People vs Ferrer

48 SCRA 382

Facts: The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 is an act to outlaw the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP) and similar associations penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined
the Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to
overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other
illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines.
Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable.
Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-
Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion
against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the CPP aggravated by
circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed
men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA,
inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. The trial court is of
opinion that… the congress assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP
without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial… and it created a presumption of organizational
guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.
Issue: Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.
Ruling: No. No one is made to suffer under this law except after conviction in a trial by a proper
court. A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is
the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a
statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute
specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of
attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)
In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow
of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only
to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Act’s
focus is on the conduct not person. Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section
4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations
before the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership
in accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the
necessary changes having been made.

Virata vs Sandiganbayan
202 SCRA 680

Facts: These are consolidated petitions urging this Court to review and annul the resolutions of
respondent Sandiganbayan in the Civil Case: Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin (Kokoy)
Romualdez, et al., and to issue an order commanding SB to desist from further proceeding in Civil
Case No. 0035.
On July 1987, the Republic, represented by the PCGG, filed a complaint with the respondent
Sandiganbayan (SB) against Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and forty-four (44) others for, as stated
under the heading Nature of the Action, recovery of "ill-gotten wealth consisting of funds and
other property which they, in unlawful concert with one another, had acquired and accumulated in
flagrant breach of trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers, with grave abuse of
rights and power and in brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the
Philippines, thus resulting in their unjust enrichment during Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos’s
rule…' In one of the petitions, petitioners contend that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse discretion in concluding that the PCGG Charter is not
unconstitutional and void as a bill of attainder.
Issue: WON the PCGG Charter is unconstitutional.
Ruling: No, it is constitutional. The PCGG Charter (composed of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and
14) does not violate the equal protection clause and is not a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law.
In the first place, nothing in the executive orders can be reasonably construed as a determination
or declaration of guilt. On contrary, the executive orders, inclusive of Executive Order No. 1 make
it perfectly clear that any judgment of guilt in the amassing acquisition of 'ill-gotten wealth' is to
be handed down by a judicial tribunal, in this case the Sandiganbayan, upon complaint filed an
prosecuted by the PCGG. In the second place, no punishment inflicted by the executive orders, as
the merest glance at their provisions will immediately make apparent. In no sense, therefore, may
the executive orders be regarded as a bill of attainder.

Equally untenable is the claim that the PCGG Charter is an ex post facto law because it alters the
legal rules of evidence a receives less or different testimony than what the law required at the time
of the commission of the offense in order to convict the offender. For both the civil and criminal
cases covered by the PCGG Charter, nothing has been altered in terms of the quantum of proof
required for an adverse judgment against the defendant or a judgment of conviction against the
accused, respectively.

People vs Taguba
229 SCRA 188

Facts: Enrique Taguba and Mirafe Taguba were both charged with eight counts of illegal
recruitment and three counts of estafa in separate informations commonly worded, filed by the
undersigned Assisstant City Fiscal for the Complainant, whom the accused promised employment
abroad, and which they did not fulfill after they received the required amount (2k-20k) from
complainants. The complainants claimed the accused promised to send them to Korror, Palau, to
work variously as a waiter, fisherman, master cutter, dressmaker, farmer, laborer, mason carpenter
or macho dancer. They were convicted in the RTC.

Among the contentions of the appellants (accused), they contend that the penalty of life
imprisonment for illegal recruitment committed on a large scale is not applicable to them because
the presidential decree imposing this penalty was published in the Official Gazette only on
February 10, 1986. P.D. 2018 was thus not yet effective at the time of the alleged commission of
the crimes imputed to them. Only two of the eight complainants for illegal recruitment testified
that they were recruited after February 10, 1986. If at all, therefore, the appellants can only be
convicted of eight separate counts of illegal recruitment under Art. 39 (c) of the Labor Code, which
is subject to a lesser penalty.

Issue: WON PD 2018 is applicable in the case of the accused.

Ruling: No. P.D. 2018 cannot apply to the appellants retroactively as it would be an ex post facto
law to them. A law is ex post facto if it refers to a criminal act, punishes an act which was innocent
when done, and retroacts to the disadvantage of the accused. Prior to the said date, recruiting on a
large scale was not yet punished with the penalty imposed in the said decree.

