has
its own logic requires an exposition of its rules. Horden speaks
of it as a game. Games have rules. Or is this personal language
nothing else than a different vocabulary?
Astronomy uses the words star and planet . Botany speaks
about internal phloem. Brown is not a personal word, but
sympathetic and angry are. Then one asks, which verbs are
personal and which impersonal? A clock runs. A boy runs too.
Without explaining any of this, Hordern says, “the normal
subjectobject division that occurs in our language about things
is absent when we are speaking about ourselves. Or if used,
must be recognized as having a different logic.” To invent an
example, John is sympathetic , take that as a sentence, John is
sympathetic contains neither a subject nor a predicate. And,
because personal, it implies by its own logic that Scotchmen are
stingy. There are some 50 or 60 pages more on which Hordern
extols personal language. Some of his remarks, especially in
opposition to Tillich, are valuable. But their matrix is a language
game that has no rules. Why should anyone want to play such a
game?
 Can God create a stone so big
that He cannot move it?
By Neil Mammen
7/26/2008
www.neilmammen.com

This is the standard question asked in every philosophy class.

In fact numerous Atheists have posited this question in an
attempt to prove that there is no God. I will attempt to answer
this question three ways.
I. The Sentence Analysis way
II. The Logical way using Set Theory.
III. The Rational way using the Nature of God.

I. The Sentence Analysis way

The Sentence Analysis way is simply to analyze the sentence
and rephrase it simply. First let us understand our definitions.
By God we mean something so powerful that cannot be resisted
by anything. Or for short we’ll just call it “something that can’t
be resisted.” By ‘stone so big’ we mean something so big and
heavy that it can resist everything. We’ll call it “something that
can resist everything”. Now when we replace those definitions
in our sentence we get this:
“Can something that can’t be resisted, create something that
can resist everything?”
OK but we seem to be forgetting something. If something is
created it will have to exist and for this to work both of these
have to co-exist. So the real statement becomes:
“Can something that can’t be resisted co-exist with something
that can resist everything?”
Well immediately, we see the sentence is pure nonsense. If
something can’t be resisted how can something exist that can
resist it? Either it can or it can’t. It is or it isn’t. It can’t be both.
 In fact our original statement can be further logically
contracted to: Can something that can’t be resisted be resisted?
This violates the law of non-contradiction. i.e. A cannot be
both A and NOT A at the same time. If you disagree with the law
of non-contradiction then an ancient Muslim scholar named
Abū =Alī al- Husayn ibn Abd Allāh ibn Sīnā or Avicenna for
short has the cure as follows:
Any one who rejects the law of non-contradiction should be
beaten and burned. He should be beaten until he accepts the
fact that to be beaten is NOT the same as to not be beaten and
he should be burned until he accepts the fact that to be burned
is not the same as to not be burned. Avicenna AD981-AD1037.
II. Using Set Theory.
OK now let’s look at the Set Theory method. Let’s first break
our problem down into definitions just like we did the first way.
a) By God we really mean an Irresistible Force (let’s call that
F)
b) By "stone so large" we really mean an Immovable Object
(let’s call that O).
But immediately we see the problem. For if the set of F is all
Forces that are Irresistible and the Set O are all objects
Immovable we see that the elements in set F cannot co-exist
with the elements in Set O.
For if O exists then no F can coexist. Think about it in words.
In the universal set where an Irresistible Force exists, there
cannot exist in the same universal set an immovable Object.
Because by defining an immovable object you have also defined
that there is no irresistible force. So by the very act of defining
an Irresistible Force, you have eliminated an immovable object
from that Universal set.
Note too that in this statement I am not suggesting that God is
part of a Universe (He is an extra dimensional being outside of
the multiple dimensional universe since he created it – see my
paper on www.RationalFreeThinker.com called “Who is Agent
X”). In this particular argument, we are discussing the
Universal set, i.e. the set of all things that exist. God is a part of
this set. We are not describing the Universe that we exist in.
Notice too that if anything is not part of U, the universal set.
Then it does not or cannot exist.
OK back to our argument:
F is a subset of U F ⊂ U
O is not a subset of U O ⊄ U
Then using set theory. What is the intersection of F and O?
Answer: a null set i.e. φ. So F ∩ O = φ
Thus we see it makes no sense to define an immovable object
and an irresistible force in the same universal set (or the same
sentence).
Let’s show this diagrammatically.
The question is trying to posit this relationship. In the
Universal Set of all things U there exists F and O.

But as we've seen, that is not possible, one logical alternative

is that either F is not a subset of U or O is not a subset of U e.g.

In which case either U is not the entire universal set of all

elements or O simply does not exist at all. In other words if O is
not a subset of U then O does not exist. Because U by definition
is All things that Exist.
And no you can’t argue that I’ve proven that O exists but is
separate from U, because you’d have to specifically prove that O
exists apart from U and by definition that is false. (Note if we
are talking about the Universe and not the Universal set, we
know at the point of the Big Bang all things started to move so
O that is anything Immovable can be scientifically proven to
NOT exist in the Universe, though not the Universal set). Note
too that we cannot appeal to multiple universes, because by
definition U consists of ALL things that exist. If multiple
universes exist then they are a subset of U.
Note there are other possibilities where O exists but F does
not exist.

Or where both don’t exist e.g.:

Now it must be noted that there could be a condition where

both O and F can co-exist, but that could only be if O is a subset
of F e.g.
 But so far the logic says that the opposite could be true as well
i.e.: F is a subset of O

And if both are true then in that case O = F.

This then it would mean that the only way there could exist a
God and an immovable object in the same universal set is if the
immovable object was part of God or God was a subset of the
immovable object or if God were the immovable object.
In the latter case what you have really asked is: Can God move
Himself if he doesn’t want to move.
But then you could ask that of yourself. Can you make yourself
1
move if you didn’t want to move? We are again seeing the
silliness of the question.
Or we could also say that both O and F are subsets of one
entity: G

That would mean that the entity G (yes God) has a few
characteristics amongst others.
1. That he cannot be resisted and
2. That nothing else can move him if he did want to be moved.

A concise answer?
But the question has been asked. So what is the proper way to
answer it concisely?
The answer is: All you have managed to prove is that language
allows you to create grammatically correct but meaningless
sentences. It’s just pure nonsense.
2
E.g. This is Round Square in 2D .
The sentence is meaningless, because by defining a Square in
2 dimensions you have simultaneously defined that it cannot be
round in the same 2 dimensions.
Another similar sentence would be: I painted this door red
with black paint.
Naturally I am excluding the old sly double meanings in the
question e.g. “What is black and white and red all over?”
Answer: a Newspaper, but the real question was “What is black
and white and read all over?” The slyness is in tricking the
listener to assume the word read (past tense) was the word for
the color red.
 A silly question to begin with
In reality this question is asking: Can an object that cannot be
moved be moved. Or can a force that cannot be resisted be
resisted. It’s a self contradictory statement and shows perhaps
the ignorance or unintelligence of the person who asks the
question (i.e. that they are unable to process or understand
what they’ve asked).
A similar sentence would be: This statement is a lie.
This as any Star Trek fan will know was the way Spock and
Kirk defeated Harry Mudd's robots. We call these statements
Suicide Statements. See the paper on the Sermons page of this
website (www.neilmammen.com) called Suicide Statements for
more such self contradictory statements and easy ways to
refute them. It turns out that lots of people spout these suicide
statements without realizing that they are spouting nonsense.
Here are a few teasers:
1. It’s wrong to impose your morals on others.
2. There is no absolute truth.
3. You can’t know anything about God.
4. You shouldn’t go around telling people that their religion is
wrong.

III. Using the nature of God.

Let's now discuss the same question using the nature of God
as defined by the Bible. First the Bible does not say that God can
do everything. The word translated for Omnipotence is the
Greek word
Pantocrator. It means “Ruler” of all things. It has never
meant: Capable of doing ALL things. Which is what many people
seem to mistake it for.
In fact there are many things that God cannot do, for
instance:
a) God cannot sin
b) God cannot cease being God
c) God cannot cease knowing everything d) God cannot forget
e) God cannot learn anything new f) God cannot be surprised
 g) God cannot create a god that is greater than Him (related to
c)
h) God cannot create anything that defeats Him (related to c)
And so on and so forth. And this is necessary for God is a
rational and logical God. Thus his nature has to be both rational
and logical.
If someone insists that God can do anything, ask them where
they got that idea from. It’s not in the Bible. They made it up.
Or they presumed that that was what the Bible said, or they
presumed that that was what was needed for God to exist. But
that is illogical
So if you go back to the stone question, the way this question
is usually posed is as such: Atheist: Do you believe God can do
anything?
To which the sucker Theist is supposed to say: Yes. Then out
comes the stone question
Atheist: Well in that case, can God create a stone so big that
He cannot move it? To which the sucker Theist is supposedly
stuck: Because if he says: Yes.
Then the answer comes back:
Atheist: Well in that case God can't do everything because
that means He can't move the stone.
But if the sucker Theist says: No.
Then comes the almost identical response:
Atheist: Well in that case God can't do everything because he
can't create the stone.
But the real problem was way back when our sucker Theist
said yes to the Can God do anything question. The answer back
there should have been:
Theist: No, we believe God is Omnipotent, this means all
powerful. Being powerful does mean you can do irrational
things or impossible things.
And that should have been followed by the list of things God
cannot do. a) God cannot sin
b) God cannot cease being God
c) God cannot cease knowing everything d) God cannot forget
 e) God cannot learn anything new f) God cannot be surprised
g) God cannot create a god that is greater than Him (related to
c)
h) God cannot create anything that defeats Him (related to c)
And since (g) above has already been mentioned, it would
immediately pre-nullify the question about
God and the immovable Object.
So if the Atheist still asks: Can God create a stone so big that
He cannot move it?
The Theist spoils his fun by saying: No, because as I told you
God cannot create anything that would defeat him or stop him
from being God.
I hope this helps you in class. Feel free to give this entire
paper to your teacher, skeptic or otherwise and they can feel
free to disagree with me and email me directly at
neils_stone@NoBlindFaith.com. After all I could be wrong. I’m
only human and I can be moved.
Neil Mammen
San Jose, CA
Originally written sometime in 1996 for a college student
who’d been asked this question.

Appendix:
Can God do Anything? (A blog I wrote for
www.crossexamined.org)
In a response to one of our readers, I said that God cannot do
anything. The reader responded? Then what about Miracles. So
let me see if I can clarify.

1. God cannot do “anything.”

He cannot do anything which is not actually possible, for
example he cannot make 1+1=3, He cannot make black actually
white, He cannot paint a door black with red paint bought from
Home Depot and no added chemicals (at least not without some
sort of other activity), He cannot give someone freedom of
choice and then and then not let them choose (note some of
these are obviously irrational but it would seem fallacious to try
to argue that the source of all rationality could be irrational
itself).
So if someone asks you if God can do anything. Say “No.”

2. Miracles are not actually impossible

Miracles are not actually impossible because any miracle or
supernatural event could have been made to take place if
enough technology or knowledge was available or if an extra-
dimensional being was able to manipulate molecules.
For instance in the Home Depot Paint example above, He
could manipulate the molecules to change them into the
molecules of Black Paint. He could make it grow a black fungus.
But red paint paints red even for God unless He does something
besides paint.
Ah but you ask, what about the water into wine miracle. Well
the water was changed into wine. It wasn’t water that was also
wine (and while it could have been hypnotism, the passage
indicates it wasn’t). He changed the water molecules into wine
molecules (and very good wine at that). Was it synthetic wine,
sure it was. Of course he could have also swapped the water for
real wine.
So we see none of these miracles are actually impossible
Now it’s worth nothing that the impossibility is usually in
philosophical or conceptual issues. E.g. making the square root
of -1 = 1. Or making the cube of 5, 124.
You see making 1+1 = 3 is not a matter of manipulating
molecules. It is dealing at a much higher level. It’s dealing with
things at the point of rationality. Mess with that and everything
stops being cohesive, the universe starts to unravel.

3. But I thought God was Omnipotent.

God IS omnipotent (all powerful) but he is not omni-able (i.e.
able to do anything). There’s a clear distinction between the
two. We believe that God is all powerful, not all capable when it
comes to irrationality. And if you think about this, this is really
tied into His character, His personality, His being.
 Endnotes
1
Yes, yes, I’m assuming that your legs are not suddenly
controlled by an alien entity or something because then that
wouldn’t really be you, would it? I’m also assuming that we
are discussing wills and not discussing paralysis.
2
Note that a 3D round square would be a squat cylinder.
 Does the Doctrine of the
Trinity Hold the Key to a
Christian Theology of
Religions? An Evaluation of
Three Recent Proposals
by Keith E. Johnson
Keith E. Johnson is a Ph.D. candidate in Christian theology
at Duke University. Keith also serves as the Director of
Theological Education for the U.S. Campus Ministry of
Campus Crusade for Christ where he oversees the
theological training of two thousand full-time campus
ministers. His dissertation research draws together two of
his central interests (the doctrine of the Trinity and the
contemporary challenge of religious pluralism) by examining
the constitutive role of Trinitarian theology in the Christian
theology of religions.

Introduction
A remarkable revival of Trinitarian the- ology emerged in the
twentieth century. Karl Rahner, on the Catholic side, and Karl
Barth, on the Protestant side, played key roles in the
1
“ecumenical rediscovery” of the Trinity. In addition to
rethinking ele- ments of this central doctrine (e.g., nature of
divine personhood, Filioque, etc.), this resurgence of interest in
the Trinity has provided the impetus for a fresh examina- tion
of other aspects of Christian theology and practice from a
Trinitarian standpoint including divine revelation, human
personhood, worship, ecclesiology, mis- sions, marriage, ethics,
2
societal relations, and even political theory. Theologians of
every stripe are attempting to relate Trinitarian doctrine to a
3
wide variety of contemporary issues.
 In this context, several Christian theo- logians have suggested
that the doctrine of the Trinity holds the key to a Christian
4
theology of religions. According to one theologian,
God has something to do with the fact that a diversity of
independent ways of salvation appears in the history of the world.
This diversity reflects the diversity or plurality within the divine
life itself, of which the Christian doctrine of the Trinity provides
an account. The mystery of the Trinity is for Christians the ulti-
mate foundation for pluralism.5
Similarly,
I believe that the Trinitarian doc- trine of God facilitates an
authen- tically Christian response to the world religions because it
takes the particularities of history seriously as well as the
universality of God’s action. This is so because the doc- trine seeks
to affirm that God has disclosed himself unreservedly and
irreversibly in the contingencies and particularity of the person
Jesus. But within Trinitarian thinking, we are also able to affirm, in
the action of the third person, that God is con- stantly revealing
himself through history by means of the Holy Spirit.
. . . Such a Trinitarian orientation thereby facilitates an openness to
the world religions, for the activity of the Spirit cannot be confined
to Christianity.6
Finally,
It is impossible to believe in the Trin- ity instead of the distinctive
claims of all other religions. If Trinity is real, then many of these
specific religious claims and ends must be real also.
. . . The Trinity is a map that finds room for, indeed requires,
concrete truth in other religions.7
The purpose of this essay is to evaluate the claim that the doctrine of
the Trinity offers the basis for a positive appraisal of non-Christian
religions.8 To this end, I will critically examine the Trinitarian doctrine
in three recent proposals in the Christian theology of religions: 9 Amos
Yong’s pneumatological theology of reli- gions, 10 Mark Heim’s
Trinitarian theology of religious ends11 and Jacques Dupuis’s Christian
theology of religious plural- ism.12 Several factors shaped my selec- tion
of these theologians. First, I wanted to limit my investigation to
proposals in which Trinitarian doctrine plays an explicit role.13 Second, I
wanted to focus upon proposals that intend to affirm historic
Trinitarian orthodoxy. Finally, I wanted to select proposals that would
provide a representative cross-section of the kind of appeal to
Trinitarian doctrine one encounters in the Christian theology of
religions.14

Amos Yong has suggested that the adequacy of his proposal should
be evalu- ated with respect to three criteria: “The trinitarianism to be
developed should relate the missions of the Word and Spirit without
identifying them. It should also be sensitive to the classical Christian
con- cerns regarding the doctrine of the Trinity as well as the
contemporary methodologi- cal issues that confront transcendental
theology.”15 I will argue that the proposals of Yong, Heim, and Dupuis
ultimately fail to satisfy Yong’s second criterion (“clas- sical Christian
concerns regarding the doctrine of the Trinity”). These “classical
concerns” are most clearly expressed in the Augustinian Trinitarian
tradition. Augustine’s doctrine of the Trinity is by far the most
influential in the history of the West. 16 Moreover, despite popular por-
trayals to the contrary, Augustine’s Trini- tarian doctrine shares much
in common with the Greek-speaking theologians of the East (e.g., the
Cappadocians).17 Thus, my evaluation will draw upon what is arguably
the most representative version of Trinitarian doctrine in the history of
the church (particularly among Protestants and Catholics). 18 I will
attempt to demonstrate that these three proposals ultimately fail to
satisfy the “classical con- cerns” of the Augustinian tradition and that
this reality undermines the claim that the Trinity represents the key to a
new understanding of religious diversity. First, I will outline the
proposals of Yong, Heim, and Dupuis paying special attention to the
role of Trinitarian doctrine. Next, I will evaluate the Trinitarian
“grammar” they each employ from an Augustinian perspective. I will
close by reflecting on the implications of my investigation for
contemporary Trinitarian theology.

Three Recent Proposals

The Christian theology of religions (which should be distinguished
from the “history of religions” and the “phi- losophy of religion”)
emerged as a distinct theological discipline following Vatican II. 19 Much
of the discussion regarding the relationship of Christianity to other
religions has taken place under the rubric of the exclusivist-inclusivist-
pluralist typol- ogy.20 Although Yong’s proposal might safely be
characterized as “inclusivist,” the proposals of Dupuis and Heim defy
easy categorization falling somewhere between “inclusivism” and
“pluralism.”

Amos Yong’s Pneumatological Theology of

Religions
In a monograph entitled Discerning the Spirit(s): A Pentecostal-
Charismatic Contri- bution to a Christian Theology of Religions, Amos Yong,
a young Pentecostal theolo- gian, attempts to develop a “Pentecostal-
charismatic” theology of religions.21 While affirming that christological
questions will always play an important role in any attempt to formulate
a viable theology of religions, Yong suggests that pneumatology
may provide the key to moving beyond what he calls the
“christological impasse,” that is, “the almost irreconcilable axioms of
God’s universal salvific will and the historical particularity of Jesus of
Naza- reth as Savior of all persons.” 22 The meta- physical basis for
Yong’s proposal is the universal presence and work of the Holy Spirit. 23
Yong argues that the Holy Spirit is present and active among non-
Christian religions and that Christians must learn to discern the Spirit’s
presence.
The “foundational pneumatology” Yong develops in Discerning the
Spirit(s) is predicated upon a Trinitarian distinction between the
“economy” of the Word and the “economy” of the Spirit: “The entire
objective of shifting to a pneumatological framework in order to
understand non- Christian faiths is premised upon the recognition that
there is a distinction between the economy of the Son and that of the
Spirit relative to the redemp- tion of the world.” 24 It would not be an
overstatement to say that this distinction constitutes the Trinitarian key
to his proposal. On the basis of this distinction, Yong affirms the
presence and activity of the Holy Spirit among non-Christian religions
and justifies the use of non- christological criteria for discerning the
Spirit’s presence. According to Yong, the economies of the Son and Spirit
are, on the one hand, “mutually related, and should not be subordinated
either to the other.”25
On the other hand, these economies pos- sess a measure of autonomy
inasmuch as they originate in the Father: “the divine missions should
also be seen as dimen- sionally affiliated and thus implying autonomy in
relationality and vice versa, and as somehow commonly originating in
the mystery of the Father.”26
 Having established this framework, Yong turns to the problem of
criteria for discerning this presence of the Spirit. He argues that previous
pneumatologi- cal approaches floundered because they were unable to
identify non-christological criteria for discerning the presence of the
Spirit. Although christological criteria are clearly useful in certain
contexts, Yong contends that they are not particularly helpful outside the
church. Other criteria are needed. Because the Spirit acts in an economy
distinct from that of the Son, one should be able to identify aspects of the
Spirit’s work that are not “constrained” by the Son.27 To this end Yong
proposes a “three-tiered process” for discerning the “religious” activity
of the Spirit among adherents of other religions. At the first level
(“phenomenological-experiential”) one compares the religious
experiences of adherents of other religions with Pen- tecostals looking
for phenomenological similarities. On the second level (“moral- ethical”)
one looks for “concrete signs that follow claims of experiencing the tran-
scendent. The primary norms on this level are moral and ethical in
nature.”28 On the third level (“theological-soteriological”) one must
consider the difficult question of the “reference” of the religious symbols
in non-Christian religions: “[T]o what transcendental reality, if any, do
religious symbols refer?”29 In addition to the Holy Spirit (“divine
presence”), one must also acknowledge the possibility of the pres- ence
of the “demonic” (“divine absence”). While the Holy Spirit “points to the
idea of law or legality, rationality, relationality, and processive
continuity culminating in the eschaton,” the demonic “sets in motion
fields or habits of chaos, irrationality, iso- lation or alienation, and
stagnation.”30
Thus, a Pentecostal theology of religions is able to account both for the
“transformative” nature of religious experience as well negative
elements. Pentecostals can learn to “discern” the presence of the Spirit
(or spirits) in other religions by cul- tivating a “pneumatological
imagination” informed by these three elements. When the Spirit’s
presence is discerned, one may recognize a non-Christian religion “as
salvific in the Christian sense.”31 As a test case for his proposal, Yong
investigates the possibility of discerning the presence of the Holy Spirit
within “Umbanda” (an Afro-Brazilian tradition). 32 Traditionally
Pentecostals have dismissed “Umbanda” as demonically inspired;
however, Yong believes that evidence of the Spirit’s presence among the
Umbanda can be seen in “the movement toward personal authenticity
in the lives of individuals and toward social solidarity.”33

Although there is good reason to believe the Spirit is present and

 active in other religions, confirmation of the Spirit’s presence can come
only through concrete engagement. Christians should not merely view
non-Christian religions in terms of praeparatio evangelica. Although
religions can function this way, “to understand indigenous traditions
solely on these terms leads to the kind of restrictive christologi- cal
quests that continue to denigrate the Holy Spirit as having less-than-
equal status as a trinitarian member.”34 If the Holy Spirit is genuinely at
work in other religions, Christians must acknowledge this and be
willing to learn from them. Yong claims that none of this undermines
the mission of the church but rather invigorates it.

Mark Heim’s Trinitarian Theology of

Religious Ends
In a book entitled The Depth of the Riches: A Trinitarian Theology of
Religious Ends, Mark Heim, a Baptist theologian, suggests that the debate
over the theol- ogy of religions proceeds on “a largely undefended
assumption that there is and can only be one religious end, one actual
religious fulfillment.”35 This assumption must be rejected. While
Christians will experience salvation (i.e., communion with the triune
God), adherents of other religions may experience other positive ends
that are not salvation:
As a Christian, it appears to me to make perfectly good sense to
say two kinds of things. First, we may say that another religion is
a true and valid path to the religious ful- fillment it seeks. . . .
Second, we may say what the book of Acts says of Jesus Christ,
that ‘there is salvation in no one else, for there is no other name
under heaven given among mortals by which we must be saved’
(Acts 4:12).36
Although he offers several arguments in support of his
proposal, Heim’s notion of multiple religious ends is ultimately
rooted in a particular vision of the triune God. In short, the
“complex” nature of God as Trinity constitutes the basis for
multiple ends.
According to Heim, the divine life of the triune God is “complex” in
that it is characterized by three dimensions: (1) “impersonal,” (2)
“personal,” and (3) “communion.” The impersonal dimen- sion of the
triune God involves the infi- nite divine life as it circulates among the
persons. Divine impersonality can be perceived in two ways. First, the
exchange among persons can be experienced as a kind of “flux” which
would give rise to the perception that “all is changing and impermanent:
all is arising. . . . The only thing that could be more fundamental would
be the cessation of such arising: something like what Buddhism calls
nirvana.”37 Second, divine impersonality can be perceived as “self
without rela- tion.” “If there were but one absolute self, then the flux and
impermanence humans perceive as a dimension of the divine pres- ence
could be taken as the natural inner reality of the self.” 38 One might call
this “self-without-another.” This would cor- respond most closely to
Advaita Vedanta Hindu thought. A second dimension involves God’s
personal involvement in the world. Through this dimension humans
“seek God’s presence, hear God’s word, see God’s acts, obey or disobey
God’s commandments, and offer praise or petition.” 39 This dimension is
charac- teristic not only of Christianity but also of Islam and Judaism. A
third dimension of relation involves “communion,” that is, a “mutual
indwelling, in which the distinct persons are not confused or identified
but are enriched by their participation in each other’s inner life.” 40
Corresponding to these three “dimen- sions” are three types of
“relations” with God: (1) “impersonal identity,” (2) “icono- graphic
encounter” and (3) “personal com- munion.” Impersonal identity
involves a relation with the impersonal dimension of God’s nature and
exists in two forms. The first variation “is grounded in the emptiness by
which each of the divine persons makes space for the others.” 41 In terms
of God’s “economic” interaction with creation, the first variation
involves God’s withdrawal or transcendence from creation. The second
variation, which is unitive, “is grounded in the coinher- ence or
complete immanence of each of the divine persons in the others.” 42 In
economic terms, the second variation involves God’s immanence in the
form of his sustaining presence: “This con- stant divine activity reveals a
universal immanence of God in every creature. It reflects the impersonal
mutual indwell- ing of the three triune persons.”43 The “iconographic
encounter” is grounded in the interpersonal encounter of the three
persons of the Trinity. Each encounters the other as a unique character.
In a parallel way, humans encounter God as a “dis- tinct other.” As in
the first relation, two variations exist. In the first variation one
encounters the divine life as a “law, an order or structure.” 44 An example
of this would be the Buddhist dharma. A second variation centers upon
God as a personal being. Here one experiences an “I-thou” relation with
God. The third relation, “personal communion,” derives from the
“perichoresis or mutual communion of the three divine persons.”45
When a relation with God is pursued “consistently and exclusively”
through one of the three dimensions the result is a “distinctive religious
end.” Four types of human destiny are possible: (1) salva- tion
(communion with the triune God), (2) alternative religious ends (which
rep- resent a response to an economic mani- festation of an immanent
dimension of the triune life), (3) non-religious human destinies (which
result from fixation on some created good), and (4) negation of the
created self. Alternative religious ends are rooted in an “authentic
revela- tion of the triune God, but not revelation of God as triune.”46
Furthermore, they depend upon God’s grace: “The triune God is party to
the realization of alternate religious ends. They are not simply the
actualization of innate human capacities; they are distinct relations with
aspects of the triune life. A particular grace of God is operative within
them.”47

Jacques Dupuis’s Christian Theology of

Religious Pluralism
In his book, Toward a Christian Theol- ogy of Religious Pluralism, the late
Jacques Dupuis, a Roman Catholic theologian, argues on Trinitarian
grounds that non- Christian religions mediate God’s saving grace.
Before outlining his proposal, it will be helpful to locate Dupuis’s work
in the context of contemporary Catho- lic approaches to religious
pluralism. Although Vatican II clearly affirmed that non-Christian
religions are—in some sense—to be viewed positively and that
individuals who have never heard the gospel can experience salvation, 48
the conciliar bishops were silent regarding the means through which
salvific grace is mediated apart from the church. Silence on this question
has led to two conflict- ing positions among Catholics that can be
summarized as follows: (P1) Although salvation is available outside the
Church, it is not mediated through non-Christian religions. 49 (P2)
Salvation is not only available outside the Church, but it is also mediated
through non-Christian religions in such a way that non-Christian
religions are to be viewed as means of salvation.50
Dupuis embraces a form of P2.
According to Dupuis, the triune God constitutes the ultimate source of
all genu- ine religious experience. 51 Thus, different religions are able to
convey differing—yet legitimate—insights into this divine ulti- mate
reality:
The religious traditions of the world convey different insights into
the mystery of Ultimate Reality. Incom- plete as these may be,
they nev- ertheless witness to a manifold self-manifestation of God
to human beings in diverse faith-communities. They are
 incomplete “faces” of the Divine Mystery experienced in vari- ous
ways, to be fulfilled in him who is “the human face of God.”52
Although Jesus Christ is the “univer- sal” savior of humankind, he is
not the “absolute” savior. “Absoluteness” can be attributed only to God
the Father. Jesus Christ is savior only in the derivative sense that “the
world and humankind find salvation in and through him.”53
Therefore, rather than speaking of Jesus Christ as “absolute” savior,
Dupuis main- tains that it would be better to speak of Jesus Christ as
“constitutive” savior. By insisting that Jesus Christ is “constitu- tive”
savior, Dupuis wants to open the door to other “saviors” who somehow
“participate” in the universal mediation of Christ. God’s saving action,
he insists, is not limited to the Christ-event. On the contrary, the “two
hands” of God, the Word and the Spirit, are universally pres- ent and
active in non-Christian religions: “Yet the action of the Word of God is
not constrained by its historically becoming human in Jesus Christ; nor
is the Spirit’s work in history limited to its outpouring upon the world
by the risen and exalted Christ.” 54 A “distinct action” of the non-
incarnate Logos continues following Christ’s resurrection: “While, then,
the human action of the Logos ensarkos is the universal sacrament of
God’s saving action, it does not exhaust the action of the Logos. A
distinct action of the Logos asarkos endures.”55 Furthermore, the Spirit is
also universally active following the incarnation. For example, as the
result of the Spirit’s inspiration, “revelation” can be encountered in the
sacred writings of non-Christian religions. On this basis, one may affirm
that sacred scriptures, such as the Qu’ran, contain the “word of God”
and that the Prophet Muhammad is a “genuine prophet of God.”56
Moreover, God’s saving grace is medi- ated through other
religions in such a way that they may legitimately be called “channels
of salvation.” According to Dupuis, salvation does not reach human
beings in spite of their religious traditions but in and through them. For
example, the worship of images may represent a means through which
God’s grace reaches Hin- dus: “[T]he worship of sacred images can be
the sacramental sign in and through which the devotee responds to the
offer of divine grace; it can mediate secretly the grace offered by God in
Jesus Christ and express the human response to God’s gratuitous gift in
him.”57
Finally, Dupuis claims that non-Chris- tian religions share in the reign
of God. The universal reign of God must be carefully distinguished from
the church. Although they are not members of the church, adherents of
other religious traditions are, nevertheless, members of the kingdom:
“While the believers of other religious faiths perceive God’s call through
their own traditions and respond to it in the sincere practice of these
traditions, they become in all truth—even without being formally
conscious of it—active members of the Kingdom.” 58 In light of these and
other factors, religious pluralism should not be viewed with suspicion
but wel- comed with open arms recognizing that “God has manifested
himself to human- kind in manifold ways.”59

A Critical Evaluation Amos Yong’s Trinitarian

Pneumatology
Inasmuch as Yong’s pneumatological theology of religions is rooted in
a dis- tinction between the “economy” of the Son and the “economy” of
the Spirit, his proposal raises important questions about the relations of
the Trinitarian persons both within the divine life of the triune God (ad
intra) and within the economy of salvation (ad extra). I will argue that
Yong’s proposal ultimately fails to offer an adequate account of the
relation of the Spirit to the Father and the Son.60

Insufficient Trinitarian Framework

Although Yong acknowledges that the “mission” of the Spirit must
ultimately be understood in a Trinitarian context, he offers no
comprehensive Trinitarian framework at the outset within which to relate
the work of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. At the economic level,
“mission” plays a key role in his proposal. Although he frequently refers
to the “missions” of the Son and Spirit, he offers no substan- tive
discussion of the content of these missions from a salvation-historical
per- spective. Echoing several contemporary theologians, he simply
asserts that the Spirit operates in an “economy” distinct from that of the
Son, brackets the “mis- sion” of the Son and then focuses almost
exclusively on the “mission” of the Holy Spirit.
At the level of the immanent Trinity, Yong offers no account of the
relations of the Trinitarian persons ad intra as ground for his
understanding of the divine “missions.” Inasmuch as his distinc- tion
between the “economy” of the Son and “economy” of the Spirit
necessarily depends upon the hypostatic distinction between the Son
and Spirit, some discus- sion of intra-Trinitarian relations seems to be
required. The closest he comes to a discussion of intra-Trinitarian
relations is a brief discussion of the procession of the Spirit. Yong rejects
the traditional Western view, expressed in the Filioque clause, that the
Spirit proceeds jointly from the Father and the Son. What is at stake for
Yong in problematizing the Filioque is not an alternative understanding
of the immanent Trinity. Rather, it is maintain- ing a theological basis for
an independent “economy” of the Holy Spirit (which is then used to
justify the search for non- christological criteria to discern the Spirit’s
presence).61 However, inasmuch as compelling reasons exist to affirm the
pro- cession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son, 62 Yong’s rejection
of the twofold procession of the Spirit is unwarranted. Furthermore,
evidence against the twofold procession of the Spirit ad intra does not
count as evidence for a distinct economy of the Spirit ad extra. Finally, it
is possible to affirm the full “equality” of the Spirit to the Son (one of the
concerns that drives Eastern rejection of the Filioque) without positing
two distinct “economies.”63
Severing the “Two Hands” of the Father Throughout Discerning the
Spirit(s), Yong repeatedly appeals to Irenaeus’s image of the Son and
Spirit as the “two hands” of God as a way of conceptualiz- ing the
Son/Spirit relationship.64 His use of this image, however, stands in
tension with his emphasis upon a distinct “econ- omy” of the Spirit.
From an economic standpoint, the “two hands” imagery is not about a
left hand doing one activity and the right hand doing another (which
seems to be implied by associating a dis- tinct “economy” with each of
the hands). It is fundamentally about the Father acting through the Son
and Spirit to a particular end.65 It underscores unity of action,66
combining hypostatic distinction at the intra-Trinitarian level (i.e.,
Father, Son and Spirit) with unity of action at the economic level. Yong’s
use of this image causes one to wonder if his proposal implicitly severs
the “two hands” of the Father.67
Although Augustine would likely have viewed the “two hands”
metaphor as sub- ordinationist, he too emphasizes the unity of the
divine persons ad extra. According to Augustine, Father, Son, and Spirit
work together in a single economy of salva- tion. Although the missiones
of the Son and Spirit are distinct in such a way that one must speak of
two “sendings” (Gal 4:4-6), these two sendings have one ulti- mate goal—
bringing human beings into communion with the triune God. Yong’s
Trinitarian pneumatology is deficient not because it affirms differing
economic roles of the Son and the Spirit (e.g., the fact that the Son alone
became incarnate). Rather, it is deficient because it affirms two dis- tinct
economies—one associated with the Son and other with the Spirit. From
two “sendings” (missiones) one should not infer two distinct
“economies.”68 As Kilian McDonnell rightly notes, “To insist on the
equality of the Spirit and the Spirit’s mis- sion, it is neither necessary nor
advisable to postulate a ‘distinct economy of the Spirit’ as does Vladimir
Lossky. There is one economy from the Father consti- tuted by the
missions of the Son and the Spirit, each of the missions being present
and active at the interior of the other.”69
The missions issue from the Father and lead back to the Father. 70 By
positing two “economies,” Yong implicitly severs the “two hands” and
undermines the unicity of the economy of salvation.
Further evidence that Yong’s Trinitar- ian pneumatology severs the
“two hands” can be seen in the way he relates the work of the Spirit to
the Son. Although Yong emphasizes the empowering role of the Spirit in
the incarnation and earthly ministry of Christ, 71 he fails to take seri-
ously biblical teaching regarding the Spirit’s unique role in bearing
witness to and glorifying the risen Christ (e.g., John 15:26-27; 16:7-15;
Acts 1:6-9; 4:24-31, etc.).72
In his discussion of Pentecost (Acts 2), Augustine discerns a special
significance in the sign through which the bestowal of the Spirit was
manifested (i.e., bearing witness to Christ in multiple languages). It
offers a proleptic fulfillment of the goal of the Holy Spirit’s work—
73
namely, lead- ing people in every nation to believe in Jesus Christ. It is
precisely in this sense that the Spirit “universalizes” the work of Jesus
Christ. This universal work of the Spirit constitutes the basis for the
evangelistic mission of the church.74 Com- menting on John 16:14,
Augustine explains that Christ is glorified when his followers, filled with
75
love, proclaim him and spread his fame around the world. Thus, from
a salvation-historical perspective, the work of the Spirit (along with the
Father and Son) among adherents of other religions must be understood
in terms of praeparatio evangelica.76 No grounds exist for positing a
distinct salvation-historical economy of the Spirit leading to some other
end. Inas- much as Yong’s proposal attempts to move beyond a
praeparatio evangelica approach to the Spirit’s work in the lives of non-
Christians (including adherents of other religions), 77 it severs the “two
hands” of the Father and obscures the missionary nature of the economic
Trinity.78
A final way Yong’s Trinitarian pneuma- tology severs the two hands of
the Father is by bracketing christological criteria for discerning God’s
work: “The value of a pneumatological theology of religions can now be
seen in clearer light. I have argued that insofar as Word and Spirit are
related but yet distinct as the two hands of the Father, we should be able
to identify dimensions of the Spirit’s presence and activity that are not
constrained by that of the Word.”79 Yong claims that many earlier
pneumatological proposals failed because they were unable to move
beyond christological criteria. For example, because of his commitment
to the Filioque, Karl Rahner was ultimately unable to distinguish the
economy of the Son and the Spirit. As a result, Rahner was unable to
articulate non-christological criteria for discerning God’s presence.
Furthermore, even Clark Pinnock, who rejects the Fil- ioque, yields too
quickly “to the theological pressure exerted by Christology.” 80 But the
problem with Yong’s proposal is that if, as Augustine rightly insists, the
Father, Son, and the Spirit are working together in a single economy
which exists to draw men and women into the life of the triune God,
then any criteria for discerning the Spirit’s redemptive work must
include a christological element.
In a more recent book entitled Beyond the Impasse: Toward a
Pneumatological Theol- ogy of Religions, Yong acknowledges, to a greater
degree, the inherent relatedness of the Son and the Spirit as the “two
hands” of the Father.81 He also seems more aware of the problems
associated with a search for non-christological criteria for discern- ing
the Spirit’s presence. Nevertheless, none of these acknowledgements
leads to any explicit revision of his earlier proposal. On the contrary, he
continues to affirm a distinct “economy” of the Spirit and still wants to
maintain the legitimacy of non-christological criteria for discerning the
Spirit’s presence and activity.82 Thus, at the end of the day, a significant
tension remains. Inasmuch as Yong emphasizes the distinct economy of
the Spirit in order to gain traction for his non-christological approach to
other religions, he implicitly severs the “two hands” of the Father.
However, inasmuch as he acknowledges the intrinsic relatedness of the
“two hands” under pressures of “classical Christian concerns
regarding the doctrine of the Trinity,” he under- mines his
quest for non-christological criteria.

Mark Heim’s Trinity of Three Dimensions

Since the patristic period, Christian theologians have drawn an
important distinction between God in se (God in himself) and God pro
nobis (God for us).83
The latter denotes God’s self-communica- tion through the economy of
salvation (the “economic” Trinity) while the former refers to the intra-
Trinitarian life of the three divine persons (the “immanent” Trinity). 84
From an epistemological perspec- tive, God’s self-revelation in the
economy of salvation constitutes the foundation for our knowledge of
the immanent Trinity. Since we have no independent access to the
immanent life of the triune God apart from the economy of salvation,
any claims about the immanent Trinity must ultimately be grounded in
the oikonomia revealed in Scripture. From an ontological perspective, the
immanent Trinity con- stitutes the foundation for the economic Trinity.85
Regarding the epistemological order, David Coffey has proposed that
we dis- tinguish three steps in our knowledge of God’ triunity. 86 In the
first step, we encounter the self-revelation of the triune God in the
oikonomia recorded in Scripture (the “biblical Trinity”). In the second
step, we reflect upon what must be true regard- ing being and nature of
the divine persons in light of God’s self-revelation in the oikonomia. The
outcome of this reflection represents a doctrine of the “immanent
Trinity” (God in se). In the third step, we articulate a systematic
conceptualization of the triune God in the oikonomia—a doctrine of the
“economic Trinity.”87 In the discussion that follows, I will argue that the
problems in Heim’s proposal center on the relationship of the economic
and immanent Trinity. More specifically, I will show that the breakdown
in Heim’s Trinitarian grammar occurs in steps two and three of the
epistemic order. In step two, Heim articulates a speculative under-
standing of the immanent Trinity that has little basis in the “biblical
Trinity.” Then, in step three, he outlines a conception of the “economic
Trinity” that includes “economies” of divine activity that bypass the
temporal missions of the Son and the Spirit as revealed in the oikonomia.

Breakdown #1: From the Biblical to the

Immanent Trinity
At the root of Heim’s proposal is an assumption that the immanent life
of the triune God is constituted by three dimensions: “impersonal,”
“personal,” and “communion.” These “dimensions” constitute the
Trinitarian foundation for multiple ends. For example, through a
“relation” with the impersonal dimension of the triune life, Buddhists
may experi- ence the Buddhist religious end—Nirvana. Inasmuch as the
knowledge of the Trinity can be gained only through the “bibli- cal
Trinity,” one must ask the following question: What constitutes the
epistemic basis for Heim’s claim that inner life of the triune God is
constituted by three “dimen- sions”? Although Heim would insist that
Scripture constitutes the ultimate basis for his understanding of
immanent Trin- ity,88 there are good reasons to question this claim. The
primary source for these “dimensions” is not God’s self-revelation in
Scripture but Smart and Konstantine’s Christian Systematic Theology in
World Context (to which Heim acknowledges his indebtedness). 89 Smart
and Konstantine simply assert the existence of these three dimensions
and then attempt to explain the “economic” activity of the triune God
among other religions on this basis of this assumption. Although Smart
and Konstantine insist that the “Trinity” is the ultimate divine reality,
they are quite skeptical regarding the foundation on which this
affirmation ultimately rests (i.e., the biblical Trinity). 90 Inasmuch as
Heim’s account of the three immanent “dimensions” is consciously
dependent upon Smart and Konstantine, it represents a speculative
account of the immanent Trinity (step two) that is inadequately rooted in
the oikonomia revealed in Scrip- ture (step one).91

Breakdown #2: From the Immanent to the

Economic Trinity
A second Trinitarian problem involves the way in which Heim’s
proposal moves from the immanent Trinity (step two) to the economic
Trinity (step three). To better understand the nature of this problem, we
must revisit Heim’s description of the eco- nomic Trinity. According to
Heim, three “relations” characterize the economic activity of the triune
God: “impersonal identity,” “iconographic encounter” and “personal
communion.” These “real rela- tions” 92 constitute the economic means
through which alternative religious ends (e.g., moksha, nirvana, etc.)
obtain. To say that other “ends” are part of God’s “econ- omy” implies
that they are willed by God: “The triune God is party to the realization of
alternate religious ends. They are not simply the actualization of innate
human capacities; they are distinct relations with aspects of the triune
life. A particular grace of God is operative in them.”93 It is crucial to
recognize the implications of the above affirmation. Alongside God’s
economy of “salvation” in Christ, other “econo- mies” of divine activity
exist: there is an economy of salvation (the Christian end), an “economy”
of nirvana (the Buddhist end), an “economy” of moksha (the Hindu end),
etc.94 No epistemic warrant exists for these alternative economies. In
book four of De Trinitate Augustine explains that the “sendings”
(missiones) of the Son and Spirit have as their goal restoring fallen
humans into a relationship of communion with the triune God. Missio
constitutes a central link between the divine persons (immanent Trinity)
and the economy of salvation (economic Trinity). By positing
“economies” of divine activity that effec- tively bypass the work of
Christ, Heim implicitly severs this link. No epistemic warrant exists for
positing additional “economies” of divine activity that bypass (or
constitute an alternative) to this one economy of salvation effected in
Christ.95
On the basis of a speculative understand- ing of the immanent Trinity
(step two), Heim outlines a deficient account of the economic Trinity
(step three) that ulti- mately undermines the divine oikonomia revealed
in Scripture (step one).
 A Trinity of “Dimensions” Replaces the
Trinity of Persons
At the level of the immanent Trinity, Heim’s proposal
ultimately employs two trinities. The first Trinity (Father, Son
and Holy Spirit) is the Trinity of Chris- tian confession;
however, this Trinity is not the one that does the real work in
Heim’s project. Heim subtly substitutes his three “dimensions”
for the Trinitarian “persons” effectively creating an alternate
“trinity.” The term “complex” plays a key role in this
substitution. When Heim first introduces the term “complex,” it
denotes the fact that God’s being is constituted by a multiplicity of
persons; however, as his argument unfolds, “complex” shifts to denote
his three “dimensions.” His sub- stitution of “dimensions” for “persons”
can be seen most clearly in the application of language, reserved for the
Trinitarian “persons,” to these “dimensions.” For example, Heim claims
that only “three” dimensions exist. Why three? Why not two, four, or
even ten? Is it merely coinci- dental that there also happen to be three
divine persons? Moreover, Heim suggests that “each of the dimensions
is granted co-equality with the others.” 96 Here Heim applies the
language of co-equality to the dimensions; yet co-equality applies only
to the Trinitarian persons. Finally, he claims that individuals experience
“rela- tions” with these “dimensions” in such a way that the
“dimensions” effectively replace the Trinitarian persons. 97 Heim’s
immanent “trinity of dimensions” has subtly replaced the triune God of
Chris- tian confession.

Jacques Dupuis’s Trinitarian Christology

There is no question that the Trinity plays a central role in Dupuis’s
proposal for he claims that the “Christian vision of the Triune God”
paves the way for a “positive evaluation of other religious traditions.” 98
Although, at first glance, Dupuis appears to be faithful to the Cath- olic
Trinitarian tradition, I will attempt to demonstrate that a close reading
reveals that his proposal gains traction only by introducing
subordinationism into the Father/Son relationship, undermining the
unicity of the economy of salvation and severing the economic and the
immanent Trinity.99

Subordinationism in the Father/Son

Relationship
In order to make space for other “sav- iors” and “mediators,” Dupuis
appeals to a “trinitarian Christology” in which Christ is recognized not
as “absolute” savior but merely as “constitutive” savior. According to
Dupuis, only “God” (i.e., the Father) is the “absolute” savior in the sense
of being the primary and ultimate source of salvation. Jesus Christ is
savior only in a secondary and derivative sense. That Jesus Christ is
“constitutive” savior means, among other things, that he is not the goal
of salvation but merely the constitutive means of salvation: “[Christo-
centrism] never places Jesus Christ in the place of God; it merely affirms
that God has placed him at the center of his saving plan for humankind,
not as the end but as the way, not as the goal of every human quest for
God but as the universal ‘media- tor’ (cf. I Tim 2:5) of God’s saving
action toward people.”100 What is troubling about the preceding
statement is not his claim that Jesus Christ is the means of salva- tion but
rather the obvious attempt to distinguish the salvific role of incarnate
Son (constitutive savior) from that of the Father (absolute savior) by
limiting the Son to an instrumental role in salvation. To suggest that the
salvific role of Jesus Christ is merely instrumental sounds suspiciously
subordinationist. One of the fundamental axioms of Augustine’s
theology—an assumption he shares with the Cappadocians—is that the
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit act with one will in the economy of
salvation.101 Of particular relevance is Augustine’s discussion of the
Passion. In contrast to Dupuis, Augustine argues that the decision
leading to the Passion involved not only the Father but also the Son. 102
Inasmuch as Jesus Christ is Savior as God-incarnate (homoousios with the
Father), one must affirm that the Son also willed salvation along with
the Father. If one instead maintains that Jesus Christ is merely a
constitutive means of sal- vation and did not also will it (along with the
Father and the Spirit), then it would seem that some from of
subordinationism is unavoidable.
Dupuis is not unaware of this problem. In order to avoid positing
subordination- ism in the immanent life of the triune God, he appeals to
the distinction between human and divine natures of Jesus Christ as the
basis for his claim that Jesus Christ is “constitutive” savior. 103 Although
this move may solve the problem of subordi- nationism, it does so only
by undermin- ing the unity of the two natures in one person. It was not a
nature that the Father sent to save the world but a person. It was not a
nature that died on the cross but a person. That person was the Son of
God. To speak of Jesus Christ as “constitutive Savior” is to speak of the
person of the Son as “constitutive Savior” and it is precisely at this point
that subordination arises. The only way Dupuis can avoid subordina-
tionism is by sharply distinguishing the two natures of Jesus Christ in a
way that undermines their unity. At the end of the day Dupuis faces a
serious dilemma. He cannot continue to affirm that Jesus Christ is
merely “constitutive” savior and uphold an orthodox “Trinitarian
Christology.” If, on the one hand, he suggests that Jesus Christ is merely
the constitutive means of salvation and did not will it along with the
Father, he necessarily introduces subordinationism into the immanent
life of the triune God. If, on the other hand, he attempts to overcome this
problem by emphasizing the “unbridgeable distance” between God the
Father and Jesus Christ in his human nature, he undermines the unity of
the two natures.

Undermining the Unicity of the Economy of

Salvation
Central to Dupuis’s proposal is a dis- tinction between the work of the
Logos ensarkos (the incarnate Logos) and the work of the Logos asarkos
(the non-incar- nate Logos).104 On the basis of this distinc- tion, he claims
that an enduring work of the Logos asarkos (distinct from the Logos
ensarkos) continues following the incarnation: “[T]here is a salvific
working of the Word as such, distinct from that of the Word operating
through his human being in Jesus Christ, risen and glorified, though in
‘union’ with it.”105 The distinc- tion Dupuis draws between the economic
activity of Logos ensarkos and economic activity of the Logos asarkos
prompts a crucial question from an Augustinian standpoint: Does the
work of the Logos asarkos constitute a second economy of sal- vation
existing in parallel with the first? Although Dupuis would insist it does
not, the way he employs the Logos ensarkos / Logos asarkos distinction
seems to require two parallel economies of salvation. 106 This can be seen
by comparing the economic activity of the Logos asarkos with that of the
Logos ensarkos. Through the work of the Logos ensarkos (and the
Spirit),107 the Christian Scriptures contain the Word of God. Through the
work of the Logos asarkos (and the Spirit),108 the Qu’ran and other non-
Christian scriptures contain the Word of God. 109 Through the work of
the Logos ensarkos, there is one mediator between humans and God.
Though the work of the Logos asarkos, other mediators exist between
humans and God (although these “mediators” somehow participate in
the mediation of Jesus Christ). Through the work of the Logos ensarkos,
the Church mediates salvific grace. Though the work of the Logos
asarkos, the worship of Hindu images mediates salvific grace.110
Through the work of the Logos ensarkos, men and women are
reconciled to God and incorporated into Christ’s Church. Though the
work of the Logos asarkos, men and women are not incorporated into the
Church but become members of “the kingdom of God.” Moving beyond
Karl Rahner, Dupuis no longer wants to talk about “anonymous
Christians.”111 How- ever, following Christ’s resurrection, how can one
be savingly related to the Father without concomitantly being included
in Christ’s Church? The latter contrast seems to suggest a second parallel
economy.112
From an Augustinian perspective, no epistemic warrant exists for
positing a sec- ond economy of salvation in parallel with that of the
incarnate Word. Augustine is quite clear that the sending of the Son and
the sending of the Spirit have one goal: bringing men and women into
fellowship with the triune God by leading people in every nation to
confess Jesus as Savior and Lord.113 Inasmuch as Dupuis implicitly posits
two economies, he undermines the unicity of the economy of salvation.
Moreover, if it is true that Dupuis distinguishes the work of the Logos
asarkos and Logos ensarkos in a way that undermines the unicity of the
economy of salvation, this also suggests a further deficiency in his
Christology (inasmuch as the distinction between the work of the Logos
asarkos and Logos ensarkos is grounded in the distinction of the divine
and human natures). When one combines Dupuis’s emphasis on the
“unbridgeable gap” between “God” and Jesus Christ in his human
nature as the basis for his “constitutive” Christology along with his
insistence upon the distinction between the divine and human natures as
the basis for a distinct and continuing action of the Logos asarkos, it
appears that his “Trinitarian Christology” may implicitly undermine the
unity of the divine and human natures of Jesus Christ in a “Nesto- rian”
fashion.

Severing the Unity of the Economic and

Immanent Trinity
One final Trinitarian problem should be noted. On the one hand,
Dupuis claims that “the mystery of the Triune God—Father, Son, Spirit
—corresponds objectively to the inner reality of God, even though only
analogically.”114 On the other hand, Dupuis also insists that authentic
economic manifestations of the triune God can be found in other
religious communities. Obviously a number of these economic
“manifestations” of the triune God are conflicting, and in some cases,
even contradictory. Buddhists, for example, envision the triune God as
emptiness while Muslims, according to Dupuis, conceive of the triune
God as a personal absolute. This leads to a problem. Inasmuch as these
conflicting economic manifestations of the triune God are to be viewed
as authentic, one seems to encounter a situation in which a kind of “God-
above-God” must be posited with the result that the identity of the
economic Trinity with the immanent Trinity is implicitly undermined.
Dupuis’s answer to this dilemma is found in his analysis of religious
experience. While adherents of other religions have authentic “expe-
riences” of the triune God, they do not possess adequate “formulations.”
The “economic” faces they posit are—objec- tively speaking—false. To
the extent Dupuis emphasizes that these economic faces are false
(ostensibly to protect his Trinitarian grammar), he undercuts their
authenticity. To the extent Dupuis empha- sizes the authenticity of these
alternative economic manifestations, he implicitly severs the unity of the
economic and the immanent Trinity. At the end of the day, his proposal
rests upon a deficient Trinitarianism.

Conclusion
The purpose of this essay was to evalu- ate the claim that a
proper understanding of “the Trinity” provides the basis for a
new understanding of religious diver- sity. To this end I
critically examined the Trinitarian doctrine in three recent
proposals in the Christian theology of religions. We saw that
Yong’s Trinitarian pneumatology severs the “two hands” of the
Father, Heim’s Trinitarian theol- ogy of religious ends
effectively replaces the Trinity of persons with a trinity of
“dimensions” that bears little resemblance to the God of
Christian confession, and that Dupuis’s Trinitarian Christology
posits subordination in the Father/Son relationship and
undermines the unicity of the economy of salvation. Inasmuch
as the proposals of Yong, Heim, and Dupuis are representative
of current appeal to Trinitarian doctrine in the Christian the-
ology of religions, there is good reason to question the claim
that “the Trinity” offers the key to a new theology of religions.
On the contrary, it appears that current use of Trinitarian
theology in the Christian theology of religions is having a
deleteri- ous effect upon the doctrine.
Immanuel Kant once asserted that the doctrine of the Trinity has no
practical value whatsoever.115 Kant would be hard- pressed to make this
criticism stick today. Contemporary theology, Protestant and Catholic, is
driven by a quest to make the Trinity “relevant.” 116 One is told that the
Trinity provides the basis for a proper understanding of human
personhood,117 that the Trinity represents the model for the proper form
of church government,118 that the Trinity provides the model for societal
relations,119 that the Trinity offers the model for an egalitarian political
democracy,120 that the Trinity provides the basis for affirming same-sex
marriage,121 that the Trinity offers the model for relat- ing theology and
science,122 and so on.
On the one hand, this contemporary flowering of Trinitarian reflection
is a welcome development. Since the triune God is the central premise of
all orthodox theology, Christians must think in “Trini- tarian” terms
about every aspect of theol- ogy. Consider evangelism. The missionary
nature of the church is rooted not in an outdated form of cultural
imperialism but in the very life of the triune God. 123 The missio (sending)
of the church is rooted in the dual missiones of the Son and the Spirit (Gal
4:4-6).124 Just as the Father sent the Son into the world, so the Son sends
his followers into the world (John 20:21). The Spirit, who is sent into the
world by the Father and the Son, bears witness to the Son by preparing
the way for and empowering the witness of Christ’s dis- ciples (John
15:26-27; Acts 1:8). Consider ecclesiology. There is a sense in which the
unity of the church is to mirror—albeit analogically—the unity of the
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit (John 17:21). Finally, consider redemption.
Unless the one who died on the cross was fully God (yet also
hypostatically distinct from the Father), there could be no salvation in a
Christian sense.125 Our preaching should under- score these Trinitarian
connections.126
On the other hand, to the extent that appeal to Trinitarian doctrine in
the theology of religions is representative of broader trends in
contemporary theology, there may be cause for concern. I will briefly
register two concerns. First, prob- lems arise when one attempts to draw
a straight line from a speculative construal of the immanent Trinity to
some perceived good in a way that bypasses (or, in some cases, even
undermines) the economy of salvation revealed in Scripture. Heim’s
proposal exemplifies the latter problem: he draws a straight line from a
speculative understanding of the immanent Trin- ity (i.e., three
“dimensions”) to multiple religious ends. Similarly, a number of
contemporary proposals draw a straight line from a speculative
understanding of the immanent life of the triune God (e.g.,
“perichoresis”) to some beneficial practice (e.g., egalitarian human rela-
tions, countering individualism, etc.).127
Not only do we lack experiential access to the immanent life of the
triune God to know what “perichoresis” might mean for the Father, Son,
and Holy Spirit in se, but Scripture ultimately directs us to imitate the
redemptive work of the triune God in the economy of salvation (i.e., the
economic Trinity): “Therefore be imitators of God, as beloved children.
And walk in love, as Christ loved us and gave himself up for us, a
fragrant offering and sacrifice to God” (Eph 5:1-2, ESV).
 My other concern centers on the end to which Trinitarian doctrine is
currently being used. One cannot help but wonder if the recent
“usefulness” of Trinitarian doctrine is driven more by Jamesian prag-
matism128 rather than a compelling vision of the triune God as the
ultimate good.129
Here contemporary theologians can learn an important lesson from
Augustine. His Trinitarian reflection in De Trinitate is driven by a quest
to know and enjoy the triune God. 130 He wants to draw his read- ers
more deeply into the life of the triune God. 131 Augustine challenges
contempo- rary theologians to consider whether their “functionalizing”
of Trinitarian doctrine leads their readers “to know and enjoy, and not
merely use, the strong Name of the Holy Trinity.”132

Endnotes
1
Geoffrey Wainwright, “The Ecumeni- cal Rediscovery of the
Trinity,” One in Christ 34 (1998): 95-124. See also Stanley J.
Grenz, Rediscovering the Triune God: The Trinity in
Contemporary Theology (Min- neapolis: Fortress Press, 2004).
2
A survey of these developments can be found in John
Thompson, Modern Trini- tarian Perspectives (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1994).
3
One notable example among evangeli- cals would be the
gender debate between “Egalitarian” and “Complementarian”
theologians regarding the Father/Son relationship in the
immanent Trinity and its implications for male/female roles in
marriage.
4
For an overview of Trinitarian propos- als in the theology of
religions see Veli- Matti Kärkkäinen, Trinity and Religious
Pluralism: The Doctrine of the Trinity in Christian Theology of
Religions (Burling- ton: Ashgate, 2004).
5
Peter C. Hodgson, “The Spirit and Reli- gious Pluralism,” in
The Myth of Religious Superiority: Multifaith Explorations of
Religious Pluralism, ed. Paul F. Knitter (Maryknoll: Orbis, 2005),
136.
6
“Gavin D’Costa, “Toward a Trinitarian Theology of Religions,”
in A Universal Faith? Peoples, Cultures, Religions and the
Christ: Essays in Honor of Prof Dr. Frank De Graeve (ed.
Catherine Cornille and
 Valeer Neckebrouck; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1992), 147.
7
Mark Heim, “The Depth of the Riches: Trinity and Religious
Ends,” Modern Theology 17 (2001): 22 (italics original).
8
By referring to “the” doctrine of the Trinity I am not implying
that there is one particular systematic understanding of the
triune God upon which all Christians agree. In this sense it
might be more accurate to speak about “a” doctrine of the
Trinity. By speaking of “the” doc- trine of the Trinity I have in
mind Trinitarian doctrine in contrast to other categories of
Christian doc- trine (e.g., soteriology, anthropol- ogy, etc.).
9
Inasmuch as the claims in the previous paragraph regarding
the validity of non-Christian religions are rooted in a doctrine of
the Trin- ity, their truthfulness depends, in part, upon the
adequacy of the Trinitarian theology on which they are based.
Orthodox Trinitar- ian doctrine represents a necessary (but not
sufficient) condition for the truthfulness of these claims.
10
Amos Yong, Discerning the Spirit(s): A Pentecostal-
Charismatic Contribu- tion to a Christian Theology of Reli- gions
(Sheffield: Sheffield Academic,
2000).
11
Mark Heim, The Depth of the Riches: A Trinitarian Theology
of Religious Ends (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
2001).
12
Jacques Dupuis, Toward a Chris- tian Theology of Religious
Pluralism (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1997).
13
Obviously Trinitarian assump- tions play an implicit role in
every
proposal in the Christian theology of religions. These
proposals are unique because of the explicit and constitutive
role that Trinitarian doctrine plays.
14
I also attempted to select theolo- gians that would
represent diverse ecclesial affiliations. Yong is Pente- costal,
Heim is Baptist, and Dupuis is Roman Catholic.
15
Yong, Discerning the Spirit(s), 95.
16
Not everyone views Augustine’s influence as positive.
Augustine’s Trinitarian theology has come under heavy attack
in the twentieth century. According to these critics, Augustine’s
theology “begins” with a unity of divine substance (which he
allegedly “prioritizes” over the divine persons), his Trinitarian
reflection is over-determined by neo-Platonic philosophy, his
psy- chological analogy of the Trinity tends toward modalism,
and he severs the life of the triune God from the economy of
salvation by focusing on the immanent Trinity. These criticisms
can be found in Colin E. Gunton, “Augustine, the Trinity and the
Theological Crisis of the West,” Scottish Journal of Theol- ogy 43
(1990): 33-58; and Catherine M. LaCugna, God For Us: The
Trinity and Christian Life (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1991).
Lewis Ayres and Michel Barnes, however, have convincingly
demonstrated that these criticisms are based on a misreading
of Augustine’s Trini- tarian theology. See Lewis Ayres, “The
Fundamental Grammar of Augustine’s Trinitarian Theology,” in
Augustine and his Critics: Essays in Honour of Gerald Bonner
(ed. Dodaro
and George Lawless; New York: Routledge, 2000) 51-76;
Michel R. Barnes, “Rereading Augustine’s theology of the
Trinity,” in The Trin- ity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the
Trinity (ed. Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, Gerald O’Collins;
New York: Oxford, 1999), 145-176.
17
This is not to say that no differ- ences exist between the
Trinitarian theology of Augustine and the Cappadocians. My
claim regard- ing the unity of Augustine and the Cappadocians
is directed at the unwarranted assumption that sig- nificant
differences exist between early “Western” approaches (which
emphasize divine unity) and “East- ern” approaches (which
empha- size a trinity of divine persons). This assumption can be
traced to the work of a nineteenth-century Jesuit, Théodore de
Régnon. Tren- chant criticisms of this polarizing paradigm can
be found in Michel R. Barnes, “De Régnon Reconsid- ered,”
Augustinian Studies 26 (1995):
51-79; idem, “Augustine in Con- temporary Trinitarian
Theology,” Theological Studies 56 (1995): 237-50; David B.
Hart, “The Mirror of the Infinite: Gregory of Nyssa on the
Vestigia Trinitatis,” Modern Theology
18 (2002): 541-61; and Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy:
An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology (New York:
Oxford, 2004), 273-383.
18
My evaluation of these proposals will draw implicitly and
explicitly upon Augustine’s most significant Trinitarian work—
De Trinitate. All citations of De Trinitate will be taken from Hill’s
translation: Saint Augustine, The Trinity (trans.
Edmund Hill; vol. 5 of The Works of
St. Augustine; Brooklyn: New City,
1991).
 19
Questions discussed under the rubric of the theology of
religions include the following: Under what circumstances, if
any, may indi- viduals experience salvation apart from the
witness of the church? To what extent, and on what basis, can
one recognize elements of truth and goodness in non-Christian
religions? What role, if any, do non- Christian religions qua
religions play in salvation-history? To what end, and on what
basis, should Christians enter into dialogue with adherents of
other religions? Finally, to what extent can one incorporate non-
Christian religious practices into the development of indigenous
churches in missionary contexts? For a helpful introduction to
the theology of religions, see Veli- Matti Kärkkäinen, An
Introduction to the Theology of Religions: Biblical, Historical,
and Contemporary Perspec- tives (Downers Grove: InterVarsity,
2003).
20
Not only is the explanatory power of this typology quite
limited (focus- ing exclusively on soteriology), but this typology
also veils the fact that every interpretation of religion is
“exclusive” inasmuch as it offers a “tradition-specific” account
of other religions that claims to be ontologi- cally and
epistemologically correct. Gavin D’Costa cogently argues this
point as the basis for a trenchant critique of a pluralist theology
of religions in The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity
(Maryknoll: Orbis,
2000).
21
Discerning the Spirit(s) is a revised version of Yong’s
dissertation which he completed at Boston University under
Robert Cummings Neville in 1998.
22
Yong, Discerning the Spirit(s), 94.
23
Readers who are familiar with the work of Clark Pinnock will
imme- diately note the similarities between Pinnock and Yong.
24
Yong, Discerning the Spirit(s), 61. In arguing for a “distinct
economy” of the Spirit, Yong builds upon the work of Georges
Khodr. See Georges Khodr, “Christianity and the Pluralistic
World—The Econ- omy of the Holy Spirit” Ecumenical Review 23
(1971): 118-28. Although in the immediate context (p. 61) Yong
is describing the proposal of Georges Khodr, it is clear that he
embraces this assumption as well.
25
Yong, Discerning the Spirit(s), 69.
26
Ibid., 69.
 27
Ibid., 136.
28
Ibid., 251.
29
Ibid., 254.
30
Ibid., 131.
31
Ibid., 312.
32
Ibid., 256-309.
33
Ibid., 279.
34
Ibid., 320 (italics original).
35
Heim, Depth of the Riches, 17.
36
Ibid., 31-32.
37
Ibid., 187.
38
Ibid., 189.
39
Ibid., 92-93.
40
Ibid., 196.
41
Ibid., 210.
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid.
44
Ibid., 211.
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid., 275 (italics original).
47
Ibid.
48
See Miikka Ruokanen, The Catholic Doctrine of Non-
Christian Religions According to the Second Vatican Coun- cil
(New York: E. J. Brill, 1992).
49
Catholic proponents of P1 would include Gavin D’Costa and
Joseph DiNoia.
 50
Catholic proponents of P2 would include Karl Rahner, Paul
Knitter, Hans Küng and Raimundo Panik- kar.
51
Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism,
277.
52
Ibid., 279.
53
Ibid., 293.
54
Ibid., 316.
55
Ibid., 299.
56
Ibid., 245.
57
Ibid., 303.
58
Ibid., 345.
59
Ibid., 386.
60
My critique will focus upon Yong’s proposal as outlined in
Discern- ing the Spirit(s). At the end of my analysis I will briefly
discuss a more recent book entitled Beyond the Impasse:
Toward a Pneumatological Theology of Religions (Grand Rapids:
Baker Academic, 2003). At this point I would simply note that
Yong does not make any revisions to the sub- stance of his
proposal in the latter book. On the contrary, he continues to
affirm a distinct “economy” of the Spirit as well the legitimacy
of non- christological criteria for discerning the Spirit’s
presence.
61
Inasmuch as the Filioque ostensibly “subordinates” the
work of the Spirit to the Son, it ostensibly under- mines his
project.
62
The question regarding the formal legitimacy of the
insertion of the
Filioque clause into the creed must be distinguished from the
substan- tive theological question of whether the Holy Spirit
proceeds from the Father and the Son. One can affirm the latter
while denying the propri- ety of the former.
63
See Kilian McDonnell, The Other Hand of God: The Holy
Spirit as the Universal Touch and Goal (Colleg- eville, MN:
Liturgical, 2003), 86-97,
196-201, 228-29.
 64
Yong refers to the Son and Spirit as the “two hands” of God
on at least sixteen different occasions in Discerning the
Spirit(s). Notice how he acknowledges his indebted- ness to
Khodr, Knitter, and others: “Khodr’s suggestion, echoed by
Samartha, Dupuis and Knitter, is that a retrieval of Irenaeus’s
theological metaphor allows us to recognize the different
economies of the Word and the Spirit” (Yong, Discerning the
Spirit(s), 62).
65
In the original context of Irenae- us’s trinitarian theology,
the “two hands” metaphor served to high- light the “direct”
nature of God’s involvement in the world over and against
Gnostics who posited a chain of intermediaries between God
and the world.
66
“A striking way of expressing the divine unity and its
embrace is through the description of the word and spirit as the
hands of God” (Eric Osborn, Irenaeus of Lyons [Cambridge:
Cambridge University,
2001], 91).
67
In fairness to Yong, it should be noted that in many places
where he employs the “two hands” metaphor, he explicitly
acknowledges that
the Son and Spirit work together. For example, commenting
on the Son and Spirit as the “two hands,” Yong explains, “As
such, they are both present universally and par- ticularly in
creation, and, in the words of Congar, they ‘do God’s work
together’” (Yong, Discerning the Spirit(s), 116).
68
Yong makes the mistake of equat- ing “mission” and
“economy.” Notice how he uses these terms interchangeably in
the following statement: “Preliminarily then, a pneumatological
theology of reli- gions that validates the distinction between the
economy of the Word and Spirit holds the christological problem
in abeyance. For now, it is sufficient to grant that there is a
relationship-in-autonomy between the two divine missions”
(Ibid., 70 [italics mine]).
69
McDonnell, The Other Hand of God,
198. “While insisting on the ‘real’ distinction between the two
mis- sions of the Word and Spirit, there is a danger of
conceiving of them as two foci at the ends of an ellipse
. . . . Such a conception, although not necessarily heretical,
would be dangerous and might lead to a kind of economic
tritheism” (Ibid.,
 200). Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that positing
two economies could lead to economic “bitheism.”
70
This highlights another problem with Yong’s proposal. Yong
not only brackets a christological per- spective but he also
brackets what might be called a “patrological” perspective. If
the Spirit represents divine presence in Yong’s proposal,
one might rightly say with McDon- nell that the Father
symbolizes divine purpose: “The Father is the origin of the
downward (outward) movement and the goal of ascend- ing
(returning) movement” (Ibid.,
94). By bracketing the Father, Yong effectively obscures the
goal of the economy of salvation.
71
At several points Yong highlights the biblical basis for and
benefits of a “Spirit-Christology” for a pneu- matological
theology of religions. See Yong, Discerning the Spirit(s),
118-120. “Spirit-Christology” is attractive because it
emphasizes the dependence of Jesus upon the Spirit in his
earthly life and ministry in a way that undermines “subordi-
nationist” understandings of the Spirit’s ministry. Yong’s appeal
to Spirit-Christology, however, raises an important question: If
there is no “Christ without Spirit” (as advocates of Spirit-
Christology insist), then how can there be “Spirit without Christ”
as Yong’s pro- posal seems to imply? Inasmuch as Spirit-
Christology emphasizes the intrinsic economic relatedness of
the Son and Spirit, it stands in tension with Yong’s “distinct
economy” of the Spirit.
72
In the Pauline epistles we see fur- ther evidence that the
Holy Spirit bears witness to, and glorifies the Son. The Spirit
glorifies Christ by witnessing to the “sonship” of the redeemed
(Rom 8:1-17), empower- ing the preaching of the gospel (1
Cor 2:2-5; Rom 15:14-21), enabling believers to confess that
Jesus Christ is Lord (1 Cor 12:2-3), removing the “veil” so that
men and women
can see the glory of Christ who is the image of God (2 Cor 3:7-
4:6), enabling believers to become con- formed to the image of
the Son (Rom
8:26-30), and enabling believers to know and experience the
love of Christ (Eph 3:14-21).
73
According to Augustine, The Holy Spirit’s “coming needed
to be dem- onstrated by perceptible signs, to show that the
whole world and all nations with their variety of lan- guage was
going to believe in Christ by the gift of the Holy Spirit.” De Trin.
IV.29, 175.
 74
As Lesslie Newbigin rightly notes, “The Spirit who thus
bears witness in the life of the Church to the pur- pose of the
Father is not confined within the limits the Church. It is the clear
teaching of the Acts of the Apostles, as it is the experience of
missionaries, that the Spirit goes, so to speak, ahead of the
Church. Like Cornelius, men of every age and nation have been
miraculously prepared beforehand to receive the message of
Christ. But—because the Spirit and the Father are one—this
work of the Spirit is not in any sense an alternative way to God
apart from the Church; it is the prepara- tion for the coming of
the Church, which means that the Church must be ever ready
to follow where the Spirit leads.” Lesslie Newbigin, Trinitarian
Themes for Today’s Mission (London: Paternoster, 1998), 53-54.
75
“For his words, ‘He will glorify me,’ can be understood in
this way: by pouring out love in the hearts of believers and by
making them spiritual, he revealed to them how the Son, whom
they only knew
before according to the flesh and, as men, thought him a
man, was equal to the Father. Or at least in this way: filled with
confidence by love itself, and with fear driven out, they
announced Christ to men, and thus his fame was spread out in
all the world.” Saint Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John,
55-111 (Fathers of the Church; vol. 90; trans. by John W. Rettig;
Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1994),
229.
76
Adopting this view does not require one to deny the
presence of truth and goodness in the lives of adher- ents of
other religions. On the con- trary, I would argue that elements
of truth and goodness in the lives of non-Christians can be
accounted for in terms of a Christian anthro- pology informed
by the doctrines of creation and fall. For example, in his
Institutes of the Christian Religion, John Calvin argues that
inside each person there resides an “awareness of divinity”
(sensus divinitatis). All religion—even pagan religion—can be
viewed as a response to this awareness of divinity. For a help-
ful discussion of the implications of Christian anthropology for
an evangelical theology of religions, see Harold A. Netland,
Encountering Religious Pluralism: The Challenge to Christian
Faith and Mission (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2001), 308-48.
77
On the one hand, Yong acknowl- edges the legitimacy of
praeparatio evangelica approach. On the other hand, it appears
that Yong wants to move beyond this approach. He claims that
viewing religions solely in terms of praeparatio evangelica
“leads to the kind of restrictive christological quests that
continue to denigrate the Holy Spirit as hav- ing less-than-equal
status as a trini- tarian member” (Yong, Discerning the Spirit(s),
320).
78
I am not merely offering a pragmatic critique (i.e., that
Yong’s proposal undermines an important “motiva- tion” for
evangelism). I am making a substantive theological claim about
how his proposal obscures the missionary nature of the eco-
nomic Trinity. If anything, rigor- ous Trinitarian reflection should
lead one to take more seriously the missionary nature of the
church: “The ultimate basis of mission is the triune God—the
Father who cre- ated the world and sent his Son by the Holy
Spirit to be our salvation. The proximate basis of mission is the
redemption of the Son by his life, death and resurrection, and
the immediate power of mission the Holy Spirit. It is, in
trinitarian terms, a missio Dei. Thus mission is based on the
will, movement, and action of the grace and love of God—
Father, Son and Holy Spirit” (Thompson, Modern Trinitarian
Perspectives, 72 [italics original]).
79
Yong, Discerning the Spirit(s), 136.
80
Ibid., 201.
81
This shift can be seen in his reading of Khodr. In Discerning
the Spirit(s) Yong reads Khodr almost solely as emphasizing an
independent econ- omy of the Holy Spirit; he effectively
brackets Khodr’s discussion of how this distinct economy of the
Spirit inherently points to Christ. See Yong, Discerning the
Spirit(s), 60-64. In Beyond the Impasse, he acknowl-
edges the christological dimension of Khodr’s proposal (which
he seems to view as somewhat problematic): “Khodr’s
presentation is neverthe- less not free from tension. Theolo-
gizing as he does from within the framework of Orthodox
trinitarian- ism, he sees the missions of the Son and Spirit as
much more connected than not. While the religions may be the
working of the economy of the Spirit, yet they are at the same
time in a very real sense connected to the economy of the Son”
(Yong, Beyond the Impasse, 89).
82
Perhaps the best way to summarize the difference between
Discerning the Spirit(s) and Beyond the Impasse would be to
say that the latter book, while articulating the same pro- posal,
is marked by much greater reserve. Beyond the Impasse, for
example, contains no bold asser- tions regarding the salvific
work of the Holy Spirit among the Umbanda in Brazil.
83
Augustine, for example, carefully distinguished
“procession” (imma- nent Trinity) from “mission” (eco- nomic
Trinity). See De Trin. II-IV.
 84
Karl Rahner’s famous axiom that
“[t]he ‘economic’ Trinity is the
‘immanent’ Trinity and the ‘imma- nent’ Trinity is the
‘economic’ Trinity,” constitutes the point of departure for much
contemporary Trinitarian reflection. Karl Rahner, The Trinity
(trans. Joseph Donceel; New York: Crossroad Publishing
Company, 1999), 22. Broadly speak- ing Rahner’s axiom has
evoked two responses. One group of theologians follows Rahner
in emphasizing the “identity” of the economic and the
immanent Trinity (in some cases pushing this “identity” to the
point that the latter is collapsed into the former). A second
group claims that Rahner’s axiom does not maintain an
adequate distinction between the economic and the immanent
Trinity. These theologians are will- ing to affirm, at least in a
quali- fied way, the first half of Rahner’s axiom (“the economic
Trinity is the immanent Trinity”) but often reject, or significantly
qualify, the second half (“the immanent Trinity is the economic
Trinity”) in order to pro- tect the freedom and transcendence of
God. For a helpful discussion of the relationship of the economic
and immanent Trinity, see Fred Sanders, The Image of the
Immanent Trinity: Rahner’s Rule and the Theological
Interpretation of Scripture (Issues in Systematic Theology
Series; vol. 12; New York: Peter Lang, 2005).
85
If the triune God does not exist apart from the economy,
there can be no economic revelation in the first place.
86
David Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God.
(New York: Oxford, 1999), 16-17. Coffey notes that one of the
weaknesses of Karl Rahner’s axiom is that it “does not tell us
which perspective [economic or immanent] is the more
fundamental, nor does it throw light on the order of our
knowledge of the Trinity” (Ibid., 14-15). Coffey addresses this
lacuna by distin- guishing “epistemological” and “ontological”
orders.
87
Coffey’s typology rightly challenges the tendency to
identity the “eco- nomic Trinity” with the teaching of
Scripture. As a systematic concep- tualization of the triune
God in the economy of salvation, the “economic Trinity” is no
less speculative than the “immanent Trinity” inasmuch as it
incorporates (either explicitly or implicitly) assumptions regard-
ing the immanent Trinity.
88
Heim argues that an “impersonal” dimension can be seen
in Old Testament theophanies (e.g., the “fire” through which
God appears to Moses). See Heim, Depth of the Riches, 185-86.
There are at least two problems with his argument. First, these
apparently “impersonal” manifestations represent one aspect
of a fundamentally “personal” self- revelation: it is the God of
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob who “speaks” to Moses from the
“burning bush.” To sever an “impersonal” aspect (e.g., “fire”)
from the “personal” and make it stand alone is highly
problematic. Second, no epistemic warrant exists for assuming
that a particular created form (e.g., fire) necessarily reveals
something about the immanent nature of the triune God.
89
See Ninian Smart and Stephen Kon- stantine, Christian
Systematic Theol- ogy in World Context (Minneapolis: Fortress,
1991), 174.
90
The following encapsulates their view of Scripture: “It
therefore seems nonsense to pretend that the Bible has
doctrinal or narrative authority” (Ibid., 47). By rejecting the
authority of Scripture, they reject the epistemic basis for a
Christian doctrine of the Trinity.
91
Moreover, it is without support in the Christian tradition.
92
“It is important to make the point that relations with God in
all three dimensions we have described are real relations with
God. They are not relations with something else (idols) or with
false gods. What humans find in such relations is truly there”
(Heim, Depth of the Riches, 199).
93
Ibid., 275 (italics mine).
94
One cannot call these “economies of salvation” because
Christian salva- tion does not represent their goal.
95
For Augustine (just as for the New Testament), all divine
activity is focused on the one divine economy effected in Christ
by the Holy Spirit.
96
Heim, Depth of the Riches, 213.
97
Heim’s equivocation on this point is quite revealing. On one
hand, he insists that individuals relate to the triune God. See
ibid., 199. On the other hand, he also claims that individuals
experience a relation with an “aspect” of God’s nature. Multiple
religious ends result from an “intensification of a particular kind
of relation with an aspect of divine life” (Ibid., 289 [italics
mine]). Thus, it is unclear whether the “rela- tion” exists with
the triune God or merely with an “aspect” of God.
98
Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism,
313.
99
In addition to Toward a Christian Theology of Religious
Pluralism, I will also draw upon a more recent work: Christianity
and the Religions: From Confrontation to Dialogue (trans. by
Phillip Berryman; Maryknoll, Orbis Books, 2002).
100
Dupuis, From Confrontation to Dia- logue, 88.
101
See De Trin. IV.30, 175. The unity of action of the divine
persons is a fundamental axiom of Trinitarian theology. It
represents a point on which Augustine and the Cappa- docians
were in clear agreement. For a discussion of unity of action in
Gregory of Nyssa, see Lewis Ayres, “On Not Three People: The
Fundamental Themes of Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian Theology
as seen in ‘To Ablabius: On Not Three Gods’,” Modern Theology
18 (2002):
445-474.
102
Augustine notes that while Rom
8:32 attributes the giving of the Son to the Father, Gal 2:20
attributes the Son’s death to his own decision.
103
“The unique closeness that exists between God and Jesus
by virtue of the mystery of the incarnation may never be
forgotten, but neither can the unbridgeable distance that
remains between the Father and Jesus in his human existence. .
. . While it is true that Jesus the man is uniquely the Son of God,
it is equally true that God (the Father) stands beyond Jesus”
(Dupuis, From Confrontation to Dialogue, 92 [italics mine]).
104
His distinction between the work of the Logos ensarkos
and Logos asarkos following the incarnation is grounded, to a
significant degree, in the distinction between the two natures of
Christ: “Admittedly, in the mystery of Jesus-the-Christ, the Word
cannot be separated from the flesh it has assumed. But,
inseparable as the divine Word and Jesus’ human existence
may be, they nevertheless remain distinct. While, then, the
human action of
the Logos ensarkos is the universal sacrament of God’s saving
action, it does not exhaust the action of the Logos” (Dupuis,
Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism, 299).
105
Dupuis, From Confrontation to Dia- logue, 139.
106
I am not suggesting that any kind of distinction between
the Logos ensarkos and Logos asarkos neces- sarily implies two
economies of salvation; rather I am arguing that the specific
way Dupuis employs this distinction implies this.
107
Although I am focusing on the work of the Logos, Dupuis
is careful not to sever the action of the Logos from the action of
the Spirit. It will become clear that Dupuis does not sever the
unicity of the economy of salvation by severing the Word from
the Spirit but rather by severing the work of the Logos ensarkos
from the work of the Logos asarkos.
108
See previous endnote. In the rest of this paragraph, it
should be under- stood that the Spirit is included when I speak
of the work of the Logos ensarkos or the Logos asar- kos.
109
See Dupuis, From Confrontation to Dialogue, 115-37.
Dupuis suggests that while Jesus Christ represents the
“qualitative fullness” of rev- elation, he does not represent the
“quantitative fullness” of revelation. It is precisely in this sense
that the revelation of the incarnate Christ is not “absolute.” On
this basis, Dupuis claims that one may recog- nize that other
religious scriptures contain the “word of God.”
110
Dupuis, Christian Theology of Reli- gious Pluralism, 303.
111
Karl Rahner coined the phrase the “anonymous Christian”
to describe individuals who experienced Chris- tian salvation
without knowing it.
112
The net result is two parallel econo- mies that converge
only eschato- logically; in the present stage of salvation-history,
they exist more or less in parallel.
113
See De Trin. IV.29, 174-75.
114
Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology of Religious
Pluralism, 259.
115
Immanuel Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties (trans. Mary
J. Gregor; New York: Abaris Books, 1979), 65-67.
116
This is the driving force behind Catherine M. LaCugna’s
controver- sial book God For Us: The Trinity and Christian Life
(San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1991).
117
John D. Zizioulas, Being as Com- munion: Studies in
Personhood and the Church (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s
Seminary, 1985).
118
Miroslav Volf, After Our Likeness: The Church as the
Image of the Trinity (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998).
 119
Leonardo Boff, Trinity and Soci- ety (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis,
1988); Thomas J. Scirghi, “The Trinity: A Model for Belonging in
Contempo- rary Society,” Ecumenical Review 54 (2002): 333-
42.
120
Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993).
121
Eugene F. Rogers, Sexuality and the Christian Body: Their
Way into the Tri- une God (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999).
122
Reich, K. Helmut, “The Doctrine of the Trinity as a Model
for Structur- ing the Relations Between Science and Theology,”
Zygon 30 (1995):
383-405.
123
“The sending of the church to the world is a continuation
of the Father’s sending of the Son and the Spirit. It is the aim of
these send- ing operations to awaken faith, to baptize, and to
start new communi- ties of discipleship. The Holy Spirit leads
the church to open new fields of mission, continuing the
apostolic history that began at Pentecost in Jerusalem. . . .
Should the church today continue to evangelize the nations in
the name of the triune God? That is basically the same question
as: Should the church con- tinue to be the church? The church
is constituted by the structure of the trinitarian mission of God
in the history of salvation. The church is the eschatological
creation of God’s Word serving to unite all humankind.” Carl E.
Braaten, “The Triune God: the Source and Model of Christian
Unity and Mission,” Missiology 18 (1990): 425.
124
From an Augustinian perspective, the missiones of the
Son and Spirit represent a temporal extension of their eternal
processiones.
125
It is helpful to remember that the early Trinitarian debates
were driven by soteriology.
126
“Trinitarian” preaching should not be construed as an
alternative to “Christocentric” preaching. Our preaching is
Christocentric because Jesus Christ represents the focal point of
the Trinitarian economy of salvation. At the same time, Chris-
tocentric preaching must be Trini- tarian in order to accurately
present the identity of Jesus Christ.
127
Karen Kilby has argued that prob- lematic appeals to
“perichoresis”
frequently involve three steps. First, “perichoresis” is named
as that which constitutes the unity of Father, Son, and Holy
Spirit. Next, “perichoresis” is defined by projecting some aspect
of human relatedness into God’s immanent life. Finally,
“perichoresis” is com- mended as an important resource
Christians have to offer the broader world. Karen Kilby,
“Perichoresis and Projection: Problems with Social Doctrines of
the Trinity,” New Blackfriars 81 (2000): 442.
128
For a discussion of the influence of William James’s
philosophy upon contemporary Trinitarian theology, see
Matthew W. Levering, “Beyond the Jamesian Impasse in Trinitar-
ian Theology,” Thomist 66 (2002):
395-420.
129
This is not to say that doctrines should have no practical
value. Kevin Vanhoozer rightly argues that the ultimate purpose
of Chris- tian doctrine is not merely to lead us to correct
understanding but to guide us in fitting participation on the
drama of redemption. See Kevin J. Vanhoozer, The Drama of
Doctrine: A Canonical-Linguistic Approach to Christian Theology
(Louisville: West- minster John Knox Press, 2005).
130
One of the biblical texts that frames Augustine’s quest is
Ps 105:4, “Seek his face.” Augustine cites this text as several
key points in De Trinitate. John Cooper has argued that one of
the most basic notions in Augus- tine’s thought is that of a
spiritual quest. See John Cooper, “The Basic Philosophical and
Theological Notions of Saint Augustine,” Augus- tinian Studies
15 (1984): 93-113.
131
See A. N. Williams, “Contem- plation: Knowledge of God in
Augustine’s De Trinitate,” in Know- ing the Triune God: The
Work of the Spirit in the Practices of the Church (ed. James J.
Buckley and David S. Yeago; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001),
121-46.
132
C. C. Pecknold, “How Augustine Used the Trinity:
Functionalism and the Development of Doc- trine,” Anglican
Theological Review 85 (2003): 141.
 Can Justice Exist Apart From
Truth?
By Bruce A. Little,
PhD Professor of Philosophy Wake Forest, North Carolina
United States of America

The most painful experience of modern consciousness is the

loss of center.
Richard Weaver

A direct correlation exists between the decline in the moral

content of a culture, the sense of justice and that culture’s
disdain for the idea of a universal—that which transcends
experience. Both justice and morality require universal Truth,
as Truth is the necessary foundation of justice and morality.
th
Unfortunately, beginning in the 20 Century the intellectual
movements in the West called for a denial of universal Truth,
suggesting there was nothing that transcended the human
experience. Shortly thereafter, the West began to experience a
moral ambivalence within its notion of justice in particular, as
well as a general confusion regarding matters of right and
wrong within culture in general. The intellectual impulse was
known as post modernity which cashed out as a commitment to
moral and epistemological relativism. Unfortunately, the
conclusion of the postmodern man was that universal Truth did
not exist, a position that has only exacerbated the moral free
fall of industrial nations in the last half of the Twentieth
Century and a subsequent convulsion in the concept of justice.
The commitment to the idea that truth is relative eventually
subverted both the idea of justice and morality in the West
leading to a fading sense of meaning and purpose in life. As
Gene Veith writes, “The postmodern mind-set can have a
devastating impact on the human personality. If there are no
absolutes, if truth is relative then there can be no stability, no
meaning in life. If reality is socially constructed, then moral
guidelines are only masks for oppressive power and individual
1
identity is an illusion.” Marcello Pera, philosopher, politician,
and president of the Italian Senate, comments on the effects of
relativism in the West: “The notion that the judgment of
cultures or civilizations constitutes an invalid mode of inquiry
has been put forward, most notoriously, by the school of
thought known as relativism. Various names have been given to
this school today: post-enlightenment thinking, post-
modernism, ‘weak thought,’ ‘deconstructionism’. The labels
have changed but, the target is always the same: to proclaim
that there are no grounds for our values and no solid proof or
argument establishing that any one thing is better or more
2
valid than another.” If one truth-claim is no better than the
other, or if one value is no better than the other, then no one
can judge another’s value as being wrong. It is also interesting
to note that it is at this time that there is a shift from talk about
virtues to talk about values. The former are universal, while the
latter are relative to a person or culture.
Denying the existence of universal Truth leaves man without
any fixed point of reference to provide him with some greater
context or overarching purpose by which meaning and
direction can be given to human existence. Without a fixed
point of reference, culture becomes like a man lost in the
woods, who looks only at his own feet for guidance to safety. All
his noble efforts lead him in circles which only compound his
state of lostness. So it is with the culture that tries to live
without universal Truth. Eventually, it loses a sense of an
overarching purpose and moral direction in life as everything
becomes relative to itself, resulting in, among other things, a
subversion of justice. In this case, there is no sure foundation
for morality, hence no foundation for justice. Lost is the
universal reference point whereby right and wrong are
measured which is, in a word—relativism. There is no
overarching standard that holds each accountable to the same
measure of justice which means that, in the end, justice
becomes whatever the moment requires for those who wish to
remain in power. Culture’s moral compass will always point in
whatever direction culture is heading.
 The outcome of moral relativism, practically speaking, is seen
in the plethora of social injustices plaguing the global
community at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The
rejection of universal Truth is the logical extension of the
denial of a transcendent reality, or what is called absolute
Reality. It seems that it is not simply a matter of coincidence
that this has come at a time when naturalistic metaphysics
prevail in the thinking of the Western mind. Yet, without the
3
acknowledgment of absolute Reality there will be no
recognition of universal truth, and without universal truth
justice has no grounding. Without some grounding in the
transcendent, justice eventually becomes relative where right is
measured by varying and often conflicting social constructs.
If one’s view of reality is only that which is in a state of
change or process, then it will follow that his view will be that
truth is changing or relative. In this case, justice is without any
grounding beyond man’s experience and all matters of justice
become arbitrary which is no justice at all. Unless there is some
universal Truth in which justice is grounded, then the judge
becomes a law unto himself—that is, there is no one to judge
the judge. Often the slogan “the end justifies the means”
becomes the criteria for what is passed off as justice.
Christianity, at least, taught that the judges were to judge by
the Law of God and were themselves judged by that same law.
This can be seen in Paul Robert's 1905 mural in the old Supreme
Court Building in Lausanne, Switzerland entitled, Justice Lifts the
Nations, “Robert pictured many types of legal cases in the
foreground and the judges in their black robes standing behind
the judges' bench. The problem is neatly posed: How shall the
judges judge? On what basis shall they proceed so that their
judgment will not be arbitrary? Above them Robert painted
Justice standing unblindfolded, with her sword pointed not
vertically upward but downward toward a book, and on the
4
book is written, 'The Law of God'." In this way, Christianity is
not relativistic morally as its sense of justice is grounded in
God’s universal Law (the transcendent Law). However, with the
dismissal of God, each man became his own grounding for
morality and justice which meant it was a system where right
was defined in terms of what seemed best for me. As Michael
Harrington (an atheist himself) observed, “The death of God has
indeed pointed toward the death of all the higher values. For
hundreds of years those values were, consciously or not, rooted
in the assumption of an absolute order in the universe,
guaranteed by God. When God and morality and religion were
relativized by the new scientific, historical, sociological and
anthropological consciousness of the nineteenth century, a
5
good part of traditional Western culture was undermined.”
Harrington understood Christianity and its commitment to
universal Truth grounded in God (absolute Reality) meant
justice and morality existed on non-relativistic terms. The
Christian view is that civil law is predicated upon the universal
moral Law, which is grounded in the Truth that God exists.
Hence, the authority of civil law is not rooted in the king/state,
but in the moral law which is above the king/state. This is to
say that in the Christian view, justice is grounded in that which
transcends human experience and it is this truth that
acknowledges the inescapable relationship between Truth and
Justice.
Of course, this only explains the grounds of justice, but
bringing it to bear on any culture is no easy task. Each culture
must struggle with the ever-present tension that exists
between the good of society and the freedom of the individual,
between the cohesive well-being of society and the liberties of
the individual. The balance is only achieved when justice
prevails; this means that justice cannot be found in arbitrary
judgments of relativism, but circumscribed by a Reality that
grounds all judgment. As Richard Weaver observes, “There is at
the heart of every culture a center of authority from which
there proceeds subtle and pervasive pressures upon us to
conform and to repel the unlike as disruptive. So, culture too is
faced with the metaphysical problem of freedom and
organization, which rules out the possibility of
6
uncircumscribed liberty." The idea that liberty is
circumscribed by some universal law, brings balance between
the freedom of the individual and the stable well-being of
society. The universal law, which I think can be argued is
written on the heart of all men, serves a dual purpose. It
informs culture on the transcendent just ordering of society
and it also requires of the individual a pattern of life that is
lived in a morally responsible way. Christianity teaches that the
same moral code that defines morality for the individual also
provides the basis for the culture's just ordering of society as a
whole. Speaking of the moral responsibility of the individual in
each society, one Russian has observed, "And yet, if we do not
learn to limit firmly our desires and demands, to subordinate
our interests to moral criteria--we, humankind, will simply be
torn apart, as the worst aspects of human nature bare their
teeth. It has been pointed out by various thinkers many times
(and I quote here the words of the twentieth century Russian
philosopher Nikolai Lossky): ‘if a personality is not directed at
values higher than the self, corruption and decay inevitably
7
take hold.’"
So at points where moral responsibility fails on the individual
level, order is upheld in society by the administration of justice,
but only if justice is non-arbitrary. So order within society is
maintained without abrogating the freedoms of the virtuous
citizens. Where justice rules, vice is not only punished, but
virtue is encouraged. Conversely, where injustice prevails,
virtue is discouraged, for justice is the core of virtue. It is
justice that stands between tyranny and anarchy.
Consequently, the good society recognizes and submits (in
public as well as in private) to the universal law. That is, it is
better to help your neighbor than unjustly harm your neighbor,
that a community of truth-tellers is better for society than a
community of liars, that rape is always wrong. It is this
recognition, that we live in a morally structured universe, that
holds the individual accountable for living according to that
moral ordering. Furthermore, it provides society with a moral
grounding for its justice that does not originate with society. In
this way, both the individual and society have the same
ordering principles that call for moral responsibility in the
individual and justice in society. Justice in turn encourages
individuals to be virtuous by the good being rewarded and the
vice being punished. The virtue of justice calls men to live in a
morally responsible fashion guided internally by a strong sense
of justice, character, and temperance. That is, to live
responsibly to God and to society. At each level and in all areas
of society these universal principles provide the foundation for
the life of society. Nothing else can provide a foundation
sufficiently strong enough to order society at every level so
that individual rights are protected, moral responsibility is
encouraged, and justice is extended to all.
Therefore, any attempt at strengthening the moral fiber of
our culture must begin with a renewed commitment to absolute
Truth as the foundation for justice. Absolute truth, I would
argue, cannot exist without the eternal, immutable God. This is
not first a call to religion, but to the acknowledgment that
there is an eternal intelligent, personal, immutable Being in
whom Truth resides because He is Truth. It is very possible
(maybe not wise, but possible) for a person to believe that the
eternal, intelligent, immutable personal God exists without
being religious. The essential point here is that absolute Truth
stands at the heart of society’s responsibility to administer
justice. Justice is the main pillar of society and Truth is the
necessary foundation.
We have, as human beings, lived rather recklessly with ideas
for the past 75 years. Because the foundation that was laid,
especially in the West, was so solid, it has only been of late that
we are beginning to feel the enormous impact of its rejection.
The West has spent the moral and intellectual capital of past
generations and the practical consequences are now on our
front doorstep. We have played with ideas as if they were our
own playthings; we could have embraced the wildest of ideas
and played with them without suffering any cultural
consequences. We deceived ourselves by thinking that man had
come of age and God was no longer needed. It was a myth, but
unfortunately a myth on which cultures were shaped, and are
even attempting to be shaped at this very hour in the West.
Paul Ramsey, in the 1960s optimistically said, “Ours is the first
attempt in recorded history to build a culture upon the premise
8
that God is dead.” The last 50 years have proven his optimism
to be overdrawn, as history shows us. The dismissal of
Christianity has found no sufficient substitute for morally
structuring either a community or a state. The idea that
Christianity was an unnecessary social or psychological myth
has proven to be both injurious to the West and blind to the
history of the West. As Pera says: “I will not enter into the
merits of the solutions, although I feel obliged to mention that
no serious attempt to account for these great moments in
history has ignored the contribution of Christianity—direct or
indirect, causal or concomitant, determinant or auxiliary,
supportive or critical—thereby confirming that Christianity has
9
been the greatest force in Western history.” Despite the fact
that the experiment of which Ramsey spoke some forty years
ago has not turned out so gloriously for all its promised
optimism, the lesson still has not been learned (or so it would
seem). Stubbornly the Christian roots of the West are ignored
as it struggles with moral confusion and growing social
injustice without acknowledging any relationship between
these two facts. As Pera points out: “Finally I will examine three
practical consequences of this philosophy [relativism]: the
negative influence of post-conciliar relativism on Christian
theology, which helps explain the current weakness of the
Church and the failure to obtain recognition of the Christian
roots of Europe in the new (and now defunct) European
10
Constitutional Treaty. . . .”
It has been recognized, almost universally, that a society
cannot survive for long where vice and injustice operate as the
governing principle of politics, economics and daily social
intercourse. Not all societies, however, have agreed on how
society should be guarded from vice and injustice. Some
societies have majored on suppressing vice by external means
only, which works in eliminating the vice that destroys society,
but does nothing to encourage justice, which strengthens
society. Absence of vice does not necessarily mean the presence
of justice or truth. The end is often some form of revolution
which solves little unless there is something substantive to
replace what it removes. It seems to me that unless cultural
relativism is abandoned, with a return to acknowledging the
transcendent, the West will continue to forfeit its place of
moral leadership in the world. A society that fails to be a just
society will soon become a society were injustice prevails giving
way to chaos and corruption, which weakens a society at its
core causing it to collapse on itself.

Endnotes
1
Gene Veith., Postmodem Times. (Wheaton: Crossway Books,
1994), 72 .
2
Joseph Ratzinger and Marcello Pera, (Trans. by Michael E.
Moore) Without Roots. (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 11.
3
Universal Truth refers to those truth statements that have a
universal status (absolute Truth is simply truth spelled with
the capital “T”). That is, they do not change with time or
space. Absolute Reality is that part of reality that does not
change it is immutable—and is referred to as transcendent
reality. Contingent reality is that reality which is subject to
change, such as mankind or one might say all of nature. If
Reality is in flux as Heraclitus taught, then from where did
meaning come. Without the transcendent reality which
anchors contingent reality, man was left with only the
particulars. Meaning then becomes relative as the only
meaning possible is what flows from the relationship of one
st
particular to the other. This is precisely the 21 century
moral quandary--it yearns for moral stability and social
justice, but has denied the very ground on which such is
possible.
4
Francis Schaeffer. How Should We Then Live?(Old Tappan, New
Jersey: Fleming H. Revell Company,1976), 106.
5
Michael Harrington, The Politics at God’s Funeral. (New York:
Penguin Books, 1983), 201.
6
Richard. Weaver, Visions of Order. Louisiana State University
Press, 1964; reprint, 1995 (Bryn Mawr, PA: Intercollegiate
Studies Institute (page references are to reprint ed.), 11.
7
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn,. Translated by Yermolai Solzhenitsyn.
The Russian Question at the End of the Twentieth Century
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1995), 127.
8
Time, “Toward a Hidden God” (April 8, 1966), 82.
9
Joseph Ratzinger and Marcello Pera, (Trans. by Michael E.
Moore) Without Roots. (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 2.
10
Ibid., 6.
 Divine Wrath
By Harold R. Booher, Ph.D
June 2010

A previous study “Is God Author of Evil” argued that the Old
and New Testaments are consistent with God having the central
characteristic of “love” and is not the author of evil even in the
Old Testament.1 Many of the statements of the Old Testament
that seem to imply God is the author of evil like hardening the
heart of Pharaoh or punishing children for the evil of their
parents are “figures of speech.” In these instances it is Satan
who is the true author of evil. God wishes the Old Testament
reader to believe He is the source of both good and evil because
He is ultimately responsible for creating Satan and giving him
free will to do evil. Another reason for such statements that
seem to attribute evil to God were permitted in the Old
Testament because He did not wish to place any special
emphasis on Satan to the Israelites because they could do little
to help God control Satan until Jesus had come to the earth,
died and was resurrected. After Christ started to fight Satan’s
kingdom on earth, Christians were able to participate in the
battle against Satan. Paul’s epistles spell out ways that
Christians can fight Satan and his powers on earth.
This does not explain however the concept of God’s wrath,
which He displayed frequently when He was angry. In Genesis
we see God’s wrath imposed on the entire world during Noah’s
flood. Another notable instance was the destruction of Sodom
and Gomorrah during the early years of Abraham’s contact
with God. In each of these instances we understand God lets
people go to the limits of their wickedness before acting to
destroy them The next large taking of life by God was the
firstborn of Egypt as God’s last plague to force Pharaoh to let
the Israelites leave Egypt. Very soon thereafter Pharaoh’s
entire fighting force and chariots were destroyed in the Red
Sea. These are some of the major acts of God in Exodus where
God takes human lives. Unlike the flood and Sodom and
Gomorrah events that are understandable examples of
wickedness provoking God’s divine wrath, we see something
different with the Egyptians. There is nothing to indicate that
the Egyptians were especially wicked by God’s standards. We
gather that God’s actions with Egypt are forced upon Him
because He has no other choice if He is to carry out His project
to move Israel back to their covenantal relationship with God.
Israel is His chosen nation to carry out His ultimate plan of
human salvation through Jesus Christ. The Egyptian events
appear more of the type where God has run out of patience with
the interference Pharaoh is placing upon God’s plan. If God
were a concrete wall and Pharaoh driving an automobile, it
would be unwise for Pharaoh to run off the road and smash into
the wall. He would likely do damage to himself simply because
the wall is not going to move out of his way. The only thing
that would convince Pharaoh to let the Israelites leave was the
death of at least some of the people, in this case “the first
born.”
Still another type of divine wrath begins with respect to Israel
after leaving Egypt. Here we see God’s relationship with Israel
changing from nurture to wrath to nurture to wrath over and
over throughout their wandering in the desert for forty years
and then occupying the chosen land. God’s dealing with the
Israelites and their enemies throughout the Old Testament is
filled with events involving God’s wrath which are not so easily
dismissed by figures of speech.
Never do we see an angry God looking for excuses to display
his wrath. He is a loving God, a merciful God, and a slow to
anger God. Yes He is also a jealous God, a Holy God, and a just
God. But wrath is not listed as a central characteristic. He can
however display great anger toward those who disobey Him or
practice things that are evil by His standard. Humans who
provoked God's anger initiated the flood and Sodom events.
God’s characteristic of “slow to anger” is shown by both of
these events. Before the flood, “every inclination of the
thoughts of [their] heart was only evil all the time.” (Gen 6:5).
God considered all people though out the earth (except Noah
and his family) “ as filled with wickedness all the time and had
resolved to destroy the earth. Even so, from the time Noah
started building the ark until the time God closed the door,
which was 100 years, Noah warned the people about what God
intended to do. We know from other examples, like Jonah with
Nineveh that God can change His mind if people change. In the
case of Sodom and Gomorrah God would have spared the cities
for the sake of only 10 righteous people (Gen 18:32).
But unlike the flood and Sodom (where we cannot be sure
there were any children at all) 2 there is a yet another type of
divine wrath (exercise of genocide through Israel rather than
directly from God) shown with Joshua’s invasion of Canaan.
This unique divine wrath (in part implemented through the
chosen people; in part show greater impatience on the part of
God and in part more complete and merciless) is one that
applied divine justice for wickedness of the type which
interfered with God’s ultimate plan for mankind. It was the
kind of divine wrath that could kill children of convicted
parents. For example Koral, Dathan and Abiram and along with
their families stand in front of their tents and God opens the
earth and swallows them all. (Numbers 16:27, 32). The attempt
of these three men to replace Moses as Israel’s leader totally
angers God because it interferes with His plan for Israel. He
cannot afford any political bickering to slow down the
movement of Israel as His chosen people. There had been
enough set backs (like the golden calf) with the leadership of
Moses and Aaron. He cannot allow this “stiff-necked people” to
get completely out of control. In some instances God even
allows the Israelites to commit genocide, killing men, women,
children and the animals of entire cities. Nowhere are the
examples as extreme as God’s command to Joshua to destroy
the Canaanite cities and all their inhabitants. The city of Jericho
was completely destroyed and dedicated to the Lord. “They
devoted the city to the Lord and destroyed with the sword
every living thing in it—men and women, young and old, cattle,
sheep and donkeys.”(Joshua 6:21) Or the towns of Sihon, King
of Heshbon “The Lord our God delivered him over to us … we
took all his towns and completely destroyed them—men,
women and children. We left no survivors.” (Deut 2:32-33).
We cannot ignore that there are things recorded in the Old
Testament which occur as a result of God’s wrath that are
inconsistent with a God who loves everyone, even to the point
that the innocent can be destroyed as a result. One thing we can
be sure of is that figures of speech do not lessen the severity of
being on the receiving end of God’s wrath. “It is a fearful thing
to fall into the hands of the living God” (Heb 10:31). “The
beginning of wisdom is fear of the Lord.” (Psalm 111:10) Some
of the instances of God’s wrath against individual sinners make
the hair on our head stand up. We usually do not think of how
tough God is with those who do not do exactly what He
commands in the Old Testament. Violators of the work on
Sunday commandment were executed (Ex 31:15). Anyone who
touched the Ark of the Covenant without permission was in
danger of being immediately killed by the hand of God (2Sam.
6:4-6).
Another possible argument for God taking children’s lives
when in the path of the returning Israelites is they will have an
opportunity for an afterlife that might not be as likely should
they become adults in the culture that surrounded them. This is
because God will judge everyone based on his or her behavior in
this life. A child is not likely to have reached the age of free will
to do evil. However, this comes dreadfully close to the
reasoning of those humans who take their children’s lives to
save them from this world. But God is not human. He does give
and take away. Even today when a child dies from a disease or
an accident, many think of God taking her away and going
directly to heaven where her life will be far better. During the
Armenian earthquake in 1999, an Armenian friend stated, “God
must have needed a lot of new angels in heaven to allow this to
happen.” But God does not give us any such license. He strictly
forbids humans to murder. War however seems to have
different rules for killing including killing civilians of a warring
nation, even for God. We have great difficulty understanding
these aspects of the Old Testament God being consistent with
one of mercy, love, and grace. I personally think this problem
is a mystery close to that of the problem of evil. For example in
the case of Joshua destroying Canaanites it appears God could
avoid genocide, but chooses not to. God either killing or
approving the killing of children in the Old Testament gives
many of us a problem with God being all good. Like the concept
of innocent suffering, the problem of God’s genocide is one
where we are unable to conceive a reasonable answer.
 Perhaps the word for children in Hebrew is really young men,
not little babies or other innocent children. Otis’s Sellers used
this argument to soften God’s harshness with children (KJV) in
a case of Elisha and the bears. The event presented in 2 Kings
23-24 starts with Elisha going to Bethel and some children
(youths) can out of town jeering at Elisha, saying “Go on up, you
bald head.” Elisha “called down a curse on them in the name of
the Lord,” and “two bears came out of the woods and mauled
forty two of the youths.” Whether youths, children or grown
men, the punishment for name-calling seems overly harsh. I
can only conclude that God’s choice on some of the paths He
guides the Israelites through in the history of Israel are paths of
greater good to assure His ever getting to the milestone
sacrifice of His own son in dealing with Satan and other free
agent forces of evil. Whatever His reasons Job notes, “The Lord
gave and the Lord takes away.” (Job 1:21). The giving and taking
of life is the Lord’s prerogative. This argument is similar to the
one of “potter’s clay” in Isaiah and repeated by Paul in the New
Testament. Isaiah (29:16) asks the question “Shall the potter be
esteemed as the clay; for shall the thing made say of him who
made it, ‘He did not make me’”? “Or shall the thing formed say
of him who formed it, ‘He has not understanding’”? Paul in
Rom 9:21 forms the question a little differently to bring out the
created difference in people for God’s purposes, “Does not the
potter have power over the clay, from the same lump to make
one vessel for honor and another for dishonor?” Paul (Rom
9:14) also repeats the argument from Exodus 33:19. “I will have
mercy on whom I will have mercy.” God is God. He made us and
He can unmake us. These are all ways of saying God can treat
people differently in this life. We have not the right to question
His ways. However we do have the right to try and understand
our Lord with the minds He gave us. Divine wrath simply does
not fit well with the central characteristics He claims for
Himself.
John Sanders provides new insight on divine wrath that
softens the concept of divine wrath to some degree. First of all
wrath is not a characteristic of God, like love, grace, holiness, or
righteousness. “Wrath is an instrument in the divine hands, not
an attribute of God”3 Any attempt to balance wrath with love as
equal attributes of God is flawed. Sanders points out that the
secret of God’s anger is really because of His love. He is not
indifferent toward the creatures he made, but He cannot stand
to see his beloved ruin herself, so he actively seeks her renewal.
When His efforts are rejected, God becomes angry. “The break
in relationship brings grief to the heart of God. He has made
himself vulnerable, and that vulnerability has been betrayed.” 4
Since Israel is His chosen nation to bring Christ into the
equation, which in turn brings in the salvation of the entire
world, most of His anger in the Old Testament is with Israel.
“The purpose of God’s wrath is to open a future for the broken
relationship. ‘The Lord is long-suffering, compassionate, loving,
and faithful, but He is also demanding, insistent, terrible, and
dangerous.’”5 Ultimately God is worried, that should His plan
through Israel fail, things could turn out that all his human
creatures will be lost (as with the time of Noah’s flood). He is
angry that this need not happen to his creatures. His
requirements are not that difficult.
Another point about God’s wrath is that it is relatively easy
for His anger to be overcome with His mercy. “God is not like us
in that his compassion is more fundamental than his anger.” 6
An example of this is found in Judges 10-6-16. It is a typical
situation where the Israelites have forsaken Yahweh and have
turned to worship other gods. As a result Yahweh delivers
them into the hands of foreign oppressors who mistreat the
Israelites. After eighteen years, the Israelites cry out to God,
seeking mercy and confessing their sin. God challenges them to
cry out to the gods they have been worshiping. God challenges
them to seek help from their adulterous lovers. “God is
depicted as a wounded lover speaking strong words of
rejection.” Even though God is so angry that he emphatically
says he would not deliver them from their oppressors, the
people of Israel showed they did not take the divine wrath
statement of God as the final word. They put away their idols
and began again to serve Yahweh. Consequently, “Yahweh
could bear the misery of Israel no longer” (Judges 10:16). From
His basic character of mercy, He then raised up Jephthah to
deliver the people.
Once God’s anger is assuaged, He forgets all about the cause of
His anger. In Exodus 4:24 God was angry with Moses for not
circumcising his son, even to the point of God searching for
Moses to “kill him.” Knowing the reason for God’s anger, Moses’
wife Zipporah immediately drew out a knife and circumcised
the child, and states “Surely you are a bridegroom of blood to
me” (Ex 4:25). God moves on as though nothing had ever
happened. “So the Lord let him alone.” (Ex 4:26).
A third observation of Sanders is that it is not unusual for God
to bring humans into conference, giving them an opportunity
to change His mind about His planned display of wrath.
Abraham pleads with God about destroying Sodom and
Gomorrah by arguing that He would not destroy an entire city
if righteous people can be found in the city. God agrees on
numbers ranging from 50 to a final 10. God would spare the city
if only 10 righteous people could be found. None (outside of
Abraham’s nephew Lot) were identified. So even though He
gave Abraham a chance to change His mind, Abraham was not
able to provide a convincing argument. The one righteous
person (Lot and his wife and daughters) was saved. In a later
example God is so angry at the Israelites that He tells Moses He
plans to destroy all of Israel and start over with Moses and
create a new nation (Numbers 14:11-12). Moses however is able
to argue God out of His plan and forgive the Israelites and
continue to work with them. Moses reasons with God that the
nations who hear of God destroying his people will say “The
Lord was not able to bring these people into the land he
promised them on oath; so he slaughtered them in the desert”
(Num. 14:16). “In accordance with your great love, forgive the
sin of these people, just as you have pardoned them from the
time they left Egypt until now” (Num 14:19). God does change
His mind based on Moses’ argument and says, “I have forgiven
them, as you asked” (Num 14:20).7
Finally the Old Testament understanding of divine wrath and
mercy develops progressively. As early as within Exodus itself
progress is shown in the greater importance placed on divine
love versus punishment of sin. Sanders lists the following
changes from the beginning of Exodus to the end. “To begin,
the order is reversed; divine love is placed before mention of
punishment of sin. Second, the conditional is removed, calling
attention to God’s unconditional love. Third, many new
elements are added in describing the divine nature. “God is
compassionate and gracious, slow to anger, and abounding in
loving-kindness and faithfulness, and he forgives iniquity,
transgression and sin.”8 By the time of Jonah and Joel, God is
still gracious and compassionate, slow to anger, abounding in
loving-kindness. But some additional characteristics are added.
First God now repents of His judgments on sin and second the
original reference to “not clearing the guilty” has been
dropped. Finally by Ezekiel 18:14-20 the entire idea of visiting
iniquity of future generations is explicitly repudiated. God has
taken on a divine risk: “Will anyone love, obey, and hold fast to
him so as to have life.”9
I have set before you life and death,
blessings and curses. Choose life so that you
and your descendents may live, loving the
LORD your God, obeying him, and holding
fast to him; for that means life to you (Deut
30:19-20).
To Sanders’ insights on divine wrath we should add God’s plan
for the future of all mankind. We are aware of some being
resurrected early into the kingdom on earth, a second coming
of Christ when some will be removed from the kingdom while
others will stay, and a final judgment when those not found in
the book of life will be cast into hell. (Our interpretation of hell
is annihilation [a second death], not eternal torment for those
unfortunate souls). But Jesus gives us a hint that judgment of
ultimate outcome for people is not totally black and white. He
mentions that it will go easier for the inhabitants of Sodom
than for those Israelites of Korazin, Bethsaida, and Capernaum
who rejected his message during the gospel period. “If the
miracles that were performed in you had been performed in
Sodom, it would have remained to this day, but I tell you that it
will be more bearable for Sodom on the Day of Judgment than
for you” (Matthew 11:23-23). If the inhabitants of Sodom are to
have an easier time of it during the future judgment than some
of the Israelites what can this mean other than there is some
kind of relative punishment in the future? The Bible is mostly
silent on this but we know a belief in some kind of transitional
existence between heaven and hell is held by some Christian
faiths. The Sodom example would support this.
We also believe that the Bible provides some support for
children who have died early will be restored to the original
parents in the kingdom. Satan killed all Job’s children and all of
his animals. When God restored Job’s possessions, it is
mentioned that Job received double what he had before. In the
case of animals Job received at the time double the number he
originally had, but in the case of children he received the same
number that were killed. Those killed were not resurrected at
the time, but in order for Job to have double the children, he
would expect to have the original children as well as his new
children in the kingdom.
So we cannot completely agree with Schoenheit et al that
anything that differs in the Old Testament from the nature of
God and His plan revealed in the New Testament is a figure of
speech. Figures of speech and proper interpretation can soften
several of the examples of God being the author of evil, but His
wrath is a real demonstration of what God will employ when He
is angry. And if the killing of innocent children is not evil, it is
difficult to imagine what is. Sanders provides a strong
argument for God’s wrath not being part of His character, but
rather a tool used to bring about His people into the necessary
relationship if His plan for human salvation is to be brought
about. In other words, God’s anger is not a characteristic of His
central personality. God’s central character includes
unconditional love, compassion, and graciousness. He abounds
in loving kindness and faithfulness. He is slow to anger and he
forgives iniquity, transgression and sin.
Nevertheless for reasons known only to God He does author at
least some evil by our human definition. As frequently noted in
this paper He kills innocent children when they are part of a
family, city, or nation that has been condemned for elimination
by God. While we cannot directly attribute all innocent
suffering directly to God, His elimination of entire families in
the Old Testament when they stand in the way of Israel or
conversely His allowance of death and destruction of Israel’s
families when they are not in His favor (for things like
worshipping other Gods) shows God does instigate evil in at
least those instances.10 While we can see specific examples and
perhaps partially understand God’s reasons for these examples
of His intolerance and in the case of innocent children as
directly authoring evil recorded in the Bible, this seems to
diminish by the time Jesus walked the earth. We have no
evidence at all for God’s involvement in any evil in the Gospels,
but by the time of Acts we have at least two examples of God’s
wrath which took lives for what we today would likely consider
mistakes by “good people.”11 We do not have any evidence of
God’s wrath applied even to the wicked in the current era since
the completion of the Acts period. On the other hand, neither
do we do have any evidence that God is not involved in the evil
that the innocent suffer in the here and now. At the least He
certainly allows many innocent to suffer and die untimely and
horrible deaths. But we are now in period of grace where God
does not punish the wicked or reward the righteous in any
public manner.
Perhaps if we could better understand the examples of God’s
evil in the Old Testament, we would have a better
understanding for the problem of evil in general. Why does a
God who is good and omnipotent allow such incredible evil in
this world? The Old Testament examples show the innocent
who suffer and die are related by family or nation to those God
commands to die or suffer in response to wickedness. Children
of people condemned by God are not immune from divine
punishment when it covers a family, a city, or a nation.
..the Bible does not understand the destruction of the men,
women, and children of these cities [Jerico and Ai] as a
slaughter of innocents. Not even the children are considered
innocent. They are all part of an inherently wicked culture that
if allowed to live, would morally and theologically pollute the
people of Israel.12.
Another finding from observing God authoring evil in the Old
Testament is that it is always for an ultimate greater good in
God’s plan. Anytime He authors evil in the Old Testament its
purpose is to bring Israel back into the proper path of
righteousness. We can surmise that the evil allowed in the
present era is somehow for a greater ultimate good in God’s
plan. That goodness is, of course, God’s judgment of ultimate
good and bad, and may not agree with ours. Most of us would
prefer God tradeoff some of the freewill we are experiencing
now for some of the peace on earth of the future
A book has been written on some of the views held by
evangelicals regarding God and the Canaanite genocide 13 C.S.
Cowles is the only one of the four who makes “The Case for
Radical Discontinuity.” By “radical discontinuity” he argues
that the message of Christ to “Love your enemies and pray for
those who persecute you” is radically different from the
command of God to Israel in dealing with the Canaanites “to
destroy them totally… and show them no mercy.” The
differences in the God of the two testaments is so great that
Cowles does not try to justify many of the commands of the Old
coming from the same God who said “love your enemies” in the
New. Cowles relies on an approach to inspiration and authority
of the Old Testament that is more from the minds of the writer
than that reflecting the character of God. Everything in the Old
Testament is from the point of view of the writers who were
from a nation that lived and died by conducting war. To these
writers, it was God who was on their side when they won and
God who was against them when they lost. Anything that
reflects violence in the Old Testament needs not to be taken
seriously as reflecting the direct command or character of God.
The people of Israel did not see God revealed as clearly as
Christians in the New Testament. Jesus “did not endorse every
word in the Hebrew Scriptures as the authentic Word of God
and rejected some Torah texts as representing the original
intention and will of God.” 14 Essentially Cowles maintains that
the acts of the Israelites against Canaan were not done from a
command from God.
The other three views (Eugene Merril – The Case of Moderate
Discontinuity); (Daniel Gard – The Case for Eschatological
Continuity); (Temper Longman III – The Case for Spiritual
Continuity) do not agree with Cowles in radically dividing the
Old from the New Testament to essentially reflect two different
understandings of God but rather agree that the nature of God
must include both holy, righteous, and just characteristics as
well as gracious, merciful, and forgiving characteristics. Merrill
states it best: “These apparently mutually exclusive traits
coexist in the record without resolution. Thus, the moral and
ethical dilemma of Yahweh war must also remain without
satisfactory satisfying rational explanation.”15 Some factors
may help the believer to accept that God does possess all the
traits mentioned above which in the long run are consistent.
1. “The genocide sanctioned by Scripture was unique to its
time, place, and circumstances. It is not to be carried over to
the age of the church.”16
2. In all the examples of God using genocide (Noah, Sodom,
Amorites, Canaan) God waited patiently until their sin “reached
its full measure” (Gen. 15:16).
3. There has been a cosmic war going on between God and
Satan that was true in both the Old Testament and the New. We
assume it is still going on today. Until Satan’s powers are staid,
God must conduct war to overcome evil. Much of the Old
Testament wars of Israel were required if Israel were to stay in
existence as a chosen nation of God. Wars of all kinds kill many
innocent people.
4. There would have been no need for Jesus to die on the cross
for everyone’s sins if a holy, righteous God did not exist. No one
can enter His presence if the sins are not washed away. Jesus
did that for mankind. God accepted the perfect sacrifice to
cover all sins. However in the long run there will be those who
resist a sovereign God. One of the tools still in Gods armory is
His ability and willingness to destroy that which is not holy and
righteous (especially if He has tried everything else within His
enduring patience, fairness, and grace).
5. The New Testament (especially Revelation, but also Jesus in
the Gospels and Paul in his letters) predicts a time when God
will come in power and glory to establish his everlasting
kingdom and His righteous wrath will again be displayed This
must happen before total peace will prevail.
This is a difficult topic to write about. I have noticed that
conservative writers and Bible commentaries quickly skip over
the killing of children by God. Apart from the above
commentary on the Canaanite genocide, few try to explain
God’s actions in this area.17 Usually if anything is said at all it
is just a recording of the event as a consequence of Israel’s
wars. To the outsider, whether God is involved or not, there is
little difference between what happens to the innocent in
human wars and the innocent in God’s wars. It seems to me the
person who believes the New and Old Testaments are consistent
and that they reflect the same God in both must believe there
are times that God judges the killing or suffering of the
innocent is necessary for Him to achieve a greater good.
Somehow this necessary evil stems from the love of God. This is
admittedly very difficult to accept by conscientious people. But
is it any more difficult to believe that the Old Testament
suffering and deaths are ultimately a necessary part of God’s
greater good for the future than the innocent suffering and
dying in the here and now? In either case, the Old Testament
or the current era, it is by faith that we believe God has before
(and is now) acting for a ultimately better good for all of
mankind.
Further, were it not for the teaching of the Bible that God is
love, how would we possible know that God does anything out
of love. As stated by Timothy Keller “The belief in a God of pure
love—who accepts everyone and judges no one—is a powerful
act of faith. Not only is there no evidence for it in the natural
order, but there is almost no historical, religious textual
support for it outside of Christianity. The more one looks at it,
the less justified it appears.”18 He concludes, “that the source
of the idea that God is Love is the Bible itself. And the Bible tells
us the God of Love is also a God of judgment who will put all
things to rights in the end.”19
Another powerful point of Keller which helps us put God’s
ways in perspective compared to ours is the business of
Christian people forgiving wrong doing and not trying to obtain
justice through violence with our own hands. “Vengeance is
mine, says the Lord.” The concept of divine justice is critical
for preventing an endless vortex of retaliation. “If I don’t
believe that there is a God who will eventually put all things
right, I will take up the sword and will be sucked into the
endless vortex of retaliation. Only if I am sure that there’s a God
who will right all wrongs and settle all accounts perfectly do I
have the power to refrain.”20
Such a thing as genocide is unthinkable in Christian teaching
for human beings. But God in his exercise of justice that puts all
things right in the end may have required destruction of entire
families, cities, and nations in order to ensure the world would
eventually produce the historical Jesus. Further everything God
does with life and death of individuals does include a
resurrection and judgment of all who have lived. Everyone will
be eventually be judged by the fairest and most gracious judge
in existence, the eternal God.
 Endnotes
1. Booher, H. R. “Is God the Author of Evil,” June 2010
2. Otis Sellers argues that there were no children killed in the
flood or at Sodom and Gomorrah. Genesis 6:4 tells us that
“the sons of God (angels?) went to the daughters of men and
had children by them.” Offspring of different species would
not be able to have offspring of their own. An ass and a
donkey can have a jenny, but jennies do not reproduce.
Sellers believes this practice of angels impregnating human
women had spread so far that only Noah and his family were
capable of reproduction. There may have been a general
decrease in fertility as well. We note that Noah’s three sons
were several hundreds of years old (after the flood) before
having any offspring. They had no children before the flood.
So far as Sodom and Gomorrah, if homosexuality had spread
to nearly everyone in those cities, there would be no children
by the time God decided to destroy them.
3. Sanders, John, The God Who Risks Downers Grove, IL:
Intervarsity. 2007, p. 65.
4. Ibid, p. 66
5. Ibid, p. 66, the subquote is from Heschel, Abraham J. The
Prophets, (2001) Perennial Modern Classics.
6. Ibid, p. 67.
7. Even though God forgives the Israelites and does not destroy
them, He considers them a stiff-necked people who treat Him
“with contempt” and refuse to believe in Him “in spite of all
the miraculous signs I have performed among them”(Num
14: 11). God decides even though He forgives them “not one
of the men who saw my glory and the miraculous sign I
performed in Egypt and in the desert but who disobeyed and
tested me ten times—not one of them will ever see the land I
promised on oath to their forefathers” Num.20-23.
8. Sanders, op. cit. no.3, p. 67.
9. Ibid, p. 68.
10. All aspects of God’s evil can of course be explained as
justice for the guilt that everyone is a part of because of the
fall. In the New Testament, Jesus mentions that without belief
in him we are already condemned. (John 3:16).
11. There are at least two instances where God exercised
judgment of death to Christians that appear to be (to us
today) minor infractions. One is recorded in Acts 5:1-11
where for themselves. They apparently claimed they were
making a gift of the whole amount to God. As Peter said, you
were under no obligation to sell the property for the Lord, nor
 after you sold it to give it to God. It was lying to the Holy
Spirit that they were giving the entire amount that gave them
the sentence of death. Also in I Corinthians 11:30 Paul states
that some of the Christian community was made sick and
some died (from God’s judgment) for not taking communion
with proper respect.
12. Temper Longman III (2003) “The Case for Spiritual
Continuity”, in C.S. Cowles et al Show Them No Mercy: 4
Views on God and Canaanite Genocide, Grand Rapids, MI:
Zondervan., p.173-4
13. Show Them No Mercy, op. cit., note 12.
14. Cowles, C.S. “The Case for Radical Discontinuity,” in Show
Them No Mercy, op.cit. note 12, p.33.
15. Merrill, Eugene, “The Case for Moderate Discontinuity,” in
Show Them No Mercy, op. cit., note 12, p. 94.
16. Ibid.
17, John Schoenheit (personal communication July, 2010) states
that he had worried about the genocides of Joshua for ten
years in his teachings of the Bible and was not satisfied. His
best effort at explaining depends on Genesis 6: 4 “The
Nephilim were on earth in those days—and also afterward—
when the sons of God went to the daughters of men and had
children by them. They were the heroes of old, men of
renown.” He speculates that this practice of fallen angels
producing children (essential a non-reproducing species)
before the flood may also have applied to the Canaanites. We
know that God did not intervene until wickedness had
reached the point of no recovery. Any children of the
Canaanites like those of people before the flood and Sodom
and Gomorrah were doomed. They had no chance of growing
up and overcoming their legacy. They may have been the
end of the line of Canaanite wickedness.
18. Keller, Timothy, The Reason for God, NY: Riverhead Books,
2008, p. 86.
19. Ibid, p. 85.
20. Ibid, p. 77.
 The Range of Inerrancy:
Correction and Clarifications
Published November 1, 2015
https://faithalone.org/grace-in-focus-articles/the-range-of-
inerrancy-correction-and-clarifications/

In the May/June issue of Grace in Focus Magazine I reviewed a

book by Dr. Craig Blomberg, Can We Still Believe the Bible? After
the article appeared, I was very sorry to learn that I had
misrepresented Blomberg. I made it seem that he personally
held to the interpretations of particular passages that he
merely presented as possible (and consistent with inerrancy).
My apologies to Blomberg for this serious error.
 In his chapter, “Aren’t Several Narrative Genres of the Bible
Unhistorical?” Blomberg spends thirty pages discussing various
historical narratives and favorably quoting views which I
mistakenly thought were his own views as well. However, in
one paragraph in the conclusion he gives hints as to his own
views on these issues.
Here is that paragraph in the conclusion:
By nature I am skeptical of any
proposals that seem to have eluded all
readers until the last couple of
centuries. Where I learn that there were
ancient debates over certain issues, I
am more open to considering
alternative interpretations. I have
deliberately not taken a stand myself
on any of the problems as I discussed
them in this chapter. Because readers
seem invariably curious, I will happily
disclose where I come down at the
moment, given the varying amounts of
study I have devoted to each. I would
support an old-earth creationism and a
literary-framework approach to Genesis
1. I lean in the direction of Kidner’s
approach to Genesis 2-3 but am open to
other proposals. I suspect that Jonah
really intended to recount a miracle
that really did happen, but with Job I
gravitate more toward Longman’s
mediating approach. Despite the
overwhelming consensus against it, I
still find the arguments for the unity of
Isaiah under a single primary author,
even if lightly redacted later, more
persuasive (or at least less problematic)
than most do. I remain pretty much
 baffled by Daniel 11; it is the issue I
have researched by far the least. My
inherent conservatism inclines me in
the direction of taking it as genuine
predictive prophecy, but I listen
respectfully to those who argue for
other interpretations and continue to
mull them over. I reject Gundry’s
approach to Matthew as highly unlikely.
I have yet to be persuaded by Licona’s
initial views of Matthew 27:51-53 but
would love to see additional
comparative research undertaken. I
think good cases can still be mounted
for the traditional ascriptions of
authorship of the New Testament
Epistles, allowing for perhaps some
posthumous editing of 2 Peter. I refuse
ever to be suckered back into the view
of my young adult years, when I
actually believed that the end times
would play out as Hal Lindsey claimed
they would (Can We Still Trust the
Bible? p. 177).
Blomberg here indicates that when he was citing various
views in the chapter he was not expressing his agreement that the
views are correct. What he was expressing is that the views are
discussable and that these views fall within what he considers
to be the range of inerrancy.1

Clarifi cation
At one point in the article, after having cited material from
Blomberg, I mentioned that he spoke of “such evangelical
stalwarts” as Bock, Carson, and Keener, who agree with him. I
then wrote the following:
So, if you believe that Adam and Eve,
 Noah’s flood, Jonah, Job, and the
creation account are all meant to be
history, get your head out of the sand.
Dr. Darrell Bock contacted me after the article and objected to
this statement and what it implied about his views and those of
the other professors at Dallas Seminary. He objected to the
implication that the men I cited believed there was nothing at all
historical about the Biblical accounts.
My apology to Bock and the DTS faculty for leaving some
readers with the mistaken impression that I was saying they
considered the creation account, the worldwide flood, Jonah,
and Job as pure fiction. I should have been clearer. What I
meant, as I shall now explain, is that they do not consider all of
these accounts to be literal history. Like most New Testament
scholars, Bock and most DTS professors believe that much of
that is poetic history.
I’ve had multiple cordial conversations with Bock and we’ve
exchanged many emails about this issue. These conversations
have led me to make several clarifications and corrections.
First, Bock indicated that when discussing inerrancy, we
should think about passages in terms of three things a person
believes about it:
1. what he considers to be true,
2. what he considers to be discussible,
and
3. what he considers to be heresy (i.e.,
outside the edges of inerrancy).
I believe that is a helpful clarification. As I said before, I made
the mistake of confusing what Blomberg believed to be true
(category 1) with what he considered discussable (category 2),
and for that I apologize.
Second, I made it seem that when interpreting the Bible there
were only two choices: something is either history or it’s
fiction. I did not intend that. I realize that there are genres of
Scripture like poetry and apocalyptic that have figurative
language that nonetheless conveys history (past or future).
However, I did not make that clear.
 Bock calls what I failed to make clear the excluded middle. He
points out that passages like Genesis 1-3 can be read in three
ways: as literal history, as poetic history, or poetic fiction. This is
also a helpful clarification.
To read Genesis 1-3 as literal history means that Adam and Eve
were historical persons created in precisely the way described
by the text. This is my view. However, my view is not
mainstream today. Most Evangelical scholars today hold to
option two, that Genesis 1-3 is poetic history.
Reading Genesis 1-3 as poetic history means that Adam and Eve
were historical persons but the story of their creation and fall is
told using poetic (i.e., figurative) language. There has to be a
“kernel of truth” (so Blomberg). How much is figurative and
symbolic is up for debate.
For example, D. A. Carson says,
I hold that the Genesis account is a
mixed genre that feels like history and
really does give us some historical
particulars [emphasis added]. At the
same time, however, it is full of
demonstrable symbolism. Sorting out
what is symbolic and what is not is very
difficult (The God Who Is There, p. 15).
Likewise, Craig Keener wrote,
Apart from some Israelite parables,
nowhere else in the Bible do we read
anything like this: a talking serpent
convinces Man and Wife to pluck a fruit
that is Knowledge. Not surprisingly,
many biblical scholars, including
evangelical biblical scholars, suspect
some figurative language here
[emphasis added]. Modern questions
aside, is it possible that this way of
reading the narrative is closer to how it
was meant to be read?
 (http://www.huffingtonpost. com/craig-
s-keener/isyoungearth-
creationismbiblical_b_1578004.html).
As Keener himself confirmed, “many biblical scholars” hold
this view. From my discussions with Bock, this also appears to
be the majority position at Dallas Seminary and within the
Evangelical Theological Society.
I consider the poetic history view of Genesis 1-3 to be
inconsistent with inerrancy. In other words, I do not consider
this view to be in the discussable category. I realize that the
majority of Evangelical scholars either hold this view
themselves or consider it within the boundaries of inerrancy.
So I know that I am the one who is out of step. However, I
happen to be convinced that I am right!
Reading Genesis 1-3 as poetic fiction means there was no literal
Adam and Eve and the whole creation account is a fictional
story meant to teach us theological lessons. I consider this view
heresy and totally outside the bounds of inerrancy. Most
Evangelical scholars, including Bock, Blomberg, Carson, and
Keener, would agree with me on this evaluation that taking
Genesis 1-3 as poetic fiction is outside the edge of inerrancy.

I Stand By What I Said

As I read Blomberg’s book Can We Trust the Bible? I was struck
by how broadly he defined inerrancy. I suggested in my review
that most New Testament scholars today, even those who claim
to believe in inerrancy, consider the events of Genesis 1-3 as
well as Jonah and Job to be historical only in a limited sense.
I see no reason to retract that claim.
In fact, the quotes from Carson and Keener, cited above, and
my conversations with Bock, only confirm that most Evangelical
scholars hold to viewing Genesis 1-3 as poetic history and
almost all think that taking much of Genesis 1-3 as poetic and
figurative is a view that is at least discussable within inerrancy.
In his book Can We Still Believe the Bible? Blomberg said:
If Farnell, Thomas, and Geisler and
 Roach were to be consistent and
chastise every Old or New Testament
commentator whose views match those
they demonize, they would scarcely find
a biblical scholar left in the Evangelical
Theological Society who would pass
muster in their eyes (Can We Still
Believe the Bible? p. 142).
A page later he reiterates his point:
But it cannot be stressed strongly
enough that the Thomases and Geislers
of the world do not speak for the vast
majority of evangelicals and inerrantists
around the globe” (Can We Still Believe
the Bible? p. 143).
I agree with Blomberg on this point. Farnell, Thomas, Geisler,
Roach, and I are in the minority, probably the extreme minority
among Evangelical scholars. “The vast majority of evangelicals
and inerrantists around the globe” agree with Blomberg, Bock,
Carson, and Keener.
Of course, the issue I was raising was not based on a poll of
New Testament scholars. I was warning about what I consider
to be a dangerous view that dominates the ranks of those who
affirm inerrancy.
I am convinced that “the vast majority of evangelicals and
inerrantists around the globe” are seriously mistaken and their
range of inerrancy is too broad. I believe the broad view of
inerrancy is not consistent with what the Scriptures teach (cf.
Matt 4:4; John 14:26; 17:17; 2 Tim 3:16; Titus 1:2; 2 Pet 1:21). 2
I think the prevailing view of inerrancy today represents a
dangerous downgrading of the doctrine, one that seriously
undermines Biblical authority. The meaning of inerrancy has
changed so much for so many that—in my understanding of the
word—the term inerrancy no longer is meaningful.
Most New Testament scholars think their broader view of
inerrancy is a very good thing. They think it is essential to help
theological students continue to walk with Christ. The
President-Elect of the Evangelical Theological Society, Dr. Dan
Wallace, has written:
I tell my students every year…that it is
imperative that they pursue truth rather
than their presuppositions. And they
need to have a doctrinal taxonomy that
distinguishes core beliefs from
peripheral beliefs. When they place
more peripheral doctrines such as
inerrancy and verbal inspiration
[emphasis added] at the core, then
when belief in these doctrines starts to
erode, it creates a domino effect: One
falls down, they all fall down. It strikes
me that something like this may be
what happened to Bart Ehrman…If our
starting point is embracing
propositional truths about the nature of
scripture rather than personally
embracing Jesus Christ as our Lord and
King,3 we’ll be on that slippery slope,
and we’ll take a lot of folks down with
us (https://bible.org/article/gospel-
accordingbart).
For most Evangelical scholars today inerrancy is not a core
belief. It is a “peripheral belief.” Wallace thinks that failing to
recognize that leads people to fall away from the Christian
faith, as Bart Ehrman did.
I share the concern about falling away from the faith. I just
happen to believe that it’s the broad view of inerrancy that is
causing people to fall away. How many students have gone to
conservative Evangelical schools believing that Genesis 1-3 and
Jonah and Job are all literal history and not some sort of poetic
history, only to be told that they are badly mistaken? And how
many of those students begin to doubt the accuracy of God’s
Word? I fear that there are many who fall away from the faith
due to being taught a broad view of inerrancy.
Of course, we cannot prove via anecdotal evidence whether
the broad view or the narrow view of inerrancy leads people
astray. It is the Scriptures which tell us which view is correct
and which is not. That is my concern. Let’s go to the Scriptures
to find out what the Scriptures say about inerrancy. That is my
appeal.
There are many topics to address here. My position needs
defending. My conversations with Darrell Bock and others have
helped clarify issues for me. I hope to have more fruitful
discussions in the future. I plan on addressing inerrancy in
greater detail in a future book.
Rest assured, however, that the central issue on which I will
write will continue to be the promise of everlasting life to all
who simply believe in Jesus (John 3:16; 5:24; 6:35; 11:26). I am
committed to keeping grace in focus. I have chosen to discuss an
issue like inerrancy because it is clearly and directly related to
the promise of everlasting life. If I know that God’s Word is
absolutely true and contains no errors in it, then it is easier for
me to believe the amazing promise of John 3:16.
If you are a New Testament scholar who holds the prevailing
broad view of inerrancy, I hope this clarification accurately
reflects your views. I do not doubt your compassion,
commitment, or zeal. I realize you affirm belief in inerrancy.
But since I do not consider your affirmation to be based on a
reasonable understanding of what inerrancy actually is, I raise
the concern. I hope you will be Bereans and evaluate my
concerns Biblically (Acts 17:11). After all, we both affirm that
God’s Word is true.

Endnotes
1. Blomberg’s expressions of his own views fall short of
statements of what he believes is true. Instead he says things
like “I suspect that…,” “I gravitate more toward…,” “I still find
the arguments…more persuasive…,” “My inherent
conservatism inclines me…,” and “I think good cases can be
mounted…” These are statements of probability, not certainty.
Of course, within a historiographical approach, most scholars
today rarely if ever speak of being sure. Things are couched in
terms of probability and likelihood.
 2. I also believe the broad view of inerrancy is inconsistent
with the teaching at Dallas Seminary while I was there (1978-
1985). Not only do I not recall a single professor advocating a
poetic/figurative view of Genesis 1-11, Jonah, or Job, there are
three pamphlets put out by DTS between 1965 and 1976 that
reinforce my memory. See Donald K. Campbell’s, We Believe in
Literal Interpretation (1974); Charles C. Ryrie’s, We Believe in
Creation (1976); and John F. Walvoord’s, We Believe the Bible
(1965).
3. Wallace’s comments about whether one starts by
embracing propositional truth versus starting by personally
embracing Jesus Christ as Lord and King represent a false
dichotomy. One can only embrace Jesus Christ as Lord and King
by believing those propositions in Scripture which report what
He said and did. One cannot existentially encounter Jesus apart
from the Word of God. To attempt to start with an experience
rather than with God’s Word is to undercut the absolutely vital
nature of the Word of God in our lives. “Man shall not live by
bread alone, but by every word that proceeds from the mouth
of God.”
The Building Block of
Knowledge
By Joe Lombardi
Published January 1, 2016
https://faithalone.org/grace-in-focus-articles/the-building-
block-of-knowledge/
 When Newsweek magazine published an article several years
ago lamenting the lack of knowledge among the youth of the
United States, there were 1,274 two-year colleges in the United
States that collectively enrolled nearly five million students.
Dr. James M. O’Neill taught English composition at four of
those colleges in two different states. During his fifteen-year
career he became increasingly concerned about the lack of
knowledge among so many of his college-age students.
 That was when he decided to present his pupils at the South
Puget Sound Community College in Olympia, WA, with an 86-
question “general knowledge” test on the first day of class one
year.
The questions that O’Neill devised were not trivial, nor were
they technical. They were based on simple facts pertaining
primarily to history and geography—basic information about
world-renowned people and well-known places that any high
school graduate should know.
The exam was given to twenty-six students ranging in age
from eighteen to fifty-four. All of them had completed at least
one semester of college-level work.
Here is just a sampling of what O’Neill learned concerning
how much (or little) his students really knew.
With respect to famous people, his students said that: Charles
Darwin invented gravity; Sid Caesar was an early Roman
emperor; Mark Twain invented the cotton gin; Heinrich
Himmler invented the Heimlich maneuver; Jefferson Davis was
the guitar player for the rock band Jefferson Airplane; Socrates
was an American Indian chieftain; and Jesus Christ was born in
the 16th century.
Professor O’Neill went on to say that “most students answered
incorrectly” and that some of them “meticulously wrote ‘I don’t
know’ as many as eighty-six times.” (Remember, there were
only eighty-six questions on the test).
No wonder why many people conclude that what we have
witnessed during the past several decades is the “dumbing
down of America.” In the words from the title of a Jim Carrey
comedy, as a nation we seem to be growing increasingly “Dumb
and Dumber.”

Illiteracy in the Pew

In my opinion, the only thing more pathetic than this pitiful
lack of knowledge among so many youth today, is an ever-
increasing Biblical illiteracy in the pew.
According to the Princeton Religious Research Center, over
half of all Americans cannot name the four Gospels. More than
one third do not know the number of Jesus’ disciples. And, in
spite of many very familiar Christmas carols, one third do not
even know the name of the town where Jesus was born.
A recent Gallup Poll found that less than four out of every ten
Protestants know that it was Jesus who said, “Ye must be born
again.”
And another national periodical published an article titled
“The Startling Belief of Our Future Ministers.” It included the
results of a survey taken by the ministerial students at several
major denominational schools. To be sure, not all of them were
Evangelical—but, remember, these were still men and women
preparing for full-time ministry.
When asked the following questions,
Do you believe in a physical (bodily) resurrection?
54% said “no.”
Do you believe in the virgin birth of Christ?
56% said “no.”
Do you believe in a literal heaven and hell?
71% said “no.”
Do you believe in the deity of Jesus Christ?
89% said “no.”
Do you believe that man was born in sin, and separated from
God?
98% said that “they were not concerned.”
Do you believe in the second coming of Jesus Christ?
99% said “no.”

God’s People Need Knowledge

As I have reflected on these tragic facts and disturbing trends,
I could not help but think of the Word of the Lord, spoken
through His prophet, Hosea, “My people are destroyed for lack
of knowledge” (Hos 4:6, emphasis added).
Ignorance is not bliss! God places no premium on ignorance.
In fact, in what our Lord Jesus regarded as the supreme
command, we are told to love the Lord our God with all our
mind, as well as with all our heart and soul and strength (Mark
12:30).
I believe that to love Him with all our mind demands (among
other things) we must grow in our knowledge of the Bible.
In previous articles, I have noted that Peter presents us with a
Divine “blue print” that specifies seven building blocks that are
to be used in the framing and fashioning of Christians in and
under construction.
In the remainder of this article I want to examine the second
building block of knowledge.

Principles for the Attainment of Knowledge

The Greek word translated “knowledge” is gnosis. The
transliterated Greek root gno appears in our English word,
“agnostic,” which means “unknown,” and in our English word
“ignoramus,” which literally means “one who is not knowing.”
Gnosis is found in its various forms over two hundred times in
the New Testament alone. In the context of 2 Peter 1 it refers
essentially to the knowledge of God—of coming to know who He is,
primarily through what He says—that is, through His special
revelation of Himself. Thus, the source of this knowledge is God
Himself, concerning whom Paul exclaimed in this beautiful
burst of praise, “Oh, the depth of the riches of the wisdom and
knowledge [gnosis] of God” (Rom 11:33).
And so we read, for example, in Prov 2:6, “For the Lord gives
wisdom, and from His mouth come knowledge [gnosis, LXX] and
understanding.” He Himself is indeed the very source of this
knowledge to which Peter refers.
I like the nuance of the paraphrase of this term in the Living
Bible, “His every word is a treasure of knowledge” (Prov 2:6,
emphasis added). I especially like what John says concerning
His Word: “And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us,
and we beheld His glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the
Father, full of grace and truth” (John 1:14). Our Lord Jesus
Christ is indeed a treasure of knowledge.
Seven hundred years before Christ’s birth the prophet Isaiah
wrote concerning Him,
There shall come forth a Rod from the
stem of Jesse, and a Branch shall grow
 out of his roots. The Spirit of the Lord
shall rest upon Him, the Spirit of
wisdom and understanding, the Spirit of
counsel and might, the Spirit of
knowledge and of the fear of the Lord
(Isa 11:1-2, emphasis added).
Concerning Jesus Christ Paul wrote, “in whom are hidden all
the treasures of wisdom and knowledge” (Col 2:3, emphasis
added). Similarly, he wrote to the believers in Corinth, “that
you were enriched in everything by Him [Jesus Christ] in all
utterance and all knowledge” (1 Cor 1:5, emphasis added). Once
an individual believes in Jesus for everlasting life, they soon
discover there is so much more to learn of Him and from Him.
Indeed, Peter adds in the text that serves as the basis for this
series of articles, “For if these things are yours and abound, you
will be neither barren nor unfruitful in the knowledge of our
Lord Jesus Christ” (2 Pet 1:8, emphasis added).
The truth is that once we begin to learn more about Him, we
soon discover that there is still so much more to learn of Him
and from Him.
I believed in Jesus nearly sixty years go. Six decades later, the
one thing I am quite sure of is that I still don’t have Him all
“figured out!” But, then again, the Psalmist explains, “Great is
our Lord, and abundant in power; his understanding is beyond
measure” (Ps 147:5, emphasis added, ESV). There is so much
more to learn. But don’t be discouraged. Jesus invites His
followers to “come to me” and “learn from me” (Matt 11:28-29).
Therefore, if you wish to be effective and productive for the
Lord, then, according to Peter, you need the building block of
the knowledge of God. This building block is so important to
Peter that he begins this letter by referring to it in 2 Pet 1:5-6,
and mentions it once again in his final conclusion in 2 Pet 3:18,
“But grow in the grace and knowledge of our Lord and Savior
Jesus Christ” (emphasis added).
Before I explain two Biblical prerequisites for the attainment
of this knowledge, I need to issue a parenthetical warning about
some dangers of which you need to be aware.
 Knowing Evil
First of all, when Peter speaks of this building block of
knowledge, he is referring to the knowledge of God and from
God. He is speaking, essentially, of the knowledge of good. For
there is a type of “knowledge” of which you and I should
remain ignorant. I am referring to the “knowledge of evil.” For
example, Paul wrote,
For your obedience has become
known to all. Therefore I am glad on
your behalf; but I want you to be wise in
what is good, and simple [that is,
innocent, unadulterated, pure]
concerning evil (Rom 16:19, emphasis
added).
The fact is that there are some things you and I just don’t
need to know. Listen to the voice of God speaking through the
prophet Jeremiah: “For My people are fools; they do not know
Me. They are foolish children, without understanding. They are
skilled in doing what is evil, but they do not know how to do what
is good” (Jer 4:22, HCSB, emphasis added). The devotional writer,
Oswald Chambers, said, “There are some things a man is a
criminal for knowing. The knowledge of evil, instead of
instigating to action, paralyzes.” Three thousand years before
Chambers’ time, one of the wisest men who ever lived wrote
that the pursuit of the knowledge of evil is “to know madness
and folly” and is a “grasping for the wind” (Eccl 1:17).

Knowledge Puff s Up
Secondly, there is also the danger of making the attainment of
knowledge an end in itself. It is knowledge just for the sake of
knowledge.
That can be a very heady thing.
The great country preacher Vance Havner once warned,
“Head knowledge is useful, but unless it is sanctified by the
Holy Spirit, it can be the most dangerous thing in the world.”
It can certainly lead to pride.
There is an old proverb which says that “knowledge humbleth
the great man, astonishes the common man, and puffeth up the
little man.” Likewise, Paul wrote, “Knowledge puffs up, but love
edifies” (1 Cor 8:1). A few chapters later he adds, “And though
I… understand all mysteries and all knowledge… but have not
love, I am nothing” (1 Cor 13:2, emphasis added).
The English author, pastor and professor, J. I. Packer, also
warned believers,
…If we pursue theological knowledge
for its own sake, it is bound to go bad
on us. It will make us proud and
conceited. The very greatness of the
subject matter will intoxicate us, and
we shall come to think of ourselves as a
cut above other Christians because of
our interest in and grasp of it… To be
preoccupied with getting theological
knowledge as an end in itself… is the
direct route to a state of self-satisfied,
self-deception (Packer, Knowing God, p.
22).
Do you know anyone like the person Packer describes?
Some of them are people who may have grown in knowledge,
but have failed to grow in grace. You see, the more knowledge
you have, the more grace you need.
By the way, as we continue our study in 2 Peter 1, I want you
to note that Christlike character is not only constructed with
knowledge, but it is also framed with the building blocks of
brotherly kindness and Christian love. Together, they bring
“balance” to this project.
Indeed, in order for knowledge to be useful, it must be
balanced not only by the last building block of love, but also by
the first building block of virtue, which is, essentially, the
commitment to do what is right with what we know.
When a person does what is right (virtue) with all that he
knows (knowledge), that is called “wisdom.” But one can be
knowledgeable without being wise when one makes the
attainment of knowledge an end in itself. However, one cannot
be wise without being knowledgeable. From Prov 13:16 we learn
that “Every prudent man acts with knowledge.” So, clearly, the
more knowledgeable you are, the wiser you may be, if you do
what is right (prudent) with what you know.

Don’t Be a Know-It-All
Here is one more final word of warning: Beware of the danger
that once you come to know a little, you begin to think you
actually know a lot!
I know believers who have come so far, and then, suddenly,
they think they don’t need to learn anymore. That is why Peter
said in 2 Peter 1:8 (NIV) that if you want to be effective and
productive for the Lord, then you must “possess these qualities
in increasing measure” (emphasis added).
I like the way Paul expressed this truth in Phil 3:8-10:
Yet indeed I also count all things loss
for the excellence of the knowledge of
Christ Jesus my Lord, for whom I have
suffered the loss of all things, and count
them as rubbish, that I may gain Christ
and be found in Him, not having my
own righteousness, which is from the
law, but that which is through faith in
Christ, the righteousness which is from
God by faith; that I may know Him…
(emphasis added).
The passion, purpose and pursuit of Paul’s life was to know
Christ! From him we also understand that as long as we are
living we need to keep on learning.

Prerequisites for the Attainment of

Knowledge
Here are two Biblical prerequisites for the attainment of this
kind of knowledge. The first one is determination. Paul said
that he wanted to know Christ more than anything else. That
passion of his life became the foundation of his purpose in life
which, in turn, became the direction for the pursuit of his life.
The Living Bible paraphrase of Prov 4:12 reads,“Determination
to be wise is the first step toward becoming wise.”
One of the two Biblical passages that God used in what I
determined to be my call to full-time pastoral ministry is Ezra
7:10 (NASB): “For Ezra had set his heart (i.e., he determined) to
study the law of the LORD, and to practice it (i.e., not just
knowledge for the sake of knowledge), and to teach His statutes
and ordinances in Israel.” Once again, the first prerequisite for
the attainment of knowledge is a determination of the will.
The second prerequisite is a discipline of the mind. Paul said
in the first half of Phil 3:8, “Yet indeed I also count all things
loss for the excellence of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my
Lord.” Paul was disciplined enough to do whatever it would
take to know Christ.
I fear that there are not too many believers today who are
willing to pay the price of determination and discipline. Why
not? Perhaps one reason is that in the western world we have
become so affluent that we have also become, as a result,
indifferent, complacent, and even content about being so
spiritually ignorant!

Conclusion
Fellow believers, it is our Father God who said, “My people are
destroyed for lack of knowledge” (Hosea 4:6, emphasis added).
That is why Hosea makes this impassioned plea two chapters
later, “Let us know, let us pursue the knowledge of the Lord”
(Hosea 6:3, emphasis added).
In the Newsweek article I quoted at the beginning of this
article, Dr. O’Neill concluded, “As a teacher I find myself in the
ignorance and hope business. Each year hopeful faces confront
me, trying to conceal their ignorance. Their hopes ride on the
dispelling of that ignorance. All our hopes do.”
I think that is also true with respect to our knowledge of the
Lord. Most assuredly, according to 2 Pet 1:2-11, our hope as
believers of a “rich welcome” into His kingdom is based on –
among other things – whether or not we have made every
effort to add to our faith not only goodness, but also
knowledge.
With that in mind, my prayer for those who read this article
is, in the words of the Apostle Paul, “…that you may know him
better” (Eph 1:17, NIV).
 Cheap Grace or Cheap Law?
By Shawn Lazar

In any debate, the language being used is critical in shaping

opinions. Control the language, and you can often control the
debate itself.
On that score, opponents of Free Grace theology may have the
upper hand. They routinely describe our position as antinomian,
easy believism and cheap grace. Every Evangelical has heard of
these terms, and everyone knows they are bad.
By contrast, few people know the term “Lordship Salvation.”
I’d like to turn the tables a bit and introduce a new term to
describe opponents of Free Grace. Specifically, I would like to
suggest why Lordship theology supports cheap law.
What is cheap law, and why should we be wary of it?
The term is inspired by the work of Gerhard Forde (1927-2005,
pronounced Fur-dee), a Lutheran theologian who wrote
extensively about the doctrine of justification by faith alone.
Although he did not specifically use the term cheap law, he
effectively described the phenomenon and strongly opposed it.
Forde helped to show that cheap grace and costly grace
preaching, instead of being opposites, are actually synonymous,
and both should be understood as preaching a cheap law that
has nothing to do with God's authentic grace in Christ.

THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW

Let us begin by understanding the purpose of the law. Forde
derived his understanding of the law from the Lutheran reading
of Romans and Galatians. Law includes more than the Mosaic
law. It includes any and all commandments. If something makes
a demand or an accusation, that is law. This includes the
Sermon on the Mount, the command to love, the command to
repent, or the moral standard written on our hearts and
conscience—all of it is law.
 With that in mind, Forde pointed out how the law demanded
holiness (Lev 11:45) and blamelessness (Deut 18:13). If you
broke even one commandment, you were guilty of breaking
them all (James 2:10). Paul emphasized that no one could be
justified before God by works of the law (Gal 2:16). Such a
course of action was hopeless because it was not the law’s
purpose. Paul made clear that the law could never give a person
life or make them righteous (Gal 3:21). On the contrary, the law
was a ministry of death (2 Cor 3:7). It does not save us from sin,
but it gives us knowledge of it (Rom 3:20). Without a law to tell
us the difference between right and wrong, sins like coveting
would go unnoticed (Rom 7:7). Hence, Paul says that the law
was actually given to increase sin (Rom 5:20). This was done
precisely so that God’s wrath would come (Rom 4:15). In other
words, the law was not meant to relieve man of sin’s burden,
but to make the burden unbearable, so as to leave the sinner
completely condemned before God. As Forde explained,
The law did not stop sin but only made sin
worse. In so doing the law showed sin to be
exceedingly sinful. The law exposed the depth of
sin by showing it to be ineradicable by human
power. Indeed, the law increased sin so as to
bring it into confrontation with its sole remedy:
that where sin abounded grace might much
more abound (Forde, Theology Is for
Proclamation, p. 78).
Hence, the law is a not an invitation of cooperation between
God and man, but an implicit denial that any such cooperation
is possible. So far from acting as a condition for receiving God’s
grace (as cheap law preachers hold), the law is meant to dispel
every thought of self-fulfillment, self-aggrandizement, self-
progression, and self-deification. The law proclaims the
absolute futility of all schemes of salvation by works
righteousness. The law slams the door shut on salvation by
works, and says, “Go another way.”
This other way to eternal salvation is nothing other than
grace. It is a grace that does not complete or supplement man’s
works, but excludes them entirely. As Paul said, “And if grace,
then it is no longer of works; otherwise grace is no longer
grace. But if it is of works, it is no longer grace; otherwise work
is no longer work” (Rom 11:6).

THE NATURE OF CHEAP LAW PREACHING

So what is cheap law preaching and why is it bad?
Cheap law preaching seems pious. It rightly demands
obedience to Christ. What could be wrong with that? The
problem occurs when obedience to Christ is made into a
requirement for eternal salvation. Cheap law preaching ignores
the Biblical purpose of the law. Cheap law preachers
unwittingly commit the error of thinking the law’s purpose is
to save people from sin. Says Forde, “We think that the law is
the remedy for sin. If we could just get our act together we
could break the slavery and be free at last” (Forde, The
Captivation of the Will, p. 88). But that is something the law
cannot do.
Certainly, the law can do many good things, “It can preserve
society. It can restrain evil. It can even help us to reach out to
give aid beyond our normal reach. It may preserve, restrain,
prevent, and so forth.” But cure sin? That it can never do. The
law “is not a remedy for sin. As a matter of fact, it just makes
sin worse” (Forde, The Captivation of the Will, p. 88).
Ultimately, Forde says there are three problems with cheap
law preaching.

CHEAP LAW PREACHING DENIES CHRIST

First, Forde says that cheap law preaching commits a
Christological error. Properly understood, the law demands
perfection. But no one has ever met that demand, except for
Jesus. But that was the ultimate purpose of the law all along.
The law was a tutor to bring us to faith in Christ (Gal 3:24). He is
the end of the law for all who believe (Rom 10:4). Jesus is “the
realization and fulfillment of that to which law can only point”
(Forde, A More Radical Gospel, p. 60).
But cheap law preaching implicitly denies this Christological
end. When grace is made to depend on some performance by
the sinner (such as repentance, commitment, or good works),
there is an assumption that sinners can meet the law’s demand.
But that is only possible if the law is made to demand
something less than Jesus’ perfect righteousness, effectively
severing Christ from being the end and purpose of the law.

CHEAP LAW PREACHING IS ANTINOMIAN

Second, Forde claims that cheap law preaching is a covert
form of antinomianism. Antinomianism means being against
(anti) the law (nomos). How can cheap law preaching be against
the law, if it openly preaches it? Forde distinguishes between
two kinds of antinomianism: overt and covert.
Overt antinomianism tries to do away with the law entirely. It
denies that the law is necessary, even to lead a person to Christ.
Clearly, cheap law preachers don’t qualify as overt
antinomians.
But covert antinomianism is a different animal. It doesn’t
explicitly deny the law. But it changes it. It softens the law’s
demand in order to better suit the sinner. This is
antinomianism in its truest form:
What is antinomianism, after all? In essence, it is
a theological attempt to bring the law to heel
short of death by some kind of manipulation,
overt and covert. If one can’t end the law, one
seeks to tone it down, to alter it, to apply it
casuistically… One disarms the law and makes it
into a gentle guide which we use in our quest for
virtue. Thus domesticated as the “house pet” of
the pious, the law indeed remains but it has lost
its teeth. (Forde, Justification by Faith, pp. 47-
48).

WHY CHEAP GRACE IS TOO EXPENSIVE

Third, by preaching a cheap law, one must also preach cheap
grace. After all, in order for grace to be cheap, it must cost
something. But that itself is the problem.
God does not sell his grace. It cannot be had for any price!
Rather, He gives it away freely, as a gift, through faith in His
Son. The problem with cheap grace is not that it costs too little,
but that it costs anything at all. Says Forde (echoing Hodges):
Is it not “cheap grace”? No! It’s not cheap, it’s
 free! “Cheap grace,” you see, is not improved by
making it inexpensive, a “bargain basement”
special. It’s free (Forde, Justification, p. 34).
God’s grace is free to us. We receive it through faith in
Christ’s promise, apart from all works.

LORDSHIP SALVATION PREACHES CHEAP

LAW
Lordship Salvation (whether Arminian, Calvinist, or Catholic)
is a form of cheap law preaching. It denies Christ by claiming
His work must be supplemented by our own efforts if we hope
to be saved. It is antinomian, because it demands something
less than Christ’s perfect righteousness. And it preaches cheap
grace, because it offers grace on the condition of imperfect
human works.
By contrast, Free Grace theology unashamedly proclaims a
perfect law that could only be fulfilled by Christ, and grace that
is freely given without demand, to all who believe in Jesus’
promise of everlasting life. Free Grace, not costly grace or
cheap law, is the true foundation of Christian living.

Shawn Lazar is Director of Publications at GES. This is a

condensed version of a talk he gave at the 2013 Conference.
MP3s available.
 Interpreting the Bible and the
Sciences
By Brad Doskocil
Published March 1, 2017
https://faithalone.org/grace-in-focus-articles/interpreting-the-
bible-and-the-sciences/

When we study the Bible there can be a propensity to

interpret it, and to judge it, in light of our understanding of the
sciences. Often our understanding of physics, biology, history,
or archaeology, is given greater weight as evidence than what
the Bible reports. This diminishes the divine authorship and
inspiration of Scripture.
One of the things I have learned over the years is that when
the sciences appear to conflict with what the Bible reports, it is
usually due to our misunderstanding of Scripture, our
misunderstanding of the sciences, or both. Misplaced
understandings will lead us to wrong conclusions.

Belshazzar Who?
While there may be many examples of apparent conflict
between the Bible and the sciences, one that illustrates the
point is the account of Belshazzar in Daniel 5.
Belshazzar is described by Daniel as the king of Babylon (Dan
5:1). In this familiar story Belshazzar threw a large party for his
leaders, which was interrupted by the handwriting on the wall.
Belshazzar proceeded to offer rewards to whoever could read
and interpret the handwriting, including being made the “third
ruler in the kingdom.” Since Belshazzar was killed that very
night, he was the final king of Babylon (Dan 5:30-31).
This account was one reason the book of Daniel is considered
unreliable. Up until the late 19th century, Belshazzar was not
mentioned in the historical records of Babylon known at the
time. In fact, history reported that Nabonidus was the last king
of Babylon.
So if you were studying the Bible in the year 1850, and there
was no historical evidence (at the time) for Belshazzar as king
of Babylon, and therefore scientists concluded that Daniel was
unreliable, what would you think? What would you think if
history told you Nabonidus was the last king of Babylon?
Would you believe the Bible or archeology?
The correct answer would be to believe the written Word of
God and Daniel’s account. But would you?

Recent Discoveries
Fortunately, in the late 19th century, archaeology made
discoveries that shed light on Belshazzar and the last days of
the Babylonian empire.
The cuneiform writing of the Nabonidus Cylinder, as well as
some other cuneiform writings, provide evidence about
Belshazzar and Nabonidus.1
You see, Nabonidus did not want to stay in Babylon and run
the government. He had an interest in archeology, and
travelled to old temple sites in order to excavate and repair
them. So he made his son Belshazzar co-regent or co-king.
Nabonidus traveled while Belshazzar ruled the government
from Babylon.
This unique situation explains why Belshazzar’s reward
included being made the “third ruler in the kingdom” (Dan 5:7;
5:16; 5:29). Why “third” ruler? Because the first two places were
already taken!
Now if you lived in the late 19th century, and you consulted a
conservative commentary for help with this passage in Daniel,
you would be left wondering why the historical records did not
recognize Belshazzar. You might be even more puzzled by the
contortions of the commentator trying to explain the apparent
discrepancy.2

What Should We Learn From This?

We need to base our understanding of Scripture on sound
exegesis.
We need to approach the Scriptures with an open mind,
wanting to believe what we learn.
If there is an apparent discrepancy with the sciences, we
should not doubt what Scripture records. Instead, we should be
skeptical of what the sciences tell us. After all, the sciences
change over time, but God’s Word remains the same!

Endnotes
Brad Doskocil is Chairman of the Board for Grace Evangelical Society.
1. See John F. Walvoord, Daniel: The Key to Prophetic Revelation (Chicago, IL:
Moody, 1971), 113-115; and John C. Whitcomb, Daniel (Chicago, IL:Moody,
1985), 70-73.
2. Consider for example, C.F. Keil; Daniel: Commentary on the Old Testament
(Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1866-1891), 597-608.
 Are there two Creation stories
in Genesis?
By Neil Mammen
www.neilmammen.com
6/18/2007

Abstract: People claim that there are two separate creation stories
in Genesis and that they contradict each other. This article attempts
to show that there is really only one story about creation and while
there is a second story, it is about the making of the Garden of Eden,
and it’s not a incorrect retelling of the creation story.

The story
We start with Genesis 1&2 and the creation story. Using the New
King James Version.

Genesis 1
The Creation
(1) 1
In the beginning God created the
2
heavens and the earth. The earth was
[1]
without form, and void; and darkness was
on the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God
was hovering over the face of the waters.
3
Then God said, "Let there be light"; and
4
there was light. And
God saw the light, that it was good; and God
 5
divided the light from the darkness. God
called the light Day, and the darkness He
called Night. So the evening and the morning
were the first day.
6
Then God said, "Let there be a firmament in
the midst of the waters, and let it divide the
7
waters from the waters." Thus God made
the firmament, and divided the waters which
were under the firmament from the waters
which were above the firmament; and it was
8
so. And God called the firmament Heaven.
So the evening and the morning were the
second day.
9
Then God said, "Let the waters under the
heavens be gathered together into one
place, and let the dry land appear"; and it
10
was so. And God called the dry land Earth,
and the gathering together of the waters He
called Seas. And God saw that it was good.
11
Then God said, "Let the earth bring forth
grass, the herb that yields seed, and the fruit
tree that yields fruit according to its kind,
whose seed is in itself, on the earth"; and it
12
was so. And the earth brought forth grass,
the herb that yields seed according to its
kind, and the tree that yields fruit, whose
seed is in itself according to its kind. And
13
God saw that it was good. So the evening
and the morning were the third day.
14
Then God said, "Let there be lights in the
firmament of the heavens to divide the day
from the night; and let them be for signs and
15
seasons, and for days and years; and let
them be for lights in the firmament of the
heavens to give light on the earth"; and it
16
was so. Then God made two great lights:
the greater light to rule the
day, and the lesser light to rule the night. He
made the stars also.
17
God set them in the firmament of the
18
heavens to give light on the earth, and to
rule over the day and over the night, and to
divide the light from the darkness. And God
19
saw that it was good. So the evening and
the morning were the fourth day.
20
Then God said, "Let the waters abound
with an abundance of living creatures, and
let birds fly above the earth across the face
21
of the firmament of the heavens." So God
created great sea
creatures and every living thing that moves,
with which the waters abounded, according
to their kind, and every winged bird
according to its kind. And God saw that it
22
was good. And God blessed them, saying,
"Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the waters in
 1
the seas, and let birds multiply on the
23
earth." So the evening and the morning
were the fifth day.
24
Then God said, "Let the earth bring forth
the living creature according to its kind:
cattle and creeping thing and beast of the
earth, each according to its kind"; and it was
25
so. And God made the beast of the earth
according to its kind, cattle according to its
kind, and everything that creeps on the
earth according to its kind. And God saw that
it was good.
26
Then God said, "Let Us make man in Our
image, according to Our likeness; let them
have dominion over the fish of the sea, over
the birds of the air, and over the cattle, over
all the earth and over every creeping thing
27
that creeps on the earth." So God created
man in His own image; in the image of God
He created him; male and female He created
28
them. Then God blessed them, and God
said to them, "Be fruitful and multiply; fill the
earth and subdue it;
have dominion over the fish of the sea, over
the birds of the air, and over every living
thing that moves on the earth."
29
And God said, "See, I have given you
every herb that yields seed which is on the
face of all the earth, and every tree whose
 fruit yields seed; to you it shall be for food.
30
Also, to every beast of the earth, to every
bird of the air, and to everything that creeps
on the earth, in which there is life, I have
given every green herb for food"; and it was
31
so. Then God saw everything that He had
made, and indeed it was very good. So the
evening and the morning were the sixth day.
1
Note a very interesting fact. Evolutionary Theory
claims the following sequence: Plants->Sea
Creature/Reptiles->Mammals/Land animals-
>Birds.

However the Bible claims the following sequence:

Plants->Sea Creatures/Reptiles-> Birds->Mammals/Land Animals

Note the Mammals and Birds are swapped. Birds came last according to
evolution.

I bet in the years to come that Evolutionary Theory will line up with the
Biblical order and Birds will come after reptiles.
Genesis Chapter 2
The Garden of Eden
1
Thus the heavens and the earth, and
2
all the host of them, were finished. And
on the seventh day God ended His work
which He had done, and He rested on
the seventh day from all His work which
3
He had done. Then God blessed the
seventh day and sanctified it, because in
it He rested from all His work which
God had created and made.
4a
This is the history[generations] of
the heavens and the earth when they
were created,
So far, we have the first and only creation story. Note that it
2
includes the creation of Eve, (presumably on Day 6 , but it talks
about Eve only in summary. The actual details of Eve’s creation
however will be presented in much detail later.
 Look at the last line: This is the
history[generations] of the
heavens and the earth when they
were created.
The “this” in that line is talking about the preceding narrative
not what is to come. In other words it is really like saying:
“Once upon a time there was a frog…(Then the story is told and
finished…). Then they all lived happily ever after. And this is
the story of the frog prince.” Nobody imagines that the story of
the frog prince is yet to come. It was already told earlier in this
self same narrative. So too in verse 4a, the author of Genesis is
saying in essence: This, which you just heard, is the account of
the heavens and the earth. This sort of language is not unusual
for the Bible.
I also believe the people who made the verse separations
(centuries after the Bible was written) made a mistake in how
they partitioned this particular verse (and a few others)
because by not partitioning them at this point they made
people assume that both sentences relate to the same
narrative. I’ve separated it as 4a and 4b. Remember we
believe that the contents of the Bible are inspired, but the
verse separations (and the translations) are not inspired.
So now in the passage Moses is going to tell us about the
Garden of Eden, but just before he does that he wants to clarify
something. This clarification is a little tidbit of information
about how there was no rain and how the vegetation was
irrigated. Because after this Moses is going to talk about a
“garden” that was different from the rest of the earth.
The Garden of Eden
4b. in the day that the LORD
God made the earth and the
heavens,—
2
Both the Garden of Eden and Eve were created on day 6 and this is just
clarification of the detail of Day 6. I think this is the most likely case because
on Day 7 God rested.

Note the way this sentence indicates that it’s a

return to the old story and an addition of detail to
that story. Note also that the word “day”
3
obviously doesn’t imply a single day but really
means “the days when God created the earth and
the heavens”. Similar to how one could say
something like: In that day no man observed the
laws of God but each did what they felt like.
Thus indicating a period of time not a single day.
So
4b In the day that the LORD God made the earth and the
heavens,
5 before any plant of the field was in the
earth and before any herb of the field had
grown. For the LORD God had not
caused it to
rain on the earth, and there was no man
to till the ground; 6 but a mist went up
from the earth and watered the whole
face of the ground.
Notice a new sort of vegetation classification: plant of the field
and herb of the field. We have not seen this type of vegetation
before, up until now the “earth” brought forth grass and herbs
4
but they were wild . So the “field” here is not relating to some
random expanse of land. It is talking about farms or gardens,
things that need both cultivation by man and irrigation that is
separate from the rain. Basically Moses is telling us here that no
cultivated crops existed. No “Shrub of the field and plant of the
field” i.e. no shrub (think tomato) of the farm or plant (think
wheat) of the farm existed, but random
undomesticated plants grew around where there were natural
streams of irrigation. Note this passage is not telling us that
God is creating this but is reminding us that these had not YET
been created till now. Note too that work before the fall of man
was enjoyable and pleasant to do. What the fall brought is
weeds and thorns and drought and perhaps unfertile and hard
ground and so on.
7
And the LORD God formed man of
the dust of the ground, and breathed
into his nostrils the breath of life; and
man became a living being..
Remember again this is all still part of the “background
narrative”, that is, part of the “in the day that the LORD God
made the earth and the heavens,—”.
So verse 7 is just putting us in perspective. Moses is telling
us: Oh, after God created Adam, (and implied is: and before
He created Eve… because later on he tells us about Eve being
created) there were no cultivated or domesticated plants….
Now comes the actual story about the making of the Garden of
Eden and of plants of the field.

3
How can we claim this? Simply because the Bible just narrated how the
heavens and the earth were created over many days. Also I think there is
good indication that the “day” used in the narrative for the 6 days do not
need to be literal days as well. After all on day 7, God rested. The question
then is: Is He still resting? If He is then Day 7 is a lot longer than 1 day. Or
do you imagine that God rested 1 day and then got back to work?
4
Actually it is also possible that that this vegetation existed but was not
domesticated.
8
The LORD God planted a garden
eastward in Eden, and there He put the
man whom He had formed.
So now we note that this is NOT a new creation story at all.
Moses is specifically talking about the Garden ONLY. Obviously
the “earth” could not be a “Garden eastward in Eden.” (How can
you go east of the earth? The “east” refers to a part of the earth
and obviously if it’s a part of the earth, it is not the whole earth).
So again obviously this narrative about to be made is not going
to be talking about the entire earth. It’s talking about a specific
garden in the east and this garden could have been planted
anytime (but it is most probably after the creation of man, since
the indication seems that man had already been formed when the
garden was planted).
The rest of this narrative then tells us either what God did
5
at the time he planted the garden in the east .
9
And out of the ground the LORD God
made every tree grow that is pleasant to
the sight and good for food. The tree of
life was also in the midst of the garden,
 and the tree of the knowledge of good
and evil.
These are obviously new trees, different from the
ones mentioned (it is immaterial if they were the
same species or not, they are new instances of
trees). It would be foolish and illogical to even
suggest that this is a retelling of the creation of
the vegetation that happened on “day 3” in
Chapter 1 verse 11. Moreover in day 3 there was
no mention of the tree of knowledge of good and
evil. And we also see that he mentions trees that
are pleasant to the sight and good for food.
Back to the narrative now:
10
Now a river went out of Eden to water
the garden, and from there it parted and
became four riverheads.
11
The name of the first is Pishon; it
is the one which skirts the whole
land of Havilah, where there is gold.
12
And the gold of that land is good.
Bdellium and the onyx stone are there.
13
The name of the second river is
Gihon; it is the one which goes around
the whole land of Cush.
14
The name of the third river is Hiddekel;
[2]
it is the one which goes toward the
east of Assyria. The fourth river is the
Euphrates.
Again as we see this is not a new creation story. This is just
simple detail about the Garden of Eden and how it was irrigated
and where it was geographically. Obviously this doesn’t apply to
the entire earth, unless we imagine that Assyria covered the
earth.

5
Or it could indicate that he did it a bit later, either case is acceptable and
immaterial to our current topic
 15
Then the LORD God took the man and put him in the
garden of Eden to tend and keep it.
As you can see the man was already alive at this point, meaning
he was already created. More evidence that this story is about a
new garden and not of the creation of the earth or of man or of
everything else.
16
And the LORD God commanded the
man, saying, "Of every tree of the garden
you may freely eat;
17
but of the tree of the knowledge of
good and evil you shall not eat, for in
the day that you eat of it you shall
surely die."
18
And the LORD God said, "It is not
good that man should be alone; I
will make him a helper comparable
to him."
19
Out of the ground the LORD God
formed every beast of the field and every
bird of the air, and brought them to Adam
to see what he would call them. And
whatever Adam called each living
creature, that was its name.
Note that in the NIV in vs. 19 it says that the LORD God HAD
formed every beast. But in the NASB and KJV the word HAD
is missing.
19
Now the LORD God had formed out of
the ground all the beasts of the field and all the
birds of the air. He brought them to the man to
see what he would name them; and whatever the
man called each living creature, that was its
name. (NIV)
If the word HAD is correctly translated then this indicates that
God took animals from the rest of the earth and brought them
before Adam. But what if the word HAD is not correctly
translated, well rather than argue for the word HAD, we can
easily see that this simply implies that God formed more beasts
of the field and the air (probably because
the original ones roaming the rest of the earth would not
have had enough time to procreate in the last few days). Or
it could also mean that the beasts of the field were different
from the beasts of the wild e.g. goats, sheep, rabbits, etc.
19b He brought them to the man to see
what he would name them; and whatever
the man called each living creature, that
was its name.
20 So the man gave names to all the
livestock, the birds of the air and all the
beasts of the field. But for Adam no
suitable helper was found.
Now comes the detail about the creation of Eve.
21
And the LORD God caused a deep
sleep to fall on Adam, and he slept; and
He took one of his ribs, and closed up
the flesh in its
22
place. Then the rib which the LORD
God had taken from man He made into a
woman, and He brought her to the man.
23
And Adam said:
"This is now bone of my bones
And flesh of my flesh;
She shall be called Woman,
Because she was taken out of Man."
24
Therefore a man shall leave his father
and mother and be joined to his wife,
and they shall become one flesh.
25
And they were both naked, the man
and his wife, and were not ashamed.
Conclusion:
As you can see there aren’t two creation stories in Genesis.
There is one creation story of the earth and one story about the
new Garden of Eden and the creation of Eve.
Here’s how it is in summary.
The summary of the Creation (The MMPV Mammen Mutilated
Paraphrased Version)
The Creation
In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. He
then created the lights in the sky, etc. Then he created the fish,
the birds and the animals and finally he created man. Then on
th
the 7 day He rested. And this is the story of creation.
A brief explanation about plants of the field
By the way, in the days when God created man, there was no
plants and herbs of the field because there was no rain to
irrigate it and there was nobody to till the ground for these
plants and herbs of the field. God then created Man.
God creates the Garden
God then created the Garden of Eden in the East for Adam and
he put him there. And in that Garden out of the ground God
made every tree grow that was pleasant to look at and that could
be eaten. The tree of life and the tree of the knowledge of good
and evil was also there in the middle of the garden of Eden.
There were 4 rivers that flowed here.
God then asked Adam to take care of it. And it was fun to take
care of, i.e. the work was rewarding and gave Adam great joy.
God told Adam he couldn’t eat from the tree of knowledge of
good and evil.
Then God said it’s not good for Man to be alone, so he
created some new animals (or brought the ones he HAD
created) to Adam.
Eve is created
But Adam could not find anything compatible among the
animals, thus teaching him a lesson, then once Adam
realized this, God made Eve out of Adam’s body. And Adam
thought she was hot and leapt for joy.
As you can see it makes perfect sense and is quite coherent
and nothing has had to be force fit to make sense and
nothing contradicts each other.
Also I think it’s rather ethnocentric and racist for people to
claim that there are two stories of creation right next to each
other in Genesis that contradict each other. Are we claiming
that the early Israelis were dolts or idiots and couldn’t see or
couldn’t realize that a contradiction in the “word” of God
rendered it erroneous? And it took you, you
sole intelligent amazing skeptic to realize the contradiction that
had been hidden there for the last 10,000 years?
Note that there is also one interesting thing to consider: In
Chapter 1 verse 27 the Bible says:
1:27 So God created man in his own
image, in the image of God he created
him; male and female he created them.
I would almost tend to think that this could be still talking about
Adam ALONE. In other words when God first created Adam,
Adam had both the male and female pieces within him, God
then separated them when Eve was created. And man is thus
reunited in marriage when the “two shall become one.” But that
is just speculation and not critical to the conclusion.
San Jose, CA
Originally argued in 1982 in response to an atheist. Written
up in 1998. Updated in August 2002
 God’s Sovereignty and Glory
By Derek Thomas
Published May 1st, 2017
http://www.ligonier.org/learn/articles/gods-sovereignty-and-
glory/
From Tabletalk Magazine
Ligonier Ministries The teaching fellowship of R.C. Sproul

God is sovereign in creation, providence, redemption, and

judgment. That is a central assertion of Christian belief and
especially in Reformed theology. God is King and Lord of all. To
put this another way: nothing happens without God’s willing it
to happen, willing it to happen before it happens, and willing it
to happen in the way that it happens. Put this way, it seems to
say something that is expressly Reformed in doctrine. But at its
heart, it is saying nothing different from the assertion of the
Nicene Creed: “I believe in God, the Father Almighty.” To say
that God is sovereign is to express His almightiness in every
area.
God is sovereign in creation. “In the beginning, God created
the heavens and the earth” (Gen. 1:1). Apart from God, there
was nothing. And then there was something: matter, space,
time, energy. And these came into being ex nihilo—out of
nothing. The will to create was entirely God’s. The execution
was entirely His. There was no metaphysical “necessity” to
create; it was a free action of God.
God is sovereign in providence. Traditional theism insists that
God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent—all powerful,
all knowing, and everywhere present. Each assertion is a
variant of divine sovereignty. His power, knowledge, and
presence ensure that His goals are met, that His designs are
fulfilled, and that His superintendence of all events is (to God,
at least) essentially “risk free.”
God’s power is not absolute in the sense that God can do
anything (potestas absoluta); rather, God’s power ensures that He
can do all that is logically possible for Him to will to do. “He
cannot deny himself,” for example (2 Tim. 2:13).
Some people object to the idea that God knows all events in
advance of their happening. Such a view, some insist, deprives
mankind of its essential freedom. Open theists or free-will
theists, for example, insist that the future (at least in its specific
details) is in some fashion “open.” Even God does not know all
that is to come. He may make predictions like some cosmic
poker player, but He cannot know absolutely. This explains,
open theists suggest, why God appears to change His mind: God
is adjusting His plan based on the new information of
unforeseeable events (see Gen. 6:6–7; 1 Sam. 15:11). Reformed
theology, on the other hand, insists that no event happens that
is a surprise to God. To us it is luck or chance, but to God it is
part of His decree. “The lot is cast into the lap, but its every
decision is from the Lord” (Prov. 16:33). Language of God
changing His mind in Scripture is an accommodation to us and
our way of speaking, not a description of a true change in God’s
mind.
God is sovereign in redemption, a fact that explains why we
thank God for our salvation and pray to Him for the salvation of
our spiritually lost friends. If the power to save lies in man’s
free will, if it truly lies in their unaided ability to save
themselves, why would we implore God to “quicken,” “save,” or
“regenerate” them? The fact that we consistently thank God for
the salvation of individuals means (whether we admit it or not)
that belief in absolute free will is inconsistent.
God is sovereign in judgment. Few passages of Scripture
reflect the sovereignty of God in election and reprobation with
greater force than Romans 9:21: “Has the potter no right over
the clay, to make out of the same lump one vessel for honorable
use and another for dishonorable use?” On the face of it, this
might appear unfair and arbitrary—as though God were playing
some vindictive child’s game with the petals of a flower: “He
loves me; He loves me not. He loves me; He loves me not.” In
response, some people have insisted that God has the right to
do whatever He pleases and it is none of our business to find
fault with Him—a point that Paul himself anticipates (Rom.
9:20). Others have taken the view that if God were to grant us
what we deserve, we would all be damned. Election is therefore
a gracious (and not just a sovereign) act. Both are true. But in
any case, our salvation displays God’s glory: “For from him and
through him and to him are all things. To him be glory forever.
Amen” (Rom. 11:36)
HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY
The assertion of divine sovereignty is not without further
questions that should be addressed.
First, there is the question of evangelism. If God is sovereign
in all matters of providence, what is the point of exerting
human effort in evangelism and missions? God’s will is sure to
be fulfilled whether we evangelize or not. But we dare not
reason this way. Apart from the fact that God commands us to
evange-lize—“Go therefore and make disciples of all nations”
(Matt. 28:19)—such reasoning ignores the fact that God fulfills
His sovereign plan through human means and instrumentality.
Nowhere in the Bible are we encouraged to be passive and
inert. Paul commands his Philippian readers to “work out your
own salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God who works
in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure” (Phil.
2:12–13).
Second, there is the question of ethics. We are held
responsible for our actions and behavior. We are culpable in
transgression and praiseworthy in obedience.
Third, in relation to civic power and authority, there is the
question of God’s sovereignty in the determination of rulers
and government. God has raised up civil governments to be
systems of equity and good and peace, for the punishment of
evildoers and for the praise of them who do well (Rom. 13:3; 1
Peter 2:14). But this is also true of evil powers and corrupt
regimes that violate the very principles of government itself;
these are also under the sovereign government of Almighty
God.
Fourth, in the question of both the origin and continued
existence of evil, the sovereignty of God meets its most acute
problem. That God does not prevent evil from existing seems to
call into question His omnipotence or His benevolence. Some
non-Christian religions try to solve this problem by positing
that evil is imaginary (Christian Science) or an illusion
(Hinduism). Augustine and many medieval thinkers believed
part of the mystery could be solved by identifying evil as a
privation of the good, suggesting that evil is something without
existence in and of itself. Evil is a matter of ontology (being).
Reformed thought on this issue is summarized by the
Westminster Confession of Faith:
God, from all eternity, did, by the most
wise and holy counsel of His own will,
freely, and unchangeably ordain what-
soever comes to pass: yet so, as
thereby neither is God the author of sin,
nor is violence offered to the will of the
crea-tures; nor is the liberty or
contingency of second causes taken
away, but rather established. (3:1)
God is the “first cause” of all things, but evil is a product of
“second causes.” In the words of John Calvin, “First, it must be
observed that the will of God is the cause of all things that
happen in the world: and yet God is not the author of evil,”
adding, “for the proximate cause is one thing, and the remote
cause another.” In other words, God Himself cannot do evil and
cannot be blamed for evil even though it is part of His
sovereign decree.
God is sovereign, and in His sovereignty He displays His
majestic glory. With out it, we would have no being, no
salvation, and no hope. Soli Deo gloria.
 Clearing up Confusion about
Heaven and Hell Revelation
20:11–21:4
By Bob Wilkin
Published March 1, 2017
https://faithalone.org/grace-in-focus-articles/clearing-up-
confusion-about-heaven-and-hell/

Most people think that they know a lot about heaven and hell.
But most popular ideas about heaven and hell do not actually
come from the Bible, but from Greek philosophy, especially
Plato, and from medieval writings like Dante’s Inferno.

Part 1: Heaven Isn’t What Most People

Suppose
We sing many songs about heaven, like “When We All Get to
Heaven” and “Heaven Is a Wonderful Place.”
But what are we thinking about when we sing such songs? Are
we thinking about where we will be if we die before the
Rapture? That is not what these songs are about. These songs
are about where we will spend eternity.
The reason we sing about heaven as our eternal home is
because most pastors and theologians believe it will be our
eternal home. As a result, many churchgoers believe that as
well. Most people in Christianity think that heaven will be the
eternal home of Christians.

Most Fail to Recognize That There Are

Three Heavens, Not One Heaven
The Greek word which is often translated as heaven is ouranos.
Yes, it sometimes refers to the place where believers who have
died are now.
But more often it refers to the place where the birds fly. It is
sometimes translated as sky, sometimes as air, and sometimes
as heaven when what is meant is the atmosphere around the
earth. See Matt 6:26; 8:20; 13:32; Mark 4:4, 32; Luke 13:19; Acts
10:12; 11:6.
In Scripture that is the first heaven.
It also often refers to the place where the stars and the
planets outside our solar system are. Outer space is often called
the heavens. When God created “the heavens and the earth,” the
heavens there refers to all the planets and the stars outside of
earth. See Heb 1:10-11; 2 Pet 3:7, 10, 12; 21:1.
In Scripture that is the second heaven.
Occasionally, but not often—except in the Book of Revelation
—the term ouranos refers to the place where God’s glory is
localized and where departed believers await Christ’s return.
See 2 Cor 12:2-4; Rev 4:1-11; 8:1-6; 16:11.
That is called the third heaven in Scripture.

The Lord Jesus and His Apostles Said That

the Current Heavens Will Be Destroyed
When the Scriptures say that “heaven will pass away,” they
do not mean the third heaven will pass away. That refers to the
first and second heavens.
The entire universe, except for the third heaven, will be
destroyed and the taint of sin completely eliminated. Sin, I
believe, is why we will get a new universe.
I’m not sure if the fall, and possibly the flood, resulted in
change in the universe. Were asteroids and meteors part of the
original design? Will they be part of the new heavens and the
new earth?
Were all planets originally inhabitable? Will all planets be
inhabitable in the eternal state?
The Bible does not answer these questions. But what it does
say is that the first and second heavens will be destroyed and
new untainted ones created. See Matt 5:18; 24:35; 2 Pet 3:10; Rev
21:1-3.

Most Fail to Read the Bible to the Very End

When I was on staff with Campus Crusade for Christ we used
to sing a song called, “Heaven Is a Wonderful Place.” We’d sing
about how wonderful heaven is, how it is filled with glory and
grace. “I want to see my Savior’s face! Heaven is a wonderful
place. I want to go there.” Students and staff alike loved the
song. But, unfortunately that song presents a flawed view of
heaven.
Yes, heaven is a wonderful place, filled with glory and grace.
And yes my Savior is there right now. However, the song gives
the distinct impression that we will spend eternity in heaven in
the presence of Jesus. But neither the Lord Jesus nor believers
will spend eternity in the third heaven. Jesus and believers will
spend eternity on the new earth. The third heaven wasn’t made
for humans, and humans weren’t made for the third heaven.
See Revelation 21-22.

Most Fail to Carefully Read the First Three

Chapters in the Bible
One simple way we know this is by reading the opening
chapters of Genesis. If Adam and Eve had not sinned, then there
is no question but Adam and Eve and all their descendants
would have lived on earth at least until they filled it. Think
about that for a moment. God’s design for human beings was
not that they live in the third heaven forever. He didn’t design
us for the third heaven. He gave us bodies and a planet on
which to use those bodies. While angels arguably were designed
to spend at least some of their time in the third heaven,
humans were not.
The first and last chapters of the Bible make it clear that God
has come to dwell with us on earth. If your aim has been to
spend eternity in heaven, I hope you will give up on that
ambition. That isn’t for you.

What Will the New Earth Be Like?

Revelation 21-22 tells us that it will be beautiful, with streets
and buildings of gold. It will have lots of precious stones. The
world capital, the New Jerusalem, will be bigger than most
countries today.
Surely the new earth will be better than this earth and better
even than the earth before the flood. Remember, before the
flood people lived 900+ years even on a fallen world. The new
earth will be perfect. And the people there will be perfect. No
more sin. It will be an amazing place to live.

We Need to Change the Way We Think

about Heaven
The way we think about heaven is wrong and we need to be
transformed by the renewing of our minds (Rom 12:2; 2 Cor
3:18). Our eternity is more glorious than we can imagine. But
we should be imagining living in the right place to start with.
And we should imagine serving the Lord Jesus Christ forever
(Rev 22:5).
Most likely, believers who are now in heaven are longing for
the Rapture. They want to be reunited with living believers.
Earth is calling them home. They long to see Israel restored to
its glorious position as God’s chosen nation. The thought of
seeing the Lord Jesus sitting on the throne of David and ruling
from Jerusalem thrills them. The Millennium is such a glorious
time to anticipate. And the New Jerusalem, the twelve gates of
pearl, the streets of gold, the nations, and the glorious sinless
new earth in which righteousness dwells, is something to
capture our imaginations, as well as the imaginations of those
now in heaven.
Of course, no one in heaven is upset or disappointed. But they
know that heaven is not their home. They realize they are just
passing through on their way back to earth.
One day Sharon and I were walking with our friends Will and
Sue Nece. I said something about how I longed to spend eternity
in heaven. Will looked over and asked, “Why would you long for
that? Our eternal home is the new earth, not heaven.
Revelation 21-22 shows that.”
That was a eureka experience for me. I saw right away he was
right. And I began to study more. And my enthusiasm grew for
the life to come. I believe your enthusiasm will grow as well if
you get your eternal focus on the new earth, where it should be.

Part 2: Hell Isn’t What Most People

Suppose
Here are some popular ideas about hell that are not actually
found anywhere in the Bible:
 • People’s skin is on fire.
• Fire shoots from the noses, mouths,
eyes, and ears of people.
• The physical pain is worse than any
pain ever experienced in this life
including childbirth, kidney stones, and
torture.
• The pain is intolerable all the time
and never lessens.
In an article on hell in The New International Dictionary of New
Testament Theology (NIDNTT) Bietenhard says, “In contrast with
later Christian writings and ideas, the torments of hell are not
described in the New Testament” (Vol 2, p. 209).
While it might be possible that some of those popular ideas
are true, if they are not found in the Bible, we should back off
on saying “Thus saith the Lord” when it comes to speculation,
which is what that is.
Let’s start by looking at three leading passages in Scripture
about hell.

Three Key Biblical Passages on Hell

The Rich Man, Lazarus, and Abraham (Luke 16:19-31)
We really don’t know the level of the rich man’s torment.
Since he is able to carry on an intelligent conversation, it is
highly unlikely his suffering is at the very top end of the scale.
We do know his torment is conscious and that the flames in his
environment are real flames.
But there is no hint here that the man is on fire. He is in a
fiery environment,1 like being near a roaring fire or a lava flow.
We do not know how this man’s sufferings compares to others
in Sheol. Is this the worst type of suffering there? Is this
average? Is this the least?
This is but a snapshot of the man’s experience in Sheol. Is his
experience like this all the time? Or might his experience be
worse than this at times and better at other times? The Lord
does not reveal that information.
 The bottom line is that while this text gives us some ideas
about what hell is like, it doesn’t tell us much.
The Smoke of Their Torment Ascends Forever (Revelation 14:11)
An angel reports that all who take the mark of the beast
during the Tribulation will be tormented: “The smoke of their
torment ascends forever and ever; and they have no rest day or
night, who worship the beast and his image, and whoever
receives the mark of his name.”
This verse shows that the torment in the lake of fire for
unbelievers from the Tribulation will be eternal. That they have
no rest day or night (a figure of speech called merism) probably
is not saying one way or the other whether the torment varies
in intensity throughout each day, but about an inability to
escape the torment. Torment will be a daily experience forever
for those in the lake of fire.
Compare Rev 20:10, which uses the same language to say that
the devil, the beast, and the false prophet “will be tormented
night and day forever and ever [aiōnas tōn aiōnōn].”
The verse before Rev 14:11 speaks of fire and brimstone,
which is the source of the smoke mentioned in v 11. There is no
reason to believe that this is anything other than literal fire,
brimstone, and smoke.
While we get some general idea here of what torment in the
lake of fire will be like, there is no specificity. We don’t yet
know how much the suffering will be, what the nature of the
suffering will be, whether it will fluctuate in magnitude for
each person, or whether the torment will vary from person to
person.
Mocking New Arrivals in Hell (Isaiah 14:9-11)
This passage is little known, but adds some information about
Sheol that we do not find in other texts.
The passage speaks of the king of Babylon going to Sheol (vv
9-11) as well as the fall of Lucifer when he led an angelic
rebellion against God (vv 12-15).2
If there is some measure of pleasure in mocking new arrivals in
Sheol, it seems likely that people in Sheol also mock each other
daily. And it seems likely that they will mock each other for
eternity in the lake of fire. This will cause emotional pain to the
ones being mocked. But it will also cause a measure of sadistic
delight for the ones doing the mocking. That won’t eliminate
their torment. But it might well distract them from it to a
degree.

Where Is Hell?
Hell (also called Hades, Sheol, Abbadon, and the Pit—and
possibly the Abyss and Tartarus and Gehenna) is not the place
where Satan, fallen angels, demons, and unbelievers will spend
eternity. That is called the lake of fire.
The location of hell is almost certainly the center of the
current earth. Whenever people died prior to Jesus’ ascension,
they are said to have gone down. The only place down from the
earth’s surface is under the earth. The earth’s core is molten,
fitting the description of flames.
The Scriptures do not say or even hint where the lake of fire
will be. Hypothetically, it might end up being in the center of
the new earth. However, since the new earth and indeed the
new universe will be free from sin and from its remnants, it is
extremely likely that the lake of fire will be in a completely
different place than the new earth and the new universe.

Two Extreme and Unbiblical Views About

the Nature of the Suffering in Hell
Extreme View #1: The Suffering Will Be Intolerable
Most conservative Christians have a view of hell that is
medieval in its origins. Their view of hell does not come from
Bible passages on the subject.
Henry Buis writes, “There is a noticeable increase in the
crudeness of the description of hell” in the Middle Ages. 3 He
goes on to tell of the descriptions of Venerable Bede (AD 673-
735) and of Dante Alighieri (AD 1265-1321) in his famous poem
Inferno. Bede speaks of flames coming out of people’s ears, eyes,
nostrils, and even every pore of their skin. 4
Many conservative Christians listen to preachers who have a
medieval view of hell. These preachers speak of hell as a place
of intolerable pain, of pain worse than anything ever suffered
here on earth.
 The medieval/conservative view is so horrendous that it is no
wonder that liberals have developed various ways of taking the
sting out of hell. However, today it is not simply liberals who
believe that unbelievers will not be tormented forever. Many
conservative Evangelicals now adopt this unbiblical view.
Extreme View #2: No Humans Will Experience Any Suffering in Hell
Many cannot imagine that God would allow for eternal
suffering. So they create an eternal future which makes more
sense to them.
There are several different ways in which Evangelicals speak
of a future in which no one (or maybe just a small number of
incorrigibles) suffers.
Annihilationism. Some teach that after the Great White Throne
Judgment (Rev 20:11-15) all of unbelieving humans will be
annihilated. That is, they will cease to exist. This view is called
annihilationism, conditional immortality, or simply conditionalism.
The problem with this view, as with the ones which follow, is
that it does not take the teachings of Scripture about eternal
torment seriously.
Postmortem conversions. Others argue that the torment of
unbelievers will be eternal, but that people have the
opportunity to hear and believe the message of life after they
die. Thus people die and go to a place of suffering in Sheol.
While there, they should become quite open to the promise of
life. But then one day they will appear before Jesus at the Great
White Throne Judgment. If a person has not come to faith in
Jesus by that time, the Lord Himself will share the message of
life at that time, giving each person one last chance to be born
again and to escape eternal torment.
The idea here is that most people will come to faith in Jesus
and escape condemnation. Thus, while the lake of fire will
indeed be a place of eternal suffering, most people won’t be
there.
While this view is not universalism, it is close to it. Instead of
few finding the way (Matt 7:13-14), most find the way, at least
eventually.
Universalism. Still others indeed argue for universalism. In this
view 100% of mankind enters the kingdom. No human being
will have the lake of fire as his eternal abode.
In the past this view was widely rejected by conservative
Evangelicals. The Bible clearly rejects this notion. However,
over the past decade or two, an increasing number of
Evangelicals hold this view.5
Once again, this view fails because it ignores or rejects the
clear teaching of the Word of God.
Unconscious Torment. Another view is that the suffering will be
unconscious. What is unconscious suffering? I don’t know. I
suppose it is pain which a person is unaware that he is
experiencing. But is it really pain if a person doesn’t feel it?
This view is not supported by Scripture either.

The Truth: The Torment in the Lake of Fire

Will Be Tolerable
A view closer to mine than any of the preceding, yet still
significantly different, is the view that the torment in the lake
of fire will be mental and spiritual, but not physical. This view
is a bit unique. In a book entitled Sense and Nonsense about
Heaven and Hell, Boa and Bowman say: “We embrace the view
that there will be endless torment in Hell, but it will be spiritual
rather than physical in nature.” 6 Here is how they define
spiritual torment: “It will consist of spiritual or mental anguish,
perhaps in the form of regret, an abiding sense of loss, and the
devastation of permanent exile from God, the world, and all
that is good, beautiful, whole, and meaningful.” 7 Thus in their
view there will be eternal suffering that is conscious, but it will
not in any sense be physical.
A more accurate view is that the torment in the lake of fire
will be physical, mental, and spiritual torment, but that all of it
will be tolerable. None of it will be unbearable. See Matt 11:22,
24.
The Lord taught both degrees of joy in the kingdom and
degrees of suffering in the lake of fire.
God is not going to give unbelievers an eternal experience
that is unbearable. He could. He could set it up so people had
level 10 suffering 24/7/365, with no breaks and no escape. But
He will not do that. Such suffering could not be described as
tolerable or more tolerable.
Which unbelievers get the more tolerable torment may
surprise us. Those of Sodom and Gomorrah and Tyre and Sidon
were notorious sinners. Yet their torment will be more
tolerable than law abiding, legalistic, self-righteous Jews of the
first century who rejected the Messiah when they saw and
heard Him directly (Matt 11:22, 24). Degree of torment will be
based in great part on how much revelation from God a person
rejected.

Practical Concerns about Hell

There are practical problems if our view of hell involves too
much or too little torment.
If we believe and teach that the torment in the lake of fire will
be worse than what the Bible actually says, these practical
problems result:
1. We will hinder our evangelistic
efforts with some, if not many, people
(unless we do not share our view of the
lake of fire). If an unbeliever is
presented a view of hell that is far
worse than the Bible portrays, he may
be repelled from Christianity entirely.
Many people under forty today are
turned off by the medieval view of hell.
They figure that nothing could be worse
than what Hitler or Stalin or Pol Pot did.
They cannot conceive of God as doing
something to people that is more
painful that what these men did. Thus
they reject hell, and sometimes with it
heaven, the kingdom, life after death,
and Christianity.
2. A secondary problem is that this
teaching of hell is normally not coupled
with the message of justification by
 faith alone. Instead, it is routinely joined
with a call to turn from one’s sins, give
one’s life to Christ, follow Him, and
serve Him. The message of an
intolerable eternity fits well within
works salvation, but not so well with
justification by faith alone.
If our view of hell is too lenient there are also practical
problems:
1. If a person teaches the view of
annihilationism or no conscious
torment, his listeners would certainly be
less concerned about their eternal
destiny and the possibility that they
may be wrong than they would be if
they had been presented with a Biblical
view of hell and the lake of fire. There
are many people who are not too
bothered by an eternal loss of
consciousness or ceasing to exist.
2. The listener might well doubt the
truthfulness of the Bible. If the listener
knows that the Bible speaks of eternal
torment, and yet the evangelist
speaking to him says there is no eternal
torment, then how does he know if
anything else the Bible says is true?
Conclusion
When an English reader of the Bible sees the words heaven
and hell, he should not simply assume he knows what is meant.
Heaven has three main meanings in Scripture: the sky, outer
space where the stars and planets are, and the place where
God’s shekinah glory is and where believers who have died
currently are.
 The third heaven will not be the eternal dwelling place for
believers. Believers will spend eternity on the new earth, which
is where the Lord Jesus will be.
Prior to Jesus’ ascension into heaven, hell/Sheol/Hades was
the place of all who had died, both believers and unbelievers.
Since Jesus’ ascension, there are no believers in
hell/Sheol/Hades. It only holds unbelievers who have died.
The current experience of unbelievers in hell is bad, but
bearable.
Unbelievers will spend eternity not in hell, but in the lake of
fire.
The eternal experience of unbelievers in the lake of fire will
be bad, but tolerable.
It is time that we move back to Scripture in order to
understand what heaven and hell really are.

Endnotes
Bob Wilkin is Executive Director of Grace Evangelical
Society. He lives in Highland Village, TX with his wife of 40
years, Sharon. His latest book is What Is the Outer
Darkness? (co-authored with Zane Hodges).
*This article is condensed from chapters 5&6 of The Ten Most Misunderstood
Words in the Bible (Denton, TX: Grace Evangelical Society, 2012).
1. The words “in this flame” mean he is living in a fiery place. It is hot there,
hence his thirst. If he had been literally on fire as some might think, then
he would not have been concerned about being thirsty.
2. It should be noted that many commentators suggest that vv 12-15 also
refer to the king of Babylon. In this view the designations Lucifer (NKJV)
should be translated as day star or morning star and is being used
figuratively of an earthly king, not of Lucifer himself. However, there is
good reason to believe that vv 12-15 do refer to Lucifer. Compare Ezek 28:12-
15.
3. Henry Buis, The Doctrine of Eternal Punishment (Philadelphia, PA: P&R
Publishing, 1957).
4. Ibid., p. 67.
5. Brennan Manning, a promoter of contemplative spirituality, has promoted
this view for years and has won many Evangelicals to his view. Many in the
contemplative spirituality movement believe in either universalism or
 annihilationism. In March 2011 famed emerging church pastor Rob Bell,
pastor of a church of 10,000, released a book in which he argues that
unbelievers will not spend eternity in hell. Many others in the emerging
church movement have rejected the idea of anyone being tormented
forever.
6. Kenneth D. Boa and Robert M. Bowman, Jr., Sense and Nonsense about
Heaven and Hell (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2007), p. 119.
7. Ibid., p. 115.
 Judas & Matthias (Acts 1:15-
26)
By Zane Hodges
Published September 1, 2015
https://faithalone.org/grace-in-focus-articles/judas-matthias-
acts-115-26/

Reminder That Jesus’ Betrayal Was

Prophesied (Acts 1:15-20)
1:15-17. Prayer results in an understanding of God’s will
because it leads to an understanding of God’s Word. It is not a
fuzzy or unexplainable feeling that results in the
comprehension of God’s mind. Rather, the Spirit illuminates the
mind of Peter as to the Word of God concerning Judas (vv 16
and 20).
In particular, Peter’s mind is turned to the Psalms. Verse 20
combines two references from the Old Testament (Pss 69:25 and
109:8). The latter verse comes into Peter’s quotation exactly as
it is in the Old Testament, but the quotation from Psalm 69
changes the plural reference of “their habitation” to “his
habitation,” and the words “in their tents” become simply “in
it.” The word epaulis (= “farm,” “homestead,” “residence”) is
the LXX rendering of the Hebrew mirah ( = encampment, BDB p.
377b) which in a poetical sense refers to a habitation and is a
poetic equivalent of epaulis.
Psalm 69:20-21 are clearly the pre-recorded words of our
Lord, so verses 22-25 refer to His enemies. But if they refer to
His enemies, then surely Judas, who guided them to Jesus (Acts
1:16), is included. Thus the Psalm rightly may be applied to him.
Psalm 109:1-5 prefigures the exercises of the Lord’s heart.
Verse 4 virtually places us in the garden of Gethsemane as, with
the adversaries on their way there and our Lord conscious of
His love for sinful man, He gives Himself to prayer.
Note in Ps 109:4 that the word yismenuni (= “they are
adversaries to me”) is a cognate of saman, meaning adversary or
Satan (BDB p. 966 c). It is deeply appropriate to that garden
scene, for Satan had entered into Judas. Verse 5 is especially
true of Judas and so suddenly the singular begins to prevail
from verses 6-8 and following. All of the enemies are now seen,
so to speak, personified in Judas.
Perhaps Peter was thinking of Judas’s field and the Spirit led
his mind to Ps 69:25. A fulfillment of this could be clearly seen
in that desolate field which became a graveyard (cf. Matt 27:7).
It followed from this that if such a prediction had to be fulfilled
(edei plerothenai), then of course Ps 109:8 likewise had to be (dei,
Acts 1:21). Thus the will of God was clear.
It would seem that Peter remembered these two verses as
though they were but a single Scripture (tēn graphēn tautēn, Acts
1:16) as indeed on a spiritual plane, in reference to Judas, they
are.
Moreover, he may not have been aware of his verbal variation
from Ps 69:25. Peter remembered the Scriptures this way
because in this way the Spirit desired them to be remembered.
Thus we see the work of the Spirit in guiding us through the
Word. He not only brings to remembrance (cf. John 14:26) but
He interprets and guides into truth (cf. John 14:13). The passage
from Ps 69:25 comes to Peter’s mind interpretatively; Ps 109:8
comes to his mind exactly; and both come to his mind
connectively. Thus he remembers and understands at one
instant.
So the Spirit of God is ever in our hearts as a reminder and an
interpreter of God’s Word that we might know God’s will. But
we must be acquainted with Scripture to benefit from such
divine leading (Ps 119:11).
1:18-19. These verses are an explanatory parenthesis by Luke.
The purchase of the field (ektēsato) may actually have been in
Judas’s name. But whether or not this was so, that is what he
“got” (ktaomai) with the blood money. The field seems to have
been named both with a view to his bloody death and also
because it was obtained with blood money (Matt 27:6-8). The
priests, acting with the false scruples noted in Matt 27:6-7, may
have regarded the money as belonging still to Judas, hence the
field as his. Acts does not state that Judas’s death was in his
field, but only that the field received its name from his death.
Of course, Matt 27:5 may telescope events that were stretched
out. Perhaps Judas lived to see the field become his and went
there to commit suicide. The “falling headlong” probably refers
to the rope breaking under the weight of his body.
Whereas such a field might have been a homestead (epaulis),
its reputation guaranteed it not being so used. No Jew would
want to be buried there. Only foreigners were interred in it.
Thus the field was marked by desolation. The field became a
picture of Judas’s life and death. Whereas that life might have
been a fruitful “field” for God and the blessing of souls—
whereas it might have furnished many with everlasting
habitations—it actually came to speak only of a ruin in which
no man desired to share in death.
Judas might have been in the upper room, awaiting the
promised coming of the Spirit, instead he was in the lowest hell
(“his own place,” ton topon ton idion v 25). The poreuthēnai
expresses the longest moral journey downward in human
history from the highest possible privilege—apostleship—to the
greatest possible ignominy and woe. Better he had never been
born.
As he had no pity or love—no bowels of kindness—in life
toward the Lord (until too late), so God’s judgment is that he
have no pity in death. His greatest sin was an unfeeling
rejection of the Savior’s love (Ps 107:4-5). His kiss of betrayal
was without compassion.

Two Candidates Chosen Based on

Qualifi cations (Acts 1:21-26)
1:21-23. Acting on this insight from the Scriptures, men with
the needed qualification for the Apostleship are now singled
out. It must be noted here that the term martyra (v 22) is a
virtual equivalent of “apostle.” Apparently only two men, out of
the 120 people assembled, meet the stipulations.
 1:24-25. The disciples—utterly deceived by Judas even to the
point of trusting him with their money—do not here trust their
knowledge of the human heart. They appeal to the Lord’s
knowledge of the heart to make this choice. God alone can place
men in His service, for He alone knows their heart (cf. 1 Tim
1:12).
1:26. The casting of lots is elsewhere sanctioned in Scripture
(cf. the division of land, Josh 18:8; the scapegoat, Lev 16:8; the
distribution of the duties of the sons of Aaron, 1 Chr 24:5-19;
and especially Prov 16:33; 18:18). It is engaged in here under
these circumstances:
1. To make a decision which it was known from the Word of
God needed to be made (v 20-21).
2. To make a decision that must be made without delay. They
knew not when the Spirit would come, soon no doubt (1:5), and
then the period of witness would begin (1:8). A new witness
was needed at once.
3. To make a decision in which the determining facts were
beyond any possibility of human knowledge, i.e., knowledge of
the heart.
It is probably best to view this situation as unique, especially
since lots were used in Scripture to distinguish between
persons in the assigning of roles, portions, duties, and offices.
No method of determining God’s will is valid if it is a substitute
for knowing God’s Word (cf. Ps 119:105 and 2 Tim 3:16-17). Here
it arose out of knowledge of God’s Word and only ignorance of
the human heart. But its Old Testament character should warn
us against seeing a normative New Testament principle in the
precise mode employed.
For Matthias it was a potentially great comfort to know, by
this procedure, that he was an Apostle by divine choice, not by
the human choice of the others (no election was held). So he
shared with them their knowledge of divine appointment.
 Three Gospel Studies
Published March 1, 2016
https://faithalone.org/grace-in-focus-articles/3gospel-studies/

Study I: Four Simple Observations from the

Evangelistic Ministry of the Lord Jesus
I recently did a Logos software study revealing four facts
which, while simple, have significant implications:
1. Jesus Christ did not spend a lot of time convincing
unbelievers that they were sinners.
2. The Lord also did not spend much time convincing individual
unbelievers to repent . However, He did spend a lot of time
announcing judgment against Israel and its cities for not
repenting and believing in Him. And He spoke quite a bit to
believers about repenting.
3. Neither metanoein (to repent) nor metanoia (repentance)
are even mentioned in the Gospel of John (which was written
so that people could get eternal life).
4. But Jesus does spend a lot of time trying to convince
unbelievers that they need to believe in Him, that is, that they
 need to believe that He is the Messiah.

Study II: Jesus Is “the Christ, the Son of

God”
When I did a Logos software study of the expression the Christ,
the Son of God (Greek: ho Christos ho huios tou Theou), I found it
only occurs six times in the New Testament, all in the Gospels.
Three times it is found in John’s Gospel, twice in Matthew, and
once in Luke.
Probably the most famous of these six uses is in the purpose
statement of John’s Gospel:
And truly Jesus did many other signs in the
presence of His disciples, which are not
written in this book; but these are written
that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ,
the Son of God, and that believing you may
have life in His name (John 20:30-31,
emphasis added).
The Apostle says that anyone who believes that Jesus is “the
Christ, the Son of God” is born again. But what does that
expression mean?
In Jesus’ famous dialogue with Martha He said, “I am the
resurrection and the life. He who believes in Me, though he may
die, he shall live. And whoever lives and believes in Me shall
never die. Do you believe this?” Martha’s response contains the
second most famous of the six uses of this expression:
“Yes, Lord, I believe that You are the Christ,
the Son of God, who is to come into the
 world” (John 11:27, emphasis added).
To believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God is to believe
that He is the resurrection and the life, i.e., that He guarantees
that believers will be in His kingdom forever (bodily
resurrection) and have everlasting life that can never be lost
(life).
Twice Peter used this expression, each time adding tou zontos,
“of the living”:
Simon answered and said, “You are the
Christ, the Son of the living God [lit. “You are
the Christ, the Son of God, the living One”]”
(Matt 16:16, emphasis added).
“Also we have come to believe and know that
You are the Christ, the Son of the living God
[lit. “You are the Christ, the Son of God, the
living One”]” (John 6:69, emphasis added).
The final two uses are not well known. Both come from
unlikely sources.
Caiaphas, the unbelieving high priest, during one of Jesus’
mock trials, said,
“I put You under oath by the living God: Tell
us if You are the Christ, the Son of God!”
(Matt 26:63, emphasis added).
Did Caiaphas know this expression from Old Testament
prophecies, from reports of Jesus’ own teachings, or did the
Holy Spirit put it on his mind just as He did when He had
Caiphas’ prophecy (unwittingly) about Jesus’ substitutionary
death (John 11:50-51)? While we can’t be sure, it is significant
that he uses the expression that John 20:31 says if one believes
(in the sense John intends it) he is born again.
The final use is from the lips of an even stranger source:
demons.
And demons also came out of many, crying
out and saying, “You are the Christ, the Son
of God!” And He, rebuking them, did not
 allow them to speak, for they knew that He
was the Christ (Luke 4:41, emphasis added).
Since Satan knows that Jesus gives everlasting life to living
humans1 who believe in Him (Luke 8:12; 2 Cor 4:4; cf. John
11:25-27), it makes sense that demons would know that as well.
But it is a bit shocking to find one of only six uses of this
expression on the lips of demons.
Notice, too, that the demons use the full expression “the
Christ, the Son of God,” but Luke reports simply that “they
knew that He was the Christ.” This helps explain a verse like 1
John 5:1, “Whoever believes that Jesus is the Christ is born of
God.”
God not only uses people like Peter, Martha, and John to
proclaim His message, He even uses the Jewish high priest and
demons to proclaim it too.
Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God. Do you believe this?

Study III: Why Is the Expression “Father in

Heaven” Only Found in the Synoptic
Gospels?
The expression “Father in Heaven” is found fifteen times in
Matthew, twice in Mark, and once in Luke.
That’s it.
It is not found in John, Acts, the Epistles, or Revelation.
I wonder why that important expression is only found in the
Synoptic Gospels? Why isn’t the Lord’s prayer (“Our Father in
heaven…”), for example, found in the epistles? Indeed why do
we never see the expression “Father in heaven” anywhere in
the epistles?
In the epistles we find “the God and Father of our Lord Jesus
Christ” six times (Rom 15:6; 2 Cor 1:3; 11:31; Eph 1:3; Col 1:3; 1
Pet 1:3). We also find “God the Father” fifteen times in the
epistles (1 Cor 8:6; 15:24; Gal 1:1, 3; Eph 5:20; 6:23; Phil 2:11; Col
3:17; 1 Thess 1:1; 2 Tim 1:2; Titus 1:4; 1 Pet 1:2; 2 Pet 1:17; 2 John
3; Jude 1) and once in the Gospels (John 6:27).
Might it be that the Apostles did not feel worthy of using the
exact expression the Lord Jesus used of His own Father?
 It seems that “God the Father” and “the God and Father of our
Lord Jesus Christ” are ways in which someone could
communicate the same truth but without the risk of sounding
blasphemous. After all, while God is our Father, He is not our
Father in the same sense in which He is Jesus’ Father, as part of
the Trinity. Jesus is uncreated. He is eternal. He created all
things with the Father and the Spirit.
Possibly another explanation might be that once God became
a man and dwelt among us, we who believe in Him now have
special access to God the Father. It is as though we are seated
with Christ in heaven (Eph 2:6).

Endnotes
1. As opposed to people who have died, only to realize in Hades that Jesus
really was the Christ. At that point, it is too late to believe and be saved.
 The Importance of Theology
By Michael Allen
Published January 1st, 2017
http://www.ligonier.org/learn/articles/importance-theology/
From Tabletalk Magazine

"Systematic theology" is a label with admittedly clinical

connotations. It conjures a picture of the theologian as
someone who takes in hand the living Word of God only to
dissect and dismember the body of biblical truth into various
pieces so that he might label (often in Latin!) and arrange those
pieces in categories of his own meticulous devising. Though
such a connotation of systematic theology is not uncommon in
popular Christian culture, it does not represent what most
Christian theologians have intended by the label. Far from
attempting to divide the seamless garment of biblical truth,
systematic theology considers what "the whole counsel of God"
(Acts 20:27) teaches on any given topic and reflects upon the
divinely revealed relations between the Bible's various topics.
In systematic theology, we not only ask, "What does the Bible
teach about salvation?" or "What does the Bible teach about
good works?" We also ask, "How does the Bible relate salvation
and good works?" The Bible's answer to the latter question, of
course, is that salvation does not follow from good works (Eph.
2:8–9). Rather, salvation precedes good works (v. 10). That
salvation precedes rather than follows good works is just as
vital for understanding the nature of salvation and good works
as it is for understanding salvation and good works as isolated
topics. Indeed, one cannot have a biblical understanding of
either topic without understanding the relationship between
them.
Systematic theology thus contemplates the body of biblical
teaching as a living organism, offering loving attention to its
various members and tracing their organic relations to each
another. Ultimately, systematic theology helps us better
understand God and all things in relation to God, a relation that
is encapsulated in the living bond between Jesus Christ, "the
head," and the church, "which is his body" (Eph. 1:22–23). In
what follows we will consider how systematic theology may
serve the church and inform the Christian life: (1) by shaping a
mind characterized by wonder and (2) by directing a life
characterized by worship and witness.

Wisdom That Promotes Wonder

Systematic theology can be classified as a species of biblical
"wisdom." According to Augustine, wisdom involves more than
the knowledge of distinct objects and more than the practical
"know-how" needed to navigate different circumstances. For
Augustine, true wisdom involves a contemplative awareness of
the relationship between temporal and eternal realities, the
relationship between creatures and the triune God, who is the
author and end of all creatures.
In describing wisdom in this manner, Augustine captures
something significant about the way the Bible teaches us about
various topics. When Moses begins his account of creation, he
begins with God: "In the beginning God" (Gen. 1:1). When John
begins his account of salvation, he too begins with God: "In the
beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the
Word was God" (John 1:1). The psalmist contemplates the
marvelous variety of God's creatures and, yet, for all their
variety, he discerns in them a unified chorus, ready to praise
the name of the Lord (Ps. 148). Having considered the
mysterious outworking of God's plan of salvation for Jew and
Gentile through the manifold twists and turns of redemptive
history, Paul bursts forth in awe and wonder before the God
"from whom and through whom and to whom are all things"
(Rom. 11:36).
As a species of biblical wisdom, systematic theology considers
the triune God, the supreme subject matter of biblical teaching,
and all things in relation to God. Systematic theology
contemplates God the Holy Trinity: it considers God in his
being, perfection, persons, counsel, and works. Systematic
theology also contemplates all things: it considers creation, sin,
Christ, and so forth. In considering the latter topics, systematic
theology is always concerned to view them in relation to God,
their author and end. Systematic theology thus exhibits a God-
centered organizing principle.
Herman Bavinck well summarizes the nature of systematic
theology in this regard. According to Bavinck, systematic
theology "describes for us God, always God, from beginning to
end—God in his being, God in his creation, God against sin, God
in Christ, God breaking down all resistance through the Holy
Spirit and guiding the whole of creation back to the objective
he decreed for it: the glory of his name." Given its focus on God
and all things relative to him, Bavinck continues, systematic
theology "is not a dull and arid science. It is a theodicy, a
doxology to all God's virtues and perfections, a hymn of
adoration and thanksgiving, a ‘glory to God in the highest'
(Luke 2:14)." Systematic theology, we might say, is for singing.
Dogmatics (another name of systematic theology) serves
doxology. In sum, systematic theology is biblical wisdom that
promotes God-centered wonder.

Wisdom That Directs Worship and Witness

Systematic theology not only shapes wisdom, but that wisdom
also enables a life of worship and witness. Paul's words to the
Romans turn in just this direction. After those lofty praises
found in Romans 11:33–36, the Apostle turns toward moral
guidance: "I appeal to you therefore, brothers, by the mercies
of God, to present your bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and
acceptable to God, which is your spiritual worship. Do not be
conformed to this world, but be transformed by the renewal of
your mind, that by testing you may discern what is the will of
God, what is good and acceptable and perfect" (Rom. 12:1–2).
God desires worship, the offering of one's own self in its
entirety. In this regard, surely the mention of "your bodies" is
meant to suggest that even the most base or mundane element
of the self—this wretched body that suffers and will die due to
the effects of sin and curse—may and can be offered unto God
in praise. Paul follows the instruction of Deuteronomy 6 here,
wherein the singularity of God (v. 4) beckons forth the whole-
hearted, all-inclusive devotion of self to God's service in
worship: "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart
and with all your soul and with all your might" (v. 5). God
desires not merely tithes and offerings, rites and ceremonies,
but a "living sacrifice" entailing one's whole being.
Such devotion does not come unopposed. First, of course, Paul
warns against the encroachments of a godless culture: "Do not
be conformed to this world." The Apostle calls us to put a
spiritual stiff-arm between our souls and the devious pressures
of the devil and this sinful world. Whether in Egypt, Canaan,
first-century Rome, or the twenty-first century West, we can
see how cultures lead astray, and we are called to be alert. But
it is not merely a godless culture that might draw innocents
into its sway.
We are ourselves a part of the problem, for we see that Paul
continues, "But be transformed by the renewal of your mind."
We dare not be drawn into the sinful cycles of the world, but we
must also be drawn from the evil inclinations of our own
hearts. Our spiritual status quo is not acceptable; we must be
sanctified and transformed within.
If these external and internal threats lurk, how does Paul
suggest we fend them off and pursue the kind of worship and
witness for which we were made? Our minds must be renewed,
he says, so that we might be discerning. The "renewal of your
mind" (Rom. 12:2) involves reorienting your frame of mind to
God and to God's merciful work done on your behalf already
(Rom. 11:33–36). That is why the moral call of Romans 12:1–2
follows logically from the preceding exposition of God's
glorious grace in Romans 1–11. (This relationship is alluded to
by the transitional word therefore in Rom. 12:1). "By the mercies
of God," we are to worship God in reasonable ways, thereby
renouncing the foolish and futile worship of the world (1:21–
23). Systematic theology displaces and relocates our obedience,
reminding us always to see ourselves through the lens of God's
mercy. Only when we know ourselves and our calling in that
framework, are we capable of discerning "what is good and
acceptable and perfect" (12:2). Paul is sketching a form of
intellectual discipleship by which we are enabled and matured
unto wise and godly discernment so that we can honor God
with our worship and attest God by our witness, pouring forth
the fame of His abundant goodness and singing aloud of His
righteousness (Ps. 145:7).
To sum up, then, the Christian life is a life of "reasonable
worship" (Rom. 12:1; translation ours). As one called to a life of
"worship," the Christian is called to be a "living sacrifice"
(12:1), to dedicate his life to the glory of God and the good of his
neighbor. As one called to a life of "reasonable worship," the
Christian learns what it means to dedicate his life to God and
neighbor through the "renewal" of his "mind" (12:2).
Systematic theology is especially suited to assist us in the call to
"reasonable worship." Systematic theology shapes a mind of
wisdom and wonder by helping us view reality from a God-
centered perspective. Systematic theology also directs a life of
worship and witness by helping us consider how all things (not
least our own redeemed selves) relate to God as their author
and end: "to him be glory forever" (Rom. 11:36).

Michael Allen
Dr. Michael Allen is associate professor of
systematic and historical theology at
Reformed Theological Seminary in
Orlando, Fla.
 Bible Morality
by Charles Watts
Vice-President of the National Secular Society
Watts and Co.
17, Johnson's Court, Fleet Street.
London, England.

SECULARISTS have no desire to extol the Bible above its

merits, nor to depreciate it below its deserts. We gladly admit
that it contains some useful precepts; but these, as a rule, are
intermixed with so many teachings of an injurious character
that their beauty is often overshadowed and their utility
annulled. Its coarse language in many places renders it unfit for
general perusal, and destroys its value as a standard for every-
day life. The true worth of literature should be its moral tone.
Novels are appreciated by the intelligent reader in proportion
to their being "adorned" with a moral. And dramas fail to gain
the approval of the thoughtful public unless virtue is inculcated
in a chaste form. So with the Bible: if in its ethical tone it is
defective, or if it is questionable in its injunctions or indelicate
in its records, it cannot with advantage be accepted as an
absolute monitor in human conduct.
All correct codes of morals should be clear in their authority
and practical in their application. This is the more necessary
when severe penalties -- as in the case of Christian ethics -- are
threatened for non-acceptance and disobedience. Now, the
ethics of the Bible are both contradictory and impracticable.
The same line of conduct is enjoined in one passage, and just as
explicitly prohibited in another. One man is blamed because he
is not cruel enough, and will not go on slaying the Lord's
enemies; another man's chief glory consists in being a mighty
man of war and a great destroyer of men, women, and children;
while other passages proclaim, "Thou shalt not kill," and enjoin
mercy and "loving- kindness."
The most absolute rest is enjoined on the Sabbath, and the
fiercest denunciations are hurled at the most vigorous
Sabbatarian. Retaliation for wrong is counselled, and
forgiveness is enjoined. We are told to love one another," and
we are commanded to hate our own flesh and blood. Industry is
advised and also discouraged; lustful pursuits are condemned
and also permitted. Thus Biblical morality is destitute of the
first fundamental condition of all just ethics.
Among the general principles taught in the Bible and
expounded by orthodoxy in this country is that belief, not
conduct, is the foundation of virtue, and that uncharitableness
towards opponents is justifiable. One of the first instructions
which a parent should enforce upon a child is never to impute
bad motives in matters of belief or non-belief. No lesson is more
valuable than this, none more calculated to render the child's
life happy and unsuspicious, and to make its influence in the
world more useful and beneficial. The Bible permits just the
opposite. According to Christian teachings, if a man does an act
of kindness, we are not to accept it with gratitude simply as an
act of kindness, but we are to judge from the motives of his
conduct.
Did he perform the act from love to God, or did he do it only
from respect for his fellow man? If the former, his services will
go up as a sweet smelling offering to Deity; if the latter, he
merely performed a "splendid vice." The motive, not the act, is
the thing to be considered. If men slay, ravish, and destroy for
the glory of God, the motive not only condones, but
consecrates, the act. Hence, in the early history of Christianity,
the practice of lying for the good of the Church was not only
allowed, but considered praiseworthy. To require universal
belief in one particular faith, and to condemn to eternal
perdition those who are unable to comply therewith, is not the
most moral doctrine.
Truly, a book that teaches that "many are called but few are
chosen," or, in other words, that the majority of our fellow
creatures are to be cast into a burning lake, cannot assist to
promote the happiness and good of mankind. The tendency of
such teaching as this cannot have a beneficial effect, inasmuch
as it often produces mutual hatred between man and man.
Artificial and unjust distinctions of government and of classes
have often produced ill-feeling between man and man; but that
evil has been increased by the religious distinctions based upon
Biblical teaching. The natural law of love is simple and clear.
It is a duty to love all men until we have reason to believe that
the trust is misplaced or abused. It then becomes necessary to
slightly modify our conduct as an act of self-defence; hence the
enactment of laws for the repression of crime and the
curtailment of injury. If a man's belief teaches him that he can
persecute, we have a right to be upon our guard, for we know
from bitter experience that such belief has frequently shaped
itself into conduct. But whatever man believes about matters
that do not affect his conduct should produce in us neither love
nor hatred towards him. His belief may be ever so curious,
absurd, unreal, and fantastic, ever so ridiculous and self-
contradictory, and in proportion of its partaking of those
qualities it may excite and amuse us; but it ought not to make
us respect or dislike him one whit more.
With the Bible it is quite different: its defect consists in its
teaching us to love and respect certain people who believe
certain things which have no direct beneficial bearing on their
conduct; while we are to avoid those whose lives may be a
model of purity and benevolence, but who cannot subscribe to a
certain faith.
The great principle of Bible morality is supposed to be
contained in the Ten Commandments. The Decalogue, we are
assured, enunciates moral lessons, against which no substantial
objections can be brought. There are two versions of the
Decalogue given in the Old Testament, varying in certain not
unimportant particulars. Moses brought down, we are
informed, the Ten Commandments from Mount Sinai, where he
had been having a 'tete-a-tete' with the Lord.
They were written on stone, and were copied off for future
generations in Exodus xx. They are also given in Deuteronomy
v.; but that was merely from memory, when Moses had become
somewhat advanced in age. It is not surprising, therefore, that
he should insert certain interpolations in the second giving of
the law which are absent from the first. How this incongruity
can be reconciled with the doctrine of the Divine inspiration of
the Bible may be left for Christians to decide among
themselves.
 The Decalogue is divided into two parts: that which relates to
man's duty to God, and that which relates to the mutual duties
of man to man. It is worthy of notice that, although the second
half contains six commands, and the former half only four,
nevertheless the first half is a great deal longer than the
second. Most of the commands of the second half are contained
in the most condensed form. The second, third, and fourth
Commandments are all developments of the first. The first
really contains or assumes the three which succeed it. The first,
which is, "Thou shalt have no other gods before me," of course
involves the second against idolatry, the third against
blasphemous swearing, and the fourth enjoining restful
remembrance of the creation of the world by God.
It is curious, while God in these Commandments had so much
to say in giving a complete code of conduct to his creatures, and
confining himself as he did within the limits of a certain
number of Hebrew characters, written on a stone small enough
for a man to carry down the side of a steep mountain, that he
should have wasted so much time in telling them how to behave
to him, and have left so little space to contain what was far
more important -- viz., the rules to regulate our conduct to
each other.
The whole prescribed duly of man to man is contained in
seventy-seven words. The second Commandment brings out
that particular character of the Christian God which is so
conspicuous in other parts of the Bible. We are not to make and
bow down to images. Very good advice, we readily admit. But
why are we not to do so? Is there any appeal to the generous
and reverential sentiments of the human heart?
Surely a noble and good God would have said something
similar to this:
"Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them,
nor serve them; for I, the Lord thy God, am a
great, beneficent, and generous God, with a
wide, all-embracing love.
Thou shalt not degrade thy soul nor debase thy being by
worshipping the gods of the heathen. I am your only father,
who made and cares for you, and your place of reverence and
trust is in the all-sustaining hollow of my hand."
 Had the Deity said this, and proved his sincerity by
appropriate actions subsequently towards his subjects, it would
have done more to have won the affections of his children to
him than the whole of his present recorded sayings contained
from Genesis to Revelation.
But no; we find that a sordid appeal is made partly to the
mean fears, and partly to the paternal affections, of the Jews.
They are forbidden to worship other gods: "For I, the Lord thy
God, am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon
the children, unto the third and fourth generation of them that
hate me." Fancy a great, Almighty God, creator of the earth,
being jealous of the estranged affection of an unfortunate Jew!
But this is in keeping with the general character of the
Christian Deity, and most of his particular and immediate
acquaintances.
The part of the Decalogue which has reference to us, as
members of society, is so brief, in comparison to that which has
been occupied by theology and the requirements of God, that
little room is left for the introduction of rewards and
punishments which are to follow the fulfillment or non-
fulfillment of so important a behest as "Thou shalt not kill."
But the punishment of idolatry, a most cruel, unjust, and
revengeful one is given at full length. The fifth Commandment,
Honor thy father and mother" is certainly, as far as it goes, an
excellent one. It comes home to the heart of everyone who has
the feelings of love and duty within him. We can take no
possible exception to its request. But the reason given for its
fulfillment is as selfish as it is untrue.
Yielding to no one in the belief that filial affection and
reverence are not only duties, but carry with them (as all
virtues do to some extent) their own reward in the satisfaction
of an approving sense of right, it has yet to be shown that the
keeping of the first part of this command will secure the
accomplishment of the second. Honoring parents does not
invariably carry with it the fulfillment of the promise,
"Thy days shall be long in the land which the
Lord thy God giveth thee."
The best of sons have frequently been called upon to pay the
last debt of nature when still in the bloom and vigor of their
manhood, while some of the worst of characters live to a
comparatively old age, a grief to their parents and a disgrace to
themselves. Though, therefore, we would echo the command,
"Children, obey your parents,"
we would also say; Do so, not from any selfish hope of
personal gain or long life, but for the love you should have for
those who have toiled for and protected you through years of
infancy and helplessness.
Duty, gratitude, and affection should be the inspiration to
obedience, not the grovelling incentive given by the Bible. But
may not this be taken as a fair sample of Bible teaching?
Whenever we discover a noble thought, a just precept, or a
generous sentiment, we generally find it surrounded by much
that is impracticable misleading, and fallacious.
The sixth, seventh, and eights Commandments call for no
special remark, save that, when they point out the extremes of
certain vices, and forbid their indulgence, they fail to state how
far persons may go in their direction without committing fatal
errors; and this difficulty is all the greater when we reflect that
these were the very Commandments which most of God's
favorites had the greatest predilection for breaking.
The chief object of the ninth Commandment is its limitation.
Why should the word "neighbor" be introduced in the
prohibition of false swearing? It is equally a wrong to swear
falsely against a stranger as against a neighbor. The tenth
Commandment is the only one of the second part of the
Decalogue which errs by excess of Puritanism. There can be no
harm, for instance, in coveting a neighbor's house if sufficient
compensation is offered to induce him to give up the lease; and,
if we did not occasionally covet our neighbor's oxen, beefsteaks
and sirloins would be even more scarce among the working
classes than they are at present. Speaking broadly, the one
great objection to the Decalogue is the absence of any noble,
inspiring principle of conduct. It teaches no real love, no true
charity; it is a penal code, not a rule of life.
Orthodox believers are continually proclaiming that love is
the foundation of Biblical ethics; the fact is, however, that, if
human actions were regulated by some teachings of the Bible,
there would be but few manifestations of love. To kill the
inhabitants of a conquered city, and to save none alive (Deut.
xx. 10-16), is a peculiar mode of exhibiting love to our fellow
men. The conduct of Christ was not calculated to inspire us
with a superabundance of love when he said:
"Whosoever shall deny me before men, him
will I also deny before my father which is in
heaven" (Matt. x. 33) or when he stated "But
those mine enemies which would not that I
should reign over them, bring them hither
and slay them before me" (Luke xix. 27).
Here we have an indication of that unforgiving and
revengeful spirit which destroys true affection. If there be any
truth in the popular notions of sin and forgiveness, it was not
moral for Christ to act as he did when speaking in a parable to
his disciples. They, not being able to understand him, asked him
for an explanation of what he then said. His reply was: "Unto
you is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of God; but,
unto them that are without, all these things are done in
parables; that seeing, they may see and not perceive, and
hearing, they may hear and not understand, lest at any time
they should be converted, and their sins be forgiven them"
(Mark iv.). This is not only partial and unjust, but a planned
determination to teach so mysteriously that people should not
learn the truth, in case they should thereby be saved.
Such a mode of advocacy would be deemed injurious, indeed,
in these days, and is only squalled by the following "inspired"
information to certain persons: "And for this cause God shall
send them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie; that
they all might be damned who believed not the truth, but had
pleasure in unrighteousness" (2 Thess. ii. 11, 12). We are
advised to be holy, even as God is holy; but what is holiness
according to Bible morality? If a "Divine" sanction to a thing
constitutes it holy, then deceit, murder, lying, and the deepest
kind of cruelty are allied with Scriptural holiness. In 2 Kings x.
God is represented as rewarding the following crimes, and
thereby giving the Bible sanction to the worst kind of
immorality.
Jehu, having become King of Israel, commences his reign with
a series of murders. Having resolved upon the destruction of
the house of Ahab, Jehu commences his task in a manner
possible only to those who fight with the "zeal of the lord."
Killing all who were likely to obstruct him in the carrying out of
his base object, he arrived at Samaria, his purpose being to slay
all the worshippers of Baal. In order, therefore, that he might
entrap them all into one slaughter house, he announced that he
was a great worshipper of Baal, and that he had come to offer a
mighty sacrifice to this idol. By this craft he succeeded in
drawing all the worshippers of Baal together. When the
unfortunate victims were assembled, tendering their sacrifices,
Jehu ordered his captains to go in and slay them, allowing none
to escape. Accordingly, they were all sacrificed to the treachery
of this "servant of the Lord."
And this conduct is approved by God; for in verse 30 is
recorded:
"And the Lord said unto Jehu, Because thou
hast done well in executing that which is
right in mine eyes, and hast done unto the
house of Ahab according to all that was in
mine heart, thy children of the fourth
generation shall sit on the throne of Israel."
Bible morality is further illustrated in the case of Samuel (1
Samuel xvi. 1-4). This prophet is commanded by God to go on a
certain mission under false pretenses, and with a direct
falsehood upon his lips. Now, is it moral to deceive and murder?
If not, why did God command and encourage such vices? And
why should men be invited to imitate the example of one who
practiced such immoralities? Biblical ethics are alleged to be
based upon the "holiness of God." In order to ascertain what
that "holiness" really is, it is only necessary to read Genesis
xxx. and xxxi., where immorality, ingratitude, deceit, and theft
are found to be ascribed to Jacob, who was encouraged and
beloved by God; Exodus ix. 13-16, where people are seen to have
been raised up by God for the very purpose of being "cut off
from the earth;" Exodus xxxii., for an account of the anger,
injustice, and cruelty of Moses, culminating in the slaughter of
thousands of human beings at the command of God; Joshua vi.,
viii., and x., for a record of his reckless murder of thousands of
human beings, among whom were men, women, and children,
at the special command of God; 2 Samuel xii. 11-31, for adultery
and cruelty in connection with David; and then peruse Psalms
xxxviii. and cix. for a confession of a life of deceit, lying, and
licentiousness.
Yet we are told that David "was a man after God's own heart,"
and that he "kept God's commandments, and did that only
which was right in his eyes" (1 Kings xiv. 8). Such may be
Biblical morality; but it is certainly opposed to Secular ideas of
ethical philosophy.
The teachings of the Bible in reference to slavery are
barbarously unjust. According to its permit, men and women
can be bought and sold like cattle, the weak being compelled to
serve the strong. In Exodus xxi. 2-6 we have a most cruel law
for regulating this "Bible institution," the cruelty and injustice
of which law are two-fold. First, if the slave when he is bought
be single, and if, during his seven years of slavery, he marries
and becomes a father, then, at the expiration of his time, his
wife and children are his master's, and the slave goes out free.
Is this moral?
What becomes of the poor man's paternal affections? Is the
love for his wife nothing? Is he to be separated from that he
holds dear, and to see the object of his affections given to the
man who for seven years had robbed him of his independence
and his manhood? If, however, the poor victim's love for his
wife and children be stronger than his desire for liberty, what is
his fate? He is to be brought to the door, have his ear bored
with an awl, and doomed to serve his master forever.
Thus Bible morality makes perpetual slavery and physical
pain the punishments of the exercise of the purest and best
feelings of human nature. Where is the moral lesson in the
statement: "And thou shalt bestow that money for whatsoever
thy soul lusteth after; for oxen or for sheep, or for wine or for
strong drink, or for whatsoever thy soul desireth; and thou
shalt eat there before the Lord thy God, and thou shalt rejoice,
thou and thine household"? If this is not giving a license to the
worst of passions, words have no meaning. But Bible morality
strikes at the manhood and happiness of man. It stifles our
tenderest affections, and urges the exercise of the cruellest
passions by teaching that a man may kill the wife of his bosom
if she dare to entice him secretly from his God (Deut. xiii. 6-9).
 Where is the man who will so far belie his nature as to accept
such morality as this? Unfortunately, Bible teachings have
frequently caused a complete severance and breaking up of the
ties of affection in families. The Bible commands its believers to
leave father, mother, sister, and brother to follow Christ.
According to its teachings, it is justifiable to break up a certain
and a human bond that we may get a problematical chance of a
problematical blessedness in a problematical future. There are
few, doubtless, who have not learned in their own sad
experience how the family tie has been often disunited by
Christian teachings. Brothers and sisters have been separated
for years from the home of their childhood because they dared
to emancipate themselves from the shackles of the prevailing
faith.
Accepting the term "moral" as expressing whatever is
calculated to promote general progress and happiness, what
Morality is contained in the following passages from the Bible:
"Take no thought for your life;" "Resist not evil;" "Blessed be ye
poor;" "Labor not for the bread which perisheth;" "Servants, be
subject to your masters with all fear, not only to the good and
gentle, but also to the forward;" "Let every man abide in the
same calling wherein he was called;" "Submit yourself to every
ordinance of man for the Lord's sake;" "Let every soul be
subject unto the higher powers, for there is no power but of
God ... Whosoever, therefore, resisteth the power, resisteth the
ordinance of God, and they that resist shall receive to
themselves damnation"? Were these injunctions obeyed,
health, independence of character, and political progress would
be ignored.
For the reforms we have hitherto secured we are indebted to
men and women who practically disregarded the Bible, and
based their conduct upon the principle of utility. To teach, as
the Bible does, that wives are to be subject to their husbands in
everything (Eph. v.); to "set your affections on things above, not
on things on the earth " (Colos. iii.); to "love not the world,
neither the things that are in the world" (1 John ii.); to "lay not
up for yourselves treasures upon earth" (Matt. vi.), is not to
inculcate the principle of equality, or to inspire man with a
desire to take an interest in "the things of time." Whatever
service the Bible may render in gratifying the tastes of the
superstitious, it cannot, to men of thought and energy, be of
any great moral worth.
To persecute for non-belief of any teaching, but more
particularly of speculative questions, is not in accordance with
ethical justice. Is it true that the Bible encourages persecution
for the non-belief in, or the rejection of its teachings? If yes, so
far at least is its moral worth lessened. For belief in the truth of
a doctrine, or the wisdom of a precept, is, to the honest
inquirer, the result of the recognition on his part of sufficient
evidence in their favor. Whenever that evidence is absent,
disbelief will be found, except among the indifferent or the
hypocritical. Now, in the Bible there are many things that the
sincere thinker is compelled, through lack of evidence, to
reject. What does the New Testament inculcate towards such
persons? When Christ sent his disciples upon a preaching
expedition he said (Matt. x.): "Whosoever shall not receive you,
nor hear your words, when ye depart out of that house or city
shake off the dust of your feet."
This, we are informed by Oriental writers, was a mode in the
East of showing hatred towards those against whom the dust
was shaken. The punishment threatened those who refused the
administrations of the disciples is most severe, for "it shall be
more tolerable for the land of Sodom and Gomorrah in the day
of judgment than for that city." In St. John xv. we read: "If a
man abideth not in me, he is cast forth as a branch, and is
withered; and men gather them, and cast them into the fire,
and they are burned." This accords with the gloomy
announcement (2 Thess. i.):
"The Lord Jesus shall be revealed from
heaven, with his mighty angels in flaming
fire, taking vengeance on them that know
not God, and that obey not the Gospel of our
Lord Jesus Christ, who shall be punished with
everlasting destruction from the presence of
the Lord, and from the glory of his power,
when he shall come to be glorified in his
saints, and to be admired in all them that
believe."
 Again (Mark xvi.): "He that believeth not shall be damned." St.
Paul exclaims (Gal. i.): "If any man preach any other gospel unto
you than that ye have received, let him be accursed." He also
says (1 Tim. vi, 3-5): "If any man teach otherwise, and consent
not to the wholesome words, even the words of our Lord Jesus
Christ ... he is proud, knowing nothing ... From such withdraw
thyself." "Of whom is Hymenaeus and Alexander; whom I have
delivered unto Satan, that they may learn not to blaspheme" (1
Tim. i. 20). In these passages persecution and punishment are
clearly taught for disbelief. And that such teaching has had an
immoral tendency the excommunications, the imprisonments,
and sacrifice of the lives of heretics in connection with the
history of Christianity abundantly prove.
Orthodox Christians contend that the Bible is a necessary
factor in the educational system of all nations. While admitting
the necessity of instruction in the affairs of daily life, they
allege that a question of far greater importance is the
preparation for existence "beyond the grave." They profess to
be impressed with the notion that there is a city of refuge in
store for them when they arrive at the end of life's journey;
and, having to encounter many storms and difficulties ere they
reach this supposed haven of rest, they feel assured that the
Bible is a sufficient guide to carry them safely over the sea of
time, and land them securely in the harbor of eternity. They
therefore rely on this book as if it were unerring in its
directions and infallible in its commands.
Now, there is ample reason to doubt the capability of this
Christian guide. Its inability, however, as an instructor and
guide does not arise from any lack of variety of contents, The
Bible contains a history of the cosmogony of the earth, and the
story of man's fall from what is termed his first estate of
perfection and happiness. Then we have the history of God's
chosen people, from their uprise to their national extinction,
with a record of the Jewish laws, specifying those acts most
calculated to propitiate the favor and secure the reward of
heaven, and those which are condemned, with their
appropriate and stipulated punishments. We have also glimpses
of the histories of other nations, the causes of their fall, and the
account of their national sins, which drew down upon them
that wrath of heaven which extinguished or sorely punished
them. Following this, there is the story of Job -- the lessons to
be derived from the sudden collapse of his worldly greatness,
and his soliloquies upon the mysteries of nature and of
providence.
Next come the Psalms -- a copious manual of praise, prayer,
cursing, and penitence, followed by the woes, lamentations, and
misfortunes of a host of prophets -- some practical, some
mystical, and some evangelical -- together with the four
different versions of the life, actions, and death of Christ; a
short account of the early doings of the Church, recorded in
several epistles written by sundry apostles, culminating in the
strange and extraordinary nightmare of St. John the Divine.
Now, any man who fails to discover in so large a field materials
by which to regulate his life must do so, not from the scarcity,
but the valuelessness, of the article supplied.
In estimating the real value of the Bible as a moral guide it
must be taken as a whole, by which is meant those books of the
Old and New Testaments which are bound together and
commonly called the Word of God. And here a question arises
that, if the knowledge of the whole Bible be necessary to our
future happiness, which according to St. John it is, why is it that
so many of the books that originally constituted the Bible are
lost? If the testimony of the book itself can be accepted, we
have only a portion of what at one time composed the Bible. In
Numbers a quotation is given from a book called "The Book of
the Wars of the Lord;" in judges and Samuel we read of "The
Book of Jasher;" in Kings mention is made of "The Book of the
Acts of Solomon;" and in Chronicles of "The Account of the
Chronicles of King David."
We further read of "The Book of the Chronicles of the Kings of
Judah" and "The Book of the Chronicles of the Kings of Israel."
Allusion is also made to "The Book of Nathan the Prophet" and
to "The Book of Gad the Seer." Notwithstanding the loss of
these books, Christians exclaim, How wonderfully their book
has been preserved! Even the portions that are retained are so
full of mistakes, errors, and corruptions that its intelligent
supporters are compelled to give the greater part of it up as
incapable of defence, while those who still contend for its
"divinity" hesitate to come forward and support it in public
debate.
 Another question suggests itself: Are we to consider the Old
Testament as the Word of God? If so, upon the Christian
hypothesis, its teachings are equally as deserving of our respect
as are those of the New Testament. If, on the other hand, the
Old Testament is not intended for our acceptance, why is it
preached and enforced as God's Word? True, it is sometimes
stated that the Hebrew writings are useful for instruction,
although they are not of the same authority with Christians as
the New Testament.
But here it is overlooked that the New Testament is founded
upon the Old, and often appeals to it to corroborate its
statements. Furthermore, the New Testament distinctly says
that the Old was written by good and holy men for our
instruction, etc. Besides, does not Christ emphatically state that
he did not come to destroy its authority? "Think not," says be,
"that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets: I am not
come to destroy, but to fulfil. For verily I say unto you, till
heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass
from the law till all be fulfilled. Whosoever, therefore, shall
break one of these least commandments, and shall teach men
so, he shall be called the least in the kingdom of heaven; but
whosoever shall do and teach them, the same shall be called
great in the kingdom of heaven." Here is a command not to
break even one of the least of the commandments. Again, Christ
says: "The Scribes and the Pharisees sit in Moses' seat;
whatsoever they bid you observe, that observe and do." Among
a collection of Christian stories occurs the following anecdote:
-- A person once asked a poor, illiterate old woman what she
deemed to be the difference between the Old and New
Testaments, to which she replied:
"The Old Testament is the New Testament
concealed, and the New Testament is the Old
Testament revealed."
This has been triumphantly quoted by Christian writers to
show the harmony existing between the two books. But it is
absurd and contradicts facts. The assumption is, that the Old
Testament is the partial statement of a body of truths, from
which the New Testament differs not in kind, but only in
degree. It is supposed that nothing in the New Testament
contradicts what is stated in the Old, but only reveals and
amplifies with a clearer light what had already been stated
partially and under allegorical semblance in the Old. Now, so
far is this from being correct that it would be difficult to find
any two alleged bodies of sacred truths which differ from and
contradict each other more than the divine revelation made
through Moses and the prophets, and the revelation made
through Christ and his Apostles. For instance, Moses taught
that retaliation was a duty, while Christ strictly prohibits it.
With Moses persecutors were put to the edge of the sword; with
Christ, however, they were to be blessed. Under the old system,
good works and a virtuous life were the conditions of Divine
favor and reward, and bad works and a vicious life were to
incur Divine disfavor and punishment. Under the new system,
faith is the all-in-all, the essential condition of salvation.
A proof of the inadequacy of the Bible as a guide and
instructor is furnished by what are termed the "liberal
Christians." Here we have men of the best intentions and of
high intellectual acquirements refusing to accept the Bible as
an absolute guide, or as an infallible instructor.
With such persons the Bible has no value as "infallible
revelation." If, however, the Bible is not an infallible record, it
is simply a human production, and has no more claim upon us,
except what its merits inspire, than any other book. Is it not
rather inconsistent to contend, as these liberal Christians do,
that certain portions of the Bible are "divine," while the other
parts are simply human?
If every Christian sect put forward similar contentions, there
would be but few parts of the "Holy Scriptures" that would not
be divine and human at the same time, according to the
respective opinions of different classes of believers. But how
are we to decide what is "divine" and what is human? To what
standard shall we appeal? What criterion have we by which to
test its genuineness? Shall we accept the authority of the
Protestant or the Catholic Church? Shall we judge from the
standpoint of the Trinitarians or the Unitarians?
For the Bible to be trustworthy as a guide it should be reliable
in its statements and harmonious in its doctrines. That it is not
so will be evident from the following reference to its pages. The
Bible teaches that God is omniscient and omnipresent; yet in
Gen. xi. 5 we read that the Lord came down to see the city and
the tower which the children of men builded; and in Gen. xviii.
20, 21: "And the Lord said, Because the cry of Sodom and
Gomorrah is great, and because their sin is very grievous, I will
go down now, and see whether they have done altogether
according to the cry of it, which is come unto me; and, if not, I
will know." It teaches that God is immutable; yet, on several
occasions, we find him changing his mind, repenting, and
sometimes turning back from his repentance; as in the great
instance (Gen. vi. 6): "And it repented the Lord that he had
made man on the earth, and it grieved him at the heart" (also 1
Sam. xv. 10, 11).
God told Baalim to go with the men (Num. xxii., 20), and was
angry with him because he went (Num. xxii. 21, 22). It teaches
that God is invisible, yet we read (Gen. xxxii. 30): "And Jacob
called the name of the place Peniel; for I have seen God face to
face, and my life is preserved;" and (Ex. xxiv. 9, 10): "Then up
went Moses, and Aaron, and Nadab, and Abihu, and seventy of
the elders of Israel; and they saw the God of Israel;" and, again
(Ex. xxxiii. 11, 23): "And the Lord spake unto Moses face to face,
as a man speaketh unto his friend ... And I will take away mine
hand, and thou shalt see my back parts; but my face shall not be
seen and, finally (Gen. xviii.), we have the remarkable though
perplexed account of the Lord paying a visit to Abraham in the
plains of Mamre, and eating with him of cakes, butter, milk, and
veal. It teaches that God is all good; yet we read (Isa. xlv. 7): "I
form the light and create darkness: I make peace and create
evil: I the Lord do all these things;" and (Lam. iii. 38): "Out of
the mouth of the Most High proceedeth not evil and good?" and
(Ezekiel xx. 25): "Wherefore I gave them also statutes that were
not good, and judgments whereby they should not live."
It teaches that God is no respecter of persons; yet we read
(Gen. iv. 4, 5): "And the Lord had respect unto Abel and to his
offering; but unto Cain and his offering he had no respect;" and
(Ex. ii. 25): "And God looked upon the children of Israel, and
God had respect unto them;" and (Rom. ix. 11-13) For the
children being not yet born, neither having done any good or
evil, that the purpose of God, according to election, might
stand, not of works, but of him that calleth; it was said unto
her, The elder shall serve the younger. As it is written, Jacob
have I loved, but Esau have I hated." And, in fact, nearly the
whole Bible story is that of a chosen people, preferred above all
other nations, surely for no superior goodness on their part!
It teaches (Ex. xx. 5) that God is a jealous God, "visiting the
iniquity of the fathers upon the third and fourth generation of
them that hate me;" yet we read (Ezekiel xviii. 20): "The son
shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father
bear the iniquity of the son." It teaches that Christ is God (John
i- 1, 14; Reb. i. 8); yet we read (John viii. 40): "But now ye seek to
kill me, a man that has told you the truth, which I have heard of
God;" also (1 Tim. ii. 5): "One mediator between God and man,
the man Christ Jesus." It teaches (John x. 30) that Christ and his
father are one; yet we read (John xiv. 28): "For my father is
greater than I." It teaches (John xvi. 30; Col. ii. 3) that Jesus
knew all things; yet we read (Mark xi. 13): "And seeing a fig-tree
afar off having leaves, he came, if haply he might find anything
thereon; and, when he came to it, he found nothing but leaves;
for the time of figs was not yet;" and, far more significant (Mark
xiii. 32):
"But of that day and that hour knoweth no
man; no, not the angels which are in heaven,
neither the Son, but the Father."
It teaches of Jesus (John viii. 14): "Though I bear record of
myself, yet my record is true; for I know whence I came, and
whither I go;" yet we read (John v. 3 1): "If I bear witness of
myself, my witness is not true." It teaches further (1 Tim. ii. 6)
that he gave himself a ransom for all; yet we read (Matt. xv. 24):
"I am not sent but to the lost sheep of the house of Israel;" and
(Mark vii. 26, 27):
"The woman was a Greek, a Syrophoenician
by nation; and she besought him that he
would cast forth the devil out of her
daughter. But Jesus said unto her, Let the
children first be filled; for it is not meet to
take the children's bread and cast it unto the
dogs."
It teaches that miracles are proofs of a divine mission (Matt.
ix. 6; John v. 36; Heb. ii. 4) yet (Deut. xiii. 1-3; Matt. xxiv. 24; 2
Thess. ii. 9) warns against false prophets and anti-Christs, who
shall show great signs and wonders. It teaches in many passages
of the New Testament that the end of the world is at hand, as in
Matt. xxiv., 1 Cor. xv. 51, 52; 1 Thess. iv. 15; 1 Peter iv. 7; yet we
read (2 Thess. ii. 2, 3):
"That ye be not soon shaken in mind, or be
troubled, neither by spirit, nor by word, nor
by letter as from us, as that the day of Christ
is at hand. Let no man deceive you by any
means."
Further, on this subject, we read (Matt. x. 23), in which Jesus
is addressing the Apostles he sent forth: "Ye shall not have gone
over the cities of Israel till the Son of Man be come;" yet we
read (Matt. xxiv. 14): "And this gospel of the kingdom shall be
preached in all the world for witness unto all nations; and then
shall the end come and, similarly (Mark xiii. 10): "And the
gospel must first be published among all nations." It teaches
(Luke i. 33; Heb. i. 8) that the kingdom of Christ shall endure
forever; yet we read, in one of the most remarkable passages of
the New Testament (1 Cor. xv. 24, 25, 28):
"Then cometh the end, when he shall have
delivered up the kingdom to God, even the
Father; when he shall have put down all rule
and all authority and power. For he must
reign till he hath put all enemies under his
feet ... And when all things shall be subdued
unto him, then shall the Son also himself be
subject unto him that put all things under
him, that God may be all-in- all."