Extending the Shield:

An Analysis of the Federal Bureau

of Investigation’s Role and
Effectiveness in Afghanistan
Between 2001 and 2014

Matthew Thomas
L250 International Politics & Intelligence Studies BA
Dissertation
Aberystwyth University
2016 - 2017
 Abstract

This study looks at the roles of the FBI in Afghanistan and evaluates the effectiveness of these roles
throughout the period of 2001 and 2014. The study finds out that while the FBI is successful in the
majority of its tasks undertaken, such as support for military operations, forensic support, and capacity
building, these successes are limited to the local level of operations, i.e. tactical and operational levels,
rather than strategic or international successes. The study also looks at the challenges and issues the
FBI has faced due to its operations in Afghanistan which have created problems for the FBI, who has
overcome the majority of these challenges and issues successfully. Another area that this study looked
at is the successful relationship between the military and the FBI, which forms a major theme that
runs throughout the FBI’s overseas history and continues past the study period. This dissertation
throughout highlights the development of the FBI’s capabilities in hostile foreign environments,
especially in support of military activities or operations.

i
 Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge the support of and thank my advisor, Dr. Warren Dockter, for his
assistance and guidance with this dissertation. He initially helped to narrow the topic area and
throughout the writing process has contributed by identifying problems in methodology and
structure.

I thank my parents and brother for acting as a springboard for ideas, helping to proofread drafts, and
for their moral support throughout the process of researching and writing this dissertation.

“Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more.”1

William Shakespeare

1Mowat, Barbara, Paul Werstine, Michael Poston, Rebecca Niles, eds., Henry V, Act III, Scene I (Washington: Folger
Shakespeare Library, n.d.). Available at: www.folgerdigitaltexts.org [Accessed 11 March 2017].

ii
 Contents

Abstract ............................................................................................................................................ i
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... ii
Contents ......................................................................................................................................... iii
Acronyms ........................................................................................................................................ iv

Introduction....................................................................................................................p1-4

Chapter 1 – Background ............................................................................................. p5-11

FBI in Afghanistan
Chapter 2 – Roles of the FBI in Afghanistan ............................................................ p12-21
Chapter 3 – Issues and Challenges from the FBI’s presence in Afghanistan ......... p21-25

FBI Activities Elsewhere & Future

Chapter 4 – Other FBI Overseas Activities between 2001 and 2014 ..................... p27-29
Chapter 5 – Implications for the Future .................................................................. p30-32

Conclusions................................................................................................................ p33-34

Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... p35-38

iii
 Acronyms

ANA – Afghan National Army JTTF – Joint Terrorism Task Force

ANP – Afghan National Police JSOC – Joint Special Operations Command

ANSF – Afghan National Security Forces LEGAT – FBI Legal Attaché

ATF – Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Explosives
AQ – Al-Qaeda
CEXC – Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell
MCTF – Afghan Major Crimes Task Forces
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OEF-A – Operation Enduring Freedom –
Afghanistan

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency PRT – Provincial Reconstruction Team

CIED – Counter Improvised Explosive Device ROE – Rules of Engagement

CT – Counter Terrorism ROL – Rule of Law

DEA – Drugs Enforcement Administration SABT – Special Agent Bomb Technician

DIA – Defence Intelligence Agency SIGINT – Signals Intelligence

DOD – US Department of Defence SOF – Special Operations Forces

DOJ – US Department of Justice SSE – Sensitive Site Exploitation

DOMEX – Document and Media Exploitation TEDAC – Terrorist Explosive Devices Analytical
Centre
DOS – US Department of State
UBL – Osama Bin Laden
DSS – Diplomatic Security Service
US/USA – The United States of America
EIT – Enhanced Interrogation Tactics
USACE – US Army Corps of Engineers
EOD – Explosive Ordinance Disposal

FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigation

GTMO – Guantanamo Bay Naval Base &

Detention Camp, Cuba

HRT – Hostage Rescue Team

HUMINT – Human Intelligence

ICCTF – International Contract Corruption

Task Force

IED – Improvised Explosive Device

ISAF – International Security Assistance Force

ISIL – Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant

iv
 Introduction

In an interview in 2011, the US Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry stated that “The FBI is
the shield in the United States...what 9/11 taught us is that you can’t defend the country against
terrorism from the U.S. shoreline. You must extend the shield globally...”2 This quote on ‘extending
the shield’ to protect the US Homeland forms the title of this dissertation which aims to look at and
evaluate the roles that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) undertook whilst it was mobilised
and deployed to Afghanistan throughout a 13 year period after the attacks on the twin towers in
New York City on 11th September 2001.

Aims
As stated above, this dissertation seeks to identify the roles of the FBI in Afghanistan and provide an
evaluation of them. The dissertation will attempt to show that the FBI presence in Afghanistan was
not ground-breaking, rather it provided specialist skills and general assistance to the US primary
goals for the country, therefore, making operations easier. The paper will also show that issues and
challenges the bureau have faced from conducting operations in Afghanistan have often affected the
bureau’s specialist capabilities it brings to the fight. The dissertation will also highlight the growing
relationship between the bureau and the US military whose cooperation provides both partners with
benefits that each independently could not achieve.

Methodology
This dissertation is located within the contemporary study areas of the Afghanistan War, federal law
enforcement, and then more widely within the security studies field and its sub-field of intelligence
studies.

Due to the broad remit of the central question of this dissertation which revolves around an analysis
of the roles and effectiveness of the bureau in Afghanistan, it is vital to break this question down
into more manageable and easily answerable sub-questions which will all add up to provide this
analysis proposed in the title. The first sub-question will be specific and concentrate on what the
FBI’s roles in Afghanistan were. The second sub-question looks at the successes and failures of the
bureau in Afghanistan to form the basis of the evaluation of the effectiveness of the bureau in
Afghanistan. The third sub-question focuses on the issues and challenges raised from the FBI’s

2Federal Bureau of Investigation. ‘Mission Afghanistan: A Model for the Future - Part 8: Legat Kabul and the International
Fusion Cell’ June 7 2011. Available at: https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/mission-afghanistan-a-model-for-the-future
[Accessed 5 February 2017].

1
involvement in Afghanistan, again for evaluation of the bureau effectiveness. The final sub-question
will look at the significance of the bureau’s participation and roles in Afghanistan for the War on
Terror.

From its inception, this dissertation has had limitations placed on it from external factors which can
be summed up under the following headings: secrecy, language barriers and the lack of opposing
and different views on the FBI’s involvement in Afghanistan. The limitation of secrecy is a major
roadblock as most of the FBI tactics, operations and capabilities are classified making it difficult to
research. This barrier has been partially overcome with documents requested by other organizations
for research on specific topics, books which were written around the subject and academic literature
by FBI agents talking about specific areas that the Bureau is involved with in Afghanistan and more
generally throughout the study’s time period. Another of the limitations that affects this dissertation
is the lack of opposing and different views especially from Afghan positions, which maybe cut off due
to the lack of writings in from Afghanistan or be non-accessible due to the language barriers with
Afghanistan’s main languages being Pashto and Dari, which the author of this dissertation does not
speak.

The sources that will be utilised will also introduce limitations, especially sources that come from the
government. These sources will have to be evaluated critically to ensure that there are no biases or
attempts to obfuscate the facts, which will result in non-government sources being used to compare
the official line to a different perspective.

Literature Review
This brief section of the introduction will look at some of the critical literature surrounding the topics
covered in this dissertation which include the histories of the Bureau and the war in Afghanistan.
One of the secondary texts relating to the FBI history especially its history during conflict is The
Threat Matrix: The FBI at War written by Garrett Graff. This book is extremely helpful to the study of
the FBI’s role in Afghanistan and war zones in general as it is an intensive study of the entire
bureau’s history in times of threat. The text is broken into three time periods: 1972-1992, 1992-2002
and 2002-2010.3 The time length of these three periods acts as an indicator of the increasing role of
the FBI in conflict as the gaps go from 20 years to 10 years and finally to an eight-year gap. The text
however does have its weak points for this dissertation with parts of the book that do not relate to
the role of the bureau in Afghanistan but give insights into the internal and external struggles of the

3
Graff, G.M. The Threat Matrix: The FBI at War in the Age of Global Terror (New York: Little, Brown & Company, 2012). p.
ix.

2
Bureau in relation to the politics of Washington, which is helpful to the general study of the Bureau
during the time period of the study that may impact the work in Afghanistan.

Another secondary text that covers the history of the Afghan War is The Good War: Why We
Couldn’t Win the War or the Peace in Afghanistan by Jack Fairweather. This text looks at the full
history of Afghanistan, including the political, economic, military and civil issues that have occurred
throughout the 2001-2014 period that this dissertation covers. The main benefit this text provides is
a background to compare events that the FBI were involved in to see if the bureau’s roles made an
effect on the overall situation of the war. The negative of the text is that is does not include
information on the FBI and its role in Afghanistan as well as not covering in depth areas that the
Bureau had worked, i.e. building the rule of law (ROL) capacity, which limits the text usefulness in
most of this dissertation apart from chapter which looks at the background of the study including
the history of the Afghan war.