People vs Sandiganbayan
211 SCRA 241

Facts: Two letter complaints were filed with the Tanodbayan by Teofilo Gelacio on October
28,1986 and December 9, 1986, a political leader of Governor Valentina Plaza, wife of
Congressman Democrito Plaza of Agusan del Sur, shortly after private respondent had replaced
Mrs. Plaza as OIC/provincial Governor of Agusan del Sur on March 1986 The complaint
questioned the issuance to Governor Paredes, when he was still the provincial attorney in 1976 of
a free patent title for a lot in the Rosario public land subdivision in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.
He misrepresented to a Lands Inspector of the Bureau of Lands that the lands subject herein are
disposable lands, thereby inducing said inspector to recommend approval of his application for
free patent. On August 10, 1989 an information for violation of RA 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act was then filed in the Sandiganbayan after an ex parte preliminary investigation. A
motion to quash the information was filed by the private respondent contending among others that
he is charged for an offence which has prescribed. Said motion was granted. The crime was
committed on January 21, 1976, period of prescription was 10 years, therefore it has prescribed in
1986. Now the motion to quash is being assailed.

Issue: Whether or Not the motion to quash validly granted.

Held: Yes. RA 3019, being a special law the computation of the period for the prescription of the
crime is governed by Sec. 29 of Act No. 3326, which begins to run from the day of the commission
of the crime and not the discovery of it. Additionally, BP 195 which was approved on March 16,
1982, amending Sec. 11 of RA 3019 by increasing ten to fifteen years of the period for the
prescription or extinguishment of a violation of RA 3019 may not be given retroactive application
to the crime which was committed by Paredes, as it is prejudicial to the accused. To apply BP 195
to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law1 for it would alter his situation to his disadvantage
by making him criminally liable for a crime that had already been extinguished under the law
existing when it was committed.
Co vs CA
227 SCRA 444

Facts: Petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn
against the Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00.
1 The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated
reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT." A criminal complaint for violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was filed by the salvage company against Albino Co with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime charged.
He argued on appeal that at the time of the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983, some four
(4) years prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People on September 21, 1987, the
delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an obligation was not considered a
punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice.

Issue: WON the decision issued by the Court can be applied retroactively.

Ruling: No. Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our
decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which
provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is
expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not
backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a
law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract
and hence, is unconstitutional

The weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Court's decision of
September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 that a check issued merely to
guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 — should not
be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons situated, who relied
on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope of
B.P. Blg. 22.

Rosales vs CA
266 SCRA 379

Facts: On April 12, 1966, the Continental Bank instituted Civil Case No. 612 with the CFI. The
complaint alleged that Atlas Timber Company, through its Managing Partner Napoleon Rosales
and Luis Bustillo, executed in favor of Continental Bank a promissory note in the amount of
P1,000,000. Defendants failed and refused to pay the first amortization on the loan of P90,000,
thus rendering the whole principal amount thereof due and demandable. Plaintiff bank prayed that
defendants be ordered to pay the amount of P1M with interest, and that the real estate mortgages
executed by defendants Rosales and Bustillo in favor of the bank be judicially foreclosed. The CFI
ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.
After the Sheriff executed the final deed of sale with the Continental Bank, Roberto Rosales (a
successor in interest of Rosales and Bustillo) filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioners argued
that the lower court amended the decision in its Order dated April 22, 1975, by adding TCT No.
T-11839 (one of the lots registered under the name of Napoleon Rosales that he mortgaged as
security for the payment of the note in the 1st case) to the properties to be sold at public auction,
without prior notice to petitioners (defendants therein). The amendment was substantial because it
included property which was not stated in the original decision; hence, the ninety-day period for
petitioners to pay the judgment debt should be reckoned not from the date of service of the original
decision but from the date of service of the amendment thereto. More importantly, the lower courts
Order dated June 30, 1975 for the issuance of a Writ of Execution was null and void, since this
was done before the expiration of the ninety-day period for defendants to pay the judgment debt.
Therefore, petitioners contend that they should be allowed another period of 90 days within which
to pay the judgment debt.
Issue: WON the modifications to the judgement are violative of section 22 of the bill of rights.
Ruling: No. The rule is that a judgment may be modified prior to the perfection of the appeal while
the lower court still has control over said judgment. In the case involved, there was an actual
material amendment of the dispositive portion of the original decision before an appeal was
perfected by the defendant. It is likewise settled that, in such a situation and for all intents and
purposes, a new judgment has been promulgated and it is from receipt thereof that the period to
appeal must be reckoned.
Subido vs Sandiganbayan
266 SCRA 379

