Property

PROPERTY
DIGESTS
Fourth Year Batch (2016-‐2017)
Vice Dean Marciano Delson

CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY the owner of the building. The principles of accession regard buildings and
constructions as mere accessories to the land on which it is built, it is logical
Ladera v. Hodges that said accessories should partake the nature of the principal thing.
CA-G.R. No. 8027-R; September 23, 1952 In the case, the house constructed by Lader is built on the land
REYES, JBL owned by Hodges.
Hence, the house built on land owned by another person should be
FACTS: Ladera entered a contract with Hodges for the purchase of a parcel regarded as immovable property.
of land payable in installments. Thereafter, Ladera built a house of mixed
materials. When Ladera failed to pay the monthly installments, Hodges filed MINDANAO BUS COMPANY v. CITY ASSESSOR & TREASURER
an action for ejectment which was granted by the court. The court issued an G.R. No. L-17870. September 29, 1962.
alias writ of execution and the sheriff sold the house at a public auction. It
LABRADOR, j.:
also appeared that Hodges sold the lot to a different person. Ladera then
filed an action in court to set aside the sale and recover the house. Hodges
contended that the house, being built on land owned by another person,
should be regarded in law as movable or personal property, thus, can be sold FACTS: This is a petition for the review of the decision of the CTA holding
separately. that the petitioner Mindanao Bus Company is liable to the payment of the
realty tax on its maintenance and repair equipment which are sitting on
ISSUE: Is the house built on land owned by another person should be cement or wooden platform. Respondents contends that said equipments
regarded in law as movable or personal property? form part of the real property of the petitioner applying the provisions of Art
415(5) of the New Civil Code, thus making the company liable for real
SC RULING: No, the house is not considered a movable property.
property tax. The company is engaged in the service of transporting goods
As enumerated in the Civil Code, immovable property includes lands,
buildings, roads, and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil. The law and passengers.
does not make any distinction as to whether the owner of the land is or is not
ISSUE:
Is the equipment necessary for the repair and maintenance of the trucks of be "unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was
the company considered as real property under Art 415(5). established. Similarly, the tools and equipments in question in this instant
case are, by their nature, not essential and principle municipal elements of
RULING: No. The equipments are not considered as real property under the petitioner's business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor
law. trucks. They are merely incidentals — acquired as movables and used only
for expediency to facilitate and/or improve its service. The transportation
Art. 415(5) of the Civil Code, gives the character of real property to
business could be carried on without the repair or service shop if its rolling
machinery, liquid containers, instruments or implements intended by the
equipment is repaired or serviced in another shop belonging to another.
owner of any building or land for use in connection with any industry or trade
being carried on therein and which are expressly adapted to meet the Aside from the element of essentiality the above-quoted provision also
requirements of such trade or industry. So that movable equipments to be requires that the industry or works be carried on in a building or on a piece of
immobilized in contemplation of the law must first be "essential and principal land. But in the case at bar the equipments in question are destined only to
elements" of an industry or works without which such industry or works would
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

repair or service the transportation business, which is not carried on in a appellants could only have meant to convey the house as chattel, or at least,
building or permanently on a piece of land, as demanded by the law. intended to treat the same as such, so that they should not now be allowed
to make an inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise.
Said equipments may not, therefore, be deemed real property.
We find no logical justification to exclude the rule out, as the appellate court
MAKATI LEASING and FINANCE CORPORATION, vs. WEAREVER did, the present case from the application of the abovequoted
TEXTILE MILLS, INC.G.R. No. L-58469 May 16, 1983 pronouncement. If a house of strong materials, like what was involved in the
DE CASTRO, J.: above Tumalad case, may be considered as personal property for purposes
of executing a chattel mortgage thereon as long as the parties to the contract
so agree and no innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby, there is
Facts: private respondent executed a Chattel Mortgage over certain raw
absolutely no reason why a machinery, which is movable in its nature and
materials inventory as well as a machinery described as an Artos Aero Dryer
becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose, may not be likewise
Stentering Range to secure the collection of the receivables assigned to
treated as such. This is really because one who has so agreed is estopped
Petitioner.
from denying the existence of the chattel mortgage.
Upon default, petitioner filed a petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
Therefore, it is undeniable that the parties to a contract may by agreement
properties mortgaged. However the sheriff failed to implement the
treat as personal property that which by nature would be real property, as
foreclosure, the lower court issued a writ of seizure which was set aside by
long as no interest of third parties would be prejudiced thereby.
the Court of Appeals. after ruling that the machinery in suit cannot be the
subject of replevin, much less of a chattel mortgage, because it is a real
property pursuant to Article 415 of the new Civil Code, the same being
attached to the ground by means of bolts and the only way to remove it from SANTOS EVANGELISTA VS ALTO SURETY & INSURANCE CO., INC
respondent's plant would be to drill out or destroy the concrete floor The G.R. No. L-11139, April 23, 1958
appellate court rejected petitioner's argument that private respondent is CONCEPCION, J.
estopped from claiming that the machine is real property by constituting a
FACTS: Petitioner Evangelista won a civil case against Ricardo Rivera where
chattel mortgage thereon. he also obtained a writ of attachment which levied upon a house, built by
Rivera on a land situated in Manila .In due course, Evangelista bought the
Issue: Can a Machinery under Article 415 of the New Civil Code be treated house at public auction held in compliance with the writ of execution issued
as personality and be subject to Chattel Mortgage? in said case. When Evangelista sought to take possession of the house,
Rivera refused to surrender it, upon the ground that he had leased the
Held: Yes, a Machinery under Article 415 of the New Civil Code be treated property from the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. — respondent herein —
as personality and be subject to Chattel Mortgage. and that the latter is now the true owner of said property. It appears that on
May 10, 1952, a definite deed of sale of the same house had been issued to
In Tumalad v. Vicencio, the court ruled that: Although there is no specific respondent, as the highest bidder at an auction sale held, in compliance with
statement referring to the subject house as personal property, yet by ceding, a writ of execution issued in a case in which judgment, for the sum of money,
selling or transferring a property by way of chattel mortgage defendants- had been rendered in favor of respondent. Hence, Evangelista instituted an
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

action against respondent and Ricardo Rivera, for the purpose of for official and public guidance and would prevent confusion and
establishing his title over said house, securing possession thereof,. misunderstanding.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’Ss decision upon Hence, the house is not a personal property.
the ground that, although the writ of attachment in favor of Evangelista had
been filed with the Register of Deeds of Manila prior to the sale in favor of Tsai v. CA
respondent, Evangelista did not acquire thereby a preferential lien, the G.R. No. 120098, October 2, 2001
attachment having been levied as if the house in question were immovable
QUISUMBING, J.:
property, although in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, it is "ostensibly a
personal property."
ISSUE: Is the house constructed by the lessee of the land on which it is built, FACTS: Ever Textile Mills, Inc. (EVERTEX) obtained loan from Philippine
should be dealt with, for purpose, of attachment, as personal property? Bank of Communications (PBCom), secured by a deed of Real and Chattel
Mortgage over the lot where its factory stands, and the chattels located
RULING: No, the house is not a personal property. therein as enumerated in a schedule attached to the mortgage contract.
As explicitly held, in Laddera vs. Hodges "a true building, not merely PBCom again granted a second loan to EVERTEX which was secured by a
superimposed on the soil, is immovable or real property, whether it is erected Chattel Mortgage over personal properties enumerated in a list attached
by the owner of the land or by usufructuary or lessee. It is true that the
thereto. These listed properties were similar to those listed in the first
parties to a deed of chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house as
personal property for purposes of said contract However, this view is good mortgage deed. After the date of the execution of the second mortgage
only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. It is based, partly, upon mentioned above, EVERTEX purchased various machines and equipments.
the principle of estoppel. Neither this principle, nor said view, is applicable to Upon EVERTEX's failure to meet its obligation to PBCom, the latter
strangers to said contract. Much less is it in point where there has been no commenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against EVERTEX under
contract whatsoever, with respect to the status of the house involved, as in the Chattel Mortgage law. PBCom then consolidated its ownership over the
the case at bar.
lot and all the properties in it. It leased the entire factory premises to Ruby
Sales on execution affect the public and third persons. The
regulation governing sales on execution are for public officials to follow. The Tsai and sold to the same the factory, lock, stock and barrel including the
form of proceedings prescribed for each kind of property is suited to its contested machineries.
character, not to the character, which the parties have given to it or desire to
give it. When the rules speak of personal property, property which is
ordinarily so considered is meant; and when real property is spoken of, it
means property which is generally known as real property. The regulations EVERTEX filed a complaint for annulment of sale, reconveyance, and
were never intended to suit the consideration that parties may have privately damages against PBCom, alleging inter alia that the extrajudicial foreclosure
given to the property levied upon. Enforcement of regulations would be of subject mortgage was not valid, and that PBCom, without any legal or
difficult were the convenience or agreement of private parties to determine or factual basis, appropriated the contested properties which were not included
govern the nature of the proceedings. We therefore hold that the mere fact in the Real and Chattel Mortgage of the first mortgage contract nor in the
that a house was the subject of the chattel mortgage and was considered as
second contract which is a Chattel Mortgage, and neither were those
personal property by the parties does not make said house personal property
for purposes of the notice to be given for its sale of public auction. This ruling properties included in the Notice of Sheriff's Sale.
is demanded by the need for a definite, orderly and well defined regulation
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

ISSUE: Are the contested properties are personal or movable properties?
On the other hand, petitioners asserted that the properties sought to be
HELD: The nature of the disputed machineries, i.e., that they were heavy, seized were immovable as defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code, the
bolted or cemented on the real property mortgaged does not make them ipso parties’ agreement to the contrary notwithstanding. They argued that to give
facto immovable under Article 415 (3) and (5) of the New Civil Code. While it effect to the agreement would be prejudicial to innocent third parties. They
further stated that PCI Leasing was estopped from treating these
is true that the properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of the contract of
machineries as personal because the contracts in which the alleged
Real and Chattel Mortgage executed by the parties herein reveal their intent, agreement were embodied were totally sham and farcical.
that is - to treat machinery and equipment as chattels. The parties herein: (1)
executed a contract styled as "Real Estate Mortgage and Chattel Mortgage,"
instead of just "Real Estate Mortgage" if indeed their intention is to treat all Issue: Under the circumstances, are the subject properties the proper
properties included therein as immovable, and (2) attached to the said subjects of the writ of seizure?
contract a separate "LIST OF MACHINERIES & EQUIPMENT". These facts,
taken together, evince the conclusion that the parties' intention is to treat
Ruling: Yes. Under the circumstances they are proper subjects of the writ of
these units of machinery as chattels. A fortiori, the contested after-acquired seizure.
properties, which are of the same description as the units enumerated under
the title "LIST OF MACHINERIES & EQUIPMENT," must also be treated as The machines although each of them was movable or personal property on
chattels. its own, all of them have become immobilized by destination because they
are essential and principal elements of petitioners chocolate-making industry.
Assuming arguendo that the properties in question are immovable by nature,
nothing detracts the parties from treating it as chattels to secure an obligation However, contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be
considered as personal. The Lease Agreement clearly provides that the
under the principle of estoppel. As far back as Navarro v. Pineda, an
machines in question are to be considered as personal property; that the
immovable may be considered a personal property if there is a stipulation as machines should be deemed personal property pursuant to the Lease
when it is used as security in the payment of an obligation where a chattel Agreement is good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned.
mortgage is executed over it.
Therefore, the machines should be deemed personal property pursuant to
Serg’s Products, Inc. vs. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. the Lease Agreement is good only insofar as the contracting parties are
G.R. No. 137705. August 22, 2000. concerned.
PANGANIBAN, J.
BURGOS v. CHIEF OF STAFF
Facts: Respondent PCI Leasing filed with the RTC-QC a complaint for a sum G.R. No. L-64264; December 26, 1984
of money, with an application for a writ of replevin. Respondent judge issued
ESCOLIN, J.:
a writ of replevin directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and
equipment to PCI Leasing after 5 days and upon the payment of the
necessary expenses. In implementation of said writ, the sheriff proceeded to
petitioner's factory, seized one machinery with the word that he would return
for the other machineries.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

FACTS: The CFI of Rizal issued two search warrants under which the price and installation cost of a water pump in the latter's premises. Judgment
premises of the “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” were searched and was rendered in favor of Goulds and thereafter a writ of execution was
printing machines, equipment and paraphernalia, among others were seized. issued. The subject property was levied upon by the sheriff and subsequently
sold. Petitioners contend that the sale was made without the notice required
Petitioners assail the validity of these search warrants; they pray for the by Sec. 18, Rule 39, of the New Rules of Court," i.e., notice by publication in
case of execution sale of real property, the pump and its accessories being
return of the seized articles on the ground, among others, that real properties
immovable because attached to the ground with character of permanency."
were seized under the disputed warrants. According to them, under Sec. 2,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Courts only personal properties may be seized
Issue: Can the pump and its accessories be considered immovable
under a search warrant. properties by their mere attachment to the ground where they were installed
ISSUE: Are the machineries which were in fact bolted to the ground real
Ruling: No. The subject properties are movable properties.
properties under Art. 415 [5] of the Civil Code?
Yap's argument that the water pump had become immovable property by it
RULING: No. The machineries seized are personal properties. Under Article
being installed in his residence is untenable. The Civil Code considers as
415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptacles, immovable property, among others, anything "attached to an immovable in a
instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without
industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land breaking the material or deterioration of the object." The pump does not fit
and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works" are this description. It could be, and was in fact separated from Yap's premises
considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo where this without being broken or suffering deterioration. Obviously the separation or
legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery which is removal of the pump involved nothing more complicated than the loosening
of bolts or dismantling of other fasteners.
movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the
tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant,
Machinery and Engineering Supplies Inc. vs. CA
usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such
G.R. No. L-7057 October 29, 1954
person acted as the agent of the owner.
CONCEPCION, J.:
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land
and/or building on which the machineries were placed. Hence, the FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for replevin for the recovery of the
machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable machinery and equipment sold and delivered to the factory of the
property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant. respondents. The respondent judge issued an order to the Provincial Sheriff
to seize the properties specified in the order. Two sheriffs, Roco (president of
Yap v. Tanada Petitioner company), and his crew went to the factory to carry out the court’s
G.R. No. L-32917;July 18, 1988 order. Contreras, the manager of the respondent company, handed to them a
NARVASA, J. letter stating that the properties in question are not personal properties. Roco
noticed that the equipment could not possibly be dismantled without causing
Facts: Goulds Pumps International (Phil.), Inc. filed a complaint against
spouses Yap seeking recovery of P1,459.30 representing the balance of the
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

damages to the wooden frames attached to them but Roco insisted alleging respect to the Power Barges. Subsequently, Polar assigned its rights under
that the company posted a bond. the agreement to Fels. Later, Fels received an assessment of real property
taxes on the power barges from Provincial Assessor of Batangas City. NPC
The defendant Company filed a counter-bond for the return of the properties. then sought reconsideration of the Provincial Assessor’s decision to assess
The trial court ordered the Provincial Sheriff and the petitioner to reinstate the real property taxes on the power barges, alleging that barges are personal
machinery and equipment in their original condition at the expense of the property and non-taxable items. In its answer, the Provincial Assessor
petitioner. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals but it averred that the barges were real property for purposes of taxation under
was denied. Hence, this petition. Section 199(c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160.
ISSUE: Are the machineries and equipment considered immovable

properties under Article 415 of the NCC?
ISSUE/S: Are the power barges, which are floating and movable, personal
properties not subject to real property tax?
HELD: Yes, the machineries and equipment are immovable properties. When
the sheriff repaired to the premises of respondent, Ipo Limestone Co., Inc.,
machinery and equipment in question appeared to be attached to the land,
particularly to the concrete foundation of said premises, in a fixed manner, in HELD: NO. The power barges are real property and are thus subject to real
such a way that the former could not be separated from the latter "without property tax.
breaking the material or deterioration of the object." Hence, in order to
The power plant facilities, while they may be classified as movable or
remove said outfit, it became necessary, not only to unbolt the same, but,
personal property, are nevertheless considered real property for taxation
also, to cut some of its wooden supports. Moreover, said machinery and
purposes because they are installed at a specific location with a character of
equipment were "intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry"
permanency.
carried on said immovable and tended." For these reasons, they were
already immovable property pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article 415 of As found by the appellate court, the CBAA and LBAA, power barges are real
Civil Code of the Philippines. property and are thus subject to real property tax. Tax assessments by tax
examiners are presumed correct and made in good faith, with the taxpayer
FELS ENERGY, INC. V. THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS having the burden of proving otherwise. Besides, factual findings of
G.R. NO. 168557, FEBRUARY 16, 2007 administrative bodies, which have acquired expertise in their field, are
CALLEJO, SR., J. generally binding and conclusive upon the Court; we will not assume to
interfere with the sensible exercise of the judgment of men especially trained
in appraising property. Where the judicial mind is left in doubt, it is a sound
FACTS: NPC entered into a lease contract with Polar Energy Inc. over diesel
policy to leave the assessment undisturbed.
engine power barges moored at Balayan Bay in Batangas. The contract
states that NPC shall be responsible for the payment of all taxes other levies Therefore, the barges are subject to real property tax.
imposed by the government to which Polar may be or become subject to with
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China Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals Meanwhile, Pacific Multi Agro-Industrial Corporation and Alfonso Roxas
G.R. No. 129664; March 7 2000 Chua’s appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeals on September 29,
J. Ynares-Santiago 1988 for failure to file brief.
On 1988, Alfonso Roxas Chua executed a public instrument denominated as

FACTS: Alfonso Roxas Chua and his wife Kiang Ming Chu Chua were the "Assignment of Rights to Redeem," assigning his rights to redeem the one-
owners of a residential land, covered by TCT 410603. A notice of levy was half undivided portion of the property to his son, Paulino Roxas Chua.
inscribed and annotated at the back of such TCT in connection with Civil Paulino redeemed said one-half share on the very same day and the same
Case No. 82-14134 entitled, "Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Plaintiff was inscribed at the back of TCT as Entry No. 7629, and the redemption of
versus Pacific Multi Commercial Corporation and Alfonso Roxas Chua.” the property by Paulino was inscribed as Entry No. 7630, both dated March
Subsequently, Kiang Ming Chu Chua filed a complaint against the City 14, 1989.
Sheriff of Manila and Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, questioning the
levy of the abovementioned property, alleging that the judgment of the court On the other hand, in connection with Civil Case No. 85-31257, another
in Civil Case No. 82-14134 against Alfonso Roxas Chua could not be notice of levy on execution was issued by the Deputy Sheriff against the right
enforced against the property inasmuch as the land subject thereof was the and interest of Alfonso Roxas Chua in property. Thereafter, a certificate of
conjugal property of the spouses. Thereafter a compromise agreement to the sale on execution dated April 13, 1992 was issued by the Sheriff in favor of
effect that the levy on land was valid and enforceable only to the extent of the China Bank and inscribed at the back of TCT as Entry No. 01896 on May 4,
undivided portion of the property pertaining to the conjugal share of Alfonso 1992
Roxas Chua.
Paulino Roxas Chua and Kiang Ming Chu Chua instituted Civil Case No.
Meanwhile, China Bank filed an action for collection of sum of money against 63199 against China Bank, averring that Paulino has a prior and better right
Pacific Multi Agro-Industrial Corporation and Alfonso Roxas Chua, docketed over the rights, title, interest and participation of China Banking Corporation
as Civil Case No. 85-31257. The complaint was anchored on three (3) in TCT 410603; that Alfonso Roxas Chua sold his right to redeem one-half
promissory notes with an aggregate amount of P2,500,000.00 plus stipulated (1/2) of the aforesaid conjugal property in his favor. For its part, China Bank
interest, where the trial court promulgated its decision in favor of China Corporation claims that the assignment of right of redemption was done to
Banking Corporation defraud them, as creditor, and may be rescinded under Article 1387 of the
Civil Code.
An alias notice of levy on execution on the one-half undivided portion of
property belonging to Alfonso Chua was issued in connection with Civil Case The trial court rendered a decision in favor of Paulino Roxas Chua declaring
82-14134. The notice was inscribed and annotated at the back of TCT on that the assignment was made for a valuable consideration and was
September 15, 1986 and a certificate of sale covering the one-half undivided executed two years before petitioner China Bank levied the conjugal share of
portion of the property was executed in favor of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Alfonso Roxas Chua on TCT 410603. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
Company, such sale was inscribed at the back of said TCT on December 22,
1987.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

ISSUE: Is the transfer of the property made between the father to his son, for
a valuable consideration, at a time when the father was insolvent and had no
other property to pay off his creditors, is sufficient to transfer ownership of the SALVADOR H. LAUREL v. RAMON GARCIA
property to the latter? G.R. No. 92013; July 25, 1990
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
RULING: NO. The transfer of the property made between the father to his
son, for a valuable consideration, at a time when the father was insolvent and
had no other property to pay off his creditors, is not be sufficient to transfer Facts: The case involves two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin the
ownership of the property to the latter. respondents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the lots in Japan
which were acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations
In the case of Oria vs. Mcmicking, the Court had occasion to state that "In Agreement with Japan.
determining whether or not a certain conveyance is fraudulent the question in
every case is whether the conveyance was a bona fide transaction or a trick Included in these lots is the Roppongi property which consists of the
and contrivance to defeat creditors, or whether it conserves to the debtor a land and building “for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy.” It became
special right. It is not sufficient that it is founded on good considerations or is the site of the Philippine Embassy until it was transferred to Nampeidai for
made with bona fide intent: it must have both elements. If defective in either the needed major repairs. Due to the failure of our government to provide
of these, although good between the parties, it is voidable as to creditors. x x necessary funds, the Roppongi property remained undeveloped.
x The test as to whether or not a conveyance is fraudulent is, does it
A proposal was presented to President Corazon Aquino by former
prejudice the rights of creditors?" The mere fact that the conveyance was
Philippine Ambassador to Japan Carlos Valdez, to lease the property to a
founded on valuable consideration does not necessarily negate the
Japanese firm. However, President Aquino issued Executive Order No. 296
presumption of fraud under Article 1387 of the Civil Code. There has to be a
entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations’ capital goods
valuable consideration and the transaction must have been made bona fide.
and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. The Roppongi property
was included.
In the case at bar, the presumption that the conveyance is fraudulent has not
been overcome. The transfer was undoubtedly made between father and son The petitioners filed petitions for prohibition in order to stop the sale
at a time when the father was insolvent and had no other property to pay off of the Roppongi property.
his creditors. Hence, it is of no consequence whether or not Paulino had
given valuable consideration for the conveyance. Issue: Can the Roppongi property and others of its own kind be alienated
by the Philippine Government?
THEREFORE, the assignment of right of redemption having been rescinded, Ruling: No, the Philippine Government cannot alienate the Roppongi
the property remained to be conjugally owned by Alfonso Roxas Chua and property.
his wife, and levy on land can be validly enforced up to the extent of the
undivided portion of the property pertaining to the conjugal share of Alfonso The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are:
Roxas Chua. ART. 419. Property is either of public
dominion or of private ownership.
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ART. 420. The following things are property public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481
of public dominion [1975]). Hence, a property continues to be part of the public domain, not
available for private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal
(1) Those intended for public use, such as
declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such
roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
(Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]).
bridges constructed by the State, banks
shores roadsteads, and others of similar Rabuco v. Villegas
character; G.R. No. L-24661 February 28, 1974
TEEHANKEE, J.
(2) Those which belong to the State, without
being for public use, and are intended for Facts: The petitioners in this case are the tenants of the land in dispute who
some public service or for the development are being ejected because of the passage of Republic Act 3120. Republic
of the national wealth. Act 3120 converted the lot in question together with another lot in San
Andres, Malate “which are reserved as communal property” into “disposable
ART. 421. All other property of the State, or alienable lands of the State State to be placed under the administration
which is not of the character stated in the and disposal of the Land Tenure Administration" for subdivision into small
preceding article, is patrimonial property. lots not exceeding 120 square meters per lot for sale on installment basis to
the tenants or bona fide occupants thereof. The respondents city officials
The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of also content that the law was unconstitutional for depriving the City of Manila
Article 420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the State and intended of the lands and for providing for their sale without payment of just
for some public service. The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public compensation.
service is expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations
Issue: Is Republic Act 3120 Constitutional?
Agreement and the corresponding contract of procurement which bind both
the Philippine government and the Japanese government. There can be no Held: Yes. Respondents city officials' contention that the Act must be stricken
doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the down as unconstitutional for depriving the city of Manila of the lots in
property has become patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do. question and providing for their sale in subdivided small lots to bona fide
occupants or tenants without payment of just compensation is untenable and
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the without basis, since the lots in question are manifestly owned by the city in its
commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective public and governmental capacity and are therefore public property over
ownership for general use and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction which Congress had absolute control as distinguished from patrimonial
of collective needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is not to property owned by it in its private or proprietary capacity of which it could not
serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the be deprived without due process and without just compensation.
common and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation.
Here, Republic Act 3120 expressly declared that the properties were
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for "reserved as communal property" and ordered their conversion into
actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial "disposable and alienable lands of the State" for sale in small lots to the bona
property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from fide occupants thereof. It is established doctrine that the act of classifying
9
PROPERTY DIGESTS

State property calls for the exercise of wide discretionary legislative power municipality and respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered into a
which will not be interfered with by the courts. contract agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain & manage the
flea markets and/or vending areas in the aforementioned streets with the
The Court therein reaffirmed the established general rule that "regardless of obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of
the source or classification of land in the possession of a municipality, Parañaque. On September 13, 1990 Brig. Gen. Macasiano ordered the
excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate destruction and confiscation of stalls along the streets. He also wrote a letter
capacity, such property is held in trust for the State for the benefit of its to Palanyag giving the latter the (10) days to discontinue the flea market;
inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary purposes. It holds otherwise, the stalls will be dismantled. Respondent filed a joint petition
such lands subject to the paramount power of the legislature to dispose of praying for preliminary injunction. The trial court upheld the assailed
the same, for after all it owes its creation to it as an agent for the Ordinance and enjoined petitioner from enforcing his letter-order against
performance of a part of its public work, the municipality being but a Palanyag.
subdivision or instrumentality thereof for purposes of local administration.
Accordingly, the legal situation is the same as if the State itself holds the ISSUE: Can a municipality validly issue an ordinance or resolution
9
property and puts it to a different use" and stressed that "the property, as authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for
has been previously shown, was not acquired by the City of Manila with its flea markets?
own funds in its private or proprietary capacity. That it has in its name a
registered title is not questioned, but this title should be deemed to be held in HELD: No. In resolving the question of whether the disputed municipal
trust for the State as the land covered thereby was part of the territory of the ordinance authorizing the flea market on the public streets is valid, it is
City of Manila granted by the sovereign upon its creation." necessary to examine the laws in force during the time the said ordinance
was enacted, namely, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as Local
Government Code, in connection with established principles embodied in the
Civil Code an property and settled jurisprudence on the matter.
The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into property for
public use and patrimonial property (Art. 423, Civil Code). Based on the
foregoing, J. Gabriel G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena
streets are local roads used for public service and are therefore considered
public properties of respondent municipality. Properties of the local
government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are
LEVY D. MACASIANO vs. HONORABLE ROBERTO C. DIOKNO, et al., under the absolute control of Congress.
respondents.
G.R. No. 97764; August 10, 1992 Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever to control or
MEDIALDEA, J.: regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon
them by Congress.
FACTS: Municipality of Parañaque passed Ordinance No. 86 which
authorized the closure of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Aside from the requirement of due process which should be complied with
Extension and Opena Streets at Baclaran for the establishment of a flea before closing a road, street or park, the closure should be for the sole
market. This was passed pursuant to MMC Ordinance No.2 and was purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from public use
approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority on July 20, 1990. Respondent when circumstances show that such property is no longer intended or
10
PROPERTY DIGESTS

necessary for public use or public service. When it is already withdrawn from
public use, the property then becomes patrimonial property of the local
government unit concerned. It is only then that the respondent municipality
can "use or convey them for any purpose for which other real property
belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

the land is a foreshore land and was mortgaged and leased within the five-
year prohibitory period.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 100709. November 14, 1997. Issue: Is the subject land considered a foreshore land?
PANGANIBAN, J.
Ruling: YES. A foreshore land is defined by the Court as “The strip of land
that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternatively wet
Case Doctrine: and dry according to the flow of the tide.”
When the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded While at the time of the grant of free patent to respondent Morato, the land
property became foreshore land and passed to the realm of the public was not reached by the water, however, due to gradual sinking of the land
domain. caused by natural calamities, the sea advances had permanently invaded a
portion of subject land.
When the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded
Facts: In 1972, respondent Morato filed a Free Patent Application on a parcel property became foreshore land and passed to the realm of the public
of land. The patent was approved and the Register of Deeds of Quezon at domain. In fact, the Court in Government vs. Cabangis annulled the
Lucena City issued Original Certificate of Title in favor of respondent. Both registration of land subject of cadastral proceedings when the parcel
the free patent and the title specifically mandate that the land shall not subsequently became foreshore land. In another case, the Court voided the
be alienated nor encumbered within five (5) years from the date of the registration decree of a trial court and held that said court had no jurisdiction
issuance of the patent.
to award foreshore land to any private person or entity. The subject land in
this case, being foreshore land, should therefore be returned to the public
Subsequently, the District Land Officer in Lucena City, acting upon reports domain.
that respondent Morato had encumbered the land in violation of the condition
of the patent, conducted an investigation. Thereafter, it was established that
the subject land is a portion of the Calauag Bay, five (5) to six (6) feet deep
CHAVES V. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY
under water during high tide and two (2) feet deep at low tide, and not
suitable to vegetation. Moreover, a portion of the land was mortgaged by G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002
respondent Morato to respondents Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan. The CARPIO, J.
spouses Quilatan constructed a house on the land. Another portion of the
land was leased to Perfecto Advincula where a warehouse was constructed. FACTS: This case invovles the reclamation of portions of Manila bay. A law
was passed creating the Public Estates Authority which was tasked with
Petitioner filed an amended complaint against respondents Morato, spouses the development, improvement, and acquisition, lease, and sale of all
Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon for kinds of lands. The then president also transferred to PEA the foreshore and
the cancellation of title and reversion of a parcel of land to the public domain,
offshore lands of Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
subject of a free patent in favor of respondent Morato, on the grounds that
Reclamation Project.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

Now in this case, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with Facts: Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of
AMARI, a private corporation. Under the Joint Venture Agreement between Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga
AMARI and PEA, several hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Province. Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the Municipality of
Freedom Islands and several portions of submerged areas of Manila Bay Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Sec. 50 of the Act provided that “Buildings
were going to be transferred to AMARI . and properties which the province shall abandon upon the transfer of the
capital to another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of
ISSUE: Can AMARI, a private corporation, acquire the reclaimed lands Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General.” Such properties
comprising of the freedom islands and portions of submerged areas of Bay? include lots of capitol site, schools, hospitals, leprosarium, high school
playgrounds, burleighs, and hydro-electric sites.
HELD: The reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered
by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public On 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province of
domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell Zamboanga into two (2): Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur.
or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only
sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in On 1961, Republic Act 3039 was approved amending Sec. 50 of
the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. Commonwealth Act 39 by providing that all properties and assets belonging
to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of
As for the submerged areas of Manila Bay, they remain inalienable Zamboanga are to be transferred, free of charge, to the City of Zamboanga.
natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or
disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for This constrained Zamboanga del Norte to file a complaint alleging
public service. The government can make such classification and declaration the constitutionality of RA 3039 for depriving it of property without due
only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these process of law.
lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only
natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the
592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the
Issue: Does Congress have legislative control over properties of
commerce of man.
municipalities?
Held: It depends.
The Province of Zamboanga del Norte v City of Zamboanga, et. al. If the property is owned by the municipality in its public and
G.R. No. L-24440; March 28, 1968 governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute
BENGZON,J: control over it. But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary
capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just
compensation. Respondent Vivencio Sarmiento, on the other hand, had a building
constructed on a portion of said government land. A part thereof was
Republic Act 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots used as capitol occupied by Andoks Litson Corporation and Marites Carinderia, also
site, school sites and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites and the high impleaded as respondents.
school playground sites—a total of 24 lots—since these were held by the
Thereafter, petitioner acquired a portion of the same area owned by the
former Zamboanga province in its governmental capacity and therefore are government by means of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property. The property
subject to the absolute control of Congress. As to the Burleigh lots and was registered in his name as T.C.T. No. 74430. He then filed an accion
schools erected thereon, the records do not disclose whether they were publiciana alleging the respondents, on the government land, closed his right
constructed at the expense of the former Province of Zamboanga. of way tothe Ninoy Aquino Avenue and encroached on a portion of his lot.
Considering however the fact that said buildings must have been erected
even before 1936 when Commonwealth Act 39 was enacted it can be Respondents, in their answer, claimed that they have been issued licenses
and permits to construct their buildings on the area; and that petitioner has
assumed that said build erected by the National Government, using national
no right over the subject property as it belongs to the government.
funds. Hence, Congress could very well dispose of said buildings in the same
manner that it did with the lots. Even assuming that provincial funds were The RTC declared that defendants to have a better right of possession over
used, still the buildings constitute mere accessories to the lands, which are the subject land except the portion covered by T.C.T. No. 74430. The RTC
public in nature, and so, they follow the nature of said lands. decision was affirmed by the CA; hence, this petition.
But Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to deprive Zamboanga del ISSUE: Who has a better right of possession over the strip of land belonging
Norte of its share in the value of the rest of the 26 remaining lots which are to the government where the stairways were built?
patrimonial properties since they are not being utilized for distinctly
HELD: Neither petitioner nor respondents have a right of possession over the
governmental purposes. disputed lot where the stairways were built as it is a property of public
dominion.
Hence, as to public property-Congress has absolute control over it.
As regards patrimonial property-Congress doesn’t have absolute control. Property of public dominion is defined by Article 420 of the Civil Code as
follows:
Teofilo C. Villarico vs Vivencio Sarmiento ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
G.R. No. 136438, November 11, 2004 (1) Those intended for public use such as roads, canals, rivers,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks,
shores, roadsteads, and other of similar character.
FACTS: Petitioner Teofilo C. Villarico is the owner of a lot separated from (2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use,
the Ninoy Aquino Avenue by a strip of land belonging to the government. As and are intended for some public service or for the development
this highway was elevated and higher than the adjoining areas, the of the national wealth.
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) constructed stairways at Public use is use that is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to
several portions of this strip of public land to enable the people to have the indefinite public.
access to the highway.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and hence it: (1) affirmed. Petitioner alleges that the trial courts reliance on the testimonies of
cannot be alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts; Evangelista and Torres was misplaced. Petitioner alleges that Evangelistas
(2) cannot be acquired by prescription against the State; (3) is not subject to statement that the possession of respondents predecessors-in-interest was
attachment and execution; and (4) cannot be burdened by any voluntary
open, public, continuous, peaceful, and adverse to the whole world was a
easement.
Records show that the lot on which the stairways were built is for the use of general conclusion of law rather than factual evidence of possession of
the people as passageway to the highway. Consequently, it is a property of title. Petitioner alleges that respondent failed to establish that its
public dominion.Considering that the lot on which the stairways were predecessors-in-interest had held the land openly, continuously, and
constructed is a property of public dominion, it can not be burdened by a exclusively for at least 30 years after it was declared alienable and
voluntary easement of right of way in favor of herein petitioner. In fact, its use disposable.
by the public is by mere tolerance of the government through the DPWH.
Petitioner cannot appropriate it for himself. Verily, he can not claim any right
of possession over it.
ISSUE: Does respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open,
Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land
G.R. No. 154953; June 26, 2008 in the concept of an owner since June 1945 or earlier?
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS: T.A.N Properties filed an Application for Original Registration of Title RULING: No, T.A.N. Properties Inc. had no open, continuous, exclusive, and
covering a land (56 hectares at San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas). notorious possession and occupation in the concept of an owner.
During the hearings conducted, T.A.N. Properties presented 3 witnesses,
namely: Torres – Operations Manager and its authorized representative; Article 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also
Primitivo Evangelista – 72 year old resident of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years,
Batangas; and Regalado Marquez – Records Officer II of the Land without need of title or of good faith.
Registration Authority. The testimonies of the witnesses showed that
There is no law that requires that the testimony of a single witness needs
Prospero Dimayuga (Kabesang Puroy) had peaceful, adverse, open, and
corroboration. However, in this case, we find Evangelistas uncorroborated
continuous possession of the land in the concept of an owner since 1942.
testimony insufficient to prove that respondents predecessors-in-interest had
Upon his death, Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio
been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner for more than 30
Dimayuga (Antonio). On 27 September 1960, Antonio executed a Deed of
years. We cannot consider the testimony of Torres as sufficient
Donation covering the land in favor of one of his children, Fortunato
corroboration. Torres testified primarily on the fact of respondents acquisition
Dimayuga (Fortunato). Later, however, Antonio gave Fortunato another piece
of the land. While he claimed to be related to the Dimayugas, his knowledge
of land. Hence on April 1961, Antonio executed a Partial Revocation of
of their possession of the land was hearsay. He did not even tell the trial
Donation, and the land was adjudicated to one of Antonio’s children,
court where he obtained his information.
Prospero Dimayuga (Porting). On August 8, 1997, Porting sold the land to
T.A.N. Properties. RTC adjudicated the land in favor of the respondent. CA
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

