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Article 3, Sec. 2 on search and arrest of the 1987 constitution provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
As it goes Sec. 2, Article 3 of the 1987 constitution protects every person against unreasonable search and arrest. When you speak
of person, it mainly refers to natural persons, human beings, or individuals like us. Yet, I’d like to underscore the fact that the
protection enshrined under sec.2 article 3 applies not only to Filipinos but also to foreigners, so Filipinos and foreigners alike are
entitled to be secured in their persons, meaning bodies, against unreasonable search or arrest, houses, papers and effects and in
their respective offices.
In fact, in one case decided by the US Supreme Court, a protection afforded to under Sec. 2 Article 3 of our 1987 Constitution
which was actually copied from the US constitution was made to apply to a person who was inside a telephone booth, so that is
how sacred this right against unreasonable search and seizure is and the 2 nd paragraph of sec. 3 article 3 provides that any
evidence obtained in violation of sec. 2 article 3 shall be inadmissible for any purpose and for any proceedings.
You recall the case of People v. Caballes, the kakawati leaves. It was found out that indeed he was transporting stolen goods
yet it was found out that the search was illegal. Look what happened? Caballes was acquitted.
You recall the case of People v. CA, regarding the raid on Apartment no. 1 which is adjacent to Abegail’s store. The search was
declared invalid, so the accused was acquitted, even if it was found out that the accused was in possession of explosives.
You look at the case of Malacat, Malacat was found in a possession of a grenade yet considering that the search was invalid the
evidence or grenade that was taken from him was rendered or decreed to be inadmissible in court.
General Rule: Any evidence obtained in violation of sec. 2 article 3, among others, is inadmissible for any purpose or in any
proceedings.
You recall the case of People v. Bongcarawan, Bongcarawan was searched by the security guards of the vessel and it yielded a
positive result. He argued that the search was invalid. The SC said that the search was valid because it was with the consent of
Bongcarawan, yet the SC in that case went on to rule that even supposing or even granting arguendo that the search conducted
on Bongcarawan was illegal, yet the evidence obtained from him would still be admissible in court. Why? Because the search,
although it may be regarded as illegal, was not done with the intervention of the State. Verily, the case of Bongcarawan,
our SC made it clear that the exclusionary rule in respect to evidence illegally obtained or evidence obtained through
illegal search and arrest may only be invoked if the search that is decreed illegal is done with the active intervention
of the State or any of its agents.
Rule on admissibility of evidence obtained from a search by a private party: Even if the search is illegal, but the search is
done without the intervention of the State or that it is done by a mere private person, then the evidence obtained thereby may
still be admissible in court. Again, the rule is that the proscription against unreasonable search and arrest as well as the
exclusionary rule in respect to evidence obtained may only be invoked if the search or the illegal arrest is done with the active
intervention of the State. But actually in the ruling in the case of Bongcarawan is nothing but a reiteration on the previous rulings
in the case of People v. Marti.
In the case of PP v. Marti, Marti sent a package through a private courier and without the knowledge of Marti, the staff of the
private courier inspected the package that was sent by Marti and it was found out that the package contained marijuana. On the
basis of such finding, Marti was prosecuted for illegal possession of prohibited drugs. Marti objected invoking the rule under the
Constitution to the end that any evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable search or arrest should be
inadmissible in evidence. Yet our SC disagreed, again just like in the case of Bongcarawan, our SC declared in the case of Marti
that the exclusionary rule in respect to evidence illegally obtained may only be successfully invoked if the search or the illegal
search is conducted by the State or any of its agents.
In the case of Waterous Drugs Corp v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113271, Oct. 16, 1997, an employee was dismissed because it was
found out that this personnel or employee was receiving kickbacks from the supplier of the company. But it was found out that
this person received kickback because the employer or the management intercepted a mail matter that was addressed to that
employee. There was an envelope, it was opened without the knowledge of that employee, although it was addressed to him and
when it was opened it was found out that it contained the check representing the kickback of that employee. In the labor
proceedings, the employer introduced evidence the check that it confiscated from the employee and the employee objected
because according to him it was the “fruit of the poisonous tree.” According to the employee, such should be inadmissible in court
because it was a result of an illegal search, but the SC again disagreed, because it was found out that the search was without the
intervention of the state, such that in the case of Bongcarawan, our SC declared that the exclusionary rule in respect to the
evidence illegally obtained may not be successfully invoked therein.
It can only be invoked, again, if the illegal search or arrest is done with the active intervention of the state or any of its agents.
The reason is that the provisions under the Bill of Rights of art. 3 of the 1987 constitution are directed against the
state, because the provisions under article 3 would serve as limitations in the exercise of the 3 inherent powers of the state. So
that is why the SC, again, ruled that any evidence illegally obtained basically will be admitted in court if such illegal search is
perpetrated by private individuals.