Facts: In Criminal Case No. 22825, the petitioners were charged with Arbitrary Detention, defined
and penalized by Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The arraignment was originally
set for 28 August 1995. On 28 August 1995, however, the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash,
contending that in view of the effectivity of R.A. No. 7975 on 6 May 1995, amending 4 of P.D.
No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over both the offense charged and the persons of
the accused. They argued that: (1) Arbitrary Detention did not fall within Chapter II, 2, Title VII
of the RPC, but within 1, Chapter 1, Title II (Crimes Against the Fundamental Laws of the State),
hence, not covered by R.A. No. 7975 and, therefore, the case should have been filed with the RTC;
(2) R.A. No. 7975 should be given prospective application and at the time the case was filed,
petitioner Subido was already a private person since he was separated from the service on 28
February 1995; while petitioner Parina did not hold a position corresponding to salary grade 27.

R.A. No. 7975 took effect on 16 May 1995, or one year, ten months and twenty-one days after the
alleged commission of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 22825 before the Sandiganbayan.
The petitioners, urge the courts to apply 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975, the
law in force at the time of the filing of the information in Criminal Case No. 22825. They submit
that under the new law, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the offense charged and their
persons because at the time of the filing of the information, petitioner Subido was already a private
individual, while the classification of petitioner Parinas position was lower than grade 27.

Issue: WON RA 7975 may be validly given retroactive effect.

Ruling: Yes. The petitioner’s invocation of the prohibition against the retroactivity of penal laws
is misplaced. Simply put, R.A. No. 7975 is not a penal law. Penal laws or statutes are those acts of
the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violation; or those that
define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. R.A. No. 7975, in further
amending P.D. No. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, mode of appeal, and other
procedural matters, is clearly a procedural law, i.e., one which prescribes rules and forms of
procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion, or those which refer to rules
of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Moreover,
the petitioners even suggest that it is likewise a curative or remedial statute; one which cures
defects and adds to the means of enforcing existing obligations. All told, as a procedural and
curative statute, R.A. No. 7975 may validly be given retroactive effect, there being no impairment
of contractual or vested rights.
Sesbreno vs CBAA 270 SCRA 360

Facts: On April 3, 1980, petitioner purchased from Estrella Benedicto Tan two (2) parcels of land covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-55917 issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City and described in
the deed of sale as follows: “A parcel of land (Lot 308 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu), with the
improvements thereon, situated in the City of Cebu (formerly Municipality of Cebu), containing an area of
Forty Nine (49) square meters, more or less. A parcel of land (Lot 309 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu),
with the improvements thereon, situated in the City of Cebu, containing an area of Forty Eight (48) square
meters, more or less The conveyance included “a residential house of strong materials constructed on the
lots above-mentioned” located in Cebu City.
Issue: Is CBAA’s Assessment Unconstitutional?
Ruling: Yes, Equally unmeritorious is petitioner’s contention that the imposition of back taxes on his
property is unconstitutional for being violative of Section 22, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. When
both Public Respondents CBAA and City Assessor imposed back taxes on petitioner’s property, they did
not violate the rule that laws shall have only prospective applicability. Respondents were only applying PD
464 which had been in effect since 1974. Besides, Section 25 of PD 464 is not penal in character; hence, it
may not be considered as an ex post facto law.

People v. Burton
FACTS: William Burton, a British national, was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, for attempting to transport 5.6 kilograms of hashish, a prohibited drug, through the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport. Though caught in flagrante delicto, he denies criminal liability
therefor on the novel ground that he was not aware that his traveling bags contained the prohibited
drug. Appellant was charged violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 21, of Republic Act No.
6425 sentencing him for life imprisonment and a fine of 20,000.
ISSUE: Whether RA 7659 increases the penalty imposed on appellant?
RULING: No. the crime was committed on December 26, 1992 or about a year before Republic
Act No. 7659, imposing the penalty of reclusin perpetua to death, came into effect on December
31, 1993. Retroactive application of said law would not be advantageous to appellant in view of
the increased range of penalty and conjunctive fine prescribed, where the quantity of prohibited
drugs is 750 grams or more. Court affirmed the decision.

Lacson vs Executive Secretary, GR 128096 January 20, 1999

Facts: Pursuant to RA 7975, the Sandiganbayan transferred the Kuratong Baleleng case toe the RTC for
lack of jurisdiction. RA 8249 amended RA 7975 in further defining the jusrisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Pursuant to the new Act, the Sandiganbayan took cognizance of the case. Petitioner and intervenors argue
that the statues’s retroactive application to the Kuratong Baleleng case constitutes an ex post facto law
for it deprives them of their right to procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the two-tiered
appeal which they had allegedly acquired under RA 7975

Issue: Whether or nor RA 8249 constitutes an Ex post facto law.