The tax declarations presented were only for the years starting HELD: No. The case of forcible entry is not a res judicata on the second
1955. While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they action to recover the parcel of land.
constitute proof of claim of ownership. Respondent did not present any
credible explanation why the realty taxes were only paid starting 1955 For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action the following
considering the claim that the Dimayugas were allegedly in possession of the requisites must concur: (1) There must be a final judgment or order; (2) The
land before 1945. The payment of the realty taxes starting 1955 gives rise to court rendering the judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter;
the presumption that the Dimayugas claimed ownership or possession of the (3) The former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and, (4) There is
land only in that year. between the first and second actions identity of parties, of subject matter and
of causes of action. In this case, there is no identity of causes of action.
Therefore, there was no open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation in the concept of an owner. The first civil case filed is a complaint for forcible entry, where what is at
issue is prior possession, regardless of who has lawful title over the disputed
OWNERSHIP property. On the other hand, the second civil case, while inaccurately
captioned as an action for "Quieting of Title and Recovery of Possession with
Felicidad Javier v. Hon. Regino T. Veridiano II, Presiding Judge, Branch I, Damages" is in reality an action to recover a parcel of land or an accion
Court of First Instance of Zambales and Reino Rosete reivindicatoria. Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is thus an
G.R. No. L-48050; October 10, 1994 action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks
BELLOSILLO,J. recovery of its full possession. In the action for forcible entry, petitioner
merely claimed a better right or prior possession over the disputed area
without asserting title thereto. It should be distinguished from and accion
FACTS: Petitioner Felicidad Javier filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application
reinvindicatoria where she expressly alleged ownership, specifically praying
for a lot on Olongapo City. Pending its approval, petitioner instituted a
that she be declared the rightful owner and given possession of the disputed
complaint for forcible entry against one Ben Babol, which was dismissed for
portion. Therefore, the prior complaint for ejectment cannot bar the
failure to prove that the area subject of forcible entry was within the
subsequent action for recovery, or petition to quiet title.
boundaries of his lot. Subsequently, the petitioner was granted
Miscellaneous Sales Patent and was issued Original Certificate of Title. Manila International Airport Authority v. CA
Meanwhile, Ben Babol had sold the property he was occupying, including the GR No. 155650, July 20, 2006
portion in question, to a certain Reino Rosete. 4 years from the finality of the CARPIO, J.:
dismissal of Civil Case, petitioner instituted a complaint for quieting of title
and recovery of possession with damages against Ben Babol and Reino FACTS: Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) is the operator of the
Rosete. Reino Rosete contends that the first case on forcible entry Ninoy International Airport located at Paranaque City. The Officers of
constituted res judicata against the second complaint. Paranaque City sent notices to MIAA due to real estate tax delinquency.
MIAA then settled some of the amount. When MIAA failed to settle the entire
ISSUE: Whether of not the first case on forcible entry constituted a res
amount, the officers of Paranaque city threatened to levy and subject to
judicata on the second action to recover a parcel of land.
auction the land and buildings of MIAA, which they did. MIAA sought for a
16
PROPERTY DIGESTS

Temporary Restraining Order from the CA but failed to do so within the 60 and transportation. Even if MIAA charge fees, this is for support of its
days reglementary period, so the petition was dismissed. MIAA then sought operation and for regulation and does not change the character of the land
for the TRO with the Supreme Court a day before the public auction, MIAA and buildings of MIAA as part of the public dominion. As part of the public
was granted with the TRO but unfortunately the TRO was received by the dominion the land and buildings of MIAA are outside the commerce of man.
Paranaque City officers 3 hours after the public auction. MIAA claims that To subject them to levy and public auction is contrary to public policy. Unless
although the charter provides that the title of the land and building are with the President issues a proclamation withdrawing the airport land and
MIAA still the ownership is with the Republic of the Philippines. MIAA also buildings from public use, these properties remain to be of public dominion
contends that it is an instrumentality of the government and as such and are inalienable.
exempted from real estate tax. That the land and buildings of MIAA are of
public dominion therefore cannot be subjected to levy and auction sale. On
the other hand, the officers of Paranaque City claim that MIAA is a Bustos vs Court of Appeals
government owned and controlled corporation therefore not exempted to real G.R. No. 120784-85; January 24, 2001
estate tax. PARDO, J.:
ISSUES: Is the MIAA an instrumentality of the government and not a FACTS: The deceased died intestate leaving four children. Subsequently,
government owned and controlled corporation and as such exempted from they instituted an extra-judicial partition of the estate of the deceased. One of
tax. the children sold her share to another person by way of Deed of Absolute
Sale, on the same day that the extra-judicial partition was instituted.
Are the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public dominion and thus
cannot be the subject of levy and auction sale. At the time of the sale, there was no cadastral survey in the town where the
lot was situated. Later, the cadastre was conducted, and the property was
RULING: MIAA is an instrumentality of the government vested with corporate
involved in the partition case. Later, the lot which is the subject of the above
powers and government functions. MIAA is not a government owned and
sale included Lot 284 which was subdivided into lots 284-A and 284-B.
controlled corporation, for to become one MIAA should either be a stock or
non stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation for its capital is not
The person (Trinidad) in possession of the subject lot refused to surrender
divided into shares. It is not a non stock corporation since it has no members.
the land to the vendee (Mendoza) despite several demands which led to the
Under the Civil Code, property may either be under public dominion or filing of a complaint. Such possessor died and her heirs partitioned her estate
private ownership. Those under public dominion are owned by the State and which included Lot 284-B and was later on sold to private respondents.
are utilized for public use, public service and for the development of national
wealth. The ports included in the public dominion pertain either to seaports or The trial court ruled in favor of Mendoza. He then sold the subject land to the
airports. When properties under public dominion cease to be for public use petitioners, who were in actual possession of the land. Private respondents
and service, they form part of the patrimonial property of the State. The court filed an action for unlawful detainer against the petitioners.
held that the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public dominion since
the airport is devoted for public use, for the domestic and international travel ISSUE: Could the petitioners be ousted from their own lot?
17
PROPERTY DIGESTS

Soriano, one of the children of Adriano Soriano, acted as caretaker of the
RULING: No. In this case, the issue of possession is intertwined with the property during the period of the lease. The heirs of Adriano Soriano
issue of ownership. In the unlawful detainer case, the Court of Appeals subsequently subdivided the property into two (2) lots, Lot No. 60052 and Lot
affirmed the decision of the trial court as to possession on the ground that the No. 8459. Lot No. 60052 was sold by the heirs of Adriano to petitioner
decision has become final and executory. This means that the petitioners spouses Braulio and Aquilina Abalos (petitioners), and three-fourths shares
may be evicted. In the accion reinvindicatoria, the Court of Appeals affirmed in Lot No. 8459 were also sold to petitioners.
the ownership of petitioners over the subject land. Hence, the court declared
petitioners as the lawful owners of the land. The de Vera spouses ousted Roman Soriano as caretaker. Thereafter,
Roman Soriano filed CAR Case No. 1724-P-68 for reinstatement and
In the present case, the stay of execution is warranted by the fact that reliquidation against the de Vera spouses before the agrarian court. The
petitioners are now legal owners of the land in question and are occupants agrarian court authorized the ejectment of Roman Soriano but on appeal, the
thereof. To execute the judgment by ejecting petitioners from the land that decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which decision became final
they owned would certainly result in grave injustice. Besides, the issue of and executory.
possession was rendered moot when the court adjudicated ownership to the
However, prior to the execution of the said decision, the parties entered into
spouses Bustos by virtue of a valid deed of sale.
a post-decisional agreement wherein the de Vera spouses allowed Roman
Soriano to sub-lease the property until the termination of the lease in 1982.
Placing petitioners in possession of the land in question is the necessary and
The post-decisional agreement was approved by the agrarian court.
logical consequence of the decision declaring them as the rightful owners of
the property. One of the essential attributes of ownership is possession. It Eleven years after the approval of the post-decisional agreement between
follows that as owners of the subject property, petitioners are entitled to Roman Soriano and the spouses de Vera in CAR Case No. 1724-P-68 for
possession of the same. An owner who cannot exercise the seven (7) juses reinstatement and reliquidation, petitioners filed with the agrarian court a
or attributes of ownership--the right to possess, to use and enjoy, to abuse or motion for execution of said post-decisional agreement which allowed
consume, to accessories, to dispose or alienate, to recover or vindicate and Roman Soriano to sub-lease the property. After a series of trials reaching all
to the fruits--is a crippled owner. the way to the Supreme Court, petitioners’ motion for execution was denied
with finality. By this time Roman Soriano has already died and was
Heirs of Roman Soriano vs. Court of Appeals, spouses Braulio Abalos and substituted by his heirs (private respondents).
Aquilina Abalos
G.R. No. 128177; August 15, 2001 On 1976, petitioners filed with the RTC (as land registration court or LRC), an
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: application for registration of title over Lot No. 60052 and three-fourths (3/4)
pro-indiviso of Lot No. 8459, docketed as LRC Case No. N-3405. Said
application for registration was granted by the trial court, acting as a land
FACTS: A parcel of land was originally owned by Adriano Soriano. When he registration court. Roman Soriano appealed all the way to the Supreme Court
died, the land passed on to his heirs who leased the same to spouses David but only to have his appeal denied. In this case the petitioners had won over
de Vera and Consuelo Villasista for a period of fifteen (15) years. Roman the two lots.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

The decision of the land registration court in LRC Case No. N-3405 was RULING: No. Although, petitioners may have won in the land registration
partially executed with the creation of a Committee on Partition. A partition case, they cannot eject the possessors of the land while the issue of their
was made on the lots. Private respondents opposed leading to another security of tenure is still being resolved.
series of trials reaching to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the partition but reversed the order of the LRC directing the Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. There is ownership
issuance of writ of possession pending the outcome of Civil Case No. 15958. when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a
manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others.
Civil Case No. 15958 originated as a case filed by Roman Soriano before the Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, among which are the right to
RTC against petitioners, as an action for annulment of document and/or enjoy the thing owned and the right to exclude other persons from
redemption, ownership and damages. This case also involved a separate set possession thereof. On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding
of trials eventually reaching the Supreme Court. Civil Case No. 15958 was of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually
dismissed with finality by the Supreme Court. and physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be had in
one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a
With the dismissal of Civil Case No. 15958, petitioner, in LRC Case No. N- holder. A person may be declared owner but he may not be entitled to
3405, moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution and/or writ of possession. The possession may be in the hands of another either as a
possession to place them in possession of Lot No. 60052 and Lot No. 8459. lessee or a tenant. A person may have improvements thereon of which he
The land registration court issued a Resolution holding the motion in may not be deprived without due hearing. He may have other valid defenses
abeyance until and after DARAB Case No. 528-P-93 for security of tenure to resist surrender of possession. A judgment for ownership, therefore, does
with prayer for status quo, has been resolved not necessarily include possession as a necessary incident.
DARAB Case No. 528-P-93 was a case filed on October 1993, by the private There is no dispute that petitioners’ title over the land under litigation has
respondents with the Department of Agrarian Adjudication Board. It is a been confirmed with finality. As explained above, however, such declaration
complaint against petitioners for “Security of Tenure with prayer for Status pertains only to ownership and does not automatically include possession,
Quo Order and Preliminary Injunction”. especially so in the instant case where there is a third party occupying the
said parcel of land, allegedly in the concept of an agricultural tenant. While
Petitioners appealed this Resolution of the land registration court to the SC.
the issue of ownership of the subject land has been laid to rest in the final
The SC referred it to the CA. The CA eventually set aside the Resolution of
judgment of the land registration court, the right of possession thereof is, as
the land registration court and ordered instead the issuance of the
yet, controverted. This is precisely what is put in issue in the security of
corresponding writ of possession in favor of private respondents. Hence, this
tenure case filed by private respondents before the DARAB.
petition.
Hence, petitioners cannot yet eject private respondents as possessors of the
ISSUE: May a winning party (the petitioners) in a land registration case
land while the issue of security of tenure is still being resolved.
effectively eject the possessor thereof (private respondents), whose security
of tenure rights are still pending determination before the DARAB? Garcia vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 133140, August 10, 1999
19
PROPERTY DIGESTS

Puno, J. enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically
occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be had in one of two
Facts: Atty. Pedro V. Garcia, in whose name TCT No. S-31269 covering a ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. A
parcel of land in Makati was registered, sold with the consent of his wife possessor in the concept of an owner may be the owner himself or one who
Remedios T. Garcia, the same to their daughter Ma. Luisa Magpayo and her claims to be so. On the other hand, one who possesses as a mere holder
husband Luisito Magpayo (the Magpayos), who later on mortgaged the land acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership,
to PBCom to secure a loan. Atty. Garcia’s Title was cancelled and in its stead whether his belief be right or wrong.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-108412/545 was issued in the name of the
Magpayos. The Magpayos failed to pay their obligation which led to the
foreclosure of the property and the redemption period of the foreclosed The records show that petitioner occupied the property not in the concept of
an owner for his stay was merely tolerated by his parents. Consequently, it is
mortgage expired without the Magpayos redeeming the same. Title over the
of no moment that petitioner was in possession of the property at the time of
land was consolidated in favor of PBCom. Upon service of the writ of
the sale to the Magpayo spouses. It was not a hindrance to a valid transfer of
possession, Mrs. Magpayo’s brother, Jose Ma. T. Garcia (Garcia), who was
ownership. On the other hand, petitioner’s subsequent claim of ownership as
in possession of the land, refused to honor it.
successor to his mother’s share in the conjugal asset is belied by the fact
Garcia thereupon filed against PBCom, the Magpayos, and the RTC Sheriff
the instant suit for recovery of realty and damages wherein he alleged that he that the property was not included in the inventory of the estate submitted by
inherited the land as one of the heirs of his mother Remedios T. Garcia, and his father to the intestate court. This buttresses the ruling that indeed the
that PBCom acquired no right thereover, and that the vendor, Atty. Garcia, property was no longer considered owned by petitioner’s parents.
was not in possession and hence could not deliver the property merely by the
execution of the document. RODIL ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 135537. G.R. No. 129609. November 29, 2001
Issue: Was Garcia’s possession in a concept of an owner? BELLOSILLO, J.
FACTS: RODIL is leasing a property in Binondo from the government.

Held: No. Garcia’s possession could not ripen into ownership. He has no
RODIL is subleasing the property to Carmen Bondoc, Teresita Bondoc-Esto,
valid title thereto. His possession is certainly not in the concept of an owner.
Divisoria Footwear and Chua Huay Soon, members of the Ides O'Racca
This is so because as early as 1981, title thereto was registered in the name
Building Tenants Association Inc. (ASSOCIATION).
of the Magpayo Spouses which title was subsequently cancelled when the
property was purchased by PBCom in a public auction sale resulting in the
issuance of title in favor of the latter in 1985. The property leased by the government was reclassified making it an
alienable property. RODIL made an offer to buy the property. Pending the
The Court stressed that possession and ownership are distinct legal determination of the market price of the property, RODIL and the government
concepts. Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one person is through Factoran entered to a contract of extension of lease for another 5
completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and years. Pending approval of the lease contract, association made an offer to
consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the lease the said premises. Association’s offer being more beneficial to the
government, Secretary De Jesus orders the cancellation of the contract
owner, one of which is the right to dispose of the thing by way of sale. Atty.
between Rodil and the government through Factoran.
Pedro Garcia and his wife Remedios exercised their right to dispose of what
they owned when they sold the subject property to the Magpayo spouses. On
the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the
20
PROPERTY DIGESTS

RODIL filed an action for specific performance, damages and injunction with Due to the overlapping of titles, petitioner filed an action for quieting of title
prayer for temporary restraining order stopping association or anyone from and damages with the RTC which decided on his favor. On appeal however,
collecting rents. Rodil subsequently filed a case of unlawful detainer against the CA reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the transaction entered
into by the parties, as evidenced by their contract, was an equitable
the members of the association.
mortgage, not a sale based on the inadequacy of the consideration agreed
upon by the parties. The said decision was affirmed by the SC resulting into
CA annulled the renewal contract and dismissed the case of unlawful
the nullification of petitioner's OCT while at the same time affirming
detainer. respondent's title.
ISSUE: Does RODIL have the right to file an action for unlawful detainer on In view of the above-mentioned decision, respondent was able to obtain a
the basis of the contract of lease? writ of possession which petitioner now seeks to enjoin by way of certiorari
and prohibition. Petitioner contends that respondent's delivery of possession
HELD: RODIL has the right to file an action for unlawful detainer. of the subject property upon the execution of the subject deed and the
The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without subsequent transfer of possession to him must be considered an essential
other limitations than those established by law. Every owner has the freedom part of the agreement between the parties which grants him the right to retain
of disposition over his property. It is an attribute of ownership, and this rule possession of the subject property so long as the mortgage loan remains
has no exception. The REPUBLIC being the owner of the disputed property unpaid. Petitioner further asserts that since the above-mentioned decision
enjoys the prerogative to enter into a lease contract with RODIL in the did not direct his immediate ouster from the subject property and the delivery
exercise of its jus disponendi. Hence, as lessor, the REPUBLIC has the right thereof to respondent, the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of
to eject usurpers of the leased property where the factual elements required respondent constituted an unwarranted modification or addition to the said
for relief in an action for unlawful detainer are present. final and executory decision.
Isaguirre v. De Lara
G.R. No. 138053; May 31, 2000
GONZAGA-REYES, J.
ISSUES:
FACTS: Respondent Felicitas De Lara was a claimant to a 1,000 square 1. Did the petitioner obtain the right to retain possession of the subject
meter parcel of land. On this lot stands a two-story residential-commercial property so long as the mortgage loan remains unpaid by the delivery of
apartment. When she encountered financial difficulties, respondent possession of the subject property upon the execution of the subject
approached petitioner Cornelio M. Isaguirre. A document denominated as deed and the subsequent transfer of possession to him?
"Deed of Sale and Special Cession of Rights and Interests" was executed by
respondent and petitioner, whereby the former sold a 250 square meter 2. Does the respondent need to go back to court to establish her right to
portion of the said lot, together with the two-story commercial and residential possess subject property because of the lack of an ouster against the
structure standing thereon, in favor of petitioner. Petitioner, through a sales petitioner in the court decision which affirmed her title?
application, was subsequently able to obtain an OCT in his favor over the
portion subject of the deed. Meanwhile, respondent was also able to obtain RULING:
an OCT of the subject property which still included that portion supposedly
sold to petitioner. 1. No, the petitioner did not obtain the right to retain possession of the
subject property so long as the mortgage loan remains unpaid by reason of
21
PROPERTY DIGESTS

the delivery of possession of the subject property upon the execution of the respondent's title, but rather, was a necessary complement thereto. It bears
subject deed and the subsequent transfer of possession to him. stressing that a judgment is not confined to what appears upon the face of
the decision, but also those necessarily included therein or necessary
As held by the SC in the case of Alvano v. Batoon, a simple mortgage does thereto.
not give the mortgagee a right to the possession of the property unless the
mortgage should contain some special provision to that effect. A mortgage is Thus, the respondent need not go back to court to establish her right to
a contract entered into in order to secure the fulfillment of a principal possess subject property even with the lack of an ouster against the
obligation. It is constituted by recording the document in which it appears petitioner in the court decision which affirmed her title.
with the proper Registry of Property, although, even if it is not recorded, the
mortgage is nevertheless binding between the parties. Thus, the only right
granted by law in favor of the mortgagee is to demand the execution and the Spoues Cristino and Brigida Custodio and Spouses Lito and Maria Cristina
recording of the document in which the mortgage is formalized. Santos vs, Court of Appeals, Heirs of Pacifico Mabasa and Regional Trial
Court of Basig, Branch 181
Regrettably for petitioner, he has not presented any evidence, other than his
G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996
own gratuitous statements, to prove that the real intention of the parties was
to allow him to enjoy possession of the mortgaged property until full payment REGALADO, J.:
of the loan. Furthermore, nowhere in the CA's decisions promulgated, or in
the SC's own decision promulgated was it ever established that the
mortgaged properties were delivered by respondent to petitioner. Facts: Pacifico Mabasa filed a case for grant of an easement of right of way
against Cristino Custodio, Brigida R. Custodio, Rosalina R. Morato, Lito
Therefore, the petitioner did not obtain the right to retain possession of the Santos and Maria Cristina C. Santos.
subject property so long as the mortgage loan remains unpaid by reason of
the delivery of possession of the subject property upon the execution of the Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon.
subject deed and the subsequent transfer of possession to him. Said property id surrounded by other immovables pertaining to Cristino and
Brigido Custodio, then that of Lito and Maria Cristina Santos, and on the right
2. No, the respondent need not go back to court to establish her right to
side that of Rosalina Morato. The Santoses constructed an adobe fence
possess subject property even with the lack of an ouster against the
petitioner in the court decision which affirmed her title. along their property making the first passageway narrow while Morato
constructed her adobe fence in such a way that the entire second
As the sole owner, respondent has the right to enjoy her property, without passageway was enclosed. It was then that the remaining tenants of
any other limitations than those established by law. Corollary to such right, Mabasa’s apartment vacated the area.
respondent also has the right to exclude from the possession of her property
any other person to whom she has not transmitted such property. The trial court ordered the grant of easement of right of way and indemnity.
Possession is an essential attribute of ownership. On appeal, the decision was affirmed with modification insofar as damages
were granted in favor of Mabasa.
In this case, it would be redundant for respondent to go back to court simply
to establish her right to possess subject property. Contrary to petitioner's
claims, the issuance of the writ of possession did not constitute an
unwarranted modification to the final and executory decision affirming
22
PROPERTY DIGESTS

Issue: Is the grant of damages against the owners who constructed a fence deprived private respondents of their property without due process of law by
along their property resulting to the blocking of the passageway of another forcibly removing and destroying the barbed wire fence enclosing their
proper? farmholdings without notice and bulldozing the rice, corn fruit bearing trees
and other crops of private respondents by means of force, violence and
Held: No, the grant of damages against the owners who constructed a fence intimidation, and trespassing, coercing and threatening to harass, remove
and eject private respondents from their respective farmholdings. The MTC
along their property resulting to the blocking of the passageway of another is
dismissed the complaint which was affirmed by the RTC. Both courts have
not proper. rationalized petitioner’s drastic action on the basis of the doctrine of self-help
enunciated on Article 249 of the NCC. On appeal, the Court of Appeals gave
Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that (e)very owner may enclose or due course to the petition and reversed the decisions of the lower courts.
fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges,
or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon. It ISSUE: Can the petitioner invoke the Doctrine of Self-help to justify its
is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their actions?
property.
HELD: No. The petitioner cannot invoke the Doctrine of Self-help to justify its
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any actions. Such justification is unavailing because the doctrine of self-help can
servitudes. Petitioners had an absolute right over their property and their act only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is
absent in the case at bar. When possession has already been lost, the owner
of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully
must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property. This is clear from
perform in the employment and exercise of said right. Article 536 of the Civil Code. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the
time petitioner entered the property, private respondents were already in
Hence, the award of damages is not proper. possession thereof . There is no evidence that the spouses Jose were ever
in possession of the subject property. On the contrary, private respondents'
PRINCIPLE OF SELF-HELP peaceable possession was manifested by the fact that they even planted
rice, corn and fruit bearing trees twelve to fifteen years prior to petitioner's act
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES INC. VS. HON COURT OF of destroying their crops. Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim
APPEALS AND ORLANDO GERNALE ; ERNESTO VILLEZA ownership based on the muniments of title it presented, such evidence does
G.R. No. 76216-76217 ; September 14, 1989 not responsively address the issue of prior actual possession raised in a
FERNAN, C.J. forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of
the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be
FACTS: Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose are the turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror.
owners of a percel of land in Sitio Inawaran, San Isidro, Antipolo Rizal. The
spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing petitioner to
develop the property into a residential subdivision. Finding that part of the
property was occupied by private respondents and twenty other persons,
petitioner advised the occupants to vacate the premises but the latter
refused. Petitioner proceeded with the development of the subject property
which included a portion occupied and cultivated by private respondents. The
latter filed an action for forcible entry against petitioner alleging that petitioner Pacencio Abejaron V. Felix Nabasa and CA
23
PROPERTY DIGESTS

G.R. No. 84831. June 20, 2001 portion despite knowledge of Abejaron’s actual occupation and possession of
PUNO, J.: said portion.
On September 24, 1974, Nabasa was issued Original Certificate of

Facts: Petitioner Abejaron avers that he is the actual and lawful possessor Title No. P-4140 pursuant to Free Patent No. (XI-4) 2877 covering Lot 1,
and claimant of a 118-square meter portion of a 175-square meter residential Block 5, Psu-154953 including therein the lot occupied by the petitioner.
lot in Silway, General Santos City. In 1945, petitioner Abejaron and his family
started occupying the 118-square meter land. At that time, the land had not On March 12, 1982 an action for reconveyance with damages
yet been surveyed. They fenced the area and built thereon a family home against respondent Nabasa before Branch 22, Regional Trial Court of
with nipa roofing and a small store. In 1949, petitioner improved their abode General Santos City.
to become a two-storey house made of round wood and nipa roofing.
Abejaron also introduced several improvements on the land including a store, Issue: Has the allegation of fraud been proven for the action for
5 coconut trees on the property of controversy, and avocado and banana reconveyance to prosper?
trees. All this time that the Abejarons introduced these improvements on the
Held: No. An action for reconveyance of a property is the sole remedy of a
land in controversy, respondent Nabasa did not oppose or complain about
landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
the improvements. Knowing that the disputed land was public in character,
another’s name after one year from the date of the decree so long as the
petitioner declared only his house, and not the disputed land, for taxation
property has not passed to an innocent purchaser for value. The action does
purposes.
not seek to reopen the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of
Petitioner stated that beginning 1955, respondent Nabasa resided on registration but only purports to show that the person who secured the
the remaining 57-square meter portion of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953. registration of the property in controversy is not the real owner thereof. Fraud
Nabasa built his house about four (4) meters away from petitioner Abejaron’s is a ground for reconveyance. For an action for reconveyance based on fraud
house. to prosper, it is essential for the party seeking reconveyance to prove by
clear and convincing evidence his title to the property and the fact of fraud.
Before 1974, employees of the Bureau of Lands surveyed the area in Such was not performed by the petitioner.
controversy. Abejaron merely watched them do the survey and did not
thereafter apply for title of the land on the belief that he could not secure title In this case, the petitioner has failed to establish the portion of the disputed
over it as it was government property. Without his (Abejaron) knowledge and land that his original nipa house, small store and wooden fence actually
consent, however, Nabasa “clandestinely, willfully, fraudulently, and occupied as of January 24, 1947. In the absence of this proof, we cannot
unlawfully applied for and caused the titling in his name” of the entire Lot 1, determine the land he actually possessed and occupied for thirty years which
Block 5, Psu-154953, including petitioner Abejaron’s 118-square meter he may acquire under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Worthy of notice is
portion. Petitioner imputes bad faith and fraud on the part of Nabasa because the fact that the disputed land was surveyed, subdivided into and identified
in applying for and causing the titling in his name of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu- by lots only in the 1970’s. Therefore, prior to the survey, it would be difficult
154953, Nabasa represented himself to be the actual and lawful possessor to determine the metes and bounds of the land petitioner claims to have
of the entire Lot 1, Block 5, including petitioner Abejaron’s 118-square meter occupied since 1947 in the absence of specific and incontrovertible proof.
24
PROPERTY DIGESTS

Also, as admitted by the petitioner, he has never declared the disputed land Villadelrey. The accused maintains that their acts were justified under Article
for taxation purposes. While tax receipts and tax declarations are not 429 of the New Civil Code.
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of
ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual ISSUE: Is the Doctrine of Self-Help under Article 429 applicable?
possession of the property or supported by other effective proof. Even the tax
HELD: No, the Doctrine of Self-Help under Article 429 is not applicable.
declarations and receipts covering his house do not bolster his case as the
earliest of these was dated 1950. Art. 429 of our Civil Code states that "The owner or lawful possessor
of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and
Petitioner’s evidence does not constitute the “well-nigh incontrovertible”
disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be
evidence necessary to acquire title through possession and occupation of the
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful
disputed land at least since January 24, 1947 as required by Sec. 48(b) of
physical invasion or usurpation of his property."
the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942. The basic presumption is
that lands of whatever classification belong to the State and evidence of a Article 429, Civil Code is inapplicable to the case at bar, for, having
land grant must be “well-nigh incontrovertible.” As petitioner Abejaron has not been given 20 days from June 6, 1959, within which to vacate Lot 105-A.
adduced any evidence of title to the land in controversy, whether by judicial Gloria did not, on June 17, 1959 invade or usurp said lot. She had merely
confirmation of title, or homestead, sale, or free patent, he cannot maintain remained in possession thereof, even though the hacienda owner may have
an action for reconveyance. become its co-possessor. Appellants did not "repel or prevent an actual or
threatened physical invasion or usurpation." They expelled the complainant
Caisip vs. People
from a property of which she and her husband were in possession even
No. L-287I6. November 18, 1970
before the action for forcible entry was filed against them on May 17, 1958,
CONCEPCION, C.J.
despite the fact that the Sheriff had explicitly authorized them to stay in said
property up to June 26, 1959, and had expressed the view that he could not
FACTS: Spouses Gloria Cabalag and Marcelino Guevara cultivated Lot 105-
oust them therefrom on June 17, 1959, without a judicial order therefor.
A of Hacienda Palico owned by Roxas y Cia. Felix Caisip is the overseer of
the Hacienda. In the action for forcible entry filed by Roxas y Cia against the Thus, accused cannot invoke the Doctrine of Self-Help under Article
spouses, the court ruled in favor Roxas y Cia ordering the spouses to vacate. 429 to justify the crime they committed.
Following its execution, the spouses were given 20 days from June 6, 1959
to vacate. On June 17, 1959, Caisip asked Gloria to leave the premises but THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TITO PLETCHA, JR.
the latter refused to do so. Thus, Caisip sought the help of his co-defendants No. 19029-CR. June 27, 1977
Sgt. Rojales and Cpl. Villadelrey, the local police within the vicinity. Because SISON, P.V., J.:
of Gloria vehement refusal to leave, Rojales grabbed her right hand and
Villadelrey held her left hand. Together, they forcibly dragged her away. FACTS: Tito Pletcha, Jr. has been in possession for 19 years a 24-hectares
Gloria was later turned over to the police on duty for interrogation. Thus, a of lot. He inherited the same from his father and in which he has occupied
complaint for Grave Coercion was filed against Caisip, Rojales and and cultivated. During his occupation, 8 workers of Radeco Corporation,
25
PROPERTY DIGESTS

without order from the court, fenced the lot leased by the corporation from title, who takes the law into his hands, but it is the trespasser for scaring
certain Lopinco. But, as claim by Lolito, an integral part of his inherited lot away the former by acts of vandalism and strategy.
was included in the fenced area and as a result he desist the workers from Hence, the act of self-defense by the appellant is justified and thus,
doing the same pending a resurvey. However, he was just ignored. Thus, acquits him of the crime charged.
appellant, returned in awhile bringing with him a bolo. Upon seeing him with
his bolo, the 8 workers immediately fled leaving their works.
A complaint was filed against Tito for grave coercion. Municipal Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 74761, November 6, 1990
court, charged and convicted him of the said crime. On appeal, appellant
FERNAN, CJ
invoke that the law gives him, as the owner, the right to use reasonable force
to exclude any person threatening his peaceful ownership. On the other FACTS: Spouses Andamo are owners of a parcel of land adjacent to the
hand, the People contends that the appellant should not have done anything Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette (MOLLS). Within the land of the
by himself to resist but should have gone to court instead to enjoin the group MOLLS, water paths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were
of 8 men from disturbing his ownership. constructed which allegedly inundated and eroded Spouses Andamo’s land,
caused a young man to drown, damaged Spouses Andamo’s crops and
plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the livers of the spouses
ISSUE: Does the facts herein justify the application of Art. 429 of the Civil
and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and
Code and if so, excluding appellant from conviction and the penalty other improvements to destruction. Consequently, Spouses Andamo filed an
imposed. action for damages against the officers of MOLLS.
HELD: Yes. The application of Art. 429 of the Civil Code of self-help is ISSUE: Does the owner have a limited use of its property as to not injure
proper. others?
Article 429 of the New Civil Code confirms the right of the owner or
SC RULING: Yes, the owner has a limited use of its property as to not
lawful possessor of property, or one who has a color of title thereto by virtue
injure others.
of long possession thereof, to use reasonable force to repel an invasion or The use of one’s property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the
usurpation, actual, threatened or physical, of his property. The principle of Civil Code provides that “the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in
self-defense and the protective measures related thereto, covers not only his such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person.” Adjoining landowners
life, but also his liberty and property. have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own
The act of building a fence on land possessed by another constitutes land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and
interests of others. Although the owner has the right to build structures on his
force in contemplation of law, and the possessor is justified in shooing away
land, such structures must be constructed and maintained using all
the trespasser, even by means of a bolo, when he refuses to listen to his reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners
appeal, without need of rushing to the court to seek redress. The situation and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature.
requires immediate action and Art. 429 of the New Civil Code give the In the case, structures in the land of MOLLS clearly caused damage
possessor self executory mechanics of self-defense and self-reliance. In and injury to the adjacent land owned by Spouses Andamo.
such a case, it is not the possessor, who enjoys the legal presumption of just Hence, MOLLS may be limited with the use of its property as to not
injure others.
26
PROPERTY DIGESTS

Article 355 of the Civil Code considers three things as civil fruits: First, the
rents of buildings; second, the proceeds from leases of lands; and, third, the
ACCESSION income from perpetual or life annuities, or other similar sources of revenue.
As the bonus in question is not rent of a building or of land, the only meaning
BACHRACH MOTOR CO. V. TALISAY-SILAY MILING CO.
of "civil fruits" left to be examined is that of "income."
G.R. No. 35223; September 17, 1931
ROMUALDEZ, J.: It is to be noted that the said bonus bears no immediate, but only a remote
accidental relation to the land mentioned, having been granted as
FACTS: On December 22, 1923, the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., was compensation for the risk of having subjected one's land to a lien in favor of
indebted to the Philippine National Bank. To secure the payment of its debt, it the bank, for the benefit of the entity granting said bonus. If this bonus be
succeeded in inducing its planters, among whom was Mariano Lacson income or civil fruits of anything, it is income arising from said risk, or, if one
Ledesma, to mortgage their land to the creditor bank. And in order to chooses, from Mariano Lacson Ledesma's generosity in facing the danger for
compensate those planters for the risk they were running with their property the protection of the Talisay-Silay, but certainly it is not civil fruits or income
under the mortgage, Talisay-Silay undertook to credit the owners of the from the mortgaged property.
plantation thus mortgaged every year with a sum equal to two per centum of
the debt secured according to yearly balance, the payment of the bonus Hence, Petitioner Bachrach has preferential rights over the fruits.
being made at once, or in part from time to time, as soon as the central
became free of its obligations to the aforesaid bank, and of those contracted EQUATORIAL REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC. & CARMELO &
by virtue of the contract of supervision, and had funds which might be so BAUERMANN, INC., vs.MAYFAIR THEATER, INC.
used, or as soon as it obtained from said bank authority to make such G.R. No. 106063 November 21, 1996
payment. Now, herein petitioner, claims the bonus in favor of Mariano HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.
Lacson Ledesma. The Philippine National Bank filed a third party claim
alleging a preferential right to receive any amount which Mariano Lacson Facts: Mayfair entered into two contract of lease with Carmelo Inc. regarding
Ledesma might be entitled to from the Talisay-Silay Milling Co. as bonus, a portion of the building situated in a land owned by the latter in Claro M.
Recto. Where Mayfair established a motion picture theatre. In both Contract
because that would be civil fruits of the land mortgaged to said bank. The
of lease entered by the parties it provides in parag. 8
corporation Talisay-Silay, answered the complaint stating that of Mariano
Lacson Ledesma's credit, belonged to Cesar Ledesma because he had That if the LESSOR should desire to sell the leased premises, the
purchased it, and praying that it be absolved from the complaint and that the LESSEE shall be given 30-days exclusive option to purchase the
proper party be named so that the remainder might be delivered. same.
ISSUE: Is the bonus in question considered as civil fruits and if so, who has In the event, however, that the leased premises is sold to someone
preferential right over the said bonus. other than the LESSEE, the LESSOR is bound and obligated, as it
hereby binds and obligates itself, to stipulate in the Deed of Sale
rd
RULING: Yes. The bonus in question is a civil fruit under the 3 kind – hereof that the purchaser shall recognize this lease and be bound by
Income. Petitioner Bachrach has preferential right over the bonus. all the terms and conditions thereof.
27
PROPERTY DIGESTS

On June 30, 1978 Carmelo sold the entire property to Equitorial hence MACASAET VS MACASAET
Mayfair instituted an action for specific performance and annulment of sale of G.R. Nos. 154391-92. SEPTEMBER 30, 2004
the leased premises to Equatorial based on parg 8. Carmelo in its answer PANGANIBAN, J.
stated that it had informed Mayfair of its desire to sell the entire C.M. Recto
Avenue property and offered the same to Mayfair, but the latter answered FACTS:
[5]
that it was interested only in buying the areas under lease, which was Petitioners Ismael and Teresita Macasaet and Respondents
impossible since the property was not a condominium; and (b) that the option Vicente and Rosario Macasaet are first-degree relatives. Ismael is the son of
to purchase invoked by Mayfair is null and void for lack of consideration. respondents, and Teresita is his wife.
Equatorial, in its Answer, pleaded as special and affirmative defense that the The parents filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)
option is void for lack of consideration (sic) and is unenforceable by reason of of Lipa City an ejectment suit against the children. Respondents alleged that
its impossibility of performance because the leased premises could not be they were the owners of two (2) parcels of land; that by way of a verbal lease
sold separately from the other portions of the land and building. agreement, respondents occupied these lots and used them as their
residence and the situs of their construction business.
Issue: Is the Right of First refusal granted to Mayfair void for impossible of Respondents denied the existence of any verbal lease agreement.
application since it involves indivisible property. They contended that the lot had been allotted to Ismael (son as advance
inheritance and the other lot was allegedly given to petitioners as payment
[10]
for construction materials used in the renovation of respondents house.
Held: NO. the Right of First refusal granted to Mayfair is valid even though it
The MTCC, RTC, and CA had the same finding that respondents
involves a indivisible property.
had been occupying the subject lots only by the tolerance of Vicente and
Rosario.
Petitioners assert the alleged impossibility of performance because the entire Consequently, in ascertaining the right of petitioners to be
property is indivisible property. It was petitioner Carmelo which fixed the reimbursed for the improvements they had introduced on respondents
limits of the property it was leasing out. Common sense and fairness dictate properties, the appellate court applied the Civil Codes provisions on
that instead of nullifying the agreement on that basis, the stipulation should lease. The CA modified the RTC Decision by declaring that Article 448 of the
be given effect by including the indivisible appurtenances in the sale of the Civil Code was inapplicable. The CA opined that under Article 1678 of the
dominant portion under the right of first refusal. Following the arguments of same Code, Ismael and Teresita had the right to be reimbursed for one half
petitioners and the participation of the owner in the attempt to strip Mayfair of of the value of the improvements made.
its rights, the right of first refusal should include not only the property
specified in the contracts of lease but also the appurtenant portions sold to ISSUE: Are the petitioners entitled to reimbursement for the useful expenses
Equatorial which are claimed by petitioners to be indivisible. Carmelo acted made?
in bad faith when it sold the entire property to Equatorial without informing
Mayfair, a clear violation of Mayfair's rights. RULING: Yes, they are entitled to reimbursement subject to the following
guidelines;
Accordingly, even as it recognizes the right of first refusal, this Court should The structures built by petitioners were useful improvements,
also order that Mayfair be authorized to exercise its right of first refusal under because they augmented the value or income of the bare lots. Thus, the
the contract to include the entirety of the indivisible property. The boundaries indemnity to be paid by respondents under Article 448 is provided for by
of the property sold should be the boundaries of the offer under the right of Article 546, which provides:
first refusal.
28
PROPERTY DIGESTS

Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; Issue: Is Feliciano’s claim of ownership batted by estoppel/laches?
but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been
reimbursed therefor. Ruling: No. The Court is not unmindful of the fact that respondents had built
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good their house on the subject lot and, despite knowledge thereof, petitioner did
faith with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the not lift a finger to prevent it. Article 453 of the Civil Code is applicable to their
possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of
case. It provides that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner
paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason
thereof. whenever the act was done with his knowledge and without opposition on his
Consequently, respondents have the right to appropriate -- as their part. Under the circumstances, respondents and petitioner are in mutual bad
own -- the building and other improvements on the subject lots, but only after faith and, as such, would entitle the former to the application of Article 448 of
(1) refunding the expenses of petitioners or (2) paying the increase in value the Civil Code governing builders in good faith.
acquired by the properties by reason thereof. They have the option to oblige
petitioners to pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably more Consequently, the petitioners are obliged to exercise either of the following
than that of the structures -- in which case, petitioners shall pay reasonable options: (1) to appropriate the improvements, including the house, built by
rent. the respondents on the subject lot by paying the indemnity required by law,
Feliciano vs. Zaldivar
or (2) sell the subject lot to the respondents. Petitioners cannot refuse to
G.R. No. 162593, September 26, 2006
exercise either option and compel respondents to remove their house from
CALLEJO, SR., J.
the land.In case petitioners choose to exercise the second option,
respondents are not obliged to purchase the subject lot if its value is
Facts: Feliciano alleged that she was the registered owner of a parcel of land considerably more than the improvements thereon and in which case,
covered by a TCT. The subject lot was originally leased from her by Pio respondents must pay rent to petitioners. If they are unable to agree on the
Dalman. She further alleged that she was going to mortgage the subject lot terms of the lease, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
to Ignacio Gil which however, did not push through. Thereafter, Aurelio filed
with the then CFI of Misamis Oriental a petition for partial cancellation of the
TCT in Feliciano’s name. It was allegedly made to appear therein that Aurelio
and his spouse Luz Zaldivar acquired the subject lot from Dalman who, in
turn, purchased it from Gil. The petition was granted and a TCT was issued
Nuguid vs. Court of Appeals
in Aurelio’s name. the spouses Zaldivar constructed their house on the
G.R. No. 151815. February 23, 2005.
subject lot. They alleged that they and their predecessors-in-interest had
QUISUMBING, J.
been occupying the said property openly, publicly, adversely and
continuously for over 41 years already. Feliciano filed against the spouses
Facts: Pedro P. Pecson owned a commercial lot located at 27 Kamias Road,
Aurelio and Luz Zaldivar a complaint for declaration of nullity of Transfer
Quezon City, on which he built a four-door two-storey apartment building. For
Certificate of Title and reconveyance of the subject property. The RTC
failure to pay realty taxes, the lot was sold at public auction by the City
rendered judgment in favor of Feliciano. On appeal, the CA reversed the
Treasurer of Quezon City to Mamerto Nepomuceno, who in turn sold it for
decision of the RTC and ruled in favor of the spouses Zaldivar.
P103,000 to the spouses Juan and Erlinda Nuguid.
29
PROPERTY DIGESTS

Pecson challenged the validity of the auction sale before the RTC of Quezon P100,000.00, the plaintiff now insists that there should be a rental to be paid
City. In its Decision, the RTC upheld the spouses’ title but declared that the by defendants.
four-door two-storey apartment building was not included in the auction sale.
This was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals and thereafter by the On December 1997, after paying the said P100,000 balance to Pedro
Supreme Court. By virtue of which, the Nuguid’s became the uncontested Pecson the spouses Nuguid prayed for the closure and termination of the
owners of the 256-square meter commercial lot. As a result, the Nuguid case, as well as the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the title of the
spouses moved for delivery of possession of the lot and the apartment property on the ground that Pedro Pecson’s claim for rentals was devoid of
building. factual and legal bases. After conducting a hearing, the lower court issued an
Order dated July 31, 1998, directing the spouses to pay the sum of
The trial court, relying upon Article 546 of the Civil Code, ruled that the P1,344,000 as reimbursement of the unrealized income of Pecson for the
Spouses Nuguid were to reimburse Pecson for his construction cost of period beginning November 22, 1993 up to December 1997. The sum was
P53,000, following which, the spouses Nuguid were entitled to immediate based on the computation of P28,000/month rentals of the four-door
issuance of a writ of possession over the lot and improvements. In the same apartment.
order the RTC also directed Pecson to pay the same amount of monthly
rentals to the Nuguids as paid by the tenants occupying the apartment units The Petitioners contend that their failure to pay the full price for the
or P21,000 per month from June 23, 1993, and allowed the offset of the improvements will, at most, entitle respondent to be restored to possession,
amount of P53,000 due from the Nuguids against the amount. but not to collect any rentals.
Aggrieved, Pecson then filed a special civil action for certiorari and On the other hand, the Respondents points out the Supreme Court ruled that
prohibition. The Supreme Court, in it’s ruling, pointed out that: (1) Article 448 “the petitioner [Pecson] not having been so paid, he was entitled to retain
of the Civil Code is not apposite to the case at bar where the owner of the ownership of the building and, necessarily, the income therefrom.” In other
land is the builder, sower, or planter who then later lost ownership of the land words, says respondent, accounting was necessary. For accordingly, he was
by sale, but may, however, be applied by analogy; (2) the current market entitled to rental income from the property.
value of the improvements should be made as the basis of reimbursement;
Issue: Are the petitioners liable to pay rent over and above the current
(3) Pecson was entitled to retain ownership of the building and, necessarily,
market value of the improvement when such was not provided for in the
the income therefrom; (4) the Court of Appeals erred not only in upholding
dispositive portion of the Supreme Court’s ruling?
the trial courtÊs determination of the indemnity, but also in ordering Pecson
to account for the rentals of the apartment building from June 23, 1993 to Ruling: Yes. The petitioners liable to pay rent to Pecson.
September 23, 1993.
Since petitioners opted to appropriate the improvement for themselves as
On November 21, 1996, the parties manifested that they have arrived at a early as June 1993, when they applied for a writ of execution despite
compromise agreement that the value of the said improvement/building is knowledge that the auction sale did not include the apartment building, they
P400,000.00 The Court notes that the plaintiff has already received could not benefit from the lot’s improvement, until they reimbursed the
P300,000.00. However, when defendant was ready to pay the balance of improver in full, based on the current market value of the property.
30
PROPERTY DIGESTS

Despite the Court’s recognition of Pecson’s right of ownership over the land. However the petitioners, being a builder in good faith, are entitled to the
apartment building, the petitioners still insisted on dispossessing Pecson by possess the residential lot until after they are paid the actual market value of
filing for a Writ of Possession to cover both the lot and the building. Clearly, their houses and granaries, unless the respondents prefer to sell said
this resulted in a violation of respondent’s right of retention. Worse, residential lot to petitioners, in which case petitioners shall pay the
petitioners took advantage of the situation to benefit from the highly valued, respondents the proportionate value of said residential lot. Provided, upon
income- yielding, four-unit apartment building by collecting rentals thereon, petitioner's failure to purchase the residential lot in question, said petitioners
before they paid for the cost of the apartment building. It was only four years shall remove their houses and granaries.
later that they finally paid its full value to the respondent.
When the judgment became final and executory, respondents moved for the
As pointed out by Pecson, the dispositive portion of our decision in G.R. No. issuance of a writ of execution praying for the removal of defendants’ building
115814 need not specifically include the income derived from the since they neither wanted to buy defendants’ building nor sell the lot on
improvement in order to entitle him, as a builder in good faith, to such which such building is erected. The court granted the motion and issued a
income. The right of retention, which entitles the builder in good faith to the writ of execution ordering the removal of the petitioners’ houses and
possession as well as the income derived therefrom, is already provided for granaries, hence this petition for certiorari assailing the validity of the
under Article 546 of the Civil Code. issuance of the writ of execution.
Given the circumstances of the instant case where the builder in good faith ISSUE: Can the owner of a lot on which the house of a builder in good faith
has been clearly denied his right of retention for almost half a decade, the was built ask for its removal without having to choose to either pay for the
increased award of rentals by the RTC was reasonable and equitable. The value of the building or sell the lot on which such building is erected?
petitioners had reaped all the benefits from the improvement introduced by
the respondent during said period, without paying any amount to the latter as RULING: No. The owner of a lot on which the house of a builder in good faint
reimbursement for his construction costs and expenses. They should is erected cannot ask for its removal without having to choose to either pay
account and pay for such benefits. for the value of the building or sell the lot on which such building is erected.
Therefore, Respondent is clearly entitled to payment by virtue of his right of The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another,
retention over the said improvement from the date of the determination of the is entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his
current market value until its full payment. building, under article 453. The owner of the land, upon the other hand, has
the option, under article 361, either to pay for the building or to sell his land to
IGNACIO v. HILARIO the owner of the building. But he cannot, as respondents here did, refuse
G.R. No. L-175, April 30, 1946 both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the
MORAN, CJ.: building to remove it from the land where it is erected. He is entitled to such
remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails
to pay for the same. But this is not the case before us.
FACTS: In a case concerning a parcel of land, the court ruled that Elias
Hilario and his wife (the respondents) are the owners of the subject parcel of
31
PROPERTY DIGESTS

ISSUE: Did the Court correctly ruled on the case when it made the choice of
39. Florencio Ignao v. Intermediate Appellate Court, Juan Ignao selling the subject lot to private respondents in accordance with Article 448?
substituted by his legal heirs and Isidro Ignao
G.R. No. 72876, January 18, 1991

HELD: No, the Court ruled that the appellate court erred in making such
Fernan, C.J., ruling. Such ruling contravened the explicit provisions of Article 448 to the
effect that "the owner of the land xxx shall have the right to appropriate xxx
or to oblige the one who built xxx to pay the price of the land xxx." The law is
clear and unambiguous when it confers the right of choice upon the
FACTS: Petitioner Florencio Ignao and private respondents are co-owners of
landowner and not upon the builder and the courts. When the co-ownership
a parcel of land. The aforesaid land was partitioned, alloting 133.5 square
is terminated by a partition and it appears that the house of an erstwhile co-
meters or 2/8 thereof to private respondents Juan and Isidro, and giving the
owner has encroached upon a portion pertaining to another co-owner which
remaining portion with a total area of 266.5 square meters to petitioner
was however made in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 should
Florencio. However, no actual partition was ever effected. Petitioner
apply to determine the respective rights of the parties. That being the case,
Florencio filed a complaint for recovery of possession of real property
the Court ruled that petitioner Florencio Ignao is directed within thirty (30)
because the two (2) houses built by private respondents exceeded the 133.5
days from entry of judgment to exercise his option to either appropriate as his
square meters previously alloted to them and it was found out that actually
encroached upon a portion of the land belonging to Florencio. own the portions of the houses of Juan and Isidro Ignao occupying his land
upon payment of indemnity in accordance with Articles 546 and 548 of the
Ruling of the Trial court - ruled that although pursuant to Article 448 of the Civil Code, or sell to private respondents the 101 square meters occupied by
Civil Code, the owner of the land should have the choice to either appropriate them at such price as may be agreed upon.
that part of the house standing on his land after payment of indemnity or
oblige the builders in good faith to pay the price of the land, based on the
40. FILIPINAS COLLEGES, INC. vs. MARIA GARCIA TIMBANG, ET AL
facts of the case, it would be useless and unsuitable for Florencio to exercise
the first option since this would render the entire houses of Juan and Isidro G.R. No. L-12812 , September 29, 1959
worthless. The trial court then applied the ruling in the similar case of Grana
vs. Court of Appeals, where the Supreme Court had advanced a more BARRERA, J.
"workable solution". Thus, it ordered Florencio to sell to Juan and Isidro
those portions of his land respectively occupied by the latter.
Contention of Petitioner: Art. 448 is not applicable since it contemplates a FACTS:

land owned by another while in the case it is a common property.
Filipinas Colleges, Inc. was declared to have acquired the rights of the
spouses Timbang in and to the lot involved in this case and in consideration
thereof, Filipinas Colleges, Inc., was ordered to pay the spouses Timbang
32
PROPERTY DIGESTS

the amounts which said spouses might have paid or had to pay to Hoskins owner of the improvement.
and Co. Inc., agent of the Urban Estates, Inc., original vendor of the lot.
Maria Gervacio Blas was declared to be a builder in good faith of the school
building constructed on the subject lot and entitled to be paid the amount for
Under the terms of articles 448 and 546, it is true that the owner of the land
the same. Filipinas Colleges, Inc. failed to deposit the value of the land. As a
has the right to choose between appropriating the building by reimbursing the
result, it lost all its rights to the land and the spouses Timbang became the
builder of the value thereof or compelling the builder in good faith to pay for
owners thereof. Spouses Timbang, then made known to the court their
his land. Even this second right cannot be exercised if the value of the land is
decision that they had chosen not of appropriate the building but to compel
considerably more than that of the building. In addition to the right of the
Filipinas Colleges, Inc. to pay. A motion for execution was issued by the
builder to be paid the value of his improvement, Article 546 gives him the
court. Appellee Blas in turn filed a motion for execution of her judgment
corollary right of retention of the property until he is indemnified by the owner
representing the unpaid portion of the price of the house sold to Filipinas
of the land. There is nothing in the language of these two article, 448 and
Colleges, Inc. Over the object of the Timbangs, the court grated the motion
546, which would justify the conclusion of appellants that, upon the failure of
and the corresponding writ of execution. Levy having been made on the
the builder to pay the value of the land, when such is demanded by the land-
house in virtue of the writs of execution, the Sheriff of Manila sold the
owner, the latter becomes automatically the owner of the improvement under
building in public auction in favor of the spouses Timbang, as the highest
Article 445.
bidders. Personal properties of Filipinas Colleges, Inc. were also auctioned in
favor of the spouses Timbang. Blas contended that because the builder in
good faith has failed to pay the price of the land after the owners thereof
exercised their option under Article 448 of the Civil Code, the builder lost his Appellee Blas is however entitled to the payment of the unpaid balance of the
right of retention provided in Article 546 and by operation of Article 445, the purchase price of the school building. Blas is actually a lien on the school
appellants as owners of the land automatically became the owners ipso building are concerned. The order of the lower court directing the Timbang
facto, the execution sale of the house in their favor was superfluous. spouses, as successful bidders, to pay in cash the amount of their bid is
therefore correct. It is likewise held that appellee Filipinas Colleges, Inc. is a
part owner of the land to the extent of the value of its personal properties
sold at public auction in favor of the Timbang.
ISSUE: Does the land-owner automatically becomes the owner of the
improvement upon failure of the builder to pay the value of the land, when
such is demanded?
41. BERNARDO VS BATACLAN
G.R. No. L-44606 November 28, 1938
HELD: LAUREL, J.:
NO. Upon failure of the builder to pay the value of the land, when such is
demanded by the land-owner, the latter does not automatically become the
33
PROPERTY DIGESTS

Facts : March 1, 1934 but on March 16 following the court below, motu
proprio modified its order of January 24,” in the sense that the plaintiff has a
By a contract of sale executed from Pastor Samonte and others ownership of prior right to the value of land not be sold at public auction, at the rate of
a parcel of land of about 90 hectares situated in sitio Balayunan, Silang, P200 per hectares and the remainder, if any there be any is served on the
Cavite was transferred to plaintiff. To secure possession of the land from the defendant in payment of the amount of P2,212 for the land clearing and
vendors the said plaintiff, on July 20, 1929, plaintiff instituted Civil Case No. improvements made thereto by the respondent cited ." On April 24, 1934, the
1935 in the Court of First Instance of Cavite. The trial court found for the court below, at the instance of the plaintiff and without objection on the part
plaintiff in a decision which was affirmed by this Supreme Court on appeal of the defendant, ordered the sale of the land in question at public auction.
1
(G.R. No. 33017). When plaintiff entered upon the premises, however, he The land was sold on April 5, 1935 to Toribio Teodoro, the highest bidder, for
found the defendant herein, Catalino Bataclan, who appears to have been P8,000. In the certificate of sale issued to said purchaser on the very day of
authorized by former owners, as far back as 1922, to clear the land and sale, it was stated that the period of redemption of the land sold was to
make improvements thereon. As Bataclan was not a party in Case No. 1935, expire on April 5, 1936. Upon petition of Toribio Teodoro the court below
plaintiff, on June 11, 1931, instituted against him, in the Court of First ordered the provincial sheriff to issue another certificate not qualified by any
Instance of Cavite, Civil Case No. 2428. In this case, plaintiff was declared equity of redemption. This was complied with by the sheriff on July 30, 1935.
owner but the defendant was held to be a possessor in good faith, entitled to On September 18, 1935, Teodoro moved that he be placed in possession of
reimbursement in the total sum of P1,642, for work done and improvements the land purchased by him. The motion was granted by order of September
made. 26, 1935, the dispositive part of which is as follows:
Both parties appealed. The decision appealed from was modified by allowing Therefore, it is directed to the Sheriff Provincial Cavite put Toribio Teodoro in
the defendant to recover compensation amounting to P2,212 and by possession of the land bought by public auction and for which it was issued
reducing the price at which the plaintiff could require the defendant to certificate of final sale, reserving the defendant his right to bring an ordinary
purchase the land in question from P300 to P200 per hectare. Plaintiff was action to claim the plaintiff the amount of P2,212 to which it is entitled for
given by this court 30 days from the date when the decision became final cleanliness and land improvements and whose sum, in justice and equity,
within which to exercise his option, either to sell the land to the defendant or should be discounted and deducted from the sum of P8,000 which has
to buy the improvements from him. On January 9, 1934, the plaintiff already received the plaintiff.
manifested to the lower court his desire "to require the defendant to pay him
the value of the land at the rate of P200 per hectare or a total price of
P18,000 for the whole tract of land." The defendant informed the lower court
that he was unable to pay the land and, on January 24, 1934, an order was Issue: Was the sale by public auction of the property valid ?
issued giving the plaintiff 30 days within which to pay the defendant the sum
of P2,212 stating that, in the event of failure to make such payment, the land
would be ordered sold at public auction On February 21, 1934, plaintiff Held: Yes. The Civil Code confirms certain time-honored principles of the law
moved to reconsider the foregoing order so that he would have preference of property. One of these is the principle of accession whereby the owner of
over the defendant in the order of payment. The motion was denied on property acquires not only that which it produces but that which is united to it
34
PROPERTY DIGESTS

either naturally or artificially. (Art. 353.) Whatever is built, planted or sown on reason to justify a rapture of the situation thus created between them, the
the land of another, and the improvements or repairs made thereon, belong defendant-appellant not being entitled, after all, to recover from the plaintiff
to the owner of the land (art. 358). Where, however, the planter, builder, or the sum of P2,212.
sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners
and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without The judgment of the lower court is accordingly modified by eliminating
causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of therefrom the reservation made in favor of the defendant-appellant to recover
creating what Manresa calls a state of "forced coownership" (vol. 3, 4th ed., from the plaintiff the sum of P2,212.
p. 213), the law has provided a just and equitable solution by giving the
owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of 42. MANOTOK REALTY, INC. V. TECSON
the proper indemnity or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and
the sower to pay the proper rent (art. 361). It is the owner of the land who is GR NO. L-47475 August 19, 1988
allowed to exercise the option because his right is older and because, by the
principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
(3 Manresa, 4th ed., p. 213). In the case before us, the plaintiff, as owner of
the land, chose to require the defendant, as owner of the improvements, to
pay for the land.
FACTS:
The defendant states that he is a possessor in good faith and that the
amount of P2,212 to which he is entitled has not yet been paid to him.
Therefore, he says, he has a right to retain the land in accordance with the In a complaint filed by MANOTOK REALTY, INC for recovery of possession
provisions of article 453 of the Civil Code. We do not doubt the validity of the of land against Nilo
premises .We find, however, that the defendant has lost his right of retention.
In obedience to the decision of this court in G.R. No. 37319, the plaintiff Madlangawa, CFI ruled the latter as a builder in good faith. MANOTOK filed
expressed his desire to require the defendant to pay for the value of the land. with the trial court a motion for approval of the exercise of option to
The said defendant could have become owner of both land and appropriate the improvements introduced by
improvements and continued in possession thereof. But he said he could not
pay and the land was sold at public auction to Toribio Teodoro. The law, as Madlangawa on the property under Article 448 of the Civil Code, and
we have already said, requires no more than that the owner of the land thereafter, for satisfaction of judgment by ordering respondents to deliver
should choose between indemnifying the owner of the improvements or possession of the property in question. Judge
requiring the latter to pay for the land. When he failed to pay for the land, the
Tecson dismissed the case, compelling MANOTOK to file for mandamus
defendant herein lost his right of retention.
asserting such entitlement as a matter of right to the execution. Nilo
The sale at public auction having been asked by the plaintiff himself and the Madlangawa filed his comment on the petition alleging that the same has
purchase price of P8,000 received by him from Toribio Teodoro, we find no already been moot and academic for two reasons: 1) fire gutted not only the
house but the majority of the houses in the estate and 2) as a result of the
35
PROPERTY DIGESTS

fire, then First Lady Marcos has placed the area under her Zonal expressly recognizing the right of petitioner over one-half of the undivided
Improvement Project. portion of the lot. Thereafter, petitioner and Mabugat partitioned the property
into two portions, with petitioner taking the western part. Petitioner took
Furthermore, President Marcos has issued a decree for the expropriation of possession of his portion and planted thereon ipil-ipil trees, coconut trees
certain estates in Metro Manila including the property in question. and other fruit-bearing trees. In 1976, petitioner began construction of a
structure with a dimension of 22-by-18 feet on his lot. His employment took
him to North Cotabato, and he left the unfinished structure to the case of his
uncle.
ISSUE/S: Should Judge Tecson issue the writ of execution for the delivery of Sometime in October 1977, petitioner allowed respondent Felomino Ayco, to
transfer his hut to petitioner's lot. About six years later, petitioner demanded
possession by the builder in good faith of the subject land to the owner after
that Ayco vacate the premises, but such demand proved futile. Hence, on
a fire gutted the improvements, extinguishing the latter’s right of retention. August 23, 1983, petitioner filed an action for unlawful detainer with damages
against respondent Ayco before the MTC. On June 26, 1983, respondent
Ebenecer Purisima entered the land and constructed a house thereon. Four
days later, petitioner filed against respondent Purisima a complaint for
HELD: Yes. Where the improvements have been destroyed by a fortuitous forcible entry before the same court. Respondent Purisima averred that the
event without the fault of the landowner, the basis of the builder in good lot was a portion of the land subject of his application for miscellaneous sales
faith’s right to retain the premises is extinguished. patent with the Bureau of Lands. Purisima contended that his father, a
geodetic engineer, had submitted a survey plan over the lot subject of the
There is no other recourse for him but to vacate the premises and deliver the said patent application, and was approved by the Director of Lands in 1960.
same to the owner. Regardless of the fire, the option given by law under Respondent Ayco did not present any evidence but merely anchored his right
Article 448 belongs to the owner of the property. The right given to the to possess the property on the evidence of Purisima.
The trial court ruled that respondent Purisima built his house "almost on the
builder in good faith is the right of reimbursement for the improvements, the
spot where Somodio's unfinished house" stood "thru stealth and strategy,"
builder cannot compel the owner of the land to sell such land to the former. not knowing that the house was built on the lot said respondent was claiming.
It further held that petitioner was the actual possessor of the subject land.
Therefore, the judge cannot deny the issuance of the writ of The court did not believe respondent Ayco's claim that the administratrix of
execution. the estate of respondent Purisima's father authorized him to build his hut on
the said lot in 1976. The court ordered private respondents to remove their
respective houses, to deliver the land to petitioner. The decision of the MTC
43. Nicanor Somodio v. Court of Appeals, Ebenecer Purisima, and was affirmed by the RTC, but both courts were reversed by the Court of
Felomino Ayco Appeals ruling that petitioner had not "clearly and conclusively established
G.R. No. 82680; August 15, 1994 physical, prior possession over the said lot. Hence, this petition.
QUIASON, J.:
Issue: Was the petitioner able to establish prior physical possession of the
Facts: Jose Ortigas executed an instrument designated as a Transfer of subject property, entitling him to be restored in its possession in an action for
Rights, conveying to Wilfredo Mabugat, the possession of a certain forcible entry and unlawful detainer?
residential lot in General Santos City. Petitioner Nicanor Somodio contributed
one-half of the purchase price. Mabugat executed an Affidavit of Trust Held:
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

Yes, the petitioner was able to establish prior physical possession of the priority in time should be the pivotal cog in resolving the issue of possession.
subject property, and must be restored in his possession of the same. Petitioner's prior possession over the property is not synonymous with his
In ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to the right of ownership over the same. As earlier stated, resolution of the issue of
physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any possession is far from the resolution of the issue of ownership. Forcible entry
claim of ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants. Anyone of them who is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title to an
can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession even from estate.
the owner himself. This rule holds true regardless of the character of a Wherefore, petitioner must be restored in his possession of the subject
party's possession, provided, that he has in his favor priority of time which property, and the actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer must be
entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person both granted in his favor.
having a better right by either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
Article 531 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that “possession is 44. Heirs of Ramon Durano, Sr., Ramon Durano III and Elizabeth
acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by Hotchkiss Durano v. Spouses Angeles Sepulveda Uy and Emigdio Bing
the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and Sing Uy et al.
legal formalities established for acquiring such right.”
Upon a review of the records, the Court is convinced that petitioner indeed G.R. No. 136456, October 24, 2000
enjoyed priority of possession over the subject lot, notwithstanding
respondent Purisima's claim to the contrary. Petitioner took possession of the Gonzaga-Reyes, J.
property sometime in 1974 when he planted the property to coconut trees,
ipil- ipil trees and fruit trees. In 1976, he started the construction of a building
on the property. It is immaterial that the building was unfinished and that he
left for Kidapawan for employment reasons and visited the property only Facts: In August 1970, petitioners filed an action for damages against the
intermittently. Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man
respondents for officiating a “hate campaign” against them over petitioners’
has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said
that he is in possession. It is sufficient that petitioner was able to subject the alleged “invasion” of respondents’ alleged properties in Danao City, Cebu.
property to the action of his will. Although petitioner started introducing Respondents received notices signed by the late Ramon Durano, Sr.,
improvements on the land only in 1981, he still enjoyed priority of possession informing them that the lands which they were tilling and residing in, formerly
because respondent Purisima entered the premises only in 1983. Neither is owned by the Cebu Portland Cement Company (Cepoc), had been
the fact that respondent Purisima's father surveyed the property of help to his purchased by Durano & Co., Inc. Men, claiming as employees of Durano &
cause. As the Court of Appeals found, respondent Purisima's father surveyed
Co., proceeded to bulldoze the lands occupied by various respondents,
the land for the Small Farmers Fishpond Association, Inc., not for himself.
Although respondent Purisima now claims that the subject lot was in destroying in their wake the plantings and improvements made by the
payment of his fee for the services of his father and that he caused the respondents therein. This took place before many of the respondents
construction of a perimeter wall in the area, these facts do not mean that received notices to vacate. In September 1970, Durano & Co. sold the
respondent Purisima himself had prior possession. He did not present any disputed property to petitioner Ramon Durano III, who procured the
proof that his father had authorized him to enter the land as his successor-in- registration of these lands in his name under TCT No. T-103 and TCT No. T-
interest. Neither did he present proof that between 1958, when his father 104.
allegedly took possession of the land, and 1983, when said respondent
himself entered the land, his father ever exercised whatever right of
possession he should have over the property. Under these circumstances,
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