But the ruling in one case is peculiar, I’m referring to Zulueta v. CA, G.R. No. 107303, Feb. 20, 1996. In the case of Zulueta,
Zulueta is a wife of a doctor then his wife suspects that her husband has an illicit relationship with another woman. So what she
did was that she went to the clinic of her husband, then without the knowledge of the husband the wife ransacked the drawer of
the husband. It was forcibly opened and there upon she discovered that there were letters that were sent by the mistress of the
husband. She filed a case against the husband, using the incriminating evidence as proof of her concubinage. The husband
objected, probably invoking the case of Marti, Waterous Drugs and Bongcarawan or the provision under sec. 3 Article 3 to the end
that any evidence illegally obtained should be inadmissible in court. The SC said that the evidence obtained by the wife is
inadmissible in court, notwithstanding the fact that the illegal search was perpetrated by a private individual. So the ruling in the
case of Zulueta is diametrically opposed to the rulings in the cases of Bongcarawan, Waterous Drugs, and Marti.
GENERAL RULE: Warrantless search or arrest is unlawful and whatever evidence recovered will be inadmissible in any court or
proceeding.
EXCEPTION: If the warrantless search or arrest is done by a private individual, it is then valid because sec. 2 Article 3 is only
applicable when the warrantless search or arrest is done by the state or any of its agents.
The protection against unreasonable search and arrest is granted to natural persons, but it is also available or granted to
juridical persons, like corporations and partnerships.
In the case of David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 6, 2003. You recall that during the celebration of the People Power the
supporters of Erap rallied to Malacañan, such that Gloria declared of State of National Emergency and pursuant to which the PNP
rounded up the premises of the Daily Tribune and Malaya Newspaper and they conducted a search without a warrant. SC then
declared that the prohibition under unreasonable search and arrest is also applicable or may be in favor of juridical persons like
the Daily Tribune and the Malaya Newspaper. The protection of unreasonable search or arrest is available not just to natural
persons but also to juridical persons like partnerships or corporations. Apply Expressio unius clause.
Sec 2 Article 3 of the 1987 constitution protects us against unreasonable search and arrest. Conversely, that particular provision
under the constitution does not protect us from search or arrest that is considered however as legal. It only protects us
against unreasonable search of arrest. As a matter of general rule, a search and arrest is valid or done legally if the same if the
same is covered by a search warrant or a warrant of arrest as the case may be. You take note however that sec 2 Article 3
prescribes the requisites for the valid issuance of a search warrant or a warrant of arrest.
As provided for under sec 2 Article 3, among others, there should be probable cause and such probable cause must be determined
personally by the judge and that such determination of probable cause must be done after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses that may be produced and that there should be particularity in the description of the place
to be search or the person or things to be seized. So, in other words, these are four concurring requisites in that absent of any
one of them would whether the issuance of a warrant of arrest or search warrant as the case may be invalid.
Warrant of Arrest
A warrant of arrest is a process or a legal document issued by the court of law or a tribunal clothe with the authority commanding
or directing the law enforcement agencies to arrest a designated person.
For such warrant of arrest to be validly issued, the same must be done with the concurrence of the four requisites that we already
enumerated.
1. Probable cause.
What is probable cause? Is this the same as suspicion? NO.
For purposes of the issuance of a search warrant, the term probable cause refers to such fact or circumstances as to lead a
reasonably prudent man to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person sought to be arrested is the
one responsible for the crime.
Probable cause is different from suspicion in that probable cause is generally based on facts and circumstances, whereas
suspicion probably there is a result of a speculation or guess word so it does not have to be based on facts or circumstances.
Probable cause is more than suspicion.
3. After examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses produced
This is the most ticklish of the requisites for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Such is ostensibly clear under sec 2 Article 3. Take note however of the ruling of Soliven v. Makasiar, is the judge mandated to
conduct a personal examination of the complainant before he can issue a warrant of arrest? NO, notwithstanding the clear import
of sec 2 Article 3. According to the SC to require a judge to conduct a personal examination before he would issue a
warrant of arrest it would then eat up the precious time of the court. So the rule as it is now and pursuant to the rule on
Soliven v. Makasiar a judge issuing a warrant of arrest is not anymore required to conduct a personal examination of the
complainant and its witnesses. All that the judge must do is to evaluate the records of the case, evaluate the affidavit
complaint the supporting evidence, the affidavit of witnesses and counter affidavit is any, as well as the resolution
of the investigating prosecutor.
Take not however, that the judge is not duty bound to hook line and sinker the resolution of the fiscal. In order words, the judge
must come up with his own personal determination in the existence of absence of probable cause. He should not rely
on the findings or resolutions of the fiscal. The reason is plainly evident because the resolution of the fiscal is merely in respect to
the existence of absence of probable cause for purposes of indictment, for purposes of filing an information in court. Whereas, the
probable cause to be determined by the judge is for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest. But then the rule is that the judge,
as what was ruled in the case of Makasiar, is not required to conduct a personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses,
all he has to do is to evaluate the records of the case.
This is anchored however on sec 5 par a Rule 112, ROC wherein it is provided in essence that within 10 days after the filing
of the information in court, the judge has to personally evaluate the records of the case and the resolution of the
fiscal. The judge may dismiss the case is he finds that there is no evidence showing probable cause.
