ALL Lima-Peru 2017-11-27 30 Op

IEC 61850 course with practical
demonstrations and hands-on
Lima, NM Lima Hotel

San Isidro 15073
27 – 30 November 2017
organized by
NAKAMA SOLUCIONES
S.A.C
Andrea Bonetti Karlheinz Schwarz

FMTP Power AB NettedAutomation GmbH
Knivsbrunna 31 Im Eichbaeumle 108
75598 UPPSALA D-76139 Karlsruhe
SWEDEN Germany
Tel +46705750214 Tel +49-721-684844
Fax+46184951068 Fax +49-721-679387
www.fmtppower.com www.nettedautomation.com
www.blog.iec61850.com
andrea.bonetti@fmtppower.com karlheinz.schwarz@nettedautomation.com

4 DAYS IEC 61850 COURSE

WITH PRACTICAL DEMONSTRATIONS AND HANDS ON
MR. KARLHEINZ SCHWARZ (NETTEDAUTOMATION), MR. ANDREA BONETTI (FMTP)
With focus on protection and control in HV/MV substations

using GOOSE, SV, SCADA and SCL Language
All the presentations are supported by practical examples or demonstrations.
Please note: The following Program blocs may be re-dispatched at different time during the week.
The training schedule is from 9:00 to 17:30, Morning break 11:00 Lunch 13:00 to 14:00, afternoon break
15:30
Detailed Program:

Registration
Welcome and introduction to the seminar.
Presentation of the teachers and organizations.
A1 Smart Grid and IEC 61850
02:00 Status of Smart Grid
(Karlheinz Schwarz) Role of the Communication Structure in Smart Grid systems
Role of IEC 61850 in Smart Grid systems
A2 Introduction to the IEC 61850 standard
04:30 Introduction of basic concepts (information modeling, information models, information exchange,
(Karlheinz Schwarz) system configuration)
History of the Standard: from the 90’s to 2016
Structure of the IEC 61850 standard documentation, Edition 1, Edition 2, Edition 2.1, Edition 3…
Lessons learned and what to expect in the near future

Basics of IEC 61850 mapping and modelling, SCL language
Modelling concept in IEC 61850, Logical Nodes, Logical Devices, SCL language, types of SCL files,
type of IEC 61850 documents (PICS, PIXIT…).

Communication services GOOSE, SV, File Exchange: Protocol understanding and encoding
A3 IEC 61850 Vertical Communication, Client/Server
03:30 Communication services MMS, COMMANDS, REPORTS:
(Karlheinz Schwarz) Protocol understanding and encoding. Network analysis and
Testing Client/Server Publisher/Subscriber. Vertical
communication, "engineering of SCADA System".
Importance of event driven reporting. Signal list to the SCADA
System. Report Control blocks.
Communication between substations and remote control center
(IEC 60870‐5‐104, DNP3)
How to build and configure Gateways from IEC 61850 to IEC 60870‐5‐104

Lima, NM Lima Hotel, Av. Pardo y Aliaga N° 330, Informes e inscripciones:
San Isidro 15073 NAKAMA SOLUCIONES S.A.C.
Del 27 al 30 de Noviembre del 2017. +51-1-3460426 / 997266827
Horario: De 09:00 a 17:30 horas. capacitaciones@nakama.com.pe
Vacantes limitadas

A4 Group Practical Exercise.
1:30 Participants will have a chance to run practical exercises of IEC 61850 modelling, reporting, logging,
(Karlheinz Schwarz) retrieving self‐description etc. An evaluation package will be provided to every participant in
advance to the training course. This training requires a Windows PC with .net framework and the
possibility to install and run communication software. We will help to install and run the package
onsite (e.g., immediately after closing the first course day).
SCL Language in details.
A5 Fundamentals of the SCL Language. Use
2:30 cases for SCL language
(Karlheinz Schwarz) Different types of SCL files

B1 Impact of IEC 61850 Standard on Substation Automation Protection and Control.
2:30 Substation automation protection and control
(Andrea Bonetti) philosophy, vertical (MMS) and horizontal
communication (GOOSE, SV), protection schemes,
interlocking. IEC

61850 engineering process.

B2
3:00 Real time performances for protection schemes, horizontal communication.
(Andrea Bonetti) Different types of GOOSE messages for different types of
"substation signals.
Protection security and dependability with IEC 61850
GOOSE and conventional technologies.
What is important to remember to specify.

B3 Process Bus and implications for the protection community
2:30 Process Bus (sampled values) today and expectations for the future.
(Andrea Bonetti) Interoperability, responsibility and testability. The role of different IEC committees: IEC TC 57
(Power systems management and associated
information exchange), TC 95 (Measuring relays and
protection equipment) and TC 38 (Instrument
transformers).

Groups Practical Exercise.
Investigate on process bus SV Streams.
Understand time synchronization of the Merging Units

B4 IEC 61850 Network topologies and redundancy
1:30 Redundancy YES or NO? When? RSTP,
(Andrea Bonetti) PRP, HSR
Examples from today’s substations

IEC 61850 Network topologies Communication Study
Communication study to assist the design and validate the
Quality of Service of the network topology.
Network Study for Communication in the substation and between substations

Vacantes limitadas

B5 IEC 61850 Testing for commissioning and maintenance activities.
3:00 Which kind of test equipment are available, test tools, how to
(Andrea Bonetti) use them. PROs and CONs, Feedback from IEC 61850 FAT
tests in substations.

Group Practical Exercise.
Measure the response time of protection schemes with GOOSE
messages.

Interoperability problems and solutions.
Feedback from commissioning activities in the substations: which types of problems have been
met, how they have been discovered and which solutions have been found.

Group Practical Exercise.
Investigate (and solve) an interoperability problem in GOOSE
communication scheme

Disturbance Recorder Logical Node.
Maintenance substation tests based on post‐fault analysis
B6 Engineering process with third party IEC 61850 Engineering Tools
2:30 Specification process
(Andrea Bonetti) Top Down Engineering
Bottom Up Engineering

B8 Real time testing of power systems in IEC 61850 environment
1:30 Introduction about OPAL‐RT Real‐time application and IED closed‐
(Andrea Bonetti) loop testing

Question & Answer time
Discussion Forum
End of the Seminar
All the presentations are supported by practical examples or demonstrations.

Vacantes limitadas
IEC 61850 Seminar and Training
S-0000 – Welcome and Opening NettedAutomation
GmbH
Information & Communication Systems
IEC 61850 –
Communication networks and systems
for power utility automation
Introduction to the Energy

Delivery System, Series IEC 61850,
and Market Situation
Karlheinz Schwarz, SCC

Karlsruhe (Germany)
schwarz@scc-online.de
NettedAutomation
GmbH
© 2004-2017 NettedAutomation
Welcome to the NettedAutomation Training Center
Copyright, 2017-07, Michael Hüter
NettedAutomation
Page 2 © 2004-2017 NettedAutomation GmbH
Brief
introduction to Before we start
IEC 61850
■ IEC 61850 is not just another protocol!
NettedAutomation
Smart People for Smart Grids. Page S-0000-1
IEC 61850 Course, Lima/Peru, 27.-30.11.2017 -- (c) FMTP/NA Page 7

GmbH
Content
■ Trainer
■ About the future
■ Organizational issues
■ Hybrid Delivery Systems
■ Power Delivery System and Information
Container, Information Logistics
■ Standardization
■ What does IEC 61850 provide?
■ Applications and Market
■ International Projects and Roadmaps
■ General Observations
NettedAutomation
Welcome Trainer
Dipl.-Ing. Karlheinz Schwarz

 Independent consultant for automation and communication
systems since 1992 (SCC & owner of NettedAutomation GmbH)
 Some 20 years background in industrial automation (Siemens)
 Experience in communication, utility applications and automation systems (AS-i,
Field busses, UCA, TASE.2, IEC 61850, IEC 61400-25, MMS, …)
 Experience and active in testing, certification and quality assurance
 Based in Karlsruhe/Germany
 Email: schwarz@scc-online.de; http://blog.iec61850.com
 Editor of IEC 61850 and IEC 61400-25 (wind power plants)
 Member of IEC TC 57 WG 10 (IEC 61850 Core), WG 17 (DER),
WG 18 (Hydro power plants), WG 19 (Long term Interoperability in TC 57)
 Member of IEC TC 88 PT 25 (IEC 61400-25-1 to 5, wind power)
 Project leader of IEC TC 88 PT 25-6 (IEC 61400-25-6, condition monitoring)
 Consultant to several utility projects related to IEC 61850
 Experienced in training on IEC 61850 and related issues
NettedAutomation
Welcome Organisational issues (1)
 Program: see hand-out folder

 Most slides presented will be provided electronically
 Most slides are updated to Edition 2 of the core parts
 Ask questions during presentations
 Contact the trainer during breaks and after the sessions
 Use these days to talk to as much people as possible (meet the
other people)
 Give feedback on what you like and what you don‘t
 It is not allowed to record the presentations and discussions (neither
audio nor video)
 Please note the copyright on all slides. You are not allowed to
make any copies of these slides or distribute them.
NettedAutomation

GmbH
Welcome Organisational issues (2)
A list of 5000+ Abbreviations related to IEC 61850 and IEC 61400-25 can be
found here:
http://blog.iec61850.com/2013/08/list-of-5000-abbreviations-in-iec-61850.html
<<Abbreviations_2017-03-10.pdf>> in the package
A list of Logical Nodes can be found here:

http://www.nettedautomation.com/standardization/IEC_TC57/WG10-
12/iec61850/models/LNs_2012-07-20_o.pdf
35 Minutes Video on IEC 61850:

http://blog.iec61850.com/2014/03/iec-61850-at-hannover-messe-2014.html
NettedAutomation Experience and Background:

http://nettedautomation.com/download/Sem/fra14/General-Training.pdf
NettedAutomation
Energy Delivery System
 Hybrid Energy Delivery:

 Electricity Grid (Power System)
 Gas Grid
 Heat Grid
 Transportation „Grid“
 Energy Lab KIT
NettedAutomation
Brief
introduction to Hybrid Grid: Power, Gas, Transportation, and Heat
IEC 61850
NettedAutomation

GmbH
Brief
introduction to
IEC 61850
R&D for Energy Systems
2015: Dr. Düpmeier, KIT, Institute for Applied Computer Science (IAI)
http://www.energieinformatik2015.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/1_D%C3%BCpmeier_DACH-Presentation_public.pdf
NettedAutomation
Key Elements of IEC 61850
■ Elements of the Power System

■ Experience of the 1970s (optional)
■ Standardized Containers for Goods and
Information
■ (Information) Logistics with IEC 61850
■ Container and Designation
■ Designations in IEC 61850
■ Logical Nodes (Container) for
Substations, Decentralized Energy
Resources, Hydro Power, Condition
Monitoring, …
■ All Information Containers in UML
■ System Topology
NettedAutomation
Brief
introduction to Key Elements of IEC 61850
IEC 61850
■ Elements of the Power System

■ Standardized Containers for Goods and Information
■ (Information) Logistics with IEC 61850
■ Container and Designation
■ Designations in IEC 61850
■ Logical Nodes (Container) for Substations, Decentralized
Energy Resources, Hydro Power, Condition Monitoring, …
■ All Information Containers in UML
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intermodal_container
NettedAutomation

GmbH
Brief
introduction to
IEC 61850
Elements of the Power System
Transmission Substation Transmission Distribution
Substation
Measuring, Monitoring, Protecting, Controlling,

Optimizing, ... to keep the Power Flowing and the
Grass Green
HEV
Generation Renewable Generation Customer
NettedAutomation
Brief
introduction to Standardized Container (1)
IEC 61850
ISO 668 - Series, freight containers —

Classification, dimensions and ratings
is an ISO international standard which classifies
intermodal freight shipping containers and
standardizes their size and weight specifications.
NettedAutomation
Brief
IEC 61850
ISO 6346 is an international standard covering

the coding, identification and marking of
intermodal (shipping) containers
Owner Code
The owner code consists of three capital letters of the Latin
alphabet to indicate the owner or principal operator of the
container. Such code needs to be registered.
Equipment Category Identifier
The equipment category identifier consists of one of the
following capital letters of the Latin alphabet:
U for all freight containers, J for detachable freight container-
related equipment, Z for trailers and chassis
Serial Number
The serial number consists of 6 numeric digits, assigned by
the owner or operator, uniquely identifying the container
within that owner/operator's fleet.
Check Digit
NettedAutomation

GmbH
Brief
IEC 61850
Standardized Information Container

for Power Systems
NettedAutomation
Brief
IEC 61850
■ IEC 61850 and IEC 61400-25 define international

standards covering the identification, designation,
location, transportation, and documentation of
power system information.
SS8/380kV/Bay5
Information Container
ABC
[Hz, PPV, PNV, PhV, A, W, ...]

report above [container of container]
measured at SS8/380kV/Bay5 to control
center ABC at every minute via link xyz.
See example demo
NettedAutomation
Brief
IEC 61850
Delivery Note Delivery Note

for packing for unpacking
(SCL per IEC 61850-6): (SCL per IEC 61850-6):
• Sender • Sender
• Receiver • Receiver
• List of Contained • List of Contained
information information
SS8/380kV/Bay5
Information Container
ABC
[Hz, PPV, PNV, PhV, A, W, ...]

report above [container of container]
measured at SS8/380kV/Bay5 to control
center ABC at every minute via link xyz.
NettedAutomation

GmbH
Brief
introduction to Prevent the many conversions
IEC 61850
NettedAutomation
Brief
introduction to (Information) Logistics with IEC 61850
IEC 61850
open
■ Logistics is generally the detailed

organization and implementation
of a complex operation.
■ In a general business sense, logistics
is the management of the flow of
things between the point of origin
and the point of consumption in
order to meet requirements of
customers or corporations. Trip
■ The resources managed in logistics
can include physical items such as
food, materials, animals, equipment,
and liquids [and energy]; as well as
abstract items, such as time and
information. time
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logistics
NettedAutomation
Information
exchange Voltage definiton and designations
NettedAutomation

GmbH
Information
exchange Many designations and many communication solutions
Modbus A*
en voltage
Spannung Skal.
fr tension tension float32 V addr=1 int16 0.1
ar (‫ﺟﻬﺩ )ﻛﻬﺭﺑﺎﺋﻲ‬،‫ﺟﻬﺩ‬
2 int16 0.1
de Spannung Spannung int32 kV
es tensión (eléctrica) 3 int16 0.1
fi jännite jännite int16 V
it tensione (elettrica) Modbus X*
ja 電圧,U（記号）
no spenning
jännite
spenning int32 kV
pl napięcie elektryczne 27182 float32
pt tensão (eléctrica) tensão int32 V 27183 float32
ru напряжение
sv spänning A 27184 float32
B
C
V V V jännite
* Or from any other communication
or local application.
http://www.electropedia.org/iev/iev.nsf/display?openform&ievref=121-11-27
NettedAutomation
Information
exchange ONE designation and ONE communication solutions (1)
Information
Container
(Logical Node) 61850-7-x
en voltage One STANDARD
fr tension Container (Model) for all MMXU
ar (‫ﺟﻬﺩ )ﻛﻬﺭﺑﺎﺋﻲ‬،‫ﺟﻬﺩ‬ communication use-cases
de Spannung PhV
es tensión (eléctrica) phsA
fi jännite
it tensione (elettrica) instCVal.mag.i
ja 電圧,U（記号） q
no spenning t
pl napięcie elektryczne units
pt tensão (eléctrica)
SIUnit
ru напряжение
sv spänning multiplier
A
B magSVC
C
scale
V V V jännite offset
NettedAutomation
Information
Modbus A
Spannung Skal.
Read register 1
addr=1 int16 0.1  2390
2 int16 0.1
3 int16 0.1 ?
Modbus X
jännite
Read register 27182
27182 float32  239
27183 float32
27184 float32 ? A
B
C
V V V
NettedAutomation

GmbH
Information
61850-7-x
MMXU
PhV
phsA
Read MMXU.PhV.phsA.instCVal.mag.i
 2390 instCVal.mag.i
q
t
Standard designations! units
All Names are standardized! SIUnit=V
mult=0
A
B magSVC
C
scale=0.1
V V V
offset=0
NettedAutomation
Information
61850-7-x
MMXU
PhV
Read MMXU.PhV.phsA [Measurements: FC=MX] phsA
 2390, good, 2014-11-10 13:31
instCVal.mag.i
q
Read MMXU.PhV.phsA.instCVal.mag.i
t FC=MX
 2390
units
SIUnit=V
mult=0
magSVC
scale=0.1
offset=0
NettedAutomation
Information
61850-7-x
Retrieve Selfdescription MMXU
MMXU
 MMXU.PhV.phsA.instCal.mag.i
 MMXU.PhV.phsA.q PhV
 MMXU.PhV.phsA.t
phsA
 MMXU.PhV.phsA.units
 MMXU.PhV.phsA.magSVC instCVal.mag.i
q
t FC=MX
Read MMXU units
 MMXU.PhV.phsA.instCal.mag.i = 2390 SIUnit=V

 MMXU.PhV.phsA.q = good mult=0
 MMXU.PhV.phsA.t = 2014-11-10 13:31
magSVC
 MMXU.PhV.phsA.units = V / 10**0
 MMXU.PhV.phsA.magSVC = 0.1 / 0 scale=0.1
offset=0
NettedAutomation

GmbH
Brief
introduction to Original Scope: Electric Substations (IEC 61850-7-4)
IEC 61850
Secondary
system:
Protection,
Control, Metering, PTOF
Monitoring, ...
Gas insulated
substation
Air insulated XCBR

substation
Primary
system
MMXU
NettedAutomation
Brief
introduction to Logical Nodes for Electric Substations (IEC 61850-7-4)
IEC 61850
Differential PDIF Environmental information MENV

Direction comparison PDIR Flicker Measurement Name MFLK
Distance PDIS Harmonics or interharmonics MHAI
Directional overpower PDOP Non phase related harmonics or interharmonics MHAN
Directional underpower PDUP Hydrological information MHYD
Rate of change of frequency PFRC DC measurement MMDC
Harmonic restraint PHAR Meteorological information MMET
Ground detector PHIZ Metering MMTN
Instantaneous overcurrent PIOC Metering MMTR
Motor restart inhibition PMRI Non phase related Measurement MMXN
Motor starting time supervision PMSS Measurement MMXU
Over power factor POPF Sequence and imbalance MSQI
Phase angle measuring PPAM Metering Statistics MSTA
Rotor protection PRTR Environmental information MENV
Protection scheme PSCH Hydrological information MHYD
Sensitive directional earthfault PSDE DC measurement MMDC
Transient earth fault PTEF Meteorological information MMET
Tyristor protection PTHF Fuel characteristics MFUL
Time overcurrent PTOC Pressure measurements MPRS
Overfrequency PTOF Heat measured values MHET
Overvoltage PTOV Flow measurements MFLW
Protection trip conditioning PTRC Emissions measurements MENV
Thermal overload PTTR
Undercurrent PTUC Frequency Variation QFVR
Underfrequency PTUF Current Transient QITR
Undervoltage PTUV Current Unbalance Variation QIUB
Underpower factor PUPF Voltage Transien QVTR
Voltage controlled time overcurrent PVOC Voltage Unbalance Variation QVUB
Volts per Hz PVPH Voltage Variation QVVR
Zero speed or underspeed PZSU
Rotor protection PRTR ...
Thyristor protection PTHF 160+
NettedAutomation
Brief
introduction to
Extended Scope: Wind Turbines and Photo Voltaic
IEC 61850 (IEC 61400-25 and IEC 61850-7-420)
Wind Turbines:
Protection,
Control,
Metering,
Monitoring, ...
Photo Voltaic:
Protection,
WTUR
Control,
Metering,
Monitoring, ...
DPVM
NettedAutomation

GmbH
Brief
Logical Nodes for Wind and DER
introduction to
IEC 61850 (IEC 61400-25 and IEC 61850-7-420)
Wind turbine general information WTUR DER plant corporate characteristics at the ECP DCRP
Wind turbine rotor information WROT Operational characteristics at ECP DOPR
DER operational authority at the ECP DOPA
Wind turbine transmission information WTRM
Operating mode at ECP DOPM
Wind turbine generator information WGEN Status information at the ECP DPST
Wind turbine converter information WCNV DER economic dispatch parameters DCCT
Wind turbine transformer information WTRF DER energy and/or ancillary services schedule control DSCC
Wind turbine nacelle information WNAC DER energy and/or ancillary services schedule DSCH
Wind turbine yawing information WYAW DER controller characteristics DRCT
Wind turbine tower information WTOW DER controller status DRCS
Wind power plant meteorological information WMET DER supervisory control DRCC
DER unit generator DGEN
Wind power plant alarm information WALM
DER generator ratings DRAT
Wind turbine state log information WSLG DER advanced generator ratings DRAZ
Wind turbine analogue log information WALG Generator cost DCST
Wind turbine report information WREP Excitation ratings DREX
Wind power plant active power control information WAPC Excitation DEXC
Wind power plant reactive power control information WRPC Speed/Frequency Controller DSFC
Reciprocating Engine DCIP
Fuel cell controller DFCL
15 Fuel cell stack DSTK
Fuel processing module DFPM
Photovoltaics module ratings DPVM
Photovoltaics array characteristics DPVA
Photovoltaics array controller DPVC
Tracking controller DTRC
CHP system controller DCHC
Thermal storage DCTS
Boiler DCHB
Reciprocating Engine DCIP
Fuel cell controller DFCL
Fuel delivery system DFLV
Battery Management System DBMS
Battery Stack DBAS
35+ Battery Module DBAM
NettedAutomation
Brief
introduction to IEC 61850-90-7 (Inverter functions) – very special
IEC 61850
Example of hysteresis in volt-VAr curves

NettedAutomation
Brief
introduction to Performance of Photovoltaics (PV) in Germany
IEC 61850
http://www.sma.de/en/company/pv-electricity-produced-in-germany.html
NettedAutomation

GmbH
Brief
introduction to Performance of Photovoltaics TransnetBW (Germany)
IEC 61850
https://www.transnetbw.de/de/kennzahlen/erneuerbare-energien/fotovoltaik/
NettedAutomation
Brief
introduction to Photovoltaics (PV) at home
IEC 61850
10 kWp on our roof in

Karlsruhe:
generated 53,54 kWh
21-Apr-2017
NettedAutomation
Brief
introduction to Extended Scope: Hydro Power Plants (IEC 61850-7-410)
IEC 61850
HGTE
NettedAutomation

GmbH
Brief
introduction to Logical Nodes for Hydro Power (IEC 61850-7-410)
IEC 61850
Control mode selection ACTM Dam overtopping protection HOTP

Joint control function AJCL Water reservoir HRES
PSS Control Common information of a PSS function APSS Start / stop sequencer HSEQ
PSS 2A/B filter APST Speed monitoring HSPD
PSS 4B filter APSF
Surge shaft or surge tank HSST
Heart beat function of a controlling device FHBT
Guide vanes (wicket gate) HTGV
Scheduler This LN represents a task scheduler FSCH
Runner blades HTRB
Functional priority status FXPS
Trash rack HTRK
Turbine – generator shaft bearing HBRG
Turbine HTUR
Combinator (3D CAM or 2D CAM) HCOM
Hydropower production unit HUNT
Hydropower dam HDAM
Deflector control HDFL Valve HVLV
Dam leakage supervision HDLS Water control function HWCL
Electrical brake HEBR Generic fire detection and alarm function IFIR
Gate position indicator HGPI Generic physical human – machine interface IHND
Governor control HGOV Heater KHTR
Dam gate HGTE Rotor protection PRTR
Intake gate HITG Field breaker configuration RFBC
Power plant joint control function HJCL Media flow supervision SFLW
Leakage supervision HLKG Media level supervision SLEV
Water level indicator HLVL Device position supervision 30+ SPOS
Mechanical brake for the generator shaft HMBR Media pressure supervision SPRS
Needle control HNDL Field flashing XFFL
Net head data HNHD
45+
NettedAutomation
Brief
introduction to Extended Scope: Conventional Power Plants (IEC 61850-7-410)
IEC 61850
ESTU
NettedAutomation
Brief
introduction to Extended Scope: Transformer Monitoring (IEC 61850-7-4)
IEC 61850
SIML
NettedAutomation

GmbH
Brief
introduction to Extended Scope: Switchgear Monitoring (IEC 61850-7-4)
IEC 61850
Switch Gear
SCBR
NettedAutomation
Brief
introduction to Extended Scope: Transformer Monitoring (IEC 61850-7-4)
IEC 61850
Supervision
Insulation
Medium Gas,
e.g., SF6
SIMG
NettedAutomation
Brief
introduction to Extended Scope: Cable Monitoring (IEC 61850-90-3)
IEC 61850
ZCAB
Power Cable
NettedAutomation

GmbH
Brief
introduction to Extended Scope: Overhead Line Monitoring (IEC 61850-90-3)
IEC 61850
Insulator Condition:
• Corona Line Condition:
• Leak Current • Line current and
direction
Meteorological info: • Line Temperature
• Wind Velocity and • Line Inclination
Direction • GPS Information
• Humidity and Ambient (Latitude, Longitude,
Temperature Altitude)
• Rain fail
• Snowfall
• Sunshine
Tower Condition:
• Salt
• Tension
• Tower Frame
Inclination
• Tower Base Frame
Sensors:
Inclination
• Acoustic/Leakage/Corona
• Current
• Temperature
• Slope
• Location
• Tension
• Frame Corrosive ZLIN
• Earth Corrosive
• Leakage Current
•…
NettedAutomation
Brief
introduction to
IEC 61850
All Logical Nodes in UML
NettedAutomation
IEC 61850 Standardization
■ Title and Scope

■ Objectives
■ Re-Use
■ One Power System – Two Models
■ History and WG 10
■ Parts of IEC 61850, IEC 61400-25
■ Editions (principle concept)
NettedAutomation

GmbH
IEC 61850
in brief Title and scope of IEC 61850 (IEC TC 57 WG 10, 17, 18)
■ IEC TC 57 project IEC 61850 started in 1995

■ Old title and Scope ሺ൏ 2007):
– Communication networks and systems
in substations
■ New title and Scope (൒ 2007ሻ:
– Communication networks and systems
for power utility automation
■ Standard series comprises 28 parts (2016-09)
■ 23 drafts (2016-10)
NettedAutomation
History U.S. and IEC activities leading to IEC 61850

EPRI IEEE TR 1550
- implementation
UCA 1.0 - experience UCA 2.0
MAP, - new requirements NIST
MMS, - ...
SGIP
FBus
(2011)
ICCP
1985 1990 1995 1998 2000
Inter Control-center IEC 60870-6-503
Communication, IEC 60870-6-802
TASE.2
Substation, ... IEC 61850-x-y
Wind Power Plant IEC 61400-25
Telecontrol IEC 60870-5-10x
http://nettedautomation.com/download/pub/Fieldbus-std-another-way-to-go_1991.pdf
http://nettedautomation.com/download/pub/Bridging-MAP-to-Ethernet_1991.pdf
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IEC 61850
Status,
Application
Scope of Technical Committee 57
Power systems management and associated

information exchange
■ Power system control equipment and Control within
systems, including ■ control centers
– EMS (energy management systems) ■ substations
– SCADA
■ Individual pieces of
– distribution automation
primary equipment
– teleprotection
including
■ associated information exchange, used in ■ interfaces to equipment,
– planning systems and databases
– operation outside the scope of
– maintenance TC57
Chairman: Thierry Lefebvre, RTE (FR)

Secretary: Heiko Englert, Siemens (DE)
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GmbH
IEC activities
in power Working Groups of TC57
systems
■ WG03: Telecontrol equipment and systems – telecontrol protocols [AT]

■ WG07: Telecontrol protocols compatible with ISO and ITU-T standards [US]
■ WG10: Power system IED communication and associated data models
(1995 – today) [CH]
■ WG13: Energy mgmt. system appl. program interface (EMS - API) [US]
■ WG14: System interfaces for distribution management (SIDM) [US]
■ WG15: Power system control and associated communications –
Data and communication security [US]
■ WG16: Framework for energy market communication [US]
■ WG17: Comm. systems for distributed energy resources (DER) [US]
■ WG18: Hydroelectric power plants – Comm. for monitoring and control [SE]
■ WG19: Interoperability within TC57 in the long term (SS-CC,
Reference Architecture, TF Smart Grid, …) [US]
■ WG20: Planning of power line carrier systems [UK]
■ WG21: System interfaces and communication protocol profiles
relevant for systems connected to the Smart Grid [DE]
[XX] = Convenor from national committee XX
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IEC 61850
in brief Most Meetings of IEC TC 57 WG 10 (1995-2016)
1 Aegeri_2002-12 21 Burgthann 7 98 41 Mackinaw_2013-09 61 Seattle_7_99

2 Ann_Arbor_12_98 22 Calgary 1 Juli 97 42 Madison_2003-09 62 Seoul_2007-04
3 Ann_Arbor_2000_08 23 Cathedral-City_2016-02 43 Merida-Mex_2006-03 63 Steckborn_2001-09
4 Ann_Arbor_2000_10 24 Charlotte_2005-12 44 Mexico-City_2013-02 64 Stockholm 6 98
5 Ann-Arbor_2005-04 25 Chicago_2000_04 45 Montpellier_2008-05 65 Stockholm_2004-04
6 Antibes 10 98 26 Cocoa_Beach_2001_01 46 Montpellier_2014-02 66 Stockholm_2015-02
7 Antibes_3_99 27 Crans-Mantana_2011-09 47 Montreal_2004-07 67 St-Petersburg_2013-06
8 Arnhem_2003-06 28 Detroit_2001-06 48 Moskau_2010-10 68 Tampa Febr 98
9 Arnhem_2006-10 29 Edinbourgh Okt 97 49 Nimes_2004-11 69 Tampa_2010-03
10 Atlanta 1 98 30 Feldkirch_2001-3 50 Nuremberg_2006-06 70 Tokio_2014-11
11 Atlanta 9 98 31 Fredericia_DK_2008-02 51 Orlando_3_2000 71 Toronto_2010-06
12 Baden_2002-07 32 Glasgow_2016-10 52 Philadelphia_2001-10 72 Valencia_2000_11
13 Baden_2003-04 33 Grenoble_2009-02 53 Porto_2012-01 73 Weggis_2000_12
14 Baden_2004-02 34 Helsinki_2002-08 54 Quebec_2007-09 74 Wien_2009-06
15 Baden_2005-08 35 Houston_2012-10-29 55 Quebec-City_2014-06 75 Zug_2002-01
16 Berlin_2012-05-21 36 Livonia_2002-05 56 Raleigh_2002-03 76 Zug_2007-07
17 Bilbao_2009-11 37 Livonia_2002-06 57 Regina_2015-06 77 Zug_2008-03
18 Brisbane_2011-02 38 Livonia_2002-11 58 Rom_2016-06 78 Zürich_2000_11
19 Brussels_2015-10 39 Livonia_2003-06 59 San Diego 3 98 79 Zürich_2004-10
20 BuenosAires_2008-11 40 Livonia_2006-12 60 San-Diego_2007-02
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IEC 61850
in brief IEC TC 57 WG 10 Members
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GmbH
IEC 61850
in brief Objectives of IEC 61850
■ Simplify the integration of devices and functions from

different manufacturers (design and engineering of system
and configuration, and inter-operability of devices).
■ Define and re-use models for topology of systems, …
signals and calculated values:
Substation220_Karlsruhe5_Bay4/Meas/MyMMXU1.PhV – electrical values,
e.g., phase voltage of specific spot → 4.000+ defined (2015)
■ Topology awareness (e.g., CSWI3 is operating Circuit Breaker in Bay5)

■ Reduce the number of communication protocols in
automation systems for electrical substations.
■ Unified exchange of all information in/for power systems.
■ Apply native international communication standards.
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Re-use of
IEC 61850 Re-use
Power Decentralized Wind Hydro Control Substation to Many other

Quality Energy Power Power Center to Substation applications
Monitoring Resources Plants Plants Substation in process:
Cond. Monitoring,
IEC IEC Conv. Power P.,
EV, Batteries,
61850-7-420 61850-7-410 IEC 61850 Distr. Automation,
...
IEC 61850-7-4 IEC 61400-25 IEC 61850 IEC 61850

…
IEC 61850 extensions 2009/2015
IEC 61850: 1995 - 2004/2005

Substations (focus in 1995: High Voltage)
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Brief
introduction to
IEC 61850
IEC 61850 applicable to many applications
CIM Model
Market
CIM – Common Information Model
(IEC 61968/70)
Enterprise CIM / 61850
1 harmonization
CIM / COSEM
Operation 2 harmonization
2
1 COSEM / 61850
3 harmonization
Station
3 Field
61850 Model
Process
COSEM
Model
Customer
Generation Transmission Distribution DER
premise COSEM = Companion Specification
for Energy Metering (IEC 62056)
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GmbH
Brief
introduction to
IEC 61850
One Power System two models
One Power System
IED and RT Simulator
fed by 61850 SCL Model
for HW‐in‐the‐loop‐test
CC Trainings
Simulator fed by
CIM Model
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Content and
structure of The Parts of IEC 61850-x-y (1)
IEC 61850
System Aspects Data Models und usage of models
1 Introduction and Overview 7-3 Common Data Classes
2 Glossary
7-4 Compatible Logical Node and Data Classes
3 General Requirements (EMC, …)
4 System and Project Management 7-410 Hydroelectric power plants
5 Comm. Requirements for Functions and Device 7-420 Distributed energy resources (DER)
Models (reaction time …) 7-5 Use of logical nodes for SAS applications
7-500 Use of LN to model functions (SAS)
Configuration
7-510 Use of LN (hydro power plants)
6 Configuration Language for electrical Substation
IED’s (App., IEDs, System, …) 7-520 Use of LN (DER)
Abstract Comm. Services

7-1 Principles and Models
7-2 Abstract Communication Services (ACSI)
Mapping to real Comm. Networks (SCSM)

