SPOUSES AMATORIO v. ATTY.

FRANCISCO DY YAP
AND ATTY. WHELMA F. SITON-YAP
A.C. No. 5914, March 11, 2015
FACTS: The complainants said that they are clients of Atty. Paras in cases which were filed against them by the respondents to compel
them to pay their indebtedness. At the time of the filing of the answer, Atty. Paras was suspended from the practice of law.
Complainants decided to seek an out-of-court settlement and asked that they be allowed to pay their obligations by way of installment.
The parties agreed on the terms. When Aida asked the respondents if they should still attend the pre-trial conference scheduled, the
latter told them they need not attend anymore as they will be moving for the dismissal of the cases. Subsequently, they were surprised to
receive copies of the decisions of the trial court declaring them in default for non-appearance. The decision however did not mention the
out-of-court settlement between the parties.
Nonetheless, the complainants continued tendering installment payments to the respondents upon the latter’s assurance that they will
disregard the decision of the trial court since they already had an out-of-court settlement
before the rendition of said judgment. They were surprised to learn, however, that the
respondents filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.
This prompted them to seek legal advice to another lawyer who referred the complainants to
Atty. Paras, who had just resumed his practice of law after his suspension. Atty. Paras
proceeded to file a disbarment case against the respondents with the IBP.
As foretold by Atty. Paras, the complainants experienced unpleasant backlash which were
allegedly instigated by the respondents who come from a very powerful and affluent clan. They
received threats of physical harm and Aida’s continued employment as a public school teacher
was put in jeopardy. Also, suspicious-looking individuals were seen loitering around their house.
When they refused to yield to the respondents’ intimidation, the latter resorted to the filing of
charges against them.
RESPONDENTS ALLEGATIONS:
Respondents denied having resorted to deceitful means to obtain favorable judgments. They
admitted that they agreed to an out-of-court settlement, but denied that the complainants ever
tendered any installment payment. They claimed that Atty. Paras merely employed cajolery in
order to entice the complainants to file the instant case to retaliate against them. They
asseverated that Atty. Paras resented the fact that the respondents served as counsel for his
former wife, who previously filed the administrative case for immorality, abandonment of family,
and falsification and use of falsified documents which resulted to his suspension.
Atty. Paras clearly defied the authority of this Court when he represented the complainants and
filed an answer on their behalf during the period of his suspension from the practice of law. They
alleged that he appeared in several cases and filed numerous pleadings despite his suspension.
IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline:
There is substantial evidence that Respondent Francisco Yap ha[s] deliberately neglected, at
the very least, offered and/or pleaded inaccurate allegations/testimonies to purposely mislead or
confuse the civil courts. Francisco Yap failed to controvert the existence and the authenticity of
the Acknowledgment Receipt which bore his signature and written in a “Yap Law Office”
letterhead.
The complainants filed a Manifestation, terminating the services of Atty. Paras as their counsel
and executed a Judicial Affidavit, disclaiming knowledge and participation in the preparation of
the complaint and the pleadings filed on their behalf by Atty. Paras in connection with the
disbarment case. They claimed that they merely signed the pleadings but the contents thereof
were not explained to them. They likewise expressed lack of intention to file a disbarment case
against the respondents and that, on the contrary, they were very much willing to settle and pay
their indebtedness to them. Further, they asserted that it was not the respondents, but Atty.
Paras who instructed them not to attend the pre-trial conference of the cases which eventually
resulted to a judgment by default against them.
ISSUE: Whether the statements of the complainants, specifically contesting the truthfulness of
the allegations hurled against the respondents in their own complaint for disbarment necessarily
results to Francisco’s absolution.
HELD: The answer is in the negative. The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Francisco Dy Yap is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months for deliberately
misleading the Court.
It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known to possess good
moral character. Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a
manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the public’s faith in the legal profession.
It is for the foregoing reason that the Court cannot simply yield to complainants’ change of heart
by refuting their own statements against the respondents and praying that the complaint for
disbarment they filed be dismissed. It bears emphasizing that any misconduct on the part of the
lawyer not only hurts the client’s cause but is even more disparaging on the integrity of the legal
profession itself. Thus, for tarnishing the reputation of the profession, a lawyer may still be
disciplined notwithstanding the complainant’s pardon or withdrawal from the case for as long as
there is evidence to support any finding of culpability. A case for suspension or disbarment may
proceed “regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainants, if the facts proven so
warrant.” It follows that the withdrawal of the complainant from the case, or even the filing of an
affidavit of desistance, does not conclude the administrative case against an erring lawyer.
Therefore, in the instant case, the Court cannot just set aside the finding of culpability against
the respondents merely because the complainants have decided to forgive them or settle
matters amicably after the case was completely evaluated and reviewed by the IBP. The
complainants’ forgiveness or even withdrawal from the case does not ipso facto obliterate the
misconduct committed by Francisco. To begin with, it is already too late in the day for the
complainants to withdraw the disbarment case considering that they had already presented and
supported their claims with convincing and credible evidence.
The complainants’ belated claim that the respondents were faultless and that the allegations stated in
the disbarment complaint were just fabricated by their former counsel cannot stand against the clear
and preponderant evidence they earlier presented. What clearly appears is that the facts material to the
violation committed by Francisco are well-established notwithstanding Atty. Paras’ supposed fabrication
of some insignificant particulars.
SPOUSES UMAGUING vs. ATTY. DE VERA February 04, 2015