Two primary documents that are useful for the study of the FBI are Black Banners by Ali Soufan and
Endless Enemies written by Raymond Holcomb who were both FBI agents throughout the 1990’s and
the early 2000’s, and who both cover the early period of bureau operations in Afghanistan. Both of
the texts also have limitations which include censorship, as the writers are bound by official
guidelines modifying what they can write on their subjects, and suffer from the authors being up
close to the action, which can blind those who witness the events to nuance and deeper
understanding. These two texts provide personal insights into the bureau’s operations throughout
the 90’s and early 2000’s with Holcomb’s book being useful for showing the bureaucratic changes
that were going on in the bureau in response to the deployment of FBI agents and other personnel
to war zones throughout the 2000’s. Soufan’s text provides insight into the FBI’s interrogations
throughout his time in the bureau, especially at Guantanamo as well as providing further insight into
Al-Qaeda (AQ), due to Soufan being an Arabic speaker and had been following Osama Bin Laden’s
(UBL) rise throughout the 1990’s.4

Apart from these four texts, the dissertation will utilise other books that cover the study area,
journal and news articles, reports from government and non-governmental sources, legal
documents and articles from websites. As previously stated, the use of government reports and
articles will be considered critically as these sources may contain bias and will usually have a specific
aim. The government sources are also faced with the issue of censorship for national security
reasons, limiting their effectiveness.

4Soufan, Ali H and Daniel Freedman. The Black Banners: Inside the Hunt for Al-Qaeda (London: Penguin Books, 2012). p.
10-14.

3
Chapter Overview
The final part of the introduction will look at what the chapter structure and content of this
dissertation will include.

Chapter one of this dissertation is concerned with the background to the study. It will look at the
two key themes of the FBI overseas and the Afghan War. The first part of the chapter looks at the
legal standing of the FBI’s overseas operations, looks at the bureau’s overseas history and finally at
two of its overseas capable units. The second part of the chapter breaks down the history of the 13-
year conflict in Afghanistan into three time periods to identify key times from the conflict where the
FBI’s impact will be seen later on in the dissertation.

Chapter two is where the dissertation looks specifically at the role and effectiveness of the FBI in
Afghanistan during 2001 to 2014. The chapter will look at the different roles the bureau has
undertaken including interrogations, support to military operations, forensic support, capacity
building and countering corruption amongst others.

Chapter three will look at the challenges and issues faced by the bureau in Afghanistan. The issues
being examined include ethical and legal issues, challenges around training and equipping FBI staff
for deployment, and finally at human resources and administration issues.

Chapter four looks at the FBI’s other overseas operations and missions throughout the 13 year
period under study. It looks at the FBI’s second longest, after Afghanistan, the overseas mission in
Iraq, the section also looks at the bureau’s involvement in responses to piracy and finally looks at the
FBI’s support to special operations forces in Libya. These examples are reviewed to see if the
bureau’s role in Afghanistan was a unique situation or the bureau’s mission set and capabilities were
changing in response to the changed world after 9/11.

Chapter five will look at what the implications of the bureau’s activities over the study period will
have on future operations and warzones that the bureau may become involved with in the future.
The chapter will apply the ethical issues and challenges faced from Afghanistan on to possible future
overseas missions to see if the lessons learnt from the 13 years can be applied to different
situations. The chapter will also look at the future implications of the relationship between the FBI
and Special Operations Forces (SOF).

4
 Chapter 1 – Background

This chapter will provide a background to the main areas of the study which can be broken down
into two sub-sections: The first sub-section will look at the history of the FBI’s overseas missions, the
legal framework that enables the bureau to operate internationally and finally the bureau’s
structures that enable the overseas roles, and then the second sub-section will look at the history of
Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan (OEF-A) between 2001 and 2014 with the history being
broken down into three parts: 2001 to 2002, 2003 to 2008 and finally 2009 to 2014.

Background of FBI Overseas Operations

This section will look at the background of the FBI’s overseas capabilities which will include the key
legislation that allows the bureau to operate overseas, it will look at a brief history of the FBI abroad,
and finally, the section will look at the FBI structure and elements that operate overseas.

Legislation
The first part of this section will discuss three key pieces of legislation that allows the FBI to operate
overseas and conduct operations where one is under US Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), another
is under Title 18 of US Code and the final piece of legislation being looked at is the Presidential
Decision Directive 39 of 1995 (PDD-39).

Title 21 section 0.85 of the CFR deals with the general functions of the FBI with part L naming the FBI
as the lead agency to investigate “all crimes for which it has primary or concurrent jurisdiction and
which involve terrorist activities or acts in preparation of terrorist activities.”5 Title 18 section 2332b
of the US code deals with acts of terrorism that transcend national boundaries, which was added
under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and adds the critical
section for the FBI with that it creates extraterritorial jurisdiction for terrorist actions.6 These two
codes work together to allow the FBI to operate overseas to investigate a variety of federal offences
and become involved internationally but contain a significant caveat that the permission of
extraterritoriality “does not imply that the FBI can become operational in a foreign country without
the permission of that government”7

5 US Government Publishing Office. “Title 28, Chapter 1, Part 0, Subpart P, Section 0.85” January 12, 2017. Available at:
http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/textidx?SID=fa57fba47e4c39e87d6064844dbc7f14&mc=true&node=se28.1.0_185&rgn=div8
[Accessed 15 January 2017].
6 “18 U.S. Code § 2332b (e) - Acts of Terrorism Transcending National Boundaries” Legal Information Institute, April 24,

1996. Available at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2332b [Accessed 15 January 2017].

7 Martell, D.F. “FBI’s Expanding Role in International Terrorism Investigations” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 56 (11), 1987.

Available at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/107706NCJRS.pdf [Accessed 15 January 2017]. p. 31.

5
PDD-39 was written for and by President Clinton’s administration to organise the US Governments
actions around counterterrorism more efficiently. The directive sets out the key US government
agencies who are responsible for different facets of the US response to terrorism with the FBI being
designated the principal agency for investigations in the US, as well as “The FBI shall have lead
responsibility for investigating terrorist acts...or which are directed at U.S. citizens or institutions
abroad”.8 It is this directive that gives the FBI its capability to operate overseas to counter terrorism
and its threats, which would normally be the primary purview of the US State Department,
highlighting the importance of the directive to the FBI’s presence in Afghanistan.

History of FBI overseas activities before 2001

The next part of the background to the FBI’s foreign operations will be concerned with a brief
introduction to the bureau’s overseas activities and investigations before the invasion of Afghanistan
in 2001.

One of the FBI’s overseas deployments of note was that of the response to the aftermath of the
both the US embassy and Barracks bombings in Beirut during 1983 where FBI forensics technicians
were deployed to provide technical expertise. The deployment of the bureau’s technicians “revealed
the importance of investigations in an effort to obtain evidence for prosecuting terrorists.” 9 This
deployment of the FBI personal highlighted the future role of overseas investigations that the FBI
would soon take.

Another overseas deployment of the FBI was for the investigation into the dual bombings of US
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. The investigation into the attacks led to a considerable FBI
overseas presence with over 900 agents being deployed throughout the investigation.10 The FBI’s
role in the two countries was “to assist in the recovery of evidence and the identification of victims
at the bomb sites and to track down the perpetrators.”11 This experience of operating overseas in
less than ideal conditions would prove to be useful for operations in Afghanistan later on.

The final major overseas deployment for the FBI, before 2001, was for the investigation into the
bombing of the USS Cole in October 2000. The bureau’s role in Yemen was similar to the
investigation in East Africa with the FBI aiming to collect evidence, identify and arrest suspects.12 The

8 President of the United States of America, PDD 39: U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism (Washington D.C.: White House Office,
1995). Available at: https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-39.pdf [Accessed 15 January 2017]. p. 7.
9 Martell, p. 30
10 Federal Bureau of Investigation. “East African Embassy Bombings” July 21, 2016. Available at:

https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/east-african-embassy-bombings [Accessed 16 January 2017].

11 FBI, ‘East African Embassy Bombings’
12 Federal Bureau of Investigation. “USS Cole Bombing” July 24, 2016. Available at: https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-

cases/uss-cole-bombing [Accessed 16 January 2017].

6
difference, however, to the other examples provided previously was that this investigation took
place in a hostile environment where the bureau team had to be protected by the FBI’s Hostage
Rescue Team (HRT) and a contingent of US Marines as well as dealing with attacks against them on a
continuous basis.13 This hostile environment would provide direct experience for the mainly civilian
FBI for operations in Afghanistan only a year later.

The examples given of the FBI’s overseas deployments before 2001 show the FBI’s extensive
previous overseas experience which demonstrates that operating in Afghanistan after 2001 was not
an unexpected event. The examples above also show that the overseas deployments led the FBI to
work with or utilise military support and capabilities, laying groundwork for future cooperation in
Afghanistan. Another commonality of these overseas deployments is that they are responses to acts
of terrorism.

FBI Overseas Capable Elements

The final part of the background of the FBI’s overseas history will be a brief look at two FBI elements
that operate overseas which are Legal Attachés (LEGATs) and the Hostage Rescue Team (HRT).

The first FBI element that will be looked at is the Legal Attachés who are based out of US embassies
and consulates worldwide, whose mission “is to facilitate and support FBI investigative interests in
the overseas arena that pertain to threats against the United States”.14 LEGATs provide two
important roles which are: building relations with local forces and providing law enforcement
coordination between the US and the host country enabling effective investigations which are
important to both countries. The LEGAT program was founded in the 1940’s and there is currently 64
offices spanning the globe.15

The second FBI element that will be looked at in this section is the HRT, which is the FBI’s full-time
counter-terrorism team. Created in 1983 to provide an extra level of protection for the 1984
Olympic Games in Los Angeles after the 1972 Munich Massacre.16 The team’s other missions, apart
from counterterrorism and hostage rescue, include protection of dignitaries and FBI personnel, high
risk raids and importantly for this study, deployments overseas to war zones such as Afghanistan and

13 Graff. p. 263-265.
14 US Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program (Washington D.C., DOJ Office of the
Inspector General, 2004). Available at: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/FBI/a0418/final.pdf [Accessed 15 January 2017]. p. ii.
15 Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Overseas Offices” July 15, 2016. Available at: https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/legal-

attache-offices [Accessed 15 January 2017].