8-1 Mapping to MMS and ISO/IEC 8802-3
8-2 Mapping to web-services
9-2 Sampled Values over ISO/IEC 8802-3
9-3 Precision time protocol profile for power utility
automation
Testing
10 Conformance Testing
10-210 Interoperability test for hydro equipment based on
IEC 61850 Status: 2015-02-13: black=Ed1 of a specific part
10-3 Testing – Functional testing of IEC 61850 based blue=Ed2 of a specific part
systems italics = draft
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Content and
IEC 61850
80-1 CDC-based data model using IEC 60870-5-10x

80-2 Mapping IEEE 1815 (DNP3) to IEC 61850 Objects
80-3 Mapping to Web Services – Requirement Analysis and Technology Assessment
80-4 Mapping between the DLMS/COSEM (IEC 62056) data models and the IEC 61850 data models
80-5 Mapping between Modbus and IEC 61850
90-1 Using IEC 61850 for SS-SS communication
90-2 Using IEC 61850 for SS-CC communication
90-3 Using IEC 61850 for Condition Monitoring
90-4 Network Engineering Guidelines
90-410 Comm. network structures in hydro power plants
90-5 Exchange of synchrophasor information
90-6 Use of IEC 61850 for Distribution Automation
90-7 Object models for PV and other DER inverters
90-8 Object Models for Electrical Transportation
90-9 Object Models for Batteries
90-10 Object Models for Schedules
90-11 Modeling of logics
90-12 Wide area network engineering guidelines
90-14 Using IEC 61850 for FACTS data modelling
90-15 Hierarchical DER system model
Status: 2015-02-13:
90-16 System Management black=Ed1 of a specific part
90-17 Use of IEC 61850 to transmit Power Quality Data blue=Ed2 of a specific part
90-18 Alarm handling italics = draft
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Content and
IEC 61850
90-19 Using Role Based Access Control (RBAC) and IEC 61850 (TR) [accepted 2016-09]
90-20 Guideline to redundancy systems (TR) [proposed 2016-09] proposal
6XX Configuration description language for communication in power utility automation systems related
to Human Machine Interfaces (IS) [proposed 2016-09]
7-6 Guideline for definition of Basic Application Profiles (BAPs) using IEC 61850 [discussed 2016-10]
7-7 Machine-processable format of IEC 61850-related data models for tools (TS) [proposed 2016-09]
90-13 Deterministic Networking Technologies for IEC 61850 based Power System IED communication
(TS) [proposed 2016-12-02; based on TSN – Time Sensitive Network, IEEE Std 802.1]
… more to come
Status: 2016-12-03:
black=Ed1 of a specific part
blue=Ed2 of a specific part
italics = draft
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Content and
structure of Parts of IEC 61400-25-x (Wind Turbines)
IEC 61850
IEC 61400-25-1 Ed2 – Overall description of principles and models

IEC 61400-25-2 Ed2 – Information models
IEC 61400-25-3 Ed2 – Information exchange models
IEC 61400-25-4 Ed2 – Mapping to communication profile (IEC 61850-8-1 MMS, IEC 60870-5-104, DNP3,
OPC XML DA, Web services) … OPC UA ?
IEC 61400-25-5 Ed2 – Conformance testing
IEC 61400-25-5 Ed2 – Logical node classes and data classes for condition monitoring
… more to come
Status: 2016-12-03:
black=Ed1 of a specific part
blue=Ed2 of a specific part
italics = draft
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Content and
structure of The Core Parts of IEC 61850-x-y (1)
IEC 61850
Philosophy of the new architecture

and content of the other parts
61850-1 Introduction and overview [30 pages] List of Terms used in other part
Quality requirements,
61850-2 Glossary [45] Environmental conditions,
EMC/EMI, Temp range, …
61850-3 General Requirements [150] Life cycle context like product

versions, discontinuation, support
after discontinuation
61850-4 System and project management [75]
General requirements, What is a
Logical Node, Logical
communication links, benefits,
61850-5 Communication requirements [140] functions, PICOMs, etc.
Language based on XML,

61850-6 System configuration language [220] configuration of Single Line
Diagram, parameters of the IEDs,
communication configurations,
relationships between IEDs, etc.
Carry configuration data between
engineering and configuration tools
of different manufacturers.
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Content and
structure of The Core Parts of IEC 61850-x-y (2)
IEC 61850
7-1: Basics of modeling [150]

61850-7 Basics for power utility automation [630] 7-2: Abstract services [215]
7-3: Common Data Classes [90]
7-4: Many LNs and DOs [180]
61850-8 Specific service mapping [190]
Mapping of most Services and

61850-9 Specific service mapping SMV [65] models to MMS and GOOSE to
Ethernet
61850-10 Conformance testing [100]

Mapping of Sampled Value
Exchange to Ethernet
Core parts: 1,600+ pages
Basics of Conformance testing
as input to UCAIUG Testing
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IEC 61850
in brief Editions in the series IEC 61850
■ Communication networks and systems

in substations Edition 1
■ Communication networks and systems

for power utility automation Edition 1 Edition 2 Edition 3
Edition 2.1
6, 7-x, 8-1
Parts 1 … 10
Parts 1 … 10 (14) Parts 1 … 10
Parts 7-410, 7-420 Parts 7-410, 7-420
Parts 90-x Parts 90-x
Parts 7-50x Parts 7-50x
Parts xx-yy Parts xx-yy
Series IEC 61850
2005…2007 … 2009 2012-07 Time not to scale!
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What does IEC 61850 provide?
■ Crucial objectives of IEC 61850

■ First example of application
■ First example of application –
modeling
■ First example of application –
communication
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GmbH
IEC 61850
in brief Crucial objectives of IEC 61850
■ Model Information of/about real world

(Status, Measurements, Settings, Control,…;
System Configuration Language: single line diagram,
function related information – SCL)
■ When to exchange values?
(Configuration of IED – SCL)
■ How to exchange values?
(ACSI, Mappings, Configuration of IED – SCL)
■ Send to whom?
■ Receive from whom?
NettedAutomation
IEC 61850
in brief Simple example of application
■ Communicate a real world Circuit Breaker Position.

■ How to model the Position?
■ How to bind the Model to the real world?
■ When and how to communicate the position?
■ What‘s the difference between IEC 61850, DNP3, IEC
60870-5-101/104, … field busses?
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IEC 61850
in brief Example of application – modeling
61850-7-2
services
Real IED/ Virtualization of real
Virtual Model world objects
GOOSE GOOSE
P SMV SMV
Mapping
Ethernet
LN
MMS TCP/IP MMS LN LN
XCBR1
HMI, … OpCnt
SCSM, e.g.
Protection 61850-8-1, 9- Pos
2 ...
XCBR1
61850-7-4 logical node 61850-7-4 data TCTR1

(circuit breaker) Real world =
(position)
Substation,
Circuit Breaker
Single line diagram and

61850-6 SCL configuration file (XML) functions of Substation
Binding
Models of the real real world
Client/ Communication world Objects; to models
Subscriber Mappings Server / Publisher
Communication Information Exchange

Network Services
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GmbH
IEC 61850
in brief First example of application – communication
event-driven GOOSE message
Real IED/
GOOSE GOOSE Virtual Model
P SMV SMV
Ethernet
LN
MMS TCP/IP MMS LN LN
Mapping
XCBR1
OpCnt
Read
Pos
Query Log Log ...
Any change of
Position of a
XCBR1.Pos.stVal=ON Circuit Breaker to
be communicated.
Event-driven or spontaneous Reports/GOOSE from server/publisher to client/subscriber

(or store entries into IED Log or Read value)
ON (tn) OFF (tn+1) ON (tn+2) OFF (tn+3)
XCBR1.Pos.stVal
(Status
Value)
OPEN
CLOSE
tn tn+1 tn+2 tn+3 Time
NettedAutomation
IEC 61850
in brief Demonstration of simple live demo (1)
Distribute continuously in real-time (ms):

IED
Circuit Breaker Position [Q0CSWI4.Pos]
P
GOOSE
SMV
GOOSE
SMV GOOSE (L2 Multicast)
Ethernet
MMS TCP/IP MMS Report (TCP)

report to HMI (ms … s):
Circuit Breaker Position [Q0CSWI4.Pos] on change
Measurements [Hz, PhV.phsA] every 5 seconds
NettedAutomation
IEC 61850
in brief Demonstration of simple live demo (2)
<SCL>
LN: Q0CSWI4.Pos[ST]
DataSet “Status”
Distribute continuously in real-time (ms): Member: Q0CSWI4.Pos[ST]
Circuit Breaker Position [Q0CSWI4.Pos]
GOOSE Control Block “GStatus”
GOOSE (L2 Multicast)
Reports (TCP) Report Control Block “Stat”
report to HMI (ms … s):
Circuit Breaker Pos [Q0CSWI4.Pos] on change Report Control Block “Meas”
Measurements [Hz, PhV.phsA] every 5 seconds
DataSet “Measurements”
Members: MMXU1.Hz[MX]
Model runs on HMS MMXU1.PhV.phsA[MX]
Anybus Gateway
(WEB-PLC)
MMXU1
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GmbH
Use of
SCL Files Single line diagram with standard designation
PDIS1
Substation Berlin220_132 =I1 =Q1

with one transformer T1 L1 =D1
between voltage levels D1
and E1, and a bay E1Q2. W1
Conducting
The transformer T1 has two =T1 PDIF1
Equipment
windings W1 and W2. W2
L3 =U1
Winding W1 is connected to a
220 kV voltage level D1 at bay =I1 TCTR1 PTOF1 =E1
Q1, connectivity node L1. L2
Winding W2 is connected to =QA1 XCBR1 CSWI1 CILO1
the bay Q2 in 132 kV voltage L1
level E1.
=QB1 =Q2
Designation according to IEC
61346 series. =W1
B1
NettedAutomation
Use of
SCL Files System Specification „Substation“
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<SCL xmlns="http://www.iec.ch/61850/2003/SCL"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" version="2007" revision="A">
<Header id="SSD Example"/>
<Substation name="Berlin220_132">
<PowerTransformer name="T1" type="PTR">
<LNode lnInst="1" lnClass="PDIF" ldInst="F1"/>
<LNode lnInst="1" lnClass="TCTR" ldInst="C1"/>
<TransformerWinding name="W1" type="PTW">
<Terminal connectivityNode="baden220_132/D1/Q1/L1"
substationName="baden220_132" voltageLevelName="D1"
bayName="Q1" cNodeName="L1"/>
</TransformerWinding>
…
</PowerTransformer>
<VoltageLevel name="D1">
<Voltage multiplier="k" unit="V">220</Voltage>
<Bay name="Q1">
<LNode lnInst="1" lnClass="PDIS" ldInst="F1"/>
<ConductingEquipment name="I1" type="CTR">
substationName="baden220_132" voltageLevelName="D1" bayName="Q1"
cNodeName="L1"/>
</ConductingEquipment>
<ConnectivityNode name="L1" pathName="berlin220_132/D1/Q1/L1"/>
</Bay>
…
NettedAutomation
Brief
introduction to
IEC 61850
System Design and Engineering
Voltage and
current Sensors
Single line
diagram
Need current/voltage of this point
Protection → send trip

to this circuit breaker
SCL
(System Configuration Language):
Formalized specification (XML) of
Systems, Single line diagram (SLD),
information models, binding models to
SLD, IEDs, communication, information Circuit breaker
flow (who talks to whom!), …
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IEC 61850
in brief Functional Topology of System (huge TSO in Germany)
SSD
Status: 2014/15
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IEC 61850
in brief Operate a Circuit Breaker with CSWI
IED
LD
LN
Operate (IP=60.80.140.11)
(F401CTRL/QA1CSWI1.Oper.ctlVal = open)
Status: 2014/15
NettedAutomation
IEC 61850
in brief GOOSE message
DSet
GCB
IED
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GmbH
IEC 61850
in brief Model and DataSet configuring GOOSE payload
DSet
Member
Member
Member
Member
GCB
LN
DOI
DAI
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IEC 61850
in brief Brief Summary
■ Information modeling method (LogicalNode.DataObject)

■ Information models of real world objects (LN.DO)
■ System Configuration Language (SCL → XML)
■ Information Exchange services (abstract)
■ Communication Services (concrete → Ethernet, TCP/IP, MMS, … )
■ Apply native standards
■ Interoperability of IEDs in small and huge systems

■ Long-term stability of definitions (like A.C. power system)
■ Prevent proliferation of solutions
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IEC 61850
in brief What does IEC 61850 provide? Summary
IEC 61850 Formalized specification for hierarchical

models: named, std. and extensions, …
■ Information modeling method Hierarchical models (Semantic in names):

Substation “MD”, MMXU, XCBR, PDIF, …
■ Information models
■ Configuration language (SCL) Formalized specification (XML) of Systems,
Single Line Diagram (SLD), information
■ Abstract Services models, binding models to SLD, IEDs,
communication, information flow, …
■ Communication protocols
Allows to map on appropriate protocols like
– TCP/IP based SCADA [Polling, MMS, Webservices, …
spontaneous messages (events,
reporting), logging, control, …]
MMS for non-real-time communication
– Real-time (GOOSE, SMV)
Specific protocols real-time communication
– Retrieve self-description
– Ethernet (Ethertype) Retrieve/browse implemented models from
IED (Intelligent Electronic Device)
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GmbH
IEC 61850
in brief What does IEC 61850 provide? Summary
Formalized specification for
hierarchical models: named, std.
and extensions, …
■ Information modeling method Hierarchical models (Semantic in

■ Information models names): Substation “MD”, MMXU,
XCBR, PDIF, …
■ Configuration language (SCL)
■ Abstract Services
■ Communication protocols Formalized specification (XML) of
– TCP/IP based SCADA [Polling, Systems, Single Line Diagram
spontaneous messages (events, (SLD), information models, binding
reporting), logging, control, …] models to SLD, IEDs,
communication, information flow, …
– Ethernet (Ethertype)
MMS for non-real-time
communication
Server
Communication:
Specific protocols real-time retrieve self-
communication description, Read,
Report, Control,
…
Retrieve/browse implemented
models from IED (Intelligent Client/
Electronic Device) Browser
NettedAutomation
IEC 61850
in brief What are the differences?
IEC 60870-5-104,
IEC 61850 DNP3, …
■ Information modeling method

■ Communication protocols ■ Communication protocol
– TCP/IP based SCADA [Polling, – TCP/IP based SCADA [Polling,
spontaneous messages (events, spontaneous messages (events),
reporting), logging, control, …] control, …]
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Welcome ISO/OSI 7 Layer Model (ISO 7498)
ISO/OSI 7 Layer Model Real World
Castle of Nagoya, Japan
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GmbH
Welcome Need more layers!
The Jakarta 14 Layer Cake
APPLICATIONS (2015+)
IEC 61850 (2013)

ACSI, Model, SCL
7 ISO/OSI Layer (1985)
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IEC 61850
in brief What is important in using IEC 61850?
In order to exchange first bit If focus is on application

– TCP/IP based SCADA [Polling,
C/S – TCP/IP based SCADA [Polling, spontaneous messages (events,
API spontaneous messages (events, reporting), logging, control, …]
reporting), logging, control, …]
NettedAutomation
IEC 61850
in brief Comprehensiveness vs Complexity
■ IEC 61850 is very comprehensive (everybody will agree)
But:
■ Is IEC 61850 also complex? It depends
■ Applications that use and exchange information (produced and

consumed by devices) vary from simple to very complex.
■ Communication services (client, server, publisher, and
subscriber) are independent of any model used (LD/LN.DO.DA).
■ Several communication stacks and APIs are available off-the-
shelve (some are simple to integrate and use).
■ Simple applications  simple IEC 61850 solutions (see demo)
■ Complex applications  complex IEC 61850 solutions
■ Versions of standard parts, firmware, and tools add challenges!
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GmbH
IEC 61850 in brief
 Need communication – not only

connections
 Common model for electrical
system (7-4)
 What to standardize?
 First introduction and overview
 What is IEC 61850?
 What is IEC 61850 NOT?
 Benefits
NettedAutomation
IEC 61850
in brief Communication: names and context are crucial
Different
contexts !!
Igel !
Eagle?
German speaking
NettedAutomation
IEC 61850
in brief Sematic is in the name of a Data Object (2014-02-17)
…
Some 850 Terms used to build dictionary of 2750+ Data Object names:
JWG25 WindTurbine::WGEN.GnOpMod ("Operation mode of generator"):

[{Gn=Generator}, {Op=Operate, operating/Trip order to circuit-breaker}, {Mod=Mode}]
JWG25 WindTurbine::WGEN.W ("Generator active power"):

[{W=Active power}]
JWG25 WindTurbine::WGEN.GnTmpStt ("Temperature measurements for generator stator"):

[{Gn=Generator}, {Tmp=Temperature (°C)}, {Stt=Stator}]
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GmbH
IEC 61850
in brief Common model for electrical system (7-4)
Standard Logical Node
Class MMXU
A Phase currents
PhV Phase to ground voltage
PhV.PhsA … Phase A (L1, 1)
PhV.PhsB … Phase B (L2, 2)
…
PPV Phase to phase voltage
W Phase active power
VAr Phase reactive power
VA
TotW
Phase apparent power
Total active power 230.000 V
TotVAr Total reactive power
TotVA Total apparent power 230 V
Hz Frequency
One Model, one Designation
What‘s the difference?
… don‘t touch the line to figure it out!!
The difference in the model is the multiplier: k=103
NettedAutomation
IEC 61850
in brief What to standardize?
3 phase Currents Generator speed Oil pressure of

and Voltages transformer
time
Information Models of real world objects, good to be

abstract communication services, and configuration language standardized
Report, Event, Log, GOOSE, …, SCL
Life Cycle of Systems
Methods, Service Mappings, Languages, Tools, Interfaces
Innovation of Hardware and Software
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IEC 61850
in brief IEC 61850 – in brief (1)
 Scope WAS on substations for electric power system (UTILITIES)

 Scope is has been expanded to application domains outside SS
 Solution goes far beyond the restricted scope written in standard
 NOT just another bus system like … or field busses, …
 Goes far beyond all other communication standards like OPC, …
 Extends the way automation devices „work together“
 Focus on WHAT to communicate (defines the semantic); standard
device CONTENT
 HOW to communicate is defined as well (selects and references
communication protocols; some special protocols defined)
 CONFIGURATION language for the substation, devices, data,
communication, …
 Is defined for multi-vendor systems
 Everything has a NAME (except „IEC 61850“)
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GmbH
IEC 61850
 Defines (communication) interoperability to a high degree
 DOES NOT provide device interchangeability (but supports it!)
 ONE standard for many phases in a life cycle of a device/system
 Re-use of standard classes, substations, bays, IEDs, …
 Metadata for process data (data about data, e.g., SI-Unit)
 Seamless naming convention for field level
 Simplifies data maintenance
 Provides set of required communication services
 Uses advanced communication technology
 Easy integration into web technology
 IEC 61850 is a unique Standard !
 IEC 61850 is applied in many domains outside substations
 Scalable, flexible, expandable, and available
NettedAutomation
IEC 61850
 DOES NOT standardize (application) FUNCTIONS like

interlocking, reverse blocking, breaker failure NOR the
distribution of a function (1 or n IEDs) !!
 Standardizes just the information produced and
consumed (3000+) by functions and how information is
exchanged (control, report, log, GOOSE, SV …)
 Standardizes a language to describe the substation
topology, information models, communication, binding
to process, the data flow, … (SCL – System
Configuration Language; IEC 61850-6)
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IEC 61850
 DOES NOT standardize ALL information needed in real

substations or wind turbines (consensus of all experts
required! – missing information needs to be defined by
the vendor/user based on the rules of IEC 61850.)
 DOES NOT standardize any concrete API (application
program interface) NOR a (function) programming
language
 DOES NOT standardize any concrete network topology
of the switched Ethernet network (new part IEC 61850-
90-4 recommends details of the network infrastructure)
 DOES NOT standardize methods for the traffic (flow)
engineering
 DOES NOT standardize tools
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GmbH
IEC 61850
 DOES NOT standardize how to IMPLEMENT and how

to USE the standard in real substations (IEDs, tools,
communication)
 DOES NOT define any migration strategy from current
solutions
 DOES NOT standardize the certification process (see
www.ucaiug.org)
 DOES NOT standardize the factory acceptance test
(FAT)
 DOES NOT standardize the site acceptance test (SAT)
 DOES NOT define WHO is responsible for the correct
and consistent configuration of a SYSTEM
 …
NettedAutomation
IEC 61850
What does Conformance with IEC 61850 mean?
Much more than what is required for nuts and bolts!
SCADA RTUs HMI Engineering
M10 Winding
Control and
Protection
Device
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IEC 61850
Conformance with IEC 61850 requires to specify a lot of
aspects of devices, tools and the substation system!
SCADA RTUs HMI Engineering
Tissues
Engineering tool
Configuration tool
Information flow IEC 61850
Models (m,o,ex)
Services Control and Control and
Network Protection Protection
Device Device
NettedAutomation

GmbH
IEC 61850
Conformance with IEC 61850 requires to specify a lot of
aspects of devices, tools and the substation system!
Tissue Database (privat)

+
http://tissue.iec61850.com
UCAIUG testing
+
http://ucaiug.org
NettedAutomation
IEC 61850
Testing, Quality improvements
http://www.ucaiug.org/org/TechnicalO/Testing/Lists/IEC
61850Ed1ClientCertificates/AllItems.aspx
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Re-use of IEC 61850
 IEC 61850 is the basis for many

other application domains
 Edition 1, Edition 2, or Edition 2.1?
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GmbH
Re-use of
IEC 61850 Edition 1, 2, 2.1 ... ?
■ The first 14 parts of the standard SERIES IEC 61850 have been published
between 2001 and 2004. These standards are often called as IEC 61850
EDITION 1. Each of these parts and also the two parts IEC 61850-7-410
(Hydro Power) and IEC 61850-7-420 (DER) have been published tagged
as EDITION 1.
■ Several of these 16 published standards are now under revision (IEC calls
this process maintenance). The revised documents - once published - will
be tagged EDITION 2, e.g., the EDITION 2 of parts IEC 61850-6 and IEC
61850-7-4 have been published recently in 2010.
■ BUT there will be not an EDITION 2 of the standard SERIES IEC 61850
per se!! Various parts (of the first 16 parts) will be revised and extended
and then published tagged as EDITION 2.
■ New parts will be published with the tag EDITION 1, e.g., IEC 61850-80-1
(Guideline to exchanging information from a CDC-based data model using
IEC 60870-5-101 or IEC 60870-5-104) - IEC/TS 61850-80-1, Edition 1.0,
2008-12.
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Re-use of
IEC 61850 Edition 1, 2, 2.1 ... ?
■ All parts published after the first 14 parts that had been published
by 2004 have either the tag Edition 2 or Edition 1 !!
■ If you are waiting for "Edition 2" what do you mean? I guess you
mean the following:
– EDITION 2 of parts IEC 61850-6, -7-4, -7-3, -7-2, -7-1, -8-1, 9-2, 7-
410, 7-420, etc. and
– EDITION 1 of the parts IEC 61850-80-1, 61850-90-1, -90-2, -90-3, -
90-4, etc.
■ It is highly recommended to name the specific part when we talk
about EDITION 2!
■ Example: IEC 61850-6 EDITION 2.
■ All core documents (-6, -7-x, and -8-1) are cleaned-up in 2015-2017
and published as Edition 2.1; publishing process: amendments
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Re-use of
IEC 61850 Building blocks
Extended blocks: Functional Basic blocks:

IEC 6…. requirements IEC 61850
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GmbH
Common
statements Summary
■ IEC 61850 is the crucial standard for the power delivery
■ Electric power is involved in almost all energy delivery
■ IEC 61850 could be used wherever electric power is a key factor
■ Electric power systems (developed for 130+ years) and energy
systems are relying increasingly on smart people and smart(er)
automation, protection, and monitoring systems
■ Smarter systems rely on information logistics (developed by
smart people)
■ Many smart grid related projects in Europe for 10+ years
■ The applications in Europe are quite huge  progress will take
time: it is like a marathon – not a sprint
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Common
statements We want to prevent any dis-connection …
… we bring people, systems, and devices together!
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Q&A
Questions?
NettedAutomation

S-0200 – IEC 61850 series overview
NettedAutomation
GmbH
IEC 61850 series

overview

Karlsruhe (Germany)
schwarz@scc-online.de NettedAutomation
GmbH
© 2004-2017 NettedAutomation GmbH
Content
■ Design objectives and scope IEC

61850
■ Content and structure of IEC 61850
■ Features of IEC 61850
■ Application modeling
■ Information exchange and
communication services
NettedAutomation
Page 2 © 2004-2017 NettedAutomation GmbH GmbH
Design objectives and scope
■ Scope of IEC 61850

■ Design objectives influenced by
changes in the technology
■ The parts of IEC 61850
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History IEC 61850 – Original scope
Remote Control (NCC) Technical Services
Station Level Equipment
Bay Control Protection Protection
Switch- Switch-
CT/VT gear
CT/VT gear
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Content and structure
■ Modelling approach
■ The communication layers
■ Stacks and interfaces
■ What are logical nodes?
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Content and
structure of IEC 61850 standard series
IEC 61850
■ The definitions comprise:

– Communication:
real-time (... 4 ms … based on Ethertype) and
client/server (… 1 sec … based on TCP/IP/MMS)
– Domain-specific and extensible object models
– Configuration language
– Using native Ethernet, TCP/IP, and MMS
– Self-description of devices (contain information
model)
– Specification of conformance testing
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Content and
structure of Models: LN and data objects
IEC 61850
Station bus
instVal
Get/Set LN „MMXU“ dead banded value
angleP)
TotW Total Active Power (Total
Total Reactive Powerrange
TotVArphsA.cVal (Total Q)
Report (s) RCB TotVA Total Apparent Power (Total S)
phsB.cVal
TotPF Average Power factor (Total PF)
phsC.cVal
Hz Frequency
GOOSE (ms) PPV Phase to phase voltages
GCB PhV Phase to ground voltages
A Phase currents (IL1, IL2, IL3)
QueryLog W Phase active power (P)
Log
VAr Phase reactive power (Q)
VA Phase apparent power (S)
Configure PF Phase power factor
Z Phase Impedance
Retrieve
Model Process bus
SV
QE3 … 4.000 …
SV SVCB
samples/sec
QC1
LN PhsBTCTR LN PhsBTVTR
.SCD QE2 Amp Vol
QA1
QE1 current / voltage samples from instrument transformers by

T1 sampled value exchange services of IEC 61850-7-2 / IEC
QB1 61850-9-2 (e.g., from Merging Unit)
NettedAutomation
Content and
structure of „Layer model“ of IEC 61850
IEC 61850
CC CIM
61968/61970 IED Description (online)
Access
Single
Information IED Description (off-line or online)
WTUR
Line
PDIS
XCBR
Logical node, data objects,

Configruration file (SCL); part 6
Information and common data classes;

Models parts 61850-7-4 and 7-3, What ?
61400-25-2
Information exchange
(publ./subscr., get, set, Abstract communication
control, ... reporting, service interface (ACSI); When ?
logging, get IED
description)
part 7-2 and 61400-25-3
Mapping to e.g. MMS

Communication profiles
in part 8-1 and How ?
(Ethernet, TCP/IP, OSI
)
WebServices,
messages
messages
101/104, OPC XML

and DNP3 in IEC
61400-25-4
NettedAutomation
Features of
IEC 61850 From application to communication
Substation Application;
long term stable
Application
Objects
(IEC 61850-7-3 and –7-4)
Services
Abstract interface
(IEC 61850-7-2)
Mapping
IEC 61850-8-1, -9-1, -9-2
7 Stack interface
6
5
4
3
2 State-of-art communication
1 technology; fast changing
ISO/OSI
seven layer stack
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GmbH
Features of
IEC 61850 IEC 61850/IEC 61400-25 Stack & Interfaces
Communication
protocols (Standard)
IEC 61850 DLL,

IEC 61850 DLL,
Library, …
Library, …
IEC 61850/
IEC 61850/ IF2 61400-25 Server, Application
SCADA, Data Values Remote
61400-25 Device model Device
HMI, ..
Client and Services Appl.
TCP/IP Data
(Standard)
Values
IF3 IF1
Scope of standards
e.g. RS232
API and Binding API and Binding
of model to client of model to server
application application data
= to be implemented for IEC 61850
NettedAutomation
Content and
structure of „Function block“ view of information models
IEC 61850
IEC 61850-7-2 Ed2

Settings and (addressable)
other inputs Logical Measurements,
To
(programmed, Node Counter, …
SCL engineering, (Function Information exchange:
online) may be Get (poll)
standardized) Reporting (event, cyc)
From Logging (event, cyc)
Service Tracking (event)
GOOSE (event, cyc)
SampledValues (cyc)
Control From To Status
Data, Data,
DataAttribute DataAttribute
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Content and
structure of „Function block“ FPID
IEC 61850
Analogue Measured
Setting Value
KP ASG Out MV
KI ASG Logical PAct MV
Node
KD ASG FPID IAct MV
Name Type (Function: DAct MV
Name Type „PID Err… MV
controller“)
Name Type
… …
Source: IEC 61850-7-4 Edition 2
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Content and
structure of „Function blocks“ PTRC, GOOSE and XCBR
IEC 61850
Enum
Setting
TrMod ENG
Logical
Node Protection
PTRC Activation
(Function:
„Trip LN
Tr ACT GOOSE Trip
GOOSE condition“) XCBR
from Op ACT
Protection Str ACD
Source: IEC 61850-7-4 Edition 2
NettedAutomation
Features of IEC 61850
■ Interoperability (exchangeability)
between devices and application
functions through standardized data
models and information exchange
■ Free configuration of
communication network and
allocation of functions to devices
■ Long term stability through
decoupling of application and
communication
NettedAutomation
Features of
IEC 61850 Data model and information exchange
IED Server has

a DATA MODEL
that can be
accessed:
The WHAT to
Request exchange
IED (IEC 61850-7-4

and 61850-7-3)
Client
Response Vendor A
(Sub- (Intelligent
scriber) Electronic
Device)
Report
IED is configured by the
SCL file <<ABC-1>>
(IEC 61850-6)
IED is configured by the The HOW to exchange
same SCL file <<ABC-1>> (IEC 61850-7-2)
(IEC 61850-6)
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GmbH
Features of
IEC 61850 Communication networks
Gateway
Station Level
Control
Control Control
Bay Level
Protection Protection
Process Level
HV Equipment HV Equipment
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Features of
Gateway
Station Level
Control
Control Control
Bay Level
Process Level
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Features of
Gateway
Station Level
Control
Control Control
Bay Level
Process Level
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GmbH
Features of
IEC 61850 Logical Nodes and Devices
Station Workplace
IHMI
Human Machine IF
Protection and Control

CSWI PDIS
Switch Controller Distance Protection
XCBR TCTR TVTR

Circuit Breaker Current Transformer Voltage Transformer
Circuit Breaker Combi Sensor
NettedAutomation
Features of
IEC 61850 Logical Nodes and Devices
Station Workplace
IHMI
Human Machine IF
Protection
CSWI PDIS
Switch Controller Distance Protection
XCBR TCTR TVTR

Circuit Breaker Current Transformer Voltage Transformer
Control Combi Sensor
NettedAutomation
Application modeling
■ Logical nodes as the core

components of the object
model
■ The hierarchical object model
■ Specification of logical nodes
and common data classes
■ DER modeling example
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GmbH
Application
modeling The IED – Intelligent electronic device
QE3
Bay Controller
QC1
Main 1 Main 2
QE2 Protection Protection
QA1
Meter
QE1
T1
An IED is a physical device that
QB1 implements a part of the
substation automation
functionality
NettedAutomation
Application
modeling Hierarchical data model
Tampa_Control IED
+ LPHD Logical Device

+ QA1CSWI1
+- QA1XCBR1 Logical Node
- Pos Data (details: CDC*)
- stVal Data Attribute
- ctlVal
Tampa_Protection
+ LPHD
+ PDIS1
* CDC = Common Data Class
+ PDIS2
NettedAutomation
Hierarchical data model

stVal
Open
GOOSE Get
TCP/IP: related
Operate.req:
CTL.XCBR1.Pos [Open]
IP: 192.168.178.51
Dattr:
q t
stVal
Report: Open; good;
2015-08-17 10:27:22:10 FuncCon: ST
DataObject: Pos
Get.req: CTL.XCBR1.Pos [ST]
Logical Node: XCBR1

Get.res: Open; good;
2015-08-17 10:27:22:10
Logical Device: CTL stVal
Ethernet multicast:
GOOSE: CTL.XCBR1.Pos [ST] Physical Device (IED): BayController Open
is Open
t
2015-08-17 10:27:22:10
NettedAutomation

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GmbH
Application
modeling Basics of logical nodes
IEC 61850-7-4 Ed2
LOGICAL NODE Abstract LN class

defined in IEC 61850-7-2
Common LOGICAL NODE Specialization
shall be shall be
defined at defined in any
least in one logical device
logical device (7-1 Ed2)
(7-1 Ed2)
Domain specific LLN0