Conversely, if records would show that the evidence is showing probable cause that judge may issue a warrant of arrest or may
issue a commitment order if the accused is already arrested without a warrant.
In case of doubt, the judge will direct the prosecution; direct the complainant to provide for additional evidence within five (5)
days from notice and such incident must be resolved within a period of thirty (30) days from the submission of such required
additional evidence. In other words, under sec 5 (a) Rule 112, ROC, the judge indeed is not mandated to conduct a personal
examination of the complainant and his witnesses before he can issue a warrant of arrest. Again, all that the judge must do is just
to evaluate the records of the case, including the resolution of the fiscal.
Unlike for purposes of search warrant, the application for the issuance of a search warrant is filed directly with the judge. It is
filed directly to the court. But in respect to a warrant of arrest, normally before the case is filed in court the case must be filed in
the office of the prosecutor. Such that when the fiscal finds probable cause that is the time that the information is filed in court.
In other words, in respect to the issuance of a warrant of arrest there is already, more or less a preliminary finding of probable
cause and such circumstance is not obtaining in respect to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Again, the application of a search
warrant is filed not in the office of the prosecutor, but directly with the court. For me that is the most compelling reason why
somehow there is a relaxation on the rule in respect to the issuance of a warrant of arrest because of this preliminary determination
of existence of probable cause.
I mentioned to you that in sec 5 (a) Rule 112, ROC that the judge is given ten (10) days within which to determine the existence
of absence of probable cause for purposes of the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Based on experience, more or less, as soon as
the information is filed in court it will only take 2 or 3 days or within 1 week there will be a warrant of arrest. On the lapse of the
ten (10) days, judge can still issue a warrant of arrest, although they are mandated or as a rule that it has to be done within a
period of 10 days.
TIPS – effective, but quite unethical: If you are the lawyer of the accused, what will you do? Where more or less the issuance of
a warrant of arrest will be expected once there is an information in court? You file a motion for a judicial determination of probable
cause. Use the same provision of the law or the Rule 112 sec 5 (a), because once you file that motion the judge will be compelled
to examine or evaluate the records of the case. The judge will be mandated to study the case meticulously, such that in case of
doubt the judge will issue an order directing the complainant or the fiscal to present additional evidence and such incident will be
decided within a period of 30 days. So by doing that therefore, you forestall the issuance of the warrant of arrest, there will be
then a hearing. Giving of course for one to compel the judge to eruditely examine the records of the case for him to determine
the existence or absence of probable cause and the second reason is to give time for your client to probably abscond. File the
motion before the issuance of the warrant of arrest.
GENERAL RULE: Judges are not duty bound to personally examine the complainant and his witness. He only needs to examine
the records of the case and the resolution of the fiscal, in which he is not also bound to follow.
Judge’s options:
Issue a warrant upon finding existence of probable cause.
In case of doubt, direct the prosecution and complainant to submit additional evidence, in accordance to sec. 5 (2), Rule 112,
ROC
4. There should be particularity in the description of the place to be searched or the persons and things to be seized
As a rule, if the full name of the person is known, that should be stated in the warrant, and if his address is known, it should also
be stated in the warrant.
But how about in cases where the true name of the accused is not known to the authority, may a warrant of arrest be issued to a
person? i.e. John/Jane Doe? Yes, and that John/Jane Doe warrant is valid for as long as that is accompanied by a description
personae of that person to be arrested, meaning to say description of that person to be arrested only to guide the law
enforcement agencies on whom to arrest pursuant to that particular warrant.
If a John/Jane Doe warrant is issued without an accompanying description personae of the person to be arrested, then such
warrant of arrest therefore is invalid.
In the case of PP v. Tui Won Chua, the warrant of arrest was against Timothy Chua, but the person arrested is of the name Tui
Won Chua. Did the court invalidate the warrant? NO, the warrant was accompanied by a description personae, the address was
stated in the warrant itself. More so that in that case, the arresting officers had personal knowledge as of the identity of that
person to be arrested in the search because they were the once who conducted the prior surveillance. So the case of Tui Won
Chua only proves that indeed an error or mistake in the description of a person may be cured by a description personae or by the
personal knowledge enforcing the warrant.
But the case of Pp vs. Priscella del Norte is different because the officers enforcing the warrant were not the ones who conducted
the prior surveillance. In fact, they did not know who Ising Diwa (the subject of the warrant) is. The barangay official who told
them that Ising Diwa was Prescilla del Norte did not testify in the course of the trial, so that was the pitfall in the case of Prescilla
del Norte. According to the law, any mistake or imperfection in describing the person sought to be arrested will be cured by the
description personae or even the personal knowledge of the person enforcing the warrant.
GENERAL RULE: imperfection or mistake in the description of the person sought to be arrested will invalidate an arrest to a
person.
EXCEPTION: If the arresting officer enforcing the warrant has personal knowledge of the arrest or by a description personae
Situation: On a process of executing a warrant of arrest, the informant decides not to proceed with the case, will the
officer be held liable in case the one supposed to be arrested files a case?