16 Federal Bureau of Investigation. “The Hostage Rescue Team: 30 Years of Service” February 1, 2013. Available at:

https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/the-hostage-rescue-team-30-years-of-service-2 [Accessed 15 January 2017].

7
Iraq where the “agents help troops exploit digital media and other intelligence for follow-on
missions, while also gathering evidence in case a terror suspect is brought back to the U.S.”17

The two overseas units of the FBI show the breadth of capabilities the bureau can deploy overseas
from law enforcement and intelligence advising and support to tactical capabilities that can be
deployed alongside military forces to assist in achieving the military’s objectives. The fact these
elements pre-date 9/11 shows the bureau has only updated its capabilities to deal with the ‘new’
threats to the US from overseas rather than created it from scratch unlike the FBI’s Counterterrorism
Fly Away Team which came into existence in 2002-2003, which is a team that deploys rapidly to
assess the situation, advise incoming bureau personnel on the case and introduce them to key host
country persons.18

Background of the US Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan (2001-2014)

This section of the chapter will give a condensed overview of OEF-A from the invasion in 2001 up to
2014 when the operation was drawn down and replaced with Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. This
brief overview will be split into three section: 2001 to 2002, 2003 to 2008 and finally 2009 to 2014.

2001-2002
The first part of the history of OEF-A will look at the invasion and the situation in Afghanistan
between the invasion and the end of 2002. The US invasion of Afghanistan started on 26th
September 2001, only 15 days after the attacks on September 11th 2001, with the insertion of a
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) team, codenamed JAWBREAKER.19 After the air campaign finished,
US Army Special Forces entered the country and partnered with the Northern Alliance forces who
together pushed back and defeated the Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan with the capture
of Mazar-e Sharif, Kunduz, and Taloqan in the north of the country by the end of November as well
as the capture of Kabul in mid-November with the campaign against the Taliban culminating in the
capture of Kandahar in early December.202122 After the fall of Kandahar, the US and coalition forces
began the battle of Tora Bora where Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda (AQ) fighters had retreated to
and eventually disappeared.23 The last significant part of the 2001-2002 period was Operation

17 Szoldra, P. “The FBI Has Been Secretly Fighting Alongside the US Military in Iraq and Afghanistan” April 10, 2014.
Available at: http://www.businessinsider.com/fbi-jsoc-relationship-2014-4?IR=T [Accessed 15 January 2017].
18 Holcomb, R.W. and Weiss, L.S. Endless Enemies: Inside FBI Counterterrorism, 1st ed. (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books,

2010). p. 201-208.
19 Neville, L. Special Forces in the War on Terror (London, United Kingdom: Osprey Publishing, 2015). p. 23-24
20 Wright, D.P. et al. A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) October

2001–September 2005, (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010) Available at:
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/docs/DifferentKindofWar.pdf [Accessed 31 January 2017]. p. 75-82.
21 Wright et al. p. 97.
22 Wright et al. p. 111-112.
23 Lambeth, B.S. Air Power against Terror: America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom (Santa Monica: Rand, 2001).

p. 146, 149-152.

8
Anaconda in March 2002, which was the attack against the last holdouts of AQ fighters in
Afghanistan resulting in the first American casualties of the war.24 A damaging decision in this period
by the US government was the refusal to support or insert a large peacekeeping force after the
defeat of both the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. This decision would allow the Taliban breathing room to
rebuild and launch an insurgency campaign that remains to this day.25

2003-2008
The second part of the history will look the period between 2003 and 2008. One of the major events
in the 2003-2008 time period for operations in Afghanistan was NATO takeover of the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF)’s command in August 2003, after individual nations had been in
charge of the mission, and remained in control until the end of the mission in 2014.26 Another major
political event that occurred in this time period was creation and adoption of the Afghan
Constitution which then led to Hamid Karzai becoming president, a role that he would remain in
until 2014. The constitution sets out Afghan rights and structures including the legal system, which
would be improved upon later by the FBI and other international organisations and bodies.27

After the major combat operations finished efforts were made to help rebuild Afghanistan including
creating a new Afghan armed forces. One of the rebuilding efforts was the Provincial Reconstruction
Teams (PRT) whose mission it was to “extend the authority of the Afghan central government,
improve security, and promote reconstruction”28 The first PRT started in Gardez in the east of the
country before the effort spread out across the country with the US having lead “thirteen PRTs and
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) directed nine”29 Military reconstruction efforts
focused on the creation of a capable Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) with different training
missions such as the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A) whose aim was to develop the
Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP).30

In 2002/03 the Taliban “began offensive operations to overthrow the Afghan government and
coerce the withdrawal of U.S. and coalition forces” leading to the start of an insurgency campaign

24 Lambeth. p. 191.
25 Fairweather, J. The Good War: Why We Couldn’t Win The War or The Peace in Afghanistan (London: Vintage, 2015). p.
71-74.
26 Yost, D.S. NATO’s Balancing Act, 1st ed. (Arlington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2014). p. 136.
27 Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Kabul, 2004).

Available at: http://www.afghanembassy.com.pl/afg/images/pliki/TheConstitution.pdf [Accessed 01 February 2017]. p. 33-

36.
28 Perito, R.M. The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, (Washington D.C.: United States

Institute of Peace, 2005). Available at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr152.pdf [Accessed 04 February 2017]. p. 2.

29 Perito. p. 1.
30 US Army. “NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan” January 28, 2010. Available at:

https://www.army.mil/article/33702/NATO_Training_Mission_Afghanistan [Accessed 04 February 2017].

9
that would last on after the end of OEF in 2014.31 The insurgency reached a new height in 2006 when
groups hostile to the US, ISAF and the Afghan government began to use IEDs and used suicide
bombing tactics at the highest level that had been seen at that point with “39 suicide terrorist
attacks in Afghanistan in 2006”.32 The lack of significant US ground presence, due in part to a belief
in a small ground footprint and preparations for the invasion of Iraq in 2003, contributed to a
security vacuum that allowed the Taliban to grow in influence throughout most of rural Afghanistan
which allowed the insurgency to flourish.33 This increased insurgency would necessitate changes to
US and coalition forces tactics and strategies in the latter part of the war.

2009-2014
The final part of this history will look at the period from 2009 to the drawdown and the replacement
of OEF-A with Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. One of the major background events that occurred
within this timeframe was the death of Osama Bin Laden in May 2011. Beginning in 2009 under the
Obama administration, a ‘surge’ of 33,000 troops were deployed to Afghanistan to “...allow the
military to protect key parts of the south from Taliban advances; ...would provide a valuable
opportunity to expand the Afghan army, and create...local governments in places were there had
been very little government influence...”.34 The surge would last until 2012 when the last of the
33,000 extra troops left the country. As a result of the surge, the US and ISAF were able to launch
major operations across the country, especially in the southern province of Helmand with
Operations Panther’s Claw and Khanjar in 2009 and Operation Moshtarak in 2010 which had the
primary purpose of securing the areas of Nad Ali, the southern Helmand Valley and Marjah
respectively as well as quelling the insurgency that has operated in these regions.35 The overarching
final event of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan was the drawdown and close down of
missions in country. Each member of ISAF began preparations to and completed their withdrawal
from the country with Canada fully leaving in March 2014, the UK and US handing over the last base,

31 Jones, S.G. “The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency” International Security, 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008). p. 33.
32 Jones. p. 35-36.
33 Jones. p. 24.
34 Chandrasekaren, R. “The Afghan Surge Is Over” Foreign Policy, 2012. Available at:

http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/25/the-afghan-surge-is-over/ [Accessed 1 February 2017].

35 Dressler, J. Operation Moshtarak: Preparing for the Battle of Marjah. (Washington D.C.: Institute for the Study of War,

2010). Available at: http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Operation_Moshtarak_1.pdf [Accessed 02

February 2017].

10
Camp Bastion and Camp Leatherneck respectively, in October 2014 which completed the ISAF
mission and handed over security to the Afghan Forces. 3637

This background section providing the history of the 13 years of operations in Afghanistan between
2001 and 2014 has been provided to help situate the main topic of the dissertation around the
events that were ongoing in country as well as to highlight world events that were also ongoing at
the time which may have impacted the mission, the role and effectiveness of the bureau’s mission in
Afghanistan.

Chapter Conclusions
This chapter has provided a brief introduction to the FBI’s overseas activities, including their legal
basis, examples of pre-2001 investigations and background to two of the FBI’s overseas capable
units, for the purpose of understanding the history and capabilities of the FBI overseas to show this
is not a new phenomenon, and finally this chapter has also provided an essential and brief
introduction to Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan, from its beginnings after the attacks on
9/11 to 2014 when the mission was drawn down, where the central part of this study looks at.

36 The Canadian Press. “Canada’s Flag Lowered as Afghanistan Military Mission Formally Ends” CBC News, March 12, 2014.
Available at: http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/canadian-military-involvement-in-afghanistan-formally-ends-1.2569162
[Accessed 02 February 2017].
37 Johnson, K. “Britain Ends Combat Role in Afghanistan, Last U.S. Marines Hand over Base” Reuters, October 26, 2014.

Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-troopwithdrawal-idUSKBN0IF06I20141026 [Accessed 02

February 2017].

11
FBI In Afghanistan

12
 Chapter 2 – Roles of the FBI in Afghanistan

This chapter will look at and evaluate the roles that the FBI undertook in Afghanistan throughout the
study period. One of the bureau’s central roles in Afghanistan was the collection of information and
actionable intelligence to prevent further attacks on the US Homeland.