LPHD
LOGICAL NODE for
example XCBR
The new working group internal tool “UML based modeling” provides a very comprehensive UML Model! (2015-01)
NettedAutomation
Application
modeling Logical Node Physical Device, LPHD
IEC 61850-7-4 Ed2 LPHD class optional /
Data object Common Explanation T M/O/
name data C mandatory /
class Common Data conditional
Data objects Class (CDC)
Descriptions
PhyNam DPL Physical device name plate M
Status information
PhyHealth ENS Physical device health M
OutOv SPS Output communications buffer overflow O
Proxy SPS Indicates if this LN is a proxy M
InOv SPS Input communications buffer overflow O
NumPwrUp INS Number of power-ups O
WrmStr INS Number of warm starts O
WacTrg INS Number of watchdog device resets detected O
PwrUp SPS Power-up detected O
PwrDn SPS Power-down detected O
PwrSupAlm SPS External power supply alarm O
Controls
RsStat SPC Reset device statistics T O
Sim SPC Receive simulated GOOSE or simulated SV O
Settings
Data sets (see IEC 61850-7-2)
Inherited and specialised from logical node class (see IEC 61850-7-2)
BufferedReportControlBlock (see IEC 61850-7-2)
Inherited and specialised from logical node class (see IEC 61850-7-2) transient
UnbufferedReportControlBlock (see IEC 61850-7-2)
Services (see IEC 61850-7-2)
NettedAutomation
Application
modeling Common Logical Node
Common LN class
IEC 61850-7-4 Ed2 Data object

name
Common
data class
Explanation T M/O/
C
Data objects
Mandatory and conditional logical node information (shall be inherited by ALL LN but LPHD)
Descriptions
NamPlt LPL Name plate C1
Status information
Beh ENS Behaviour M
Health ENS Health C1
Blk
Controls
SPS Dynamic blocking of function described by the LN O
General Data
Mod ENC Mode C1
CmdBlk SPC Blocking of control sequences and action triggers of controllable data C2
objects
Settings
InRef1 ORG General input reference O
BlkRef1 ORG Blocking reference shows the receiving of dynamically blocking signal O
Logical node information (statistical calculation specific – refer to Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht
gefunden werden.)
Status information
ClcExp SPS Calculation period expired T C3
Controls
ClcStr SPC Enables the calculation start at time operTm from the control model (if O
set) or immediately
Settings
ClcMth ENG Calculation method of statistical data objects C3
ClcMod ENG Calculation mode. Allowed values: TOTAL, PERIOD, SLIDING C4
ClcIntvTyp
ClcIntvPer
ENG
ING
Calculation interval type
In case ClcIntvTyp equals to MS, PER-CYCLE, CYCLE, DAY, WEEK,
MONTH, YEAR, number of units to consider to calculate the calculation
C4
C4 Statistical Data
interval duration
NumSubIntv ING The number of sub-intervals a calculation period interval duration O
contains
ClcRfTyp ENG Refreshment interval type O
ClcRfPer ING In case ClcIntvTyp equals to MS, PER-CYCLE, CYCLE, DAY, WEEK, O
MONTH, YEAR, number of units to consider to calculate the refreshment
interval duration
ClcSrc ORG Object reference to source logical node C5
ClcNxTmms ING Remaining time up to the end of the current calculation interval – O
expressed in milliseconds
InSyn ORG Object reference to the source of the external synchronization signal for O
the calculation interval
Inherited and specialised from logical node class (see IEC
61850-7-2)
Services
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GmbH
Application
modeling Common Logical Node (1) - General Data
IEC 61850-7-4 Ed2
Common LN class
Data object Common Explanation T M/O/
name data class C
Data objects
Mandatory and conditional logical node information (shall be inherited by ALL LN but LPHD)
Descriptions
NamPlt LPL Name plate C1
Status information
Beh ENS Behaviour M
Health ENS Health C1
Blk SPS Dynamic blocking of function described by the LN O
Controls
Mod ENC Mode C1
CmdBlk SPC Blocking of control sequences and action triggers C2
of controllable data objects
Settings
InRef1 ORG General input reference O
BlkRef1 ORG Blocking reference shows the receiving of O
dynamically blocking signal
NettedAutomation
Application
modeling Common Logical Node (2) - Statistical Data
IEC 61850-7-4 Ed2
Status information
ClcExp SPS Calculation period expired TC3
Controls
ClcStr SPC Enables the calculation start at time operTm from O
the control model (if set) or immediately
Settings
ClcMth ENG Calculation method of statistical data objects C3
ClcMod ENG Calculation mode. Allowed values: TOTAL, C4
PERIOD, SLIDING
ClcIntvTyp ENG Calculation interval type C4
ClcIntvPer ING In case ClcIntvTyp equals to MS, PER-CYCLE, C4
CYCLE, DAY, WEEK, MONTH, YEAR, number of
units to consider to calculate the calculation
interval duration
NumSubIntv ING The number of sub-intervals a calculation period O
interval duration contains
ClcRfTyp ENG Refreshment interval type O
ClcRfPer ING In case ClcIntvTyp equals to MS, PER-CYCLE, O
CYCLE, DAY, WEEK, MONTH, YEAR, number of
units to consider to calculate the refreshment
interval duration
ClcSrc ORG Object reference to source logical node C5
ClcNxTmms ING Remaining time up to the end of the current O
calculation interval – expressed in milliseconds
InSyn ORG Object reference to the source of the external O
synchronization signal for the calculation interval
NettedAutomation
Application
modeling Common Logical Node (3) - Services
IEC 61850-7-4 Ed2

Condition C1: Mod, Health and NamPlt shall be inherited by LLN0 of the root LD of a
hierarchy as mandatory and by all other LN as optional.
Condition C2: CmdBlk shall be inherited as optional data object by all LNs which contain
controllable data objects additionally to Mod, if there is no BlkOpn/BlkCls available (like in
XCBR).
Condition C3: This data object is optional but mandatory when considering statistical
calculation, especially the MMXU, MMXN LN.
Condition C4: These data objects are mandatory, except when ClcMth equals
UNSPECIFIED.
Condition C5: This data object is mandatory, if the considered LN is performing statistical
calculation derived from another LN.
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Application
modeling LLN0 – LN Zero
IEC 61850-7-4 Ed2
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Application
modeling Logical node and logical node instances
■ The names of logical node classes

QE3 QE3XSWI4 (e.g. XSWI) are standardized in IEC
QC1 61850-7-4 and have always four (4)
QC1XSWI5 characters
QE2 QE2XSWI2 ■ The name of an instance of a logical
node may have a prefix and a suffix
QA1
■ The use of prefixes and suffixes is
QE1 QE1XSWI3
quite different – depending on device
manufacturer and device type
T1 ■ See next slide for an example (ABB)
QB1 QB1XSWI1
Instance of a LN
LN XSWI (Switch)
NettedAutomation
Application
modeling Logical node and logical node instances
IEC 61850-7-4 Ed2

Table 7
TR2PTDF1 T2WPDIF
ABB 615 series

RE_615_tech_756887_Eng.pdf
ABB 650 series

1MRK511242-UEN_-_en_Communication_protocol_manual__IEC_61850__650_series__IEC.pdf
NettedAutomation

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GmbH
Application
modeling Specification method
IEC 61850-7-4 Ed2
IEC 61850-7-3 Ed2
NettedAutomation
Application
modeling Specification method (CDC)
IEC 61850-7-3 Ed2
Trigger Option:
dchg = data change
qchg = quality change
to trigger a report or log entry
Functional Constraint:
ST = Status
SV = Substitution
DC = Description
MX = Measurement
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SCADA services Analog information (CDC MV, 61850-7-3)
Trigger Option
range,
mag
deadband
range
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GmbH
SCADA services Range monitoring function
Reports from server to client

(or store entries into IED log)
Analogue
h, t hh, t max,t
Value
RangeConfig:
max = 120
instMag
hhLim = 70
hLim = 55
Good
Maintenance required Maintenance Failure
demanded
min lLim llLim = 0
Time
Range: normal high high-high max
NettedAutomation
SCADA services Dead-band monitoring function
Reports from server to client (or log entries)
Analogue
value (tn) value (tn+1) value (tn+2) value (tn+3)
Value
mag
instMag
db (deadband
configuration):
+/-10 %
of (Min-Max) value
tn tn+1 tn+2 tn+3 Time
start
NettedAutomation
IEC 61850
Stack and
Layering
Model (Standard) – IEC 61850-7-4/7-3
LN: STMP.Tmp.mag.i 7-4
LN: STMP.Tmp.mag.i
7-3
LN: STMP.Tmp.mag.i
GetDataValues
Domain/NV & Read
Read Protocol
Message-Schema
Basic Encoding
Layer 6 and 5
Layer 1 to 4 (TCP)
Read Messages
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GmbH
IEC 61850
Stack and
Layering
Model (Standard) – IEC 61850-7-4
LN: STMP.Tmp.mag.i
STMP1
LN: STMP.Tmp.mag.i Reports
(RBE, report by exception)
LN: STMP.Tmp.mag.i STMP1.Alm (stVal=TRUE)

Temperature
(STMP1.Tmp.mag.i) STMP1.Alm (stVal=FALSE)
GetDataValues [Analogue Value]
trigger option =
data change
Domain/NV & Read
configuration STMP1.TmpTripSpt
Read Protocol
configuration STMP1.TmpAlmSpt
Message-Schema
Basic Encoding Time
STMP1.Alm
Layer 6 and 5
Layer 1 to 4 (TCP)
Read Messages
NettedAutomation
Application
modeling IEC 61850-90-7 (Inverter functions)
Example of hysteresis in volt-VAr curves

Status: 2013-06
NettedAutomation
Application
modeling IEC 61850-90-7 (Inverter functions)
DRCT class (existing in IEC 61850-7-420)
Data object Common
Explanation T M/O/C
name data class
Settings
DERNum ING Number of DER units connected to controller M
LN DRCT: DERTyp
Type of DER unit:
Value Explanation
0 Not applicable / Unknown
1 Virtual or mixed DER
DER ING 2
3
Reciprocating engine
Fuel cell
M
controller 4
5
Photovoltaic system
Combined heat and power
characteristics MaxWLim ASG

99 Other
Nominal max output power M
MaxVarLim ASG Nominal max output reactive power M
StrDlTms ING Nominal time delay before starting or restarting M
StopDlTms ING Nominal time delay before stopping M
LodRampRte ING Nominal ramp load or unload rate, power versus time M
Setpoint for maximum active power and reference value for
WMax ASG M
functions
PRef ASG Reference active power with default set equal to WMax M
VMax ASG Setpoint for maximum voltage M
VMin ASG Setpoint for minimum voltage M
VAMax ASG Setpoint for maximum apparent power M
VArMax ASG Setpoint for maximum reactive power M
VRef ASG Reference voltage for functions using grid voltage as input M
VRefOfs ASG Reference offset voltage for functions using grid voltage as input O
Default ramp rate for changes in active power: percentage of
WGra ASG O
WMax
PFSign ENG Power factor convention: IEC = 1; IEEE = 2; Excitation = 3 O
Var action on change between charging and discharging: switch
VArAct ENG O
= 1, remain = 2
Setpoint for maximum active charging power and reference
WChaMax ASG O
value for functions
VAChaMax ASG Setpoint for maximum apparent charging power O
Setpoint for maximum charging ramp rate: percentage of
WChaGra ASG O
WChaMax
Calculation method used for total apparent power calculation
Status: 2013-06 ClcTotVA ENG
(Vector | Arithmetic)
O
NettedAutomation

NettedAutomation
GmbH
Application
modeling Modeling Sensors and Supervision (1)
■ Crucial real world applications modeled with IEC 61850 Logical
Nodes and Data are: Sensor applications
Sensors (T-LN = Transducer): Supervision (S-LN =Supervision):
Angle Arcs monitoring
Axial Displacement Tap changer
Distance Operating mechanism
Flow Partial discharge
Frequency Power transformer
Generic sensor Pressure
Humidity Temperature
Media level Vibration
Magnetic field Circuit breaker
Movement/speed Switches
Position Insulation gas
Pressure (absolute) Insulation liquid
Rotational speed
Sound pressure
Temperature
Mechanical tension
Vibration
Water PH level
Current transformer
Voltage transformer wg10uml02v20draft13-wg18uml02v11b-wg17uml02v18-jwg25uml02v04c-tc17umlv0-tc38umlv0.eap
NettedAutomation
Application
TANG Angle
TAXD Axial Displacement
TDST Distance
TFLW Flow
TFRQ Frequency
TGSN Generic sensor
THUM Humidity
TLVL Media level
TMGF Magnetic field
TMVM Movement/speed
TPOS Position
TPRS Pressure (absolute)
TRTN Rotational speed
TSND Sound pressure
TTMP Temperature
TTNS Mechanical tension
TVBR Vibration
TWPH Water PH level
TCTR Current transformer
TVTR Voltage transformer
wg10uml02v20draft13-wg18uml02v11b-wg17uml02v18-jwg25uml02v04c-tc17umlv0-tc38umlv0.eap
NettedAutomation
Application
SARC Arcs monitoring
SLTC Tap changer
SOPM Operating mechanism
SPDC Partial discharge
SPTR Power transformer
SPRS Pressure
STMP Temperature
SVBR Vibration
SCBR Circuit breaker
SSWI Switches
SIMG Insulation gas
SIML Insulation liquid
NettedAutomation

NettedAutomation
GmbH
Application
■ Crucial real world applications modeled with IEC 61850

Logical Nodes and Data are: Sensor applications
■ Example temperature sensor and supervision:
– Sensor data
Monitoring Applications
Cyclic report • STMP.Tmp.instMag + .quality + .timestamp
– Sensor data supervision

Event report • STMP.Alm.stVal + .quality + .timestamp
Event report • STMP.Trip.stVal + .quality + .timestamp
Event report • STMP.RteAlm.stVal + .quality + .timestamp
– Sensor sampled data

STMP SMV • TTMP.TmpSAV.instMag + .quality + .timestamp
– Sensor supervision
Asset Event report • TTMP.EEHealth.stVal + .quality + .timestamp
Management
NettedAutomation
Information exchange
■ Client / Server and Publisher /

Subscriber communication
■ Reporting
■ GOOSE
■ Transmission of sampled
values
NettedAutomation
Information
exchange ACSI services (1)
■ Association
■ Information model
– Directory services
– Read and write data or datasets
– Create / Delete datasets
– Substitute data
■ Tracking services (Edition 2 of IEC 61850-7-2)
– Keep tracking of message parameters received/sent by server
■ Setting groups
– Edit setting groups
– Activate setting groups
■ Spontaneous data transmission (Reporting)
– Configuring reports
– Transmit buffered or unbuffered reports
NettedAutomation

NettedAutomation
GmbH
Information
exchange ACSI services (2)
■ Storing sequence of events (Logging)

– Configuring logs
– Read logged information
■ Fast event transmission
– Multicasting of events (GOOSE, GSSE)
■ Transmission of sampled values
■ Control model
– Select and operate
– Time activated operation
■ Time synchronization (sntp, ntp, IREG B, 1PPS, IEC 61588)
■ File transfer
– Read and write files
– Delete files
NettedAutomation
Information
exchange Communication roles
Physical Device Physical Device
ACSI Client ACSI Server
Data
Client / Server communication reports
Data
Data
Application of “client – req / rsp
server” communication
■ typical SCADA application Application
Physical Device
like control of switchgear ACSI Server
req / rsp
or transmission of Data
events (Reporting) Data
■ Store and retrieve Data
sequence of events (log)
■ Transfer of files (i.e. Application
Application
Comtrade files)
Physical Device
NettedAutomation
Information
exchange Communication roles
Physical Device Physical Device
Publisher-subscriber ACSI Client
Publisher
ACSI Server
communication; Data
time critical
Data
Data
Applications of “publisher-
subscriber" communication
 tripping of circuit breakers; Application
Physical Device
interlocking: short information
that needs to be transmitted ACSI Server
with a low probability of loss Data
within a few milliseconds GOOSE Message Data
Sampled Values
 transmission of sampled Data
values from instrumental multicast
transformers: high amount of
Application
data, to be transmitted within a Application
few milliseconds, loss of data
needs to be detected Physical Device
Subscriber
NettedAutomation

NettedAutomation
GmbH
Information
exchange Communication protocols
■ Use of state of the art communication protocols

like TCP/IP and Ethernet with priority tagging
– Immediate benefit from progress in communication
technology (e.g. higher bandwidth and scalable
configuration)
Application
Abstract communication
Publ-Subscr Client-Server
service interface (ACSI)
GOOSE Communication
Service Tracking
Sampled Values stack with MMS Model Exchange
Ethertype and TCP/IP Data Exchange
Control
Ethernet File request
NettedAutomation
Information
exchange Information flow (client/server, publisher/subscriber)
Client Get, GetDef, ... Server

Data? Data
<values>
Client Set, Operate, .. <values> Server
Data? Data
confirmation
Ethernet
Client Server
TCP/IP
Report <values>
Data? Data
Subscriber Publisher
Ethertype
Ethernet
multicast <values>
Data? Data
Subscriber
Data?
Scope of Standard parts IEC 61850-7-x
NettedAutomation
Information
exchange Information flow (system view as defined in IEC 61850-6)
Server Client Server

Appl
Data Data
C-S-Services
Server +
Appl
Client
Publisher
Data
Client +
Appl
Subscriber
Multicast Messages Publisher
Data
Appl
Subscriber
Publisher+Server+Subscriber Configured by SCL:

Data, Server, Publisher, Client,
Data Subscriber, C-S-Services,
Multicast Messages and
NettedAutomation

NettedAutomation
GmbH
Information
exchange Configuration of Client/Server (Subscriber/Publisher)
IED A
DEcode message
Client
Appl
Encode message
ON
Server B +
Real Client IED A
Publisher
stVal ON
Shadow Server B and Publisher:
LD, LN, DO, DA „stVal“, DataSet, Real Server B and Publisher:

Communication Control Blocks
LD, LN, DO, DA „stVal“, DataSet,
Communication Control Blocks
<SCL ...
<Communication ... <SCL ...
<IED name=„A“ ... xx SCL File <Communication ...
<IED name=„B“ ... <IED name=„B“ ...
NettedAutomation
Information
exchange Configuration of Server/Subscriber
IED A
DEcode message
Server A + Subscriber
stVal Encode message
Server B +
Real Server A and Subscriber:
To Publisher
LD, LN, Inputs, DO, DA „stVal“, stVal ON
DataSet, Publisher Control Block
From
From
Shadow Server B and Publisher: Real Server B and Publisher:
LD, LN, DO, DA „stVal“, DataSet, LD, LN, DO, DA „stVal“, DataSet,
Publisher Control Block Publisher Control Block
IED A does not need a MMS/TCP/IP connection!! xx SCL File
NettedAutomation
Information
exchange Configuration of Server/Subscriber for multiple Publisher
Server A + Subscriber Server B + Server C + Server D +

Publisher Publisher Publisher
GOOSE GOOSE GOOSE
Real Server A and

Subscriber:
Real Server B
Shadow Server B and Publisher
and Publisher
Real Server C
Shadow Server C and Publisher
and Publisher
Real Server D
Shadow Server D and Publisher
and Publisher
.SCD – Substation Configuration Description
.CID – Configured IED Description A Shadow Server X contains usually a

= “SCD file, possibly stripped down to
what the concerned IED shall know.” subset of the model of the real Server X.
NettedAutomation

NettedAutomation
GmbH
Information
exchange Configuration of Server/Subscriber
NettedAutomation
Basics of Information exchange
■ Get, Monitoring, Logging basics

■ Get Data and Get DataSet
■ DataSets used by Controlblocks
NettedAutomation
Information
exchange GetDataValues of Data Objects and DataSet
Client Server
GetDataValue ■ Access to one data object

value
one value – GetDataValue
■ Access to multiple data
GetDataValues
values objects
multiple values
– GetDataValues
CreateDataSet
confirmation
– GetDataSetValues
GetDatSetValues
values
multiple values
NettedAutomation

NettedAutomation
GmbH
Information
exchange Data Model, Data Set, Control Block, Message
Communication Values specified to LogicalNode.DataObject

Behaviour (cyclic, be monitored for
event, RBE, …, communication QE3XSWI1
logging) Pos
Dataset
QC1XSWI2
Control
Member Pos
Reporting Block
Member
Logging (4)
GOOSE …
Sampled Values
When/how what Values
Any status,
Message or measured value,
Log Entry setting, … can be
referenced in
DataSets
NettedAutomation
Information
exchange Control Blocks – configure message or log content
Control
Block Dataset QE3XSWI1
Report, Dataset Pos
Log, “SwitchPositions”
GOOSE, QC1XSWI2
or SMV QE3XSWI1.Pos Pos
QC1XSWI2.Pos
Control QE2XSWI3.Pos QE2XSWI3
Block QE1XSWI4.Pos Pos
QB1XSWI5.Pos
QE1XSWI4
Pos
Values specified to
Message or be monitored for
QB1XSWI5
Log Entry communication Pos
NettedAutomation
GOOSE
■ Basics
■ GOOSE Control Block
■ GOOSE Message
NettedAutomation

NettedAutomation
GmbH
Information
exchange GOOSE – configuring the content
Q1_XSWI dataset SwitchPositions

Q1_XSWI.Pos
Q8_XSWI Q8_XSWI.Pos
Q9_XSWI Q9_XSWI.Pos
Q51_XSWI.Pos
Q51_XSWI Q52_XSWI.Pos
Q52_XSWI
GOOSE Control
DatSet
ConfRev
AppID
AppID DatSetRef Value
NettedAutomation
Information
exchange GOOSE – Generic object oriented event
dataset SwitchPositions
Off On On Off
On On
Publisher
On On On Off | n
On Off n-1
On Off On On Off | n-1 On On On On Off | n
Parameters in Message:
Off
On On
- Status Number (shown)
- Sequence Number
Subscriber
- Time allowed to live
NettedAutomation
MMS Data for

GOOSE GOOSE Message payload (IEC 61850-8-1 Ed1)
NettedAutomation

NettedAutomation
GmbH
GOOSE The MMS Ethereal analyzer – GOOSE
Encoding of
“Sequence Number” of
a GOOSE message
NettedAutomation
Sampled Values
■ Basics
■ SV Control Block
■ Implementation Guideline 9-2LE
NettedAutomation
Information
exchange Transmission of sampled values
n-1 n
n-4 n-3 n-2 n-3 n-2

n-2 n-1 n
n-4
n-4 n-3
n-1 n
Subscriber
Publisher
NettedAutomation

NettedAutomation
GmbH
MV Sampled value message (according to UCAIUG Spec.)
NettedAutomation
Control model
■ Basics
■ Details (example)
NettedAutomation
Information
exchange Control Model
IEC 61850-7-2 Ed2 SCL:
■ Status Only
■ Direct control
– normal security
Operate, TimeActivatedOperate, Cancel
– enhanced security
Operate, TimeActivatedOperate, Cancel, CommandTermination
■ SBO control (Select Before Operate)

– normal security
Select, Operate, TimeActivatedOperate, Cancel
– enhanced security
SelectWithValue, Operate, TimeActivatedOperate, Cancel,
CommandTermination
NettedAutomation

NettedAutomation
GmbH
Information
exchange Control Model Services
IEC 61850-7-2 Ed2
■ Select (Sel)
■ SelectWithValue (SelVal)
■ Cancel (Cancel)
■ Operate (Oper)
■ CommandTermination (CmdTerm)
■ TimeActivatedOperate (TimOper)
■ TimeActivatedOperateTermination
NettedAutomation
Information
exchange Control Model Pre-Conditions (example)
IEC 61850-6 Ed2
■ LLN0.Mod = “on”
SCL:
■ HeatKFAN1.OpCtl.ctlModel = “direct-with-normal-security”
■ HeatKFAN1.Mod = “on”
SCL:
NettedAutomation
Information
exchange Direct control with normal security
Client Server (Control Object) Operated Device IEC 61850-7-2 Ed2
Operate (ctlVal=open)
Activation of device
Operate rsp+ Activate output mechanism
Control model (61850-7-2)

between
open Acquisition of status
from device
Report (open)
Reporting (61850-7-2)
NettedAutomation

NettedAutomation
GmbH
Information
exchange Direct control with normal security (HMS Anybus SG Gateway)
Input must be two bits for DPC (Double Point Status)
NettedAutomation
Information
exchange Direct control with enhanced security

between
from device
Report (open)
Reporting (61850-7-2) Deactivate output
Deactivation of device
CmdTerm mechanism (wait until
completion of switch
gear drive operation,
… persistent output)
NettedAutomation
Information
exchange Direct control with enhanced security (examples)
■ CommandTermination (CmdTerm) – Application examples
■ A circuit breaker (CB) spring (drive) mechanism may work that it is only charged
when the CB is Opened or Tripped. Then the energy in the spring mechanism
would be enough to perform a Close Operation as well as a Trip Operation.
■ As the Trip mechanism does not need spring re-charging, it is instantaneous.
However, there is a big delay after the Trip operation which is needed for the
spring to charge or reset the mechanism again.
■ Although the indication of Trip will be instantaneous and reported spontaneously,
however the switchgear cannot accept a new command since the spring
mechanism is being recharged. During this time, the unit will not transmit the
‘Command Termination’ message so that a new command cannot be initiated.
Once the spring is successfully charged, a ‘Command Termination’ message is
transferred.
■ The CB mechanism example given above is one of many… there are some
linear actuators which can Over-shoot during the process of operating the switch,
this is then re-adjusted (i.e., brought to the normal position) after the
instantaneous status change. The extra time needed to re-align actuator position
(or to bring the actuator in the dead zone), will be the time after which the
‘command termination’ message is sent out.
NettedAutomation

NettedAutomation
GmbH
Information
exchange SBO control (Select Before Operate) with normal security
Select Block additional

Client, 2-step
Select rsp+ Select process, …

between
from device
Report (open)
Reporting (61850-7-2)
NettedAutomation
Information
exchange SBO control (Select Before Operate) with enhanced security
SelectWithValue (open) Block additional Client,

2-step process, …
SelectWithValue rsp+ Select check o/c

between
from device
Report (open)
Reporting (61850-7-2) Deactivate output
Deactivation of device
CmdTerm mechanism (wait until
completion of switch
gear drive operation,
Control model (61850-7-2) de-select, …)
NettedAutomation
Information
exchange Control (1) IEC 61850-7-2 Ed2
Operate Select SelectWithValue CommandTermination

Parameter name Parameter name Parameter name Parameter name
Request Request Request Request
ControlObjectReference ControlObjectReference ControlObjectReference ControlObjectReference
ctlVal Response+ ctlVal ctlVal
origin ControlObjectReference operTm[0..1] operTm[0..1]
ctlNum Response– origin origin
T ControlObjectReference ctlNum ctlNum
Test AddCause [0..1] T T
Check ServiceError Test Test
Response+ Check Check
ControlObjectReference Response+ Request–
ctlVal ControlObjectReference ControlObjectReference
origin ctlVal ctlVal
ctlNum All seven (7) operTm[0..1] operTm[0..1]
T parameters have to be origin origin
Test provided in one ctlNum ctlNum
Check message … “write” to T T
Response– Test Test
ControlObjectReference
ctlVal only is not
Check Check
ctlVal sufficient. Response– AddCause
origin ControlObjectReference
ctlNum ctlVal
T operTm[0..1]
Test origin
Check ctlNum
AddCause T
ServiceError Test
Check
AddCause
ServiceError
NettedAutomation

NettedAutomation
GmbH
Setting group control
■ Example for protection LN

settings
■ Control block
NettedAutomation
IEC 61850
control blocks Settings and setting group control
Logical node LN PVOC

Status information
... actual
setting
Settings values
Minimum Operate Time MinOpTmms 122
Operating Curve Type (volt.) AVCrv 3
Operating Curve Type (amp) TmACrv 12
Time Multiplier TmMult 435
Reset Curve Type TypRsCrv 564
Maximum Operate Time MaxOpTmms 653
Operate Delay Time OpDlTmms 45
Reset Delay Time RsDlTmms 43
LN PDIF
Settings
Restraint Mode RstMod 9
NettedAutomation
IEC 61850
control blocks Setting group control block (SGCB )
Active settings (exposed in settings to be edited

the corresponding LNs)
122 222
3 111
12 121
435 543
564 122 3 12 435 564 653 45 43 9 243
653 23
45 43
21 13 211 243 828 42 43 5 8 4
43
222 111 121 543 243 23 43 4 4
available settings
9 4
NettedAutomation

NettedAutomation
GmbH
Data exchange details
■ Get Data
■ Get DataSet
■ Reporting mechanisms
■ Comparison reporting with publisher
■ Report Message
■ SCL examples for reporting
■ Various features and applications
■ The various „Keep alives“ in IEC
61850
NettedAutomation
Information
exchange The data object and how to exchange values
■ Overview of all methods to exchange values from a data

object (e.g. a status point)
– The data object and GetDataValues
– The dataset and dataset access
– The dataset and reporting/logging (dchg – data change)
– The dataset and reporting/logging (integrity)
– The dataset and reporting (general interrogation)
– Reporting remarks
– Summary of values from data object
■ The exchange services discussed here will be presented
in more detail in other modules. The objective here is to
have all methods together in order to compare them.
NettedAutomation
Information
exchange The data object and GetDataValues (polling)
Client Server
(data objects)
One data object
QE3XSWI1
GetDataVales „QE3XSWI1.Pos“ Pos
Value of „QE3XSWI1.Pos“ QC1XSWI2
Pos
Many data objects
QE2XSWI3
GetDataVales Pos
„QE3XSWI1.Pos“,
„QC1XSWI2.Pos“, … QE1XSWI4
Pos
Values of
„QE3XSWI1.Pos“, QB1XSWI5
„QC1XSWI2.Pos“, …
Pos
NettedAutomation

NettedAutomation
GmbH
Information
exchange The dataset and dataset access (polling)
Created by programming,
Client configuration or
communication
One DataSet
QE3XSWI1
GetDataSetValues Dataset Pos
„SwitchPositions“
“SwitchPositions”
QC1XSWI2
QE3XSWI1.Pos Pos
Many values
QC1XSWI2.Pos
QE2XSWI3.Pos QE2XSWI3
Values of
„QE3XSWI1.Pos“, QE1XSWI4.Pos Pos
„QC1XSWI2.Pos“, … QB1XSWI5.Pos
QE1XSWI4
Pos
QB1XSWI5
Pos
NettedAutomation
Information
exchange Reporting (General)
Client Server *
■ Events
Configure report control – Data change
– Quality change
event
Report – Data update (counter)
– Integrity period expired
(cyclic)
– General interrogation (on
event request)
Report
event
Report
* Data Set and Control Block not shown
NettedAutomation
Information
exchange Reporting (unbuffered)
Client Server
■ Two kind of reports
– Unbuffered reports – events
event may be lost due to
Report
communication interruption
or overflow
event
– Buffered reports – used for
No Communication: sequence of events (to some
No Reports sent event practical limits!)
(Events lost!)
event
new Report
NettedAutomation

NettedAutomation
GmbH
Information
exchange Reporting (buffered)
Client Server
■ Two kind of reports
– Unbuffered reports – events
event may be lost due to
Report
communication interruption
or overflow
event
– Buffered reports – used for
No Communication: sequence of events (to some
No Reports sent event practical limits!).
(But Events buffered) Sending buffered reports
may take minutes – deferring
Buffered events a new report quite long.
Buffered Reports
event
new Report
NettedAutomation
Information
exchange The dataset and reporting (dchg – data change)
set by programming,
Client configuration or Server
dynamically by Set
SetRCBValues Report Dataset

DatSet=„SwitchPositions“ Control Block “SwitchPositions”
“SW-Pos”
SetRCBValues DatSet QE3XSWI1.Pos
„RptEna=TRUE“ RptEna QC1XSWI2.Pos
TrgOps=dchg QE2XSWI3.Pos
IntgPd=0
QE1XSWI4.Pos
QB1XSWI5.Pos
Value of
„QB1XSWI5.Pos“
In the event of a change of the data value
(dchg) the changed value only will be
reported – RBE Report By Exception ;
identified by an inclusion bitstring.
NettedAutomation
Information
Client Server
(.icd + IP Address + IED Name)
inclusion bitstring Dataset

(Index) “SwitchPositions”
0 QE3XSWI1.Pos
What is that? 0 QC1XSWI2.Pos
0 QE2XSWI3.Pos
How to interpret? 0 QE1XSWI4.Pos
1 QB1XSWI5.Pos
true,
valid,
t
No Names !
true, valid, t Just Boolean value of
changed object !
Report
NettedAutomation

NettedAutomation
GmbH
Information
Client Server
(.cid) (.icd + IP Address + IED Name)
Dataset inclusion bitstring Dataset

“SwitchPositions” (Index) “SwitchPositions”
QE3XSWI1.Pos 0 0 QE3XSWI1.Pos
QC1XSWI2.Pos 0 0 QC1XSWI2.Pos
Conf
QE2XSWI3.Pos 0 0 QE2XSWI3.Pos
QE1XSWI4.Pos 0
Rev 0 QE1XSWI4.Pos
QB1XSWI5.Pos 1 1 QB1XSWI5.Pos
true,
valid,
t
No Names !
true, valid, t Just Boolean value of
changed object !
Report
NettedAutomation
Information The dataset and reporting (dchg – data change)

exchange
and buffer time (BufTm)
Client Server
Report Dataset
Control Block “SwitchPositions”
“SW-Pos”
DatSet QE3XSWI1.Pos
RptEna QC1XSWI2.Pos
TrgOps=dchg QE2XSWI3.Pos
BufTm=1s
QE1XSWI4.Pos
IntgPd=0
QB1XSWI5.Pos
„buffered“ Values of
„QC1XSWI2.Pos“
„QB1XSWI5.Pos“ In the event of a change of the data value (dchg)
the changed values will be buffered (BufTm) to
collect all changes during the buffer time of 1
second (has nothing to do with buffered reporting)
NettedAutomation
Information
exchange Polling versus (event) Reporting
Karlheinz Police
I lost my Canon camera
9:00 h
Did you find my camera?
10:00 h No!

10:15 h
No! BIG DATA
(good for providers of
10:30 h network infrastructures,
No!
storage systems, and
central data processing
Don’t call us … we will call you software)
11:00 h when we found your camera
Found the camera
We found your camera!!