In their counterclaim, respondents alleged that petitioners’ acts deprived Ordinary acquisitive prescription, in the case of immovable property, requires
most of them of their independent source of income and made destitutes of possession of the thing in good faith and with just title, for a period of ten
some of them. Petitioners had done serious violence to respondents’ spirit, years. A possessor is deemed to be “in good faith” when he is not aware of
as citizens and human beings, to the extent that one of them had been any flaw in his title or mode of acquisition of the property. On the other hand,
widowed by the emotional shock that the damage and dispossession has there is “just title” when the adverse claimant came into possession of the
caused. Respondents demanded damages for the cost of the improvements property through one of the modes for acquiring ownership recognized by
they made on the land, together with the damage arising from the law, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right. The
dispossession itself. claimant by prescription may compute the ten-year period by tacking his
possession to that of his grantor or predecessor-in-interest. The properties
In March 1990, the trial court upheld the respondents’ counterclaim and were conveyed to respondents by purchase or inheritance, and in each case
ordered the return of the properties to Repaso, Tito and Gonzales for their the respondents were in actual, continuous, open and adverse possession of
lands were not part of the purchased land from Cepoc. Thus, bulldozing of the properties. They exercised rights of ownership over the lands, including
these lands by petitioners were totally unjustified. The court ordered not only the regular payment of taxes and introduction of plantings and
the total reimbursement of useful and necessary expenses on the properties improvements.
but also the return of these properties to them. As to other respondents, the
court found their possession of the properties to be in the concept of owner While the Supreme Court cannot sustain the Court of Appeals’ finding of
and adjudged them to be builders in good faith. On appeal, the Court of fraud because of this jurisdictional impediment, the non-production of the
Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision and ordered the return of the alleged reconstituted titles of Cepoc despite demand therefor gives rise to a
property to all the respondents, the return of the properties covered by TCT presumption (unrebutted by petitioners) that such evidence, if produced,
Nos. T-103 and T-104. It ruled that the titles procured in the name of Ramon would be adverse to petitioners. The unregistrability of the deed of sale is
Durano III were attended by fraud. It declared that petitioners were in bad also a serious defect that should affect the validity of the certificates of title.
faith. Notarization of the deed of sale is essential to its registrability.
The purchase of the property by petitioner Ramon Durano III from Durano &
Co. could not be said to have been in good faith. Petitioners were builders in
Issue: Were Durano and company builders in bad faith? bad faith. The Civil Code provides:
Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the

land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without
Ruling: Yes, they were in bad faith. The records clearly bear out respondents’
right of indemnity.
prior and actual possession, more exactly, the records indicate that
respondents’ possession has ripened into ownership by acquisitive Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been
prescription. built, planted or sown in bad faith may demand the
demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be
removed, in order to replace things in their former condition
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or
he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the ISSUE: Can a co-owner who builds on land owned in common be
land, and the sower the proper rent. considered a builder in good faith?
Art. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the RULING: Yes. Article 448 should apply in a case where the builder is a co-
owner of the property.
landowner is entitled to damages from the builder, planter or
sower. The Supreme Court ruled that when a co-ownership is terminated by the
partition and it appears that the house of respondents overlaps or occupies a
The owner of the land, thus, has three alternative rights: (1) to appropriate portion of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to petitioners which the
what has been built without any obligation to pay indemnity therefor, or (2) to former built in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil
demand that the builder remove what he had built, or (3) to compel the Code should apply. Hence, petitioners have the right to appropriate said
builder to pay the value of the land. In any case, the landowner is entitled to portion of the house of respondents upon payment of indemnity to
damages under Article 451. The right of the owner of the land to recover defendants as provided for in Article 546 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, the
damages from a builder in bad faith is clearly provided for in Article 451 of petitioners may oblige the respondents to pay the price of the land occupied
by their house. However, if the price asked for is considerably much more
the Civil Code. Although said Article 451 does not elaborate on the basis for
than the value of the portion of the house of respondents built thereon, then
damages, the Court perceives that it should reasonably correspond with the the latter cannot be obliged to buy the land. The respondents shall then pay
value of the properties lost or destroyed as a result of the occupation in bad the reasonable rent to the petitioners upon such terms and conditions that
faith, as well as the fruits (natural, industrial or civil) from those properties they may agree. In case of disagreement, the trial court shall fix the terms
that the owner of the land reasonably expected to obtain. thereof. Lastly, the respondents may also demolish or remove the said
portion of their house, at their own expense, if they so decide.
Hence, the petition is denied.
46. PACIFIC FARMS, INC., vs. ESGUERRA, ET AL.
45. SPOUSES DEL CAMPO vs. ABESIA G.R. No. L-21783 November 29, 1969
G.R No. L-49219; April 15, 1988
GANCAYCO, J. CASTRO, J.:
FACTS: Petitioners and Respondents are co-owners of a parcel of land with

an area of 45 square meters at 1/3 share each. At the time that the land is
being partitioned, the court-appointed commissioner recommended that the FACTS:
property be divided into two lots: 1161-A with an area of 30 square meters
and 1161-B with an area of 15 square meters. The house of respondents Carried Lumber Company sold and delivered lumber and construction
however encroached upon a 5 square meter portion of Lot 1161-A of materials to Insular Farms, Inc., which the latter used in the construction of
petitioners. The trial court ruled that respondents should remove and six buildings. Insular Farms, Inc. failed to pay Carried Lumber Company,
demolish the part of their house that encroached upon the other at their which prompted the latter to institute an action to recover the said unpaid
expense since Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot apply.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

balance from the Insular Farms, Inc. The trial court rendered judgment owner of the said materials with the obligation however of praying for their
sustaining the Company's claim. A writ of execution was issued. Pacific value. The owner of the materials, on the other hand, is entitled to remove
Farms, Inc. filed a third-party claim asserting ownership over the levied them, provided no substantial injury is caused to the landowner. Otherwise,
he has the right to reimbursement for the value of his materials.
buildings, which it had acquired from the Insular Farms, Inc. by virtue of a
Although it does not appear from the records of this case that the land upon
deed of absolute sale. Asserting absolute and exclusive ownership of the which the six buildings were built is owned by the appellee, nevertheless,
buildings in question, the Pacific Farms, Inc. filed a complaint Carried that the appellee claims that it owns the six buildings constructed out of the
Lumber Company and the sheriff with the court a quo, praying that judgment lumber and construction materials furnished by the appellant is indubitable.
be rendered, (a) declaring null and void the levy and judicial sale of the six Therefore, applying article 447 by analogy, we perforce consider the
buildings, and (b) adjudging the defendants jointly and severally liable to the buildings as the principal and the lumber and construction materials that went
plaintiff. into their construction as the accessory. Thus the appellee, if it does own the
six buildings, must bear the obligation to pay for the value of the said
materials; the appellant — which apparently has no desire to remove the
materials, and, even if it were minded to do so, cannot remove them without
ISSUE: Is Pacific Farms now the owner of the construction materials through necessarily damaging the buildings — has the corresponding right to recover
the value of the unpaid lumber and construction materials.
the process of accession therefore making it liable to Carried Lumber for the
unpaid materials? 47. Pedro Pecson vs. CA, Spouses Nuguid
G.R. No. 115814 May 26, 1995
Davide Jr., J.
HELD: FACTS: Pedro Pecson was the owner of a commercial lot on which he built a
4-door-2-storey apartment building. He failed to pay realty taxes so the lot
Yes, Pacific Farms is now the owner of the materials and is therefore liable to was sold at public auction to Mamerto Nepomuceno who later on sold it to
Carried Lumber, Article 447 of the Civil Code provides: the Sps. Nuguid.
“The owner of the land, who makes thereon personally or through
another, plantings, constructions or works with the materials of Pecson challenged the validity of the auction before the RTC. On the other
another, shall pay their value; and, if he acted in bad faith, he shall hand, Spouses Nuguid claimed that the auction sale included the apartment
also be obliged to the reparation of damages. The owner of the building. The RTC dismissed the complaint of Pecson but ruled that the
materials shall have the right to remove them only in case he can do apartment bldg was not included in the sale. On appeal, the CA appealed in
so without injury to the work constructed, or without the plantings, toto the decision of the RTC.
constructions or works being destroyed. However, if the landowner
acted in bad faith, the owner of the materials may remove them in After an entry of judgment was made, the Sps. Nuguid filed with the trial
any event with a right to be indemnified for damages.” court a motion for delivery of possession of the lot and the apartment building
The above-quoted legal provision contemplates a principal and an citing Art. 546 of the Civil Code. The RTC issued an order requiring the
accessory, the land being considered the principal, and the plantings, movant to reimburse plaintiff the construction cost of P53,000.00 and after
constructions or works, the accessory. The owner of the land who in good such payment has been made, Spouses Nuguid shall be entitled to
faith — whether personally or through another — makes constructions or immediate issuance of a writ of possession over the Lot and improvements
works thereon, using materials belonging to somebody else, becomes the thereon. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part the order of the trial court
40
PROPERTY DIGESTS

citing Article 448 of the Civil Code. It stated that as the private respondent such a way as neither one nor the other may enrich himself of that which
opted to appropriate the improvement introduced by petitioner on the subject does not belong to him. Guided by this precept, it is therefore the current
lot, giving rise to the right of petitioner to be reimbursed of the cost of market value of the improvements which should be made the basis of
constructing said apartment building, in accordance with Article 546 of the reimbursement.
Civil Code, and of the right to retain the improvements until he is reimbursed
of the cost of the improvements, because, basically, the right to retain the
improvement while the corresponding indemnity is not paid implies the 48. TECNOGAS PHILIPPINES MANUFACTURING CORPORATION
tenancy or possession in fact of the land on which they are built. v. COURT OF APPEALS
The parties agree that the petitioner was a builder in good faith of the G.R. No. 108894. February 10, 1997
apartment building on the theory that he constructed it at the time when he
was still the owner of the lot, and that the key issue in this case is the Panganiban, J.
application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Does Article 448 apply to a case where the owner of the land is the
builder, sower, or planter who then later loses ownership of the land by sale FACTS: Petitioner Tecnogas Philippines Manufacturing Corporation
or donation? (Tecnogas) purchased a parcel of land from Pariz Industries, Inc. (Pariz
Industries) in 1970, together with all the buildings and improvements
HELD: YES. By Analogy
including the wall existing thereon. Portions of the buildings and wall bought
In strict point of law, Article 448 is not apposite to the case at bar. by Tecnogas together with the land from Pariz Industries are occupying a
Nevertheless, we believe that the provision therein on indemnity may be portion of private respondent’s adjoining land. Upon learning of the
applied by analogy considering that the primary intent of Article 448 is to encroachment or occupation by its buildings and wall of a portion of private
avoid a state of forced co-ownership and that the parties, including the two respondent’s land, Tecnogas offered to buy from private respondent that
courts below, in the main agree that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code
particular portion of the latter’s land occupied by portions of its buildings and
are applicable and indemnity for the improvements may be paid although
they differ as to the basis of the indemnity. wall with an area of 770 square meters, more or less, but private respondent
refused the offer.
Article 546 does not specifically state how the value of the useful
improvements should be determined. The respondent court and the private
respondents espouse the belief that the cost of construction of the apartment
building in 1965, and not its current market value, is sufficient reimbursement Thereafter, the parties entered into a private agreement, wherein
for necessary and useful improvements made by the petitioner. This position Tecnogas agreed to demolish the wall at the back portion of its land thus
is, however, not in consonance with previous rulings of this Court in similar giving to private respondent possession of a portion of his land previously
cases. The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer justice enclosed by petitioner’s wall. Private respondent later filed a complaint
between the parties involved. In this regard, this Court had long ago stated against Tecnogas regarding the encroachment or occupation by petitioner’s
in Rivera vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila that the said provision
buildings and walls of a portion of its land but said complaint did not prosper.
was formulated in trying to adjust the rights of the owner and possessor in
good faith of a piece of land, to administer complete justice to both of them in Private respondent dug or caused to be dug a canal along petitioner’s wall, a
41
PROPERTY DIGESTS

portion of which collapsed in June 1980, and led to the filing by petitioner of wrongfully. The good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are
the supplemental complaint in the above-entitled case and a separate made known to the possessor, by extraneous evidence or by suit for
criminal complaint for malicious mischief against private respondent and his recovery of the property by the true owner.
wife which ultimately resulted into the conviction in court of private
respondent’s wife for the crime of malicious mischief. During the trial of the (2) No. In view of the good faith of both petitioner and private respondent,
case, petitioner filed in court a formal proposal for settlement of the case but their rights and obligations are to be governed by Art. 448. The private
said proposal, however, was ignored by private respondent.
respondents insistence on the removal of the encroaching structures as the
proper remedy, is thus legally flawed. This is not one of the remedies
bestowed upon him by law. It would be available only if and when he
The trial court ruled in favor of Tecnogas ordering the private chooses to compel the petitioner to buy the land at a reasonable price but the
respondent to sell to petitioner that portion of land owned by him and latter fails to pay such price. This has not taken place. Hence, his options are
occupied by portions of petitioner’s buildings and wall. Upon appeal, the limited to: (1) appropriating the encroaching portion of petitioners building
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, hence this recourse. after payment of proper indemnity, or (2) obliging the latter to buy the lot
occupied by the structure. He cannot exercise a remedy of his own liking.
ISSUES:
(1) Can Tecnogas be considered in good faith considering that it is a
successor-in-interest of Pariz Industries?
49. GEMINIANO, ET. AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS
(2) Can the private respondent insist, the removal of the encroaching
structures as the proper remedy?
G.R. No. 120303, 24 July 1996
HELD:
DAVIDE, JR. J.:
(1) Yes. Article 527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no
proof exists to show that the encroachment over a narrow, needle-shaped
portion of private respondents land was done in bad faith by the builder of the
FACTS:
encroaching structures, the latter should be presumed to have built them in
good faith. It is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the
Paulina Amado vda. de Geminiano, Petitioners’ mother, originally owned a
same character in which it was acquired, until the contrary is proved. Good
faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his, lot in Dagupan with an area of 314 square meters. On a 12-square-meter
and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. Hence, such good faith, by portion of that lot stood the Petitioners' unfinished bungalow, which the
law, passed on to Pariz’s successor, petitioner in this case. Further, (w)here Petitioners sold in November 1978 to the private respondents for the sum of
one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of P6,000.00, with an alleged promise to sell to the latter that portion of the lot
the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence occupied by the house. Subsequently, the petitioners' mother executed a
against the former. And possession acquired in good faith does not lose this
contract of lease over a 126 square-meter portion of the lot, including that
character except in case and from the moment facts exist which show that
the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or portion on which the house stood, in favor of the private respondents for
42
PROPERTY DIGESTS

P40.00 per month for a period of seven years commencing on 15 November
1978. Private respondents, Dominador Nicolas and Mary A. Nicolas, then
introduced additional improvements and registered the house in their names. It does not apply where one's only interest is that of a lessee under a rental
After the expiration of the lease in November 1985, however, the Petitioners' contract; otherwise, it would always be in the power of the tenant to
mother refused to accept the monthly rentals. It turned out that the lot in "improve" his landlord out of his property. And even if the petitioners indeed
question was the subject of a suit, which resulted in its acquisition by one promised to sell, it would not make the private respondents possessors or
Maria Lee in 1972. In 1982, Lee sold the lot to Lily Salcedo, who in turn sold builders in good faith so as to be covered by the provisions of Article 448 of
it in 1984 to the spouses Agustin and Ester Dionisio. RTC ruled that since the the Civil Code.
Private respondents were assured by the Petitioners that the lot they leased
would eventually be sold to them, they could be considered builders in good
faith, and as such, were entitled to reimbursement of the value of the house The latter cannot raise the mere expectancy of ownership of the
and improvements with the right of retention until reimbursement had been aforementioned lot because the alleged promise to sell was not fulfilled nor
made. its existence even proven. The first thing that the private respondents should
have done was to reduce the alleged promise into writing, because under
Article 1403 of the Civil Code, an agreement for the sale of real property or
ISSUE: an interest therein is unenforceable, unless some note or memorandum
thereof be produced. Not having taken any steps in order that the alleged
Are the private respondents builders in good faith? promise to sell may be enforced, the private respondents cannot bank on
that promise and profess any claim nor color of title over the lot in question.
RULING:
50. Pleasantville Development Corp. vs Court of Appeals
NO. Being mere lessees, the private respondents knew that their occupation
of the premises would continue only for the life of the lease. Plainly, they G.R. No. 79688. February 1, 1996
cannot be considered as possessors nor builders in good faith.
Panganiban, J.
In a plethora of cases, this Court has held that Article 448 of the Civil Code,
in relation to Article 546 of the same Code, which allows full reimbursement Facts: Edith Robillo purchased from petitioner a parcel of land designated as
of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is Lot 9, Phase II and located at, Pleasantville Subdivision. Jardinico bought the
made, appliesonly to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land rights to the lot from Robillo and secured a Transfer Certificate of Title.
with the belief that he is the owner thereof. Subsequently, he discovered that improvements had been introduced on Lot
9 by respondent Wilson Kee, who had taken possession thereof.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

It appears that Kee bought on installment Lot 8 of the same subdivision from At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot was
C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. (CTTEI), the exclusive real estate agent of what he bought from petitioner. He was not aware that the lot delivered to
petitioner. Unfortunately, the parcel of land pointed to Kee was Lot 9. him was not Lot 8. Thus, Kee’s in good faith. Petitioner failed to prove
Thereafter, Kee proceeded to construct his residence, a store, an auto repair otherwise.
shop and other improvements on the lot.
After a confrontation, the parties tried to reach an amicable settlement, but 51. DAMIAN IGNACIO et. al. v. ELIAS HILARIO
failed.
GR No. L-175 April 30, 1946
When Kee refused to vacate Lot 9, Jardinico filed with the MTCC a complaint
Moran, C.J,
for ejectment with damages against Kee. Kee, in turn, filed a third-party
complaint against petitioner and CTTEI.
Facts: Spouses Elias Hilario and Dionisia Dres were adjudged as the legal
owners over a parcel of land. As for the ownership of the houses and
The MTCC held that the erroneous delivery of Lot 9 to Kee was attributable
to CTTEI. The RTC held that Kee was a builder in bad faith. granaries built on the residential portion of the said land, it was adjudged that
Damian, Francisco and Luis, all surnamed Ignacio were owners thereof.
They were granted the rights of a possessor in good faith as provided for in a
dispositive portion of that decision “[t]hat the defendants are entitled to hold
ISSUE: Was Kee a builder in good faith? the possession of the residential lot until after they are paid the actual market
value of their houses and granaries erected thereon, unless the plaintiffs
prefer to sell them said residential lot, in which case defendants shall pay the
plaintiffs the proportionate value of said residential lot taking as a basis the
HELD: Yes. Kee was a builder in good faith.
price paid for the whole land.” The spouses however, moved for an order of
execution assailing that since they chose neither to pay for the buildings nor
agreed to sell the lot where these structures were built, the Ignacios should
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on be ordered to remove the same at their own expense and to restore the
is his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title.9 And as good faith is spouses in the possession of said lot.
presumed, petitioner has the burden of proving bad faith on the part of Kee.
Issue:
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

Can the owner of a land refuse to choose between reimbursing the petitioners lot with legal interest. Both proposals were, however, rejected by
possessor in good faith for the value of the building built in good faith or opt petitioners and directed Castelltort to stop the construction of and demolish
to offer the land for sale? his house and any other structure he may have built thereon, and desist from
entering the lot.
Ruling:
Petitioners subsequently filed on September 1, 1995 a complaint for recovery
No. The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by of possession and damages with prayer for the issuance of a restraining
another, is entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the
order and preliminary injunction against spouses-respondents Miguel and
value of his building, under article 453. The owner of the land, upon the other
hand, has the option, under article 361, either to pay for the building or to sell Judith Castelltort. The Castelltorts claimed in their Answer with
his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot, as respondents here did, Counterclaim that they were builders in good faith. RTC ruled in favor of the
refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner petitioners rendering immaterial the good faith of the respondent. CA
of the building to remove it from the land where it is. reversed RTC decision.
52. ROSALES v. CASTELLTORT

GR No. 157044; October 5, 2005
Carpio Morales, J. ISSUE:
FACTS: Spouses-petitioners Rodolfo V. Rosales and Lily Rosqueta-Rosales

Was Castelltort a builder in good faith.
(petitioners) are the registered owners of a parcel of land designated as Lot
17 situated in Los Baos, Laguna. On August 16, 1995, petitioners discovered
that a house was being constructed on their lot, without their knowledge and
consent, by respondent Miguel Castelltort (Castelltort). It turned out that HELD:
respondents Castelltort and his wife Judith had purchased a lot, Lot 16 of the
same Subdivision Plan, from respondent Lina Lopez-Villegas (Lina) but that YES. A builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that the land he
after a survey thereof by geodetic engineer Augusto Rivera, he pointed to Lot is building on is his, or that by some title one has the right to build thereon,
17 as the Lot 16 the Castelltorts purchased. and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title.
Article 527 of the Civil Code provides that good faith is always presumed,
and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the
Negotiations for the settlement of the case thus began, with Villegas offering burden of proof.
a larger lot near petitioners lot in the same subdivision as a replacement
thereof.[6] In the alternative, Villegas proposed to pay the purchase price of In the case at bar, Lot 16 was sold by Lina, through her attorney-in-fact
Villegas, to Castelltort and a certain Elizabeth Cruz for a consideration
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

of P500,000.00. While prior to the sale, what Villegas showed Castelltort as Under the foregoing provision, the landowner can choose between
evidence of his mother Linas ownership of the property was only a photocopy appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the
of her title TCT No. (T-42171) T-18550 he explaining that the owners builder to pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably more than
duplicate of the title was lost and that judicial reconstitution thereof was that of the structures, in which case the builder in good faith shall pay
ongoing, Castelltort acted in the manner of a prudent man and went to the reasonable rent. If the parties cannot come to terms over the conditions of
Registry of Deeds of Laguna to procure a certified true copy of the TCT. The the lease, the court must fix the terms thereof.
certified true copy bore no annotation indicating any prior adverse claim on
Lot 16.
The records indicate that at the time Castelltort began constructing his house The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the
on petitioners lot, he believed that it was the Lot 16 he bought and delivered principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not
to him by Villegas. The confusion in the identification of Lot 16 was the other way around. Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant
eventually traced to the error committed by geodetic engineer Augusto to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. The landowner cannot refuse to exercise
Riveras employees in placing stone monuments on petitioners property, either option and compel instead the owner of the building to remove it from
instead of on Lot 16, the lot sold to Castelltort, based on the survey made by the land.
the engineer in 1992.
The Decision dated October 2, 2002 and Resolution dated February 6, 2003
Both parties having acted in good faith at least until August 21, 1995, the of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION such that the
applicable provision in this case is Article 448 of the Civil Code which reads: trial court shall include for determination the increase in value (plus value)
which petitioners 315 square meter lot may have acquired by reason of the
existence of that portion of the house built before respondents Miguel and
Judith Castelltort were notified of petitioners rightful claim on said lot, and the
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, current fair market value of said portion.
sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as
his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the
indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one
who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who 53. Eulogio Agustin, heirs of Baldomero Langcay, Arturo Balisi & Juan
sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be Langcay vs Intermediate Appellate Court, Maria Melad, Timoteo Melad,
obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of Pablo Binayug & Geronima Ubina
the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if
G.R. Nos. L-66075-76 July 5, 1990
the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or
trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.
of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the
terms thereof.
46
PROPERTY DIGESTS

FACTS:
Private respondents, Maria Melad and Pablo Binuyag are among RULING:
those who are occupying the western bank of the Cagayan River while
petitioner Eulogio Agustin occupied a land on the eastern bank, From 1919 1. YES. Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are
to 1968, eroding the lands on the eastern bank including Agustin’s lot, the present: (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted
Cagayan River moved gradually eastward, depositing silt on the western from the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where
bank owned by Pablo Binuyag. accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a river.
In 1968, after a typhoon which caused a big flood, the Cagayan All these requisites of accretion are present in this case for, as the trial court
River changed its course and returned it to its 1919 bed and it cut through found:
the lands of respondents whose lands were transferred on the eastern side.
. . . Cagayan River did move year by year from 1919 to 1968 or for a period
To cultivate the lands they had to cross the river. When they were cultivating
of 49 years. Within this period, the alluvium deposited on the other side has
said lands, Agustin accompanied by the mayor and some policemen claimed
become greater in area than the original lands of the plaintiffs in both cases.
the land and drove them away. So Melad and Binuyag filed separate
Still the addition in every year is imperceptible in nature, one could not
complaints for recovery of their lots and its accretions.
discern it but can be measured after the lapse of a certain time. Testimonial
The Trial Court ordered Agustin among others to vacate the lands evidence that the Cagayan River moved eastward year by year is
and return them to respondents. On appeal by Agustin, the IAC affirmed in overwhelming.
toto the judgment thus the case at bar.
These accretions belong to riparian owners upon whose lands the
Petitioners alleged that the land in question had not become part of alluvial deposits were made. The reason for this principle is because, if lands
private respondents' estate and that the ownership of private respondents bordering on streams are exposed to floods and other damage due to the
over the accretion cannot stand, because of the sudden and abrupt change destructive force of the waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to
in the course of the Cagayan River when it reverted to its old bed encumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is only just that such risks
or dangers as may prejudice the owners thereof should in some way be
compensated by the right of accretion.
ISSUES:
1. Base from the given facts, are all the requisites of accretion present? YES 2. NO. Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates
from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and transfers it to another
2. Is the private respondents' ownership of the accretion to their lands lost estate, the owner of the land to which the segregated portion belonged
upon the sudden and abrupt change of the course of the Cagayan River retains the ownership of it, provided that he removes the same within two
when it reverted to its old bed, and separated or transferred said accretions years.
to the other side? NO
47
PROPERTY DIGESTS

Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving purposes. Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged in their answer that the land
a piece of land or part thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains his claimed by private respondents is non-existent and that the "subject land" is
ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is separated from the estate an accretion to their registered land and that they have been in possession
by the current. and cultivation of the"accretion" for many years.
In the case at bar, the sudden change of course of the Cagayan

River as a result of a strong typhoon in 1968 caused a portion of the lands of
the private respondents to be "separated from the estate by the current." ISSUE: Can the petitioners claim ownership over the subject land by
presenting their Original Certificate of Title as opposed to the tax declarations
Hence, the private respondents have retained the ownership of the in the possession of private respondent?
portion that was transferred by avulsion to the other side of the river.
RULING: Yes. Tax Declaration not sufficient evidence to prove ownership

54. Cureg v. Intermediate Appellate Court and the OCT indicates true and legal ownership of petitioner.
G.R. No. 73465, September 7, 1989 It was ruled that as against an array of proofs consisting of tax declarations
and/or tax receipts which are not conclusive evidence of ownership nor proof
Medialdea, J. of the area covered therein, an original certificate of title indicates true and
legal ownership by the registered owners over the disputed premises.
Private respondent’s claim of ownership of their alleged 2 & 1/2 hectare land
FACTS:
is anchored mainly on 4 tax declarations. Cureg's OCT should be accorded
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioners are assailing the decision greater weight as against the tax declarations offered by Apostol, et.al. in
of the Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the support of their claim.
Regional Trial Court declaring private respondent Apostol was the absolute
Moreover, a decree of registration bars all claims and rights which arose or
owner of the parcel of land in dispute.
may have existed priorto the decree of registration. By the issuance of the
Respondents filed a complaint for quieting of title and damages with decree, the land is bound and title thereto quieted, subject only to exceptions
preliminary injunction against the petitioners alleging that they are the owners stated in Section 39, Act 496 (now Section 44 of PD 1529). Since Cureg's
of the subject land based on four tax declarations covering the said land and original certificate of title clearly stated that subject land is bounded on the
that they have been in actual, open, peaceful and continuous possession of north by the Cagayan River, Apostol's claim over the land allegedly existing
the same. Moreover, the land already manifested signs of accretion of about between Cureg's land and the Cagayan River, is deemed barred and nullified
3 hectares on the north caused by the northward movement of the Cagayan with the issuance of the original certificate of title.
River and thus, private respondent declared the land and its accretion for tax
48
PROPERTY DIGESTS

ISSUE: Will the OCT automatically cover the accretion gradually received by 1926, Lot No. 7511 and Lot No. 7340 were separated by the Suague River;
the subject land from the effects of current of the the Cagayan River? that the area of 11,819 square meters of what was Lot No. 7340 has been in
the possession of the defendants; that the area of 14,036 square meters,
RULING: No. The land in question is an alluvial deposit left by the northward which was formerly the river bed of the Suague River has also been in the
movement of the Cagayan River. possession of the defendants; and that the plaintiffs have never been in
actual physical possession of Lot No. 7340.
Pursuant to Article 457 of the New Civil Code, it is said that "to the owners of The trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint of plaintiffs
Viajar and declaring defendant Ladrido as owner of the parcel of land.
land adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion which they gradually
Petitioners contend that Article 457 of the New Civil Code must be construed
receive from the effects of the current of the waters." to limit the accretion mentioned therein as accretion of unregistered land to
the riparian owner, and should not extend to registered land. Thus, the lot in
The area covered by OCT P-19093 is only 4,584 sq. ms. The accretion question having remained the registered land of the petitioners, then the
attached to said land is approximately 5.5 hectares. The increase in the area private respondents cannot acquire title there in derogation to that of the
of Cureg's land, being an accretion left by the change of course or the petitioners, by accretion, for that will defeat the indefeasibility of a Torrens
northward movement of the Cagayan River does not automatically become Title.
registered land just because the lot which receives such accretion is covered ISSUE: Is accretion under Art. 457 limited to accretion of unregistered land?
by a Torrens title.
HELD: NO. The accretion contemplated under Art. 457 extends to registered
As such, it must also be placed under the operation of the Torrens System. lands.
Under Article 457 of the Civil Code, the accretion which the banks or rivers
may gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters becomes
the property of the owners of the lands adjoining the banks. Sections 45 an
46 of Act No. 496, on the other hand, provides: SEC. 45. The obtaining of a
55. Viajar v. Court of Appeals
decree of registration and the entry of a certificate of title shall be regarded
G.R. No. 77294 December 12, 1988
as an agreement running with the land, and binding upon the applicant and
MEDIALDEA, J:
all successors in title that the land shall be and always remain registered
land, and subject to the provisions of this Act and all Acts amendatory
FACTS: Spouses Ricardo and Leonor Ladrido were the registered owners of
thereof. SEC. 46. No title to registered land in derogation to that of the
Lot No. 7511 situated in Pototan, Iloilo, containing an area of 154,267 square
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
meters. Spouses Rosendo and Ana Te were also the registered owners of a
The rule that registration under the Torrens System does not protect the
parcel of land described in their title as Lot No. 7340.
riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his registered land
Rosendo Te, with the conformity of Ana Te, sold this lot to Angelica Viajar
through gradual changes in the course of an adjoining stream is well settled.
and Celso Viajar. A Torrens title was later issued in their names. Later,
Such accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams
Angelica had Lot No. 7340 relocated and found out that the property was in
and the provisions of the Civil Code in that respect are not affected by the
the possession of Ricardo Ladrido.
Registration Act. (Payatas Estate Improvement Co. vs. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55)
Angelica instituted a civil action for recovery of possession and damages
Therefore, the accretion to Lot No. 7511 belongs to the defendants.
against Ricardo. The facts admitted by the parties show that the piece of real
property which used to be Lot No. 7340 was located in Pototan, Iloilo; that it
56. HEIRS OF NAVARRO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
consisted of 20,089 square meters; that at the time of the cadastral survey in
49
PROPERTY DIGESTS