FACTS:

Umaguing ran for the position of SK Chairman but lost to her rival. Complainants lodged an election
protest and engaged in the services of Atty. De Vera. According to the complainants, Atty. De Vera
moved at a glacial pace; he rushed the preparation of the documents and attachments for the election
protest. Two (2) of these attachments are the Affidavits of material witnesses, which was personally
prepared by Atty. De Vera. At the time that the aforesaid affidavits were needed to be signed by the
witnesses, they were unavailable. To remedy this, Atty. De Vera look for the nearest kin of the witnesses
and ask them to sign and he had all the documents notarized. He hastily filed the election protest with
full knowledge that the affidavits were falsified. In further breach of his oath, the integrity and
competency of Atty. De Vera, the complainants withdraw him and for lack of trust and confidence in as
their counsel. Complainants sought Atty. De Vera’s disbarment.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Atty. De Vera should be held administratively liable.

Whether or not a case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of
interest of the complainant.

HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that, fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with
the courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. Xxx The
Lawyer’s Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing
any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his
clients. xxx In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
“[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.”

Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility by submitting a falsified document before a court. Disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the privilege to practice law in this
country should remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath.

Yes. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary
proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a
plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest
and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
administration of persons unfit to practice in them. xxx The complainant or the person who called the
attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no
interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.
 The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU vs. The Insular Life Assurance
Co., Ltd., 37 SCRA 244 , January 30, 1971
This apparent error, however, does not seem to warrant an indictment for contempt against the
respondent Judge and the respondents’ counsels. We are inclined to believe that the misquotation is
more a result of clerical ineptitude than a deliberate attempt on the part of the respondent Judge to
mislead. We fully realize how saddled with many pending cases are the courts of the land, and it is not
difficult to imagine that because of the pressure of their varied and multifarious work, clerical errors
may escape their notice. Upon the other hand, the respondents’ counsel have the prima facie right to
rely on the quotation as it appears in the respondent Judge’s decision, to copy it verbatim, and to
incorporate it in their brief. Anyway, the import of the underscored sentences of the quotation in the
respondent Judge’s decision is substantially the same as, and faithfully reflects, the particular ruling in
this Court’s decision, i.e., that “[N]ot even the acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges against
him, is a bar to the employer’s right to impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon which
the criminal charges were based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer’s interest.”