Ruling: NO, RA 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it
does not partake the nature of an expost facto law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory
right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws. “The right to appeal is not
a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law.”

People vs Nitafan, GR 107964-66 February 1, 1999

Facts: Without waiting for accused to file a motion to quash an information, the judge ordered the
prosecution to show cause why the case should not be dismissed on the ground that the prosecution was
under an ex post facto law.

Issue: Whether or not the action of the judge was proper when he ordered prosecution to show cause
why the case should not be dismissed without waiting for the accused’s motion to quash

Ruling: NO, every law carries with it the presumption of constitutionality until otherwise declared by
this court. To rule that the CB circular is an expost facto law is to say that it is unconstitutional. However,
neither private respondent nor the SolGen challenges it. This court, much more the lower courts, will not
pass upon the constitutionality of a statute or rule nor declare it void unless directly assailed in an
appropriate action.

Fajardo v. CA GR 128508
FACTS: Petitioner was convicted of violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Petitioner filed a motion
for probation contending that he was eligible for probation because at the time he committed the
offense in 1981, an accused who had appealed his conviction was still qualified to apply for
probation and that the law that barred an application for probation of an accused who had
interposed an appeal was ex post facto in its application, and, hence, not applicable to him, the trial
court denied petitioner's motion for probation. Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari to annul the lower court's denial of his application for probation, which the
Court of Appeals denied. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Is the appeal ex post facto in its application?
HELD: NO, the court denies the petition. At the time of the commission of the offense charged in
1981, petitioner could have appealed if convicted and still availed himself of probation. However,
petitioner was convicted on May 26, 1988, and he appealed. At that time, petitioner no longer had
the option to appeal and still apply for probation if unsuccessful in the appeal.
An ex post facto law is one that punishes an act as a crime which was innocent at the time of its
commission; Presidential Decree No. 1990, like the Probation Law that it amends, is not penal in
character; it may not be considered as an ex post facto law

People v. Valdez GR 127663

FACTS: The Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Urdaneta, Pangasinan convicted as charged the
accused-appellant Rolando Valdez for the complex crime of Multiple Murder with Double
Frustrated Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions (Presidential Decree No.
1866) and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and the prison term of reclusion perpetua.
Victims met the appellant and his companions who were armed with guns, and without any
warning, they pointed their guns and fired at them which caused the instantaneous death. It was
raised that each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each
particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give
rise to the complex crime of multiple murder. Republic Act No. 8294(for Illegal Possession of
Firearm) took effect on July 6, 1997, fifteen days after its publication on June 21, 1997. The crimes
involved in the case at bar were committed on September 17, 1995.
ISSUE: Whether RA No. 8294 be given retroactive application?
RULING: No Retroactive application insofar as it will prejudice the accused by increasing the
penalty. The use of an unlicensed firearm in the case at bar cannot be considered as a special
aggravating circumstance in Criminal Case No. U-8747 (for Complex Crime of Multiple Murder),
also because it will unduly raise the penalty for the four counts of murder from four reclusion
perpetua to that of four-fold death. Insofar as this particular provision of Republic Act No. 8294
is not beneficial to accused-appellant because it unduly aggravates the crime, this new law will not
be given retroactive application, lest it might acquire the character of an ex-post facto law.

People v. Ringor GR123918

FACTS: The accused (Ringor) on the night of June 23, 1994 was seen entering People’s
Restaurant. A witness Fely Batanes saw the accused approach a table where the victim was sitting,
pulled his hair, and poked a knife at the latter’s throat. After, leaving the restaurant, the accused
returned with a gun, entered the kitchen of the restaurant, stealthily approached the victim from
behind and shot him six times successively. The defendant was later apprehended and caught in
his possession was an unlicensed weapon. Upon verification in Camp Crame, it was found out that
Ringor is not a licensed firearm holder and that the gun was not licensed. Ringor put up self-
defense but he failed to prove Florida’s unlawful aggression. He was found guilty of murder
qualified by treachery and was sentenced to death. He was found guilty of a separate charge of
possession of an unlicensed firearm with a sentence of 17 to 20 years.
ISSUE: Whether or not the amendatory law RA 8294 (which took effect in 1997: crime occurred
in 1994) is applicable
RULING: No. At the time of the commission of the crime the use of an unlicensed firearm was
still not an aggravating circumstance in murder to homicide. To apply it to Ringor would increase
his penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. Hence, RA 8294 cannot retroact as it is unfavorable
to the accused, lest it becomes an ex post facto law.
Where the amendatory law making the “use of an unlicensed firearm” as an aggravating circumstance in
murder or homicide is not favorable to the accused, it cannot be applied lest it becomes an ex post facto
law.