The main aim of collecting intelligence for the protection of the homeland has been attempted
through five different methods: interrogations, supporting operations to capture suspects,
Document and Media Exploitation (DOMEX) support, training assistance and liaison with other
agencies to gather intelligence with a US specific focus.38 The methods of supporting capture
operations and DOMEX support will be looked at in the support to military operations, training
assistance will be examined in the capability building part, and finally liaising with other agencies will
be a general theme that will be discussed throughout this chapter. The bureau has also conducted
other roles including countering corruption, conducting investigations and the provision of forensic
support which will all be reviewed in the individual sections within this chapter.

Interrogations
This part of the chapter will focus on the first method of collecting intelligence which is the
conducting of interrogations and FBI support to other agencies conducting interrogations.

Due to the FBI’s experience in conducting investigations, gathering evidence and presenting it to
courts, the military, in the initial invasion of Afghanistan, utilised the Bureau to organise detention
and to carry out interrogations of the ever-increasing numbers of prisoners that were being brought
to detention centres.39 At the same time, the Bureau collected biometric data from the prisoners,
some of which had US criminal records (this role will be looked at in detail in the section on Forensic
Support). The bureau’s interrogations of the majority of prisoners produced very little intelligence
due to the “majority of those detained had been swept up for the bounty money (offered by the US
to Afghan forces)” who had no real intelligence value for protecting the US Homeland.40 The FBI did,
however, develop high-quality intelligence through the interrogations of Ibn al-Shakyh al-Libi, who
ran an al-Qaeda camp provided vital intelligence which stopped attacks across the Middle East,
assisted with investigations into failed attacks on the US homeland and assisted with the launching

38 Federal Bureau of Investigation. Internal FBI Memorandum Re: CTORS/MLDU, FBIHQ-Afghanistan (Washington D.C.:
Federal Bureau of Investigation Counterterrorism Division, 2004). Available at:
https://www.thetorturedatabase.org/document/internal-fbi-memorandum-re-ctorsmldu-fbihq-afghanistan [Accessed 4
March 2017]. p. 4-5.
39 Graff. p. 350-353.
40 Graff. p. 355.

13
of Operation Anaconda.41 Another prominent detainee interrogated by the FBI in Afghanistan was
Ramzi bin al-Shieb who under interrogation provided the link between Khalid Sheikh Mohammad,
who was the planner of 9/11 and the mysterious ‘Mukhtar’ who “every American intelligence agency
had been trying to find out...”42 While these two key interrogations showed the worth of FBI’s role in
interrogations, their bureaus worth would be shown when the CIA took over the prisoners and failed
to get accurate information from them with some of the information being gathered under
‘Enhanced Interrogation Techniques (EIT)’ proving to be false.4344

The bureau’s involvement in the interrogation role was the most controversial as it was ongoing
during the period where EIT was being utilised by the US military and CIA. The issue of being
involved in torture or EIT will be looked at further in this chapter in the section on ethical issues and
will also be briefly reviewed in relation to the bureau’s role in Iraq in chapter four.

Support to Military Operations

One of the roles the bureau has undertaken in Afghanistan in support of military operations is
assisting in Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE). SSE is “activities to preserve, characterize, exploit, and
disable or neutralize analyze information, personnel, and/or material found during the conduct of
operations...” with the element of time being of importance.45 In this role, Bureau Special Agents
and Intelligence Analysts would deploy alongside the military in raids and in the aftermath would
collect information that would help identify or locate suspected terrorists.46 The Bureau also
supported the military with forensic and technical assistance which will be discussed within the
Forensic Support section of this chapter.

Another of the assistance roles provided by the bureau to the military was support to Document and
Media Exploitation (DOMEX) missions which is “The processing, translation, analysis, and
dissemination of collected hard copy documents and electronic media, which are under the U.S.
government’s physical control and are not publicly available.”47 The bureau initially helped the
military with the translation and analysis of captured documents due to the military concentrating

41 Graff. p. 357-358.
42 Holcomb. p. 227-228.
43 Graff. p. 358-360.
44 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and

Interrogation Program (Washington D.C.: Government Publishing Office, 2014). p. 2.

45 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defence Technical Information

Centre, 2014). p. IV-21.

46 Office of the Inspector General, Oversight and Review Division. A Review of the FBI’s Involvement in and Observations of

Detainee Interrogations in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Washington D.C.: US Department of Justice, 2008). p.
21-22.
47 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Intelligence Community Directive Number 302: Document and Media

Exploitation, (Washington D.C.: DNI, 2007). Available at: https://fas.org/irp/dni/icd/icd-302.pdf [Accessed 2 March 2017].
p. 6.

14
on battlefield intelligence and finding “Osama bid Laden and his crew and engage the scattered,
well-hidden enemy”.48 Later the FBI and the DOD joined together under the direction of the
Intelligence Community Directive 302 to create the DOMEX Committee to coordinate and develop
DOMEX capabilities.49 The bureau mainly provided the military with translation capabilities where
the military had few language specialists.

The FBI has also had a role in supporting SOF missions in Afghanistan with the bureau’s HRT being
primarily being used due to their specialist training. HRT agents deployed alongside SOF to assist in
the targeting of Al-Qaeda members.50 HRT also provided SOF with investigative capabilities while
improving the chances of getting charges against the terrorist and insurgent members that were
being captured in these raids.51 This relationship between SOF and the FBI will be looked at further
in chapters four & five.

Other Investigations
Apart from investigations around terrorism and insurgents, the FBI is involved with other
investigations within Afghanistan. One of these investigations included the provision of assistance
after the crash of Pamir Airways Flight 112 in 2010. The FBI is not typically involved in air accident
investigations in the US, but in the country due to American citizens being on the plane, the Bureau
was invited to assist.52 The bureau’s role in this investigation was ‘simply’ to collect bone and tissue
fragments to aid with identification of the bodies so they could be repatriated.53 The reality was the
crash scene was located 14,000 feet above sea level in the Hindu Kush near an area where there had
been Taliban activity.54 This investigation showed the versatility of the bureau's capabilities,
especially in a war zone.

Another significant investigation area for the FBI in Afghanistan is into attacks against US citizens.
One example of this cooperative approach was the investigation into the August 2004 DynCorp

48 Holcomb. p. 288.
49 Office of Director of National Intelligence. p. 4.
50 Watkin, Kenneth. Fighting at the Legal Boundaries: Controlling the Use of Force in Contemporary Conflict (United States:

Oxford University Press, 2016). p. 437.

51 Goldman, A. and Tate, J. “Inside the FBI’s Secret Relationship with the Military’s Special Operations” Washington Post,

April 10, 2014. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/inside-the-fbis-secret-relationship-

with-the-militarys-special-operations/2014/04/10/dcca3460-be84-11e3-b195-dd0c1174052c_story.html [Accessed 23
January 2017].
52 Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Mission Afghanistan: Pamir Air Crash” May 20, 2011. Available at:

https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/mission-afghanistan-pamir-air-crash [Accessed 25 February 2017].

53 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Pamir Air Crash.
54 Roberts, Lt. Col. Gregory A. “From a Mentor’s View: Execution of Pamir Airways Flight 112 Crash Recovery” US Air Forces

Central Command, May 31, 2010. Available at:

http://www.afcent.af.mil/News/Commentaries/Display/tabid/4818/Article/223274/from-a-mentors-view-execution-of-
pamir-airways-flight-112-crash-recovery.aspx [Accessed 25 February 2017].

15
bombing where three Americans were killed; the Bureau assisted in finding those responsible.5556
Another significant example of this is in the aftermath of the attack on the US consulate in Herat in
September 2013 by the Taliban. The Bureau conducted the investigation in conjunction with the
Department of State’s (DOS) law enforcement arm, the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) which also
provides protection to US embassies across the globe.57 These two investigations show that primary
purpose of the Bureau protecting the US, its citizens and property is still a significant role for the FBI
in war zones.58

Contract Corruption Investigations

The bureau has been heavily involved in countering corruption surrounding military contracts in
Afghanistan due to the FBI having primary “responsibility for international corruption and fraud
investigations” under the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.59 The FBI set up and works with the
International Contract Corruption Task Force (ICCTF) “to ensure that contractors and contracting
personnel are held accountable for bribery, theft and other improprieties that illegally divert
taxpayers dollars...”60 The ICCTF is a coalition of federal agencies who work together to counter
corruption showing the FBI’s skill set and how it can apply to operations in Afghanistan.

Contract fraud can produce deadly consequences for the military and the civilian population in
Afghanistan, this is highlighted in the fraud surrounding the culvert denial system, which is place to
prevent under road culverts from being used as hiding places for Improvised Explosive Devices
(IEDs), where a contractor defrauded the government by failing to build the system which resulted in
injuries and deaths.61

The ICCTF and the FBI agents assigned to it have conducted multiple investigations that have led to
convictions. One of the investigations that resulted in convictions was that of a former US soldier
who received bribes of up to $250,000 from Afghan contractors to give them contracts and then
attempted to launder the money back in the US which resulted in him being “sentenced...to 41

55 Morgan, Matthew J. A Democracy Is Born: An Insider’s Account of the Battle against Terrorism in Afghanistan (United
States: Praeger Security International, 2007). p. 41.
56 Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Our New Office in Kabul, Afghanistan” June 21, 2006. Available at:

https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2006/june/kabul_legat062106 [Accessed 25 February 2017].

57 US Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security: Year in Review 2013, (Washington D.C.: US Department of State,

2014). p. 2-4.
58
US Department of Justice. “Organization, Mission and Functions Manual: Federal Bureau of Investigation” September 26,
2014. Available at: https://www.justice.gov/jmd/organization-mission-and-functions-manual-federal-bureau-investigation
[Accessed 25 February 2017].
59 US Department of Justice and US Securities and Exchange Commission, A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt

Practices Act, (Washington D.C.: Government Publishing Office, 2012). p. 5.