20:00 h SMART DATA FAKE DATA
NettedAutomation

NettedAutomation
GmbH
Information
exchange Polling versus (event) Reporting
■ Assuming a (cycle) rate of polling of One (1) poll request

per 5 seconds and One (1) value change in 10 minutes
■ Polling requires per 10 minutes
– 120 Requests and
– 120 Responses with the values
■ Reporting requires only
– One (1) „Response“ (MMS Information Report) with the value(s)
■ Reporting saves 99.2 % of messages
– NO value change  NO Message
■ Event may be 4.999 seconds delayed when polling
NettedAutomation
Information
exchange The dataset and reporting (integrity)
set by
Client configuration Server
or dynamically
SetRCBValues RCB Dataset

„TrgOps=integrity“ “SW-Pos” “SwitchPositions”
SetRCBValues DatSet QE3XSWI1.Pos

„IntgPd=1000“ RptEna QC1XSWI2.Pos
TrgOps=integ QE2XSWI3.Pos
IntgPd=1000
Values of QE1XSWI4.Pos
„QE3XSWI1.Pos“, QB1XSWI5.Pos
Values of ALL values are

„QE3XSWI1.Pos“, reported every
„QC1XSWI2.Pos“, … 1000 ms by Server
NettedAutomation
Information
exchange Polling versus Integrity Period
■ Assuming the same (cycle) rate of polling and integrity

period
■ Polling requires
– One (1) Request and One (1) Response with the values
■ Integrity requires only
– One (1) Response with the values
■ Integrity saves 50 % of messages
■ Monitoring the sequence of integrity reports: if there is a
value change between two integrity reports and no
report on data change between the two  a report was
lost.
NettedAutomation

NettedAutomation
GmbH
Information
exchange The dataset and reporting (general interrogation)
set by
Client configuration Server
or dynamically
RCB Dataset
SetRCBValues
„TrgOps=general “SW-Pos” “SwitchPositions”
Interrogation“
DatSet QE3XSWI1.Pos
RptEna QC1XSWI2.Pos
SetRCBValues
TrgOps=gi QE2XSWI3.Pos
„GI=TRUE“
GI
QE1XSWI4.Pos
QB1XSWI5.Pos
Values of
„QE3XSWI1.Pos“,
ALL values are
reported on
request by Client
NettedAutomation
Information
exchange Reporting remarks
■ One or more trigger options (TrgOps) can be

selected.
■ Almost all values for the attributes of a control
block may be fixed (by application), configured
(configuration) or set dynamically through a
communication service by the client.
Example: Reinhausen Tap Change Controller.
■ Reports may be sent on the initiative of the client
or the server
NettedAutomation
Information
exchange Discussion of report configuration
■ If the engineer of the server IED does not know what the client
needs, he may configure many big data sets and configure the
report control blocks in a way that reports contain names of the
objects with the values (option field „data name“=TRUE) and set the
integrity period to a small value …
■ The client may need only 5 per cent of the values … and no names
… but it has to receive the huge data sets for GI and integrity reports
■ GI may take so long that the client disconnects …
■ Some prefer to configure the data sets dynamically in order to
specify only those data objects as members that it really needs.
■ Statically configured datasets and report control blocks require a
very good engineering – you have to think first, before you configure
the IED.
NettedAutomation

NettedAutomation
GmbH
Information
exchange Summary of accessing data objects (1)
■ Get a value of single data object (GetDataValues – Client initiated)
■ Get a list of values of data objects (GetDataValues with list sent in each
request – Client initiated)
■ Get the complete list values of data objects using a dataset object
(GetDataSetValues – Client initiated)
■ Get the complete list of values of data objects (of a dataset) using
reporting (reporting, General Interrogation – Client initiated)
■ Get the complete list of values of data objects (of a dataset) using
reporting (reporting, Integrity period – Server initiated)
■ Get one (BufTm=0) or more (BufTm>0) value(s) of data objects (of a
dataset) using reporting on data and quality change and data update –
Server initiated)
■ GOOSE and Sampled Values … exchanges complete list of values of
data objects of a dataset (events: application specific – Server initiated)
■ Get sequence of value(s) of data objects (of a dataset) using logging
(on data and quality change and data update – Client initiated)
NettedAutomation
Information
exchange Summary of accessing data objects (2)
Reporting GOOSE / SMV

Max. message size … 64.000 … octets < 1.500 octets
Segmentation Yes (option in Report) No
Flow control Yes (TCP) No
Detection of loss Yes (TCP) Yes (var. counters)
Reliable transmission Yes (TCP) Yes (re-transm. / cyc.)
Network routing Yes (IP) No (Yes: 90-5 UDP/IP)
Relation – 1:1 Yes No / Yes
Relation – 1:n Yes (multiple CBs) Yes (Layer 2 multicast)
Timeliness … 1 sec … … few msec …
General Interrogation Yes No
Layers 1 … 7, Application 1,2,7, Application
Documents IEC 61850-7-2, 8-1 IEC 61850-7-2, 8-1 / 9-2
NettedAutomation
Reporting Buffered report control block

Configurable ID
Enable reporting
Data to be reported
Revision of
configuration
What to include in
reports?
Time to wait for

further events before
sending report
Sequence # of report
Which triggers?
Periodic report
General
interrogation
Purge Buffer
Entry ID
Time of Entry
Reservation time
Owner
NettedAutomation

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GmbH
Reporting Report changes of reporting attributes
Report control
block 5
RCB4.RptEna = FALSE
RptEna = TRUE
DatSet = X
Report control block 1
RptEnacontrol block 2
Data Set X Report
RCB1.RptEna
RCB2.RptEna RptEna
Report control block 3
RCB3.RptEna
The formal model for this RCB4.RptEna RptEnacontrol block 4
Report
function is defined in the
Service Tracking Model in RptEna
IEC 61850-7-2 Ed2
NettedAutomation
Reporting Configure report control block
Services
Data Sets
Unbuffered
report control
block
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General
Settings
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GmbH
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NettedAutomation
Information
exchange Logging
Client Server
■ Almost the same as
buffered Reporting:
– Events are locally logged and not
sent immediately
event – Events (Log entries) can be queried
later
Events logged – Events can be reported immediately
event
at any time and logged by applying one DataSet
that is used by reporting and
logging.
– A log may also be retrieved by a file
Query Log Entries
Logged events formatted by COMFEDE (Common
Format for Event Data Exchange
(COMFEDE) for Power Systems;
Log Entries IEEE C37.239)
NettedAutomation

S-0207 – IEC 61850-6 System Configuration Language NettedAutomation
GmbH
IEC 61850-6 System

configuration language

Karlsruhe (Germany)
schwarz@scc-online.de
NettedAutomation
GmbH
© 2004-2017 NettedAutomation GmbH
Content
■ Title and Applications of SCL Files

■ Applications of SCL Files
■ The object model and content of the SCL
files
■ Examples
■ Binding models to real world, inputs,
outputs, …
■ Function modeling
■ Functional and product naming
■ Challenge with subsets
■ Order, order confirmation, delivery note,
and delivery – as example for reporting,
GOOSE and SV
NettedAutomation
SCL Title and Applications of SCL Files
■ “Configuration description language for communication

in electrical substations related to IED’s” – SCL
■ Edition 2 has been published in 2009-12
■ Edition 2.1 is in process (2017-02)
■ SCL is an XML (ASCII) based language that allows a
formal description of
– an automation system (substation, …) and the switchyard
including the relation between them
– the IED configuration (information produced and consumed)
– the information logistics (flow between IEDs and LNs)
– some configuration
– the communication network
■ SCL file sizes grow beyond 80 MB (2017-03)

NettedAutomation

GmbH
SCL What is XML? A two minute course ...
■ Search for "Guenther" AND "Wilhelm".

■ Google returns 18,700,000 hits.
■ I could not specify that "Guenther" is the first name and
"Wilhelm" is the family name.
■ Searching for "Guenther Wilhelm" returns just 30,000 hits.
■ The second is closer to what I am looking for.
■ I would like to search:
– "firstname = Guenther" and
– "familyname = Wilhelm".
■ In this example we have added some semantic (meaning) to
the names by the terms „firstname“ and “familyname“.
NettedAutomation
SCL What is XML? A two minute course ...
Business Card Business Card

on paper as XML Document
Guenther Wilhelm <Firstname>Guenther</Firstname>

Im Eichbaeumle 108 <Familyname>Wilhelm</Familyname>
76139 Karlsruhe <Street>Im Eichbaeumle 108</Street>
+49 721 684844 <Zip>76139</Zip>
+49 721 679387 <Town>Karlsruhe</Town>
<Tel>+49 721 684844</Tel>
<Fax>+49 721 679387</Fax>
<Fax> … </Fax> = Wrapper, meaning
NettedAutomation
SCL What is XML? A five minute course ...

XML Schema as XML Document
(princip)
<Firstname> mandatory <Firstname>Guenther</Firstname>

<Familyname> mandatory <Familyname>Wilhelm</Familyname>
<Street> mandatory <Street>Im Eichbaeumle 108</Street>
<Zip> mandatory <Zip>76139</Zip>
Conform to
<Town> mandatory Schema?
<Town>Karlsruhe</Town>
<Tel> optional <Tel>+49 721 684844</Tel>
<Fax> optional <Fax>+49 721 679387</Fax>
Conform to
Conform to
Conform to
Content
XML?
XML?
Spec?
NettedAutomation

GmbH

XML Schema as XML Document
(princip)
<Firstname> mandatory <Firstname>Guenther</Firstname>

<Familyname> mandatory <Familyname>Wilhelm</Familyname>
<Street> mandatory <Street>Im Eichbaeumle 108</Street>
<Zip> mandatory <Zip>76139</Zip>
Conform to
<Town> mandatory Schema? <Towwn>Karllzruhe</Towwn>
<Tel> optional No! <Tel>+49 721 684844</Tel>
<Fax> optional <Fax Tel>+49 721 679387<\Fax>
Conform to
Conform to
Conform to
XML? No!
XML? No!
Spec? No!
Content
NettedAutomation
Conform to
XML XML?
SCL Schema Conform to

IEC 61850-6 SCL Schema? SCL File
Logical Node
Classes and
Conform to
Common Models?
Data
Classes
IEC 61850-7-x
e.g., DNV/KEMA SCL Checker (see demo and hands-on training)
NettedAutomation
SCL Use-cases of SCL
1. System design → single line diagram (re-useable designs in library)

2. System engineering → System configuration (re-useable config.)
3. IED development → IED capabilites (fixed … open functions)
4. IED requirements → IED needs (procurement)
5. IED configuration/parameterization → running IEDs
6. Documentation → provides view of system
7. Original SCL file → check if it is still the same in all IEDs
8. Plausibility/verification → check if system is able to run
9. Self description of IEDs → Retrieve IED section from IED by services
10. Validation of Device content → Check model against standard
11. Simulate I/Os of IEDs for testing → e.g., OPC and Fieldbus driven
remote I/O
Bold = use case example on the following slides
NettedAutomation

GmbH
SCL Use-cases of SCL
12. Simulate IEDs → Generate virtual IEDs on computer from SCL file
13. Message interpretation → Use SCL file to get semantic of the model
14. Message tracing → Hunt, e.g., for GOOSE messages and compare with
SCD file if this GOOSE message is from a known publisher
15. White list of all relation patterns (server-client, publisher-subscriber)
16. LN-Type in SCL → Use for Client graphic template (see STMP)
17. Calculate traffic throughput – check against network infrastructure (e.g.,
100 Mbit/s)
18. Manage Ethernet Switches → block input or output ports
19. Map IEC 61850 CDCs automatically to IEC 60870-5-10x or DNP3
20. Simulation of power system, HW-in-the-loop-test, see OPAL RT
21. …
Bold = use case example on the following slides
NettedAutomation
Content of SCL
File Elements of the SCL file
.SSD System Specification Description

Data exchange from a system specification tool to the system configurator
.SCD Substation Configuration Description

Data exchange from the system configurator to IED configurators
.ICD IED Capability Description

Data exchange from the IED configurator to the system configurator
.CID Configured IED Description

Data exchange from the IED configurator to the IED
It is an SCD file, possibly stripped down to what the concerned IED shall know
(restricted view of source IEDs)
.IID Instantiated IED Description

Data exchange from the IED configurator to the system configurator
.SED System Exchange Description

Data exchange between system configurators of different projects
Quite often you will find that the file extensions are used in a non-conformant way.
NettedAutomation
Use of
SCL Files (1) System design
Real world =
Circuit Breaker
Single line
61850-6 SCL configuration file (XML) diagram
NettedAutomation

GmbH
Use of
SCL Files Single line diagram with standard designation
PDIS1
Substation Berlin220_132 =I1 =Q1

with one transformer T1 L1 =D1
between voltage levels D1
and E1, and a bay E1Q2. W1
Conducting
The transformer T1 has two =T1 PDIF1
Equipment
windings W1 and W2. W2
L3 =U1
Winding W1 is connected to a
220 kV voltage level D1 at bay =I1 TCTR1 PTOF1 =E1
Q1, connectivity node L1. L2
Winding W2 is connected to =QA1 XCBR1 CSWI1 CILO1
the bay Q2 in 132 kV voltage L1
level E1.
=QB1 =Q2
Designation according to IEC
61346 series. =W1
B1
NettedAutomation
Use of
SCL Files (1) System Specification „Substation“
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<SCL xmlns="http://www.iec.ch/61850/2003/SCL"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" version="2007" revision="A">
<Header id="SSD Example"/>
<Substation name="Berlin220_132">
<PowerTransformer name="T1" type="PTR">
<LNode lnInst="1" lnClass="PDIF" ldInst="F1"/>
<LNode lnInst="1" lnClass="TCTR" ldInst="C1"/>
substationName="baden220_132" voltageLevelName="D1"
bayName="Q1" cNodeName="L1"/>
</TransformerWinding>
…
</PowerTransformer>
<VoltageLevel name="D1">
<Bay name="Q1">
<LNode lnInst="1" lnClass="PDIS" ldInst="F1"/>
<ConductingEquipment name="I1" type="CTR">
substationName="baden220_132" voltageLevelName="D1" bayName="Q1"
cNodeName="L1"/>
<ConnectivityNode name="L1" pathName="berlin220_132/D1/Q1/L1"/>
</Bay>
…
NettedAutomation
Use of
SCL Files (1) Single line diagram with stand. designation
Real HV Substation Specification (2014)
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GmbH
Use of
SCL Files (1) Single line diagram with stand. designation
Real HV Substation Specification (2014)
NettedAutomation
Use of
SCL Files IEC 60870-5-104 information model (RWE)
NettedAutomation
Use of
SCL Files (2) System engineering
Virtual World
Mapping
TCP/IP LN
MMS MMS LN LN
Network
XCBR
OpCnt
Pos
...
Real world =
Circuit Breaker
Single line
61850-6 SCL configuration file (XML) diagram
Binding
Models of the real real world
Client Communication world Objects to models
Mappings
Information
Communication Exchange Services
Network
NettedAutomation

GmbH
Use of
SCL Files (2) System engineering (information flow)
ABB ITT600: AA1_example.scd
NettedAutomation
Use of
SCL Files (3) IED capability (.icd Document)
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<SCL xmlns="http://www.iec.ch/61850/2003/SCL„
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.iec.ch/61850/2003/SCL SCL.xsd">
<Header id="TC260" nameStructure="IEDName"/>
<IED name="TEMPLATE" type="TAPCON" manufacturer="MR-Reinhausen">
<Services>
<DynAssociation/>
<GetDirectory/>
<GetDataObjectDefinition/>
<DataObjectDirectory/>
<GetDataSetValue/>
<SetDataSetValue/>
<DataSetDirectory/>
<ConfDataSet max="4" maxAttributes="25"/>
<ReadWrite/>
<ConfReportControl max="4"/>
<GetCBValues/>
</Services>
<AccessPoint name="MRTapconAccessPoint">
<Server>
<LDevice inst="TC260">
<LN0 inst="" lnClass="LLN0" lnType="LN0">
<DataSet name="DataSet01">
<FCDA ldInst="TC260" prefix="" lnClass="LLN0" doName="Mod„
…
NettedAutomation
Use of
SCL Files (8) Plausibility/verification, check if system is able to run
FCDA has FC=“ST”;

no “ST” in DO.DA
DO.DA has FC=“SP”; no

“ST” in DO.DA
2016-09-20
NettedAutomation

GmbH
Use of
SCL Files (8) Plausibility/verification, check if system is able to run
■ The following tools did not care about the error:

• DNV/KEMA SCL-Checker (V3.29)
• IEDScout (4.1)
• Siemens SCL Validator
• SystemCorp ICD-Designer
■ Only the stack from SystemCorp reported the error:
2016-09-20
NettedAutomation
Use of
SCL Files (11) Simulate IEDs
PC /
Mapping
TCP/IP XCBR
MMS MMS
Network OpCnt embedded
...
Pos Controller
Generate “IED”
from Model in
SCL
61850-6 SCL configuration file (XML)
Models of the real

world Objects
Information
Exchange Services
NettedAutomation
Use of
SCL Files (12) Message interpretation
Virtual World
Mapping
TCP/IP LN
MMS MMS LN LN
Network
XCBR
Analyze values and OpCnt
semantic by UNICA Pos
importing the ...
Analyzer
corresponding SCL
Document
61850-6 SCL configuration file (XML)
Models of the real

Client Communication world Objects
Mappings
Information
Communication Exchange Services
Network
NettedAutomation

GmbH
Content of the SCL file
■ The object model of the SCL

file
■ The elements of the SCL file
NettedAutomation
Content of SCL
File SCL object model (simplified)
Communication structure
Functional / Substation structure
Sub- 1 Access 1..* Product / IED structure
network 0,1
1..* Point
Client access points
1
1 1 1 0..* 1
IED Server LDevice LN Data
LNode LNType
0 ..*
1
ConnectivityNode
0..2
1 1 1 1 1 1
Substation 1 Voltage
1 Bay
1 Conducting
1 Subdevice /
Level Equipment Phase
VTR DIS CBR
NettedAutomation
Functional and
product naming Functional hierarchy and functional naming
Station
Voltage Level
Bay Bay
Function
Sub
Function
LN
Station VoltageLevel Bay Function SubFunction prefixLNsuffix DataObject
Berlin 110kV E2 Protection Distance DSRREC7 Mod.stVal
Names specified by configuration Names defined in IEC 61850
NettedAutomation

GmbH
Functional and
product naming Functional naming and product naming
Functional naming
Station VoltageLevel Bay Function SubFunction prefixLNsuffix DataObject
Berlin 110kV E2 Protection Distance DSRREC7 Mod.stVal
Names specified by configuration Names defined in IEC 61850
Product naming
IED Name LD Name prefixLNsuffix DataObject
Vendor A:
E01DIS_DIS1 CTRL RREC1 Mod.stVal
Vendor B:
IED87 PROT 87RREC2 Mod.stVal
Further discussion see end of presentation
NettedAutomation
Content of SCL
Header
<?xml version ="1.0"?>
Substation Section
<SCL xmlns="http://www.iec.ch/61850/2003/SCL" ...
<Header id="Substation
<Substation Atlanta" nameStructure = "IEDName"/>
name="Atlanta">
Communication
<Voltage LevelSection
name="D1" >
<Communication>
IED<SubNetwork
Section
<Bay name="Q1">
...>
IED Section
<LNode
<ConnectedAP
<IED name lnInst="1"
"E1Q1SB1"> lnClass="PDIS"...>
iedName="E1Q1SB1" ...>
<ConductingEquipment
<Address>
<AccessPoint name="S1"> name="QA1" type="CBR">
Data Type Templates
<Server><LNode
<P lnInst="1" lnClass="CSWI"...>
type="IP">10.0.0.11</P>
<LNodeType</Address>
id="CTRa"
<Terminal
<LDevice lnClass="TCTR">
connectivityNode="Pt1">
inst="C1">
<DO name="Mmode"
<SMV Terminal
<LN0 type="myINC"/>
< idInst="C1" connectivityNode
cbName="Volt">
lnType="LN0" ="Pt2">
lnClass="LLN0" inst=""/>
</LNodeType
lnType="myRDRE" ...
<Address>
<LN lnClass="RDRE" inst="1">
<DOType id="myINC"
<P cdc="INC">
type="MAC-Address">01-0C-CD-04-01-01</P>
<DOI name="FltNum">
<DA name="ctlVal"
</Address> fc="CO" bType="INT32"/>
... name="stVal">
<DAI
</DOType> <Val>125</Val>
<DAType id="myAnalogValue">
</DAI> ...
<BDA name="f"
</LDevice>bType="FLOAT32"/>
...
</DAType> ...
NettedAutomation
Content of SCL
Header
<?xml version ="1.0"?>
<SCL xmlns="http://www.iec.ch/61850/2003/SCL" ...
<Header id="Substation Atlanta" nameStructure = "IEDName"/>
Substation Section
<Substation name="Atlanta">
<Voltage Level name="D1" >
<Bay name="Q1">
<LNode lnInst="1" lnClass="PDIS"...>
<ConductingEquipment name="QA1" type="CBR">
<LNode lnInst="1" lnClass="CSWI"...>
<Terminal connectivityNode="Pt1">
< Terminal connectivityNode ="Pt2">
</ConductingEquipment> ...
NettedAutomation

GmbH
Content of SCL
Communication Section
<Communication>
<SubNetwork ...>
<ConnectedAP iedName="E1Q1SB1" ...>
<Address>
<P type="IP">10.0.0.11</P>
</Address>
<SMV idInst="C1" cbName="Volt">
<Address>
<P type="MAC-Address">01-0C-CD-04-01-01</P>
</Address> ...
NettedAutomation
Content of SCL
IED Section
<IED name "E1Q1SB1">
<AccessPoint name="S1">
<Server>
<LDevice inst="C1">
<LN0 lnType="LN0" lnClass="LLN0" inst=""/>
<LN lnType="myRDRE" lnClass="RDRE" inst="1"/>
<DOI name="FltNum">
<DAI name="stVal">
<Val>125</Val>
</DAI> ...
</LDevice>
...
NettedAutomation
Content of SCL
Data Type Templates

<LNodeType id="CTRa" lnClass="TCTR">
<DO name="Mmode" type="myINC"/>
</LNodeType
<DOType id="myINC" cdc="INC">
<DA name="ctlVal" fc="CO" bType="INT32"/>
</DOType>
<DAType id="myAnalogValue">
<BDA name="f" bType="FLOAT32"/>
</DAType>
...
NettedAutomation

GmbH
Content of SCL
File Data type templates
<LNodeType id="9-2LETCTR" lnClass="TCTR">

<DO name="Amp" type="9-2LESAVAmp"/>
</LNodeType>
<DOType id="9-2LESAVAmp" cdc="SAV">

<DA name="instMag" bType="Struct" type="9-2LEAV" fc="MX"/>
<DA name="q" bType="Quality" fc="MX"/>
<DA name="sVC" bType="Struct" type="9-2LEsVCAmp" fc="CF"/>
</DOType>
<DAType id="9-2LEsVCAmp">
<BDA name="scaleFactor" bType="FLOAT32">
<Val>0.001</Val>
</BDA>
<BDA name="offset" bType="FLOAT32">
<Val>0</Val>
</BDA>
</DAType>
NettedAutomation
Binding models to real world, inputs,

outputs, …
■ Inputs in SCL
■ The Problem to be solved
■ Data and Functions
NettedAutomation
Inputs and
binding to use Inputs in SCL
■ Specifies which data values are required in a

Logical Node coming from a Logical Node in
another IED.
■ A wide range of optional details can be provided
to specify also how these values are
communicated and bound to the internal
application at the receiving IED (and sending
IED).
■ The following presentation introduces the Edition
1 of IEC 61850-6 and the extended possibilities
of Edition 2.
NettedAutomation

GmbH
Inputs and
binding to use The Problem to be solved (need a value)
Need position
of circuit breaker Circuit
XYZ for breaker
„Interlocking“ XYZ
Communication
Function
NettedAutomation
Inputs and
binding to use The Problem to be solved (need a value)
IED B IED A
Need LN XCBR
position Pos.stVal
of circuit
breaker XYZ Communication
Circuit
breaker
XYZ
NettedAutomation
Inputs and
binding to use The Problem to be solved (refer to source)
IED B Reference IED A
IED B references to source in the

SCL
<Inputs>IED A…XCBR.Pos.stVal
Document LN XCBR
</Inputs>
Pos.stVal
Communication
Circuit
breaker
XYZ
NettedAutomation

GmbH
Inputs and
binding to use The Problem to be solved (use of values)
IED B
LN CILO
Values
SCL specifies the use of SCL
received values in IED B Document
in the <Inputs>… </Inputs>
Bind the
received
values to
LN CILO
NettedAutomation
Inputs and
binding to use The Problem to be solved (specify comm)
IED B IED A
SCL specifies/refers to SCL

Communication: Document
- GOOSE LN XCBR
- Reporting Pos.stVal
- Polling (Read)
- SMV
in the <Inputs>… </Inputs>
Communication Circuit
(Ed2) breaker
XYZ
NettedAutomation
Inputs and
binding to use The Problem to be solved (specify comm)
SCL specifies/refers to
IED B Control Block IED A
for Communication:
- GOOSE Control Block
SCL - Reporting
Document - SMV
in the <Inputs>… </Inputs> DataSet
LN XCBR
Pos.stVal
Source Control Block Circuit

(Ed2) breaker
XYZ
NettedAutomation

GmbH
Inputs and
binding to use Inputs in SCL (Edition 1)
Table 30 – Attributes of the Input/ExtRef element
Attribute name Description
iedName The name of the IED from where the input comes
ldInst The LD instance name from where the input comes
prefix The LN prefix
lnClass The LN class according to IEC 61850-7-x
lnInst The instance id of this LN instance of below LN class in the IED
doName A name identifying the DO (within the LN).In case of structured
DO, the name parts are concatenated by dots (.)
daName The attribute designating the input. The IED tool should use an
empty value if it has some default binding (IntAdr) for all process
input attributes of a DO (fc = ST or MX), especially for t and q. If
the attribute belongs to a data type structure, then the structure
name parts shall be separated by dots (.)
intAddr The internal address to which the input is bound. Only the IED
tool of the concerned IED shall use the value. All other tools
shall preserve it
NettedAutomation
Inputs and
binding to use Inputs in SCL (Edition 2)
Table 33 – Attributes of the Input/ExtRef element
All Attributes of Edition 1 plus the following
desc A free description / text. Can e.g. be used at system engineering
time to tell the IED engineer the purpose of this incoming data
serviceType Optional, values: Poll, Report, GOOSE, SMV, Typically used at

system design time to specify the service type to be used for
sending the needed input data
srcLDInst The LD inst of the source control block – if missing, same as
ldInst above
srcPrefix The prefix of the LN instance, where the source control block
resides; if missing, no prefix
srcLNClass The LN class of the LN, where the source control block resides;
if missing, LLN0
srcLNInst The LN instance number of the LN where the source control
block resides – if missing, no instance number exists (LLN0)
srcCBName The source CB name; if missing, then all othere srcXX attributes
should also be missing, i.e. no source control block is given.
NettedAutomation
Inputs and
binding to use Binding to external signals (Example Ed1)
<Inputs>
<ExtRef
iedName="I1M24C1
ldInst="CTRL" prefix="L79"
lnClass="GGIO"
lnInst="1"
doName="SPCSO13"
daName="q"
intAddr="CTRL/L79GGIO1/ST/SPCSO13/q"
/>
</Inputs>
NettedAutomation

GmbH
Data and
binding to Real
World
Problem of binding models to real world
IED A
LN XCBR1 LN XCBR2 LN XCBR3

Pos.stVal Pos.stVal Pos.stVal
? ? ?
Circuit Circuit Circuit

breaker breaker breaker
XYZ4 XYZ8 XYZ12
NettedAutomation
Data and
binding to Real
World
Problem of binding models to real world
IED A
LN XCBR1 LN XCBR2 LN XCBR3

Pos.stVal Pos.stVal Pos.stVal
I/O
DI4 DI5 DI6 Terminals
Wires
Circuit Circuit Circuit
breaker breaker breaker
XYZ4 XYZ8 XYZ12
DI = Digital Input
NettedAutomation
Data and
binding to Real
World
Problem solved with sAddr
IED A
SCL binds (links) the model „Pos.stVal“
to Digital Input DI4 and CB XYZ4:
<IED name=A>
LN XCBR1 SCL
<LN name=XCBR1
Document
Pos.stVal <DO name=Pos>
<DAI
name=„stVal“
sAddr=„DI4; XYZ4“/>
…
DI4
Circuit <DAI> = DataAttribute Instance

sAddr = Short Address, structure and
breaker meaning is vendor specific
XYZ4
NettedAutomation

GmbH
Data and
binding to Real
World
GOOSE: binding to Inputs and Outputs
IED B IED A
GOOSE #2 [TRUE]
LN CILO LN XCBR1
(Logic)
Pos.stVal
LN GGIO
SPCSO.ctlVal
Listen to GOOSE
with
DI4
XCBR1.Pos.stVal
DO3
Circuit
breaker
XYZ4
NettedAutomation
Data and
binding to Real
World
GOOSE messaging
IED A
LN XCBR1
GOOSE #2 [TRUE]
Ethernet Pos.stVal
Network
DI4
Circuit
breaker
XYZ4
NettedAutomation
Data and
binding to Real
World
GOOSE binding to Inputs
IED B IED A
LN CILO LN XCBR1
GOOSE #2 [TRUE]
Pos.stVal
LN GGIO
SPCSO.stVal
DI4
DO3
Circuit
breaker
XYZ4
NettedAutomation

GmbH
Functional and product naming
■ Functional naming versus product

naming
■ Functional hierarchy and functional
naming
■ Report message mapped to
functional name
■ Standards, implementation,
application
■ What you order is what you will get!
■ Recommendation
NettedAutomation
Functional and
product naming Functional naming versus product naming
■ IEC 61850-7-2 defines concept of hierarchy of

IED/LD/LN/Data/DataAttributes.
■ IEC 61850-7-4 defines LN/Data classes.
■ IEC 61850-7-3 defines Common Data/DataAttributes.
■ Real IEDs can apply different approaches to name LDs
and LN prefixes and LN suffixes.
■ Vendors apply different approaches of LDs and naming
hierarchies.
■ IED exchangeability needs further specifications.
■ German VDE FNN (TSOs) „IEC 61850“ group prepares
some kind of a „Profile for exchangeable IEDs“
NettedAutomation
Features of
IEC 61850 Replacing an IED
SCL file <<ABC-1>>
IED
Request Vendor A
Client Response
(Sub-
scriber)
IED
Report
Vendor B
What is the
(same impact on
functionality Server?
What is the impact on Client? as IED A) SCL file
SCL file <<ABC-?>> <<ABC-?>>
NettedAutomation

GmbH
Features of
IEC 61850 Replacing one IED and Re-Configuring two IEDs
SCL file <<ABC-1>>
Control
Message 1 DataSet IED
block
Vendor A
Client
(Sub- Control
Message1 DataSet 1
scriber) block 1 IED
Vendor B
(same
Control functionality
Message 2 DataSet 2 as IED A)
block 2
Impact on Client Impact on Server

configuration: configuration:
<<ABC-2>> !! <<ABC-2>> !!
NettedAutomation
Features of
IEC 61850 Replacing one IED and Re-Configuring two IEDs
SCL file <<ABC-1>>
Control
Message DataSet IED
block
Vendor A
Client
(Sub-
scriber) IED
Control Vendor B
Message DataSet (same
block functionality
as IED A)
NO Impact on Client NO or Minimum Impact on

configuration: Server configuration:
<<ABC-1>> !! <<ABC-1>> or <<ABC-3>> !!
NettedAutomation
Features of
IEC 61850 What needs to be Re-Configured?
■ The replacement of an IED A by an IED B may cause

no, minimum or a lot of Re-Configurations at the Server
side or at the Server (Publisher) and Client (Subscriber)
Side.
■ There are various reasons why a Client (Subscriber)
may need to be Re-Configured after a replacement,
removal or installing of a new IED:
– Different DataSets (one or more)
– Different configurations of Control Blocks (integrity, data change)
– Different Naming of LD/LN/DO (functional or IED Naming)
– Different Services (polling versus event driven, MMS/WS)
– Different approaches to deal with pre-configured DataSets and
Control Blocks …
– … NettedAutomation

GmbH
Challenge with
subsets Standards, implementation, application
Standardization Standard Utility‘s expectation

IEC 61400-25
IEC 61850
2007 … high compliant
IEC 61850substation
expectations
automation
compliant system
substation
Standard
Standard using a reasonable
automation system
IEC 61850 set aofreasonable
using possibilities
IEC 61850
Edition 2 set of possibilities
Edition 1
2008 …
2003
Vendor X Vendor‘s delivery

compliant
device with Device
Device
minimum of Device
Device Device
IEC 61850 Device Device
Implementation understood by used for real delivered to site … with
project engineers projects minimum possibilities
NettedAutomation
Questions?
NettedAutomation

A00_ Andrea Bonetti & FMTP
About me, Andrea Bonetti
1993: Electrical Engineer from ”La Sapienza” University, Italy, Rome

1993 - 1995: Relay Protection Engineer at ABB Relays Italy, Rome
1995 - 1997: Relay Protection Engineer at ABB Substations, Italy, Lodi (Milan)
1998 - 2007: Relay Protection Engineer at ABB Relays, Västerås, Sweden (HV Relay
Manufacturer)
2008 - 2009: Product Manager for relay test sets and IEC 61850 equipment at
”Programma”, Täby, Sweden
2010: Relay Protection and IEC 61850 Specialist at STRI

Västerås, Sweden
Andrea Bonetti - FMTP Power AB

Proprietary - Copyright ®
2011 ... 2013 Relay Protection Specialist:

Megger Sweden AB – Sweden
2013: Technical Manager Substation Automation at STRI

Västerås, Sweden
2014 … 2016  Technical Manager FMTP Power AB

Sweden

: From 2006 member of IEC Group TC95 – MT4:

MEASURING RELAYS AND PROTECTION EQUIPMENT
: Member of IEC 61850 – UCA -- INTEROPERABILITY TESTS
andrea.bonetti@fmtp.se

Smart People for Smart Grids.

TC95 – MT4  Impact on relay protection testing
Technical Manager FMTP POWER AB

IEC 61850 Protection and Control trainings
IEC 61850 SCL Engineering Consulting

IEC 61850 Test Equipment
IEC 61850 time synch equipment


IEC 61850 and Real Time Power System Simulations

IEC 61850 SA Commissioning / Maintenance / Engineering services

IEC 61850 Time synchronization equipment

A01_ Substation Automation with IEC 61850
Protection and Control with IEC 61850
Substation Automation with IEC 61850
Andrea Bonetti
Andrea Bonetti - FMTP Power AB Proprietary - Copyright ®
Smart Grid
Andrea Bonetti - FMTP Power AB – andrea.bonetti@fmtp.se
The Three Pillars of IEC 61850 in abstract language

There is also Pillar number four:
globally accepted and in use
The IEC 61850 standard in Substation Automation
The main purpose of the standard is to
achieve interoperability among different devices from different vendors within the same substation.

The IEC 61850 standard in Substation Automation
What is intended for Substation Automation?

We need to know what we are talking about, in order to understand what needs to be
standardized.