G.R. No. 68166. February 12, 1997 public domain, it being a part of the foreshore of Manila Bay; that he was a
lessee and in possession of a part of the subject property by virtue of a
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J: fishpond permit issued by the Bureau and confirmed by the Office of the
President; and that he had already converted the area covered by the lease
Facts:
into a fishpond.
Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased, filed an application for foreshore lease
The land sought to be registered was formed at the northern tip of the
covering a tract of foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an
applicant's land. Applicant's registered property is bounded on the north by
area of approximately seventeen (17) hectares but was denied. Emiliano
the Manila Bay.
Navarro, also the deceased predecessors-in-interest of petitioners herein,
filed a fishpond application with the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty five Issue: May the land sought to be registered be deemed an accretion in the
(25) hectares of foreshore land also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. The sense that it naturally accrues in favor of the riparian owner?
Director of Fisheries gave due course to his application but only to the extent
of seven (7) hectares of the property as may be certified by the Bureau of Held: No.
Forestry as suitable for fishpond purposes. The Executive Secretary, acting
in behalf of the President of the Philippines, similarly affirmed the grant. Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires
the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil
Later on, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application to register and confirm his or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the
title to a parcel of land, situated in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an area action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where the accretion
of 146, 611 sqm and described in Plan Psu-175181. Pascual claimed that takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river. Accretion is the process
this land is an accretion to his property, situated in Barrio Puerto Rivas, whereby the soil is deposited, while alluvium is the soil deposited on the
Balanga, Bataan, and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6830. It is estate fronting the river bank ; the owner of such estate is called the riparian
bounded on the eastern side by the Talisay River, on the western side by the owner. Riparian owners are, strictly speaking, distinct from littoral owners,
Bulacan River, and on the northern side by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River the latter being owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea or lake or
as well as the Bulacan River flow downstream and meet at the Manila Bay other tidal waters. The alluvium, by mandate of Article 457 of the Civil Code,
thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property resulting in an is automatically owned by the riparian owner from the moment the soil
accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as the riparian deposit can be seen but is not automatically registered property, hence,
owner. The Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant Solicitor General, subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
filed an opposition stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-
interest possessed sufficient title to the subject property, the same being a In this case, petitioners' claim of ownership over the disputed property under
portion of the public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the the principle of accretion, is misplaced. First, the title of petitioners' own tract
Philippines. of land reveals its northeastern boundary to be Manila Bay. Petitioners' land,
therefore, used to adjoin, border or front the Manila Bay and not any of the
Navarro thereupon filed an opposition to Pascual's application. Navarro two rivers whose torrential action, petitioners insist, is to account for the
claimed that the land sought to be registered has always been part of the accretion on their land. In fact, one of the petitioners, Sulpicio Pascual,
50
PROPERTY DIGESTS

testified in open court that the waves of Manila Bay used to hit the disputed power to make the declaration that the lands so gained by action of the sea
land being part of the bay's foreshore but, after he had planted palapat and is no longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for the cause of
bakawan trees thereon in 1948, the land began to rise. Petitioners' own land establishment of special industries or for coast guard services. 26 Petitioners
lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers; in front of their land on the utterly fail to show that either the executive or legislative department has
northern side lies now the disputed land where before 1948, there lay the already declared the disputed land as qualified, under Article 4 of the
Manila Bay. If the accretion were to be attributed to the action of either or Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, to be the property of petitioners as owners
both of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium should have been of the estates adjacent thereto.
deposited on either or both of the eastern and western boundaries of
petitioners' own tract of land, not on the northern portion thereof which is Hence, the petition is denied
adjacent to the Manila Bay. Clearly lacking, thus, is the third requisite of
accretion, which is, that the alluvium is deposited on the portion of claimant's
land which is adjacent to the river bank. Second, there is no dispute as to the 57. VDA. DE NAZARENO v. COURT OF APPEALS
fact that petitioners' own tract of land adjoins the Manila Bay. Manila Bay is
obviously not a river, and jurisprudence is already settled that Manila Bay is a G.R. No. 98045, 26 June 1996
sea. The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea
bank, or on what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined ROMERO, J.
petitioners' own tract of land on the northern side. As such, the applicable
law is not Article 457 of the Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866 (Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 FACTS: The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land situated in
provides as follows: "Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial Telegrapo, Puntod, Cagayan de Oro City, formed as a result of sawdust
deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public domain. dumped into the dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the banks of the
When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not Cagayan river.
necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special
industries, or for the coast-guard service, the Government shall declare them Respondents Jose Salasalan and Leo Rabaya leased from Antonio
to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as Nazareno (petitioners' predecessor-in-interest) the subject lots on which their
increment thereof.") houses stood. Respondents allegedly stopped paying rentals, prompting
Antonio Nazareno and petitioners to file an ejectment suit against them. The
The same being an accretion on a sea bank which, for all legal purposes, the lower court ruled against the respondents, and the private respondents were
foreshore of Manila Bay is. As part of the public domain, the herein disputed ejected from portions of the subject lots they occupied.
land is intended for public uses, and "so long as the land in litigation belongs
to the national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of
being appropriated by any private person, except through express Lands of a Survey Plan with the view to perfecting his title over the accretion
authorization granted in due form by a competent authority." 25 Only the area being claimed by him. Upon the respondents’ protest, the Bureau
executive and possibly the legislative departments have the right and the conducted further investigations. Subsequently, the Bureau ordered the
51
PROPERTY DIGESTS

amendment of the Survey Plan in Antonio Nazareno’s name by segregating Tiongco v. Director of Lands, et al., where the land was not formed solely by
therefrom the areas occupied by the respondents who, if qualified, may file the natural effect of the water current of the river bordering said land but is
public land applications covering their respective portions. also the consequence of the direct and deliberate intervention of man, it was
deemed a man-made accretion and, as such, part of the public domain.
In this case, the petitioners did not meet the first and second requirements of
ISSUE: Are the petitioners entitled to the rights of a riparian owner over the the above rules on alluvion. They admitted that the accretion was formed by
subject accretion? the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on portions of the
Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River bounding their land. It cannot be
claimed, therefore, that the accumulation was gradual and imperceptible,
HELD: No. The petitioners cannot claim ownership over the subject land as resulting from the action of the waters or the current of the Balacanas Creek
riparian owners because such land is property of the public domain. and the Cagayan River. On the contrary, the accretion was man-made or
artificial.
Art. 457 of the Civil Code provides that "to the owners of lands adjoining the
banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the Therefore, since the accretion is a man-made accretion, it is public land
effects of the current of the waters." The Supreme Court, in Hilario v. City of which they therefore cannot claim.
Manila, held that the word "current" indicates the participation of the body of
water in the ebb and flow of waters due to high and low tide.
It was also held in Meneses v. Court of Appeals that accretion, as a mode of

acquiring property under Art. 457 of the Civil Code, requires the concurrence 58. Avila v. Spouses Barabat
of these requisites:
G.R. No. 141993, March 17, 2006
1. that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;
2. that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); Corona, J.:
and
3. that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks or
rivers (or the sea coast).
These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to the FACTS:
owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion
gradually received from the effects of the current of waters. In Republic v.
Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the requirement that the deposit should
be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
from Art. 457 of the Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. seeking the reversal of the CA resolution.
Putting it differently, alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. Thus, in
52
PROPERTY DIGESTS

The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land located in Toledo City, The RTC ruled in favour of the spouses Barabat and nullified the deed of
Cebu. The entire property was registered under a decedent who was sale between Avila and the spouses Adlawan. It also ordered Avila to
succeeded by her five children, petitioners Narcisa Avila (Avila), Natividad execute a formal and notarized deed of sale in favor of the spouses Barabat.
Macapaz (Macapaz), Francisca Adlawan (Adlawan), Leon Nemeño The CA affirmed the RTC ruling.
(Nemeño) and Jose Bahena (Bahena). These heirs built their respective
houses on the lot as there was already a partition.
ISSUES:
The spouses Barabat were lessees of a portion of the parcel of land. Avila 1. Must the first sale to the spouses Barabat be upheld?
offered to them her share in the lot after her siblings showed no interest
2. May the siblings of Avila redeem the property sold to the spouses
therein. Their agreement was evidenced by a private document. The
Barabat?
spouses Barabat later stopped paying rentals to Avila and took possession of
the property as owners. They also assumed the payment of realty taxes on it.
HELD:
In 1982, the Spouses Barabat were being ejected from the property by
Januario Adlawan who introduced himself as a buyer of the property.
1. Yes. The sale of the property to the spouses Barabat must be upheld. It
was an absolute sale and not an equitable mortgage.
Considering the sale to the spouses Adlawan as prejudicial to their title and
peaceful possession of the property, they demanded that Avila execute a
public document evidencing the sale of the property to them but Avila For Articles 1602 and 1604 to apply, two requisites must concur: (1) the
refused. Respondents filed a complaint for quieting of title with the RTC of parties entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale and (2) their
Toledo City, anchoring their claim on the private document. intention was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage.
Avila denied having offered to sell her property to respondents. She claimed Here, both the trial and appellate courts found (1) that private document
that respondents gave her an P8,000 loan conditioned on her signing a evidenced a contract of sale and (2) that the circumstances of the case show
document constituting her house and share in lot security for its payment. that Avila intended her agreement with respondents to be a sale. The
subsequent acts of Avila revealed her intention to absolutely convey the
disputed property. It was also respondents who took over the payment of real
property taxes after the execution of the private document.
53
PROPERTY DIGESTS

The petitioners’ claim of gross inadequacy of selling price has no basis. They 59. Aurora Del Banco vs Intermediate Appellate Court
failed to introduce evidence of the correct price at the time the land was sold G.R No. 72694; December 1, 1987
to respondents in 1979. In the absence of evidence as to the fair market PARAS, J.
value of a parcel of land at the time of its sale, we cannot reasonably
Facts: In 1859, three brothers, Benedicto, Jose and Manuel (all surnamed
conclude that the price at which it was sold was inadequate. Pansacola) entered into an agreement embodied in a documet which
provided, among others:
(1) That they will purchase from the Spanish Government the lands
2. There is no right of redemption available to the petitioners. comprising the Island of Cagbalite which is located within the boundaries of
the Municipality of Mauban, Province of Tayabas (now Quezon) and has an
approximate area of 1,600 hectares;
(2) That the lands shall be considered after the purchase as their
Petitioners’ right to redeem would have existed only had there been co- common property;
ownership among petitioners-siblings. But there was none. For this right to (3) That the co-ownership includes Domingo Arce and Baldomera
be exercised, co-ownership must exist at the time the conveyance is made Angulo, minors at that time represented by their father, Manuel Pansacola.
by a co-owner and the redemption is demanded by the other co-owner or co- (4) That whatever benefits may be derived from the Island shall be
owner(s). However, by their own admission, petitioners were no longer co- shared equally by the co-owners in the following proportion: Benedicto
Pansacola-1/4 share; Jose Pansacola-1/4 share; and, Domingo Arce and
owners when the property was sold to respondents in 1979. The co-
Baldomera Angulo-2/4 shares which shall be placed under the care of their
ownership had already been extinguished by partition. father, Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena).
In 1866, co-owners entered into the actual possession and enjoyment of the
Island. In1868 they agreed to modify their agreement and provided for a new
sharing and distribution of the lands so as to include other heirs. In 1907, the
The regime of co-ownership exists when the ownership of an undivided thing representatives of the heirs entered into agreement to partition the Island and
or right belongs to different persons. By the nature of co-ownership, a co- supplemented by another agreement in 1908. In1968, private respondents
owner cannot point to any specific portion of the property owned in common brought a special action for partition. Petitioners herein, interposed defenses
as his own because his share in it remains intangible and ideal. of prescription, res judicata, exclusive ownership, estoppel and laches.
Issue: Can a mere agreement to partition the property terminate co-
Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs is deemed to ownership?
be a partition. Ruling: No. It is not enough that the co-owners agree to subdivide the
property. They must have a subdivision plan drawn in accordance with which
they take actual and exclusive possession of their respective portions in the
plan and titles issued to each of them accordingly (Caro vs. Court of Appeals,
Here, the particular portions pertaining to petitioners had been ascertained 113 SCRA 10 [1982]). The mechanics of actual partition should follow the
and they in fact already took possession of their respective parts. procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. Maganon vs. Montejo,
146 SCRA 282 [1986]).
54
PROPERTY DIGESTS

Neither can such actual possession and enjoyment of some portions need for the property arise. He thereafter verbally requested respondents to
of the Island by some of the petitioners herein be considered a repudiation of vacate the house and lot, but they refused and filed instead an action for
the co-ownership. It is undisputed that the Cagbalite Island was purchased quieting of title with the RTC. Finally, upon respondents’ refusal to heed the
by the original co-owners as a common property and it has not been proven
last demand letter to vacate, petitioner filed the instant case.
that the Island had been partitioned among them or among their heirs. While
there is co-ownership, a co-owner's possession of his share is co-possession
which is linked to the possession of the other co-owners (Gatchalian vs.
Arlegui, 75 SCRA 234 [1977]).
Respondents Narcisa and Emeterio, alleged that the subject property
Furthermore, no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against
his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the was originally registered in the name of their deceased father, Ramon and
co-ownership (Valdez vs. Olonga, 51 SCRA 71 [1973], Tero vs. Tero, 131 the ancestral house standing thereon was owned by their parents. During the
SCRA 100 [1984]). Co-owners cannot acquire by prescription the share of lifetime of their parents and deceased siblings, all of them lived on the said
the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership clearly property. Dominador and his wife, Graciana Ramas Adlawan, who died
communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 without issue, also occupied the same. Petitioner, on the other hand, is a
[1987]). stranger who never had possession of such.
An action for partition does not prescribe. Article 403 of the Old Civil
Code, now Article 497, provides that the assignees of the co-owners may
take part in the partition of the common property, and Article 400 of the Old
Code, now Article 494 provides that each co-owner may demand at any time
MTC dismissed the complaint holding that the establishment of
the partition of the common property, a provision which implies that the
action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches petitioner’s filiation and the settlement of the estate of Dominador are
conditions precedent to the accrual of petitioner’s action for ejectment. The
60. ARNELITO ADLAWAN v. EMETERIO M. ADLAWAN and NARCISA M. RTC reversed the decision of the MTC holding that the title of Dominador
ADLAWAN cannot be collaterally attacked. It thus ordered respondents to turn over
possession of the controverted lot to petitioner and to pay compensation for
G.R. No. 161916 the use and occupation of the premises. The CA set aside the decision of the
RTC and reinstated the judgment of the MTC. It ratiocinated that petitioner
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
and the heirs of Graciana are co-owners of the subject property. As such,
petitioner cannot eject respondents from the property via an unlawful
detainer suit filed in his own name and as the sole owner of the property.
FACTS: A house and lot registered in the name of the late Dominador
Adlawan and located at Cebu is the subject property of this case. In his
complaint, petitioner Arnelito claimed that he is an acknowledged illegitimate
ISSUE: Can the petitioner validly maintain the instant case for ejectment?
child and the sole heir of Dominador. He then executed an affidavit
adjudicating to himself the subject property. Out of respect and generosity to
respondents who are the siblings of his father, he granted their plea to
occupy the subject property provided they would vacate the same should his
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

RULING:
NO. Article 487 of the civil code provides that: 61. RIZALINO, substituted by his heirs, JOSEFINA, ROLANDO and
FERNANDO, ERNESTO, LEONORA, BIBIANO, JR., LIBRADO and
ENRIQUETA, all surnamed OESMER vs. PARAISO DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in
ejectment. G.R. No. 157493; February 5, 2007
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession.
Article 487 includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal),
recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership Facts: Petitioners together with Adolfo Oesmer and Jesus Oesmer, are
(accion de reivindicacion). A co-owner may bring such an action without the brothers and sisters, and the co-owners of undivided shares of two parcels of
necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is agricultural and tenanted land which were acquired by right of succession.
presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners. It should be stressed, Respondent Paraiso Development Corporation is known to be engaged in
however, that where the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims the real estate business. This case originated when Ernesto Oesmer, one of
to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession of the litigated property, the co-owners of the subject land, met with the President of respondent
the action should be dismissed. corporation for the purpose of brokering the sale of petitioners’ properties to
respondent corporation. Pursuant to the said meeting, a Contract to Sell was
drafted whereby petitioners Ernesto and Enriqueta subsequently signed the
aforesaid Contract to Sell. A check in the amount of P100,000.00, payable to
In the instant case, it is not disputed that petitioner brought the suit
Ernesto, was given as option money. Sometime thereafter, Rizalino,
for unlawful detainer in his name alone and for his own benefit to the
Leonora, Bibiano, Jr., and Librado also signed the said Contract to Sell.
exclusion of the heirs of Graciana as he even executed an affidavit of self-
However, two of the brothers, Adolfo and Jesus, did not sign the document.
adjudication over the disputed property. It is clear therefore that petitioner
Later on, petitioners informed the respondent, through a letter, of their
cannot validly maintain the instant action considering that he does not
intention to rescind the Contract to Sell and to return the amount of
recognize the co-ownership that necessarily flows from his theory of
P100,000.00 given by respondent as option money. Respondent did not
succession to the property of his father, Dominador.
respond to the aforesaid letter. Afterwards, herein petitioners, together with
Adolfo and Jesus, filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity or for
Annulment of Option Agreement or Contract to Sell with Damages before the
Petitioner’s action operates as a complete repudiation of the RTC. The trial court held that the assailed Contract to Sell is valid and
existence of co-ownership and not in representation or recognition thereof. binding only to the undivided proportionate share of Ernesto who signed the
Dismissal of the complaint is therefore proper. document and received the check. Ernesto was ordered to execute the
56
PROPERTY DIGESTS

Contract of Absolute Sale concerning his 1/8 share over the subject two Despite the co-owner’s lack of written authority from the five petitioners to
parcels of land in favor of respondent. On appeal, the Court of Appeals sell their shares in the subject parcels of land, the supposed Contract to Sell
modified the decision of RTC whereby it declared that the Contract to Sell is remains valid and binding upon the latter. All the co-owners signed the
valid and binding with respect to the undivided proportionate share of the six document.
signatories of the document.
Issue: Did the contract to sell bind the co-owners of Ernesto. Therefore, a written authority is no longer necessary in order to sell their
shares in the subject parcels of land because, by affixing their signatures on
the Contract to Sell, they were not selling their shares through an agent but,
rather, they were selling the same directly and in their own right.
Ruling: Yes. The contract to sell was valid and binding.
It is well-settled that contracts are perfected by mere consent, upon the
acceptance by the offeree of the offer made by the offeror. From that
In contrast to the contention of the five co-owners who affixed their moment, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been
signatures in the contract to sell that their signatures do not confer authority expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to
to Ernesto as an agent to sell their shares, the Court held that they were their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. To produce a
selling the same directly and in their own right. Hence, written authority is no contract, the acceptance must not qualify the terms of the offer. However, the
longer necessary since they were selling their shares in their own capacity as acceptance may be express or implied. For a contract to arise, the
owners. In addition, the petitioners, being owners of their respective acceptance must be made known to the offeror. Accordingly, the acceptance
undivided shares in the subject properties, can dispose of their shares even can be withdrawn or revoked before it is made known to the offeror. (Jardine
without the consent of all the co-heirs. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides Davies, Inc. v. CA, 389 Phil. 204).
that, “Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
In the case at bar, the Contract to Sell was perfected when the co-owners
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
consented to the sale to the buyer of their shares in the subject parcels of
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
land by affixing their signatures on the said contract. Such signatures show
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
their acceptance of what has been stipulated in the Contract to Sell and such
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
acceptance was made known to buyer when the duplicate copy of the
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
Contract to Sell was returned to the latter bearing petitioner’s signatures.
ownership.” Consequently, even without the consent of the two co-heirs,
Adolfo and Jesus, the Contract to Sell was valid and binding with respect to
the 6/8 proportionate shares of the petitioners.
62. AGUIRRE, ET AL. v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 122249 : January 29, 2004
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

1. No, he did not acquire ownership of the land either through ordinary or
Facts: Leocadio was the owner of a parcel of land measuring 2,611 square extraordinary prescription.
meters. Herein petitioners are his children or their respective heirs. Upon
death of Leocadio, the surviving heirs agreed that Sixto, a child of Leocadio, Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.
would manage and administer the subject property. Sixto, without knowledge Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith
and approval from his co-owners, sold portions of the estate by executing an and with just title for the time fixed by law; without good faith and just title,
Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property stating therein that he was the only heir acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character. Regarding
of Leocadio. Sixto sold a portion to Maria Bacong and another to Tiburcio real or immovable property, ordinary acquisitive prescription requires a
Balitaan. Maria then sold her property to Rosendo Bacong. Sixto died. period of possession of ten years, while extraordinary acquisitive prescription
requires an uninterrupted adverse possession of thirty years. Ordinary
Petitioners demanded the reconveyance of the portions sold by Sixto but acquisitive prescription demands that possession be in good faith, which
Tiburcio, Maria, and Rosendo (herein private respondents or their respective consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the thing is
heirs) refused. Hence, petitioners filed against them a complaint for received has been the owner thereof and could thereby transmit that
Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Partition, Malicious Prosecution and ownership. There is just title when the adverse claimant comes into
Damages. possession of the property through any of the modes recognized by law for
the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but that the grantor is neither
In their Answer, private respondents contend that petitioners have no cause the owner nor in a position to transmit the right. Article 1130 of the Civil Code
of action because they acquired their property thru a valid deed of sale and, states that the title for prescription must be true and valid.
alternatively, petitioners cause of action, if any, was barred by prescription
and laches. Tiburcio further contends that he is in possession and enjoyment The requirements for ordinary acquisitive prescription as hereinabove
of the land in the concept of absolute owner, peacefully, and publicly. described have not been met in this case. Private respondents failed to
discharge the burden of proof that Tiburcio Balitaan was a purchaser in good
Petitioners, Rosendo, and the heirs of Maria entered into a compromise faith. It is undisputed that Tiburcio practically lived his entire lifetime in the
agreement. area where the property in dispute is located and had been a neighbor of
The RTC rendered judgment against the defendants. CA declared petitioners. He knew that Sixto Medrano had other siblings because his son,
respondents as absolute owners of 1,695 square meters of the subject Dr. Elias Balitaan, is the godson by baptism of spouses Jose Aguirre and
property for they have been in possession, in the concept of owner, of the Gertrudes Medrano, the latter being a deceased sister of Sixto. Thus,
entire parcel of land sold to Tiburcio for seventeen years. Tiburcio was not a complete stranger to the Medrano clan. Private
respondents failed to show that the petitioners were notified of the subject
Issue: sale or that respondents gave their consent to the sale. Not being in good
1. Did private respondents acquire the ownership of the subject property faith, the ten-year period required for ordinary acquisitive prescription does
through acquisitive prescription. not apply. Even the thirty-year period under extraordinary acquisitive
2. Did Sixto adversely and clearly repudiated the existing co-ownership prescription has not been met in this case. Private respondents claim to have
among the heirs of Leocadio Medrano. been in possession, in the concept of owner, of the entire parcel of land sold
3. Was the sale between Sixto and respondents valid. to Tiburcio Balitaan by Sixto Medrano for only seventeen years (1958-1975).
Therefore, the land was not acquired by defendants through prescription.

Held:
2. No, there was no clear showing that he repudiated the co-ownership.
58
PROPERTY DIGESTS

In Ramirez v Bautista, it was held that the appropriate recourse of co-owners
In Salvador vs. CA, This Court has held that the possession of a co-owner is in cases where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property
like that of a trustee and shall not be regarded as adverse to the other co- as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners
owners but in fact as beneficial to all of them. Acts which may be is an action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court.
considered adverse to strangers may not be considered adverse Neither recovery of possession nor restitution can be granted since the
insofar as co-owners are concerned. A mere silent possession by a co- defendant buyers are legitimate proprietors and possessors in joint
owner, his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the property, the ownership of the common property claimed.
erection of buildings and fences and the planting of trees thereon, and
the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive It is clear therefore that the deed of sale executed by Sixto Medrano in favor
ownership. of Tiburcio Balitaan is a valid conveyance only insofar as the share of Sixto
Medrano in the co-ownership is concerned.
Thus, in order that a co-owners possession may be deemed adverse to
the cestui que trust or the other co-owners, the following elements must Thus, the respondent court erred in declaring the ownership of the entire
concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation 1,695-square
amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or the other co-owners; (2)
that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to
the cestui que trust or the other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence 63. BALO vs. CA G.R. No. 129704
thereon must be clear and convincing. September 30, 2005
Chico-Nazario, J.
Respondents failed to present competent evidence that the acts of Sixto
adversely and clearly repudiated the existing co-ownership among the heirs
of Leocadio Medrano. Facts:
A complaint for Judicial Partition of Real Properties and Accounting with
3. Yes, it was a valid sale. Damages, was filed by private respondent Josefina Garrido. The complaint
clearly states that the late Eugenio Balo, Sr., and Maria Pasagui Balo had
If a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own two (2) children, namely: Ulpiano, Sr. and Maximino. The plaintiff is the
share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the daughter of the late Maximino Balo and Salvacion Sabulao; while the
sale. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides that each co-owner shall have the defendants are children of the late Ulpiano Balo, Sr. and Felicidad Superio.
full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and
he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another Private respondent further alleged in her complaint that immediately upon the
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the death of her grandfather, Eugenio Sr., the petitioners took possession of the
effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall said real properties without her knowledge and consent. The petitioners
be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the being her uncle and cousins, private respondent earnestly requested them
termination of the co-ownership. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his that they come up with a fair and equal partition of the properties left by her
undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the grandparents. The petitioners having outrightly refused her proposal, private
consent of the other co-owners is not null and void; only the rights of the co- respondent filed the complaint.
owner/seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the
property. Issue:
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

Did the action for Judicial Partition and accounting prescribed, waived, or But for unknown reasons the tax declaration of the parcel of land in the name
otherwise abandoned. of Silvino was cancelled and transferred to Exequiel Ballena and later on,
was transferred to Hilario Robles and his wife. Andrea Robles secured a loan
from Antipolo Rural Bank using the tax declaration as security. For failure to
Held:
No. It is noteworthy that the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners did not pay the mortgage debt, the property was foreclosed with Cardona Rural
ipso facto establish prescription. Dismissal prior to answer is premature. An Bank emerging as the highest bidder. The bank sold the property to spouses
action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for Vergel and Ruth Santos. Petitioners discovered the mortgage and attempted
segregation and conveyance of a determine portion of the properties to redeem the property but it was unsuccessful. The spouses Santos took
involved. If the defendant asserts exclusive title over the property, the action possession of the property and was able to secure a Free Patent. Petitioners
for partition should not be dismissed. Rather, the court should resolve the then filed an action for quieting of title. Respondents questioned their
case and if the plaintiff is unable to sustain his claimed status as a co-owner,
standing to sue for quieting of title, contending that petitioners no longer have
the court should dismiss the action, not because the wrong remedy was
availed of, but because no basis exists for requiring the defendant to submit any interest to the property in question due to the mortgage affected by
to partition. If, on the other hand, the court after trial should find the existence Hilario and the consequent foreclosure thereof by the Bank. Respondents
of co-ownership among the parties, the court may and should order the argued that Hilario had become the absolute owner of the property at the
partition of the properties in the same action. time he mortgaged the same. Then the trial court ruled in favor of
petitioners. But the CA ruled that the several transfers of the tax declaration
This case is ordered remanded to the court of origin which is directed to of the property in question from Silvino to the spouses Santos had the effect
resolve the case with dispatch.
of divesting petitioners of their title by prescription to Hilario.
64. Robles vs Court of Appeals Issue: Whether Hilario acquired the share of his co-owners in the disputed
property by prescription?
G.R. No. 123509. March 14, 2000
Held: No. It is a fundamental principle that a co-owner cannot acquire by
PANGANIBAN, J.: prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of
the co-ownership.
In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following
Facts: The property subject of this case is originally owned by Leon Robles. requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of
When he died, it passed to his son Silvino who declared the property in his repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive
name and paid the taxes thereon. Upon the latter’s death, his widow and acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3)
children inherited the property. Petitioners Lucio Robles, et al. were the the evidence thereof is clear and convincing. In the present case, Hilario
children of Silvino, and Hilario Robles is their half-brother. The task of effected no clear and evident repudiation of the co-ownership. Hilario did not
cultivating was assigned to Lucio while the payment of the land taxes was have possession of the subject property; neither did he exclude the
entrusted to Hilario. petitioners from the use and the enjoyment thereof, as they had indisputably
shared in its fruits. Likewise, his act of entering into a mortgage contract with
60
PROPERTY DIGESTS

the bank cannot be construed to be a repudiation of the co-ownership. Lot No. 3347, (15,906 sqm) and the residential portion of the property (287
sqm) to Astrologo Hular. In 1961 or thereabouts: Iluminado asked Hular’s
As absolute owner of his undivided interest in the land, he had the right to permission to construct a house on a portion of Lot No. 3347 near the road,
alienate his share, as he in fact did. Neither should his payment of land taxes and the latter agreed. Iluminado Baloloy in 1945 acquired a coconut land
in his name, as agreed upon by the co-owners, be construed as a (north of the residential portion of Lot 3347, Lot No. 3353 (9302 sqm) and
repudiation of the co-ownership. The assertion that the declaration of registered the same. Iluminado constructed his house on a portion of Lot No.
ownership was tantamount to repudiation was belied by the continued 3353. He and his family, including his children, forthwith resided in said
occupation and possession of the disputed property by the petitioners as house.
owners.
Thus, the sale of the subject property to the Santos spouses is valid insofar
as it pertained to Hilario’s share only. In 1979, respondent Hular had his house constructed near the trail (road) on
Lot No. 3347, which, however, occupied a big portion of Lot No. 3353.
Iluminado Baloloy died intestate on November 29, 1985. His widow and their
children continued residing in the property, while petitioner Reynaldo Baloloy,
65. Baloloy vs. Hular
one of Iluminado’s children, later constructed his house near that of his
G.R. No. 116607 April 10, 1996 deceased father. When Astrologo Hular died, he was survived by his
children, Jose, Romeo, Anacleto, Elena, Leo, Teresita, and the respondent,
Puno, J. Alfredo Hular among others, who continued to reside in their house.
Facts: On May 11, 1993, respondent Alfredo Hular filed a complaint for Issue:
quieting of title of real property with damages against the children and heirs
of Iluminado Baloloy, namely, Anacorita, Antonio, and petitioners Reynaldo Whether or not all the indispensable parties had been impleaded by the
and Adelina, all surnamed Baloloy. He prayed among others that he be respondent in the trial court
declared the absolute owner of the property in question.
Held:
Spouses Lino and Victoriana Estopin were the original owners of a parcel of
No. Alfredo Hular adduced evidence that when his parents died intestate,
land located in Barangay Biriran, Juban, Sorsogon (Lot No. 3347) of the
they were survived by their children, the respondent and his siblings Elena,
Juban Cadastre. A major portion of the property was agricultural, while the
Jose, Romeo, Anacleto, Leo, and Teresita, all surnamed Hular.
rest was residential. When Lino Estopin died intestate, his widow, Victoriana
Lagata, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale on over the agricultural portion of
61
PROPERTY DIGESTS

Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more Held:
heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before partition, owned in common 1. No, they are not liable to pay rents for the use of the upper floor. Matilde
by such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased. Under Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use as a
dwelling, in the house of joint ownership; but the record shows no proof that,
Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners may bring an action
by so doing, the said Matilde occasioned any detriment to the interest of the
in ejectment. This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of community property, nor that she prevented her sister Vicenta from utilizing
possession, including an accion publiciana and a reinvidicatory action. If the the said upper story according to her rights. It is to be noted that the stores of
action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner the lower floor were rented and accounting of the rents was duly made to the
and entitled to the possession thereof, the action will not prosper unless he plaintiffs.
impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties. 2. Yes, they are liable to pay rents for the use of the portion of the lower floor.
Notwithstanding the above statements relative to the joint-ownership rights
which entitled the defendants to live in the upper story of the said house, yet
in view of the fact that the record shows it to have been proved that the
In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming sole defendant Matilde's husband, Gaspar de Bartolome, occupied for four years
ownership over the subject property and praying that he be declared the sole a room or a part of the lower floor of the same house on Calle Escolta, using
it as an office for the justice of the peace, a position which he held in the
owner thereof. There is no proof that the other co- owners had waived their
capital of that province, strict justice, requires that he pay his sister-in-law,
rights over the subject property or conveyed the same to the respondent or the plaintiff, one half of the monthly rent which the said quarters could have
such co-owners were aware of the case in the trial court. produced, had they been leased to another person. The amount of such
monthly rental is fixed at P16 in accordance with the evidence shown in the
record. This conclusion as to Bartolome's liability results from the fact that,
even as the husband of the defendant coowner of the property, he had no
66. Ricardo Pardell y Cruz vs. Gaspar De Bartolome right to occupy and use gratuitously the said part of the lower floor of the
G.R. No. L-4656, November 18, 1912 house in question, where he lived with his wife, to the detriment of the
Torres, J. plaintiff Vicenta who did not receive one-half of the rent which those quarters
could and should have produced, had they been occupied by a stranger, in
Facts: the same manner that rent was obtained from the rooms on the lower floor
Two sisters, Vicenta Ortiz-Pardell and Matilde Ortiz-De Bartolome, owned in that were used as stores.
common a two storey house with an upper floor used as a dwelling and
lower floor used as a dwelling and a lower floor available for rent by stores. 67. Luz Caro v. Honorable Court of Appeals and Basilia Lahorra Vda. De
Vicenta Pardell resided in the province. Matilde De Bartolome occupied a Benito, as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Mario Benito
portion of the lower floor which her husband used as his office. The other G.R. No. L-46001; March 25, 1982
portions were rented to others. GUERRERO, J.
Vicenta Pardell brought a suit to recover, among others, rents from Matilde
De Bartolome and her husband. FACTS: Alfredo Benito, Mario Benito, and Benjamin Benito were the original
Issue: co-owners of two parcels of land located in Sorsogon. When Mario Benito
1. Are Matilde Ortiz-De Bartolome and her husband liable to pay rents for the died, his surviving wife, Basilia Lahorra, herein private respondent, and
use of the upper floor? Saturnino Benito, father of Mario, were appointed as joint administrators of
2. Are they liable to pay rents for the use of a portion of the lower floor? Mario’s estate. Benjamin Benito executed a deed of absolute sale of his one-
62
PROPERTY DIGESTS

third undivided portion over said parcels of land in favor of petitioner Luz hectares, more or less, was ceded to petitioner Luz Caro. Thereafter, the co-
Caro which was registered. Thereafter, an oral subdivision among Alfredo, owners took actual and exclusive possession of the specific portions
Saturnino, as co-administrator of Mario’s estate, and Luz Caro was agreed respectively assigned to them. A subdivision title was subsequently issued
upon where a subdivision title was issued to petitioner Luz Caro over Lot I-C, on the lot assigned to petitioner. As aforesaid, a subdivision title has been
under T.C.T. No. T-4978. When Basilia learned of the sale, she sent to issued in the name petitioner on the lot ceded to her. Upon the expiration of
petitioner through her counsel, a written offer to redeem the said one-third the term of one year from the date of the entry of the subdivision title, the
portion sold, but to no avail. The other co-owners, Alfredo and Saturnino, did Certificate of Title shall be incontrovertible (Section 38, Act 496). Since the
not exercise their right of legal redemption. title of petitioner is now indefeasible, private respondent cannot, by means of
the present action, directly attack the validity thereof. Even on the
ISSUE: Was the co-ownership among Alfredo, Mario, and Benjamin Benito assumption that there still is co-ownership here and that therefore, the right
over the two parcels of land extinguished by the oral subdivision executed by of legal redemption exists, private respondent, as administratrix, has no
Alfredo, Saturnino (as co-administrator of Mario’s estate) and Luz Caro (to personality to exercise said right for and in behalf of the intestate estate of
whom Benjamin sold his one-third undivided portion over said lands prior to Mario Benito. She is on the same footing as co-administrator Saturnino
the subdivision), which would, in effect, not entitle Basilia Lahorra to exercise Benito. Hence, if Saturnino's consent to the sale of the one-third portion to
the right of legal redemption against Luz Caro? petitioner cannot bind the intestate estate of Mario Benito on the ground that
the right of redemption was not within the powers of administration, in the
RULING: Yes. same manner, private respondent as co-administrator has no power to
exercise the right of redemption — the very power which the Court of
An agreement of partition, though oral, is valid and consequently binding Appeals ruled to be not within the powers of administration.
upon the parties. (Hernandez vs. Andal, et al., 78 Phil. 196) Inasmuch as the
purpose of the law in establishing the right of legal redemption between co- Therefore, the prior sale to Luz Caro by Benjamin Benito was valid and the
owners is to reduce the number of participants until the community is done co-ownership was extinguished by the subsequent oral partition and would
away with (Viola vs. Tecson, 49 Phil. 808), once the property is subdivided no longer entitle Basilia Lahorra to exercise the right of legal redemption, as
and distributed among the co-owners, the community has terminated and co-administrator of Mario’s estate.
there is no reason to sustain any right of legal redemption. (Caram, et al., vs
Court of Appeals, et al., 101 Phil. 315) In Saturnino vs. Paulino, 97 Phil. 50, 68. DELIA BAILON-CASILAO, LUZ PAULINO-ANG, EMMA PAULINO-
We held that the right of redemption under Article 1067 may be exercised YBANEZ, NILDA PAULINO-TOLENTINO, and SABINA BAILON, vs. THE
only before partition. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CELESTINO AFABLE
G.R. No. 78178; April 15, 1988
As early as 1960, co-ownership of the parcels of land covered by Transfer CORTES, J.:
Certificates of Title Nos. T-609 and T-610 was terminated when Alfredo
Benito, Luz Caro and the Intestate Estate of Mario Benito, represented by FACTS:The parcel of land involved in this case is co-owned by Rosalia,
administrator Saturnino Benito, as trustee and representative of the heirs of Gaudencio, Sabina Bernabe, Nenita and Delia, all surnamed Bailon, each
Mario Benito, agreed to subdivide the property. A petition for subdivision was with a 1/6 share. Gaudencio and Nenita are now dead, are being
then filed for the purpose. This was accompanied by the affidavits of Alfredo
represented by her children. Luz, Emma and Nilda. Bernabe went to China in
Benito and Saturnino Benito, both dated September 15, 1960, to the effect
that they agree to the segregation of the land formerly owned in common by 1931 and had not been heard from since then. Rosalia and Gaudencio sold a
Mario Benito, Alfredo Benito and Benjamin Benito. A subdivision plan was portion of the said land to Donato Delgado. Then, Rosalia alone sold the
made and by common agreement, Lot I-C thereof, with an area of 163 remainder of the land to Ponciana de Lanuza. Also Lanuza acquired from
63
PROPERTY DIGESTS