60 US Department of Defence Inspector General. Semi-annual Report to the Congress: April 1, 2009 to September 30, 2009

(Washington D.C.: Department of Defence, 2009). p. 30.

61 Sopko, John F. U.S. Challenges in Afghanistan: A Discussion with John Sopko (Washington D.C.: Special Inspector General

for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2015).

16
months and was ordered to forfeit $115,000” showing the effectiveness of the task force and the
Bureau to build cases overseas and convict in the US.62 Another successful case for the Bureau and
the ICCTF was the conviction of a US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) worker, her sister and the
president of a contract firm after an undercover investigation into reported bribery and corruption.
The convicted USACE employee accepted bribes to give favourable contract information to her sister
ensuring that company would get the contracts.6364

The success of the ICCTF is another of the positive roles for the bureau in Afghanistan and also
highlights the cooperation between government agencies and departments that have allowed the
investigation, arrest, and convictions of more individuals and companies that would have happened
without the creation of the ICCTF. The ICCTF also highlights the positive impact of a task force
created to investigate crimes coming out of the US involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Capability/Capacity Building
The next part of this section will look at the bureau’s attempts at capacity building especially the
building of counter corruption capabilities in the Afghan government.

One role of the FBI in Afghanistan was its involvement in capability and capacity building for the Rule
of Law (ROL) and improving the Afghan National Security Forces. The FBI has been involved in efforts
to improve the ANSF to be able to take over control of security in the country when the US and ISAF
personnel have left, this FBI’s efforts in this area were focused around “...coordinating anti-
corruption investigative efforts and professionally training Afghan law enforcement authorities.”65

The Bureau’s major involvement in capacity building was with assistance to the Major Crimes Task
Force (MCTF), which was an Afghan government initiative set up in May 2009 for “investigating and
processing major anti-corruption, kidnapping, and organized crime cases”66 The FBI was involved
only in the training of members of the task force then the provision of legal advice and mentoring, so
that the Afghans could run their own investigations and secure prosecutions by themselves.67 Within

62 US Department of Justice. “Former Army Sergeant Sentenced on His Guilty Plea to Money Laundering Conspiracy
Resulting from Bribes Sergeant Received in Afghanistan.” January 9, 2015. Available at: https://www.justice.gov/usao-
wdtn/pr/former-army-sergeant-sentenced-his-guilty-plea-money-laundering-conspiracy-resulting [Accessed 3 March
2017].
63 Giblin, Paul. “USACE Official in Afghanistan Goes Undercover to Help FBI Snare Contracting Cheats.” April 16, 2010.

Available at:
https://www.army.mil/article/37523/USACE_official_in_Afghanistan_goes_undercover_to_help_FBI_snare_contracting_ch
eats [Accessed 3 March 2017].
64 US Department of Defence Inspector General. p. 31.
65 US Department of State. “Legal Attaché” US Embassy Kabul, N.D. Available at:

https://kabul.usembassy.gov/legalattache.html [Accessed 25 February 2017].

66 Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, U.S. Agencies Have Provided Training and Support

to Afghanistan’s Major Crimes Task Force, but Reporting and Reimbursement Issues Need to Be Addressed, (Arlington, VA:
SIGAR, 2011). p. 1.
67 Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. p. 1.

17
a year of being set up, the MCTF began to have successes in the area of counter corruption with 43
investigations out of 83 being focused on corruption, which shows that the training and support
provided to the task force by the FBI and partners to be of very high quality.68 The task forces role in
countering corruption placed it in direct confrontation with the Karzai administration which caused
its ability to operate effectively to be diminished with the FBI pulling out support for the MCTF in
2012 bringing an end to the bureau’s initially successful attempt at building Afghan capacity for
major crime investigations.69

The political backlash to the task force in the aftermath of the arrest of a close friend of President
Karzai was the main reason for the failure of the capacity building project of the FBI. However, the
bureau’s successful support for the MCTF in its set up and early days shows the FBI’s capability in
capacity building after conflict can produce exceptional results if the political situation is stable
enough and if the drive to counter corruption, kidnapping, and organised crime. Capacity building
will be further looked at in chapter five.

Forensic Support
One of the areas the FBI has been involved with in Afghanistan throughout the 2001 and 2014 study
period has been the provision of biometrics support to the military and other government forces.
Biometrics “is any measurable, robust, distinctive physical characteristic or personal trait that can be
used to identify, or verify the claimed identity of, an individual.”70 These characteristics can include
fingerprints, facial features, iris and retina scans, and hand geometry. The bureau has provided this
support since late 2001 where it went to the Tora Bora region to “...freeze the identities of terrorists
through a traditional law enforcement booking procedure...so the terrorists could always be
identified as such.”71 This mission was the beginning of attempts to ‘freeze’ the identities of the
enemy so that they could be rapidly identified in the future for the protection of both the US
homeland and US deployed forces. The fear of the FBI was that forensic and biometric evidence was
being missed at the scenes of attack that would be “...missed opportunities in the short term to
wage battle better by identifying and neutralizing insurgents on the ground in theatre, and missed
opportunities in the long term to secure the homeland...”72 This capability that is not unique to the
FBI but they brought to the ground in Afghanistan in support of the military operation throughout

68 Cyrus, Stephen A. The Major Crimes Task Force-Afghanistan: A Case Study and Examination of Implications for Future FBI
Capacity Building Programs (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2014). p. 27.
69 Cyrus. p. 31, 37-41.
70 Woodward, Jr., John D., Katharine W. Webb, Elaine M. Newton, Melissa Bradley, and David Rubenson. Army Biometric

Applications: Identifying and Addressing Sociocultural Concerns: 2001 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999). p. 9.
71 Shannon, Paul J. “Fingerprints and the War on Terror: An FBI Perspective.” Joint Forces Quarterly. Issue 43, (October

2006). p. 76.
72 Shannon. p. 80.

18
2001 to 2014 shows the nature of counter-insurgency campaigns requires law enforcement methods
to identify and prevent the insurgents before they become a threat to soldiers on the ground.

Another of the forensic support to forces on the ground was the support to explosives investigations
with one of the efforts being the creation by the FBI and ATF of the Terrorist Explosive Devices
Analytical Centre (TEDAC) whose main purpose is “to coordinate and manage interagency efforts for
gathering and forensically analyzing terrorist IEDs from war zones in Iraq and Afghanistan.”73 The
centre provides expert analysis of IEDs for the DOD forces in war zones of Afghanistan and Iraq with
the main aim being the provision of methods to US forces to be able to defeat the insurgent and
terrorist groups most used weapon.74 The FBI’s role in this area was the investigation of attacks using
explosives in Afghanistan, where the bureau’s Special Agent Bomb Technicians (SABT) were assigned
to the Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell (CEXC) “which deploy small footprint expeditionary
laboratories for the technical exploitation of IEDs and other ordnance...”75 The counter-explosives
role in Afghanistan has allowed the FBI to bring a unique perspective to ground forces by bringing
law enforcement methods and experience to allow the identification and targeting of the bomb
makers responsible for large numbers of US and coalition service deaths.

The TEDAC has provided the military forces across the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq with
effective information to be able to counter insurgent bomb makers, who produce the devices that
caused the highest number of casualties in US and ISAF forces. One unique success of the TEDAC was
when the military utilised an intelligence report from the centre in a targeting the bomb layers when
an “EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare aircraft circling over Afghanistan sent out signals on
frequencies used...to detonate IEDs and managed to trigger an IED in the process of being laid...”76
This effort resulted in the death of the insurgent laying the device, which meant the TEDAC’s work
had produced an enemy kill. This unique success highlights the importance of the FBI counter-IED
role in support of the effort in Afghanistan.

Intelligence Support
With the FBI being a member of the US intelligence community, it has provided intelligence support
to the DOD and other agencies operating in Afghanistan. The Bureau provides intelligence to the

73 Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division, Explosives Investigation Coordination between the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice,
2009). p. 66.
74 Evans, Rob. “Afghanistan War Logs: How the IED Became Taliban’s Weapon of Choice.” The Guardian, July 25, 2010.

Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/25/ieds-improvised-explosive-device-deaths [Accessed 21

February 2017].
75 Smith, Thomas B. and Marc Tranchemontagne. “Understanding the Enemy: The Enduring Value of Technical and Forensic

Exploitation.” Joint Forces Quarterly 75 (2014). p. 123.

76 Graff. p. 475.

19
intelligence community through the INTELINK-S and INTELINK-TS systems.77 For the DOD “the
primary route...to receive FBI intelligence products is through the DIA...” showing the close relations
between the FBI and military intelligence allowing for the select distribution of relevant information
to the warfighter which is the primary job of the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA).78 The main area
of intelligence sharing for the bureau is around counter-terrorism support to the DOD, due to this
being the FBI’s speciality.79 Another important intelligence role of the FBI in relation to Afghanistan is
the TEDAC which also produces information from its forensic analysis of IED’s and other terrorist
devices to alert and update EOD personnel on how to counter the devices that have been found
elsewhere in the country.80 The bureau also maintains links and attached personnel from and to
DOD commands such as Special Operations Command (SOCOM), Joint Special Operations Command
(JSOC), Central Command (CENTCOM) and European Command (EURCOM).81 The FBI’s role in this
area is limited to specialist intelligence products on counter-terrorism and for counter-IED purposes,
which results in the DOD being able to leverage specialist support to its operational goals. This
highlights the FBI’s unique capabilities being effectively used where other expertise and capabilities
are not available.

Conclusions on Roles of FBI

The roles undertaken by the FBI in Afghanistan have highlighted the versatility that a federal law
enforcement agency can bring to a war zone. The roles that have been described in this section have
been relatively successful, bar the Major Crimes Task Force which failed due to political events in
Afghanistan, which shows the impact of the bureau was not felt at the strategic level of operations
but at the operational and tactical levels, i.e. with the warfighters.

Chapter Conclusions
This first chapter of the main part of the dissertation has looked at the roles & effectiveness of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s involvement in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014.

The first distinct area looked at two components which were first the roles of the bureau in
Afghanistan, with most of the roles showing that the FBI did not provide any strategic, operational or
tactical ‘Midas touch’ which might have helped to win the counter-insurgency campaign or even

77 US Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Able Danger and Intelligence Information Sharing, (Washington: Government
Publishing Office, 2005). Available at: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg25409/pdf/CHRG-109shrg25409.pdf
[Accessed 22 February 2017]. p. 50.
78 US Senate Committee on the Judiciary. p. 51.
79 US Senate Committee on the Judiciary. p. 50.
80 Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division. p. 66.
81 US Senate Committee on the Judiciary. p. 49.

20
speed up its end, rather the bureau brought specialist capability which enhanced the military force's
mission in the war as shown with roles in forensic and C-IED support. These roles provided a
specialist capability that the military could not bring or provide itself due to the roles being
associated with law enforcement, who have practiced and improved their tradecraft within that
speciality. The bureau’s roles in Afghanistan have generally been successful and have provided
positive benefits for the DOD and the US government as a whole, apart from the Major Crimes Task
Force which showed capabilities for the bureau in capacity building around the ROL but the initiative
failed due to the political situation in on the ground preventing the MCTF from completing its
mission. The role in interrogations despite being successful in some cases proved to be a major thorn
in the bureau's side from the legal and ethical side of being near to the CIA’s EIT program. The
bureau has mixed effect for its overriding objective of protecting the US homeland with intelligence
collection providing warnings to preventing attacks, but the other roles have limited impact on
protecting the US.

The chapter has shown that the FBI provide a unique capability to operations in war zones. This is
especially true in areas the military does regularly conduct training or operations where a law
enforcement agency provides an extra capability. The edge provided by the bureau assisted the
military but did not prove to be a game changer. The next chapter will look at the challenges and
issues the bureau has faced due to its operations in Afghanistan.

21
 Chapter 3 - Issues and Challenges from the FBI’s presence in
Afghanistan

This chapter will look at challenges and issues that have arisen for the bureau due to its presence in
the war zone in Afghanistan. The problems that will be looked include ethical issues, training &
preparedness challenges, legal issues, and other issues focused on FBI personnel.

Ethical Issues
This first section of the chapter looks at the ethical issues that have arisen from the FBI’s
deployment to Afghanistan. It looks at ethical issues around the bureau’s involvement near torture.

One of the major ethical issues the bureau faced in the early phase of the deployment to
Afghanistan was due to FBI agents being nearby or around during the torture or EIT of suspects. In
Afghanistan, the bureau often had to share interrogation spaces with the CIA and military
interrogators who utilised ‘hard’ interrogation tactics which could have opened up the bureau to
claims of complicity with the tactics. This also raised the issue: should FBI agents participate in
interrogations where these tactics were used?82 And then is it ethical to receive or hand over
detainees who have been or may be recipients of the ‘hard’ measures? Another ethical issue around
torture was the fear of bureau agents being used unknowingly being pulled into “Good cop-bad cop
scenarios” by the military for them to try to gain more information.83

The FBI’s handbooks and guidelines strictly forbid the collection of information or confessions
through the usage of violence or intimidation.84 The bureau advised agents in the field to follow
guidelines and try to provide some standard of treatment to the detainees.85 FBI agents and staff
involved in joint interrogations were also advised to leave interrogations if the personnel from other
agencies did not follow their guidelines or standards and potentially follow up incidents by reporting
them to senior agents and supervisors.86

82 Federal Bureau of Investigation. “FBI Afghanistan Operational Issues” (Washington D.C.: Federal Bureau of Investigation
Office of the General Consul, 2004). p. 1.
83 Caproni, Valerie. “Internal FBI Email re: Battlefield Advice” (Washington D.C.: Federal Bureau of Investigation Office of

the General Counsel, 2004).

84 Office of the Inspector General, Oversight and Review Division. Detainees. p. 47-48.
85 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of the General Counsel. “Treatment of Prisoners and Detainees” (Washington

D.C.: Federal Bureau of Investigation Office of the General Counsel, 2004). p. 1.

86 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of the General Counsel. p. 2.

22
The advice and guidelines followed by FBI agents and staff in the field did not prevent EIT measures
being used against detainees, but it prevented Bureau personnel from being involved in illegal
activities that could have resulted in arrests and jail time in the future.

Training & Preparedness

This section of the chapter looks at issues and challenges around training of bureau agents and
personnel for deployments to war zones and equipping them for combat.

Another of the challenges and issues for the FBI surrounds training agents and other staff to be able
to operate in war zones such as Afghanistan. Before 2004, the agents and staff who deployed to
Afghanistan had no combat training, except for agents within HRT and Special Weapons and Tactics
(SWAT) teams.87 In 2004, the bureau decided to create a training program that would prepare staff
for deployments to Afghanistan where they might be attached to military forces going into combat.
The training focused on skills such as cultural awareness, the FBI’s role, understanding of other units
in theatre, evidence collection, EOD knowledge, force protection (including shooting policies),
firearms training and Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) training.88

A smaller but just as vital issue for the bureau is around equipping FBI agents and staff for
operations in Afghanistan. The deployment of a civilian agency into war zone initially was difficult
with agents deployed having body armour that “would not stop a round from an AK-47...” or those
who were deployed needed body armour and gas masks to be shipped to them.89 This highlighted
the significant changes that would need to occur to ensure the bureau’s staff were prepared for war
zones. The DOJ ‘war’ supplement request for 2007 shows that $3.7 million was requested to be able
to “to provide adequate protective equipment to FBI personnel” which included a request for more
funding for combat capabilities including more weapons, ammunition and gunsmith services due to
high levels of combat operations.90 These equipment issues highlight the problems for agencies
whose main work is in civilian areas and also importantly shows the changes that occurred at the
bureau from a peacetime agency to one on a war footing.

87 Graff. p. 350.
88 Federal Bureau of Investigation. ‘Request to establish a pre-deployment training program for FBI personnel who deploy
to Afghanistan’ (Washington D.C.: Federal Bureau of Investigation Counterterrorism Division, 2004).
89 Holcomb. p. 212-213.
90 US Department of Justice. “FY 2007 War Supplemental + $173.5 million (New Enhancements)” (Washington D.C.:

Department of Justice, 2007). p. 5.

23
Legal Issues
This section of the chapter looks at the legal issues and challenges that have arisen from the
bureau's deployment between 2001 and 2014. The section looks at the issues of Mirandization and
rules of engagement (ROEs).

One of legal matters faced by the bureau is whether to Mirandize suspects as required under US law
or to use a different local legal rights system. Miranda Rights are required in US law for evidence
from interrogations to be admissible in court.91 There are arguments over Miranda Rights being
issued to suspects in foreign nations with some arguing that the suspects must be Mirandized and
others claim that Miranda Rights are not always needed in overseas interrogations.92 For FBI agents
in Afghanistan in the early phase of operations, this caused some issues with agents not wanting to
Mirandize every suspect due to unknown crimes when they had been brought in and mainly for the
reason that “if someone did ask for a lawyer...where exactly was Knowles (FBI Agent) supposed to
find a public defender?”93 This highlights the difficulties of federal agents operating in foreign war
zones in locations that have little to no formal justice systems.

The other major legal issue the bureau has faced from operations in Afghanistan relates to rules of
engagement. The main issue around ROEs is the FBI’s policy surrounding deadly force which states
that agents “may use deadly force only when necessary, that is, when the officer has a reasonable
belief that the subject of such force poses an imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to
the officer or to another person”94 These rule of engagement create problems when FBI agents
deploy alongside the military, especially SOF, who may use deadly force immediately rather than
attempt arrest. The FBI looked into changing the ROE’s due to events in Afghanistan and Iraq with
HRT members being attached to combat missions but ultimately kept the rules the same as the team
members were not military operators, rather they were attached personnel only.95

Other Challenges
The penultimate section looks at the issue of false overtime claims by agents and staff of the FBI
during their deployments to Afghanistan.

91 Miranda Rights include the right of remaining silent, advising that any statements made can be used in court against the
suspect, and that the suspect has a right to attorney. These rights can be waived by the suspect. See Rogers et al. ‘An
Analysis of Miranda Warnings and Waivers: Comprehension and Coverage’ Law and Human Behavior, 31(2), 2007 for a
more detailed coverage of the rights.
92 Schneider, Jessica. “Right to Miranda Warnings Overseas: Why the Supreme Court Should Prescribe a Detailed Set of

Warnings for American Investigators Abroad” Connecticut Journal of International Law 25(2), 2010. p. 460-463.
93 Graff. p. 355.
94 Office of the Inspector General. ‘A Review of the September 2005 Shooting Incident Involving the Federal Bureau of

Investigation and Filiberto Ojeda Ríos’ (Washington D.C.: US Department of Justice, 2006). p. 89.
95
Goldman and Tate.

24
One of the other challenges that the FBI has faced in Afghanistan surrounds false overtime claims for
bureau personnel in the country. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) received complaints from
within the country that personnel were claiming excessive overtime when often they were doing
other activities than work.96 This problem emerged due to a decision where “...scheduled overtime
had been approved for employees working in support of the September 11 investigations.”97 This
issue highlights the problem of a civilian federal agency that has specific rules and regulations that
are effective in the US but fail in war zones like Afghanistan due to the different operating
environment and the constant mission cycle in the country.

Chapter Conclusions
This chapter has shown the ethical issues and challenges the bureau has faced due to operations in
Afghanistan which have affected the bureau’s ability to support the US military in theatre effectively.
These challenges, especially the legal and preparedness issues, highlight the difficulties for
federal/civilian agencies that operate in war zones in support of the military operations and national
policy goals. The next chapter will look at other overseas FBI activities and operations to see if the
mission in Afghanistan was a one off or is part of a new trend for the bureau in the post-9/11 world.

96 Office of the Inspector General, Oversight and Review Division. ‘An Investigation of Overtime Payments to FBI and Other
Department of Justice Employees Deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan’ (Washington D.C.: US Department of Justice, 2008). p.
69-71.
97 Office of the Inspector General, Oversight and Review Division. ‘Overtime Payments’. p. 68.

25
FBI Activities Elsewhere & Future

26
 Chapter 4 – Other FBI Overseas Activities

This chapter will focus on the FBI’s other overseas activities and operations between 2001 and 2014
to analyse if the operation in Afghanistan was a one-off or a new trend for the bureau in the post
9/11 world. The chapter will briefly look at the FBI’s role in Iraq from 2003 onwards, the FBI’s role in
the capture of two terrorist suspects in Libya alongside military forces, and finally support to counter
piracy missions near to Somalia.

Iraq
One of the FBI’s long-term overseas activity in the same period as its involvement in Afghanistan was
its support to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and operations afterwards. During the invasion phase
the bureau’s primary role was to collect and analyse information from the Iraqi Intelligence Service
(IIS) and information relating to threats to the US homeland. This is laid out in Operational Order
(OPORD) 1015 which stated the FBI will aim to “exploit all Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) sites and
personnel for information regarding planned terrorist attacks in the United States...and to gather
intelligence related to other matters of U.S. national security.”98 After the Invasion, the FBI
concentrated on three areas which were: detainee interviews, collection of biometrics data and the
participation in Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) missions with the military as well as a secondary role
of supporting criminal investigations of bombings and murders in Baghdad and across the rest of
Iraq.99 The FBI’s role in Iraq was similar to its roles in Afghanistan showing a consistency of what the
FBI can and cannot do in war zones with the bureau in both conflicts mainly assisting the military
with its operations. Some of these continuations include the deployment of HRT Special Agents to
SOF teams to assist them on raids with specialist law enforcement and investigative skills.100 The
bureau also provided assistance to the military forces with the agents preparing “three-by-five cards
outlining intelligence priorities...so that when troops questioned Iraqi prisoners and citizens so they
could attempt to collect intelligence quickly”101 Both of these case highlight the continuity of roles
between the two war zones.

98 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Operational Order 1015, (Washington D.C.: Federal Bureau of Investigation
Counterterrorism Division, 2003). Available at:
https://www.thetorturedatabase.org/files/foia_subsite/pdfs/dojoig014027.pdf [Accessed 25 January 2017]. p. 2.
99 Office of the Inspector General, Oversight and Review Division. p. 35-38
100 Graff. p. 465
101 Graff. p. 436.

27
Libya Arrests
Two of the bureau’s overseas missions that highlights the changing role of the FBI in the post-9/11
world is the involvement of the HRT agents supporting the captures of Abu Anas Al Libi and Ahmed
Abu Khattala with US special operations forces across Libya in Tripoli (2013) and Benghazi (2014).
The operation to capture Al Libi occurred in a Tripoli on October 5th, 2013. Al Libi was wanted for his
role in the 1998 East African embassy bombings, which the FBI’s role in investigating was looked at
in chapter 1.102 The raid in Benghazi in June 2014, targeted Khattala, who is believed to be one of the
leaders of the attack against the US Special Mission Compound in Benghazi in 2012, to be arrested
and brought to trial.103104 Both of the raids are a continuation of the FBI’s connections and working
relation with JSOC and other SOF units that have been built up since 9/11. The raid also shows the
growing importance of the bringing terror suspects to federal court in the US, which is where the
FBI’s presence makes the most sense as they can “preserve evidence and maintain a chain of
custody should any suspect be transferred to the United States for trial.”105 Both of these operations
highlights the growing importance of federal law enforcement experience being required to support
the military and national security goals.

Support to Countering Piracy

Another smaller role of the FBI overseas was its support to the attempted rescue of four American
hostages aboard a yacht, the S/V Quest, in February 2011. After the hostages were taken, FBI
personnel, one HRT agent and a crisis negotiator, were dispatched to the Gulf of Aden to potentially
rescue the four hostages but they were murdered aboard the vessel before any rescue attempt
could be made.106 The bureau agents in support to the military moved to secure the crime scene,
arrested the surviving pirates and then began to process the crime scene allowing the hijackers to be
sentenced in a court.107 This adaptability of the bureau and its agents highlights the positive value
the FBI can bring to the modern combat and challenging international environment.

Chapter Conclusion
This chapter has shown that the FBI has been increasingly involved across the globe in the post-9/11
era at the same time as their operations and activities of the bureau in Afghanistan for the purpose

102 Kirkpatrick, D.D. “Al-Liby Capture, a Long Wait for U.S.” The Hindu, October 6, 2013. Available at:
http://www.thehindu.com/news/alliby-capture-a-long-wait-for-us/article5207084.ece [Accessed 30 January 2017].
103 The Soufan Group. “TSG IntelBrief: Catch and Remand: The Capture of Abu Khattala.” June 18, 2014. Available at:

http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-catch-and-remand-the-capture-of-abu-khattala/ [Accessed 23 January 2017].

104 60 Minutes. “Why the FBI Embeds with U.S. Troops Overseas” 0:45-1:05. [YouTube Video] October 5, 2014. Available at:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yoNQ8DUhHsQ [Accessed 23 January 2017].

105 Goldman and Tate.
106
Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Hostage Rescue Team: Mission in the Gulf of Aden.” December 15, 2016. Available at:
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/hostage-rescue-team-mission-in-the-gulf-of-aden [Accessed 26 February 2017].
107 Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Hostage Rescue Team: Mission in the Gulf of Aden”

28
of actively defending the US homeland from threats of terrorism, as opposed to the operations
described in Chapter 1 where the FBI was responding to incidents. This change highlights the new
trend and changing of strategy under the FBI director Robert Mueller to counter threats. The
operations in Iraq exposed issues for a domestic federal law enforcement agency, especially after
allegations and proven cases of abuse emerged which would and should raise concerns for future
overseas activities for the FBI. These concerns are also raised in chapter 3 on issues and challenges
for the bureau in Afghanistan.

This chapter has also shown the increased scope of involvement of the bureau in the major events
the US military has been involved in since 2001, highlighting the FBI and DOD increased working
relationship. The next chapter will look at the future implications of the bureau’s overseas
deployments and activities.

29
 Chapter 5 – Implications for the Future

The final chapter of the dissertation will consider the implications of the Federal Bureau of
Investigations role in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014 as well as its roles elsewhere in the same
period to identify if the deployment of FBI personnel can provide a positive impact on overseas
operations. The chapter will first look at what the future will be for the future of bureau’s overseas
operations and the move on to discuss the impact the FBI can provide to future military operations,
especially to SOF-led operations.

Future of Overseas Operations

The FBI’s role in overseas operations looks secure for the future due to two significant factors:
successful support to overseas operations and the need for specialist skills in global hotspots.

The first factor is important as the bureau has shown through its support to activities and operations
throughout the globe during 2001 to 2014. The success for the bureau include bringing terrorists,
who have targeted the US or its citizens, to justice (see Libya arrests and support to counter piracy in
chapter 4), conducting successful investigations into contract fraud saving the US government
potentially millions of dollars (see combating contract fraud in chapter 2) and supporting CIED
efforts across the conflict zones (see forensic support in chapter 2). These successes show the
adaptability and versatility of the bureau in conditions that traditional law enforcement agencies
could not handle. The only real failure for the bureau was around the capacity building where it
should not be counted as a failure for the bureau as the issue was down to the Major Crimes Task
Force collapsing due to the political situation in Afghanistan. These successes should ensure that the
bureau will continue to undertake and support international operations into the foreseeable future.

The second factor supports the first and can stand alone as the FBI’s specialist abilities needed for
the successes throughout period under study, but the bureau has continued to utilise its specialist
skills to aid the US internationally this can be shown in the bureau’s deployment to Kenya in the
aftermath of the Westgate mall attack in Nairobi to support the law enforcement in country.108 The
bureau has also utilised its skills to counter the terrorist organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL) attempts to raise funds through the theft and sale of antiquities in Iraq and Syria, which

108
Federal Bureau of Investigation. “On the Ground in Kenya, Part 2: Terror at the Westgate Mall” January 10, 2014.
Available at: https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/on-the-ground-in-kenya-part-2 [Accessed 8 March 2017].

30
highlights another area the bureau can provide it specialist skills for counterterrorism purposes
overseas.109

Future for FBI support to military operations

A significant theme that has repeatedly come up throughout this study is the relationship between
the FBI and US Military with a focus on the bureau’s support to military’s operations throughout the
study period. The utility of the FBI to the military becomes evident in the statements of senior
officers in the US military with one General calling up Washington and saying “You’ve got to help
me; they’re trying to take my FBI agents away!” and General Petraeus also complimented the
bureau’s specialist capabilities that it brought to Afghanistan.110111 These anecdotal cases highlight
the importance of the bureau in the eyes of the military which receives specialist help such as
forensic support to counter IEDs and help to identify suspects, the ability to gather evidence and
testify in court, and support in finding terrorists and insurgents through DOMEX and other
intelligence techniques.