The power substation
In a substation there are Primary Equipments:

The primary equipments in the substation need to be ”controlled”.
The word CONTROL in a substation is not related to Process Control, where the
word CONTROL is usually associated to ”feedback systems”:

In a substation, the power flow may need to be redirected.

Some part of the substation may need to be put out of service for maintenance.
Circuit Breakers, Disconnectors

(Isolators), Earthing Switches :
Open/Close
Power Transformar Tap Changer:
Move Up or Down
(Raise – Lower)


Example with busbar change.
In the initial position the load ”runs” through busbar 2
BUS 1
BUS 2

Busbar change. Connecting Busbar 1 to Busbar 2
BUS 1
BUS 2

Busbar change: Connecting the Feeders to Busbar 1
BUS 1
BUS 2


Busbar change: Disconnecting feeders from Busbar 2
BUS 1
BUS 2

Busbar change: Disconnecting Busbar 2 from the system
BUS 1
BUS 2

Busbar change. The load runs through busbar 1.
BUS 1
BUS 2


Manoeuvring the primary equipments is a delicated task.
Dangerous errors can occour, for personnel and equipments.
It must be clear for the operator WHAT is open and WHAT is closed. What IS energized, what is NOT
To minimize the possibility to operate on the wrong equipments with the wrong conditions,
interlocking schemes are implemented in the substation.
Operating on Power Equipment…
Operating the primary equipment is a delicate task.
Dangerous errors can occur, for personnel and equipment
It must be clear for the operator WHAT is open and WHAT is

closed. What IS energized, what IS NOT
To minimize the possibility to operate on the wrong equipment

with the wrong conditions, interlocking schemes are
implemented in the substation.
Earthing Switch and Disconnector
I can OPEN / CLOSE the Disconnector ONLY if the Earthing Switch is OPEN.
(If the Earthing Switch is CLOSED I cannot open the disconnector.
Relatively EASY when you

“CAN SEE”

(If the Earthing Switch is CLOSED I cannot open the disconnector.
More difficult when you

“CAN’T SEE”
One very simple example for interlocking:
(If the Earthing Switch is CLOSED I cannot open the disconnector)

Signals situation when the EARTHING SWITCH CLOSED


Signals situation when the EARTHING SWITCH is OPEN

The interlocking system

Andrea Bonetti - FMTP Power AB Proprietary - Copyright

®


®

®

®


®
A Local Action (open/close) may require:
Local information (from the same bay)

Remote information (from different bays)

®
Information is exchanged with extensive cabling.
Often it is necessary the use of several auxiliary

relays to multiply (repeat) the limited amount of
auxiliary contacts (position) available on board of the
primary equipment.

®

The IEC 61850 interlocking system
Interlockings are based on

”low level substation
interlockings”, which means
that they are performed among
the IEDs installed in the
substation, and are not carried
in a higher level system like
SCADA

®
Control / Interlockings in the IEC 61850 substation
Station Remote control (NCC)

computer Engineering
station
Station
Station Level gateway
Station bus (LAN)
Control IED Control IED Control IED
Bay Level
INTERLOCKING/CONTROL signals (CB and Disconnector Positions, reservation, etc.) are sent through the station
bus. This type of communication is normally called Horizontal communication
Example of interlocking
IED3 ”wants to close” the disconnector 3 (DISC_3)
In order to close DISC_3, IED3 needs to verify that:
ESW_1 (CB_3 is OPEN) AND (ESW1 is OPEN)
DISC_3
The position information of CB_3 is available to
IED_3 from Binary Inputs connected to auxiliary
contacts of CB_3.
CB_3
The position information of the earthing switch 1
(ESW_1) is sent by IED1 on the substation bus
with a GOOSE MESSAGE. The GOOSE message
is received by IED_3 (and by any IED that needs
such information)
IED_1 knows the position of the ESW_1 through

Binary Inputs connected to auxiliary contacts of
ESW_1.

®

Example of interlocking logic
The position information of the earthing switch 1 (ESW_1) is sent by IED1 on the substation bus with a GOOSE
MESSAGE. The GOOSE message is received by IED_3 (and by any IED that needs such information)
IED_1 knows the position of the ESW_1 through Binary Inputs connected to auxiliary contacts of ESW_1.

®
The position information of CB_3 is

available to IED_3 from Binary Inputs
connected to auxiliary contacts of
CB_3.
LOCAL INFORMATION

®
The GOOSE message with the

position information of ESW_1 (sent
by IED1) is received by IED3.
REMOTE INFORMATION

®

IED_3 contains all the local and remote

information to take the decision to close or
not the disconnector DISC_3.
LOCAL LOGIC IN THE IED

®
In a substation there are Primary Equipments…..

… that must be protected.
https://www.youtub
e.com/watch?v=_F
sRZ-I9_F0


Protection relays
In a substation there are Secondary Equipments (Protection Relays). They monitor the electrical quantities
of the protected system (voltages, currents) ….

Protection relays
… and based on ”protection algorithms” they decide that there is an electrical fault and issue the opening
command to the circuit breaker

Protection relays
The circuit breaker opens and interrupts the fault current. The relay sees no fault conditions anymore and it
resets. Circuit breaker remains open, the fault has been cleared.


The protection system
In order to speed-up the fault clearing time

(dependability) or to achieve a better
knowledge on where the fault is positioned
(selectivity), protection relays may
communicate together (protection schemes)
Usually relays exchange SIMPLE SIGNALS,

contact position …
YES or NO (OPEN or CLOSED)
Smart Grid..
REMEMBER?
The need for communication

between devices will be more and
more necessary in the future, with
the progress of Smart Grid
concept.
http://www.iec.ch/smartgrid/sta
ndards/
Protection Schemes
It’s in front of me!
It’s in front of me!
It’s in front of me It’s in front of me

AND AND
in front of him. in front of her.
It is between us!  ( I’ll trip ) It is between us!  ( I’ll trip )

Protection Schemes
SHE: It’s in front of me AND NOT

in front of him.
It is NOT between us!  NO TRIP
HE: It’s NOT front of me AND it’s in

front of her.
It is NOT between us!  NO TRIP
SHE: It’s NOT in front of me AND

in front of him
It is not between us!  NO TRIP
HE: It’s in front of me AND NOT in
front of her.
It is not between us!  NO TRIP
The protection system – exchange of blocking signals
Radial Feeders: No communication





Radial Feeders: Communication






The protection system – exchange of trip signals
Distributed Breaker Failure Scheme








The protection system: other application examples
 Overcurrent blocking schemes
 Initiation and/or back up tripping of Breaker Failure
 Initiation of Autoreclosure (and exchange of signals

between AR and protection relay)
 Protection acceleration schemes
 Intertripping between IEDs (direct intertrip)
 Phase selection signal exchange for parallel lines

ESW_1
applications
DISC_3
 Disturbance recorder “cross-triggering”
CB_3  Interlocking schemes

®
The IEC 61850 protection system
PROTECTION signals (Trip, Block, Acceleration..) are sent through the station bus.
Horizontal communication


IEC 61850 APPLICATION: REPORTING TO SCADA / RTU
IEDs from different vendors can exchange and use information over a common communications media. No need to
have protocol converters.
Reporting: Vertical Communication.
HMI/SCADA Communication (Vertical Communication)
Communication between station level and bay level devices uses services defined in IEC 61850-7-2
These include:
 Control (operating of primary objects, Commands)
 Reporting of events (MMS, Report Control Blocks)
 (Logging)
 (Statistical data)
 Disturbance files upload (ftp, COMTRADE)
All these services: This is Client/Server

 Use Ethernet TCP/IP communication.
 Are base on client-server-communication “High Level” TCP-IP
communication, based on IP
Address

HMI/SCADA Communication (Vertical Communication)
 Event driven – The IEDs send processed data when data has
changed
 The information is ”Object Oriented” with a clear semantic
 Non need for protocol converters
 The substation is described by one XML file - called SCD

(Substation Configuration Description, part of the Substation
Configuration Language, SCL)


”BEFORE IEC 61850”: REPORTING TO SCADA / RTU
Proprietary communication protocols were / are available. The correct handling of all protocols was and is still a
challenge.
”BEFORE”: PROTOCOL CONVERTERS / IMPLEMENTATIONS

Disturbance recording and data collection before
MANY MANY MANY propretary files from different numerical devices from different vendors


Disturbance recording and data collection NOW
Thanks to IEC 61850 standard today:
We have known communication protocol for file

transfer (FTP or MMS)
We know how to communicate (Ethernet, 100

Mbit/s)
We know how the files look like (COMTRADE)
We know where the file are stored in the IEDs

(folder /COMTRADE)


IEC 61850: The SCL language
IEDs and Substations are described through XML files.
The “IEC 61850 language used in the XML files” is called
SCL language.
SCL: Substation Configuration Language.


IEC 61850: The SCL language
IEC 61850: The SCL language. Example for IED Modelling

IEC 61850: The SCL language (IED Modelling)
Bay A Bay Unit (IED)
PTRC (Trip, Operate)


Bay Unit (IED) SCL
Bay A

Bay A Bay Unit (IED) SCL

Bay A Bay Unit (IED) SCL


It is possible to “structure” the Logical Nodes, SCL
and group them under different Logical SCL
Devices.
The “rules” of this structure are described in
the XML file.
The SCL file also describes what the IED can
do (services).
In this right case the IED cannot offer upload of

disturbance recorder file, as the “FileHandling
Service” is not listed:
While this IED to the left allows to

upload the disturbance recorder files
“FileHandling Service” is listed.

IEC 61850: Different SCL files
Depending on the information they carry, there are different types of SCL files:
ICD (IED Capability Description)

CID (Configured IED Description)
SCD (Substation Configuration Description)
SSD (System Specification Description)
IID (Instantiated IED Description)

SED (System Exchange Description)
Note:
The IID file for an IED, as far as the syntax restrictions are concerned, is similar to a CID file, except that typically the referenced IED is the
only IED in the file (while CID files may contain several IEDs!)


IEC 61850: Engineering Process

One IEC 61850 substation is described by one special SCL file, called SCD file
(Substation Configuration Description).
Make sure the substation

SCD file is part of the
Substation Delivery!
One IEC 61850 Engineering Tool (SCT: System
Configuration Tool) is in principle a “software that handles
and creates SCL files”.
The initial SCL files are provided by the IED vendor

software tools, and they are called ICD files (IED Capability
Description).
The ICD files are imported in the IEC 61850 Engineering

TOOL and GOOSE – Reporting information are added for
each IED, creating the so called SCD file (Substation
Configuration Description).
The SCD file is then exported from the Engineering Tool.

IED vendor tools (ICT: IED Configuration Tool) will import
that file and will download in the IEDs the IEC 61850
information that are written in the SCD files.
The SCADA system is also IEC 61850 compliant,
and it can read the SCD files understanding how
the substation looks like, and what information are
sent to “him” (which reports the SCADA needs to
receive)

IEC 61850: Engineering Process, Horizontal Communication
GOOSE APPLICATIONS
IEC 61850: Engineering Process, GOOSE Applications
In the SCL file there is written which IED talks to which IED.
The standard messages among IEDs in the same substation are called GOOSE messages (Generic Object
Oriented System Event).
The datasets are designed in the engineering tool, and then associated to a GOOSE Control Block which is
the “engine” that sends the data horizontally.
IEC 61850: Engineering Process, Vertical Communication
MMS APPLICATIONS
REPORTING
COMMANDS
DISTURBANCE UPLOADS

IEC 61850: Engineering Process, Vertical Communication
REPORTING  Vertical Communication
Datasets and Reports are designed in the

engineering tool.
The dataset contains the information that needs

to be sent to the SCADA/RTU.
The Report is the “engine” that sends the
information in the dataset with MMS protocol (it
sends a Report to the SCADA / RTU).
SCL for unique documentation
Documentation
The SCD file describes the

substation in IEC 61850 language
(SCL).
The IEC 61850 tool is able to

elaborate such information and to
show it in human readable format,
like a PDF or a Word file.

IEC 61850: Engineering Tools
Documentation
The SCD file describes the substation in IEC 61850

language (SCL).
The IEC 61850 tool is able to elaborate such

information and to show it in human readable format,
like a PDF file.


The message…
The SCL Language is of major importance in the IEC
61850 Standard
The SCD file is of vital importance for documentation,

future retrofitting or maintenance of the substation
Make sure that the SCD file is part of the delivery together
with the Substation!
If possible make sure that also the IEC 61850 Engineering

Tool that has been used for the design is also part of the
delivery.
Network Topologies

Ethernet network – Ethernet switches
The data traffic runs on Ethernet, 100 Mbit/s.
This means that in the IEC 61850 substation there are Ethernet switches.
Protection and Control signals are

dependent on the correct functionality
of the communication system, which
has in the Ethernet switches one of its
most important factors.


Network topologies

FULLY IEC 61850 SUBSTATION

WHERE ARE THE SAMPLED VALUES COMING FROM?
SAMPLED VALUES


How do these SV look like?
Data Stream.. Data Meaning..
RELEVAT IEC COMMITTEES FOR IEC 61850 SA APPLICATIONS
Approved May 2016
TC 38 defines the Merging Units and has

recently selected a set of Sampled Values
profiles that should be followed to keep
interoperability.

TC 95 takes care of the important

aspects of the IEC 61850 standard
that have impact on relay
protection.
Defines the performances, how to

measure them and what the
manufacturer has to declare.
IEC 61850 Standard
Tissues (Technical Issues) database
www.tissues.iec61850.com
IEC 61850 standard is a dynamic standard!. You must follow it!

Conclusions
GOOSE is the real time standardized protocol for protection and interlocking schemes (Horizontal communication)
MMS / REPORT is the standardized protocol for communication of events, commands, disturbance files to
SCADA/RTUs (Vertical communication)
SAMPLED VALUES (SV) is the real time standardized protocol for communicating sampled analog quantities
through digital media
IEC 61850 is not ”just” protocols.

It has impact on the specification, engineering, documentation, tools: SCL Language

IEC 61850 is not ”just” protocols.

It’s a complete philosophy!

A03_ GOOSE messages ‐ Horizontal Communication

Horizontal Communication and GOOSE messages
Andrea Bonetti

Control / Interlockings in the IEC 61850 substation
Station Remote control (NCC)

computer Engineering
station
Station
Station Level gateway
Station bus (LAN)
Control IED Control IED Control IED
Bay Level
INTERLOCKING/CONTROL signals (CB and Disconnector Positions, reservation, etc.) are sent through the station
bus. This type of communication is normally called Horizontal communication
Protection Schemes in the IEC 61850 substation
PROTECTION signals (Trip, Block, Acceleration..) are sent through the station bus.
Horizontal communication

The GOOSE Message
The GOOSE message is the standardized digital message by the IEC 61850 standard.
GOOSE means: Generic Object Oriented System Event.
GOOSE is a unacknowledged multicast message, sent through the Ethernet network.

The GOOSE message is not based on IP Addressing
The GOOSE message is ”originated” (engineered) in the SCL files, that are used to instruct the IEDs
about what messages they have to send (GOOSE Control Blocks and Datasets) and to receive
(Input Section).

GOOSE MESSAGE ‐ REPETITION
The GOOSE message is repeated with a certain strategy allowing the supervision of the Horizontal
Communication.

GOOSE MESSAGE – REPETITION – No change
The DATASET of the GOOSE message:

general trip is FALSE
MAX TIME for the SCL file

”Time Allowed to Live” on the Network


GOOSE MESSAGE – REPETITION – Change
The DATASET of the GOOSE message:

general trip TRUE

“PROTECTION GOOSE”
Protection information:
Single Point Information (Boolean)
TRIP (1) / No TRIP(0)
START(1) / Not START(0)
Block (1) / Not Block (0)

“CONTROL GOOSE”
Object Position: Double Point Information (2 bit string)


“CONTROL GOOSE”
Other information: Single Point Information (Boolean)
Bay in Local (1) / Bay in Remote (0)
Object reserved (1) Not Reserved (0)

“CONTROL GOOSE”
Analog value (current for instance) : Real value

Some Examples


Some Examples

QUALITY?

QUALITY?
Take care of the QUALITY!

How to “Generate” a GOOSE Message
GOOSE messages are generetad (engineered) in the SCL files.
The Application Information (start, trip, block, object position…) is organized in the Datasets.
The Dataset must be defined firstly.
Creating the dataset means choosing the Data Attributes (usually ”relay signals” that are intended to be sent by
the GOOSE message).
When the dataset is created, it has to be associated to a GOOSE CONTROL BLOCK, where the GOOSE
CONTROL BLOCK NAME, GOOSE MAC Address, APP ID etc are defined.
The SCL file contains these definitions and is imported by the IED tool that instructs the IED to send (publish) the
engineered GOOSE message.
At that point the GOOSE message is available (published) on the network.

Dataset and GOOSE CONTROL BLOCK

Dataset and GOOSE CONTROL BLOCK


A04_ Protection Dependability and Security ‐ 61850 and Conventional

Protection Dependability and Security
IEC 61850 and Conventional Technology
Andrea Bonetti

Relay protection
is the art to get
the best compromise
between Dependability and Security.

Dependability:
The capability of the protection system to clear the fault (to operate) if there is a power system fault in its protected area.
Lack of dependability brings to ”missed trip” or “delayed trips”
Security:
The capability of the protection system to not operate if there a power system fault but is not in its protected area.
(of course this implies also no operation if there is no power system fault)
Lack of security brings to ”unwanted trip”


How to increase Dependability
How to increase Security
You choose..

CB1: Correct Trip (Dependability Ok)

1) CB2: Correct Trip (Dependability Ok)
CB3: Correct Non-trip (Security Ok)
CB1: Missed trip (Dependability BAD)


3) CB2: Missed trip (Dependability BAD)



CB3: Unwanted trip (Security BAD)


Protection Dependability
DEPENDABILITY
of the protection system with
conventional technology
and
IEC 61850 technology (GOOSE messages)








Simplification with direct intertrip scheme
Conventional Technology (Binary Inputs / Binary Outputs).
Implementation with GOOSE Technology.


Simplification with direct intertrip scheme

Measuring “Contacts” and “GOOSE Messages”

IED A “trips” IED B ‐ RESULTS


IED A “trips” IED B ‐ RESULTS
Direct intertrip time.
36 ms (35,74 ms)
33 ms (32,74 ms)
GOOSE technology is typically 3 ms faster than the conventional technology.

IED A “trips” IED B – Closer Analysis
IED A is typically 1 ms faster in publishing a trip GOOSE message than closing

its trip contact (binary output).
IED B needs typically 12 ms to receive a trip order from its binary input and
send it to its trip binary output.
IED B needs typically 10 ms to receive a trip order GOOSE message and
forward it to its trip binary output.
The GOOSE technology is 3 ms faster in this case because IED A is 1ms
faster in sending the GOOSE message than closing its trip contact and IED B
is faster in receiving the GOOSE message than the binary input (2 ms).
For the GOOSE technology the following considerations may be done:

IED A would trip the A-breaker with its binary output after 23.44 ms (23 ms)
IED B trips its breaker (B-breaker) after 32,74 ms (33 ms)
This means that IED B “delays the trip order” by 9 ms (32,74 – 23.44 = 9.3
ms)
NOTE! 9 ms is few ms more that the operate time of a normal EM

auxiliary relay!

IED B “trips” IED A – Results


IED B “trips” IED A – Results
Direct intertrip time.
35 ms (34,93 ms)
30 ms (30,19 ms)
GOOSE technology is typically 5 ms faster than the conventional technology.

IED B “trips” IED A – Closer Analysis
IED B is typically 4 ms faster in publishing a trip GOOSE message than closing

its trip contact (binary output).
IED A needs typically 8 ms to receive a trip order from its binary input and send it
to its trip binary output.
IED A needs typically 7 ms to receive a trip order GOOSE message and forward
it to its trip binary output.
The GOOSE technology is 5 ms faster in this case because IED B is 4 ms faster
in sending the GOOSE message than closing its trip contact and IED A is faster
in receiving the GOOSE message than the binary input (1 ms).
For the GOOSE technology the following considerations may be done:
IED B would trip the B-breaker with its binary output after 26.93 ms (27 ms)
IED A trips its breaker (A-breaker) after 30,19 ms (30 ms)
This means that IED A “delays the trip order” by 30 – 27 = 3 ms only.
NOTE: 3 ms is the operate time of a very fast EM auxiliary relay!

SUMMARY
IED A
Typical protection function Typical protection function
Operate Time Contact Operate Time GOOSE
23,44 ms 22,65 ms
Typical Intertrip Transfer Time Typical Intertrip Transfer Time
BI – TRIP Contact GOOSE – TRIP Contact
7,9 ms 7,1 ms
IED B
Typical protection function Typical protection function
Operate Time Contact Operate Time GOOSE
26,9 ms 23,1 ms
Typical Intertrip Transfer Time Typical Intertrip Transfer Time
BI – TRIP Contact GOOSE – TRIP Contact
12,5 ms 10,1 ms

SUMMARY
GOOSE Communication offers

Better Dependability

Impact of IEC 61850 on Relay Performances
Relay Typical Operate Time

Protection Dependability
SECURITY
of the protection system with
conventional technology
and
IEC 61850 technology (GOOSE messages)


Reverse blocking scheme
The selectivity is achieved through time delay grading

Reverse blocking scheme (Conventional)
In order to decrease the trip time for faults

“belonging” the higher level circuit breaker,
the so called “reverse blocking” scheme is
implemented.
The blocking signal is the START signal of
the downstream protection relay(s).
With the conventional technology, the

starting signals binary outputs of the
downstream relays are connected in parallel
to the blocking binary input of the upstream
protection relay.

Reverse blocking scheme (Conventional)
In case of “communication error”, like loose

connection between the output contacts and
the binary input, for a “downstream fault” the
upstream relay trips.
This is called unwanted trip, and the

security of the protection system has
failed.


Protection schemes with communication failure
A protection scheme is affected by the absence / failure of the communication system.
- performance degradation (missed trip or longer trip time)  dependability is affected
- unwanted trip  security is affected

GOOSE Communication Supervision
The GOOSE message is repeated, even when the dataset doesn’t change.
This allows the supervision of the Horizontal Communication at the RECEIVING IED.

GOOSE Communication Supervision
When a GOOSE message is received, the receiver looks
at the TimeAllowedToLive (20000 ms in this example).
This means that the next GOOSE message must be
received within AT LEAST 20000 ms, if nothing changes
in the dataset.
(Note that In this case the message is sent every 13
seconds, and not every 20 seconds)
If the GOOSE message is NOT received within the 20000

ms, the communication with the sender is lost and a
FLAG SIGNAL can be raised.


Reverse blocking scheme (IEC 61850 GOOSE)
What happens when the protection scheme is

implemented with IEC 61850 GOOSE
messages?
We know that GOOSE messages are ”fast

enough” (if not faster) than Binary Input / Binary
Output connection:
There is no risk that the upstream relay is
”blocked too late” (when it has already tripped),
causing unwanted trip.

Reverse blocking scheme (IEC 61850 GOOSE)
In case of communication failure, the self

supervision in the upstream relay detects it.
If a power system fault will occurs later on (see

figure), the relay ”knows” that the blocking
signals will not be received, causing
unselective trip.
The relay can then change its setting for the
trip time, and increase it to the trip time that it
would be used without communication.
According to our example 600 ms.
Of course an alarm is also issued informing the

user that the communication with the sender is
lost.

INCREASED PROTECTION SECURITY
”GOOD” NEWS:
Considering that unwanted trip because of missed connection
between blocking signal (start signal) and blocking input is one of the
most common ”incidents” in medium voltage plants, it easy to
understand that the correct use of the self supervision of the horizontal
communication results with a strong increase of the relay protection
security!
”BAD” NEWS: Nothing is for free.

The IEC 61850 standard gives the potential to create the
communication supervision, but:
- Protection relays must have the capability of supervising the
GOOSE messages
- What to do when no communication is detected must be
SPECIFIED and ENGINEERED and TESTED.


Handling the ”quality” of the received message
COMMUNICATION SUPERVISION can be considered as

”QUALITY” of the information received.
Do you remember the interlocking logic?
We use the so called ”Double Indication” to understand the

position of the object:
- OPEN (1,0)
- CLOSED (0,1)
- UNKNOWN (0,0 – 1,1)
With the IEC 61850 standard we can use now other
information (at receiving site) like:
- Quality of the information from the SENDER

- COMM SUPERVISION of GOOSE

The message…
The COMMUNICATION SUPERVISION must be done at the
RECEIVING RELAY, so that the receiving relay “can decide” what to
do in case the message (the information) is not received anymore,
depending on the application.
Important to decide what to if a signal is received with bad quality (for

instance because of the self supervision in the sender IED). This
requires specification and engineering flexibility!
Make sure you specify the self-supervision of the horizontal

communication!
Let’s look at some technical specification

examples!


A05_ Communication Network Topologies
Communication Network Topologies
Andrea Bonetti
Andrea Bonetti - FMTP Power AB –

Ethernet Switches
The data information are delivered through Ethernet, at the communication speed of 100 Mbit/s
(also 1 Gbit/s is approved)
This means that in the IEC 61850 substation there are Ethernet switches.
Protection and Control signals are dependent on the

correct functionality of the communication system.
The Ethernet Switch is one of its most important
factors.
Ethernet Hubs are not used

Ethernet Switches
Behavior of the Ethernet HUB (not to be used)
IP = 192.168.4.20
IP = 192.168.4.100
IP = 192.168.4.101
IP = 192.168.4.102
IP = 192.168.4.104
IP = 192.168.4.103


Ethernet Switches
TCP/IP (like MMS) Behavior of the Ethernet Switch
Ethernet switches behave differently if

the communication is:
IP = 192.168.4.100 - ”high level TCP/IP based”
IP = 192.168.4.20
(Client/Server, like MMS)
- ”low level Multicast” (like GOOSE

messages)
IP = 192.168.4.101
IP = 192.168.4.102
IP = 192.168.4.104
MMS Communication is based on TCP/IP

Address
IP = 192.168.4.103

Ethernet Switches
Multicast (like GOOSE) Behavior of the Ethernet Switch
Ethernet switches behave differently if the

communication is:
IP = 192.168.4.100
- ”high level TCP/IP based” (Client/Server,
IP = 192.168.4.20
like MMS)
- ”low level Multicast” (like GOOSE

messages)
IP = 192.168.4.101
IP = 192.168.4.102
IP = 192.168.4.104
IP = 192.168.4.103
For GOOSE messages the switch behaves like a hub

GOOSE messages are not affected by IP Address

What about the IP Addresses in the Substation?
WHAT IS THE NETWORK MASK IN

THIS EXAMPLE?

What about the IP Addresses in the Substation?
Today a lot of substations are commissioned with a simple choice

of IP Addresses:
- subnetwork mask is the “default network mask” that is found in
the protection devices or that has been used the previous time..
As consequence we have a lot of substations (of the same owner)

that have the same subnetwork mask (network prefix), and
possibly two different devices in different substation have also the
same address (host identifier).
Feedback from the field:
One day you may need to communicate to those devices from remote, and all
IP Addresses in the substations must be changed!
Make sure that every substation has it’s own DIFFERENT subnetwork mask.
Network Topology
Make sure your network topology is loopfree!
Make sure you don’t ”close loops” when your connects your test
equipments with multiple ports!

Basic STAR Topology – Not redundant
Very simple structure
A lot of substations have

been (and are) built with this
technique.
No loops!


RING Topology – with reconfiguration (RSTP)
Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol (RSTP)
”KEY”

It is a protocol that uses reconfiguration

(with a small recovery time).
”KEY”
LEFT RIGHT
The ”KEY” is not forwarding the
messages ”from left to ritgh” and
viceversa.
There are no loops!

The ”LEFT” and ”RIGHT” ports talk

”KEY” together with a different protocol than
LEFT RIGHT
IEC 61850, and continuously monitor the
path between LEFT and RIGHT (RSTP
Packets).
PATH MONITOR


If the PATH is broken, the ”KEY” will

”KEY” detect it because also the RSTP
Packets are not delivered
LEFT RIGHT
PATH MONITOR (RSTP Packets)

The ”KEY” ”closes” the connection

”KEY” between ”LEFT” and ”RIGHT” and the
communication is restored.
LEFT RIGHT
Alarm or information of the event is sent

to station HMI and/or is given on the local
panel of the switch.
The system continues to communicate

but the broken path must be repaired.

Practical Examples
RING with RSTP
PROT PROT PROT PROT
PROT PROT PROT PROT
CTRL CTRL CTRL CTRL
BAY 1 BAY 2 BAY 3 BAY 4


Practical Examples
RING with RSTP
PROT PROT PROT PROT
PROT PROT PROT PROT
CTRL CTRL
BAY 1- MAIN1 BAY 1- MAIN2 BAY 2- MAIN1 BAY 2- MAIN2

Practical Examples

Practical Examples

RECOVERY TIME?
Recovery times according to TC57 WG10:
Communication devices Communication Recovery Time

media
SCADA  IED Station bus 100 ms
(client/server)
”KEY”
IED  IED Station bus 4 ms
(Interlockings)
IED  IED Station bus 4 ms
(Reverse Blocking)
Sampled values Process bus 0 ms

RECOVERY TIME?
It is always the application that puts the requirement on the

recovery time, which means how fast shall the connection in
the system be reestablished.
”KEY”
Remember that protection systems are not designed for

considering two independent ”faults” at the same time, which
means that the situation where there is a power system fault
and at the same time there is a communication network fault is
not requested to be managed by the protection system.
Recovery times in the order of the 100’s of ms are considered good enough for IEC 61850 substation
buses.
Try to keep it reasonable: specify (or verify) that the recovery times is below the time necessary for
the communication supervision (for GOOSE and for MMS) to detect the lack of connection and alarm
unecesserarely.

REDUNDANCY, PRP and HSR
IEC 61850 ”Edition 2” defines two redundancy protocols:
- PRP (Parallel Redundancy Protocol)

- HSR (High-availability Seamless Redundancy)
With these both protocols, each node (IED has two identical Ethernet ports
for one network connection.
Redundancy is achieved down to the Node Level (Doubly Attached
Nodes, DAN)
Both these protocols achieve ”zero switch-over time”
The basic idea is that multiple copies of the same data packet are
transmitted through two independent paths.
The receiving IED processes the packet arriving first and discards the copies.


REDUNDANCY, PRP
With PRP the two independent paths
are in the two separated networks
The same frames are sent/received by both

ports.
DA IED: Doubly Attached IED

LAN 1 LAN 2
VA IED: Virtually Attached IED
RedBox: Redundancy Box

”Red Box”
DA IED VA IEDs
DA IED

Substation with PRP redundant bus
RING with RSTP
PROT PROT PROT PROT

PROT PROT PROT
RedBox
CTRL CTRL CTRL
CTRL PROT PROT
BAY 1 BAY 2 BAY 3 BAY 4

Practical Examples – Simplicity of PRP

REDUNDANCY, HSR
With HSR the two independent paths are in the two
directions of the same network (ring).
The same frames are sent and received by both

Ethernet ports (”A” Frame and ”B” Frame)
Each node forwards the frames from one port to the

other port
When the originating node receives a frame sent by

itself, it discards it to avoid loops.
Messages are sent through one network

only (50% bandwidth compared to PRP)
No switches are needed (potentially

cheaper than PRP)

MIXING PRP, HSR and RSTP

QUALITY OF SERVICE

QUALITY OF SERVICE
Royal Institute of Technology

Stockholm
Substation Communication Modeling and Simulation
Case Study

Case Study – Traffic modelling GOOSE
Case Study – Traffic modelling MMS and SV
Case Study – Switch parameters

Case Study – Scenarios and results

A06_ Process Bus ‐ IEC 61850‐9‐2

Process Bus – IEC 61850-9-2
Andrea Bonetti

Replacement of BO cards with Ethernet port…
THE RELAY

Replacement of BI cards with Ethernet port… THE” IEC 61850‐8‐1” IED


Replacement of analog cards + A/D conversion THE FULLY IEC 61850 COMPLIANT IED

”FULLY IEC 61850” SUBSTATION WHERE ARE THE SAMPLED VALUES COMING FROM?

WHERE ARE THESE SAMPLED VALUES?
Data Stream.. Data Meaning..

THE ”LIGHT EDITION”: IEC 61850‐9‐2 LE

How many samples and how many samples per ”frame”??

For Protection Applications: 80 Samples / period
8 Analog quantities (4 x U and 4 x I)
1 sample / quantity per message
For Measurement / Power Quality applications: 256 samples / period

8 Analog quantities (4 x U and 4 x I)
8 samples / quantity per message
CONSIDERING PROTECTION APPLICATION:
50 Hz System  4000 samples / second (sampling rate of 4 kHz, 1 sample every 0,25 ms)
60 Hz System  4800 samples / second (sampling rate of 4,8 kHz, 1 sample every 0,208333 ms)
How is the ”analog data” structured (sort of DATASET)?
DATA IS IN PRIMARY VALUES


Who carries the dataset?
Multicast message with Multicast Address: 01-0C-CD-04-xy-zw
GOOSE is (01-0C-CD-01-xy-zw)
The ”SV Control Block” is the

Sampled Values IS (SVID).
This is often called as
”Merging Unit Name”
Note that ”APPID” in 9-2 LE is

always set to HEX 4000

How are the samples ”synchronized”?

How can I get the correct relationship in phase angles?
One very important information of the SV packet is related to the ”Time Sycnhronisation (smpSynch).
MERGING UNIT NOT SYNCHRONIZED: smpSYnch = 0
MERGING UNIT SYNCHRONIZED LOCAL 1PPS: smpSYnch = 1
MERGING UNIT SYNCHRONIZED GLOBAL 1PPS: smpSYnch = 2
Time synchronisation is ”Pulse Per Second: 1PPS”.