People vs. Magbanua GR 128888 Dec. 3, 1999

Facts: Accused was guilty for raping his daughter Poblica Magbanua, there were several instances where
the accused continued to rape the victim who eventually led to her to give birth to a child, and she went
to report to the police station where she voluntarily executed a statement before SPO2 Resurrecion
Atlas concerning the rape incidents. Accused was brought to court, trial court convicted appellant of
rape and sentenced him to death.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing the supreme penalty of death upon accused –
appellant by applying retroactively republic act no. 7659(death penalty law)

Ruling: Yes, Republic Act No. 7659 cannot be applied retroactively because, to do so, would go against
the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws.

The Court, however, is sentencing appellant to a single punishment of reclusion perpetua only because
despite the several rapes perpetrated by appellant on Poblica the information merely stated a lone
allegation of rape.

People vs Desierto GR 136506

Facts: The OSG initiated the complaint for violation of R.A. No. 3019 before the PCGG. The complaint
alleged that respondent Cojuangco, Jr., taking advantage of his close relationship with then President
Marcos, had caused the latter to issue favorable decrees to advance his personal and business interests, and
caused the government through the NIDC to enter into a contract with him under terms and conditions
grossly disadvantageous to the government. PD 582 was issued by then President Marcos, which created
the CIDF to revitalize the coconut industry. 6 days after the issuance of P.D. No. 582 at the instigation of
respondent Cojuangco, Jr, AII, represented by respondent Cojuangco, Jr. as Chairman and President, and
NIDC, represented by its Senior Vice-President, Augusto E. Orosa entered into a MOA. The MOA granted
Cojuangco exclusivity with Dr. Yann Fremond of the Research Institute for Oil and Oilseeds, to establish
and operate a seed garden for the production of Ivory Coast Hybrid Seednuts
The complaint filed by the Solicitor General alleged that the MOA is a one-sided contract with provisions
clearly stacked up against the NIDC thereby placing the latter in a no-win situation. Respondent Cojuangco,
Jr. sought the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prescription
Issue: Whether or not the dismissal according to the complainant on the ground of prescription is valid.
Ruling: NO, it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations
of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the public officials
concerned connived or conspired with the beneficiaries of the loans, we agree with the COMMITTEE that
the prescriptive period for the offenses with which the respondentswere charged should be computed from
the discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission
R.A. No. 3019, as applied to the instant case, covers not only the alleged one-sidedness of the MOA, but
also as to whether the contracts or transactions entered pursuant thereto by private respondents were
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, whether they caused undue injury to the
government, and whether the private respondents were interested for personal gain or had material interest
in the transactions.
An ex post facto law is defined, in part, as a law which deprives persons accused of crime of some
lawful protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or of the proclamation of amnesty—every law
which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his
disadvantage; A construction which raises a conflict between different parts of the constitution is not
permissible when by reasonable construction, the parts may be made to harmonize.
Note: Agricultural Investors, Inc. (AII)
Coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF)

People vs Torres 501 scra 591

Facts: Dexter Torres was charged with violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6425, as amended, for unlawful possession of 831.91 grams of marijuana fruiting tops, a
prohibited drug; as well as Section 16, Article III of the same law for illegal possession of 0.26
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug commonly known as shabu. The two
(2) criminal cases were jointly tried at the branch 8 Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri,
Cagayan; Dexter pleaded not guilty to both charges.

However the court found accused Dexter Torres y De La Cruz guily beyond reasonable doubt in
both cases and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and a fine of Five
Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos in Criminal Case No. 08-1334 and, the indeterminate
prison term of six (6) years, one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand
(P500,000.00) Pesos in Criminal Case No. 08-1344.

Issue: Whether or Not the penalty imposed upon accused was violative of Art. 3 section 22 of the
constitution in so far as it increased the penalty for the crime committed.
Ruling: Yes, Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, increased the penalty for illegal possession of less than five (5) grams of
shabu to imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty years and a fine ranging
from three hundred thousand (P300,000.00) to four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00).
However, since this law is not favorable to appellant, it cannot be given retroactive
application in the instant case.