A: No. The police officer will not be held liable. Unless there is an order coming from the court recalling that particular warrant and
unless the same is communicated to the police officer concerned, the police officer incurs no liability, the same as to search warrants.
Take in note, in course of our discussion, a search warrant has a life span. A search warrant is good for 10 days reckoned from
the issuance thereof, but a warrant of arrest is not necessarily invalid after the lapse of 10 days.
Warrantless Arrests
As a rule, for an arrest to be valid is has to be covered by a warrant of arrest, but that is merely a general rule. In our jurisdiction
there are exceptional circumstances under which a warrantless arrest is considered valid.
The exceptions are provided for under sec. 5 Rule 113, ROC.
1. In flagrante Delicto
A warrantless arrest is valid when the person arrested is actually committing an offense, is about to commit an offense, or has
committed an offense in the presence of the police officer or even a private citizen.
Conversely, under sec. 5 Rule 113, ROC, even a civilian can effect an arrest for as long the person arrested is committing
an offense in his presence, or is about to commit an offense or has committed an offense. Such that is the arrest is
affected by a private citizen then that arrest is termed as a citizen’s arrest.
This is an arrest known as in flagrante delicto where the person arrested is caught red handed in the act of committing a crime;
either he does the act in its consummated stage, in its executory stage or in its attempted stage.
In this instance, in flagrante delicto arrest it is important or it is imperative that the person making the arrest has actual or
personal knowledge of the commission of the crime. It is either they saw it or he perceives the commission of the offense
through his other senses.
Perception of a crime through your sense of smell, is that allowed? YES. A case in point is the case of PP v. Claudio, wherein that
case, Claudio boarded a bus. She was bringing with her a buri bag and inside the buri bag was marijuana. Unfortunately for
Claudio, she put her buri bag on her back and right in front of Patrolman Opinion, and Patrolman Opinion is a NARCOM agent.
Opinion was very familiar with the smell of marijuana then he reached inside the buri bag and it was marijuana. On the base of
that, he arrested Claudio. During the trial, Claudio objected the admissibility of the evidence obtained from her contending that it
was the result of an illegal search, because according to her Opinion did not, at the time of the arrest, he did not know that the
bag contained marijuana. SC disagreed. According to SC, perception of the offense need not be through your eyes only. It may
be perceived through your other senses, hearing, smell, sight, taste or touch.
Under the so called arrest in flagrante delicto, then you can justify the arrest of a person who is said to be committing what is
known to be a continuing offense. Recall the case of Umil v. Ramos, involving the arrest of Dural. Dural was arrested three
(3) days after the commission of the offense for killing 2 patrolmen. He protested to his arrest, contending that he was arrested
three days after the commission of the offense. The SC disagreed because in that case Dural was said to be committing a
continuing offense.
What offenses are characterized as continuing offenses? Subversion, rebellion, insurrection or any conspiracy or proposal to commit
of these crimes, these are considered to be continuing offenses. Such that when a person is committing a continuing offense
everything then he can be arrested at anytime without need of any warrant of arrest.
The same can be said of a person who is committing a crime of kidnapping and illegal detention, especially if victim has not yet
been recovered. If the detention is continuing and the person or the culprit may be arrested even without a warrant of arrest.
Recall the case of the Chiong sisters, a guy who turned out to be a state witness was arrested without a warrant. He questioned
the validity of his arrest but SC ruled that he was committing a continuing offense. Until now, the body of the victims have not yet
been recovered.
May there be a valid warrantless arrest pursuant by mere reliable information? In the case of PP v. Nuevas, Nuevas was validly
arrested because he voluntarily surrendered the bag that he was carrying which contained marijuana. Afterwards, Nuevas pointed
to his colleagues, Din and Inocencio, and on the basis of the tip off or the information relayed to the police authorities by Nuevas,
Din and Inocencio were arrested. The SC then said that the arrest of Din and Inocencio was invalid because in our jurisdiction, a
person cannot be arrested by a mere suspicion.
Yet take note in the cases of Montilla, Malmstedt, Maspi and Tangliben, the accused also was arrested pursuant to an
information, yet this time around or in those cases the information was given by a civilian informant of the authorities. In the case
of Nuevas, it was Nuevas himself, an accused, who pointed to another accused as malefactors, but in the cases of Montilla,
Malmstedt, Maspi and Tangliben the information was relayed not just by any other person but by an informant of the police
authorities. In those cases, SC invariably held that the warrantless arrest of the accused was valid because there was a tip off
given by an informant and among other things the accused also at the time of their arrest in those cases were acting
suspiciously and far more important there was, in those cases, urgency in the situation in that the accused therein
were either boarding a vehicle, were about to board a vehicle, or had just disembarked from a vehicle. In that context
therefore, we can differentiate the cases of Montilla, Malmstedt, Maspil and Tangliben from the case of Nuevas.
Yet you take note also in the cases of PP v. Rodriguez and PP v. Mengote because in those cases, there was also a tip off or an
information conveyed to the police authorities. Yet in the cases of Rodriguez and Mengote the tip off was but conveyed through a
telephone call, meaning the informant was not even around at the time of the arrest of the accused.