It can manage one accuracy of 1 us

Several Merging Units (N) in ”one box”. PHYSICAL MU1
(Several Logical Merging Units in one single
CLOCK (EXT)
Physical Merging Unit)
”>=1”
No matter if the Physical MU is externally CLOCK (INT)
synchronized or not, it is expected that all the
N x 8 quantities = N x (4 x I + 4 x U) are LOGICAL MU 1 LOGICAL MU 2 LOGICAL MU 3
sampled at the same time, so the ”SAMPLE
ZERO” (smpCnt = 0) is taken at the same
time for all the quantities  The phase 4I – 4U 4I – 4U 4I – 4U
relationship is maintained
ETH



Several Physical Merging Units
They must all be time synchronized otherwize
the phase relations among the quantities
(currents and voltages) of the different MUs is
lost.
Note that in several relay applications this

relation is not important (non-directional
overcurrent protection), so the Physical MUs
must be synchronized if the application requires
it, which often does.
Data from Logical Merging Units of the same

Physical Merging Unit are all ”synchronized”
among themselves, even if there is no external
clock synchronisation.
”NEW” Formats, beyond Light Edition
Approved May 2016
LE
LE
LE
Merging Units
SAMU:
Stand Alone Merging Unit

Merging Units
Is there any “Polarity” for a Merging Unit?
(Specially by thinking to a Faraday Effect Instrument Transformer)
The answer could seem to be ”NO”!

Thanks to IEC 61850 we skip this problem now…
P1, P2, S1, S2… DOT IN, DOT OUT..
Now the quantities are given in PRIMARY VALUES, so:
”End of the Problem”.
Unfortunately Merging Units have a setting:

“Direct” or “Inverted” (or similar names) … Why?
How to check if it is Ok then?
In Relay Protection it is common to say that “one current is positive” if it enters the
protected object. This is in practice the Kirchhoff reference for nodes: currents into
the node are positive, currents exiting the node are negative...
So we need to check that the Faraday Effect sensor is mounted correctly… Luckily
the NCITs do not filter the DC current, the test is simple!.
What is a “MERGING UNIT”?
Implication on Relay Protection (Transient Performances)
Can I connect ANY CT or any VT (conventional) to my protection relay and ensure that the
protection functionality is achieved?
CVTs have different performances (transient performances) than magnetic VTs.
This has impact for instance on distance protection relays.

Implication on Relay Protection (Transient Performances)
Can I connect ANY CT or any VT (conventional) to my protection relay and ensure that the
protection functionality is achieved?
CTs need to be ”validated” in terms of ”knee point voltage”, wit short circuit calculations based on the
application of the protection relay (Current Transformer Requirements)
What we know about Merging Units so far

What is a “STAND ALONE MERGING UNIT (SAMU)”?
Implication on Relay Protection
Courtesy of Cigré, Stig Hols, Janez Zakonjsek

Implication on Relay Protection
Courtesy of Cigré, Stig Hols, Janez Zakonjsek
Very Important the Role of TC 38
Courtesy of Pac World’s Magazine Andrea Bonetti - FMTP Power AB

Very Important the Role of TC 38
The efforts of TC38 in defining the TRANSIENT PERFORMANCES of the Merging Units
(SAMU) is very important for the relay protection community.
This will probably bring to the definition of similar requirements as for the current transformers from the relay
manufacturers, something like ”MU Requirements”, at least for the most sensitive protection functions.


What about TC 95 ?
What about TC 95 ?
The Standard IEC 60255-121 does not enter in the

details of process bus applications as IEC 61850-9-2 was
not mature enough at the time of its editing.
Other similar standards like IEC 60255-187 consider the

process bus application by stating that the tests
described are made for applications when conventional
current transformers are directly connected to the
protection relay. For process bus applications, these tests
should be adapted by mutual agreement of all of the
parties involved.
In the next revision of the IEC 60255-121:2014 it is

probable that a similar statement will be mentioned.
What about TC 95 ?
FR-06 4.6 Te Invalid or Questionable SV in protections Ad a §4.6.x "Invalid or Questionable Sample 2016-10-18. AB. OK.
connected to a process bus should also be Values" :
Accepted. MY will do it.
mentioned. "The manufacturer shall declare which is the It should go into chapter
behaviour of the protection if it receives 5.
Sampled Values with quality bit set to
a. Questionnable
This is just a sentence to
b. Invalid" make sure that the
manufacturer tells
something. But MT4 must
Proposal: “open this box” in the next
revision of the standard.
Behhavior of differential protection with digital
interface for energizing quantities.
The manufacturer shall declare which is the

behaviour of the protection if it receives
Sampled Values with non good quality or
different clock situation of the merging unit.
We are also referring to TC 38 and not more to

IEC 61850-9-2 TO IEC 61869-9.
We are also asking the manufacturer to declare

what happens if the time synch of SV is lost.
Additional requirements can be described by the

manufacturer.

What about TC 95 ? – Ad Hoc Working Group 3

What about us?

Implementation example: CFE Mexico 2011












Implementation example: Powerlink, Australia, 2011/12
In 2011/12 Powerlink completed the

first application ofIEC 61850 process
bus at a pilot project at Loganlea
Substation, which services
metropolitan Brisbane (Australia).
This was the world’s first commercial

installation of a substation
protection system outside of China
that is based entirely
upon IEC 61850 process bus.
Courtesy of Powerlink’s Presentation

Courtesy of Powerlink’s Presentation

Courtesy of Pac World’s Magazine


A13_ Time Synchronization
Time Synchronisation
Andrea Bonetti

Time synchronisation requirements
Substation Automation Applications Fast Protection

Relaying
Traveling Wave
Fault Location
Sampled Values
Event Recorders (IEC 61850-9-2)
Devices with no Disturbance Recorders
specific Time Reporting Synchrophasors
requirement SCADA (IEEE C37.118)
Milliseconds to milliseconds >microseconds

seconds Time Protocol Demodulated IRIG-B,
Any or no (NTP/SNTP) 1PPS
synchronization PTP with Power Profile
Power System Applications Fast Protection

Relaying
Traveling Wave
Fault Location
Sampled Values
WHY? (IEC 61850-9-2)
Synchrophasors
(IEEE C37.118)
>microseconds
Demodulated IRIG-B,
1PPS
PTP with Power Profile

1 ms in time error  18 degrees @ 50 Hz
I_in = 100% I_out = 100%
1 ms in time error  18 degrees @ 50 Hz ……
I_in = 100% I_out = 100%
100% through load

And 18 degrees error
gives 31% DELTA current!
Network Time Protocol (NTP, SNTP)
1ms to 100ms based on the Stratum level of the

device and the network configuration Stratum 0
In Substation Application it is usually used Stratum 1

the Simplified NTP: SNTP.
Stratum 2
If there SNTP server is in the substation,
the reached time accuracy is in practice
within 1 ms
Stratum 3

IRIG‐B and Pulse per Second (1PPS)
Modulated 1µs
IRIG-B
Demodulated
IRIG-B
100ns
1PPS
Precise Time Protocol PTP (soon IEC 61850‐9‐3)
Message-based time transfer protocol

(as NTP or SNTP)
It requires hardware and software implementation
Compatible Hardware (switches for instance) required
100ns accuracy with Power Profile Network
Default Profile and other do not focus on accuracy
Power Profile means focusing on accuracy while limiting
user-accessible settings
COAX CABLE – BNC Connectors (1PPS)
The coaxial cable with Bayonet Neill-Concelman connector is very popular
since the 50’s in HF transmission
An impedance mismatch (T connections…) between
the cable and the IED can cause time inaccuracy
The length of the cable needs to be considered

Some cable may attenuate signal power and slow
rising edges (time inaccuracies)
Avoid splitting/sharing 1PPS signal from

existing installations!

Optical Fiber (IRIG‐B / 1PPS)
Optical fiber shall be used to carry binary information the same way a
coaxial cable would
Rising edges are sharper, distance between clock and IED can be
longer
Depending on clock and IED hardware
Dust in connectors may dim traveling light
Less durable than coaxial cables and many different connectors

Splitting the signal means divide its power by two
Avoid splitting/sharing
clock signal from
existing installations!

A08_ IEC 61850 Protection and Control Testing

IEC 61850 Protection and Control Testing
Andrea Bonetti

MAINTENANCE
What means maintenance?
"action of upholding or keeping in being"
COMMISSIONING and MAINTENANCE tests
Which kind of tests do we do in a substation today?
MAINTENANCE TESTs
Verify that the system is
STILL working
Maintenance Tests are a sub-set of the Commissioning Tests.


COMMISSIONING and MAINTENANCE tests
If the result of the maintenance tests is negative, there is need of investigation.

The troubleshooting process needs the same competence of the commissioning engineer and the
same type of tests that have been done at commissioning.
TESTING THE IEC 61850 HORIZONTAL COMMUNICATION

INTERLOCKINGS with Conventional Technology
The LOGIC The chain of contacts…. (signals)



The main tools:


The main extra tool:

INTERLOCKINGS with IEC 61850
We have the technical experience to describe

the needs and testing methods because there
is the experience of the hundreds and
hundreds of IEC 61850 substations that have
been commissioned since 2005.
Mainly what needs to be done is:
- Verify that the GOOSE messages carry the correct information

- Verify that the GOOSE messages are correctly sent and
correctly received by the involved IEDs
- Verify that the interlocking logic works correctly


WE NEED TOOLS
Network Analyzer are needed to ”see” the GOOSE

messages in a signal-like format instead for a pure protocol
format, find the signals that have changed, see their value
etc..
”Protocol Format” ”Signal Format”

WE NEED TOOLS
Tools are needed to ”see” the GOOSE messages in a signal-like format, find the signals that have
changed, see their value etc..
WE NEED TOOLS
Tools are needed to ”see” the GOOSE messages in a signal-like format, find the signals that have
changed, see their value etc.. Take care of QUALITY!

WE NEED TOOLS
Interlockings are described by several information that are sometimes tricky to follow in a texted report.
Engineers need to visualize the GOOSE messages in real time.
Commissioning Engineers need good and fast indications for what may be
wrong, in order to concentrate their investigation in the correct direction.
WE NEED TOOLS
Interlockings and control signals are described by several information that are often tricky to follow in a
texted report.
Engineers need to ”convert” the GOOSE message into a physical
signal to drive or activate other equipment/instruments like:
- breaker simulators (electromechanical lock-out relays)

- non-IEC 61850 equipment (signal recorders)
Description for the reclosing sequence:
The IED sends the GOOSE MESSAGE (RE-CLOSE),

which converted into analog signal closes the mechanical
relay (breaker simulator).
The position of the breaker is converted into GOOSE
message and sent back to the IED
WE NEED TEST METHODS
In order to commission substations with the new

IEC 61850 technology….
there is need to use some new tools and methods.
The key for these methods is –paradoxically- available in

the IEC 61850 standard itself.

WE NEED TEST METHODS – CONSISTENCY CHECK
In order to understand where the interoperability problem could be:
Comparison between ”SCL file

GOOSE” and ”Network GOOSE” is
necessary.
This type of tests is also called, more

formally, as ”CONSISTENCY
CHECK”
WE NEED TEST METHODS – CONSISTENCY CHECK
Why is the consistency check so important for IEC 61850 Substations?
RELAY PROTECTION
There is the technical experience to describe the

needs and testing methods because there is the
experience of the hundreds and hundreds of IEC
61850 substations that have been commissioned
since 2005.
Not all substation using GOOSE for interlockings are
also using GOOSE for protection!
Also in this case it is needed to check

that the GOOSE messages are
correcly sent and correcly received by
the involved IEDs.
Timing is obviously a very important

(and new) issue.


RELAY PROTECTION
Also for protection testing we need tools and instruments :
GOOSE visualizers (sniffers)
Visualisation of GOOSE messages in real time

Possibility to send and receive GOOSE messages
(simulation of other equipments)
Comparison between
”SCL GOOSE” and ”Sniffed GOOSE”
RELAY PROTECTION
We also need to consider what to do with the relay testing..
We need relay test sets with built-in IEC 61850 GOOSE interface:

RELAY PROTECTION
We also need to consider what to do with the relay testing.
We need to consider the existence of the ”Hybrid Technology and Tools” in the today’s substations:
1- 2 ms
4-6 ms
CONSIDER THE REAL TIME PERFORMANCES OF THE IEC 61850 INTERFACES!

(How fast or how slow is the conversion GOOSE into Contact?)

RELAY PROTECTION
Relay Test equipment must be able to ”RECEIVE” and ”SEND” GOOSE messages
Breaker Failure testing is a typical

example where the test equipment
must handle publish and receive of
GOOSE messages, in REAL TIME.
Remember!
Any delay in the processing of
GOOSE messages from the test set
will result in a (wrongly) REPORTED
DELAY of the TESTED RELAY!
RELAY PROTECTION – SOME ”NEW TESTS”
Network overload
What happens to GOOSE communication if there is an

avalanche (overload) of GOOSE messages?
In order to be as realistic as possible, it is important to

generate the GOOSE traffic overload during the power
system fault, and not ”just like” a simple steady state
overload which is an unrealistic tests..

RELAY PROTECTION – SOME ”NEW TESTS”
Network overload
1) Relay test set generates the pre-fault
2) Test set generates the fault

Test set sends High Frequency voltage to the
GOOSE converter
3) GOOSE converter sends a ”500 Hz GOOSE” (1,

0, 1, 0, 1, 0…) ONLY during the fault injection
4) Relay trips, generation stops, generation of

avalanche GOOSE also stops


THE HEADHAKE OF PROTECTION ENGINEER

HOW CAN I SEPARATE THE GOOSE MESSAGEs?
With a ”GOOD DESIGN”; when the test handle is inserted, the

TRIP ORDER for REMOTE BREAKERS is also ”blocked”.
TRANSLATION FOR DIGITAL ENGINEERS:

When I insert the test handle in the SENDER, the TRIP ORDER
to remote breakers IS BLOCKED at the SENDER!

GOOSE TEST ”FLAGS”
SIMULATION (TEST) Service Parameter (in the ”body” of the GOOSE message)
IEC 61850 test service parameter

(In ED. 1 it is called ”TEST”.
(In ED. 2 it is called ”SIMULATION” and not ”TEST”.

also a special bit in the reserved bits is set!)

REAL GOOSE, TEST GOOSE (Ed.1), SIMULATED GOOSE (Ed. 2)
TEST GOOSE (Ed.1)
IEC 61850 test service parameter (TEST) is set.

(Only this parameter is set, nothing else!)
SIMULATED GOOSE (Ed.2)
IEC 61850 service parameter (SIM/TEST) is set.

Also the ”SIM bit” in the ”reserved bytes” is set,
as ”mirrored indication”
REAL GOOSE (Ed.1 or Ed.2)
IEC 61850 service parameter (SIM/TEST) is set to FALSE

Also the ”SIM bit” in the ”reserved bytes” is set, as ”mirrored indication”, obviously to FALSE
Note: In Ed.1, the ”Reserved Bytes” were not used at all, so their value was always ZERO and
Ed.1 IEDs did not look at those bytes at all.

TEST Attribute in Quality String of the dataset
Test quality attribute = ”1”
Test quality attribute = ”0”

TEST MODE, SIMULATION, TEST FLAG
”Edition 2” of the standard has clarified the intention and the use of simulation flags and test modes.
SIMULATION Service Parameter (in the ”body” of the GOOSE message)

SIMULATION Service Parameter (in the ”body” of the GOOSE message)
The parameter Simulation (Test in Ed. 1):
If TRUE it indicates that the message and therefore its

value is issued by a simulation unit (test equipment).
The GOOSE subscriber (receiver IED) will report the

value of the simulated message to its application instead
of the „real‟ message depending on the setting of the
receiving IED.”


PHYSICAL DEVICE LOGICAL NODE (LPHD):
The LPHD logical node has also a “Sim”

control which is valid for ALL Logical Nodes
in the device.
When ”Sim” is activated

(LPHD.ST.Sim.stVal = TRUE), the IED will
receive the ”simulated” GOOSE message
instead of the ”normal” process GOOSE.
The same is valid for Sampled Values

stream.

”Real” GOOSE A
(Simulation = 0)
”Test” GOOSE A
(Simulation = 1)
LPHD.ST.Sim.stVal = FALSE
”Real” GOOSE A
is processed in the IED
”Real” GOOSE A
(Simulation = 0)
”Test” GOOSE A
(Simulation = 1)
LPHD.ST.Sim.stVal = TRUE
”Test” GOOSE A
is processed in the IED

Test quality attribute

quality attribute TEST:
These principles are not

mandatory and are still not followed
by all vendors
It is not clear for everybody what

”IED in TEST” means (but it is
reasonabely assumed that it means
GOOSE Simulation: LPHD.ST.Sim.stVal = TRUE)
It requires correct engineering of

GOOSE messages, with the quality
attribute in the dataset!
This means you risk that you don’t

know how the IED will behave with
testing flags/parameters…

A USE CASE WITH SIM and TEST QUALITY
TESTING OF DISTRIBUTED BREAKER FAILURE
G_Bup_TRIP (0) G_Bup_TRIP (0)

G_Bup_TRIP (0) q=0
q=0
q= 0
IED_BF IED_RLY2 IED_RLY3
G_StartBF (0)
G_StartBF (0)
How to ”force” the GOOSE message ”G_StartBF”

without disconneting anything?
IED_RLY1

A USE CASE WITH SIM and TEST QUALITY
TESTING OF DISTRIBUTED BREAKER FAILURE
G_Bup_TRIP (1) G_Bup_TRIP (1)

G_Bup_TRIP (1) q=T
q=T
q= T
IED_BF IED_RLY2 IED_RLY3
G_StartBF (1)
I
TRIP!
G_StartBF (0)
We have tested the breaker failure ”remote trip order”

without tripping any breaker by mistake!
IED_RLY1
LET’s SUPPOSE EVERYBODY IMPLEMENTS THE SAME WAY
During commissioning,
the test procedures must
be tested!

ANY ALTERNATIVE METHOD THAT ALWAYS WORKS?
Can we do it in a simple way with ”simple” GOOSE messages
(Without Simulation and without test quality flag)
We need to ”think outside the box”
”SENDER IED” ”RECEIVING IEDs”


ONE SENDER AND ONE RECEIVER
During commissioning, the test

situations must be tested!

TYPICAL FACTORY ACCEPTANCE TEST
SCD File CHECK
The SCD file describes the IEC 61850 substation.
How can it be verified that

The SCD file really
describes the substation?
There are a lot of cheks that should be done, and this operation can be very long, if done manually. We
need tools!
The ”CONSISTENCY CHECK IDEA”, used for troubelshooting the Interoperability Problems, can
also be used to verify the SCD file, at least for the GOOSE messages point of view (same idea
should be done for MMS Reporting Control Blocks for instance, Vertical Communication)
SCD FILE CHECK
With the Nework Scanning, all the GOOSE messages present on the
network are read. (GREEN messages).

SCD FILE CHECK
The SCD file is imported in the tool and all the GOOSE messages
described on the substation SCD file are read
(BLACK messages)
SCD FILE CHECK
Look at the two columns, containing ”SNIFFED GOOSE” (´LEFT, GREEN) and ”SCL GOOSE” (RIGHT, BLACK)
SCD FILE CHECK
COMPARE the two columns.
From this example it can be seen that

there are:
- 29 GOOSE messages GREEN

- 0 GOOSE message YELLOW
- 5 GOOSE message RED
The GREEN messages have been found

on the network and in the SCL file, and
they are the same.
The YELLOW messages are suspicious,

and no suspicious message have been
found.
The RED messages have not been

matched

SCD FILE CHECK
The SCD file cannot be validated.
All messages are supposed to be GREEN.
In this case we have five RED messages. The messages are

available on the network but NOT AVAILABLE on the SCD file, so
the SCD file does not well describe the substation.
In this particular example, the SCD file contains some Future IEDs,
so the substation has been designed already considering some
new IEDs that will be installed later on.
This is just one example. Tre result of this comparison bring

to a discussion in order to explain the differences. If all the
differences are explained, the SCD file can be approved.
Otherwize no.
This method, with a lot of manual work, has already been

implemented in Scandinavian Utilities at FAT.
Process Bus (Sampled Values)
It is clear that for process bus the availability of the analog signals (Sampled
Values) and of the time synchronisation are very important.
Time synchronisation means the system providing the time reference (Master clock, eventually switches)
but also the system (IEDs) ”using” the time information.
Experience has shown that IEDs can be quite sensitive to ”time synchronisation shocks”.
While “time synchronization chocks” are not to supposed to occour in a steady-state running substation,
they will of course occour when shutting down one bay and starting it up again, for instance.
Care should be take during commissioning and for sure at FAT/SAT to make sue that the system is
“robust” to following events:
- Powering OFFof time synch master clock. Powering ON of the clock master again
- Switching OFF of protection device(s) and switching it ON again.
- Powering OFF of substation switch, powring it ON again.
- Power OFF of the entire bay, power ON of the bay again, according to the specified sequnce.
For Sampled Values it is still unclear if the following tests should be performed at FAT/SAT, or if they
should be mandatory for IED type testing (IEC 60255-1xx series)

For Sampled Values it is still unclear if the following tests should be performed at FAT/SAT, or if they
should be mandatory for IED type testing (IEC 60255-1xx series)
MAINTENANCE TEST
How can I make sure that the system is STILL WORKING?
One IEC 61850 substation is a numerical substation. We need to use numerical solutions!
Communication (GOOSE) is supervised (or make sure it is… it’s an

engineering issue).
If COMM supervision from relays is OK, this is a good information.
Make use of internal self supervision of IEDs. They tell you when they
are sick!
Post fault analysis. Did everything happen according to system

expectations?
Time Synchronize the IEDs, make use of internal disturbance recorder.
COMPARE a reference situations with actual situations
MAINTENANCE TEST – IED SETTINGS COMPARISON
COMPARE settings and configuration of all IEDs with the master reference files. Need for a ”third part centralized
database” which stores relay settings and test reports in an efficient way.

MAINTENANCE TEST – ”SNIFF/SNIFF” COMPARISON
The best should be, of course, to compare the GOOSE messages detected on the network (sniffed
GOOSE) with the GOOSE messages that are described in the AS BUILT SCD File.
Sometimes, the Substation owner does not like to provide the SCD file to the maintenance engineer.
What to do?
Comparison from two different

”SNIFF” at two different times:
Of course we expect to see all messages GREEN.
But not in the case of this example..
What has happened to this substation between the two

recordings?
MAINTENANCE TEST – SECURE ACCESS POINT
Make sure that from the beginning there is at least one access point to the
substation bus, dedicated for this!
Make sure the access point can see all GOOSE traffic, or provide different access
points if you want to see different parts of the traffic (VLAN division for instance).
Use SECURE devices:

No data can be sent, no PC connected to the substation bus.
Remember!
GOOSE communication has no handshake!
The GOOSE subscriber just receives the ”digital frame”, no matter ”who” is sending it!
The PC might generate a random stream of unwanted GOOSE messages, without that
the user knows it (malware ? User error?) and this can have bad consequences on the
implemented protection and control schemes of the substation.
Some papers from us

Some papers from us

A09_ RDRE ‐ The Logical Node for Disturbance Recorder
RDRE
The Logical Node for Disturbance Recorder
Benefits of the standardisation and simplification of
power system post-fault analysis
Andrea Bonetti

Disturbance recording and data collection
Disturbance recorder files for protection devices and/or dedicated devices are becoming more and
more important in power system operation and maintenance, where a systematic post-fault or post-
event analysis allows to:
- Detect incorrect relay settings and give facts supporting their improvement
- Verify relay coordination
- Verify relay performances
- Determine the position of the fault (fault location)

- Perform asset condition monitoring
Retrieving the disturbance files has been a complex task in the past: proprietary vendor software was
necessary to retrieve the information, proprietary communication protocol, lack of fast and reliable
communication structure to transmit the disturbance files to a central location…
MANY MANY MANY propretary files from different numerical devices from different vendors

MANY MANY MANY propretary communication protocols from different numerical devices
from different vendors
How was it before
There was a ”de-facto” standard (since about year 2000…. ) for file protocol: COMTRADE
COMTRADE:
COMmon format for TRansient Data Exchange for power systems
IEC 61850 standardisation

Main facts about the standardisation
FROM IEC 61850-5 ”ED2”:
FROM IEC 61850-7-4 ”ED2”:
FROM IEC 61850-8-1 ”ED2”:

Modelling in ABB 670, with function blocks:
RDRE
RBDR
RADR
Modelling according to IEC 61850:
RDRE RDRE
In the IED (Self Discovery) In the IEC 61850 standard
RDRE
In the IED as function block
Interoperability
From one vendor tool (ABB) it is possible to acces disturbance recorder files in an IED from
a different vendor (Protecta)
The same for a ”third part tool”

or for a SCADA System…

Interoperability
It is possible to get the list of disturbance files from Protecta IED into ABB Software tool:
COMTRADE files in
PROTECTA IED:
Interoperability
It is possible to get the list of disturbance files from Protecta IED into ABB Software tool:
COMTRADE files in
ABB PCM 600
Interoperability
It is possible to get the list and fetch the disturbance files stored into the Protecta IED from
the ABB Software tool:

Interoperability
It is possible to VIEW the “PROTECTA COMTRADE FILES” from “ABB COMTRADE Viewer”
(Short COMTRADE Report)
Interoperability
It is possible to VIEW the PROTECTA COMTRADE FILES from any COMTRADE Viewer
Easier access to data for Post‐Fault Analysis!
Thanks to IEC 61850 standard today:
We have known communication protocol for file transfer (FTP or MMS)
We know how to communicate (Ethernet, 100 Mbit/s)
We know how the files look like (COMTRADE)
We know where the file are stored in the IEDs (folder /COMTRADE)
There are no excuses for not performing the post-fault analysis!


Post‐fault analysis based on COMTRADE files
Disturbance Recorder Files (DFR) contain important power system information like:
- Waveforms of currents and voltages after and before the ”perturbance” (RADR)
- Sequence Of Events (status of binary signals, RBDR) like:

- relay operation (trip) with open command
- autorecloser start
- autorecloser close command
- blocking signals sent to other relays
- important internal relay device signals
The combination of all this information, together with the

information from disturbance recorder files from other devices
(in the same bay , in different bays or in a different substation),
allows to perform a post-analysis to verify the correct/wrong
behavior of the protection system and decide actions to improve
the system performance or pinpoint deficiencies/defects in equipment and apparatuses.
You “don’t trust GOOSE” but have MMS / SCADA?
Implement CROSS‐TRIGGERING of Disturbance Recorders!
When the Recording starts in one IED,
GOOSE messages are sent to IEDs in
other bays to start also their disturbance.
This logic is complex and expensive to

execute with conventional technology,
but comes ”almost for free” with IEC
61850 GOOSE, if you already have
implemented the IEC 61850 Ethernet
communication for other purposes
(SCADA, RTU).
For each fault you have information from all other bays! Very powerful for the post-fault analysis!
IT MUST BE SPECIFIED!
”Indirect” maintenance tests. Some examples.
SCADA communicated ”Zone 1 Trip” and

succesful autorecloser. Nothing to worry.
Is that really true?
- Did you know that ”Zone 1 Trip” could occur after more than 100 ms from the fault inception?
- Did you know that a ”40 ms Circuit breaker” could actually open in 60 or 80 ms?
- Did you know that the circuit breaker may need 150 ms to close, instead of the expected 80 ms?
Did you know that detecting these situations in advance will allow you to do preventive and planned
maintenance/repair saving a lot of money with respect to urgent intervention at apparatus break?

”Indirect” maintenance tests: Relay operate time
Find the point of “fault start”
and see where the relay trips.
The time difference is the
relay operate time (internal of
the IED).
The internal relay operate

time was 29 ms.
By adding 3 … 4 ms for the
TRIP binary output to close,
we can state a relay operate
time of approx. 32 … 33 ms.
DFR Courtesy of
”Indirect” maintenance tests:
Total Fault Interruption time
Find the point of “fault start”
and find the point where the
fault current is cleared. The
time difference is the total
fault interruption time.
The total fault interruption

time was approx. 75 ms.
DFR Courtesy of
”Indirect” maintenance tests: CB Opening time
Considering some 3…4
ms for the TRIP binary
output to close, we can
reasonably state a circuit
breaker opening time of
approx. 40 … 41 ms (at
least <= 45 ms).
DFR Courtesy of

”Indirect” maintenance tests: CB Closing time
In this DFR we can see the single phase
trip and automatic circuit breaker
reclosing.
Let’s measure the time from when the
autorecloser CLOSE command is issued
and when the circuit breaker has
closed…
There are some problems
here…
That should absolutely be

investigated…
Why the CLOSE CMD from

autorecloser is issued AFTER
that the CB has CLOSED?
Has somebody else (another

autorecloser) closed the
breaker before????
This is a different DFR, with also
single phase trip and automatic
reclose.
Let’s measure the time from when

the autorecloser CLOSE
command is issued and when the
circuit breaker has closed…
We can say that the circuit

breaker needed 73 ms to close,
considering the internal relay
close command.
Considering a time delay of the
close command output contact of
3 … 4 ms, we have the closing
time of approx. 70 ms.

Relay settings optimization:
Harmonics Blocking / Power Transformer Inrush
How much should I set the second harmonic blocking level to manage the
protection to be stable (to block the overcurrent protection) on power transformer
inrush but not on sudden load changes?
Blocked protection relays are always generating nervousness…
If I set it to 2% (low level) I’m sure overcurrent is blocked by transformer

inrush, so I have no unwanted trip (HIGH SECURITY), but I risk to keep
blocked overcurrent in many other cases (load change, steady state
harmonics etc.) and I risk to miss to trip (LOWER DEPENDABILITY)!
If I set it to 30% (high level) I’m sure overcurrent relay is not blocked by
load change or steady state harmonics (HIGH DEPENDABILITY) but I
may “miss” to detect the transformer inrush, so I may have unwanted trip
(LOWER SECURITY)!
“take a picture” of
several inrush
situations of your
power transformer
and “measure” the 2nd
harmonics content
(45,5 %)
Consider the
harmonics measured
by the relay when you
have your normal load
changes (9,5 %)

Consider the
harmonics measured
by the relay when you
have another load
change.. (8.1 %)
Your setting for 2nd

harmonics level is
probably above 10%
and below 30%.
”Indirect” maintenance tests. Some examples.
SCADA communicated ”Zone 2 Trip”.

The fault must be at the end of the
line or in the next line
Is that really true?
- Did you know that ”Zone 2 Trip” could occur for faults in your protected line? Very CLOSE to the
protection relay?
- One of the most sensitive distance protection settings is the “Fault Resistance Coverage”
… and it is also one of the most “guessed” settings?
The ”odd” Fault Resistance

The ”odd” Fault Resistance
SCADA communicated ”Zone 2 Trip” for relay at “A” side

SCADA communicated “Zone 1 Trip” for relay at “B” side.
Because of “Zone 2 Trip” indication it is common to believe that the fault was in the approx.
(LAST) 15% of the line…
Where is the fault?
It is believed that the fault was is in the approx. (LAST) 15% of the line…
Let’s do a fast POST FAULT Analysis.

We need COMTRADE files for the
accident” recorded from both relays
“A” and “B”.
Where is the fault?
Let’s do a fast POST FAULT Analysis.
We need COMTRADE files from both relays “A” and “B”
Thanks to IEC 61850 standard :
We have easy communication

for file transfer (FTP or MMS)
We know where the file are

stored in the IEDs (folder
/COMTRADE)
We know how the files look

like (COMTRADE)

Where is the fault?
We need a COMTRADE file analyzer, that can handle several files and complex/advanced calculations:
FILE “A”
FILE “B”
Where is the fault?
FILE “A”
FILE “B”
Where is the fault?
The Post Fault Analysis indicates that the

fault was at the beginning of the line
(close to “A”) and not at the end of the line
(close to “B”).

Where is the fault? – How is it possible?
We believed that the fault was approx. in the (LAST) 15% of the line…
BUT we have seen that the fault is approx. in the (FIRST) 20% of the line…
RELAY “A”
RELAY “B”
FAULT
RESISTANCE
SETTING
FOR
RELAY A!
Can we do this automatically?
Source:
Source:

Source:
PROTECTION MONITORING in IVPower

 Global objectives
1. Fast (near real-time) and reliable indication of protection and circuit breaker behaviors (control center
personnel, analysts)
2. Optimize asset maintenance, anticipating or postponing their maintenance or replacement (asset managers)
Smart protection monitoring as an investment in network quality
 Protection Monitoring in IVPower

1. Through a dedicated “Protection Performance Monitoring” module, delivered with a standard set of rules.
Rule set is run in real time after the fault analysis, based on the observed sequence of events.
 Optionally, utility-specific configurable rules can be developed and run for each type of relay (profile)
2. Through the “Conditional Maintenance” module, where all protection statements belonging to previous events
are stored and can be leveraged for conditional maintenance
Source:
PROTECTION MONITORING (1 of 2)
 Predefined Rule Set
 The Protection Performance Monitoring
module incorporates analysis functions on
the behavior of protection relays using the
binary signals from disturbance
recordings.
 List of all the pick-up and trips observed;
 Notification about faults causing pick-up but no
tripping;
 Line faults with missing backup protection pick-
up;
 Unexpected line differential protection pick-up.
 Such verifications are also defined in the rule itself and are translated into easy-to-interpret and actionable messages to
the Users.
 Analysts can steer their work according to the color flags issued by the tool and can validate (or correct) these automatic
reports.
Source:

PROTECTION MONITORING (2 of 2)
 Conditional Monitoring
This (licensed) module leverages
historical database of past events,
becoming statistically solid over
time.
 Analysts may want to check all
historical data concerning a specific
function during the last quarter and
verify its performance, comparing
anomalies etc.
 Hidden failures: silence may be a
warning. In fact, if a device has
been silent for a while, whilst the
protected line observed several
disturbances, a warning flag is
raised for a prompt maintenance.
 With a solid database available (e.g. one year of cumulative data), the analyst can then characterize the protection and circuit
breaker assets, anticipating or postponing their maintenance or replacement.
IVPower offers smart maintenance as opposed to a periodical, fixed maintenance
Source:
Complete, automatic, real-time characterization

of the disturbance event (Web Interface GUI)
Time stamped event Conclusion for operator and NCC Line Status Bar
Pages with Event Details
Filters on micro-events
Details on micro-event
SOE
Sequence of
Micro Events
Source:
Complete, automatic, real-time characterization

of the disturbance event (Web Interface GUI)
Timestamped Event
Conclusion for Control Room Timeline Bar
of event
Protection &
CB monitoring
Any number of records
resync’ed & analyzed
Monitoring also Fault Location details

adjacent lines
Timelined event Micro-events

sequence details
Smart conclusions
from analog signals
Confirmation from
Source:
binary signals Andrea Bonetti - FMTP Power AB – andrea.bonetti@fmtp.se

Automatic & real-time characterization

of relays & CB performances under disturbance
Relay performances Rules applied

analyzed during event per statement
Relays configured, but no

records for this event
Automatic statements:
Comment & Validation
Relay timeline
during event
Source:
About post‐fault location…
Post-fault location is not a “real time” process. It needs anyway to be carried out in a reasonable
amount of time to allow to take the correct decisions
Post-fault location requires less power system data than “single-ended fault location” implemented in
protection devices.
Disturbance file viewer and analyzer developers can concentrate on developing more sophisticated
mathematical algorithms instead of converting protocols for difference fault recorder file protocols /
media transmission protocols.
Post-fault location allows to judge protection relay performances
Post-fault location allows to correct / improve protection relay settings
About post‐fault location…
Post fault location allows to decide how to “search for the fault”

We live in a mixed technology (Hybrid Technology)
How do I manage IEC 61850 devices and non-IEC 61850 devices?
How do I manage Static and E/M Devices?
Non Intrusive Technology

How do I manage feeders with no protection? (Incoming feeders for MV Substations)

How do I manage “all”?
The message…
SPECIFY a Disturbace Recorder Collection System to be able to perform disturbance files

collection, storage and easy visualization of COMTRADE files
IMPLEMENT cross-triggering for disturbance recorders with GOOSE messages
The IEC 61850 standard establishes and improves more and more. “Old” equipment need
to find solution for at least partially manage the connection to IEC 61850 world!
PERFORM routine post-fault analysis based on Fault Disturbance Files. Verify correct
behavior of apparatuses, verify relay settings and performances.
This is one of the best maintenance tests you can do for your power system.