Salvador vs Mapa 539 SCRA 34

Facts: Pres. Ramos Issued Administrative Order 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest loans. The committee was tasked to inventory all behest loans and determine
the courses of action that the governemnt should take to recover theses loans. On Nov 9, 1992
Memorandum Order 61 the functions of the committee were expanded to include all non-
performing loans which shall embrace behest and non- behest loans.
Several loan accounts were referred to the Committee for Investigation, including the loan
transactions between Philippine Eagles Mines Inc. and the DBP. The committee determined that
they bore the characteristics of behest loans, because the officers of PEMI were known cronies of
Marcos; the load was under-collateralized; and PEMI was undercapitalized at the time the loan
was granted. Atty. Salvador, consultant of the committee, and representing PCGG filed with the
office of the ombudsman a sworn complaint for violation of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, against respondents. Ombudsman dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription.
Issue: Whether or not Administrative Order no. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex-post
facto laws.
Ruling: No, Memorandum Order 61 merely provides a frame of reference for determining behest
loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative Order 13 and Memorandum Order 61 cannot be
characterized as ex post facto laws. There is therefore no basis for the Ombudsman to rule that the
subject administrative and memorandum orders are ex post facto.
The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law generally prohibits the retrospectivity
of penal laws. Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish
penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their
punishment.

Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.

19. Art. 3. Sec. 22 - Republic v. Eugenio - 545 SCRA 384

After the Agan v. PIATCO ruling, a series of investigations concerning the award of the NAIA 3 contracts
to PIATCO were undertaken by the Ombudsman and the Compliance and Investigation Staff (“CIS”) of
the Anti-Money Laundering Council (“AMLC”).
The OSG wrote AMLC requesting AMLC’s assistance “in obtaining more evidence to completely reveal
the financial trail of corruption surrounding the NAIA 3 Project,” and also noting that the Republic was
presently defending itself in two international arbitration cases. The CIS conducted an intelligence
database search on the financial transactions of certain individuals involved in the award, including
Alvarez (Chairman of the Pre-Qualification Bids and Awards Technical Committee). By this time, Alvarez
had already been charged by the Ombudsman with violation of Section 3(J) of the Anti Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. The search revealed that Alvarez maintained 8 bank accounts with 6 different
banks
The AMLC issued a resolution authorizing its Executive Director to sign and verify an application to
inquire into the deposits or investments of Alvarez et al. and to authorize the AMLC Secretariat to
conduct an inquiry once the RTC grants the application. The rationale for the resolution was founded
on the findings of the CIS that amounts were transferred from a Hong Kong bank account to bank
accounts in the Philippines maintained by respondents. The Resolution also noted that by awarding the
contract to PIATCO (despite its lack of financial capacity) Alvarez violated Section 3(E) of the Anti Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. The MAKATI RTC rendered an Order granting the AMLC the authority to
inquire and examine the subject bank accounts of Alvarez et al.

In response to a letter of Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio, AMLC issued a Resolution authorizing its
Executive Director to inquire into and examine the accounts of Alvarez, PIATCO, and several other
entities involved in the nullified contract. AMLC filed an application before the MANILA RTC to inquire
into the accounts alleged as having been used to facilitate corruption in the NAIA 3 Project. The ex parte
application was granted and the MANILA RTC issued a bank inquiry order.
Alvarez alleged that he fortuitously learned of the bank inquiry order, which was issued following an ex
parte application, and he argued that nothing in the “AMLA” authorized the AMLC to seek the authority
to inquire into bank accounts ex parte.

After several motions, manifestations, orders and resolutions the case went up to the SC. Alvarez et
al.’s position: The AMLA, being a substantive penal statute, has no retroactive effect and the bank
inquiry order could not apply to deposits or investments opened prior to the effectivity of the AMLA
(17 October 2001). The subject bank accounts, opened in 1989 to 1990, could not be the subject of the
bank inquiry order without violating the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proscription against ex post facto laws applies to Section 11 of the AMLA (a
provision which does not provide a penal sanction BUT which merely authorizes the inspection of
suspect accounts and deposits).