The consideration in the cases of Aminnudin and Molina, the informants were at the time of the arrest present with the police
authorities. In those cases, SC held that those arrests were invalid. In the cases of Montilla, Malmstedt, Maspil and Tangliben,
the informants were around yet the arrests were valid, but in the case of Aminnudin and Molina the informants were not around
yet the arrest were declared invalid. In that case of Aminnudin, the police officers had at least 2 days within which to secure a
warrant, yet they did not. In the case of Molina, the officers had 2 months within which to secure a warrant, yet for the reason
one way or another, they did not bother to secure a warrant. In that respect, we need to distinguish the case of Aminnudin vis-a-
vis the cases of Maspil and Montilla because one in the cases of Maspil and Montilla, the police authorities had more or less
sufficient period of time within which to secure a warrant wherein which they did not thus it was declared as valid.
In the case of Aminnudin, the identity of the accused, the drug courier was known already before the arrest. Also the vessel that
will bring him to Iloilo was already known as well as the time of arrival. But in the case of Maspil where there had 3 days to secure
a warrant but they did not because the identity of the drug courier was not known, the mode of transportation that would bring
him to a particular place was not also known, much less the date of arrival. Just like in the case of Montilla, SC said that while it
is true that there is sufficient period of time in which the police officers, in the case of Maspil and Montilla, would have secured a
warrant yet it is highly impossible for them to secure a warrant because they did not know where the transaction would take place,
they do not even know to whom the warrant should be addressed, much the place where the commodity would be dropped off.
This is how to distinguish the cases of Aminnudina and Molina on one hand vis a vis the cases of Montilla and Maspil on the other
hand, because in those cases there was sufficient period of time for a warrant but in one case the SC declared the arrest as invalid
and in the other book of cases the SC declared also the warrantless arrest as valid.
The person making the arrest need not actually see the crime committed. It is enough that he has actual and personal
knowledge of the crime committed. The term “in his presence” is satisfied when he had perceived the crime committed
by his senses. Those taking place within the optical or auditory perception. Includes situation “when one hears the disturbance
created and proceeds at once to the scene”. Requires mens rea (intention to commit the crime) and overt act of an offense. A
person liable for a continuing crime may be arrested at any time.
2. Hot Pursuit
Here, the arrest made by a law enforcer or a civilian is valid even without a warrant if an offense has just been committed and
that the person making the arrest has probable cause to believe, based on personal knowledge that he acquired of other facts and
circumstances that the person to be arrested is the one who committed the offense.
Now, in flagrante delicto arrest, I mentioned to you earlier that the person making the arrest has actual personal knowledge of
the commission of the offense, meaning to say that the person making the arrest in in flagrante delicto arrest has perceived the
commission of the offense with his eyes or through his other senses. But in hot pursuit arrest, here it is not necessary that
the person making the arrest has actually witnessed the commission of the offense, he may not have seen the offense,
yet he acquired personal knowledge of the facts and other circumstances of the offense which would imbed probable
cause on his part to believe that the person he is going to arrest is the offender.
You recall the case of Pp vs. Padilla, 2 officers positioned themselves in the Abacan bridge. They did not actually see the side
swiping incident; they did not actually see Padilla committing the crime involving the balut vendor. The SC then held that they
could well arrest Padilla for the side swiping incident because they may have not actually witnessed the side swiping incident but
they have personally acquired knowledge of facts or other circumstances which made them believe that Padilla was
the offender. There was a report through the radio as relayed through the viper Manarang and they observed that the hood of
the car of Padilla was already dented, the plate number was dangling and matched the plate number that was announced through
the radio. All these circumstances according to SC would impel probable cause that Padilla was the one referred to in the report.
In the case of PP v. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756, where in that case, a report was relayed to them, and acting on that report, the
police officers went to the crime scene. They recovered the instrument of the crime, they interviewed the witnesses and they
pointed to to Gerente as the culprit. They went to the hospital and saw the body of the victim and 3 hours thereafter, Gerente was
arrested. Gerente said that the arrest was illegal because it was not covered by a warrant. The SC disagreed, nothing that the
police officers may have not witnessed the commission of the crime yet they acquired personal knowledge of other facts and
circumstances which would make up a probable cause on their part to believe that Gerente was the offender.
Again, in a hot pursuit arrest, the police officer or the civilian who may make the arrest may not have actually witnessed the
commission of the crime yet he acquired other personal knowledge of facts or other circumstances which would make him believe
that the person is the one who is the offender.
You take not however that in a hot pursuit arrest, there should be a large measure of urgency between the commission
of the crime and the actual arrest of the offender. In other words, the warrantless arrest of the person in a warrantless
arrest must not be too far removed from the commission of the offense.
Recall the case of Pp vs. del Rosario, he was arrested a day after the commission of the offense. The SC then said that the arrest
was illegal because it was not covered by a warrant. Take not that there was once a gap of 1 day from the time of the commission
of the offense and the arrest of del Rosario, yet SC declared that the arrest was illegal. According to SC, police officers should
have secured a warrant for the arrest of del Rosario.