Be that as it may, we must articulate our firm view that in citing this Court’s decisions and rulings, it is
the bounden duty of courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-for-word and
punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. Indeed, there is a salient and salutary reason why they should
do this. Only from this Tribunal’s decisions and rulings do all other courts, as well as lawyers and litigants,
take their bearings. This is because the decisions referred to in article 8 of the Civil Code which reads,
“Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines,” are only those enunciated by this Court of last resort. We said in no uncertain
terms in Miranda, et al. vs. Imperial, et al (77 Phil. 1066) that “[O]nly the decisions of this Honorable
Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction.” Thus, ever present is the danger that if
not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of this Court may lose their proper and correct
meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public who may thereby be misled. But if
inferior courts and members of the bar meticulously discharge their duty to check and recheck their
citations of authorities culled not only from this Court’s decisions but from other sources and make
certain that they are verbatim reproductions down to the last word and punctuation mark, appellate
courts will be precluded from acting on misinformation, as well as be saved precious time in finding out
whether the citations are correct.

Happily for the respondent Judge and the respondents’ counsel there was no substantial change in the
thrust of this Court’s particular ruling which they cited. It is our view, nonetheless, that for their mistake,
they should be, as they are hereby, admonished to be more careful when citing jurisprudence in the
future. [The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU vs. The Insular Life Assurance
Co., Ltd., 37 SCRA 244(1971)]
 ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER v. ATTY. LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., et al.

477 SCRA 634 (2005)

A lawyer is prohibited from representing an interest contrary to that earlier espoused

by his firm.

Erlinda K. Ilusorio-Bildner filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Luis Lokin, Jr..
This sprung from the time that her father, the late Potenciano Ilusorio, engaged the
services of the law office of Lokin to represent him in the Sandiganbayan where the
Republic was claiming, among other properties, shareholdings in Philippine Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC) and Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT).

Ilusorio, with the assistance of Lokin, entered into a Compromise Agreement where
Ilusorio was to get 673 POTC shares. Ilusorio-Bildner alleges that the informal gathering,
through the “high-handed and deceitful maneuvers” of Lokin, was suddenly and without
notice transformed into a Special Stockholders Meeting at which directors and officers of
PHILCOMSAT were elected. Her father contested the validity of the meeting by filing
before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against Manuel Nieto, et al. who
were purportedly elected directors and officers of PHILCOMSAT, in which SEC case
Lokin appeared as the counsel of Nieto, et al., contrary to his oath not to represent
conflicting interests.

Ilusorio, had earlier filed with the IBP a disbarment complaint. However, on account of
the death of Ilusorio, his complaint was dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a new
complaint by Ilusorio’s children. Ilusorio-Bildner now filed the complaint but the IBP
Board of Governors dismissed it. No copy of the notice of resolution was served upon
petitioner. Ilusorio-Bildner, nonetheless, learned about the matter.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lokin was personally barred by the rules of ethics from representing an
interest contrary to that earlier espoused by his firm

HELD:

Notwithstanding his acknowledged involvement in both the Sandiganbayan and SEC

cases, respondent denies that he was guilty of representing conflicting interests, he
proffering that, in the first place, the case of Ilusorio in the Sandiganbayan “has been the
personal account of Atty. Raval, separate and apart from the accounts of the law
partnership.” Not only is this claim unsubstantiated, however. It is contradicted by
respondent’s own evidence and statements.

As earlier noted, respondent has stated that Ilusorio was represented by his firm in the
Sandiganbayan case. In light thereof, respondent was personally barred by the rules of
ethics from representing an interest contrary to that earlier espoused by his firm.
Plainly, when Lokin represented Nieto, et al. in the SEC, he was advocating an interest
hostile to the implementation of the same Compromise Agreement that he had priorly
negotiated for Ilusorio.

The Board thus erred when, while acknowledging that Ilusorio was represented by
respondent’s firm in his negotiations with the PCGG, it nonetheless maintained that there
was no conflict of interest upon a finding that the subsequent SEC case “did not in any
way involve the validity of the compromise agreement forged with the PCGG.”
A.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant,
 vs.
 ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.
CARPIO, J.:

DOCTRINE: the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as
long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal
knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term "practice of law."

NATURE: Disbarment complaint

FACTS:

1. Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of
his estate. Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc, a
domestic corporation engaged in the operation of timber concessions from the government. PCGG
sequestered it and its operations ceased.
2. Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel
of Taggat Industries, Inc. until his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao,
Cagayan.
3. employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a criminal complaint entitled "Jesus Tagorda, Jr.
et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago," docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 ("criminal complaint"). Taggat
employees alleged that complainant, who took over the management and control of Taggat after
the death of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause
4. Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary
investigation. He resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651 Informations
for violation of Article 288 in relation to Article 116 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
5. Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:
a. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility- guilty of representing conflicting
interests. Respondent, being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of
Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself
from hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees.
b. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor-
Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor. He
received retainer’s fees which respondent claims to only consultation fees.
6. Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for the violations committed.
7. Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had resigned from
Taggat for more than five years and refutes complainant’s allegations and counters that
complainant was merely aggrieved by the resolution of the criminal complaint which was adverse
and contrary to her expectation.
8. Respondent points out that complainant did not file a motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the
criminal complaint and states that complainant’s reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her
impression that respondent would exonerate her from the charges filed
9. While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by respondent to file
651 Informations against complainant was reversed and set aside by Regional State Prosecutor.
Hence, the criminal complaint was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was engaged in private practice of law while being a public
official.

YES. Government prosecutors are prohibited to engage in the private practice of law. The act of
being a legal consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to do any of those acts that
are characteristic of the legal profession. It covers any activity, in or out of court, which required the
application of law, legal principles, practice or procedures and calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience.

ISSUE: whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor

HELD: YES. A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a former
client, the duty to "maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will
injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him."

I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code" (see Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutors Office,
Annex "B" of Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was being accused as having the
"management and control" of Taggat. Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of
Taggat, herein Respondent undoubtedly handled the personnel and labor concerns of Taggat. Respondent,
undoubtedly dealt with and related with the employees of Taggat. Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt
with and related with complainants in I.S. No. 97-240.

It should not be forgotten, however, that a lawyer has an immutable duty to a former client with respect
to matters that he previously handled for that former client. In this case, matters relating to personnel, labor
policies, and labor relations that he previously handled as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat.
I.S. No. 97-240 was for "Violation of the Labor Code." Here lies the conflict. Perhaps it would have been
different had I.S. No. 97-240 not been labor-related, or if Respondent had not been a Personnel Manager
concurrently as Legal Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-related and Respondent was a former
Personnel Manager of Taggat.

RULING. The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (conflicting interest.) In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when
respondent handled the preliminary investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in
1997. The issue in the criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that occurred from 1 April 1996
to 15 July 1997. Clearly, respondent was no longer connected with Taggat during that period since he
resigned sometime in 1992.

However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility against unlawful conduct. 42 Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he violated
Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or
Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713").

Respondent is mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x x x conduct." Unlawful
conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee to "engage in the private
practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not
conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official functions."
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio
from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
TAROG V RICAFORT
FACTS:
This is a complaint for disbarment for alleged grave misconduct brought against Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort for his failure to account
for and to return the sums of money received from his clients for purposes of the civil action to recover their property from a
foreclosing banking institution he was handling for them. The original complainant was Arnulfo A. Tarog, but his wife, Erlinda R.
Tarog, substituted him upon his intervening death.

In 1992, the Tarogs sought the advice of Atty. Jaime L. Miralles regarding their bank-foreclosed property located in the Bicol
Region. Atty. Miralles advised them to engage a Bicol-based attorney for that purpose. Thus, they went to see Atty. Ricafort
accompanied by Vidal Miralles, their friend who was a brother of Atty. Miralles. They ultimately engaged Atty. Ricafort as their
attorney on account of his being well-known in the community, and being also the Dean of the College of Law of Aquinas University
where their son was then studying.

Having willingly accepted the engagement, Atty. Ricafort required the Tarogs to pay P7,000.00 as filing fee, which they gave to
him. He explained the importance of depositing P65,000.00 in court to counter the P60,000.00 deposited by Antonio Tee, the buyer
of the foreclosed property. After they informed him that they had only P60,000.00, he required them to add some more amount
(dagdagan niyo ng konti). To raise the P65,000.00 for the Tarogs, therefore, Vidal solicited a loan from one Sia with the guarantee
of his brother Atty. Miralles. Sia issued a check in that amount in the name of Arnulfo.

On November 7, 1992, the Tarogs and Vidal went to the office of Atty. Ricafort to deliver the P65,000.00. When Arnulfo said that
he had first to encash the check at the bank, Atty. Ricafort persuaded him to entrust the check to him instead so that he (Atty.
Ricafort) would be the one to encash it and then deposit the amount in court. On that representation, Arnulfo handed the check to
Atty. Ricafort.

After some time, the Tarogs visited Atty. Ricafort to verify the status of the consignation. Atty. Ricafort informed them that he had
not deposited the amount in court, but in his own account. He promised to return the money, plus interest.

The Tarogs further claimed that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, in Sorsogon (RTC), where their complaint for annulment of
sale was being heard, had required the parties to file their memoranda. Accordingly, they delivered P15,000.00 to Atty. Ricafort
for that purpose, but he did not file the memorandum.

When it became apparent to the Tarogs that Atty. Ricafort would not make good his promise of returning the P65,000.00, plus
interest, Arnulfo demanded by his letter dated December 3, 2002 that Atty. Ricafort return the P65,000.00, plus interest, and
theP15,000.00 paid for the filing of the memorandum. Yet, they did not receive any reply from Atty. Ricafort.

In his defense, Atty. Ricafort denied that the P65,000.00 was intended to be deposited in court, insisting that the amount was
payment for his legal services under a “package deal,” that is, the amount included his acceptance fee, attorney’s fee, and
appearance fees from the filing of the complaint for annulment of sale until judgment, but excluding appeal. He claimed that the
fees were agreed upon after considering the value of the property, his skill and experience as a lawyer, the labor, time, and trouble
involved, and his professional character and social standing; that at the time he delivered the check, Arnulfo read, understood, and
agreed to the contents of the complaint, which did not mention anything about any consignation and that Arnulfo, being a retired
school principal, was a learned person who would not have easily fallen for any scheme like the one they depicted against him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts of Atty Ricafort constitute a grave violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING:
Following the investigation, of an IBP Commissioner - Commission on Bar Discipline rendered his Report and Recommendation
dated October 7, 2004, in which he concluded that: It is respectfully recommended that respondent, Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort be
DISBARRED and be ordered to return the amount of P65,000 and P15,000 which he got from his client. The Commissioner
concluded that Atty. Ricafort violated Canon 15, and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of theCode of Professional
Responsibility by taking advantage of the vulnerability of his clients and by being dishonest in his dealings with them by refusing
to return the amount of P65,000.00 to them. Through Resolution No. XVII-2006-569,[13] therefore, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Reyes and recommended the disbarment of Atty.
Ricafort and the order for him to return the amounts of P65,000.00 and P15,000.00 to Erlinda. Atty. Ricafort moved for
reconsideration. Acting on Atty. Ricafort’s motion for reconsideration, the IBP Board of Governors downgraded the penalty from
disbarment to indefinite suspension.

However, the Court found and declared Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort guilty of a violation of Canon 16, Rule 16.01 and Canon 17 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and, accordingly, disbar him. The Bar Confidant was directed to strike out his name from the
Roll of Attorneys. Atty. Ricafort was ordered to return to Erlinda R. Tarog the sums of P65,000.00 and P15,000.00, plus interest of
six percent per annum reckoned from the demand made on December 3, 2002, within twenty days from notice.
Nunez v Ricafort (382 SCRA 381)

Facts:

An administrative complaint was by Soledad Nuñez, a septuagenarian represented by her attorney-in-

fact Ananias B. Co, Jr., seeking the disbarment of Atty. Romulo Ricafort on the ground of grave
misconduct.

Sometime in October 1982, Soledad authorized Atty. Ricafort to sell her two parcels of land located in
Legazpi City for P40,000. She agreed to the lawyer 10% of the price as commission. Atty. Ricafort
succeeded in selling the lots, but despite Soledad’s repeated demands, he did not turn over the
proceeds of the sale. This forced Soledad to file an action for a sum of money before the RTC, Quezon
City.

The court rendered its decision ordering the Atty. to pay Soledad the sum of P16,000 as principal
obligation, with at the legal rate from the date of the commencement of the action.

An appeal to the CA was made. However, the appeal was dismissed for failure to pay the required
docket fee within the reglementary period despite notice.

Soledad filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution. But it appears that only a partial
satisfaction of the P16,000 judgment was made, leaving P13,800 unsatisfied. In payment for the latter,
Atty. issued four postdated checks but was dishonored because the account against which they were
drawn was closed.

Hence, Soledad was forced to file four criminal complaints for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the MTC,
Quezon City.

In a joint affidavit, Atty. Ricafort admitted having drawn and issued said four postdated checks in favor
of Soledad. Allegedly believing in good faith that said checks had already been encashed by Soledad, he
subsequently closed his checking account in China Banking Corporation, Legazpi City, from which said
four checks were drawn. He was not notified that the checks were dishonored. Had he been notified, he
would have made the necessary arrangements with the bank.

The court required Atty. to comment on the complaint. But he never did despite the favorable action on
his three motions for extension of time to file the comment. His failure to do so compelled Soledad to
file a motion to cite Atty. in contempt on the ground that his strategy to file piecemeal motions for
extension of time to submit the comment “smacks of a delaying tactic scheme that is unworthy of a
member of the bar and a law dean.”

The IBP findings show that the Atty. had no intention to “honor” the money judgment against him. It
recommended that Atty. be declared “guilty of misconduct in his dealings with complainant” and be
suspended from the practice of law for at least one year and pay the amount of the checks issued to the
complainant.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Romulo Ricafort is guilty of grave misconduct in his dealings with complainant.

Held:
YES. There is a blatant violation of Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:

A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.

By violating Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. diminished public
confidence in the law and the lawyers. Instead of promoting such confidence and respect, he miserably
failed to live up to the standards of the legal profession.

His act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of the alias writ of execution for money judgment rendered
by the trial court was a clear attempt to defeat the ends of justice. His failure to make good the checks
despite demands and the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 showed his continued defiance of
judicial processes, which he, as an officer of the court, was under continuing duty to uphold.

To further demonstrate his very low regard for the courts and judicial processes, he even had the
temerity of making a mockery of the court’s generosity to him. We granted his three motions for
extension of time to file his comment on the complaint in this case. Yet, not only did he fail to file the
comment, he as well did not even bother to explain such failure notwithstanding our resolution
declaring him as having waived the filing of the comment. To the SC, Atty. openly showed a high degree
of irresponsibility amounting to willful disobedience to its lawful orders.

Atty. Ricafort then knowingly and willfully violated Rules 12.04 and 12:03 of Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility stating that:

Lawyers should avoid any action that would unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or
misuse court processes; and that lawyers, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, should not let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for their failure to do so.

The SC indefinitely suspended Atty. Ricafort from the practice of law and directed to pay Soledad
P13,800.