HELD: YES. It is clear that no person may be prosecuted under the PENAL provisions of the AMLA for
acts committed prior to the enactment of the law (17 October 2001).
With respect to the AUTHORITY TO INSPECT, it should be noted that an ex post facto law is one that
(among others) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.
PRIOR to the AMLA:
(1) The fact that bank accounts were involved in activities later on enumerated in the law did not, by
itself, remove such accounts from the shelter of absolute confidentiality.
(2) In order that bank accounts could be examined, there was need to secure either the written
permission of the depositor OR a court order authorizing such examination, assuming that they were
involved in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in a case where the money
deposited or invested was itself the subject matter of the litigation.
The passage of the AMLA stripped another layer off the rule on absolute confidentiality that provided
a measure of lawful protection to the account holder. The application of the bank inquiry order as a
means of inquiring into transactions entered into prior to the passage of the AMLA would be
constitutionally infirm, offensive as to the ex post facto clause.
NEVERTHELESS, the argument that the prohibition against ex post facto laws goes as far as to prohibit
any inquiry into deposits in bank accounts OPENED prior to the effectivity of the AMLA even if the
TRANSACTIONS were entered into when the law had already taken effect cannot be sustained. This
argument will create a loophole in the AMLA that would result to further money laundering. It is hard
to presume that Congress intended to enact a self-defeating law in the first place, and the courts are
inhibited from such a construction by the cardinal rule that “a law should be interpreted with a view to
upholding rather than destroying it.”

20. Art. 3. Sec. 22 - Valeroso v. People - 546 SCRA 450

Armed with warrant of arrest and based on the probable reason to believe based on surveillance
conducted in herein petitioners hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan and Bulacan, and when the petitioner is
about to board a tricycle, he was then arrested and was charged in violation of illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition under PD 1866, as amended.

The lower court imposed a penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period or from 4 years, 2
months and 1 day as minimum to 6 years as maximum and to pay the fine in the amount of Php 15,
000.

Upon motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision with modification of a
period of 4 years and 2 months as minimum up to 6 years as maximum.

The petitioner herein was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition
under the first paragraph of Section 1 of PD No 1866, as amended. It provides that the penalty of
RECLUSION TEMPORAL shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in,
acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or
instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.

PD 1866 as amended,was the governing law at the time the petitioner committed the offense/
however RA No 8294 amended PD No 1866 during the pendency of the case with the trial court.

Section 1: Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition or possession of Firearms or

ammunition or instruments used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or
ammunition. - the penalty of PRISION CORRECCIONAL in its maximum period and a fine of not less
than Php 15, 000 shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfuly manufacture, deal in,
acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, suc as..

ISSUE:
Whether or not the amended PD 1866 imposing prisional correccional as punishment shall be
imposed to the petitioner in the case at bar.

HELD:
Yes.As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire the
character of an ex post facto law. An EXCEPTION to this rule, however is when the law is
advantageous of the accused.
A new law has a prospective, not retroactive, effect. however penal laws that favor a guilty person,
who is not a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effect. These are the rule, the exception and
exception to the exception on effectivity of laws.

21. Art. 3. Sec. 22 - Presidential v. Desierto - 548 SCRA

FACTS: President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee). A behest loan may involve civil liability for non-
payment or non-recovery and may likewise entail criminal liability.
Several loan accounts were referred to the Committee for its investigation, including the loan
transactions between now Integrated Circuits Philippines (ICPI), and the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP).

After examining and studying the loan transactions, the Committee filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman a sworn complaint3 for violation of Section 3(e)(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the Concerned Members of the DBP Board of Governors,
and Concerned Directors and Officers of ICPI.

After evaluating the evidence submitted by the Committee, the Ombudsman issued the assailed
Memorandum, finding that there was no probable cause to warrant the filing of the instant case in
court. To start with, the cause of action has prescribed and the aforesaid Administrative and
Memorandum Orders both issued by the President in 1992, may not be retroactively applied to the
questioned transactions which took place in 1980 because to do so would be tantamount to an ex post
facto law. Petitioner alleges that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that (i) the offenses subject of its criminal complaint had
prescribed; (ii) Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex post facto laws; and
(iii) there is no probable cause to indict private respondents for violation under Section 3(e)(g) of R.A.
No. 3019.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman can acted with grave abuse of discretion

RULING: NO. The counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the date of discovery of the
offense in 1992. Thus, the criminal offenses allegedly committed by the private respondents had not
yet prescribed when the complaint was filed.

The constitutional proscription of ex post facto laws is aimed against the retrospectivity of penal laws.
Administrative Order No. 13 merely creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact- Finding Committee on Behest
Loans and provides for its composition and functions. Memorandum Order No. 61, on the other hand,
simply provides the frame of reference in determining the existence of behest loans. Not being penal
laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex-post
facto laws.