Delgado land which the latter had earlier acquired from Rosalia and effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
Gaudencio. John Lanuza, acting under a special power of attorney given by limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
his wife, Ponciana, sold the two parcels of land to Celestino Afable, Sr. Thus, termination of the co-ownership”. As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that
the petitioners herein filed a case for recovery of property and damages with even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his
notice of lis pendens against the defendant and herein private respondent, own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the
Celestino Afable. In his answer to the complaint filed by the herein sale. From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled
petitioners, Afable claimed that he had acquired the land in question through to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner
prescription and contended that the petitioners were guilty of laches. without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However,
only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the
RTC in its decision, declared Afable as co-owner of the land, having validly buyer a co-owner of the property. It is now settled that the appropriate
bought the 2/6 respective undivided shares of Rosalia and Gaudencio, and recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent were not secured in a
the others having 1/6 share each. The lower court, also, ordered partition of sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares
the land to terminate co-ownership. The CA affimed the decision of RTC. of some of the co-owners is an action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the
However, the appellate court declared that, although registered property Revised Rules of Court. Neither recovery of possession nor restitution can be
cannot be lost by prescription, nevertheless, an action to recover it may be granted since the defendant buyers are legitimate proprietors and
barred by laches, citing the ruling in Mejia de Lucaz v. Gamponia[100 Phil. possessors in joint ownership of the common property claimed.
277 (1956)]. Accordingly, it held the petitioners guilty of laches and dismissed
their complaint. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari of the decision of 2. NO. In the light of the attendant circumstances, defendant-appellee's
the Court of Appeals. defense of prescription is a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the
Civil Code, '(n)o co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership.
ISSUES: Such co-owner may demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in
common, insofar as his share is concerned.' In Budiong v. Bondoc , this
1. What is the effect of the sale of the land owned in common by a co-owner
Court has interpreted said provision of law to mean that the action for
without the consent of other co-owners?
partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by prescription. For Article 494
2. Can Afabel acquire the land through prescription? of the Civil Code explicitly declares: "No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-
owner or co- heir so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
3.Was the petitioners guilty of laches? ownership." Furthermore, the disputed parcel of land being registered under
the Torrens System, the express provision of Act No. 496 that '(n)o title to
HELD: registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired
by prescription or adverse possession' is squarely applicable. Consequently,
1. The rights of a co-owner of a certain property are clearly specified in
prescription will not lie in favor of Afable as against the petitioners who
Article 493 of the Civil Code. “Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full
remain the registered owners of the disputed parcel of land.
ownership of his part and of the acts and benefits pertaining thereto, and he
may therefore alienate assign or mortgage it and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

3. NO. Well-stated in this jurisdiction are the four basic elements of laches, The third element of laches is likewise absent. There was no lack of
namely: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant or of one under whom he knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainants would
claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which assert the right on which they base the suit. On the contrary, private
respondent is guilty of bad faith in purchasing the property as he knew that
the complainant seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the corporations
the property was co-owned by six persons and yet, there were only two
complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the signatories to the deeds of sale and no special authorization to self was
defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute suit; granted to the two sellers by the other co-owners. Even as the land here was
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the misrepresented in the deeds of sale as "unregistered," the truth was that
complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and, (4) injury Afable already had notice that the land was titled in the name of six persons
or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the by virtue of the Certificate of Title which was already in his possession even
complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred. While the first and last before the sale.
It may be gleaned from the foregoing examination of the facts that Celestino
elements are present in this case, the second and third elements are
Afable is not a buyer in good faith. Laches being an equitable defense, he
missing. who invokes it must come to the court with clean hands.
The second element speaks of delay in asserting the complainant's rights. 69. Delima vs. Court of Appeals
However, the mere fact of delay is insufficient to constitute, laches. It is G.R. No. L-46296 September 24, 1991
required that (1) complainant must have had knowledge of the conduct of MEDIALDEA, J.:
defendant or of one under whom he claims and (2) he must have been
afforded an opportunity to institute suit. This court has pointed out that laches Facts: During his lifetime, Lino Delima acquired Lot No. 7758 of the
is not concerned with the mere lapse of time. It must be noted that while Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate in Cebu by sale on installments
there was delay in asserting petitioners' rights, such delay was not attended from the government. Lino Delima later died in 1921 leaving as his
with any knowledge of the sale nor with any opportunity to bring suit. In the only heirs three brothers and a sister namely: Eulalio Delima, Juanita
first place, petitioners had no notice of the sale made by their eldest sister. It Delima, Galileo Delima and Vicente Delima. After his death, TCT No.
is undisputed that the petitioner co-owners had entrusted the care and 2744 of the property in question was issued on August 3, 1953 in the
management of the parcel of land to Rosalia Bailon who was the oldest name of "The Legal Heirs of Lino Delima, deceased, represented by
among them. In the second place, they were not afforded an opportunity to Galileo Delima." On September 22, 1953, Galileo Delima, now substituted
bring suit inasmuch as until 1981, they were kept in the dark about the by respondents, executed an affidavit of "Extra-judicial Declaration of
transactions entered into by their sister. It was only when Delia Bailon- Heirs." Based on this affidavit, TCT No. 2744 was cancelled and TCT
Casilao returned to Sorsogon in 1981 that she found out about the sales and No. 3009 was issued on February 4, 1954 in the name of Galileo
immediately, she and her co-petitioners filed the present action for recovery Delima alone to the exclusion of the other heirs. Galileo Delima
of property. The appellate court thus erred in holding that 'the petitioners did declared the lot in his name for taxation purposes and paid the taxes
nothing to show interest in the land." Now, if knowledge of the sale by thereon from 1954 to 1965. On February 29, 1968, petitioners, who are
Rosalia was conveyed to the petitioners only later, they cannot be faulted for the surviving heirs of Eulalio and Juanita Delima, filed With the Court
the acts of their co-owner who failed to live up to the trust and confidence of First Instance of Cebu (now Regional Trial Court) an action for
expected of her. In view of the lack of knowledge by the petitioners of the reconveyance and/or partition of property and for the annulment of
conduct of Rosalia in selling the land without their consent in 1975 and the TCT No. 3009 with damages against their uncles Galileo Delima and
absence of any opportunity to institute the proper action until 1981, laches Vicente Delima,. Vicente Delima was joined as party defendant by the
may not be asserted against the petitioners. petitioners for his refusal to join the latter in their action.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

The intestate heirs of Januario Avendano executed a document
Issue: Is the petitioners' action for partition is already barred by the entitled "Paghahati at Pagtagabuyan ng Mana sa Labas ng
statutory period provided by law which shall enable Galileo Delima to Hukuman." Through this instrument, extrajudicial partitionwas effected
perfect his claim of ownership by acquisitive prescription to the among the intestate heirs.
exclusion of petitioners from their shares in the disputed property? Co-owners Illuminada, Gregorio, Miguel, Bernardino, Bienvenido,
Numeriano and Rufina, all surnamed Avendaño, in consideration of the
Held: YES. aggregate amount of P500.00, transferred their collective and undivided
When a co-owner of the property in question executed a deed of threefourths (3/4) share in the lot to respondent Ernesto Roque and Victor
partition and on the strength thereof obtained the cancellation of the Roque, thereby vesting in the latter full and complete ownership of the
title in the name of their predecessor and the issuance of a new one property. The transactions were embodied in two (2) separate deeds of sale
wherein he appears as the new owner of the property, thereby in effect both entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Patuluyan" and both duly notarized.
denying or repudiating the ownership of the other co-owners over their Subsequently, in an unnotarized "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan", Emesto and
shares, the statute of limitations started to run for the purposes of the Victor Roque purportedly sold a three-fourths (3/4) undivided portion of the
action instituted by the latter seeking a declaration of the existence of lot their half-sister, petitioner Concepcion Roque, for the same amount. The
the co-ownership and of their rights thereunder.l Evidence shows that property, however, remained registered in the name of the decedent,
TCT No. 2744 in the name of the legal heirs of Lino Delima, Januario Avendaño.
represented by Galileo Delima, was cancelled by virtue of an affidavit Concepcion wanted to have the land for partition so she had the land
executed by Galileo Delima and that on February 4, 1954, Galileo surveyed but Ernesto Roque and the legal heirs of Victor Roque, however,
Delima obtained the issuance of a new title in his name numbered refused to acknowledge petitioner's claim of ownership of any portion of the
TCT No. 3009 to the exclusion of his co-heirs. The issuance of this new lot and rejected the plan to divide the land.
title constituted an open and clear repudiation of the trust or co- Concepcion filed a Complaint for "Partition with Specific
ownership, and the lapse of ten (10) years of adverse possession by Performance" against respondents Ernesto and the heirs of Victor. She also
Galileo Delima from February 4, 1954 was sufficient to vest title in him alleged that, as a co-owner of lot, she had a right to seek partition of the
by prescription. As the certificate of title was notice to the whole world property, that she could not be compelled to remain in the co-ownership of
of his exclusive title to the land, such rejection was binding on the the same.
other heirs and started as against them the period of prescription. In an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, it impugned the
Hence, when petitioners filed their action for reconveyance and/or to genuineness and due execution of the "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" on the
compel partition on February 29, 1963, such action was already barred ground "that the signatures appearing thereon are not the authentic
by prescription. Whatever claims the other co-heirs could have validly signatures of the supposed signatories." It was also alleged that Concepcion
asserted before can no longer be invoked by them at this time. occupied a portion of the lot in question by mere tolerance. Respondents
also refused to honor the unnotarized Kasulatan and, additionally, denied
having had any participation in the preparation of the Subdivision Plan.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of Concepcion but the CA
70. Concepcion Roque vs. Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.
G.R. 75886; August 30, 1988 ISSUE: Can the land be subject to partition despite the adverse decisions of
Feliciano, J. the other co-owners?
FACTS: Januario Avendano was the registered owner of a parcel of land. RULING: YES. The land can be partitioned.
Avendano died as a bachelor and intestate.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

An action for partition-which is typically brought by a person claiming 71. Virgilio B.Aguilar v. CA, and Senen B. Aguilar .
to be co-owner of a specified property against a defendant or defendants
whom the plaintiff recognizes to be co-owners — may be seen to present [G.R. No. 76351, October 29, 1993
simultaneously two principal issues. First, there is the issue of whether the
plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned. Bellosillo, J.
Second, assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first issue, there
is the secondary issue of how the property is to be divided between plaintiff
and defendant(s) — i.e., what portion should go to which co-owner.
th th
Should the trial court find that the defendants do not dispute the FACTS: Petitioner Virgilio (7 child) and respondent Senen (5 child) are
status of the plaintiff as co-owner, the court can forthwith proceed to the brothers who purchased a house and lot in Parañaque where their father
actual partitioning of the property involved. In case the defendants assert in could spend and enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood.
their Answer exclusive title in themselves adversely to the plaintiff, the court
Initially, the brothers agreed that Virgilio's share in the co-ownership was
should not dismiss the plaintiffs action for partition but, on the contrary and in
the exercise of its general jurisdiction, resolve the question of whether the two-thirds while that of Senen was one-third. Later on, by virtue of a written
plaintiff is co-owner or not. Should the trial court find that the plaintiff was memorandum dated 23 February 1970, Virgilio and Senen agreed that their
unable to sustain his claimed status as co-owner, or that the defendants are interests in the house and lot should be equal, with Senen assuming the
or have become the sole and exclusive owners of the property involved, the remaining mortgage obligation of the original owners with the Social Security
court will necessarily have to dismiss the action for partition. This result System (SSS) in exchange for his possession and enjoyment of the house
would be reached, not because the wrong action was commenced by the
together with their father. Since Virgilio was then disqualified from obtaining a
plaintiff, but rather because the plaintiff having been unable to show co-
ownership rights in himself, no basis exists for requiring the defendants to loan from SSS, the brothers agreed that the deed of sale would be executed
submit to partition the property at stake. If, upon the other hand, the court and the title registered in the meantime in the name of Senen. After
after trial should find the existence of co-ownership among the parties Maximiano Aguilar died in 1974, Virgilio demanded from Senen that the
litigant, the court may and should order the partition of the property in the latter vacate the house and that the property be sold and proceeds thereof
same action. Judgment for one or the other party being on the merits, the divided among them. Senen refused so Virgilio filed an action to compel the
losing party (respondents in this case) may then appeal the same. In either sale of the house and lot so that the they could divide the proceeds between
case, however, it is quite unnecessary to require the plaintiff to file another
them. When the case was set for pre-trial, Senen and his counsel whom he
action, separate and independent from that for partition originally instituted.
Functionally, an action for partition may be seen to be at once an action for granted a Special Power of Attorney to attend pre-trial failed to attend
declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a resulting to the rendition of judgement in default. Trial Court ruled that
determinate portion of the property involved. This is the import of our petitioner and respondents are co-owners of subject house and lot in equal
jurisprudence on the matter and is sustained by the public policy which shares; either one of them may demand the sale of the house and lot at any
abhors multiplicity of actions. time and the other cannot object to such demand; thereafter the proceeds of
The Court ordered the heirs of the late Victor Roque and Ernesto the sale shall be divided equally according to their respective interests; to
Roque, to execute a deed of confirmation of the sale made by Ernesto and
pay plaintiff P1,200.00 as rentals from January 1975 up to the date of
Victor Roque in favor of plaintiff Concepcion Roque. The partition of the
parcel of land will be granted in accordance with the approved subdivision decision plus interest. CA set aside this decision that is why Virgilio filed a
plan. petition for review on certiorari.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

72. TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE, INC., vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. ALEJANDRO S. MARQUEZ, CRISANTA DE CASTRO,
ISSUE: Did the CA erred in setting aside the decision of the trial court on the ELPIDIA DE CASTRO, EFRINA DE CASTRO, IRENEO DE CASTRO and
merits of the case and remanding the same for pre-trial? ARTEMIO DE CASTRO ADRIANO
G.R. No. 124262 October 12, 1999
QUISUMBING, J.
HELD: Yes, the CA erred in setting aside the decision of the trial court. The
Court uphold the trial court in ruling in favor of petitioner, except as to the FACTS:
effectivity of the payment of monthly rentals by respondent as co-owner Private respondents filed an action for Partition before the Regional Trial
which we here declare to commence only after the trial court ordered Court of Morong, Rizal. They alleged that their predecessor-in-interest, Juan
respondent to vacate in accordance with its order of 26 July 1979. Being a De Castro, died intestate in 1993 and they are his only surviving and
co-owner respondent has the right to use the house and lot without paying legitimate heirs. They also alleged that their father owned a parcel of land
any compensation to petitioner, as he may use the property owned in located at Barrio San Juan, Morong, Rizal. They further claim that in 1979,
common so long as it is in accordance with the purpose for which it is without their knowledge and consent, said lot was sold by their brother
intended and in a manner not injurious to the interest of the other co-owners. Mariano to petitioner. The sale was made possible when Mariano
Each co-owner of property held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the represented himself as the sole heir to the property. The private respondents
whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than contend that the sale made by Mariano affected only his undivided share to
that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners, the reason being that the lot in question but not the shares of the other co-owners equivalent to
until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot be determined four fifths (4/5) of the property. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending
and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants joint lack of jurisdiction and prescription and/or laches. The trial court dismissed
ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and the complaint. Petitioner appealed contending that the RTC acted with grave
enjoyment of the same. When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of abuse of discretion and authority in taking cognizance of the case.
the property and the trial court granted the petition and ordered the ejectment
of respondent, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to ISSUE:
enjoy the possession jointly also ceased. Thereafter, the continued stay of Does the sale of the co-owned land made by Mariano covers the shares of
respondent and his family in the house prejudiced the interest of petitioner as the other co-owners?
the property should have been sold and the proceeds divided equally
between them. To this extent and from then on, respondent should be held HELD:
liable for monthly rentals until he and his family vacate. No. The Court ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his,
the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners
who did not consent to the sale.
Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, the sale or other disposition affects only
the seller's share pro indiviso, and the transferee gets only what corresponds
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

to his grantor's share in the partition of the property owned in common. Since alleged that to the best of their knowledge there is no mortgage or
a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property encumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting said parcels of land nor is
by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and there any person having any estate or interest thereon, legal or equitable in
void. However, only the rights of the co-owner/seller are transferred, thereby possession, remainder, reversion or expectancy, and that they acquired said
making the buyer a co-owner of the property. The proper action in a case like lands by purchase from the spouses VICTORIANO CERVO and IGNACIA
this, is not for the nullification of the sale, or for the recovery of possession of GUILLERMO as evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed by the latter in favor
the property owned in common from the third person, but for division or of the former. They further alleged that That the said parcels of land are not
partition of the entire property if it continued to remain in the possession of occupied by anybody;
the co-owners who possessed and administered it. Such partition should
result in segregating the portion belonging to the seller and its delivery to the Petitioner filed an OPPOSITION to said application alleging —
buyer.
That the oppositor Rizal Cement Co., Inc. is in possession of said land and
has been religiously paying the real estate tax in the Municipality of
Petitioner's defense of prescription against an action for partition is a vain
Binangonan, Rizal from the time it had acquired said property from the
proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, "no co-owner shall be
previous owner
obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co- owner may demand at
anytime the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is Private respondents, in REPLY to said OPPOSITION, countered that the
concerned." Court has interpreted said provision of law to mean that the whole three (3) parcels of land known as Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 4 of Plan Psu-
action for partition is imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by prescription. For 2260 do not belong to the petitioner; that a portion of Lot No. 1 consisting of
Article 494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares: "No prescription shall lie in 6,133 square meters and portion of Lot No. 4 consisting of 19,916 square
favor of a co-owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly meters belong to them; that they and their predecessors-in-interest have
recognizes the co-ownership." been in continuous, adverse and open possession of said portion since time
immemorial; and that they have been religiously paying the real estate taxes
73.RIZAL CEMENT VS CONSUELO VILLAREAL thereon.
G.R. No. L-30272 February 28, 1985
Judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance on April 28, 1965
CUEVAS, J: denied the application for registration and orderedthe issuance of a decree of
registration after finality of said decision in the name of Rizal Cement
Company.
Facts :
Respondents appealed to the then Court of Appeals which reversed and set
Sometime in December 1955, private respondents filed with the then Court of aside the lower court's decision. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but
First Instance of Rizal in Pasig, an Application for Registration for a two was denied.
parcels of agricultural land assessed at a total amount of Php 1,500 (Php
Petitioners assailed the CA decision stating that
1190 and Php 310 respectively) in the Province of Rizal. Respondents
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

a) Reliance on the Deed of Sale purporting to have been executed by Maria possession of the properties since 1911, while several portions thereof were
Certeza in 1924 in favor of Apolonia Francisco, the due execution of which only under lease to several persons.
have been duly established, and made capital of this deed of sale as having
ejected the transfer of rights over the lots in question, successively from the Based on respondents-applicants' testimonial and documentary evidence, it
original vendor down to herein private respondents; appears that the property applied for, designated as Lots Nos. 1 and 2 of
Plan Psu-147662, have a total area of 26,015 square meters; that these lots
b) Giving much weight to private respondents evidence to the effect that originally belonged to one Maria Certeza; that upon her death, the property
former Justice Mariano de Joya and one Gonzalo Certeza were former was involved in a litigation between her grandchildren and Gonzalo Certeza
owners of the property in question, and that they are the predecessors-in- and that the lots were given by the latter to former Justice de Joya as the
interest of the applicants-respondents. However, the Court of Appeals failed latter's attorney's fees; that the lots were then sold by de Joya to Filomeno
to consider the fact that these persons who were then available and were the Sta. Ana who, in turn sold the same to spouses Victoriano Cervo and Ignacia
best witnesses to substantiate applicants' claim, were not presented as Guillermo in 1939; that sometime in November 1955, the said spouses sold
witnesses thereby giving rise to the legal presumption that their testimonies the said lots to the herein applicants ; that the spouses Cervo declared the
would have been adverse had they testified in this case; property for taxation purposes in the name of the wife, Ignacia Guillermo, and
paid for the realty taxes due thereon; that prior to the sale, the spouses
c) Failure of the Court of Appeals to consider the fact that the two (2) lots Cervo had the two parcels surveyed first in 1950 and then in 1955.
sought to be registered by private respondents were not listed in the
inventory of Maria Certeza's properties submitted to the court; Upon the other hand, oppositor, (now petitioner) Rizal Cement Company,
claims to be the owner of the subject lots, having bought the same from
d) Failure of the Court of Appeals to rule that private respondents were not Maria Certeza, and to have been in continuous and adverse possession of
able to prove that the properties covered by Exhibit "H" were the same the property since 1911, To substantiate its claim, petitioner submitted
properties covered in Exhibit "I". The Court of Appeals has acted contrary to documentary evidence, to wit,Plan Psu-2260 which covers the survey of a
the doctrine laid down in land registration cases to the effect that an applicant big tract of land for the company designated as Lots 1, 2 and 4 of the Plan
must prove not only the genuineness of his title but also the Identity of the with a total area of 210,644 square meters. The survey was made in 1911
land applied for; and the plan was approved in 1912; A sketch plan of the geographical
position of the real pro- parties of Madrigal and Company; Tax Declaration
e) Stressing that the evidence of petitioner (then oppositor) was weak to
No. 1066 secured in 1949 from the Rizal Provincial Assessor which is a
substantiate its claim but failed to apply the doctrine that the burden is upon
consolidation of all lands of the Rizal Cement Company located in Darangan
the applicant for registration of land to prove satisfactorily that he is the
with a total area of 2,496,712 square meters and which includes the land in
owner and it is not enough to prove that the property does not belong to the
litigation; Tax Declaration No. 10570 which cancels Tax Declaration No.
opponent. The evidence must be absolute and not merely preponderant; and
1066; and Real estate tax receipts issued for Madrigal and Company,
f) In stating that applicants by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest covering among others the land applied for.
have an unbroken adverse possession under claim of ownership for over
Issue:
thirty years thus failing to consider that petitioner has also been in
Does the Petitioner have a better right to the land in question?
70
PROPERTY DIGESTS

Held: effective proofs. Neither can the survey plan or technical descriptions
prepared at the instance of the party concerned be considered in his favor,
No. Being an attribute of ownership, appellants' possession of the land in the same being self-serving.
question goes far to tip the scale in their favor. The right to possess flows
from ownership. No person will suffer adverse possession by another of what Apropos thereto is the appellate court's finding that —
belongs to him. Were the oppositor- appellee rightful owner of the land in
question, it would not have allowed the tenants to cultivate the land and give Against the chains of tax declarations presented by the applicants-appellants
the owner's share to appellants and/or their predecessors. It would have which originated beyond 1920 from Maria Certeza, undisputably the original
opposed the survey for applicants' vendors on May 21 and 28, 1950 and July owner of Lots 1 and 2, the oppositor-appellee presented no tax declaration
31, 1955, but did not as shown in the surveyor's certificate, If oppositor really which could refer specifically to the two lots in question. Tax Declaration No.
bought Lot 2 from Maria Certeza in 1909 as claimed, it has not been 10570 (Exhibit 35-1949) for the oppositor-appellee admittedly does not
explained how she could sell a portion thereof to Apolonia Francisco on April indicate any of the two lots in question. Indeed, the senior deputy assessor of
15, 1924 by deed On the other hand, applicants' vendors in mortgaging the Rizal, as witness for the oppositor-appellee, categorically declared that his
two lots to Pedro Picones in 1952, Exhibits 0 and 01, for P11, 000.00, office refused to issue tax declaration for the land covered by its Plan Psu-
exercised a dominical act; and Aniano Bautista's testimony that the Cervos 2260, for the reason that the same had been in possession of various
were not owners of the land challenges belief since Bautista was a witness to persons in Darangan.
Exhibits 0 and 0-1, being uncle of Picones.
Anent the allegation of petitioner to the effect that tile subject lands, full
Very significantly petitioner did not present any witness in actual possession technical description of which are found in Psu-147662 approved in October
of the land in question. 1955, covers portion of Lots 1 and 4 of Psu-2260, the Court of Appeals
correctly observed —
As aptly found by the appellate court, respondents possess the property in
the concept of an owner. The only documentary evidence which the oppositor-appellee may capitalize
for its claim of ownership is the notation in applicants' plan Exhibit D that the
Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise lots in question are portions of a previous survey made in 1911 for oppositor,
of a right or by the fact it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper Plan Psu-2260. The survey plan however has no original record in the
2
acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. Bureau of Lands. Be that as it may, survey plans merely delimit areas sought
to be registered. Besides, the annotation relied upon by the lower court in its
Petitioner's evidence, consisting of tax receipts, tax declaration and survey judgment in favor of the oppositor is nothing more than what it imports - a
plan are not conclusive and indisputable basis of one's ownership of the previous survey. Neither the plan nor its approval carried with it any
property in question. Assessment alone is of little value as proof of title. Mere adjudication of ownership. The, Director of Lands through approval merely
tax declaration does not vest ownership of the property upon the certifies that the survey has been made in accordance with approved
declarant. Settled is the rule that neither tax receipts nor declaration of methods and regulations in force. (Philippine Executive Commission vs.
ownership for taxation purposes alone constitutes sufficient evidence of Antonio, CA-G.R. No. 8456, February 12, 1943)
ownership or of the right to possess realty. They must be supported by other
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ISSUE/S: Is Wong the rightful possessor of the property?
74. IGNACIO WONG, V. HON. LUCAS D. CARPIO

HELD: No. Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or
G.R. NO. 50264 OCTOBER 21, 1991. the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will,
or by the proper acts and legal formalities for acquiring such right." (Art. 531,
BIDIN J
Civil Code; Rizal Cement Co., Inc. v. Villareal, 135
SCRA 15 [1985]); and that the execution of a sale thru a public instrument
shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing, unless there is stipulation to
FACTS: Private respondent Manuel Mercado acquired a parcel of land from
the contrary. If, however, notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the
William Giger by virtue of a deed of sale. Mercado harvested coconut fruits
purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and
on the land and paid the taxes thereon. He went periodically to the land to
make use of it herself because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by
make copra. Neither did he reside on the land as he is a businessman and
another, then delivery has not been effected.
storekeeper by occupation. Meanwhile, Petitioner Ignacio Wong went to the
land in litigation to find out if there were other people residing there or
claiming it besides the owner and he found none. So, he bought the parcel of
land in litigation from William Giger. Possession passed from vendor William Giger to private respondent Manuel
Mercado by virtue of the contract of their contract of sale. The sale in favor of
Wong placed laborers on the land in suit, built a small farm house after
Wong failed to pass the possession of the property because there is an
making some clearings and fenced the boundaries. He also placed impediment — the possession exercised by Mercado.
signboards.
Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different
Later on, Mercado again went to the land in suit to make copras.
personalities except in the cases of co-possession. Should a question arise
Mercado filed a complaint for forcible entry against Mercado. Wong in
regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if
claiming that the Mercado has not established prior possession, argues that there are two possessions, the one longer in possession, if the dates of
Mercado’s periodic visit to the lot to gather coconuts may have been possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if these
consented to and allowed or tolerated by the owner thereof for the purposes conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending
of paying an obligation that may be due to the person gathering said nuts determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings
and that a person who enters a property to gather coconut fruits and convert (Art. 538, Civil Code).
the same to copras may only be a hired laborer who enters the premises
every harvest season to comply with the contract of labor with the true owner
of the property. 75. Eden Ballatan and Sps. Betty Martinez and Chong Chy Ling v. Court
of Appeals, Gonzalo Go, Winston Go, Li Ching Yao, Araneta Institute of
Agriculture and Jose N. Quedding
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G.R. No. 125683; March 2, 1999 of taking. Hence, this petition. Petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals
PUNO, J.: erred when it applied equity or equitable solutions to the instant case. They
argued that the CA under the guise of applying equity but in effect a very
Facts: apparent partiality and favor to respondents Go, the CA ordered payment of
The case involves a dispute over forty-two square meters of residential land the encroached area at the value at the time of its taking and not the value at
belonging to petitioners. The parties are owners of adjacent lots. Lot No. 24 the time of payment, thereby enriching the Go's but depriving petitioners of
is registered in the name of petitioners Eden Ballatan and spouses Betty the fruits or increase in value of their property to which they are entitled
Martinez and Chong Chy Ling. Lots Nos. 25 and 26 are registered in the under the law as the registered owners with Torrens title in their names.
name of respondent Gonzalo Go, Sr. On Lot No. 25, respondent Winston Go, Issue: May the respondents be considered builders in good faith?
son of Gonzalo Go, Sr., constructed his house. Adjacent to Lot No. 26 is Lot Held:
No. 27, and is registered in the name of respondent Li Ching Yao. In 1985, Yes, the respondents are builders in good faith and are entitled to the rights
petitioner Ballatan constructed her house on Lot No. 24. During the under Article 448 of the Civil Code.
construction, she noticed that the concrete fence and side pathway of the All the parties are presumed to have acted in good faith. Their rights must,
adjoining house of respondent Winston Go encroached on the entire length therefore, be determined in accordance with the appropriate provisions of the
of the eastern side of her property. Ballatan informed respondent Go of this Civil Code on property. Article 448 of the Civil Code provides that “the owner
discrepancy and his encroachment on her property. Respondent Go claimed of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith,
that his house, including its fence and pathway, were built within the shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting,
parameters of his father's lot; and that this lot was surveyed by Engineer after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to
Quedding, the authorized surveyor of the Araneta Institute of Agriculture oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one
(AIA), the owner-developer of the subdivision project. who sowed the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be
A relocation survey upon request of the parties was made by the Engineer obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the
Quedding. He found that Lots Nos. 25, 26 and 27 moved westward to the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of
eastern boundary of Lot No. 24. Lot No. 24 lost approximately 25 square the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
meters on its eastern boundary. Lot No. 25, although found to have indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
encroached on Lot No. 24, did not lose nor gain any area. Lot No. 26 lost disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.”
some three square meters, which were gained by Lot No. 27 on its western Article 448 has been applied to improvements or portions of improvements
boundary. On the basis of this survey, petitioner Ballatan made a written built by mistaken belief on land belonging to the adjoining owner. The claim
demand on respondents Go to remove and dismantle their improvements on that the discrepancy in the lot areas was due to AIA's fault was not proved. It
Lot No. 24. Respondents Go refused. The parties including Li Ching Yao met was the erroneous survey by Engineer Quedding that triggered these
several times to reach an agreement on the matter, but failed. Ballatan discrepancies. And it was this survey that respondent Winston Go relied
instituted against respondents Go a case for recovery of possession before upon in constructing his house on his father's land. Respondents Go had no
the RTC. knowledge that they encroached petitioners' lot. They are deemed builders in
The trial court ordered the Go's to vacate the subject portion of Lot No. 24, good faith until the time petitioner Ballatan informed them of their
demolish their improvements and pay petitioner Ballatan actual damages. encroachment on her property. Respondent Li Ching Yao built his house on
The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court. Instead of his lot before any of the other parties did. He constructed his house in 1982,
ordering respondents Go to demolish their improvements on the subject land, respondents Go in 1983, and petitioners in 1985. There is no evidence, much
the Court of Appeals, on appeal, ordered them to pay petitioner Ballatan, and less, any allegation that respondent Li Ching Yao was aware that when he
respondent Li Ching Yao to pay respondents Go, a reasonable amount for built his house he knew that a portion thereof encroached on respondents
that portion of the lot which they encroached, the value to be fixed at the time Go's adjoining land. Petitioners, as owners of Lot No. 24, may choose to
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

purchase the improvement made by respondents Go on their land, or sell to Maglucot in 1927. In 1952, Tomas Maglucot, one of the registered owners
respondents Go the subject portion. If buying the improvement is impractical and respondents’ predecessors-in-interest, filed a petition to subdivide lot No.
as it may render the Go's house useless, then petitioners may sell to 1639. The trial court issued an order directing the parties to subdivide said lot
respondents Go that portion of Lot No. 24 on which their improvement
into six portions as follows: (a) Hermogenes Olis – Lot 1639-A, (b) Pascual
stands. If the Go's are unwilling or unable to buy the lot, then they must
vacate the land and, until they vacate, they must pay rent to petitioners. Olis - Lot 1639-B, (c) Bartolome Maglucot - Lot 1639-C, (d) Roberto (Alberto)
Petitioners cannot compel respondents Go to buy the land if its value is Maglucot - Lot 1639-D, (e) Anselmo Lara - Lot 1639-E, and (f) Tomas
considerably more than the portion of their house constructed thereon. If the Maglucot - Lot 1639-F.
value of the land is much more than the Go's improvement, the respondents
Go must pay reasonable rent. If they do not agree on the terms of the lease, In 1963, Guillermo Maglucot rented a portion of Lot No. 1639-D (subject lot).
then they may go to court to fix the same. In the event that petitioners elect to Subsequently, Leopoldo and Severo, both surnamed Maglucot, rented
sell to respondents Go the subject portion of their lot, the price must be fixed portions of subject lot in 1964 and 1969, respectively, each paying rentals
at the prevailing market value at the time of payment. The Court of Appeals therefor. Said respondents built houses on their corresponding leased lots.
erred in fixing the price at the time of taking, which is the time the
They paid the rental amount of P100.00 per annum to Mrs. Ruperta Salma,
improvements were built on the land. This is a case of an owner who has
been paying real estate taxes on his land but has been deprived of the use of representing the heirs of Roberto Maglucot, petitioners’ predecessors-in-
a portion of this land for years. Article 448 and the same conditions interest. In 1992, however, said respondents stopped paying rentals claiming
abovestated also apply to respondents Go as owners and possessors of their ownership over the subject lot.
land and respondent Li Ching Yao as builder of the improvement that
encroached on thirty-seven square meters of respondents Go's land. Maglucot-Aw et al. asserted that respondents were estopped from claiming
Therefore, the respondents are builders in good faith and are entitled to their to be co-owners of the subject lot in view of the mutual agreement in 1946,
rights under Article 448 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, the decision of the judicial confirmation in 1952, and respondents’ acquiescence because they
Court of Appeals is modified to conform with the provisions of Article 448 of
themselves exclusively exercised ownership over Lot No. 1639-A beginning
the Civil Code.
1952 up to the present. On the other hand, respondents contended the
76. Gavina Maglucot-Aw et al. v. Leopoldo Maglucot et al. following: (1) The petitioners failed to show that the interested parties were
apprised, or notified of the tentative subdivision contained in the sketch; (2)
G.R. No. 132518, March 28, 2000 The petitioners were unable to show any court approval of any partition; and
(3) Lot No. 1639 remained undivided since OCT No. 6275 was a perfectly
Kapunan, J. valid title, containing no annotation of any encumbrance or partition
whatsoever.
The RTC found the existence of tax declarations in the names of