11/17/2017
A10a_ ‐ IEC 61850 Specification and Engineering Processes
IEC 61850
Specification and engineering processes
Andrea Bonetti

Tools, Files and IEC 61850 Standard
The Engineering process is described in IEC 61850 standard:

- IEC 61850 part 4
- IEC 61850 part 6
In order to secure interoperability among tools it is required that:

Tools must implement roles and functionalities defined by the standard
Tools exchange data using a standardized format (SCL)

11/17/2017
Different roles of the tools
The following three roles are defined by IEC 61850 Standard:
IED Configuration Tool ICT
System Configuration Tool SCT
System Specification Tool SST
Interoperability among tools
Interoperability is achieved through the SCL language.
Tools from different vendors can exchange engineering data
Vendor independent tools can be used for system specification and system integration.
Most important SCL files
ICD : IED Capability Description

Describes data model and capabilities of a specific type of IED or of a family of IEDs.
SSD: System Specification Description

Describes the substation structure and allocates functions (Logical Nodes) in this
structure
SCD: System (Substation) Configuration Description

Describes the complete IEC68150 communication configuration of a substation

11/17/2017
Other SCL files
CID: Capability IED Description

Describes data model and capabilities of a specific type of IED or of a family of IEDs. Contains
engineered information (datasets, GOOSE, Reports).
May contain the description of more than one device.
IID: Instantiated IED Description (Ed. 2)

Describes data model and capabilities of a specific type of IED or of a family of IEDs.
Contains engineered information (datasets, GOOSE, Reports).
Contains the description of only one device.
ICD File (IED Data Model)
Substation IED
Structure
Data Network
Types
SSD File (System Specification Description)
Substation IED
Structure
Data Network
Types

11/17/2017
CID / IID File (Configured IED Description)
Substation IED
Structure
Data Network
Types
SCD File (Substation Configuration Description)
Substation IED
Structure
Data Network
Types
Engineering flow

11/17/2017
Engineering flow (from a slide of 2006)
One Device Tool that can only be ICT
One Device Tool that can be ICT or SCT

11/17/2017
What is done in the Tools, as per today 2017
ICT (IED Configuration Tool)
Provides the ICD file of the device

ICT
Manages Protection and Control (P&C) Settings of the device
Manages the Application Configuration of the device:
What to do with internal P&C signals
What to do with reception of Binary Inputs
What to do with reception of GOOSE messages
What to do with analog quantities
What to do with received SV quantities
Imports the System SCD file and loads into the device the communication instructions
written in it (GOOSE to send, GOOSE to receive, SV to receive, Reports to send)
What is done in the Tools, as per today 2017
SCT (System Configuration Tool)
Imports different ICD files of different device

SCT
Creates Datasets
Creates GOOSE and REPORT Control Blocks
Associates Datasets to GOOSE or REPORT Control Blocks
Creates the ”Input Sections” (which GOOSE to receive for IEDs, which REPORTs for the
Station HMI)
Exports the final System (Station) SCD file for importing into the ICTs.
Note: the SCT does NOT handle (today) P&C settings, neither Substation Application
design.
BOTTOM UP Engineering
Building the house from the

fundamentals, brick after brick…
What does it mean?
Start implementation with IEDs

11/17/2017
Bottom up engineering
All Know-How is bound to the IED‘s and

stored in vendor specific tools
The protection , control , signal flow and

naming is vendor specific and not according
to customer standards.
TOP DOWN Engineering
Building the house

from the roof….
What does it mean?
Use a formal
specification process
Top down engineering
IC
IC
SSD D IC
D IC
System D IC
D
Specification D
Tool
System
Configuration
The Engineering Know-How is stored in the
System Tools. Tool
IEDs and vendors can be exchanged
SCD
Note: CAREFUL with the word “exchange”..
We manage to exchange the model (TC 57) but NOT the
performances behind the model (TC 38 or TC 95).
IED
Configuration
Tool

11/17/2017
Top down engineering. What can we do today?
IC
DIC
DIC
SSD DIC
System DIC
D
Specification
Tool
System
The Know-How is stored in the System Tools, but the Configuration
Engineering is based on preconfigured IEDs. Tool
In the SCT It is possible to ”map” the specification

functionality (Logical Nodes) to the delivered
functionality by the ICT. SCD
IEDs and vendors can still be “exchanged”, by changing

the “mapping”
IED
Configuration
Tool
Specification and Acceptance Process
https://www.pacw.org/no-
cache/issue/december_2014_issue/lessons_learned/third_party_tools_for_iec_61850_substati
on_modernization_projects.html

11/17/2017
Workflow at Utility:
Workflow at System Integrator:
Acceptance Procedure

11/17/2017
Acceptance: Interaction Utility / System Integrator:
The 4 activities of Engineering
Bottom Up • Start implementation with IEDs

Engineering
Top Down • Use a formal specification process
Engineering
Maintenance • Fix bugs and make minor enhancements
Retrofit • Replace parts or entire system
The message…
The IEC 61850 know how for the substation belongs to the Utility
The Utility OWNS the Engineering files (SCL files and anything
else)
The SCD file is of vital importance for future retrofitting or

maintenance
Make sure that the SCD file is part of the delivery together with the
Substation!
If possible make sure that also the IEC 61850 Engineering Tool that has
been used for the design is also part of the delivery.

11/17/2017

A10_ ‐ Specification for Top Down Engineering, SSD and SCL FIles
SSD SCL Files

and
Specification for Top Down Engineering
Andrea Bonetti

Reference
https://www.pacw.org/issue/december_2014_issue/lessons_learned/third_party_tools_for_iec_61850_substation_
modernization_projects/complete_article/1.html
GOOGLE SEARCH:
“IEC 61850” “Helinks” “PAC WORLD”
”top-down”
Process.
From:
Single Line Diagram
to:
SSD File

SCT: System Configuration Tool
Some important definitions:
Engineering at “System Level”:

SCT  System Configuration Tool
Engineering at IED Level:

ICT IED Configuration Tool
STEP1 ‐ Drawing of the Single Line Diagram

Normally the user doesn’t want to
directly work with SCL files.
It is possible however to see how the
SCT works at SCL level, and
didactically it is a good possibility.
To enable this view the SCT:
Navigation:
(enable
STS files)
Right click on
STS:SCD file and
Show it as
XML

Drawing of the Single Line Diagram

Graphically create a Substation. It is created also in the SCL file

Graphically create a Substation. It is created also in the SCL file

Create a Voltage Level and two bays within the Voltage Level.


Create a Busbar.
Select the first bay and put primary objects in the bay. Connect the objects and connect the bay to the
busbar.

Select the second bay and put primary objects in the bay. Connect the objects and connect the bay to
the busbar.

By ”removing” the SCL file view, here the graphical view:

STEP 2 ‐ Specifying the Logical Nodes

Double Click on the Bay1 (the “blue point” of the Bay 1):
Specifying the Logical Nodes
Notice that the SCT has added FUNCTIONS

associated to each primary object.
In the functions the SCT has added the obvious Logical

Nodes associated to that object. Of course the user
can remove them if they are not needed.
A new FUNCTION will be added: ”PROTECTION”.

The new “FUNCTION” called “PROTECTION” is added in Bay1.

Select the Correct Logical Nodes for the protection function.
According to the specification this is needed:
Distance Protection Zones: 1, 2 and 3

Instantaneous Overcurrent Protection
Trip Block (trip unit)
Autorecloser
Synchrocheck
Disturbance Recorder
Select Logical Nodes according to “Edition 1”:
Let’s look at the signals
Look at the signal list: it contains the signals that I will use in the project.
Look at the signal list:

it contains the signals
that will be used in
the project.
(signals for GOOSE
or MMS are created
at that level)
At the moment the

mandatory signals
for the selected LN
are shown.

Configure the signals
Protection functions: single phase trip (phase segregated trip) is requested
Zone1 (PDIS1) contains now the phase segregated start and trip signals:
The same process is done for other LNs
(Zone2 and 3, Instantaneous Overcurrent, Trip Function)

Insert the Control Command Attribute to the LN CSWI so that it can receive the MMS command to
OPERATE!
(for all three objects: 2 disconnectors and one circuit breaker)
Use Specification Name for signals

The ”Process Name” for the signals is changed into the Utility Specification Name.
BAY 2 is also done!

STEP 3 ‐ Horizontal Comm: INTERTRIP FROM BAY1 TO BAY 2

A direct intertrip signal is sent from PRTC in Bay1 into Bay2
In the Single Line Diagram a new APPLICATION is created.
Select the Sending Funtion for the Application
Open the application and choose the sending function
It is the PROTECTION funcion (SCL function.. ) of the BAY 1
Select the Sending Signal

From the ”Sending Function” select the Sending Signal (s)

Select the Sending Signal

From the ”Sending Function” select the Sending Signal (s)
We need to select the

”Receiving Function”
Select the Receiving Function

Choose the Receiving Function, which is the PROTECTION function of the BAY 2:
Select the Receiving Function

Connect the Sending Function to the Receiving Function with a ”High (Priority) Connection”
At specification Level, the ”Intertrip Application” is fully specified.

It will be an ”engineering issue” the implementation with GOOSE message.

Vertical Comm: Signals to SCADA
We need to create the ”SCADA FUNCTION” in the Substation.
Double click on the ”Blue Point”

of the Substation to open it.
Insert a New Function and give to it the ”SCADA” name
Assign the ”HMI Logical Node” to the

SCADA Function
(This is the client gateway

receiving MMS Reports)
We define the signals that the Client needs to receive (instead of deciding what the server will send).
FC Depending: if ST will be
buffered, if MX will be
unbuffered.
The SCT will do it during the
engineering phase! Andrea Bonetti - FMTP Power AB

This is the list of the data

exchanged with SCADA.
Also commands are there.
It will be used by the SCT

calculate the datasets for the
IEDs.
It will also be used to configure

the Gateway and/or the
SCADA system
STEP 4 ‐ Documentation (PDF)
Documentation (PDF)

Documentation (SCL  SSD)
Documentation (SCL  SSD)

17.11.2017
Model Based Testing and
IEC 61850
Real‐Time Power System Simulations
Andrea Bonetti – FMTP Power AB Sweden
A cut‐off from brochure

describing the static (electronic)
simulator in ASEA Relays,
Västerås, Sweden
REAL TIME SIMULATOR, ASEA, SWEDEN, 1980..
http://digitalsubstation.com/
en/2013/12/02/real‐time‐
simulation‐of‐electric‐power‐
systems

17.11.2017
IEC 61850 for Power System Automation (SA)
NON REAL‐TIME APPLICATIONS
REAL‐TIME APPLICATIONS…
What does Real‐Time mean for a protection engineer?

17.11.2017
What does Real‐Time mean for the protection engineers?

17.11.2017
The relay takes the decision during the power system TRANSIENT!
Harmonics during fault, from IEC 60255‐121
HOW TO TEST ”RIGHT”
Important considerations
HOW TO TEST ”RIGHT”
Important considerations

17.11.2017
HOW TO BE CONFIDENT ABOUT THE TEST RESULTS?
TOOL COMPLEXITY INCREASES WHEN RELAY COMPLEXITY INCREASES
(in order to improve DEPENADBILITY AND SECURITY)
IS THIS SCARING?
NOT REALLY

17.11.2017
WE HAVE SOME IMPORTANT COMMITTEES AND STANDARDS
IEC COMMITTEE TC 95 ‐ MT4
PUBLISHED STANDARDS BY TC 95 – MT4
STANDARD EDITION / TITLE
STATUS
IEC 60255‐151:2009 Edition 1.0 Functional requirements for over/under current
(2010‐04‐27) protection
IEC 60255‐127:2010 Edition 1.0 Functional requirements for over/under voltage
(2010‐04‐27) protection
IEC 60255‐149:2013 Edition 1.0 Functional requirements for thermal electrical
(2013‐07‐30) relays
IEC 60255‐121:2014 Edition 1.0 Functional requirements for distance protection
(2014‐03‐07)

17.11.2017
STANDARDS ON THEIR WAY TO GET APPROVED 2017
STANDARD EDITION / STATUS TITLE
IEC 60255‐181 ED1 95/362/CD Functional requirements for frequency protection

(frequency and ROCOF)
IEC 60255‐187‐1 95/351/CD Functional requirements for restrained and unrestrained

differential protection of motors, generators and
transformers
IEC COMMITTEE TC 38
”NEW” Formats for Merging Unit data, from TC 38
Approved
May 2016
”LE” ‐ PROT
”LE” ‐ PQ
”LE” ‐ PQ

17.11.2017
Relay performances (ex. for IEC 60255‐121) from TC 95 – MT4
Relay performances and IEC 61850 GOOSE
STANDARDIZED REALISTIC TESTS
SIR Diagrams are the result of standardized realistic network
simulation tests
Power system simulations are expected to be used for

performing these tests.
Simplified software tools are appearing on the market based on
the test definitions of the Standard.

17.11.2017
Results with Opal‐RT tool
The ”Theory” (from the Standard) The ”Reality” (from the Opal‐RT Tool)
2014 2017
Results with Opal‐RT tool
The ”Theory” (from the Standard) The ”Reality” (from the Opal‐RT Tool)
2014 2017
STANDARDIZED REALISTIC TESTS
HIL:
Hardware in
the Loop
In order to perform these tests
a real time power system simulator is
required, which can simulate the
behavior of the remote relay(s) and
circuit breaker(s), and also to simulate
the power system on the direct
behavior of the relay under tests
(operation for only one phase, operation for
all the phases for instance).

17.11.2017
HARDWARE IN THE LOOP (CONVENTIONAL)
HARDWARE IN THE LOOP (IEC 61850)
HARDWARE IN THE LOOP (IEC 61850)

17.11.2017
ARE WE TESTING “THE SAME THING”?
All the A/D conversion chain of the relay is The “A/D conversion chain” is in the MU that
included in the test. must be simulated in the Simulator!
CT/VT behavior is simulated in the Models to be created.
Simulator. We have reasonable models for
them.
ARE WE TESTING “THE SAME THING”?
All the A/D conversion chain of the relay is

The A/D conversion chain” is in the SAMU.
included in the test.
Each SAMU is a different SAMU (transient
CT/VT behavior is simulated in the
performances  TC 38)?
Simulator. We have reasonable models for
them.
PROCESS BUS ANS IEC 60255‐1xx STANDARD: AHG3

17.11.2017
AD HOC GROUP 3 (“DRAFT OF THE DRAFT” INFORMATION)

17.11.2017
WE NEED TOOLS TO INVESTIGATE
CONCLUSIONS
We need to perform realistic tests from the Power System point of view
TC95 MT4 has recognized and formalized this need with the IEC 60255‐1xx series
TC 38 is working on standardizing the transient behavior of Merging Units.
For IEC 61850 applications a new Ad Hoc Group 3 (AHG3) has been started by TC 95.
Sometimes real time network simulation is required, sometimes it could be off‐line. The use of real
time simulator simplifies both the tests and minimizes errors.
Real time network simulators need to “manage” IEC 61850 in real time (GOOSE, SV)
Real time network simulators need to simulate Merging Units behaviors, and probably some parts of
the IEC 61850 network behavior
We need more tools

We need more ”pre‐validated models” (to minimize complexity to the user).
We need also completely new tools.
CONCLUSIONS
The IEC 60255‐1xx standard specifies the minimum requirements for functional and
performance evaluation of relay protection functiosn and the described tests are mandatory part
of the type‐test for the protection relay.
Relay manufacturers are requested to conduct extensive testing.
It is expected to see the standard as a reference for relay acceptance tests

requested by the end‐users. Needs of third part validations (“Kema”, TÜV..)?
pass/fail criteria are not specified: users are expected to specify their own
acceptance criteria/requirements according to their application.
Not enough to specify: “according to IEC 60255‐1xx “ !!!)
The standard provides detailed discussion on CVT transients and requirement on CT sizing.
The standard specifies NO commissioning/routine tests:

Several tests and definitions in the Standard can be reasonably applied to them.

17.11.2017
SOME USEFUL PAPERS
SOME USEFUL PAPERS

IEC 61850 GOOSE TESTING
Contents
Introduction........................................................................................................................................................ 2
Step-by-step Guide ............................................................................................................................................. 3
1. Getting started ....................................................................................................................................... 3
2. Start sniffing ........................................................................................................................................... 4
3. Move the 6 GOOSE messages to the Workspace. .................................................................................. 5
4. Import from SCL file (SCD) ...................................................................................................................... 8
5. Rename the signals...............................................................................................................................11
6. Create Visualizers .................................................................................................................................14
7. Understanding basic functionality to test. ...........................................................................................15
8. TRIP BY OC ABB RELAY..........................................................................................................................17
9. TRIP BY OC PROTECTA RELAY. ..............................................................................................................17
10. TRIP BY OC SIEMENS RELAY. .............................................................................................................17
11. Timing tests. .....................................................................................................................................19

Introduction
This guide is to help you to use the state of the art IEC 61850 testing tools and equipment to efficiently
detect the technical problems and work-out their solutions. It gives the basic understanding of what needs
to be done where in the system there are several GOOSE messages and many signals to check.
This guide is prepared for the engineered system with protection IEDs:
- ABB REC670
- PROTECTA EuroProt
- SIEMENS 7SJ82

Step-by-step Guide
1. Getting started
GOOSE sniffer can be accessed by clicking the GOOSE icon from the GridEx® home screen:
Then in the main Tab Sniffer icon can be clicked to access the sniffer function:
The data shown in the GOOSE sniffer does not contain the object oriented information typically found on
the SCL files. This because the sniffer simply looks at the GOOSE messages available on the substation bus
and cannot show more information than what is available in the network frames.
The list of sniffed GOOSE messages cannot be “manipulated” in any way by the user, as this list is a sort of
“fingerprint” of the horizontal communication in the substation for that moment. For instance it is not
possible to assign any user name to any data attribute sniffed. To do this it is necessary to “move” the
GOOSE message into the Workspace.
The list of sniffed GOOSE messages can be saved in a special file and can also be moved to the COMPARE
tool for more advanced comparison analysis.

2. Start sniffing
The Capture GOOSE function ( ) starts the GOOSE sniffer. The GOOSE messages can be recorded from
Ethernet port ETH1, or ETH2 or both. This depends from the settings, the settings for GOOSE sniffer can be
found under the ‘’Config’’ tab as marked in the following figure, the port for GOOSE message, Recording
time and Binary Input Trigger option can be found in the settings menu:
Figure below shows the result of GOOSE sniffing from the network. Only 6 of those 9 GOOSE messages are
important for the tests of the multivendor system ABB – PROTECTA - SIEMENS :

3. Move the 6 GOOSE messages to the Workspace.
In the Workspace is the GridEx® acts as GOOSE subscriber, and not as GOOSE sniffer. This because the
Workspace can work indifferently with GOOSE scanned from the network (Green GOOSE, from the sniffer)
or available on SCL file (black GOOSE, from SCL import).
Move the 6 GOOSE messages to the Workspace:
NOTES / QUESTION.
Which are the 6 GOOSE messages?
How can you at the best guess tell which are the 6 GOOSE messages of our interest?
The IED NAME of the IEDs should help you for instance.

This is how the Workspace will look like:
Still it is not easy to understand which application information each GOOSE message carries. We know that
the applications implemented in this system are the followings:
- Direct Intertrip based on overcurrent detection (PTOC)
- Cross-Triggering of Disturbance Recorder, based on General Trip Function (PTRC)
Each protection device sends two messages to the other two devices; one from PTOC which sends a trip
signal command to the other two bays (Intertripping), and another from PTRC which informs the other IEDs
of the general trip condition and is used to trigger the disturbance recorder inside the receiving IEDs (cross-
triggering of disturbance recorder).

These information are NOT carried by the GOOSE messages “on the wires”. It is very difficult to find which
message carries PTOC or PTRC information.
We better require the SCD file that describes the system.
NOTES / QUESTION.
What can you try to understand from the GOOSE messages on the wire?
“Not everything is not” written there! Sometimes it is enough to work with sniffed messages…

4. Import from SCL file (SCD)
From “Main” find the icon SCL and click there:
Click on the icon “SCL” to import from one SCL file, choose the SCD file that has been used to engineer the
multivendor system:

The GOOSE messages available in the SCD file are imported (“black GOOSE”):
Try to move those GOOSE into the Workspace (Right click on the GOOSE message, choose to move it to
Workspace)
NOTES / QUESTION.
You know that you already have your 6 GOOSE in the Workspace.. previously moved there from the
list of sniffed GOOSE messages (GREEN COLOR). What do you expect to happen when you try to
move there the “same GOOSE” from SCL file (BLACK COLOR)?
This is what will happen:

Accept the “Merge” and move all the 6 “SCL GOOSE” to the Workspace.
Go to the Workspace and look at your GOOSE messages. There are some “Green information” and some
“Black information”.

5. Rename the signals
The content of the dataset in a GOOSE message can be renamed. This function is enabled for the user to
rename the signals in terms of protection and control signals suitable for power system engineers. Double
clicking an element in a dataset will pop up a window to rename the signal:
NOTES / QUESTION.
Is it clear which complex process is behind the “merge” between one “sniffed GOOSE” and one “SCL
GOOSE”?

Double clicking in the pop up field will open an on-screen keyboard to enter a custom name for the signal.
User can use the keyboard to input names:
When a signal name is changed, it can be reverted to the original name by right clicking and selecting to
“Set original variable name”.
In our case we will create the following names, based on the help we got from the SCD file information:
ABB TRIP – related to general trip information from ABB

ABB OC – related to overcurrent trip information from ABB
SIE TRIP – related to general trip information from Siemens
SIE OC – related to overcurrent trip information from Siemens
PROT TRIP – related to general trip information from Protecta
PROT OC – related to overcurrent trip information from Protect

NOTES / QUESTION.
The above picture shows only 4 renamed signals. Are you able to rename all the 6 signals?

6. Create Visualizers
Visualizers are representation of IEC 61850 communication in terms of icons and buttons for the user to
observe, understand and interpret them easily. Graphical visualizers can be created for different types of
dataset of the GOOSE messages to observe their changes. Expanding the tree for the intended GOOSE
message, right clicking the dataset item and clicking ‘’Create Visualizer’’, visualizers can be created. The
variables in the dataset can be renamed if needed as explained in the previous section.
Select the quality for the signal you are associating to the Visualizer:

You should have the following 6 Visualizers, and all the indications should be “FALSE” (OFF, ZERO..)
7. Understanding basic functionality to test.

The first test of the system, is the conceptual test.
Is the system responding according to the design?

NOTES / QUESTION.
How should the system work?
If ABB TRIPS by OC:
If PROTECTA TRIPS by OC:
If SIEMENS TRIPS by OC:

8. TRIP BY OC ABB RELAY.
By forcing ABB to Trip by overcurrent, this is the result:
9. TRIP BY OC PROTECTA RELAY.

By forcing PROTECTA to Trip by overcurrent, this is the result:
10. TRIP BY OC SIEMENS RELAY.

By forcing SIEMENS to Trip by overcurrent, this is the result:

NOTES / QUESTION.
What are we NOT testing with the above tests?
Are these tests giving you any idea about the performances of the system?

11. Timing tests.
The first test of the system, was the conceptual test.
We need to verify the timing performances now, as we know already that correct information are sent and
correct information are received.
Perform the tests again, but with GridEx scan (subscribe to) the messages with recording activated. This will
generate the Event List.
Start the recording:
Trip ABB, wait , trip Protecta, wait, Trip Siemens, wait.
Look at the Event List:

Set the zero (relative) reference time at the correct event (right click with mouse on the Event)
And measure the time from when the trip order is present on the Substation Bus to when the receiving IED
has consequently tripped.

The above pictures show ONE result. You may get different results, and that’s why a “more fair” test
method should be used, based on a statistical approach. This test gives anyway good information that
things “may be fine”.

NOTES / QUESTION.
Write your own results here.
 ABB PTRC  PROTECTA PTRC  SIEMENS PTRC
ABB PTOC TRIP 
PROTECTA PTOC TRIP 
SIEMENS PTOC TRIP 

UNDERSTANDING THE IEC 61850 QUALITY
Contents
Introduction........................................................................................................................................................ 2
1. Getting started ....................................................................................................................................... 3
2. Start capturing the GOOSE messages..................................................................................................... 3
3. Verify when ABB IED is in Test Mode. .................................................................................................... 4
4. IED Self Supervision activation: FAILURE................................................................................................ 8
5. “Lost GOOSE” – Ghost GOOSE..............................................................................................................10
6. IED behavior for a “Ghost GOOSE”.......................................................................................................14

Introduction
detect the technical problems and work-out their solutions. It gives the basic understanding of the famous
“quality string” that we can see in GOOSE messages, MMS messages (reports) and also in Sampled Values
streams
This guide is prepared for the engineered system with protection IEDS:
- ABB REC670
- PROTECTA EuroProt
- SIEMENS 7SJ82

Step-by-step Guide
1. Getting started
Make sure you have ready 6 Visualizers for the 6 GOOSE messages we are interested to.
You need the results from the previous Hands-On exercise for this:
2. Start capturing the GOOSE messages

Make sure the messages are all available, the quality for each message is good (the Visualizer shows the
quality):

3. Verify when ABB IED is in Test Mode.
Activate the Test Mode in the ABB IED and verify what happens to the GOOSE messages

NOTES / QUESTION.
What can you tell about the quality string values when the IED is in test mode?
How are the “Bits” counted in the Quality String? What is Bit 0 and what is Bit 12?

NOTES / QUESTION.
What is one IED expected to do when it gets one message with “Test Mode” quality activated?

4. IED Self Supervision activation: FAILURE
Another interesting bit of the quality string is related to the self-supervision of the IED.
When the self-supervision is not confirmed to be Ok, the bit related to “failure” is raised.
To see this, ABB is a good device because at start-up, it sends GOOSE messages before the self-supervision
has finished its job and confirmed that the device is Ok. During this time, the GOOSE messages are sent
with bad quality flag, and this can be seen and measured.
Note: ABB raising the failure flag (in GOOSE and MMAS) at start-up, until the self-supervision has not
confirmed the Ok, has been (and still is) a controversial issue, but from IEC 61850 point of view it is fully
correct. The user also knows that the self-supervision is really driving the quality bit!
In order to verify this interesting situation do the following:
Power OFF ABB device.

Start to subscribe to all the GOOSE messages with GridEx
Power On ABB device
GridEx will NOT FIND the two ABB GOOSE messages. Let GridEx continue
The two ABB GOOSE messages are seen by GridEx
You may see the quality is not good, but just let the system continue to run
When ABB “clicks” (Internal Relay Fault contact released  Self supervision Ok) stop GridEx after a while
Look at the Event List of GridEx

NOTES / QUESTION.
Are you able to tell for how much time is ABB sending GOOSE messages with invalid quality?
Why “Invalid”?

5. “Lost GOOSE” – Ghost GOOSE
The receiving IED can supervise the GOOSE messages and detect when the “sender is lost”.
The same can GridEx do, for testing purposes.
Monitor the GOOSE messages when “the network is Ok”:
Remove the Siemens Siprotec 5 IED from the network and wait:

Reconnect the Siemens device to the network:

Look at the event list:

NOTES / QUESTION.
How does the GHOST Icon work?
How are protection relay behaving on the “GHOST” GOOSE? Any idea?

6. IED behavior for a “Ghost GOOSE”.
Instead of the “GHOST Icon”, the Protection and Control Devices treat the missing received message as
Invalid.
This is the example of ABB, when the GOOSE message from Siemens IED is not received anymore.
In the first step, the GOOSE messages from Siemens and Protecta are well received: their values are
“FALSE” but they are VALID.
Now the case when Siemens IED is removed from the network:
This is what ABB shows (GridEx shows the icon “GHOST”):

NOTES / QUESTION.
The possibility to supervise the GOOSE communication is one of the most important possibilities
that IEC 61850 gives us.
What can we do when the missed GOOSE is detected?

SUPERIMPOSED AND SIMULATED GOOSE
Contents
Introduction........................................................................................................................................................ 2
1. Getting started ....................................................................................................................................... 3
3. Simulate one GOOSE message with Omicron IED Scout. ....................................................................... 4
4. SIMULATED GOOSE ..............................................................................................................................11

Introduction
detect the technical problems and work-out their solutions. It gives the basic about detecting strange IED
behaviors during commissioning
- ABB REC670
- PROTECTA EuroProt
- SIEMENS 7SJ82

Step-by-step Guide
1. Getting started
Make sure you have ready 6 Visualizers for the 6 GOOSE messages we are interested to.
You need the results from the previous Hands-On exercise for this:

Make sure the messages are all available:
3. Simulate one GOOSE message with Omicron IED Scout.

Open the station SCD file with Omicron IED Scout and simulate the Siemens OC GOOSE message (Open
SCL):

Select the GOOSE message that you want to simulate:
Click on “Simulate”:

Click now on “Configure GOOSE:
Set “True” to the signal you want to simulate (Siemens Overcurrent Trip):

And press on “Update”.
Observe the GOOSE messages: Siemens “seems to oscillate”!

NOTES / QUESTION.
Or… is it really “oscillating”? What happens to ABB Relay? And to Protecta Relay?
GrdEx has detected that something is strange for that GOOSE. Right click on the GOOSE and ask to see the
Warnings:

Look in the REPORT:

NOTES / QUESTION.
Are you able to explain what has happened?
Is GOOSE an acknowledge message?
Know the receiving relay from where the GOOSE it has to receive is coming from?

4. SIMULATED GOOSE
From IED SCOUT, generate the same GOOSE but as SIMULATED ONE (Edition 2):
Look with the simple SNIFFER how many GOOSE you see on the network now:
Look at the values in the two GOOSE messages (the REAL ONE and the SIMULATED ONE):

Note that relay protections DO NOT react to the SIMULATED GOOSE (they are EDITION 1 devices)
Remove the REAL GOOSE from the network (Unplug Siemens device), so there is only the Siemens
SIMULATED GOOSE in the network.
Move the Siemens GOOSE (real) to Workspace (if not already there) and try to subscribe to it.

GridEx will not subscribe to it, because it is a simulated GOOSE.
NOTES / QUESTION.
What happens to your GridEx when you want to subscribe to the Siemens GOOSE?

Change the settings into GridEx to subscribe to Simulated GOOSE, GridEx subscribes to it.
NOTES / QUESTION.
What happens to your GridEx when you want to subscribe to the SIMULATED GOOSE?
More or less this is what Edition two relays can do: subscribe to Simulated GOOSE (for testing
purposes) or to real GOOSE (in normal condition).

NOTES / QUESTION.

TIME SYNCHRONISATION
Contents
Introduction........................................................................................................................................................ 2
1. Getting started ....................................................................................................................................... 2
3. Issue trip from SIEMENS IED................................................................................................................... 7
4. Analysis in the Event List ........................................................................................................................ 7

Introduction
detect the technical problems and work-out their solutions. It gives the basic understanding about time
synchronization in IEDs and test devices.
- ABB REC670
- PROTECTA EuroProt
- SIEMENS 7SJ82
Step-by-step Guide
1. Getting started
Make sure your GridEx is SNTP Synchronized to the SERTEL SNTP server:
Choose the settings in GridEx:

And from there choose Time:
Set GridEx to be synchronized to the correct SNTP Server (IP Address):

NOTES / QUESTION.
The synchronization may not work.
What do you think about the IP Address of the Ethernet port of your GridEx?
This is probably the time to have a look at it.. SNTP Protocol is a TCP-IP based protocol, differently
from GOOSE that doesn’t care about the IP Address of the Ethernet ports!

Exit from the settings and go back to GOOSE. You will get notified that the clock status of GridEx has
changed:
Start the subscription (with RECORD) to the GOOSE messages just to check that everything is Ok:

3. Issue trip from SIEMENS IED.
Create a trip condition (Overcurrent) for the Siemens IED and verify the response from all the devices:
4. Analysis in the Event List

Open the Event List and see the correct sequence of events:

Select the first trip event (or any other event) for the Siemens IED and ask GridEx to show you the “entire
message” for that event (right click on the GOOSE message):
NOTES / QUESTION.
Calculate the time distance between the two time stamps.
What can we say on this time difference?
The “absolute time” is the GridEx time stamp to for when the event was recorded in GridEx. The
“Timestamp” in the GOOSE message is the timestamp that the sender IED wrote in the message at the
moment of publishing the message, so it is related to the clock of the protection device.

Do the same for all the three devices. Here some results for your reference:

NOTES / QUESTION.
Report here the time differences detected for the different GOOSE messages from the different
relays:
ABB:
PROTECTA:
SIEMENS:
What are we actually measuring when we do this?