In that regard, the ruling in the case of Umil v. Ramos involving the arrest of Nazareno is therefore modified. Recall the case of
Nazareno, he was arrested for murder for 10 days after the commission of the offense yet the SC declared the arrest as valid. The
ruling in the case of Umil v. Ramos is no longer controlling, but there is a peculiar circumstance in the case of Nazareno,
because in the case of Nazareno what was filed therein was a petition for habeas corpus for the release of Nazareno, but before
the SC could decide on the case for habeas corpus the information was already filed in court and the court wherein the case was
filed already issued a commitment order, such made the petition for habeas corpus moot and academic. Again, in hot pursuit
arrest the rule as it is now that the warrantless arrest of a person in a hot pursuit arrest must not be too far removed from the
commission of the offense.
Q: How about this practice of the accused in putting up bail for his temporary liberty, would it not amount as a waiver
of right to question the validity of his arrest?
A: NO. Under sec 26, Rule 124, ROC, putting up a bail is no longer considered as a waiver of your right to question the validity of
the arrest.
While par 2, sec 3, article 3 ostensibly provides that any evidence obtained in violation of sec 2, article 3 is admissible and for any
purpose and for any proceedings yet there is another instance where that may be admitted in evidence.
When that evidence, although illegally obtained, is being offered not against the person from whom the same is taken but
against the person making such illegal search or arrest.
Example:
I am illegally searched by a police officer. I offered my objection without a warrant, so no doubt that such is illegal. During trial,
shabu for example, when the shabu is offered against me, I timely interposed my objection and the court that that should be
excluded. After acquittal, suppose that I filed a counter suit against the officer who made such illegal search or arrest. I sued him
for a criminal case on illegal search. Can I utilize that shabu as my evidence against the police officer? YES, because this time
around that evidence is not offered against me but against such person who made the illegal search or arrest.
Under our jurisdiction, there are actually 3 instances under which an evidence, otherwise illegally obtained or confiscated may be
admitted in court. First, failure to object to the admissibility of the evidence. Second, if that is rather used not against the person
from whom the same was taken, but from the person or against the person who perpetrated such illegal search or arrest. Third
instance is when the search although illegal is conducted without the intervention of the state or any of its agents. Just like in the
case of Bongcarawan, so that is the third instance when an evidence otherwise illegally obtained may be admitted in court, when
the search otherwise illegal is conducted without the active participation or intervention of the state or of its agents. Take note of
these 3 instances where an evidence illegally obtained may still be admitted in court.
SEARCH
Search Warrant
A search warrant is a court process directing or allowing the law enforcement agencies to search a particular place and confiscate
or seize the items enumerated in the search warrant itself.
3. Such probable cause must be determined after examination under oath of the complainant and the witnesses
The third requisite attended to the issuance of a search warrant is that the probable cause must be determined by the judge
after examination under oath of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. This is a requirement under sec 2,
Article 3 of the Constitution, and this requirement is further buttress by sec 5, Rule 126, ROC, which provides and mandates that
indeed judges should examine the applicant and the witnesses in connection to the issuance of the search warrant.
In our discussion on arrest and citing the case of Soliven vs. Makasiar, the judge, in the issuance of a warrant of arrest, is not
anymore mandated to conduct a personal examination of the complainant. But this rule is different in the issuance of a search
warrant, because under the rule particularly sec 5, Rule 126, ROC, the judge is mandated to conduct a personal
examination of the applicant and his witnesses.
In fact, under the rules, the judge must ask searching questions and that he should ask probing questions, he should not ask
questions answerable by a yes or no. He should more or less cross examine the applicant and his witnesses before issuing the
search warrant. Under the rules, such examination should be conducted under oath, such that if the applicant is not telling the
truth then he can be prosecuted for perjury and such interrogation must be reduced in writing.
While the warrant of arrest may be issued without the judge having to conduct and examination of the complainant, yet a search
warrant can never be issued without the judge conducting personal examination of the applicant and his witnesses.
The rule is very strict, such that in one case, the case of Alvarez v. CFI, our SC succinctly ruled that an applicant for the issuance
of a search warrant should only testify on matters which are within his personal knowledge. In other words, hearsay information
will not suffice.
In the case of Burgos v. Chief of Staff, the SC declared as invalid the search warrant that was issued on the basis of what was
termed as the evidence gathered by the military unit. The applicant in that case was the military commander, but he was not the
one who gathered the evidence. It was rather his subordinate who supposedly gathered the evidence, yet it was him who applied
for the search warrant. So no doubt, his testimony in respect to the existence of the evidence is considered hearsay.
4. There should be particularity in the description of the place to be searched and the object or things to be seized
The last requirement in the issuance of the search warrant is that there should be particularity in the description of the place to
be searched. I would like to invite your attention to the case of PP v. CA, you recall the raid of Apartment no. 1 where the address
stated in the search warrant is Abegail store. The SC said that it was invalid, because there was no meeting of the minds
between the applicant and the issuing judge. What the applicants had in mind was Apartment no. 1 but the address stated
in the search warrant was rather Abegail store and the judge issued the search warrant authorizing the search on Abegail store.