Facts: Gavina Maglucot-Aw et al. instituted a complaint for recovery of
Hermogenes Olis and Pascual Oils (purported owners of Lots 1639-A and
possession and damages with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete
1639-B, respectively) as proof that there was a subdivision of Lot No. 1639. It
City, alleging that they were owners of Lot No. 1639-D. The lot was originally
likewise found that Tomas Maglucot commenced the action for partition. It
part of Lot No. 1639 issued in the names of Hermogenes Olis, Bartolome cited Article 1431 of the Civil Code which states that “through estoppel an
Maglucot, Pascual Olis, Roberto Maglucot, Anselmo Lara and Tomas admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.” appears that “the parties are unable to agree upon the partition” directed by
It held that while there was no court order showing that Lot No. 1639 was the court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court
partitioned, its absence could not be used by Tomas Maglucot, or with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second
respondents as his successors-in-interest, to deny the existence of an stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its
approved partitioned against the other co-owners who claim that there was approval by the court after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be
one. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto
It ruled that the sketch plan and tax declarations relied upon by petitioners entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in
were not conclusive evidence of partition. question. Such an order is, to be sure, final and appealable.
Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and

who took possession of the portion allotted to them, are estopped to question
Issue: Was there a valid partition in 1952? title to portion allotted to another party. A person cannot claim both under
and against the same instrument. In other words, they accepted the lands
awarded them by its provisions, and they cannot accept the decree in part,
Ruling: Yes, the parties partitioned Lot No. 1639 in 1952. An action for and repudiate it in part. They must accept all or none. Parties who had
partition is comprised of two phases: (1) an order for partition which received the property assigned to them are precluded from subsequently
determines whether a co-ownership in fact exists, and whether partition is attacking its validity of any part of it. Here, respondents, by themselves
proper; and (2) a decision confirming the sketch or subdivision submitted by and/or through their predecessors-in-interest, already occupied of the lots in
the parties or the commissioners appointed by the court, as the case may be. accordance with the sketch plan. This occupation continued until this action
was filed. They cannot now be heard to question the possession and
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the ownership of the other co-owners who took exclusive possession of Lot
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, (i.e., not 1639-D also in accordance with the sketch plan.
otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all
the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration Hence, the petition is granted.
that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership
does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, upon the other
hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is
proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the
defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, “the
parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition among themselves by
proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so
agreed upon. In either case – i.e., either the action is dismissed or partition
and/or accounting is decreed – the order is a final one, and may be appealed
by any party aggrieved thereby. The second phase commences when it
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUENA and RUPERTA MENDOZA LIRIO vs. Possession by the petitioners does not prevail over that of the respondent.
HONORATA MENDOZA BOLANTE Possession by the former before 1985 was not exclusive, as the latter also
G.R. No. 137944; April 6, 2000 acquired it before 1985. Before 1985, the subject land was occupied and
PANGANIBAN, J.: cultivated by Sinforoso. When respondent came of age in 1948, she paid
realty taxes for the years 1932-1948. Margarito declared the lot for taxation in
FACTS: his name in 1953 and paid its realty taxes beginning 1952. Based on Article
Sinforoso Mendoza, father of respondent, died in 1930, leaving a parcel of 538 of the Civil Code, the respondent is the preferred possessor because,
land originally declared for taxation purposes in his name. Margarito benefiting from her father's tax declaration of the subject lot since 1926, she
Mendoza, Sinforoso’s brother, and father of petitioners, contested such tax has been in possession thereof for a longer period. On the other hand,
declaration through an affidavit. The tax declaration was cancelled and a new petitioners' father acquired joint possession only in 1952.
one was issued in the name of Margarito. Respondent was then occupying
the said property. Later, a cadastral survey was done on the property. During Hence, the respondent’s longer possession of the disputed land made her its
such survey, a dispute on the ownership of the land ensued between preferred possessor.
respondent and Miguel Mendoza, brother of petitioners. Petitioners
contended that their tax receipts and declarations proved their ownership. On 2. YES. The respondent’s tax receipts and declarations of ownership for
the other hand, respondent alleged that her actual, physical, exclusive, and taxation, coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, make her
continuous possession of the land since 1985 gave her a better title under the rightful owner of the disputed land.
Article 538 of the Civil Code.
Tax receipts and declarations are prima facie proofs of ownership or
ISSUE: possession of the property for which such taxes have been paid. Coupled
1. Did the respondent’s longer possession of the disputed land make with proof of actual possession of the property, they may become the basis
her its preferred possessor? of a claim for ownership. By acquisitive prescription, possession in the
2. Did the respondent’s tax receipts and declarations of ownership for concept of owner -- public, adverse, peaceful and uninterrupted -- may be
taxation, coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, converted to ownership. On the other hand, mere possession and occupation
make her the rightful owner of the disputed land? of land cannot ripen into ownership.
RULING: Being the sole heir of her father, respondent showed through his tax receipt
1. YES. The respondent’s longer possession of the disputed land made her that she had been in possession of the land for more than ten years since
its preferred possessor. 1932. When her father died in 1930, she continued to reside there with her
mother. Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when the
Article 538 provides that “possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the petitioners' father claimed the land. But by then, her possession, which was
same time in two different personalities except in the cases of co-possession; in the concept of owner -- public, peaceful, and uninterrupted-- had already
and that should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present ripened into ownership. Furthermore she herself, after her father's demise,
possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one longer in declared and paid realty taxes for the disputed land. In contrast, the
possession; if the dates of the possession are the same, the one who petitioners, despite thirty-two years of farming the subject land, did not
presents a title; and if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed acquire ownership. It is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere
in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership occupation. Unless coupled with the element of hostility toward the true
through proper proceedings.” owner, occupation and use, however long, will not confer title by prescription
or adverse possession.
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If the Government is justified in disturbing the possession of the applicants, it
Hence, the respondent’s tax receipts and declarations of ownership for can only be on the ground that they have abandoned their property, or that it
taxation, coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, make her has been totally destroyed and has now become a part of the public domain
the rightful owner of the disputed land. by the erosive action of the sea. It is quite clear that applicants have never
abandoned their possession under a claim of ownership of this land. And we
JUAN N. ARAGON vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT think the facts above stated fully sustain a finding that there has been no
G.R. No. L-6019; March 25, 1911 such destructive or total loss of the property as would justify a holding that
CARSON, J.: the owners have lost possession. Doubtless the property has been injured by
the erosive action of the sea. Doubtless the owners in order to profitably
FACTS: enjoy the possession of this property will be compelled to make some
Inocencio Aragon sought the registration of a piece of land in question in his relatively small expenditure by way of a "fill" or a retaining wall. But the actual
name. He alleged that he and his predecessors have been in possession of condition of the property as it appears from the record makes a claim that it
this land under claim of ownership. This land was completely covered by the has been totally lost or destroyed preposterous and wholly untenable.
waters of Manila Bay during high tide, but it was completely bare during low
tide. With some expenditure by way of a “fill”, Aragon was able to utilize the Hence, the petitioner did not lose his right of possession because of the
land and build a house. The Government of the Philippine Islands, however, nature of the land in question.
opposed the registration of the said land, arguing that they could not have
possessed the land since it is a part of the public domain, the same being a CATHOLIC VICAR APOSTOLIC OF THE MOUNTAIN PROVINCE VS.
shore. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 80294-95; September 21, 1988
ISSUE: GANCAYCO, J.
Did the petitioner lose his right of possession because of the nature of the
land in question? FACTS:
RULING: Vicar filed with the CFI of Baguio an application for registration of title over
NO. The petitioner did not lose his right of possession because of the nature Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4. However, the Heirs of Valdez and the Heirs of Octaviano
of the land in question. opposed and asserted ownership and title to Lots 2 and 3. After trial, the
court confirmed the registrable title of VICAR to the lots. On appeal, the CA
Article 460 of the Civil Code provides that the possessor may lose his reversed the decision of the land registration court and dismissing the
possession: VICAR's application as to Lots 2 and 3. The Both heirs of Octaviano and
1. By the abandonment of the thing. heirs of Valdez filed their MR praying for the transfer to their names Lot 3 (for
2. By transfer to another for a good or valuable the latter) and Lots2 and 3 (for the former). The CA denied both MR.
consideration. Thereupon, the VICAR filed with the SC petition for review on certiorari of the
3. By the destruction or total loss of the thing or by the thing decision of the CA dismissing its application for registration of Lots 2 and 3.
becoming unmarketable. On the other hand, the Heirs of Valdez filed their own petition for review for
4. By the possession of another, even against the will of the the denial of their MR. Both petitions were denied in a minute resolution.
former possessor, if the new possession has lasted more Upon the finality of both SC resolutions, the Heirs of Octaviano filed with the
than one year. then CFI of Baguio a Motion For Execution of Judgment praying that the
Heirs of Octaviano be placed in possession of Lot 3. The Court denied the
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

motion on the ground that the decision in CA-G.R. No. 38870 did not grant Valdez and Octaviano. Both Valdez and Octaviano had Free Patent
the Heirs of Octaviano any affirmative relief. Aggrieved, the Heirs of Application for those lots since 1906. The predecessors of private
Octaviano filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and mandamus but the respondents, not petitioner Vicar, were in possession of the questioned lots
same was dismissed. Subsequent to the foregoing, the Heirs of Octaviano since 1906.
and the Heirs of Valdez filed separately a complaint for recovery of
possession of Lots 2 and 3 respectively. In these two cases, the heirs of The CA found that the predecessors-in-interest and heirs of Valdez and
Valdez and Octaviano argued that the defendant Vicar was barred from Octavio were possessors under claim of ownership in good faith from 1906;
setting up the defense of ownership and/or long and continuous possession that Vicar was only a bailee in commodatum; and that the adverse claim and
of the two lots in question since this was barred by prior judgment of the CA repudiation of trust came only in 1951.
under the principle of res judicata. They contend that the question of
possession and ownership have already been determined by the CA. On his heirs of Valdez and Octavio were able to prove that their predecessors'
part, Vicar maintained that the principle of res judicata would not prevent house was borrowed by Vicar after the church and the convent were
them from litigating the issues of long possession and ownership because destroyed. They never asked for the return of the house, but when they
the dispositive portion of the prior judgment merely dismissed their allowed its free use, they became bailors in commodatum and Vicar the
application for registration and titling of lots 2 and 3. it contended that only bailee. The bailees' failure to return the subject matter of commodatum to the
the dispositive portion of the decision, and not its body, is the controlling bailor did not mean adverse possession on the part of the borrower. The
pronouncement of the CA. bailee held in trust the property subject matter of commodatum. The adverse
claim of petitioner came only in 1951 when it declared the lots for taxation
ISSUE: purposes.
Did Vicar acquired title to lots 2 and 3 by acquisitive prescription?
Therefore, action of Vicar by such adverse claim could not ripen into title by
RULING: way of ordinary acquisitive prescription because of the absence of just title.
No, Vicar was in possession as borrower in commodatum up to 1951, when it
repudiated the trust by declaring the properties in its name for taxation EDCA PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTING CORP. vs. SPOUSES LEONOR
purposes. When Vicar applied for registration of Lots 2 and 3 in 1962, it had and GERARDO SANTOS
been in possession in concept of owner only for eleven years. G.R. No. 80298 April 26, 1990
CRUZ, J.:
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession for ten years, but
always with just title. Extraordinary acquisitive prescription requires 30 years. FACTS:
Professor Jose Cruz placed an order by telephone with the EDCA for 406
The CA found that petitioner did not meet the requirement of 30 years books, payable on delivery. EDCA prepared the corresponding invoice and
possession for acquisitive prescription over Lots 2 and 3. Neither did it satisfy delivered the books as ordered, for which Cruz issued a personal check
the requirement of 10 years possession for ordinary acquisitive prescription covering the purchase price. Cruz sold 120 of the books to Leonor Santos
because of the absence of just title. The appellate court did not believe the who paid him after verifying the seller's ownership from the invoice he
findings of the trial court that Lot 2 was acquired from Juan Valdez by showed her. EDCA having become suspicious and made inquiries with the
purchase and Lot 3 was acquired also by purchase from Egmidio Octaviano DLSU where he had claimed to be a dean and was informed that there was
by Vicar because there was absolutely no documentary evidence to support no such person in its employ. Further verification revealed that Cruz had no
the same and the alleged purchases were never mentioned in the application more account or deposit with the Philippine Amanah Bank. EDCA then went
for registration. By the very admission of Vicar, Lots 2 and 3 were owned by to the police, which set a trap and arrested Cruz, the police forced their way
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into the store of spouses Santos. They seized the 120 books without warrant, cautious — in fact, too trusting in dealing with the impostor. Although it had
loading them in a van belonging to EDCA. Ownership of the books was never transacted with him before, it readily delivered the books he had
recognized in favor of the spouse Santos by the MTC, which was sustained ordered (by telephone) and as readily accepted his personal check in
by the RTC, which was in turn sustained by CA.The EDCA argued that it payment. It did not verify his identity although it was easy enough to do this.
was, because the impostor acquired no title to the books that he could have It did not wait to clear the check of this unknown drawer. Worse, it indicated
validly transferred to Spouses Santos. It reasoned that, as the payment in the sales invoice issued to him, by the printed terms thereon, that the
check bounced for lack of funds, there was a failure of consideration that books had been paid for on delivery, thereby vesting ownership in the buyer.
nullified the contract of sale between it and Cruz.
Surely, the Leonor Santos did not have to go beyond that invoice to satisfy
ISSUE: herself that the books being offered for sale by Cruz belonged to him; yet she
Was EDCA unlawfully deprived of the books thereby having a right to rcover did. Although the title of Cruz was presumed under Article 559 by his mere
the same from Spouses Santos under Article 559 of the Civi Code? possession of the books, these being movable property, Leonor Santos
nevertheless demanded more proof before deciding to buy them.
RULING:
No, Spouses Santos acquired the books in good faith and EDCA was It would certainly be unfair now to make Spouses Santos bear the prejudice
negligent in transacting with Cruz. sustained by EDCA as a result of its own negligence. There is no justice in
transferring EDCA's loss to the Santoses who had acted in good faith, and
The article runs in full as follows: with proper care, when they bought the books from Cruz.
Art. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has Hence, being negligent, EDCA was not unlawfully deprived and, thus, cannot
been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in recover what had been lost and in possesion of Spouses Santos in good
possession of the same. faith.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully
deprived has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot Consuelo S. De Garcia v. Court of Appeals
obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor. G.R. No. L-20264; January 30, 1971
FERNANDO, J.:
One may well imagine the adverse consequences if the phrase "unlawfully
deprived" were to be interpreted in the manner suggested by the EDCA. A FACTS:
person relying on the seller's title who buys a movable property from him Angelina Guevarra while talking to Consuelo S. de Garcia, owner of La
would have to surrender it to another person claiming to be the original Bulakeña restaurant, recognized her ring in the finger of De Garcia and
owner who had not yet been paid the purchase price therefor. The buyer in inquired where she bought it, which the De Garcia answered from her
the second sale would be left holding the bag, so to speak, and would be comadre. Guevarra explained that that ring was stolen from her house
compelled to return the thing bought by him in good faith without even the several months ago. De Garcia handed the ring to Guevarra and it fitted her
right to reimbursement of the amount he had paid for it. finger. Two or three days later, at the request of Guevarra, her husband Lt.
Col. Juan Guevara, Lt. Cementina of Pasay PD, and her attorney proceeded
It bears repeating that in the case before us, Leonor Santos took care to to the store of Mr. Rebullida to whom they showed the ring in question. Mr.
ascertain first that the books belonged to Cruz before she agreed to Rebullida examined the ring with the aid of high power lens and after
purchase them. The EDCA invoice Cruz showed her assured her that the consulting the stock card thereon, concluded that it was the very ring that
books had been paid for on delivery. By contrast, EDCA was less than plaintiff bought from him. The ring was returned to de Garcia who despite a
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

written request therefor failed to deliver the ring to Guevarra. Guevarra filed FERNANDO, J.:
an action for the recovery of the lost ring. As a defense, De Garcia asserted
the she purchased the ring from another person, who got the ring from the FACTS:
original owner thereof. Lourdes Suntay is the owner of a three-carat diamond ring valued at
P5,500.00. Suntay and Clarita Sison entered into a transaction wherein the
ISSUE: Who has a better right between the two? former’s ring was delivered to the latter for sale on commission. Upon
receiving the ring, Sison executed and delivered to the Suntay the receipt.
HELD: After the lapse of a considerable time without Sison having returned to
Guevarra has a better right. Suntay the latter’s ring. The Suntay made demands on Sison for the return of
her ring but the latter could not comply with the demands because, without
The controlling provision is Article 559 of the Civil Code. It reads thus: "The the knowledge of the Sunta, the ring was pledged by Melia Sison, niece of
possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. the husband of Sison, evidently in connivance with the latter, with the
Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived Dominador Dizon’s pawnshop. Subsequently thereafter, Suntay, through her
thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the same. If the lawyer, wrote a letter to Dizon asking for the delivery her ring pledged. Since
possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully Dizon refused to deliver the ring, Suntay filed an action for the recovery of
deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot the ring.
obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor." Respondent
Angelina D. Guevara, having been unlawfully deprived of the diamond ring in ISSUE: Is Suntay entitled to the recovery of the ring?
question, was entitled to recover it from petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia
who was found in possession of the same. The only exception the law allows HELD:
is when there is acquisition in good faith of the possessor at a public sale, in Yes.
which case the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price.
As authoritative interpreted in Cruz v. Pahati, the right of the owner cannot be There is a fairly recent restatement of the force and effect of the governing
defeated even by proof that there was good faith by the acquisition by the codal norm in De Gracia v. Court of Appeals. Thus: "The controlling provision
possessor. There is a reiteration of this principle in Aznar v. Yapdiangco. is Article 559 of the Civil Code. It reads thus: 'The possession of movable
Thus: "Suffice it to say in this regard that the right of the owner to recover property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who
personal property acquired in good faith by another, is based on his being has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it
dispossessed without his consent. The common law principle that where one from the person in possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable
of two innocent persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by the another, lost of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good
the law imposes the loss upon the party who, by his misplaced confidence, faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing
has enabled the fraud to be committed, cannot be applied in a case which is the price paid therefor.' Respondent Angelina D. Guevara, having been
covered by an express provision of the new Civil Code, specifically Article unlawfully deprived of the diamond ring in question, was entitled to recover it
559. Between a common law principle and statutory provision, the latter must from petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia who was found in possession of the
prevail in this jurisdiction." same. The only exception the law allows is when there is acquisition in good
faith of the possessor at a public sale, in which case the owner cannot obtain
Thus, Guevarra has a better right over the ring. its return without reimbursing the price. As authoritatively interpreted in Cruz
v. Pahati, the right of the owner cannot be defeated even by proof that there
Dominador Dizon v. Lourdes Suntay was good faith in the acquisition by the possessor. There is a reiteration of
G.R. No. L-30817; September 29, 1972 this principle in Aznar v. Yapdiangco. Thus: 'Suffice it to say in this regard
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

that the right of the owner to recover personal property acquired in good faith
by another, is based on his being dispossessed without his consent. The FACTS: Eusebio and petitioners had a dispute over the possession of a
common law principle that were one of two innocent persons must suffer by a certain parcel of public land in the year. Eusebio had filed a lease application
fraud perpetrated by another, the law imposes the loss upon the party who, for a parcel of land containing an area of about 349 hectares. A portion of
by his misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed, cannot which was occupied by petitioners herein, Leonardo L. Azarcon and his
be applied in a case which is covered by an express provision of the new companions, under a homestead application. Hence, there was a conflict
Civil Code, specifically Article 559. Between a common law principle and a between the lessee and the homesteaders. Before the dispute could be
statutory provision, the latter must prevail in this jurisdiction." settled, Eusebio filed a complaint alleging that he had acquired a big parcel
of land, 349 hectares in area, by lease; that while he was in possession,
Hence, Suntay is entitled to the recovery of the ring. defendants occupied a portion. Azarcons were ordered to vacate and pay
damages. While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, a writ for the
LEDESMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS execution of the judgment of the lower court was issued ordering Azarcon to
G.R. NO. 86051 SEPTEMBER 1, 1992 remove from the premises and let Eusebio to have restitution of the same,
FACTS: A man pretending to be a member of the Consunji family was able Azarcon continued to enter the premises and gather the palay, which was
to deceive Citywide Motors into selling and delivering to him two cars in then pending harvest. It is found out that the palay had been planted and
exchange for fraudulent checks. Citywide sought to recover the cars, cultivated by Azarcon who had been in possession of the land.
recovered one, but found the other one in the possession of Jaime Ledesma
who claims to have purchased it in good faith and for value from one ISSUE/S: Is Azarcon allowed to gather the palay during the pendency of the
Armando Suarez. The CA awarded Citywide the right to repossess the car to case?
which Ledesma takes exception arguing that Art. 559 of the New Civil Code
invoked by Citywide is inapplicable to this case as it was not unlawfully HELD: Yes. Under the law a person who is in possession and who is being
deprived of the cars. ordered to leave a parcel of land while products thereon are pending harvest,
has the right to a part of the net harvest, as expressly provided by Article 545
ISSUE/S: Was there unlawful taking against Citywide? of the Civil Code.
ART. 545. If at the time the good faith ceases, there should be any natural or
HELD: NO. The rule is that such ownership shall pass from the vendor to the industrial fruits, the possessor shall have a right to a part of the expenses of
vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the cultivation, and to a part of the net harvest, both in proportion to the time of
purchase price has not yet been paid. Ownership in the thing sold shall not the possession.
pass to the buyer until full payment of the purchase price only if there is a
stipulation to that effect. Non-payment only creates a right to demand The rice found on the disputed land at the time of the service of the order of
payment or to rescind the contract, or to criminal prosecution in the case of execution had been planted by Azarcon, who appear to have been in
bouncing checks. possession of the land from 1951. While the court ordered Azarcon to move
Here, it cannot be said that Citywide was unlawfully deprived of its cars as it out from the premises, it did not prohibit them from gathering the crop then
voluntarily delivered the car to the deceiver and thereby transferred existing thereon As the order of execution did not expressly prohibit Azarcon
ownership thereto. It could not therefore, invoke the remedy granted by the from gathering the pending fruits, which fruits were the result of their
provision it invokes as the same applies only to the owner of a thing. possession and cultivation of the land, it cannot be said that the Azarcon
committed an act which is clear violation of the courts' order.
AZARCON VS. EUSEBIO
G.R. NO. L-11977 APRIL 29, 1959 Felipa Cordero v. Victoria Cabral
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

G.R. No. L-36789; July 25, 1983 Martin Mendoza v. Manuel de Guzman
Abad Santos, J. G.R. No. L-28721; October 5, 1928
Malcolm, J.
Facts:
Petitioners are the heirs of Gregorio Ocampo who allegedly was the
registered owner of the disputed Lot No. 5. When the petitioners took Facts:
possession of the lot, they found out that the southern portion of the same In a cadastral proceeding, a lot was adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs, Martin
was possessed by the defendants. Due to the defendant’s occupancy, the Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez, subject to the right of retention on the part of
plaintiffs argued that they failed to realize a yearly harvest of at least ten (10) Manuel de Guzman until he shall be indemnified for the improvements
cavanes of palay at the rate of P10.00 per cavan, from the harvest-time of existing to the land. A writ of possession was granted to Manuel on June 25,
1958, time of the death of Gregorio, up to the present. The defendant alleged 1924 and has been in possession and enjoyment of the land since then up to
that she and her predecessors in interest are the real owners and have been the present time. Plaintiffs then requested the court to (a) fix the amount of
in actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession of the lot. The trial indemnity to be paid to Manuel and (b) require Manuel to render accounting
court and court of appeals dismissed the complaint. of the fruits received by him and order the value of the fruits be applied to the
payment of the necessary and useful expenses.
Issue:
Are the heirs of the registered owner entitled to the fruits of a lot in Issues:
possession of a possessor in good faith from the time of the death of the 1. Should the value of indemnity to be paid be fixed according to the
registered owner? necessary and useful expenses incurred Manuel?
2. Would the value of fruits received by Manuel be applied to the
Ruling: indemnity to which he is entitled?
No. The heirs of the registered owner are entitled to the fruits of the lot only
from the time the service of summons. Ruling:
1. Yes. The value of indemnity shall be fixed according to the
Art. 528 of the civil code provides that good faith cease when the possessors necessary and useful expenses incurred by Manuel.
were served with summons to answer the complaint. Further, Art. 549 of the
civil code provides that possessors in bad faith shall reimburse the fruits In accordance with the provisions of articles 435 and 454 in relation
received and those which the legitimate possessor could have received. with article 361 of the Civil Code, the value of the "indemnization" to
be paid to the defendant should be fixed according to the necessary
The defendants, by their own admission, are in possession of the disputed and useful expenses incurred by him in introducing "las plantaciones
land. There is no evidence that they were possessors in bad faith. However, en cuestion."
their good faith ceased when they were served with summons to answer the
complaint. As possessors in bad faith from the service of the summons they Here the plaintiffs have chosen to take the improvements introduced
"shall reimburse the fruits received and those which the legitimate possessor on the land and are disposed to pay the amount of the necessary
could have received. and useful expenses incurred by the defendant.
Hence, the heirs are entitled to fruits thereof pursuant to Article 549 of the 2. Yes. The value of fruits received by Manuel be applied to the
Civil Code from the service of the summons. indemnity to which he is entitled.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

The value of the fruits received by the defendant should first be introduced into the house be paid to her. HERMANOS brought suit against
applied to the payment of the "indemnizacion," and in that it exceeds her for ejectment.
the value of the "indemnizacion," the excess shall be returned to the
plaintiffs. ISSUES:
1) Is Robles the owner of the improvements and hence, has the right
Inasmuch as the retentionist, who is not exactly a posessor in good to demand payment of their value? Moreover, does she have the right to
faith within the meaning of the law, seeks to be reimbursed for the retain the possession of the house until payment of the value of the said
necessary and useful expenditures, it is only just that he should improvements?
account to the owners of the estate for any rents, fruits, or crops he 2) Was Robles a possessor in good faith when she made those
has gathered from it. improvements?
Therefore, the value of fruits received by Manuel be applied to the HELD:

indemnity to which he is entitled. 1) YES. Article 453 of the Civil Code provides that “Necessary
expenditures shall be refunded to every possessor, but only the possessor in
good faith may retain the thing until they are repaid to him. Useful
expenditures shall be paid the possessor in good faith with the same right to
ROBLES AND MARTIN vs. LIZZARAGA HERMANOS retention, the person who has defeated him in his possession having the
G.R. No. L-16736, December 22, 1921 opinion of refunding the amount of such expenditures or paying him the
ROMUALDEZ, J.: increase in value which the thing has acquired by reason thereof.”
FACTS: Anastasia de la Rama died leaving six children surnamed Robles, The expenditures incurred in these improvements were not
and some properties, among which is house No. 4 on Iznart Street in the city necessary inasmuch as without them the house would have continued to
of Iloilo. The children and heirs of Anastasia de la Rama entered into stand just as before, but were useful, inasmuch as with them the house
partnership with Lizarraga Hermanos (HERMANOS) in liquidation and better serves the purpose for which it was intended, being used as a
settlement of their accounts, by virtue of which the competent court awarded residence, and the improvements consisting of the addition of a dining room,
to said partnership the properties left by the deceased, including the kitchen, closet, and bathroom in the lower and upper stories of the house,
aforesaid house. Evarista Robles (ROBLES), one of the said heirs, since and a stable, suitable as a coach house and dwelling, it is beyond doubt that
before the death of her mother, has been with her husband occupying the such improvements are useful to the building.
aforesaid house by permission of her mother, and later on by the consent of
her coheirs. Lastly, she entered into an agreement with HERMANOS that the 2) YES. Article 434 provides that "good faith is always presumed and
house be sold to them in the future with payment of rent in the amount of P40 the burden of proving bad faith on the part of the possessor rests upon the
in the meantime. Because of such agreement, they made some person alleging it." Hermanos did not allege nor prove in the first instance the
improvements on the house. bad faith characterizing Robles' possession who began to occupy the house
by permission of the former owner and continued later in the occupation by
However, sometime thereafter, HERMANOS notified ROBLES that beginning the consent of her coheirs, and afterwards by considering herself the future
April next year the rent of the upper story of the house would be raised to owner of the building by virtue of the contract with the present owner,
sixty pesos (P60) a month, and that, if she did not agree to the new rate of Hermanos. Said improvements were begun after the agreement with
rent, she might vacate the house. ROBLES refused to pay such a new rate of Hermanos for the sale thereof to Robles.
rent and to vacate the house until the value of the improvements she
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

Therefore, since the improvements were useful and Robles' ISSUE: Does a possessor in bad faith have the right to remove useful
possession was in good faith, she is entitled to reimbursement and to retain improvements?
the building until the same is made.
HELD: NO. Article 449 of the Civil Code provides that "he who builds, plants
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Court of Appeals or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or
G.R. No. L-54526, August 25, 1986 sown without right to indemnity." As a builder in bad faith, NAWASA lost
FERIA, J.: whatever useful improvements it had made without right to indemnity.
Moreover, under Article 546 of said code, only a possessor in good faith shall
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA be refunded for useful expenses with the right of retention until reimbursed;
which affirmed the decision of the then CFI of Pangasinan which declared and under Article 547 thereof, only a possessor in good faith may remove
respondent City of Dagupan the lawful owner of the Dagupan Waterworks useful improvements if this can be done without damage to the principal thing
System and held that the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and if the person who recovers the possession does not exercise the option
(NAWASA), now petitioner Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System of reimbursing the useful expenses. The right given a possessor in bad faith
(MWSS), was a possessor in bad faith and hence not entitled to indemnity for to remove improvements applies only to improvements for pure luxury or
the useful improvements it had introduced. mere pleasure, provided the thing suffers no injury thereby and the lawful
possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying the value they have at
The facts of the case show that The City of Dagupan filed a complaint the time he enters into possession.
against NAWASA now MWSS, for recovery of the ownership and possession
of the Dagupan Waterworks System. NAWASA interposed as one of its In the Matter of the testate estate of Emil Bachrach vs Sophie Seifert
special defenses R.A. 1383 which vested upon it the ownership, possession GR No. L-2659 October 12, 1950
and control of all waterworks systems throughout the Philippines and as one Ozaeta, J.
of its counterclaims the reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred for
necessary and useful improvements amounting to P255,000.00. Facts:
When Emil Bachrach died, he left no forced heir except his wife Mary
The trial court, as well as, the appellate court held that these useful expenses Bachrach. In his last will, he stated that he is bequeathing and devising to
were made in utter bad faith for they were instituted after the complaint was Mary all the fruits and usufruct of the remainder of all his estate after
filed and after numerous Supreme Court decisions were promulgated payment of the legacies, bequests, and gifts.
declaring unconstitutional the taking by NAWASA of the patrimonial
waterworks systems of cities, municipalities and provinces without just The estate of E. M. Bachrach, as owner of 108,000 shares of stock of the
compensation. Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc., received from the latter 54,000 shares
representing 50 per cent stock dividend on the said 108,000 shares. On June
MWSS now seeks to remove such useful improvements. The City of 10, 1948, Mary McDonald Bachrach, as usufructuary or life tenant of the
Dagupan argues that petitioner, as a possessor in bad faith, has absolutely estate, petitioned the lower court to authorize the Peoples Bank and Trust
no right to the useful improvements. Even assuming that petitioner has the Company as administrator of the estate of E. M. Bachrach, to her the said
right to remove the useful improvements, such improvements were not 54,000 share of stock dividend by endorsing and delivering to her the
actually identified, or even if they could be identified, they could not be corresponding certificate of stock, claiming that said dividend, although paid
separated without causing substantial injury or damage to the Dagupan out in the form of stock, is fruit or income and therefore belonged to her as
Waterworks System. usufructuary or life tenant.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