MEASURING PROTECTION RELATED TIME
Contents
Introduction........................................................................................................................................................ 2
1. Getting started ....................................................................................................................................... 3
2. Start the Wizard ..................................................................................................................................... 4

Introduction
detect the technical problems and work-out their solutions. It gives the basic understanding about the
process of measuring operate times of protection devices or protection schemes like in this example.
- ABB REC670
- PROTECTA EuroProt
- SIEMENS 7SJ82
This measurement approach is taken from the IEC Standard for protection relays of the series IEC 60255-
1xx, where the Typical Operate time of the protection relay is expressed with a standardized statistical
approach:

Step-by-step Guide
1. Getting started
Make sure your GridEx is well configured in the Workspace with the GOOSE messages that we are
interested to. Verify that the GOOSE messages are still available and that no modifications have been done
by the previous exercise.
Choose the settings in GridEx:

Verify also that the correct relay trips and that the correct GOOSE are received.
2. Start the Wizard

Exit from the GOOSE analyzer and open the Wizard:
The “Signal timing Wizard” is a time measurement tool. In this Wizard GridEx can measure time between one
start signal and another stop signal. The start and stop signals can be configured as per user requirement.
Single indication from GOOSE and Binary Input can be used as start and stop signal.
For protection applications, where the signals are trip signals from protection relays (typical application is
direct intertrip scheme), the measured times are reported.
Select the starting signal, which we decide to be the Siemens Overcurrent GOOSE TRIP:

Select the quality associated to the signal:
And make sure you choose the condition (from 0 to 1: True)

Press to continue and go to next step, where we will select the General Trip Signal from ABB. Make sure
you set the condition (from 0 to 1) and also that you select the quality (just like before for the start signal).
Go to the next phase and verify that you have the correct settings in the GOOSE subscriber (REAL GOOSE):

START the wizard (go to next step).

Inject one fault in the Siemens IED and wait for the Wizard to get the time between the two GOOSE
messages:

At this point click on the button to continue and see the results (the histogram cannot be very nice with
only 30 measurements..)

NOTES / QUESTION.
What have we measured?
“One shot” is enough to judge the behavior of protection systems?
Which IEC standard (s) requires relay manufacturers to report the typical operate time of protection
relays on a statistical basis?

NOTES / QUESTION.
If time allows repeat the tests with all the combinations, and report the MAX, MIN and MEDIAN
time of the results:
 ABB PTRC  PROTECTA PTRC  SIEMENS PTRC
ABB
PTOC TRIP 
PROTECTA
PTOC TRIP 
SIEMENS
PTOC TRIP 

USING RELAY TEST SETS
Contents
Introduction........................................................................................................................................................ 2
1. Getting started ....................................................................................................................................... 3
2. Start testing ............................................................................................................................................ 9

Introduction
process of measuring operate times of protection devices or protection schemes like in this example. The
guide makes use of a relay test set, able to interface IEC 61850 and conventional technologies.
- ABB REC670
- PROTECTA EuroProt
- SIEMENS 7SJ82

Step-by-step Guide
1. Getting started
Prepare the Omicron Test set (CMC 256 Plus) to receive the 6 GOOSE messages (from OC protections and
from General Trip), and also to sense the three contact trip signals from the protection relays.
For GOOSE settings, the SCD file needs to be used.

Choose GOOSE Configuration:
Import the SCD file:

Import all the 6 GOOSE messages.

MAP (by dragging and dropping the DA onto the BI):
BI2 of Omicron to OC GOOSE from Siemens, BI3 of Omicron to GENERAL TRIP from Siemens
BI5 of Omicron to OC GOOSE from Protecta, BI6 of Omicron to GENERAL TRIP from Protecta
BI8 of Omicron to OC GOOSE from ABB, BI9 of Omicron to GENERAL TRIP from ABB:
Load the Configuration into the CMC 256:

Start an application software. Most simple for this test is Quick CMC:
Set the BI1 BI4 and BI7 to contact OC trip signal from Siemens, Protecta and respectively ABB.
Give a reasonable name to the “GOOSE mapped Binary Inputs”:

NOTES / QUESTION.
What have we done?
How is Omicron test equipment CMC behaving when it receives GOOSE messages?

2. Start testing
At this point connect the current amplifier of CMC 256 to SIEMENS relay, cause SIEMENS to TRIP and see
the results of all the signals in the system:
Inject the fault into Siemens relay and measure the results:
NOTES / QUESTION.
Write here the times you have measured for SIEMENS TRIP:
SIEMENS OC TRIP GOOSE

SIEMENS GENERAL TRIP GOOSE
SIEMENS GENERAL TRIP CONTACT
ABB GENERAL TRIP GOOSE

ABB GENERAL TRIP CONTACT
PROTECTA GENERAL TRIP GOOSE

PROTECTA GENERAL TRIP CONTACT
How fast or slow is GOOSE compared to the contact?

Inject the fault into Protecta relay and measure the results:

NOTES / QUESTION.
Write here the times you have measured for PROTECTA TRIP:
PROTECTA OC TRIP GOOSE



Inject the fault into ABB Relay and see the results:

NOTES / QUESTION.
Write here the times you have measured for ABB TRIP:
ABB OC TRIP GOOSE




NOTES / QUESTION.
By doing some DELTA calculations, are you able to verify the measurements we did with the GridEx?
ALL GOOSE  ABB PTRC  PROTECTA PTRC  SIEMENS PTRC
ABB
PTOC TRIP 
PROTECTA
PTOC TRIP 
SIEMENS
PTOC TRIP 

MERGING UNITS AND PROCESS BUS
Contents
Introduction........................................................................................................................................................ 2
1. Getting started ....................................................................................................................................... 2
2. Analyze the Sampled Values .................................................................................................................. 3
3. Continue analysis from Workspace ........................................................................................................ 4
4. Latency of the Merging Unit .................................................................................................................11
5. Testing with 2 Merging Units ...............................................................................................................12
6. Verify if MUs are synchronized or not..................................................................................................17

Introduction
working principle of the Merging Units, time synchronization and phase angle measurement between
different quantities.
Step-by-step Guide
1. Getting started
Make sure Vizimax SAMU is well synchronized to its GPS clock and let Vizimax publish its data.
Inject some analog values to the MU and with the SV sniffer in GridEx detect the published data stream
from Vizimax:

Make sure also GridEx is time synchronized. We would like to use 1PPS for these tests, but 1PPS is
complicated to deliver to all the stations, so we accept our limitation of 1ms in the accuracy and run with
SNTP instead.
2. Analyze the Sampled Values

Look at the detailed information of the MU: The MU declares to be synchronized to a local clock, which is
correct, it is its own GPS clock.

3. Continue analysis from Workspace
Move the MU to the Workspace:
Start the subscription to the MU (with recording):

Look at the time domain data:

All the 4 voltages have been added now:
View the graphical data:

:

NOTES / QUESTION.
What is that squared waveform at Voltage 4?
Find one “Sample Count Zero” and zoom the view on the time axis around it:

Measure the time from “Sample Count Zero” to when the phase angle is zero degrees:

NOTES / QUESTION.
How many degrees is UL! Compared to the absolute reference of the GPS clock?
In this example:
7 ms / 20 ms * 360 deg = 126 degrees
What about on your measurement?
In Omicron we wrote “0 degrees” for UL1… How can it be like that?

4. Latency of the Merging Unit
Look at the report from GridEx:

NOTES / QUESTION.
Considering that GridEx is synchronized with an accuracy of +/- 1 ms (SNTP), the latency is for sure
less than 1,6 ms, which is definitely correct (the IEC 61850 standard requires 3 ms).
In this example.
What about your measurement?
What means “the latency of the Merging Unit”?
5. Testing with 2 Merging Units

Let’s run two Merging Units now.
For second Merging Unit we will use Omicron CMC 256, that can be a Sampled Values publisher.
Let’s define the MU from Omicron CMC 256.:

NOTES / QUESTION.
Load the IEC 61850 stack information to the CMC device:
There are two SV data streams on the bus now:

Start the analog injection into the Vizimax SAMU and at the same time the digital injection into the
Omicron MU:
And this is the result from the SV sniffer:

NOTES / QUESTION.
Is Omicron declaring synchronization?
The two MU are NOT synchronized to each-others. How can you tell this?
6. Verify if MUs are synchronized or not

Let’s verify if the MU are synchronized or not.
First look at the “clock declaration” of the MUs in their packets:

Then we can do it more complicated..
Move the two MUs to the Workspace and record the analog waveforms for both:

Look at the analog waveforms:
You can see that the background has different colors… the same color is used for the data that can be
“compared in phase”. The two MUs cannot be compared in phase and they have different colors.
But the data from the same MU (Vizimax) can be compared in phase, so Channel U1 and U4 have the same
color).
When you time-scroll the diagrams, only the diagrams with the same color follow the scroll!
Look at the report... what can you tell about the “latency” of the two Merging Units?

NOTES / QUESTION.
GridEx does not always measure the latency of the Merging Unit.. it depends if the MU is
synchronized or not, and also if GridEx is synchronized or not.. the measurement that GridEx does is
the distance of the “Sample Count Zero” from GridEx clock!.
Write down here the results from your report and try to state which conclusions you can draw.

Training: Protection and Control with IEC 61850
Mr. Karlheinz Schwarz, Mr. Andrea Bonetti, Mr. Mehrdad Kazemtabrizi
IEC 61850 GOOSE TESTING

Contents
Introduction........................................................................................................................................................ 2
Step-by-step Guide .............................................................................................................................................2
1. Getting started ....................................................................................................................................... 2
2. Start sniffing ...........................................................................................................................................3
3. Sniff and record. Event list. .................................................................................................................... 4
4. Simple and extended views ....................................................................................................................5
5. Warnings................................................................................................................................................. 5
6. Mark signals that are changing ..............................................................................................................6
7. “REAL” and “SIMULATED” GOOSE..........................................................................................................8
8. Event List ................................................................................................................................................8
9. Report ...................................................................................................................................................10
10. Sending GOOSE messages to other sub-tools in GridEx ...................................................................10
10.1. Moving GOOSE message to Compare ..........................................................................................11
10.2. Moving GOOSE messages to Workspace .....................................................................................13
11. The Workspace .................................................................................................................................14
11.1. Renaming the signals....................................................................................................................14
11.2. Visualizers .....................................................................................................................................15
11.3. Event List ......................................................................................................................................17
11.4. Graphical Viewers .........................................................................................................................17
September 2017 - page 1 of 19

Introduction
This document is a guide for using the GOOSE sniffer of GridEx®. This guide contains the basic information
to allow the reader to take confidence with the instrument and be able to easily learn how to perform
more advanced tests with GOOSE messages.
Step-by-step Guide
1. Getting started
Then in the main Tab Sniffer icon can be clicked to access the sniffer function:
The data shown in the GOOSE sniffer does not contain the object oriented information typically found on

the SCL files. This because the sniffer simply looks at the GOOSE messages available on the substation bus
and cannot show more information than what is available in the network frames.
The list of sniffed GOOSE messages cannot be “manipulated” in any way by the user, as this list is a sort of
“fingerprint” of the horizontal communication in the substation for that moment. For instance it is not
possible to assign any user name to any data attribute sniffed. To do this it is necessary to “move” the
GOOSE message into the Workspace.
The list of sniffed GOOSE messages can be saved in a special file and can also be moved to the COMPARE
tool for more advanced comparison analysis.
2. Start sniffing
The Capture GOOSE function ( ) starts the GOOSE sniffer. The GOOSE messages can be recorded from
Ethernet port ETH1, or ETH2 or both. This depends from the settings, the settings for GOOSE sniffer can be
found under the ‘’Config’’ tab as marked in the following figure, the port for GOOSE message, Recording
time and Binary Input Trigger option can be found in the settings menu:
Figure below shows a result of GOOSE sniffing from a network with 82 GOOSE messages:

Any GOOSE message can be seen in details by opening the tree view:
3. Sniff and record. Event list.

The Capture & Record function ( ) starts the GOOSE sniffer while it also records the events associated to
the changings in the GOOSE messages (time stamped Event List). The following figure shows GridEx®
screen when Capture & Record is enabled. In the upper right corner of the screen the recording time is

shown:
4. Simple and extended views

The Extended view function can be used to see detailed information about the GOOSE message for the
user. The left side shows simple view, and the right side shows the extended view. It more information for
the GOOSE message is shown in the tree view for the extended view.
5. Warnings
As shown in the figures below, some of the captured GOOSE messages may contain some warnings ( ).
The warnings are shown in both cases of sniff with recording or simple sniffing. The description of the
warnings can be found by Right Click and selecting ‘’Show errors/warnings’’. The warnings are also
automatically shown in the report created by GridEx®. Please note that the report can only be created
where the network is scanned (sniffed) with recording.

6. Mark signals that are changing

The mark event change icon ( ) in ‘’View’’ tab, highlights the GOOSE messages that are changing during a
Capture without record ( ) or Record ( ), it will also highlight the specific property that is changing.
This function is useful when there are many GOOSE messages in the network and the user needs to identify
the messages that are changing in an efficient manner.

After enabling this button, if Capture without record ( ) or Record ( ) is started, the changing GOOSE
message will be marked as shown as follows,
The tree view can be used to see the value that has changed:

7. “REAL” and “SIMULATED” GOOSE

GridEx® GOOSE sniffer differentiates between Real and Simulated GOOSE messages; the simulated
messages are shown in bold fonts, as it can be seen by the following figure. Very often the real GOOSE
(published by substation devices) and its simulated GOOSE (published by test devices) are present together
on the network while testing and it is important for the test engineer to be able to recognize them in an
easy way.
8. Event List
Event list is the complete list of all the events for the GOOSE messages recorded during that time frame.
Event list is available in both Sniffer ( ) and My Workspace ( ), whenever the messages are recorded (
). Changes for the Dataset of recorded messages are shown. Event list can be accessed from clicking the
Event list icon ( ) under Analysis tab:

Any event can be chosen to be a time reference to more efficiently analyse the sequence of events.
In the right-top corner the settings for the event list is found, there are options for adding and removing
information, sorting and other function for ease of use.

9. Report
A comprehensive report of the GOOSE messages is created when record is enabled in Sniffer ( ) or in My
Workspace ( ). Clicking on “Analyse the Captured” data icon ( ) under the “Analysis” tab the user can
view the report of the recorded data for the selected GOOSE messages:
10. Sending GOOSE messages to other sub-tools in GridEx

The list of detected GOOSE messages can be saved in a special file, to be re-opened later on for
maintenance purposes for instance.
The same list can also be copied to the COMPARE tool, for comparison of the detected GOOSE messages
with a proper SCL file or for comparison with a new GOOSE sniff.
Sniffed GOOSE messages can also be copied to the WORKSPACE for more detailed analysis: it is possible for
instance to create user’s name for the different attributes of the dataset, associate graphical visualizers

particular members of the dataset etc.
10.1. Moving GOOSE message to Compare

The GOOSE messages that are captured in the Sniffer can be used to compare them with the list of GOOSE
messages available on a SCL file or with a list of GOOSE messages that have been sniffed and saved
previously.
The captured messages can be moved to COMPARE by going to the ‘’Main’’ tab, and clicking the COMPARE
icon marked as in the figure below:
This will open the COMPARE window:
In the COMPARE function there are two columns to fill in with GOOSE messages. The icons in both column
A and column B tabs are as follows:

A B
Copy Captured GOOSE to A Copy Captured GOOSE to B
Copy SCL Imported GOOSE to A Copy SCL Imported GOOSE to B
Import SCL imported GOOSE from Import Captured GOOSE from

GridEx file to A GridEx file to B
To import the GOOSE messages captured in Sniffer, the Copy Captured GOOSE ( ) icon can be used in any
of the columns.
For example, to import the sniffed GOOSE to column A, the marked icon in the following figure can be
clicked:

The other column can be filled up with GOOSE messages from another source (e.g. SCL file or Sniffed
GOOSE) and then they can be compared.
10.2. Moving GOOSE messages to Workspace

The GOOSE messages that are captured in Sniffer can be moved to WORKSPACE if a detailed analysis is
required (Also GOOSE messages imported from CL can be moved to Workspace).
In the WORKSPACE the changes in the GOOSE messages can be seen graphically and the names can be user
customized.
To move any GOOSE to WORKSPACE simply right click the message and select ‘’Copy GOOSE to Workspace’’
from the menu:
Then this message can be found in the WORKSPACE.

11. The Workspace

In the Workspace is the GridEx® acts as GOOSE subscriber, and not as GOOSE sniffer. This because the
Workspace can work indifferently with GOOSE scanned from the network (Green GOOSE, from the sniffer)
or available on SCL file (black GOOSE, from SCL import).
11.1. Renaming the signals

The content of the dataset in a GOOSE message can be renamed. This function is enabled for the user to
rename the signals in terms of protection and control signals suitable for power system engineers. Double
clicking an element in a dataset will pop up a window to rename the signal:
Double clicking in the pop up field will open an on-screen keyboard to enter a custom name for the signal.
User can use the keyboard to input names:

When a signal name is changed, it can be reverted to the original name by right clicking and selecting to “Set
original variable name”.
11.2. Visualizers
Visualizers are representation of IEC 61850 communication in terms of icons and buttons for the user to
observe, understand and interpret them easily. Graphical visualizers can be created for different types of
dataset of the GOOSE messages to observe their changes. Expanding the tree for the intended GOOSE
message, right clicking the dataset item and clicking ‘’Create Visualizer’’, visualizers can be created. The
variables in the dataset can be renamed if needed as explained in the previous section.

The picture below shows one Visualizer created for the dataset value of the GOOSE message:
The indications from the visualizers are updated when the subscribing function is started.
The GOOSE message in the workspace can be subscribed to and recorded in this tab. The icons found in this
tab are as follows:

Start Subscribing GOOSE
Subscribe and Record
Stop
11.3. Event List

Event list is the complete list of all the events for the GOOSE messages recorded during that time frame.
Event list is available in both Sniffer ( ) and My Workspace ( ), whenever the messages are recorded (
). Changes for the Dataset of recorded messages are shown. Event list can be accessed from clicking the
Event list icon ( ) under Analysis tab. GOOSE messages are colored differently for ease of view.
11.4. Graphical Viewers

By selecting the “Graphical Viewer” option, user can see the changes in the Dataset elements represented
graphically. For the selected variables, it shows the status and changes, e.g. for a single indication, when it is
“High” and “Low”.
After recording the messages, first right clicking on the desired values under dataset the user need to add
them to graphical viewer.

The quality associated with the Signal can be selected then,
Then clicking the Graphical representation icon ( ) under analysis tab the graphs are opened. The icons in
the graphs are for ease of navigation with touch as well as with a mouse.

By using the zoom in/out buttons the graph can be zoomed in for ease of viewing, the graph can be
dragged along the time axis to reposition the signals, right clicking on graph the user can use different
options.

IEC 61850 SPECIFICATION, ENGINEERING AND TESTING OF MULTIVENDOR SYSTEM
IEC 61850 SPECIFICATION, ENGINEERING

AND TESTING OF MULTIVENDOR SYSTEM:
HANDS-ON GUIDE
Contents
Introduction........................................................................................................................................................ 2
Step-by-step Guide .............................................................................................................................................2
1. Getting started ....................................................................................................................................... 2
2. Single Line Diagram ................................................................................................................................3
3. Function Specification ............................................................................................................................ 6
4. Communication Specification................................................................................................................. 9
4.1. GOOSE ............................................................................................................................................ 9
4.2. MMS reports.................................................................................................................................16
5. System Diagram (Import SCL files) .......................................................................................................18
6. Implementation ....................................................................................................................................21
7. Communication configuration..............................................................................................................25
8. Export SCD ............................................................................................................................................27
9. Documentation.....................................................................................................................................27
10. Use of ICTs for loading the communication configuration into IEDs ...............................................28
11. Application configuration in the ICTs ...............................................................................................29
12. Testing ..............................................................................................................................................29

Introduction
This guide is to help you in creating a small substation and configuring GOOSE and MMS communication.
Step-by-step Guide
1. Getting started
 Start STS Helinks by double clicking on the icon.
 Once the screen shows up, you can choose the name of your workspace and where to save it. Keep the
default location for the save and for the purposes for this presentation, call it: “FMTP Training”.
 You can see the dashboard. You have access to different parts of the tool from here. To get started,
click on the icon for Single Line.

2. Single Line Diagram

 The Substation we will use for this training has 3 bays. One incoming bay and two outgoing feeders. To
start the design, click on “Substation” at the right-hand palette and use the left mouse click on the
screen. Name the substation “FMTP TRAINING”.

 Click on “Voltage Level” and choose “V1” as the voltage.
 Next, from the “Bay Types” tab, choose “Bay”. Since there are no transformers in the system, there is
only one voltage level and all the bays are under this voltage level.

 Name the first Bay “Incoming” then create two other bays and call them “Outgoing1” and “Outgoing2”.
 There is one busbar in this design. Click on “Bus Bar” from the palette and you can drag a line on the
screen. You can name it Busbar1.

 For each bay, for simplicity, there is only one circuit breaker and one feeder. From the “Power
Equipment” tab, choose “Circuit Breaker” and then click on the screen to place the equipment.
 Find “Feeder” from the same tab and perform the same action to place it on the canvas.
 NOTE: To create equipment for a specific bay, the bay would have to be highlighted. So, before you
place any power equipment, make sure the right bay is selected by clicking on the bay and highlighting
the blue icon under its name.
As you can see from the screen above, the “Incoming” bay is highlighted so any power equipment
placed on the canvas will be under the “Incoming” bay.
The Single Line Diagram is finished and we will proceed to creating functions and logical nodes.
3. Function Specification
 Double click on one of the bays, for example the “Incoming” bay. The screen which opens is the
Function Specification Diagram. For each bay, a function is created called “Protection”. The logical
nodes placed in this function are “PTOC” and “PTRC”.
 From the palette on the right side, under the “Functions” tab, choose “New Function”. Click on the
screen and a function box is created. Name it “Protection”.

 Once the “Function” box is made, you can place logical nodes inside. From the palette, under the tab
“IEC 61850 7-4 ED1”, choose the logical nodes “PTRC” and “PTOC”. Choose each one individually and
use the left mouse click inside the function to place the logical node.
 Last part to be placed in the screen is the virtual IED. Under the tab “IEDs”, choose virtual IED, draw a
small box on the canvas and call it “IED1”. This will be the virtual IED which will be implemented to a
real one later.
 Choose “Assign Device” under the tab “Connections”. Draw a line from the virtual IED to the header of
the functions. The picture below shows the whole configuration.
 Use the right mouse click on “PTRC” and choose “Configure Signals”.

 On the next window, choose “Edit”. This way, you can add signals to the logical node. Choose
“Op.general” from the list of signals and add them to the list and press OK afterwards and close the
windows.
 Create the same function and virtual IEDs (IED2 for Outgoing1 and IED3 for Outgoing2) for the other
outgoing bays. They should look like the following pictures.
Outgoing1:
Outgoing2:

4. Communication Specification
This section is to create specification for both vertical and horizontal communication. This means creating
GOOSE and MMS applications.
4.1. GOOSE
There are six applications in total for this exercise. The two applications per bay are “Intertrip” and “Cross-
Triggering of Disturbance Recorder”.
One bay will send two messages to the other two bays; one from PTOC which sends a trip signal command
to the other two bays (Intertripping), and another from PTRC which informs the other bays of the general
trip condition and is used to trigger the disturbance recorder inside the receiving IEDs (cross-triggering of
disturbance recorder).
 Back in Single Line section, from the palette, choose “GOOSE Application” under the “Application” tab.
Use the left mouse click on the canvas and a box is created which you can name what you wish for the
application.

 For the application names, you can choose what you wish. But keep in mind, there are six applications
so you could name something easy to remember for example for the incoming bay applications you
could use “Incoming to Outgoing1, Outgoing2 DR” for PTRC and “Incoming to Outgoing1, Outgoing2
Trip” for PTOC and repeat the same naming process for Outgoing1 and Outgoing2.
 Regardless of the names, create two applications for “Incoming” bay; one for disturbance recorder
using PTRC and another for a trip using PTOC.
 Use the right mouse click on the DR application and choose “Open Application”.
The window which opens is where you can design your GOOSE messages. For this application, we must
send a trip signal from PTRC in Incoming bay to trip signals from PTRC in Outgoing1 and Outgoing2.

 From the palette on the right side, choose “Sending Function” and then choose “Protection” from the
bay “Incoming”.
 Now choose “Receiving Function” from the palette and choose “Protection” from “Outgoing1” and
again “Protection” from “Outgoing2”.
 Use the right mouse click on the incoming function “Protection” and choose “Signal Selection”.

 From the next window, choose the signal “Op.general” from the logical node “PTRC” and press Ok.
 From the palette, use the “High Priority” connection and drag a line from Op.general inside the
Protection function for Incoming bay to Protection for Outgoing1 and 2. Each one will give you a
prompt to choose the receiving signal (subscriber).
 For both functions, choose “PTRC1” as the receiver. The next window which opens, asks for a text for
the incoming signal. You can write “DR from Incoming”.
The following pictures will help you in making this connection.

 Remember to do the same for the receiver in Outgoing2.
 Save and move back to the single line diagram and open the application for Trip from Incoming bay.
 Using the same procedure, create an application in which the signal “Op.general” from “PTOC” in the
Protection function from Incoming bay is sent to “PTOC” in Protection from Outgoing1 and Outgoing2.
You can write in the description for the input; “Trip from Incoming”

 Two applications are completed for bay “Incoming”. Repeat the same process for bays Outgoing1 and
Outgoing2. This table should help you realize how to create the applications.
Publisher Subscriber App name Function LN, Signal Input

(sender) (receiver) Description
Incoming Outgoing1 In to Out1, Protection PTRC, DR from

Outgoing2 Out2 DR Op.general Incoming
Incoming Outgoing1 In to Out1, Protection PTOC Trip from

Outgoing2 Out2 Trip Op.general Incoming
Outgoing1 Incoming Out1 to In, Protection PTRC, DR from

Outgoing2 Out2 DR Op.general Outgoing1
Outgoing1 Incoming Out1 to In, Protection PTOC, Trip from

Outgoing2 Out2 Trip Op.general Outgoing1
Outgoing2 Incoming Out2 to In, Protection PTRC, DR from

Outgoing1 Out1 DR Op.general Outgoing2
Outgoing2 Incoming Out2 to In, Protection PTOC, Trip from

Outgoing1 Out1 Trip Op.general Outgoing2
Out1 to In, Out2 DR:

Out1 to In, Out2 Trip:
Out2 to In, Out1 DR:
Out2 to In, Out1 Trip:

4.2. MMS reports

To create MMS reports in Helinks, we need to create inputs from the desired bays to an HMI client.
 Back in the single line diagram, open the specification for the substation section like you did for the
bays by double clicking on the substation box.
 The function specification diagram for the substation is now open. Create a function called “HMI”, add
a logical node “ITCI” to it and assign it to a virtual IED called “HMI”.
 Use the right mouse click on “ITCI” and choose “Configure Inputs”.

 In the next window, you can choose how many signals should be considered in the MMS reports.
Choose “Select”.
 In the next window, you have tick the boxes for bays under voltage level V1 to make sure their signals
are considered as inputs. After that, press OK for all windows.

The Horizontal and Vertical Communications have been specified (for both respectively MMS and
GOOSE). Now we need to move towards the implementation/engineering.
5. System Diagram (Import SCL files)

 Move back to the dashboard. Use the Import button to import multiple ICD files to be used for
implementation. The ICD files are produced by the vendor tools.
 The “ICD files” folder is inside the folder for your workspace. Import the following ICD files:
SICAM_HMI
ABB_REC670
PROTECTA_ed1_FMTP_Variant3_EMPTY GOOSE and MMS
Siprotec_Siemens_7SJ82
Use the following option for each window that pops up when you import an ICD:
Don’t import specification

Add ieds to project
 Back in dashboard, choose “System Diagram” by clicking on the icon.
 As you can see from the palette, the ICD files have been imported.

 Click on each tab and click on the icon within and place it on the canvas. For each IED that you place,
you are prompted to name it. After placing all the IEDs (other than the HMI), you can use the “IEC61850
Connection” to connect the devices to the switch “Switch1”.
 Create another switch called “Switch2” from the “Generic Devices” tab and connect to Switch1 and
connect the HMI to Switch2.
 A default IP address is appointed after creating each connection. You can change it by clicking on it and
writing a new IP address.
The table and picture below should help you.
File name Device name IP address
SICAM_HMI HMI 192.168.0.200
ABB_REC670 ABB 192.168.0.102
PROTECTA_ed1_FMTP_Variant3_EMPTY PROTECTA 192.168.0.33

GOOSE and MMS
Siprotec_Siemens_7SJ82 SIEMENS 192.168.0.107

6. Implementation
 Move back to the single line and double click on Incoming bay to open the function specification
diagram for it.
 Now that there are IEDs in the workspace, we can implement virtual IEDs to the real ones. Use the right
mouse click on IED1 and choose “Implement”.
 You can choose between different IEDs in the system diagram. For the Incoming bay, choose “ABB
IED670” and press OK.

 Notice the icon next to the virtual has changed from a yellow warning to a green check sign. We should
map the logical nodes in the specification to the ones inside the IED. Double click on the green sign to
open the logical nodes for the ABB IED.
 You have open one of the logical devices inside and choose a logical node which is compatible with the
logical nodes in the specification. Open LD0 and next to the “S.XCBR.1” click on the row and then you
can click on “…” icon.
 The next prompt which opens shows all the logical nodes for the bay which are the same as the one
selected inside the IED. Just choose the XCBR for CBR1 and press OK.
 So, the XCBR logical node is mapped. Do the same for the other logical nodes. Note that mapping the
equipment logical nodes is not very essential but for PTOC and PTRC, you have to choose the particular
ones.
Afterwards, you can move on to other bays and the substation section to implement various IEDs and
map the important logical nodes. The table and pictures below are for your guidance.
Bay IED LN in Logical Device LN in IED

specification in IED

Incoming ABB IED670 PTOC OC4_1 OC4.PTOC.1

PTRC LD0 SMP.PTRC.1
Outgoing1 SIEMENS 7SJ82 PTOC PROT ND_.PTOC.1

PTRC PROT PTRC.1
Outgoing2 PROTECTA Europrot PTOC LD0 F1.PTOC.1

PTRC LD0 GSE.PTRC.1
Station level HMI SICAM ITCI Access Point S1 ITCI.1
Incoming:
Outgoing1:

Outgoing2:
Substation:

7. Communication configuration
 Back to the single line diagram, choose the icon on the top menu called “Set SCL Communication
Settings from Specification”.
 From the window, which opens, choose “Select IEDs to configure” and on the next window choose
“Configure all IEDs”.
 Close the window and press Ok on the next one and when another window prompts, press Yes.

 After the communication is finished, you can press OK on the next window.
 Back in the dashboard, you can click on the “Communications” icon and check the GOOSE and Reports
tab to check if the GOOSE messages and MMS reports have been created, respectively.

8. Export SCD
 From the dashboard, click on the icon for export SCD, SSD.
 From the menu, you can choose which type of file you would like to export, SSD, SCD, etc.
9. Documentation
 For the last feature of this guide, click on the icon for Documentation from the dashboard.

This way, you can get a full report in the form of a pdf document detailing the system from single line
diagram to the communication implementation.
10. Use of ICTs for loading the communication configuration into IEDs
 This is the next phase, where the engineered SCD file is given to the vendor tools (ICTs) for import and
“download” (write) the IEC 61850 communication instructions into the specific IED.

11. Application configuration in the ICTs

 The application configuration of the IEDs is done in the ICTs. Here we need to instruct the protection
and control device to do what “we need to do” (at least) with the signals that we receive (GOOSE
messages).
 Also in this case the configuration is downloaded (written) into the devices by the ICT
12. Testing
 The implemented scheme needs IEC 61850 competence and also protection and control
competence to be tested in its functionality. Also we need tools…
With use of the acquired competence in testing methodologies, let’s verify that the multivendor
system implemented works as it is expected.

 In this phase there are:
- Functional tests to prove that the concept has been well implemented
- Troubleshooting tests in case something doesn’t work as it should
- Detailed tests to prove the performances of the system implemented
- Validation of the SCD file. Is the network communication corresponding to the SCD file?
- Final report with results (commissioning report)


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IEC 61850 course with practical

demonstrations and hands-on

Lima, NM Lima Hotel

Andrea Bonetti Karlheinz Schwarz

4 DAYS IEC 61850 COURSE

With focus on protection and control in HV/MV substations

All the presentations are supported by practical examples or demonstrations.

All the presentations are supported by practical examples or demonstrations.

Introduction to the Energy

Karlheinz Schwarz, SCC

Welcome to the NettedAutomation Training Center

Copyright, 2017-07, Michael Hüter

■ IEC 61850 is not just another protocol!

Smart People for Smart Grids. Page S-0000-1

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Dipl.-Ing. Karlheinz Schwarz

Welcome Organisational issues (1)

 Program: see hand-out folder

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<<Abbreviations_2017-03-10.pdf>> in the package

A list of Logical Nodes can be found here:

35 Minutes Video on IEC 61850:

NettedAutomation Experience and Background:

Energy Delivery System

 Hybrid Energy Delivery:

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Key Elements of IEC 61850

■ Elements of the Power System

■ Elements of the Power System

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Measuring, Monitoring, Protecting, Controlling,

Generation Renewable Generation Customer

ISO 668 - Series, freight containers —

ISO 6346 is an international standard covering

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Standardized Information Container

■ IEC 61850 and IEC 61400-25 define international

[Hz, PPV, PNV, PhV, A, W, ...]

See example demo

Delivery Note Delivery Note

[Hz, PPV, PNV, PhV, A, W, ...]

Smart People for Smart Grids. Page S-0000-6

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■ Logistics is generally the detailed

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Smart People for Smart Grids. Page S-0000-8

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 MMXU.PhV.phsA.instCal.mag.i = 2390 SIUnit=V

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Air insulated XCBR

Differential PDIF Environmental information MENV

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Example of hysteresis in volt-VAr curves

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