There was no particularity in the description of the place in that case, such that the search warrant was declared
invalid by the SC. But in actual practice and only to avoid this kind of problem, normally the authorities in the application of a
search warrant present to the judge the vicinity map or sketch map present the location of the premises sought to be searched.
In the case of PP v. CA, it was argued by the prosecution that there was a sketch that was submitted, yet it was found out that
that sketch was rather submitted belatedly. In fact, that only came out when the prosecution already filed a motion for
reconsideration on the order of the judge quashing the search warrant. It was rather an attempt to cover up the mistake in the
application of the search warrant.
Scattershot warrant
A scatter shot warrant is issued for more than one specific offense, while a general warrant may be issued for one specific
offense yet it does not particularly describe the things or objects subject matter thereof.
In the case of Stonehill v. Diokno, the SC also nullified the warrant for being a general warrant, because in this case the search
warrant was issued for the confiscation of financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondents, receipts, letters, portfolios,
typewriters and other documents evidencing all business transactions. According to the SC that warrant is defective, because it
authorized the confiscation of all documents pertaining to all business transactions without distinctions as to legitimate or
illegitimate transactions.
Similarly, in the case of Burgos v. Chief of Staff, the search warrant was also declared as invalid for being a general warrant,
because it authorized the confiscation of subversive materials without specifying what materials are to be considered as subversive.
Yet in another case of Alvarez v. CFI, the SC however said that when the object or things are incapable of being technically
described then a general description would suffice, because in this case the search warrant for the seizure of books, documents,
receipts and lists, however there was a qualifying clause list as by used of Alvarez in connection with his usurious money lending
transaction which is conducted in violation of the law. Unlike in the case of Diokno which authorizes the confiscation of all
documents evidencing all and any kind of business transactions, even if the same is a legitimate business.
Assume that the judge issues a search warrant and the search warrant authorized the confiscation of several items listed in
paragraph A and B and the items enumerated under paragraph A are generally described although the same may be physically
described, but the items in paragraph B are particularly described. Should the entire warrant be voided? No.
Recall the case of Microsoft vs. Maxicorp, according to the SC, only those items that are but generally described are to be
considered invalid, yet the remainder thereof will have to remain valid. Indeed, as what was ruled in the case of Microsoft and
Salanguit, a search warrant therefore is severable, such that when there is a portion thereof that is invalid, then it will not
render the entire warrant invalid, so the remainder which is not affected thereby would have to be enforced.
A: Items which are the subject matter of the offense or anything that may be used in the commission of the offense or is intended
to be used in the commission of the offense may also be ordered confiscated. These are the subject of the offense, stolen or
embezzled goods, as well as the instrument of the commission of the offense.
Warrantless Search
The general rule, for a search to be valid it has to be covered by a search warrant yet that particular rule admits of some exceptions.
Exceptions to the rule that no search can be conducted unless a search warrant is first secured:
1. Consented searches
2. Stop and frisk search
3. Search incidental to a lawful arrest
4. Plain-view doctrine
5. Customs search conducted on vessels and aircrafts
6. Search of moving vehicles
7. Inspection of building or premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary, and/or building regulation
8. Search under emergency instances
1. Consented searches
One such exceptional circumstance where they may be a valid warrantless search is in the case of a (1) Consented search, meaning
to say that the person concerned has none the less given his consent to be searched upon without a search warrant. Take note
however that for such consent to be valid it should be given unequivocally, expressly, voluntarily and intelligently.
Recall the case of Caballes vs. CA, it was argued by the prosecution that Caballes has given his consent because he did not
interpose any objection and that according to the prosecution, according to the police officers, Caballes did not impose tenacious
objections, rather he kept silent. The SC said that mere silence is not enough, mere passivity is not enough. Consent in
the concept of a warrantless search has to be given freely, intelligently, and for more important expressly.
In that context, recall also the case of Pp vs. Susan Canton, in the plane ticket, there is that provision or stipulation pursuant to
RA 6235 whereby the airline passenger is deemed to have given his or her consent to being searched upon at the terminal
otherwise he or she may be refused embarkation into the aircraft. Consent will validate and in otherwise invalid search or even if
the search is conducted without a warrant if the person concerned has given his consent thereto then it becomes valid already.
Take note however that for such consent to a warrantless search to be valid such consent must only be given by the person who
is the holder of such right. The waiver of right against unreasonable search or giving consent to an otherwise warrantless search
may only be given by the holder of the particular right.