One of the key parts of the relationship between the bureau and military has been through the FBI
HRT and US military’s SOF teams. This relationship has grown from basic support in the Afghan
theatre to full attachment of HRT agents to JSOC and Tier 1 Special Forces units in combat
operations beyond the front line (the Libya arrests are case in point) highlighting the mutual
relationship between the two entities who both benefit from it.

The successes of the bureau in its support to the military and positive reaction from the military,
show that the bureau will continue to operate alongside the military, conventional and special
operations forces, for the foreseeable future as both groups have seen the benefit either provides to
each other’s missions.

Chapter Conclusions
This chapter has shown that the FBI’s future in overseas operations is generally secure and looking
bright due to the success of its role in Afghanistan and elsewhere throughout 2001 to 2014. The
future will depend on differing factors which include and are not limited to: continuing
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, the need for law enforcement means to

109 Cavaliere, Victoria. “FBI warns U.S. art dealers about antiquities looted from Syria, Iraq” August 27, 2015. Available at:
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fbi-antiquities-idUSKCN0QW0O420150827 [Accessed 8 March 2017].
110 Bowman, M.E. “Case Study 8: Counterterrorism Activities of the FBI: At Home and Abroad” Institute for National

Strategic Studies Center for Technology and National Security Policy Case Studies. (Washington D.C.: INSS, 2007). p. 1.
111 Federal Bureau of Investigation. “The FBI's Role in a War Zone”. 1:58-2:11. [YouTube Video] May 18, 2011. Available at:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F6nWnGg2m0g&t=1s [Accessed 8 March 2017].

31
remove threats and the continuing threat from IEDs. Another area that will most likely see the most
future growth will be the working relationship between the bureau and US military with the
relationship between HRT and SOF being key. The relationship between the two entities brings
separate skill sets and capabilities that both can and cannot do, combining them to produce effects
for the US government and its national security.

32
 Conclusions

This dissertation has looked at the roles and effectiveness of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in
Afghanistan throughout the period of 2001 to 2014. This dissertation has also looked at the
challenges and issues that the FBI has faced from operations in the country as well as looking at
other overseas activities and operations that the bureau has been involved in. The future of FBI
operations and the relationship between the bureau and the US military has also been looked at.

This dissertation has shown that the FBI is a force multiplier for the US government rather than
being a game changer. This evident from the bureau’s successful activities in Afghanistan and
elsewhere with successes in providing forensic support to Counter-IED efforts to supporting military
operations. The bureau has suffered setbacks in training and capacity building which emerged from
the political situation rather than a purely FBI failure. The activities discussed in chapter 2 and 4
show the effectiveness of the bureau overseas. However, these events did not provide any grand
strategic effect, and their successes affected local area events.

The dissertation has highlighted the development of the bureau’s overseas capability from it early
overseas investigations into acts of terrorism in the Middle East to directly operating alongside the
military and special operations forces in combat zones and other high-risk areas, all of which
highlights the changes following 9/11 and shows how the bureau has adapted to the challenges
posed in the aftermath. The background, study period and further operations not only show how
effective law enforcement can be when deployed in support of national and military goals but they
also show how events across the globe act as a catalyst for change within national security services.

The study has also looked at and shown the challenges and issues the bureau has faced from
overseas operations and seen the effects they have produced on the bureau. There have been
numerous different challenges, from ethical issues raising major questions for a law enforcement
agency such as torture and legal challenges such as matters of procedure to ensure information from
interrogations can be used in court. The bureau has also faced issues faced by most organisations
such as overtime pay fraud issues to issues faced by organisations deploying personnel to war zones
such as lack of equipment. These challenges and issues have caused the bureau to adapt and
overcome to ensure the continued success of operations.

Finally, the dissertation has shown the relationship between the FBI and the US Military which has
been a successful partnership between the two that has allowed for successes, such as the capture
of wanted suspects in Libya. The future of this relationship looks to be secure due to the advantages

33
both gain out of cooperation. The partnership has allowed for civilian law enforcement to be
brought to the battlefield and present the warfighters with an advantage over their enemies.

Overall, the dissertation has shown that the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s role in the War on
Terror and more specifically in Afghanistan, while it has been widely unknown to the general public,
has been generally successful in support of the military operations in Operation Enduring Freedom
Afghanistan and more generally in the war on terror as it has provided different capabilities to
counter the threats faced in the post-9/11 warzones. With international threats such as ISIL and
resurgence from Al-Qaeda, the FBI skill set that it has developed over the 13 years are set for the
coming future as are the challenges and issues it has faced.

34
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- US Department of Justice. “FY 2007 War Supplemental + $173.5 million (New Enhancements)” (Washington D.C.:
Department of Justice, 2007). Available at:
https://www.justice.gov/archive/jmd/2008factsheets/pdf/0809_war_supplemental.pdf [Accessed 7 March 2017].
- US Department of State. Bureau of Diplomatic Security: Year in Review 2013, (Washington D.C.: US Department of State,
2014). Available at: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/225841.pdf [Accessed 25 February 2017].
- Wright, Donald P, James R Bird, Steven E Clay, Peter W Connors, LTC. Scott C Farquhar, Lynne Chandler Garcia, and Dennis
F Van Wey. A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) October 2001–
September 2005, (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010) Available at:
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/docs/DifferentKindofWar.pdf [Accessed 31 January 2017].

Speeches
- Sopko, John F. U.S. Challenges in Afghanistan: A Discussion with John Sopko (Washington D.C.: Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2015). Available at:
https://www.sigar.mil/newsroom/ReadFile.aspx?SSR=7&SubSSR=29&File=speeches/15/SIGAR_Brown_Speech.html
[Accessed 03 March 2017].

Videos
- Federal Bureau of Investigation. “The FBI's Role in a War Zone.” 1:58-2:11. [YouTube Video] May 18, 2011. Available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F6nWnGg2m0g&t=1s [Accessed 8 March 2017].
- Federal Bureau of Investigation. “FBI Trains for War-Zone Deployments” 0:56-1:24. [YouTube video] December 10, 2010.
Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZEFnjb9Lyr8 [Accessed 7 March 2017].
- 60 Minutes. “Why the FBI Embeds with U.S. Troops Overseas” 0:45-1:05. [YouTube Video] October 5, 2014. Available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yoNQ8DUhHsQ [Accessed 23 January 2017].

Websites
- Chandrasekaren, Rajiv. “The Afghan Surge Is Over.” Foreign Policy, 2012. Available at:
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/25/the-afghan-surge-is-over/ [Accessed 1 February 2017].

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- Federal Bureau of Investigation. ‘Mission Afghanistan: A Model for the Future - Part 8: Legat Kabul and the International
Fusion Cell’ June 7, 2011. Available at: https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/mission-afghanistan-a-model-for-the-future
[Accessed 5 February 2017].
- Federal Bureau of Investigation. “East African Embassy Bombings” July 21, 2016. Available at:
https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/east-african-embassy-bombings [Accessed 16 January 2017].
- Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Hostage Rescue Team: Mission in the Gulf of Aden.” December 15, 2016. Available at:
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/hostage-rescue-team-mission-in-the-gulf-of-aden [Accessed 26 February 2017].
- Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Mission Afghanistan: Pamir Air Crash.” May 20, 2011. Available at:
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/mission-afghanistan-pamir-air-crash [Accessed 25 February 2017].
- Federal Bureau of Investigation. “On the Ground in Kenya, Part 2: Terror at the Westgate Mall” January 10, 2014.
Available at: https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/on-the-ground-in-kenya-part-2 [Accessed 8 March 2017].
- Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Our New Office in Kabul, Afghanistan.” June 21, 2006. Available at:
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2006/june/kabul_legat062106 [Accessed 25 February 2017].
- Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Overseas Offices” July 15, 2016. Available at: https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/legal-
attache-offices [Accessed 15 January 2017].
- Federal Bureau of Investigation. “The Hostage Rescue Team: 30 Years of Service” February 1, 2013. Available at:
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/the-hostage-rescue-team-30-years-of-service-2 [Accessed 15 January 2017].
- Federal Bureau of Investigation. “USS Cole Bombing” July 24, 2016. Available at: https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-
cases/uss-cole-bombing [Accessed 16 January 2017].
- Roberts, Lt. Col. Gregory A. “From a Mentor’s View: Execution of Pamir Airways Flight 112 Crash Recovery.” US Air Forces
Central Command, May 31, 2010. Available at:
http://www.afcent.af.mil/News/Commentaries/Display/tabid/4818/Article/223274/from-a-mentors-view-execution-of-
pamir-airways-flight-112-crash-recovery.aspx [Accessed 25 February 2017].
- The Soufan Group. “TSG IntelBrief: Catch and Remand: The Capture of Abu Khattala.” June 18, 2014. Available at:
http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-catch-and-remand-the-capture-of-abu-khattala/ [Accessed 23 January 2017].
- US Army. “NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan.” January 28, 2010. Available at:
https://www.army.mil/article/33702/NATO_Training_Mission_Afghanistan [Accessed 04 February 2017].
- US Department of Justice. “Former Army Sergeant Sentenced on His Guilty Plea to Money Laundering Conspiracy Resulting
from Bribes Sergeant Received in Afghanistan.” January 9, 2015. Available at: https://www.justice.gov/usao-
wdtn/pr/former-army-sergeant-sentenced-his-guilty-plea-money-laundering-conspiracy-resulting [Accessed 3 March
2017].
- US Department of Justice. “Organization, Mission and Functions Manual: Federal Bureau of Investigation” September 26,
2014. Available at: https://www.justice.gov/jmd/organization-mission-and-functions-manual-federal-bureau-investigation
[Accessed 25 February 2017].
- US Department of State. “Legal Attaché.” US Embassy Kabul, N.D. Available at:
https://kabul.usembassy.gov/legalattache.html [Accessed 25 February 2017].

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