Furthermore the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction in delving into the constitutionality of the subject
administrative and memorandum orders.

However, there was no probable cause to base the action. Mistakes committed by a public officer are
not actionable, absent a clear showing that he was motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting
to bad faith. Petitioners utterly failed to show that private respondents’ actions fit such description. In
sum, petitioner does not persuade us that the contract between ICPI and DBP was a behest loan.

The Ombudsman can hardly be faulted for not wanting to proceed with the prosecution of the offense,
convinced that he does not possess the necessary evidence to secure a conviction.
The petition is DENIED. The assailed Memorandum and Order of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-95-0443,
are AFFIRMED.

22. Art. 3. Sec. 22 - PCGG v. Carpio Morales, 740 SCRA 368 (2014)

In 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating a Presidential Ad-
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Ad Hoc Committee) and Memorandum Order No. 61
prescribing certain criteria to be used by the Ad Hoc Committee as a guide in investigating and studying
loans granted by government financing institutions that amount to behest loans. One of the loan
accounts referred to the Ad Hoc Committee for investigation was that of Resorts Hotel Corporation
(RHC), which was 37.2% owned by Rodolfo Cuenca, a known Marcos business associate. From 1969 to
1977, RHC obtained a number of loans totaling P86.9 million. To secure said loans, RHC offered as
collaterals the assets that were acquired by these loans. In 1980, 40% of the amount were converted
into DBP’s common shareholding in RHC, and the balance of P58.4 million was restructured. The
properties were foreclosed in 1983 with arrearages of P11.97 million.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Ad Hoc Committee found that DBP’s total exposure as of 1986
amounted to P99.1 million. On January 4, 1993, the Ad Hoc Committee then submitted a report to the
President where it concluded that the RHC account qualifies as behest in character. An Affidavit-
Complaint was filed on January 6, 2003 with the Office of the Ombudsman, against respondent
directors and officers of RHC and the directors of DBP for violation of Sections 3(e) and 3 (g) of Republic
Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Ombudsman issued an Order
dismissing the Affidavit-Complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the
Ombudsman issued another Order dismissing the complaint on the ground ofprescription, effectively
denying the motion for reconsideration.

Whether respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Affidavit-
Complaint dated January 6, 2003 on the ground of prescription.

NO. The petition is without merit. RA 3019, Section 11 provides that all offenses punishable under
saidlaw shall prescribe in ten (10) years. This period was later increased tofifteen (15) years with the
passage of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 195, whichtook effect on March 16, 1982. This does not mean,
however, that the longerprescriptive period shall apply to all violations of RA 3019. Following the
Court’s pronouncements in People v. Pacificador , the rule is that “in the interpretation of the law on
prescription of crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is to be adopted.” As such, the
longer prescriptive period of 15 years pursuant to BP Blg. 195 cannot be applied to crimes committed
prior to the effectivity of the said amending law on March16, 1982. Considering that the crimes were
committed in 1969, 1970, 1973,1975, and 1977, the applicable prescriptive period thereon is the ten-
year period set in RA 3019, the law in force at that time. What is, then, left for the Court’s determination
is the reckoning point for the 10-year period. Notably, RA 3019 is silent as to when the period of
prescription shall begin to run. This void, however, is remedied by Act No. 3326, Section 2 of which
provides in part:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if
the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding
for its investigation and punishment. xxx.

Based on the above, there are two reckoning points for the counting of the prescription of an offense:
1) the day of the commission of the violationof the law; and 2) if the day when the violation was
committed be not known, then it shall begin to run from the discovery of said violation and the
institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment. In the case at bar, involving as it
does the grant of behest loans which the Court has recognized as a violation that, by their nature, could
be concealed from the public eye by the simple expedient of suppressing their documentation, the
second mode applies. The Court, therefore, counts the running of the prescriptive period from the date
of discovery thereof on January 4,1993, when the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee
reported to the President its findings and conclusions anent RHC’s loans. This being the case, the filing
by the PCGG of its Affidavit-Complaint before the Office ofthe Ombudsman on January 6, 2003, a little
over ten (10) years from the date of discovery of the crimes, is clearly belated. Undoubtedly, the ten-
year period within which to institute the action has already lapsed, making it proper for the
Ombudsman to dismiss petitioner’s complaint on the ground of prescription.