A case in point is the case of Damaso, 212 SCRA 457, where the elements of the defunct Philippine Constabulary conducted a
warrantless search on the house of Damaso. At the time of the search Damaso was not around, such that the PC sought the
permission of the person there who turned out to be a mere house helper, so she gave her consent for the elements of the PC to
conduct a search on the house of Damaso. After the search, it was found out that Damaso had in his possession subversive
materials. In the ensuing criminal prosecution the contention of Damaso claim that the search was illegal, but the prosecution
countered that the consent was given by the helper of Damaso. SC sided with Damaso that according to SC that any such consent
was invalid because it was given by the person who was not the holder of the right. If at all it should have been Damaso who
should have given his consent to such warrantless search.
But the ruling in a different and much earlier case in Lopez v. Collector of Customs, 68 SCRA 320, was quite different. It was
quite disturbing. There was a warrantless searched conducted in a hotel room occupied by Lopez. At the time of the warrantless
search, Lopez was not around and the person present was the manicurist. So the law enforcers sought the permission of the
manicurist for them to be allowed entry into the room and for them to conduct a search thereon. In the ensuing criminal
prosecution, Lopez objected to the validity of the search, yet in this case our SC said that it was enough that a consent was given
for the law officers to conduct such warrantless search. SUPERSEDED BY DAMASO CASE. For such consent to be valid, such
consent should be given by the holder of that right. If the officers insisted, then such is may be invalid for it will not be
covered by the exceptional circumstance.
4. Plain-view doctrine
Another exceptional circumstance where there may be a valid warrantless search is in the event known as confiscation of things
or items in plain view, the plain view doctrine.
Here, incriminating evidence which is in the so called plain view of the police officer who has the right to be in the position to have
that view may be confiscated and admitted in evidence. It is important that there may be inadvertent discovery of the incriminating
evidence and the illegality of the item must be readily apparent.
So the requisites for the application of the doctrine are as follows; (1) there should be a valid intrusion, meaning the person must
be in the position to have that view (2) there should be inadvertent discovery of that illegal thing or object, meaning that there
should not be any conscious effort to particularly search for or look for that illegal thing, (3) the item must be readily illegal, (4)
if you may want to add, is that the plain view would authorize the outright confiscation of the item.
Situation:
Intrusion may be valid even without a warrant. Let’s say a police officer is pursuing a snatcher, the snatcher went inside this
house the police officer followed only to arrest this person, then once inside the police officer observed that there are marijuana
placed on the table.
Can the police officer confiscate the marijuana? But he went inside the house without a warrant? Is the intrusion valid? YES.
In other words, when we speak of valid intrusion, it does not matter if such intrusion is with or without a warrant. What
matters most is that the same is valid.
Situation:
What if the marijuana which was wrapped in newsprint was discovered in the course of looking for shabu? Assume that
marijuana which was wrapped in newsprint was placed in the cabinet where the shabu was located and only to find out what
was inside the package the police officer had to cut it open. Would that be admissible? Would you abide the plain view doctrine?
YES. This time around you can apply the plain view doctrine because it was found in the course of looking for shabu. Although
there was an effort at slicing the container such was precisely done if only to discover what was inside it and the police officer
in doing that did not expect what was really inside the package. Their purpose in opening that is for the purpose of looking
for shabu.
In the case of PP v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597, where in this case Musa was arrested pursuant to a test buy operation but such was
conducted inside his living room and after the test buy Musa was placed under arrest. The police officer tried to locate the mark
money, but such was not found. In the search for looking for the marked money, the police officer conducted a search particularly
in the entire house of Musa including the kitchen and in the course thereof, one police officer noticed that there was a package
and when it was opened, it contained marijuana. SC decreed that the marijuana was inadmissible in evidence. They did not apply
the plain view doctrine because it was not apparent what was inside the package. There was an active search that was conducted.
More so the search was conducted after the arrest of Musa. Search incidental to an arrest cannot also be applied because the
kitchen at that time was beyond the ambit of control of Musa, because he was arrested right in his living room and also the
transaction.
Situation:
Assume that there is a nearby shot out in the vicinity of San Carlos, a riding in tandem, and then it was relayed through a
radio that the malefactors were riding on a pink motorbike and they are wearing black jackets with the logo of SpongeBob
and Patrick. So there is a checkpoint then there is this motorcycle resembling the one that was reported. On the situation, do
you think that police officers are not allowed to conduct a thorough search? NO, because there is already probable cause to
believe that the motorist is a criminal offender.
Recall the case of Padilla, there was a tip off. According to SC, even is Padilla was searched that would have been valid, because
there was already a tip off and there was already a checkpoint.
In the case of Libnao, there was already advance information by the civilian informant, a checkpoint was conducted and Libnao
was thoroughly searched wherein the bag of Libnao was opened. The SC said that it was perfectly valid. That is why I like to
believe that the case of Malmstedt, Montilla and Maspil could be well justified to be falling under this exceptional circumstance
because in those cases checkpoints were held. In those cases, they were already advance information which would make up a
probable cause to believe that the one riding on the vehicle was a criminal offender. That is why I don’t subscribe in the ruling
there in where the SC said that the search there was valid because it was incidental to a valid arrest, because the search was done
first.
7. Inspection of building or premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary, and/or building regulation
Another exceptional circumstance where there may be a valid warrantless search is when there is an inspection conducted on
buildings for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations.