MARY ELIZABETH TY-DELGADO V.

HRET & PHILIP ARREZA

PICHAY

G.R. NO: 219603, January 26, 2016

PONENTE: CARPIO, J.

FACTS: Respondent Pichay was convicted by final judgment for four counts of
libel on September 16, 2008. Later, he filed his certificate of candidacy on October
09, 2012 for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First
Legislative District of Surigao del Sur for the May 13, 2013 elections. Petitioner,
Ty-Delgado filed a petition for disqualification against Pichay under Section 12 of
the Omnibus Election Code before the Commission on Elections on the ground
that Pichay was convicted of libel, a crime which involves moral turpitude. Pichay
argued that the libel does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. Further, he
claimed that he did not personally perform all the acts prohibited and his
conviction for libel was only due to his presumed responsibility as president of the
publishing company. On May 14, 2013, Pichay was proclaimed by the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Surigao as the duly elected Member of the House of the
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur. Petitioner filed
an ad cautelam petition for quo warranto before HRET reiterating that Pichay is
ineligible to serve as Member of the House of Representatives because he was
convicted by final judgment of four counts of libel, a crime involving moral
turpitude. The HRET ruled in favor of Pichay holding that Pichay did not
participate in the writing of the libelous articles but his conviction was in line with
his duty as the president of the publishing company. Thus, Pichay’s conviction for
libel did not involve moral turpitude.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Pichay is qualified to run for the position of Member
of the House of Representatives of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur?

RULING: Under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, a sentence by final

judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground of disqualification.

Moral turpitude is defined as everything which is done contrary to justice,

modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private
and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general.

Citing the case of Tulfo v. People of the Philippines, the Court, ruled that
Pichay was liable for publishing the four defamatory articles, which are libelous
per se, with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not. The crime of libel
would not even be consummated without his participation as publisher of the
libelous articles. One who furnishes the means for carrying on the publication of
the newspaper and entrusts its management to servants or employees whom he
selects and controls maybe said to cause to be published what actually appears and
should be held responsible. Clearly, Pichay committed an “act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which he owes his fellow men or society
in general.
 The Court ruled that Pichay was ineligible to hold and serve the office of
Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of
Surigao del Sur. Petitioner Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado was declared the winner
for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First
Legislative District of Surigao del Sur in the 13 May 2013 elections.
 ORION WATER DISTRICT, REPRESENTED BY ITS GENERAL
MANAGER, CRISPIN Q. TRIA, ET. AL V. THE GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS)

G.R. NO. 195382, June 15, 2016

PONENTE: REJES, J.

FACTS: This case originated from a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money
and Damages filed by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) on April
4, 2006, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City against OWD, a
local water district organized as a government-owned and controlled corporation
(GOCC) and its officers. In that complaint, GSIS alleged that OWD and its
officers failed and refused to pay, remit or deliver the employees personal share in
the premiums of their life and retirement policies covering the period of July 1993
to July 1, 2000 which amounts to Five Hundred Fifty-One Thousand Four Hundred
Seven Pesos and Sixteen Centavos(P551,407.16). It averred that it made repeated
written demands to collect payment of the said arrearages but OWD still failed to
remit its premium and arrearages. On March 13, 2007, OWD filed a motion to
dismiss alleging that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case. It asserted that GSIS and OWD, both being GOCCs, the Secretary of Justice
has jurisdiction over the disputes or controversies between them pursuant to
Sections 66 to 70 , Chapter 14, Book IV of the Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292.
The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and later the Motion for Reconsideration.
Aggrieved by the orders of RTC, OWD filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals. CA ruled affirmed the challenged orders of the RTC. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 66 to 70, Chapter 14, Book IV of E.O. No. 292
are applicable in settling dispute between two GOCC’s?

RULING: The Court of Appeals correctly held that the provisions of E.O. No.
292 are inapplicable in the instant case because that not all controversies between
or among government offices, departments or instrumentalities fall under the
mentioned provisions of E.O. No. 292. In explaining, the Court made reference to
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 242, the precursor of Chapter 14, Book IV of E.O.
No. 292, from which the entirety of the provisions in question was lifted.

Section 1 of P.D. No. 242 states that: Provisions of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, all disputes, claims and controversies solely between or among
the departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the National
Government, including constitutional offices or agencies, arising from the
interpretation and application of statutes, contracts or agreements, shall
henceforth be administratively settled or adjudicated as provided hereinafter:
Provided, That this shall not apply to cases already pending in court at the time of
the effectivity of this decree.

Citing the case, Philippine Veterans Investment Development Corporation

(PHIVIDEC) v. Judge Velez, the Court elaborated that P.D. No. 242 applies only to
certain cases of disputes. It does not intrude into the jurisdiction of regular courts
as it "only prescribes an administrative procedure for the settlement of certain
types of disputes between or among departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and
instrumentalities of the National Government, including [GOCCs], so that they
need not always repair to the courts for the settlement of controversies arising from
the interpretation and application of statutes, contracts or agreements."

Section 1 of P.D. No. 242 is now Section 66, Chapter 14, Book IV of E.O.
No. 292. There was no indication of an intention to broaden its scope far larger
than the original law despite the noticeable change in the language of the law.
Section 66 reads as follows:
SEC. 66. How Settled.—All disputes, claims and controversies, solely between or
among the departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the
National Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
such as those arising from the interpretation and application of statutes, contracts
or agreements, shall be administratively settled or adjudicated in the manner
provided in this Chapter. Xxx

The Court ruled that the instant case does not partake of the instances
contemplated in Section 66. It bears to stress that the complaint filed by GSIS
does not concern the interpretation of a law, contract or agreement between
government agencies. It is a complaint for collection of sum of money, specifically
to unremitted premium contributions which by law, the OWD, as the employer, is
mandated to deliver to GSIS within the prescribed period of time. Unfortunately,
OWD reneged in its obligation and refused to comply despite repeated notices;
hence, the filing of a complaint for collection of unremitted contributions by GSIS.

Further, the Court emphasized that even assuming that the instant case falls
under any of the instances of disputes stated in Section 66, it cannot still qualify for
administrative settlement since the case also involved officials of OWD and not
solely between GSIS and OWD. Section 66 explicitly provided is that only
disputes, claims and controversies solely between and among departments,
bureaus, offices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the National Government,
including GOCCs shall be administratively settled or adjudicated.

In conclusion, the CA was correct in holding that the GSIS properly

instituted the complaint with the RTC, which has the jurisdiction in civil cases
where the demand for sums of money or value of property exceeds P300,000.00 in
the provinces, or P400,000.00 in Metro Manila.
 KILUSANG MAYO UNO V. HON. BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO

G.R. No. 210761, June 28, 2016

PONENTE: BRION, J.

FACTS: Congress passed Republic Act No.7875, the National Health Insurance
Act (NHIA), establishing the National Health Insurance Program (NHIP) and
creating the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) to administer the
Program. PhilHealth is a government corporation attached to the Department of
Health (DOH) for policy coordination and guidance. Its President and Chief
Executive Officer (CEO) is directly appointed by the President of the Republic
while its Board of Directors(the Board) is composed of several cabinet secretaries
(or their permanent representatives) and representatives of different stakeholders.
The Board made Resolution No. 1571, Series of 2011, which approved the
increases in annual premium contributions for the Calendar Year 2012 to enhance
the NHIP benefit packages and to support the universal Health Care Program as
part of the Aquino Health Agenda. On September 30, 2013, PhilHealth issued three
circulars fully implementing the new premium rates for 2014 namely: 1) Philhealth
Circular No. 0024, S. 2013 increasing the minimum annual premium rate for IPP
to P2,400.00 for members with a monthly income of P25,000.00 and below; 2)
PhilHealth Circular No. 0025 S. 2013 adjusting the annual premium rate for the
OWP to P2,400 for all landbased OFW’s, whether documented or undocumented.
3) PhilHealth Circular No. 0027 S. 2013, which retained the 2.5% at the premium
rate and the P35,000 salary bracket ceiling for the employed sector. The petitioner
KMU filed the present petition for certiorari with application for a Temporary
Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction against the implementation of the new
rate and impleaded President Aquino and PhilHealth as respondents. The
President, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), invoked his
immunity from suit as a sitting Head of the State and moved that he be dropped as
a party-respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President is immune from suit?

RULING: The Court ruled that the President is immune from suit because the
events that gave rise to the present action and the filing of the case occurred during
the incumbency of President Aquino.

Further, it explained no allegations as to any specific presidential act or

omission that amounted to grave abuse of discretion were stated in the petition. It
is therefore, proper to drop the President as a party-respondent in this case. The
Court said: “At the outset, we stress the settled principle that a sitting head of state
enjoys immunity from suit during his actual tenure.” The petition was
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
 MUNICIPALITY OF CORDOVA V. PATHFINDER DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION & TOPANGA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

G.R. NO. 205544, June 29, 2016

PONENTE: PERALTA, J.

FACTS: Respondent Pathfinder Development Corporation (Pathfinder) is the

owner of real properties in Alegria, Cordova, Cebu: (1) Lot. No. 692 with an area
of 1,819 square meters and (2) part of Lot No. 697 covered by Transfer
Certificated of Title (TCT) No. T-95706 with an area of 50,000 square meters
while Respondent Topanga Development Corporation (Topanga) owns Lot No.
691 covered by TCT No. 109337 with an area of 29,057 square meters and part of
Lot No. 697 with an area of 15,846 square meters. Petitioner Sangguniang Bayan
of Municipality of Cordova enacted Ordinance No. 003-2011 on February 8, 2011,
expropriating 836 square meters of Lot. No. 692, 9,728 square meters of Lot. No.
697, 3,898 square meters of Lot No.691, and 1,467 square meters of Lot No. 693
owned by Eric Ng Mendoza for the construction of a road access from the national
highway to the municipal roll-on/roll-off (RORO) port. The Ordinance also
authorized the Mayor of Cordova to initiate and execute the necessary
expropriation proceedings. Consequently, the Mayor of Cordova filed an
expropriation complaint against the owner of the properties. The Respondent
Corporations, Pathfinder and Topanga filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of
the Expropriation Ordinance before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City,
Branch 56, arguing that there was no offer to buy, addressed to them was shown or
attached to the expropriation complaint, thus, the Ordinance is unconstitutional for
it violated their right to due process and equal protection. The Respondents
likewise filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on prejudicial
question in the case for the declaration of nullity of the Ordinance. The Trial Court
of Lapu-Lapu, Branch 27, denied the respondent corporations’ motion for
suspension and granted the issuance of Writ of Possession in favor of the
municipality.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Municipality of Cordova validly exercised its power
of eminent domain? Whether or not the Municipality of Cordova observed the
proper proceedings for expropriation?

RULING: “The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature but

may be validly delegated to local government units.” The exercise of this power
by the Municipality of Cordova, was granted under Section 19 of Republic Act
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code.

The Court ruled that “there is indeed a necessity for the taking of the subject
properties as these would provide access towards the RORO port being constructed
in the municipality. The construction of the new road will highly benefit the public
as it will enable shippers and passengers to gain access to the port from the main
public road or highway. The complaint for expropriation was found to have been
sufficient in form and substance and the required deposit had been duly complied
with, hence, the petitioner is entitled as a matter of right, to a writ of possession.
The issuance of the writ had aptly become ministerial on the part of the RTC.
 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION
(DOTC) V. SPS. VICENTE ABECINA AND MARIA CLEOFE ABECINA

G.R. NO. 206484, June 29, 2016

PONENTE: BRION, J.

FACTS: Spouses Vicente and Ma. Cleofe Abecina are the registered owners of
the five parcels of land in Sitio Paltik, Barrio Sta. Rosa, Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte. DOTC awarded Digitel Telecommunications Philippines
(DIGITEL) a contract for the management, operation, maintenance and
development of a Regional Telecommunications Development Project (RTDP)
under the National Telephone Program, Phase I, Tranche 1 (NTPI-1). The
Municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, donated a one thousand two
hundred square meters (1200 sq.m) parcel of land to the DOTC for the
implementation of the RDTP in the municipality. The municipality, however,
erroneously included portions of the respondents’ property in the donation. Digitel
constructed a telephone exchange on the property which encroached on the
properties of the respondent spouses. The respondent spouses sent a final demand
letter to both the DOTC and Digitel to vacate the premises and to pay the unpaid
rent/damages in the amount of One Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P1,200,000.00). Neither DOTC nor Digitel complied with the demand. The
Respondent spouses filed an accion publiciana complaint against DOTC and
Digitel for recovery of possession and damages. DOTC claimed immunity from
suit and ownership over the subject properties. The RTC ruled against the DOTC
and brushed aside the defense of state immunity. It held that respondent spouses as
the lawful owners of the properties, enjoyed the right to use and to possess them.

ISSUE: Whether or Not DOTC is entitled to immunity from suit?

RULING: The DOTC encroached on the respondents’ properties when it

constructed the local telephone in Daet, Camarines Norte. The exchange was part
of the RTDP pursuant to the National Telephone Program. The Court opined that
there was no doubt when the DOTC constructed the encroaching structures and
subsequently entered into the FLAs with Digitel for their maintenance, it was
carrying out a sovereign function. The Court agreed with the DOTC’s contention
that these are acts of jure imperii that fall within the cloak of state immunity. The
Court explained however, that there are Constitutional limitations to be observed in
the exercise of the powers of the State. “Chief among these limitations are the
principles that no person shall be deprived of life liberty or property without due
process of law and that private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation. Accordingly, it required in our laws that the State’s power of
eminent domain shall be exercised through expropriation proceedings in court. By
necessary implication, the filing of a complaint for expropriation is a waiver of
State immunity. The DOTC however did not follow the regular procedure upon
discovering that it had encroached on the respondent’s property. The Court ruled
therefore, that the Department’s entry into and taking of possession of the property
of the spouses Abecina constituted to an implied waiver of its governmental
immunity from suit.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE V. SANDIGANDBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 213847, July 12, 2016

PONENTE: BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS: The People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Special
Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, filed a Motion for Reconsideration to
assail the decision of the Supreme Court promulgated on August 18, 2015 whereby
the Court granted the petition for certiorari and ordered the provisional release of
the petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-028 upon posting of a
cash bod of P1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan. The People sought for the
reversal of the said decision on the grounds that: I.) The decision granting bail to
petitioner was premised on a factual finding that he is not a flight risk on a
determination that he suffers from a fragile state of health and on other
unsupported from a fragile state of health and on other unsupported ground unique
and personal to him. The People argued that in granting bail to petitioner on the
foregoing grounds, the decision unduly and radically modified constitutional and
procedural principles governing bail without sufficient constitutional, legal and
jurisprudential basis. II.) The decision violates the People’s constitutional right to
due process of law since it was based on the grounds not raised in the Petition and
therefore never refuted or contested. III.) The decision gave preferential treatment
and undue favor to petitioner in a manner inconsistent with the equal protection
clause of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of bail to the petitioner on the basis that he was
he was not a flight risk was supported by legal grounds?

RULING: The Court found no compelling reason to reverse its decision. The
Court clarified that the People were informed on the health condition of the
petitioner through the Omnibus Motion and Motion to fix Bail of the petitioner.
The petitioner manifested to the Sandiganbayan his currently frail health and
presented medical certificates to show that his physical condition required constant
medical attention. The Omnibus Motion and his Supplemental Opposition dated
June 16, 2014 were heard by the Sandiganbayan after the filing by the Prosecution
of its Consolidated Opposition. It is clear therefore, People were not denied of the
reasonable opportunity to challenge or refute the allegations about the petitioner’s
advanced age and instability of his health even if the allegations had not been
directly made in connection of his Motion to fix Bail.

Furthermore, the imputation of "preferential treatment" in "undue favor" of

the petitioner is absolutely bereft of basis. The Court did not grant his provisional
liberty because he was a sitting Senator of the Republic. It did so because there
were proper bases - legal as well as factual - for the favorable consideration and
treatment of his plea for provisional liberty on bail. By its decision, the Court has
recognized his right to bail by emphasizing that such right should be curtailed only
if the risks of flight from this jurisdiction were too high. The Court viewed,
however, the records demonstrated that the risks of flight were low, or even nil. It
took into consideration other circumstances, such as the petitioner’s advanced age
and poor health, his past and present disposition of respect for the legal processes,
the length of his public service, and his individual public and private reputation. To
ignore his advanced age and unstable health condition in order to deny his right to
bail on the basis alone of the judicial discretion to deny bail would be probably
unjust.

“Bail exists to ensure society's interest in having the accused answer to a

criminal prosecution without unduly restricting his or her liberty and without
ignoring the accused's right to be presumed innocent.”

The Court emphasized that admission to bail always involves the risk that
the accused will take flight. Thus, the probability or the improbability of flight is an
important factor to be taken into consideration in granting or denying bail, even in
capital cases. The exception to the fundamental right to bail should be applied in
direct ratio to the extent of the probability of evasion of prosecution. The Court
found that the petitioner has proven with more than sufficient evidence that he
would not be a flight risk, basically, by reason of his advanced age and fragile
state of health have minimized the likelihood that he would make himself scarce
and escape from the jurisdiction of our courts.

The Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
 GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE
REGION, REPRESENTED BY THE PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE V. JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ,

G.R. No. 207342, November 07, 2017

PONENTE: BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS: This is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner seeking for
the review and reversal of the decision promulgated on August 16, 2016. In the
assailed decision, the Court affirmed the amended decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) on March 1, 2013, CA-G.R. CV no. 88610 and accordingly denied the
petition for review on certiorari. The Court thereby held that respondent Juan
Antonio Muñoz could only be extradited to and tried by the HKSAR for seven (7)
counts of conspiracy to defraud, but not for the other crime of accepting an
advantage as an agent. It is because conspiracy to defraud was a public sector
offense, but accepting an advantage as an agent dealt with private sector bribery.
Consequently, the Court ruled that the dual criminality rule embodied in the treaty
of extradition has not been met.
ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Munoz can be extradited for the crime of
accepting an advantage as an agent?
RULING: The Court denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration for its lack
of merit considering that the basic issues being thereby raised were already passed
upon and no substantial arguments were presented to warrant the reversal of the
decision promulgated on August 16, 2016.
Under the Dual criminality rule embodied in the extradition treaty between
the Philippines and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR),
however, the Philippines as the Requested State is not bound to extradite the
respondent to the jurisdiction of the HKSAR as the Requesting State for the
offense of accepting an advantage as an agent because the extradition treaty is
forthright in providing that surrender shall only be granted for an offense coming
within the descriptions of offenses in its Article 2 insofar as the offenses are
punishable by imprisonment or other form of detention for more than one year, or
by a more severe penalty according to the laws of both parties.
The Court denied petitioner's prayer that the exclusion of the crime of
accepting an advantage as an agent be reversed and that Munoz be extraditable for
such crime. To support its contention, the petitioner cited the
ruling supposedly handed down by the Court of Final Appeal of the HKSAR in the
case of B v. The Commissioner of the Independent Commission Against
Corruption to the effect that the term agent in Section 9 of the
HKSAR's Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO) also covered public servants
in another jurisdiction.
The Court ruled that, to grant it would be to take judicial notice of the ruling
in B v. The Commissioner of the Independent Commission Against Corruption.
Like all other courts in this jurisdiction, however, the Court is not at liberty to take
judicial notice of the ruling without contravening our own rules on evidence under
which foreign judgments and laws are not considered as matters of a public or
notorious nature that proved themselves.

Certainly, foreign judgments and laws, if relevant, have to be duly alleged

and competently proved like any other disputed fact.

At this moment that the ruling in B v. The Commissioner of the Independent

Commission Against Corruption was supposedly handed down on January 28,
2010 by the Court of Final Appeal of the HKSAR, this case was already pending
consideration on appeal by the CA. The CA promulgated the assailed amended
decision on March 1, 2013 upon Muñoz's motion for reconsideration in order to
declare that he could not be extradited for the crime of accepting an advantage as
an agent due to non-compliance with the dual criminality rule.

All throughout this time, the petitioner did not seasonably and properly
apprise the CA of the relevant case law in its jurisdiction. It was only in the motion
for reconsideration that the petitioner apprised the Court of the ruling, but
mentioned only the title of the case. The petitioner did not attempt to prove the
ruling as a fact.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIED the motion for reconsideration with

finality.
 BARANGAY MAYAMOT, ANTIPOLO CITY V. ANTIPOLO CITY,
SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD OF ANTIPOLO

G.R. NO. 187349, August 17, 2016

PONENTE: JARDELEZA, J

FACTS: In 1984, pursuant to Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 787 to 79 , eight
(8) new barangays in the then Municipality of Antipolo were created namely:
Barangays Beverly Hills, Dalig, Bagong Nayon, San Juan, Sta. Cruz, Munting
Dilaw, San Luis, and Inarawan in addition to the original eight (8) (Calawis,
Cupang, Mambugan, Dela Paz, San Jose, San Roque, San Isidro, and Mayamot.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Antipolo passed Resolution No.97-80 to integrate the
territorial jurisdiction of the sixteen (16) barangays into the map of Antipolo and
commissioning the City Assessor to plot and delineate the territorial boundaries of
the (16) barangays . Subsequently, on October 25, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Antipolo passed Resolution No. 97-89, "Defining the Territorial Boundaries of the
Eight (8) Newly Created Barangays and the Eight (8) Former Existing Barangays
of the Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal." Resolution No. 97-89 approved the
barangay boundaries specified and delineated in the plans/maps prepared by the
City Assessor. On September 21, 1999, Barangay Mayamot filed a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity and/or Annulment of Resolution No. 97-89 and
Injunction against Antipolo City, Sangguniang Panglungsod of Antipolo,
Barangays Sta. Cruz, Bagong Nayon, Cupang, and Mambugan, the City Assessor
and the City Treasurer before the RTC of Antipolo City.
It claimed that the adoption of Resolution No. 97-89 reduced its territory to one-
half of its original area and was apportioned to Barangays Sta. Cruz, Bagong
Nayon, Cupang, and Mambugan. Barangay Mayamot further alleged that
Resolution No. 97-89 violated Section 82 of BP Blg. 337 or the Local Government
Code of 1983, the law in force at the time, which provided that alteration,
modification and definition of barangay boundaries shall be by ordinance and
confirmed by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to try and decide a barangay
boundary dispute?

RULING: At the time petitioner filed its petition before the RTC of Antipolo City,
RA No. 7160 was already in effect. Sections 118 and 119 of RA No. 7160 dictate
that barangay boundary dispute shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang
panglungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned. If there is failure of amicable
settlement, the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned and
shall decide the same within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification
referred to. Further, the decision of the sanggunian may be appealed to the RTC
having jurisdiction over the area in dispute, within the time and manner prescribed
by the Rules of Court. Pursuant to the said law, the RTC is without jurisdiction to
settle a boundary dispute involving barangays in the same city or municipality.