Respondents Sophie Seifert and Elisa Elianoff , legal heirs of the deceased, Facts:
opposed said petition on the ground that the stock dividend in question was An unregistered parcel of land was owned by Jose Hemedes, father of
not income but formed part of the capital and therefore belonged not to the petitioner, which the former donated inter vivos with a resolutory condition in
usufructuary but to the remainderman. And they have appealed from the favor of his third wife Justa Kauapin. The resolutory condition reads:
order granting the petition and overruling their objection.
(a) Upon the death or remarriage of the DONEE, the title to the property
Issue: Is a stock dividend fruit or income, which belongs to the usufructuary, donated shall revert to any of the children, or their heirs, of the DONOR
or is it capital or part of the corpus of the estate, which pertains to the expressly designated by the DONEE in a public document conveying the
remainderman? property to the latter; or
(b) In absence of such an express designation made by the DONEE before
Held: her death or remarriage contained in a public instrument as above provided,
Stock dividends are civil fruits. the title to the property shall automatically revert to the legal heirs of the
DONOR in common.
Under section 16 of our Corporation Law, no corporation may make or
declare any dividend except from the surplus prof its arising from its Pursuant to the first condition abovementioned, Justa Kauapin executed on
business. Any dividend, therefore, whether cash or stock, represents surplus September 27, 1960 a Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property
profits. Article 471 of the Civil Code provides that the usufructuary shall be by Reversion conveying to Maxima Hemedes, the petitioner the subject
entitled to receive all the natural, industrial, and civil fruits of the property in property but the usufructuary remained with Kauapin during her lifetime.
usufruct. And articles 474 and 475 provide as follows:
However, the property was foreclosed when Hemedes failed to pay his loan
ART. 474. Civil fruits are deemed to accrue day by day, and belong to the with R&B Insurance- the latter being the highest bidder. The usufructuary of
usufructuary in proportion to the time the usufruct may last. Kauapin was respected nonetheless.
ART. 475. When a usufruct is created on the right to receive an income or Kauapin however transferred the same property to a stepson, Enrique
periodical revenue, either in money or fruits, or the interest on bonds or Hemedes. Enrique in turn sold the property to Dominion Realty which the
securities payable to bearer, each matured payment shall be considered as latter leased to Asia Brewery. Asia Brewery constructed two warehouses in
the proceeds or fruits such right. the lot. Hence, R & B demanded its right as the lawful owner of the property.
Issue:
When it consists of the enjoyment of the benefits arising from an interest in Who is the rightful owner of the property?
an industrial or commercial enterprise, the profits of which are not distributed
at fixed periods, such prof its shall have the same consideration. Held:
R & B Insurances claim is entitled to the protection as a mortgagee in good
In either case they shall be distributed as civil fruits, and shall be applied in faith.
accordance with the rules prescribed by the next preceding article.
It is a well-established principle that every person dealing with registered
Hemedes vs CA land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued and
GR No. 107132 October 8, 1999 the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the
Gonzaga-Reyes, J. condition of the property.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another premises is to receive the rents therefrom when due; and that as
without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such usufructuary she has no right nor authority to administer the said premises
property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such nor to lease them nor to evict tenants, which right and authority are vested in
purchase or before he has notice of the claim of another person. the intervenor as owner of the premises. Judgment was accordingly rendered
ordering the defendant Ngo Soo to vacate the premises and to pay the rents.
It is a well-settled principle that where innocent third persons rely upon the The complaint in intervention was dismissed.
correctness of a certificate of title and acquire rights over the property, they
cannot just disregard such rights. Otherwise, public confidence in the ISSUE: Does Fabie have the right under the will and the judgment in
certificate of title, and ultimately, the Torrens system, would be impaired for question to occupy said premises herself?
everyone dealing with registered property would still have to inquire at every
instance whether the title has been regularly or irregularly issued. Being an HELD:
innocent mortgagee for value, R & B Insurance validly acquired ownership Yes.
over the property, subject only to the usufructuary rights of Justa Kausapin It is admitted by the parties that the petitioner Josefa Fabie is the
thereto, as this encumbrance was properly annotated upon its certificate of usufructuary of the income of the property in question and that the
title. respondent Juan Grey is the owner thereof. It is likewise admitted that by
virtue of a final judgment entered in civil case No. 1659 of the Court of First
Fabie vs. David Instance of Manila between the usufructuary and the owner, the former has
G.R. No. L-123. December 12, 1945 the right to collect all the rents of said property for herself with the obligation
Ozaeta, J. on her part to pay all the real estate taxes, special assessments, and
insurance premiums, and make all necessary repairs thereon, and in case
FACTS: default on her part the owner shall have the right to do all those things, in
Josefa Fabie is the usufructuary of the income of certain houses in Santo which event he shall be entitled to collect all subsequent rents of the property
Cristo, Bindondo, Ongpin and Santa Cruz Manila. The owner of Santo Cristo concerned until the amount paid by him and the expenses of collection are
property is Juan Grey, while those of the Ongpin property are other person fully satisfied, after which the usufructuary shall again collect the rents. There
not concern herein. In June 1945 Josefa Fabie commenced an action of is therefore no dispute as to the title to or the respective interests of the
unlawful detainer against Ngo Boo Soo alleging in her amended complaint parties in the property in question. The naked title to the property is to
that the defendant is occupying the premises located at Santo Cristo and a admittedly in the respondent Juan Grey, but the right to all the rents thereof,
door, without plaintiff's consent and contrary to their agreement, had been with the obligation to pay the taxes and insurance premiums and make the
subleased by Ngo Boo Soo to another Chinese, but plaintiff refused, based necessary repairs, is, also admittedly, vested in the usufructuary, the
on the fact that the she badly needs the said house to live in as her house; petitioner Josefa Fabie, during her lifetime. The only question between the
that defendant was duly notified, to leave the said premises, but he refused; plaintiff and the intervenor is: Who has the right to manage or administer the
and she prayed for judgment of eviction and for unpaid rentals. The property — to select the tenant and to fix the amount of the rent? Whoever
defendant answered alleging that he was and since 1908 had been a tenant has that right has the right to the control and possession of the property in
of the premises in question, which he was using and had always used question, regardless of the title thereto.
principally as a store and secondarily for living quarters; that he was renting it
from its owner and administrator Juan Grey. And because Fabie is only a We think that, as a corollary to her right to all the rent, to choose the tenant,
usufructuary, she has no right to eject tenants. Juan Grey intervened and and to fix the amount of the rent, she necessarily has the right to choose
alleged that he is the owner and Fabie is a usufructuary. The only right herself as the tenant thereof, if she wishes to; and, as she fulfills her
recognized in favor of Josefa Fabie as usufructuary of the income of said obligation to pay the taxes and insure and conserve the property properly,
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

the owner has no legitimate cause to complain. As Judge Nable of the
municipal court said in his decision, "the pretension that the plaintiff, being a Yes. It was the sincere intention and desire of the testator to reward his
mere usufructuary of the rents, cannot occupy the property, is illogical if it be nephew Vicente Aranas for his faithful and unselfish services by allowing him
taken into account that that could not have been the intention of the to enjoy one-half of the fruits of the testator’s third group of properties until
testatrix." Vicente’s death and/or refusal to act as administrator in which case, the
administration shall pass to anyone chosen by Carmelo Aranas among his
We find that upon the pleadings, the undisputed facts, and the law the action sons and upon Carmelo’s death, his sons will have the power to select one
instituted in the municipal court by the petitioner Josefa Fabie against the among themselves. Vicente Aranas therefore as a usufructuary has the right
respondent Ngo Soo is one of unlawful detainer, within the original to enjoy the property of his uncle with all the benefits which result from the
jurisdiction of said court, and that therefore Judges Dizon and Gutierrez normal enjoyment (or exploitation) of another’s property, with the obligation
David of the Court of First Instance erred in holding otherwise and in to return, at the designated time, either the same thing, or in special cases its
quashing the case upon appeal. equivalent. This right of Vicente to enjoy the fruits of the properties is
temporary and therefore not perpetual as there is a limitation namely his
Vda de Aranas vs Aranas death or his refusal. Likewise his designation as administrator of these
G.R. No. L-56249, May 29, 1987 properties is limited by his refusal and/or death and therefore it does not run
Paras, J counter to Art. 870 of the Civil Code relied upon by the petitioners. Be it
noted that Vicente Aranas is not prohibited to dispose of the fruits and other
FACTS: benefits arising from the usufruct. Neither are the naked owners (the other
Fr. Teodoro Aranas, a priest of the Roman Catholic Church, died. He had heirs) of the properties, the usufruct of which has been given to Vicente
executed his Last Will and Testament which was admitted to probate. In said Aranas prohibited from disposing of said naked ownership without prejudice
Last Will and Testament, Fr. Teodoro Aranas which stipulates that the of course to Vicente’s continuing usufruct.
special administration of the remainder of the estate of the testator by
Vicente Aranas, a faithful and serviceable nephew and designating him also NICOLAS VALISNO v FELIPE ADRIANO
as recipient of 1/2 of the produce of said properties after deducting the G.R. No. L-37409 May 23, 1988
expenses for the administration and the other 1/2 of the produce to be given GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.::
to the Catholic Church for the eternal repose of the testator’s soul.
ISSUE:
FACTS:
Does the property of the testate estate of the late Fr. Teodoro Aranas are Plaintiff is the absolute owner and actual possessor of a land in Nueva Ecija,
subject to remunerative legacies by way of usufruct of the net proceeds of with TCT No. NT-16281. He bought the land from the respondent’s sister,
1/2 of the estate after deducting expenses for administration in favor of Honorata Adriano Francisco. The land which is planted with watermelon,
Vicente Aranas, during his lifetime and shall continue an administrator of the peanuts, corn, tobacco, and other vegetables adjoins that of the respondent
estate, and, who, upon his death or refusal to continue such usufruct, may be Felipe Adriano on the bank of the Pampanga River. Both parcels of land had
succeeded by any of the brothers of the administrator as selected by their been inherited by Honorata and Felipe from their father. At the time of the
father, Carmelo Aranas, if still alive or one selected by his sons if Carmelo is sale of the land to Nicolas Valisno, the land was irrigated by water from the
dead? Pampanga River through a canal about seventy (70) meters long, traversing
the Respondent's land.
HELD:
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

In 1959, Respondent levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that Plaintiff estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance
was deprived of the irrigation water and prevented from cultivating his 57- of either of them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the
hectare land. execution of the deed.
Plaintiff filed in the Bureau of Public Works and Communications a complaint
for deprivation of water rights. This provision shall also apply in case of the division of a thing owned in
common on by two or more persons (Civil Code)
A decision was rendered ordering Adriano to reconstruct the irrigation canal.
Instead of restoring the irrigation canal, the appellee asked for a This provision was lifted from Article 122 of the Spanish Law of Waters which
reinvestigation of the case by the Bureau of Public Works and provided:
Communications. A reinvestigation was granted. Article 122. Whenever a tract of irrigated land which previously received its
In the meantime, Plaintiff rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own expense waters from a single point is divided through inheritance, sale or by virtue of
because his need for water to irrigate his watermelon fields was urgent. some other title, between two or more owners, the owners of the higher
estates are under obligation to give free passage to the water as an
Later, he filed a complaint for damages in the RTC claiming that he suffered easement of conduit for the irrigation of the lower estates, and without right to
damages when he failed to plant his fields that yearfor lack of irrigation water, any compensation therefore unless otherwise stipulated in the deed of
and when he reconstructed the canal. Meanwhile, the Secretary of Public conveyance. (Art. 122, Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866.)
Works and Communications reversed the Bureau's decision by issuing a final
resolution dismissing Valisno's complaint. The Secretary held that Eladio No enlightened concept of ownership can shut out the Idea of restrictions
Adriano's water rights which had been granted in 1923 ceased to be enjoyed thereon, such as easements. Absolute and unlimited dominion is
by him in 1936 or 1937, when his irrigation canal collapsed. His non-use of unthinkable, inasmuch as the proper enjoyment of property requires mutual
the water right since then for a period of more than five years extinguished service and forbearance among adjoining estates (Amor vs. Florentino, 74
the grant by operation of law, hence the water rights did not form part of his Phil. 403).
hereditary estate which his heirs partitioned among themselves.
The deed of sale in favor of Plaintiff included the "conveyance and transfer of
ISSUE: the water rights and improvements" appurtenant to Honorata's property.
Did the Plaintiff acquire the easement of water over Respondent’s land? According to the Plaintiff, the water right was the primary consideration for
his purchase of Honorata's property, for without it the property would be
HELD: unproductive.
Yes. The plaintiff acquired the easement for water over respondent’s land.
The existence of the irrigation canal on Respondent’s land for the passage of Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes,
water from the Pampanga River to Honorata's land prior to and at the time of which are appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the
the sale of Honorata's land to the plaintiff was equivalent to a title for the land, although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser's
vendee of the land to continue using it as provided in Article 624 of the Civil easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor's land
Code (Doctrine of Apparent Sign): cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a third person. The fact
that an easement by grant may also have qualified as an easement of
Article 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two necessity does detract from its permanency as property right, which survives
estates, established or maintained by the owner of both shall be considered, the determination of the necessity.
should either of them be alienated, as a title in order that he easement may
continue actively and passively, unless at the time, theownership of the two Therefore, as an easement of waters in favor of the appellant has been
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance or Petitioners’ counsel asked DAR as to who (petitioners or respondent Helen
wrongful interference, such as the appellee's act of levelling the irrigation Schon) should receive the rents which respondent tenants have been giving
canal to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River. to Helen Schon. The DAR District Officer decided that such rents as of
October 1972 were properly considered as amortization payments for the
RAMONA R. LOCSIN, TERESITA R. GUANZON, CELINA R. SIBUG; MA. land and as such should belong to the landowners and not to the
LUISA R. PEREZ; EDITHA R. YLANAN,; and ANA MARIE R. usufructuary.
BENEDICTO, v HONORABLE JUDGE VICENTE P. VALENZUELA, Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch III and Petitioners filed a civil case for collection of rentals plus damages with prayer
SPOUSES JOSEPH SCHON and HELEN BENNETT SCHON for preliminary injunction against spouses Joseph and Helen Schon. They
G.R. No. L-51333 February 19, 1991 assert that since the land subject to Helen Schon's usufructuary rights was
covered by PD No. 27, the rental payments which the respondent spouses
RAMONA R. LOCSIN,; TERESITA R. GUANZON,; CELINA R. SIBUG,; had been collecting from the tenants belong to the petitioners starting from
MA. LUISA R. PEREZ; EDITHA R. YLANAN and ANA MARIE R. 21 October 1972 as amortization payments for the land. Petitioners sought to
BENEDICTO v CARLOS PANALIGAN, AMADO MARQUEZ, HERBERT recover from the Schons all such rentals and prayed for injunction to prevent
PEDROS, ANTONIO FELICIANO, JR., HUGO AGUILOS, ALBERTO respondents from collecting any further rentals from the said tenants.
GUBATON, JULIA VDA. DE ESQUELITO, SERAFIN JANDOQUELE, However, respondents Schon contend that Article 609 of the Civil Code must
SEREFIAS ESQUESIDA, CARLOS DELA CRUZ, ELISEO GELONGOS, be applied assuming that arguendo that the Court of First Instance of Negros
ESPINDION JOCSON, SALVADOR MUNUN, ULFIANO ALEGRIA, and did have jurisdiction.
IRINEO BALERA, and the Spouses JOSEPH SCHON and HELEN
BENNETT SCHON Five months after from filing the civil complaint, petitioners filed a second
G.R. No. L-52289 February 19, 1991 complaint with the Court of Agrarian Relations. Petitioners prayed that the
FELICIANO, J.: respondent tenants be required to pay to petitioners (rather than to the
spouses Schon) all future rentals beginning with the crop year of 1978 and
FACTS: every year thereafter, until full payment of the amortization payment
Petitioners Ramona R. Locsin, Teresita Guanzon, Celia R. Sibug, Maria computed by the DAR.
Rosa R. Perez, Editha Ylanan and Ana Marie R. Benedicto were co-owners
of “Hacienda Villa Regalado", an agricultural located in Canlaon City, Negros However, the respondents Schon once again questioned the jurisdiction of
Occidental with TCT Title No. T-494 stating Lot No. 2-C-A-3 with an area of the Court of Agrarian Relations.
60.07464 hectares was subject to the lifetime usufructuary rights of The respondent tenants agreed with the Schons that there was no tenancy
respondent Helen Schon. Helen Schon collected rental payments from the relationship with regard ot the land they cultivated since is under "Operation
lessee-tenants. Land Transfer", and prayed that the petitioners and the usufructuary be
required to settle their issues with the proper court.
On the occasion of martial law, the land in question including the usufruct of
Helen Schon was under the “Operation Land Transfer” in accordance with The Court declared that two (2) cases were within the jurisdiction of
Presidential Decree No. 27 - "Emancipation of Tenants." Thus, Department appropriate Regional Trial Court by virtue of the provisions of Section 19 (7)
of Agrarian Relations (DAR) employees told the tenants-tillers of Hacienda of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and so non-jurisdictional issues should be
Villa Regalado to make and submit to the Bureau of Land Office the settled. The Solicitor General filed a motion for intervention on behalf of the
necessary parcellary map sketch. Government as directed by the Court.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

ISSUES: leasehold system did continue to govern the relationship between the
(1) Are the the naked owners entitled for the he amounts paid by the tenants "landowner and his tenant-tillers".
beginning 21 October 1972? xxx xxx xxx
(2) Are the payments made on 21 October 1972 considered as payments It is also important to adduce Department Circular No. 8, dated 1 April 1975,
on the price of the land itself instead of civil fruits of the land? issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform pursuant to Presidential
(3) Does a usufructuary still have rights after the effectivity of Presidential Decree No. 27 and which constitutes contemporaneous administrative
Decree No. 27? construction of Presidential Decrees Nos. 27 and 57. Department Circular
No. 8 stated that:
HELD: xxx xxx xxx
(1)Yes. The the naked owners are entitled to receive the amounts paid by the 3. Tenant-farmers are deemed owners of the land they till as of October 21,
tenants. 1972, subject to the rules and regulations to be hereafter promulgated. On
lands already covered by Operation Land Transfer, the leasehold system
We observe that under Presidential Decree No. 2, the basic statute, the shall be provisionally maintained and the lease rentals paid by the tenant-
tenant-farmer became owner of a family-size farm of five (5) hectares or, if farmers to the landowner [shall] be credited as amortization payments.
the land was irrigated, three (3) hectares, and that the tenant-owner had to Payment of rentals shall be stopped when the Land Bank shall have paid the
pay for the cost of the land within fifteen (15) years by paying fifteen (15) cost of land. On lands not yet covered by Operation Land Transfer, leasehold
equal annual amortization payments. Thus, it appears clear that ownership shall continue to govern the relationship between the landowner and his
over lands (like Lot No. 2-C-A-3) subjected to Operation Land Transfer tenant-tillers. (Emphasis supplied)
moved from the registered owner (the old landowner) to the tenants (the new Finally, after the effective date of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No.
landowners). The fifteen (15) annual amortizations to be paid by the tenants- 228 dated 17 July 1987 was promulgated and provided in part as follows:
owners were intended to replace the landholdings which the old landowners SECTION 1. All qualified farmer beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as
gave up in favor of the new landowners, the tenants-owners. It follows that in of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential
respect of land subjected to Operation Land Transfer, the tenants-farmers Decree No. 27 (hereinafter referred to as P.D. No. 27).
became owners of the land they tilled as of the effective date of Presidential xxxxxxxx
Decree No. 27, i.e., 21 October 1972. The exemption of the old landowner from the capital gains tax on the
amortization payments made to him by the tenants-purchasers, under
(2) Yes. Payments in October 21, 1972 are considered as payments on the Presidential Decree No. 57 (supra), underscores the fact, referred to above,
price of the land. that ownership or dominion over the land moved immediately from landowner
Pending full payment of the cost of the land to the old landowner by the Land to tenant-farmer, rather than upon completion of payment of the price of the
Bank of the Philippines, the leasehold system was "provisionally maintained" land. In general, capital gains are realized only when the owner disposes of
but the "lease rentals" paid by the tenants-farmers prior to such full payment his property.
by the Land Bank to the old landowner, would be credited no longer as We believe and so hold that Lot No. 2-C-A-3 having been declared part of
rentals but rather as "amortization payments" of the price of the land, the un- the land reform area and subjected to Operation Land Transfer, the
amortized portion being payable by the Land Bank. In respect of lands payments made on and after 21 October 1972 by the private respondent
brought within the coverage of Operation Land Transfer, the leasehold tenants-farmers constituted amortization payments on the cost of the land
system was legally and effectively terminated immediately on 21 October that they were required to pay under Presidential Decree No. 27. These
1972 (notwithstanding the curious statement in Department Circular No. 8 payments, therefore, legally pertain to petitioners, the former landowners as
that it was "provisionally maintained"). It was in respect of lands not yet part of the compensation for the dominion over land of which they were
subjected to the terms and effects of Operation Land Transfer that the deprived by operation of Presidential Decree No. 27. Those payments can
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

not be characterized as rentals like those which had been paid to Helen decide an otherwise unavoidable issue upon the ground of non liquet ("it is
Schon as usufructuary prior to the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. not clear") is not a permissible response by a court where there is no
4
27 and prior to the effectivity of Operation Land Transfer. provision of law clearly and specifically applicable to the facts at hand, we
(3)Yes. the usufructuary still have rights despite the effectivity of Presidential believe that Article 609 should be applied to the present set of facts by
Decree 27. analogy.
We believe that the usufruct which had therefore existed as a jus in re aliena It follows that respondent Helen Schon, so long as her rights as usufructuary
in favor of Helen Schon was effectively extinguished by Presidential Decree persist under the instrument which gave birth to such rights, would be entitled
No. 27. To hold, as private respondent Helen Schon apparently urges, that to a replacement reasonably equivalent to the land previously burdened with
her usufruct was not extinguished but rather remained impressed upon the her usufructuary right, or to legal interest on the amount of the indemnity or
land passing on to the new owners, would obviously defeat the very purpose cost of the land paid by private respondent tenants-farmers and the Land
of the land reform statute. Presidential Decree No. 27 was enacted to Bank. While the option or choice belongs to petitioners, considering that
"emancipate" the tenants from the "bondage of the soil" by giving to tenants- Helen Schon had already received part of the purchase price of the land
farmers ownership of the land which they were cultivating upon the previously owned by petitioners from private respondent tenants-farmers,
assumption that they would work harder to improve their lot in life if they and in the interest of expeditious justice, we consider it the second
became landowners rather than mere tillers of somebody else's land. To hold alternative that should be given effect. Thus, from the monies that she
Helen Schon as entitled to continue enjoying, as usufructuary, the natural or actually received from private respondent tenants-farmers on and after 21
civil fruits of Lot No. 2-C-A-3, would be to set at naught the major purpose October 1972, respondent Helen Schon is entitled to retain an amount
projected by Presidential Decree No. 27 and maintained by Executive Order equivalent to the legal interest on said amounts for every year that the
No. 228. usufruct would by its own terms have continued to exist had it not been
This is not to say that respondent Helen Schon lost any and all rights upon extinguished by operation of Presidential Decree No. 27; the balance of such
the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 27. In a legal, technical sense, it amounts received by her shall be turned over to petitioners. She is also
may be difficult to hold that Presidential Decree No. 27 resulted in the lands entitled to the same right in respect of the balance of the price of the land
brought within the scope of Operation Land Transfer being "expropriated for petitioners presumably received from the Land Bank.
public use", as this term is used in Article 609 of the Civil Code, which reads Private respondent spouses Joseph and Helen Schon are hereby
thus: DIRECTED to deliver to petitioners the amounts paid to them by private
Art. 609. Should the thing in usufruct be expropriated for public use, the respondent tenants-farmers beginning on 21 October 1972, after deducting
owner shall be obliged either to replace it with another thing of the same therefrom an amount equivalent to simple legal interest thereon computed at
value and of similar conditions, or to pay the usufructuary the legal interest six (6%) percent per annum on the amount received each year.
on the amount of the indemnity for the whole period of the usufruct. If the
owner chooses the latter alternative, he shall give security for the payment of
the interest.
For it was not the Government or any of its agencies which took over Ronquillo vs Roco
ownership of the land nor was such land devoted subsequently to "public GR No L-10619; February 28, 1958
use", since ownership was transferred directly from former landowner to the Montemayor, J.
tenant-tiller as new landowner, for the use and benefit exclusively of the new
landowner. While, however, Article 609 of the Civil Code may not be strictly FACTS:
applicable, we believe that the situation contemplated in Article 609 is Petitioners’ parcel of land was connected to the Naga Market Place and
sufficiently close to that which resulted from application of Presidential Igualdad St. by an easement of a right of way through the land of the
Decree No. 27 to the land here involved. Bearing in mind that refusal to respondents, which they have been using for more than 20 years. On
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

May 1953, however, respondents built a chapel right in the middle of the FACTS:
road which actually impeded, obstructed and disturbed the continuous Cardenas owns two contiguous parcels of land: Lot 7501-A and Lot 7501-B.
exercise of the rights of the plaintiffs over said right of way. One year after, On Lot 7501-A is constructed an apartment building, while the improvements
by means of force, intimidation, and threats, respondents illegally and on Lot 7501-B consist of an apartment, a two-storey house, a bodega and a
violently planted wooden posts, fenced with barbed wire and closed septic tank for the common use of the occupants of the 2 lots. A small portion
hermitically the road passage way and their right of way in question against of the apartment building on Lot 7501-A also stands on Lot 7501-B.
the petitioners’ protests and opposition, thereby preventing them from going Cardenas sold the 1st lot to Tañedo, mortgaged him the 2nd lot and
to or coming from their homes to Igualdad Street and the public market of the promised that should he sell the said lot, he would then offer it first to
City of Naga. Petitioners claim to have acquired the easement of right of way Tañedo. Cardenas allegedly sold the 2nd lot to the respondent Spouses
over the land of the defendants through prescription by their continuous and Sim. Tañedo offered to redeem the property from Sim but the latter refused.
uninterrupted use of a narrow strip of land of the defendants as passage way Instead, Sim blocked the sewage pipe connecting the building of Tañedo
or road. built on Lot 7501-A, to the septic tank in Lot 7501-B. He also asked Tañedo
to remove that portion of his building enroaching on Lot 7501-B.
ISSUE:
Can the easement of a right of way be acquired by prescription? ISSUE:
Has the right to continue to use the septic tank ceased upon the
RULING: subdivision of the land and its subsequent sale to different owners?
No, the easement of a right of way cannot be acquired by prescription.
RULING:
Article 620 of the Civil Code provides that only continuous and No, The alienation of the dominant and servient estates to different
apparent easements may be acquired by prescription. An easement of persons is not one of the grounds for the extinguishment of an
right of way though it may be apparent is, nevertheless, discontinuous or easement.
intermittent and, therefore, cannot be acquired through prescription, but only
by virtue of a title. The easement of a right of way cannot be considered Art. 631 of the Civil Code provides that easements are extinguished:
continuous because its use is at intervals and is dependent on the acts
of man. (1) By merger in the same person of the ownership of the dominant and
servient estates;
In the case, although petitioners may have enjoyed the continuous and (2) By non-user for ten years; with respect to discontinuous easements, this
uninterrupted use of a narrow strip of land of the defendants as passage way period shall be computed from the day on which they ceased to be used;
or road to the Naga Market Place and Igualdad St., the same may not be and, with respect to continuous easements, from the day on which an act
considered as a ground for the acquisition of the easement of right of way. contrary to the same took place;
The said easement claimed by petitioners though it may be apparent is, (3) When either or both of the estates fall into such condition that the
nevertheless, discontinuous or intermittent and, therefore, cannot be easement cannot be used; but it shall revive if the subsequent condition of
acquired through prescription, but only by virtue of a title. the estates or either of them should again permit its use, unless when the
use becomes possible, sufficient time for prescription has elapsed, in
Tañedo vs. Bernard accordance with the provisions of the preceding number;
G.R. No L-66520; Aug. 30, 1988 (4) By the expiration of the term or the fulfillment of the conditions, if the
Padilla, J. easement is temporary or conditional;
(5) By the renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate;
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(6) By the redemption agreed upon between the owners of the dominant and
servient estates. ISSUE:
Do private respondents have the right to demand an easement of right of
The alienation of the dominant and servient estates to different persons is not way under a claim of prescription?
one of the grounds for the extinguishment of an easement.On the contrary,
use of the easement is continued by operation of law as provided in RULING:
Art 624 which states that the existence of an apparent sign of easement No. It is already well-established that easement of right of way, as is involved
between two estates, established or maintained by the owner of both, shall here, is discontinuous, and as such can not be acquired by prescription.
be considered, should either of them be alienated, as a title in order that the Here, there is absent any showing that the private respondents had
easement may continue actively and passively, unless, at the time the established the existence of the four requisites mandated by law. For one,
ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in they failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet from their respective
the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid should be properties to a public highway. On the contrary, as alleged by the petitioner
removed before the execution of the deed. in its answer to the complaint, and confirmed by the appellate court, “there is
another outlet for the plaintiffs (private respondent) to the main road.” Yet, it
In the case, no abolishment or extinguishment was provided in the deed ordered the re-opening of the old passageway on the ground that “the
of absolute sale. Nor did Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe and existing outlet (the other outlet) is inconvenient to the plaintiff.” On this score,
septic tanks before he sold the lots. Accordingly, the spouses Sim cannot it is apparent that the Court of Appeals has lost sight of the fact that the
impair, in any manner, the use of the servitude. convenience of the dominant estate has never been the gauge for the grant
of compulsory right of way. To be sure, the true standard for the grant of the
Hence, the right to continue to use the septic tank had not ceased upon legal right is “adequacy.” Hence, when there is already an existing adequate
the subdivision of the land and its subsequent sale to different owners. outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, even if the said outlet,
for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to open up another
Costabella Corporation v. Court of Appeals servitude is entirely unjustified. For to justify the imposition of an easement or
G.R. No. 80511; January 25, 1991 right of way, “there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial necessity for it.”
SARMIENTO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner owns real estate adjoining properties owned by private Encarnacion v. Court of Appeals
respondents and began constructing a beach hotel. Prior thereto, private G.R. No. 77628; March 11, 1991
respondents had been using a passageway which traversed petitioner’s FERNAN, C.J.
property in going to and from their own respective properties. Petitioner
closed the passageway when it began constructing its hotel but opened FACTS:
another route across its property through which the private respondents Petitioner owns the dominant estate of two adjacent estates. The servient
could pass. In the second phase of construction, petitioner fenced its estate, owned by private respondents, stands between the dominant estate
property thus closing even the alternative passageway and preventing the and the national road. Prior to 1960, persons going to the national highway
private respondents from traversing any part of it. Private respondents just crossed the servient estate at any particular point. However, in 1960,
assailed petitioner’s closure of the original passageway which they claimed private respondents constructed a fence around the servient estate, a
to be an “ancient road right of way” that had been existing before World War roadpath measuring 25 meters long and about a meter wide was constituted
II and since then had been used by them. to provide access to the highway. Petitioner owned a plant nursery business
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

which began to flourish and eventually became too difficult to haul the plants heirs of late Pablo Tuason and Leocadia Santibañez. The latter alleged that
and garden soil to and from the nursery and the highway with the use of they are owners in common of the property adjoining that of Edwin Case on
pushcarts. Petitioner was eventually able to buy a jeep to use for transporting the southwest and that the latter, in making the plan attached to his petition,
his plants, but said jeep could not pass through the roadpath and so he extended his southwest boundary line to a portion of the lot of the said heirs
requested the servient estate owners to sell 1 ½ meters of their property to of Tuason and Santibañez. They further alleged that the true dividing line
him to be added to the existing pathway to allow passage for his jeepney, to between the property of the petitioner and that of the said heirs is the walls
which they refused. indicated in black ink on the accompanying plan, which walls belong to the
opponents, and that about two years ago, when the applicant made
ISSUE: alterations in the buildings erected on his land, he improperly caused a
Is the dominant estate entitled to a widening of an already existing easement portion of them to rest on the wall owned by the parties.
of right of way?
Issue: Is wall that with slight interruption runs from Calle Escolta to the River
RULING: Pasig, and which divides the adjoining properties of the applicant, Edwin
Yes. Article 651 of the Civil Code provides that “the width of the easement of Case, and of the opponents, belongs to the former, as he claimed in the first
right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant instance, or is a dividing wall as affirmed in his brief in this second instance,
estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time.” This is taken to or is the property of the said opponents, the heirs of the late Tuason and
mean that under the law, it is the needs of the dominant property which Santibañez?
ultimately determine the width of the passage. And under the law, it is the
needs of the dominant property which ultimately determine the width of the Held: It is not a party wall. It belongs to the heirs of the late Tuason and
passage. And these needs may vary from time to time. When petitioner Santibañez.
started out as a plant nursery operator, he and his family could easily make
do with a few pushcarts to tow the plants to the national highway. But the Under article 572 of the Civil Code the easement of party walls is presumed,
business grew and with it the need for the use of modern means of unless there is a title or exterior sign, or proof to the contrary, among others,
conveyance or transport. Manual hauling of plants and garden soil and use of in dividing walls adjoining buildings up to the common point of elevation.
pushcarts have become extremely cumbersome and physically taxing. To
force petitioner to leave his jeepney in the highway, exposed to the elements The legal presumption as to party walls is limited to the three cases dealt
and to the risk of theft simply because it could not pass through the with in the said article of the code, and is that of juris tantum unless the
improvised pathway, is sheer pigheadedness on the part of the servient contrary appear from the title of ownership of the adjoining properties, that is
estate and can only be counter-productive for all the people concerned. to say, that the entire wall in controversy belongs to one of the property
Petitioner should not be denied a passageway wide enough to accommodate owners, or where there is no exterior sign to destroy such presumption and
his jeepney since that is a reasonable and necessary aspect of the plant support a presumption against the party wall.lawphi1.net (Art. 573, Civil
nursery business. Code.)
EDWIN CASE vs. THE HEIRS OF TUASON Y SANTIBAÑEZ The intermediate portion of the walls in question, lying between numbers 6
G.R. No. L-5044; December 1, 1909 and 13 on the defendants' plan, equivalent to a little more than numbers 30
Facts: Edwin Case filed a petition with the Court of Land Registration to 25 on the plan of the petitioner, is the portion against which no other wall
requesting that the property owned by him, described in the petition, be appears to have been erected on the land owned by Mr. Case. In spite of this
registered in accordance with the provisions of Land Registration Act. After a it can not be presumed that the aforesaid portion was a party wall, and that it
written opposition was presented by Felipe R. Caballero on behalf of the was not exclusively owned by the defendants, inasmuch as the latter have
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

proven by means of a good title that has not been impugned by the shown in the case that at one time an old building belonging to the
petitioner, that when one of their ancestors and principals acquired the opponents used to rest on a portion of the wall near the river.
property the lot was already inclosed by the wall on which the building was
erected; it must therefore be understood that in the purchase of the property SEVERINA and FLORA CHOCO vs. ISIDRO SANTAMARIA
the wall by which the land was inclosed was necessarily included. G.R. No. 6076 December 29, 1911
Three openings have been made in the wall , undoubtedly to allow the Facts: The defendant in the building of his house, has made several
passage of air and light. Two of them are beveled on the side toward the land openings and windows in the walls of the house on both sides overlooking
of the objectors, and the third has recently been beveled on the other. A then property of the plaintiff. The plaintiffs protested at the time the defendant
rafter or lintel was found imbedded in the wall on the side of the property of was building his house, and the windows and the openings were being
the opponents. These things constitute exterior signs and were recorded as made, and later on and in the year 1905 made written protest and demand
the result of personal inspection by the trial court in company with the experts on the defendant. The latter suggested an adjustment of the matter, but it
of both parties. These signs positively and conclusively prove that the said was not made. Thus, this action was brough before the trial court, which
wall is not a party wall, but the exclusive property of the defendant. rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Severina and Flora Choco, and
against the defendant, Isidoro Santamaria, ordering the prohibition of the
The fact that the petitioner built a wall and backed it against the one in opening of the window or be made to conform to the requirements of the law.
question to support the edifice he had constructed between points 21 and 13
of the corrected plan is a further indication that the neighboring wall is not a Issues:
party one. He knew perfectly well that he had no right to rest his building on 1. Is the large window opened in the balcony of the back part of the
the latter. That he built a terrace about four years previously over the wall Santamaria's house must be closed because it does not comply with the
between points 30, 29, 28, and 27 does not prove that the whole of the wall, distance required by law?
from the Escolta to the River Pasig, is a party wall, but it does show that he 2. Will openings and windows, Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9, might be
usurped a portion thereof to the prejudice of the real owner. continued to open if they were fixed so as to comply with the
requirements of the law as regards their dimensions and the placing of
Neither can it be presumed that that part of the wall bordering on the River iron grates embedded in the wall.
Pasig comprised between points 13 and 14 is a party wall. It was shown in
the proceedings as resulting from the above-mentioned ocular inspection that Held:
the side of the said wall, which is rather a low one, there is another, a higher 1. Yes.
one erected on the petitioner's land and backed against the one in question.
The first one, as has been said, forms part of that which has surrounded the It appears obvious to us, from the evidence, that the window No. 1, referred
property from the date of its acquisition, more than a century ago, until the to in the first assignment of errors, is next appellants' lot. To judge from the
present date. It is absolutely independent of that built by the petitioner, and photographic views, Exhibits A and D, it opens on the boundary line between
that it is the exclusive property of the objectors and is not a party wall can not the said lot and that the appellee and is situated perpendicularly above a part
be denied. of the wall that belongs to the appellants. This opinion is corroborated by the
testimony of the defendant's witness who took the said photographs, in so far
Therefore, the whole of said wall from the Escolta to the River Pasig can not as he said that "a part of the window in question is in front of the plaintiffs'
be presumed to be a party wall; the evidence to the contrary conclusively property, and a person approaching the window may clearly see the said lot."
proves that it belonged exclusively to the defendants, and it has been further And certainly if it is in front of this lot, it is unquestionable that it directly
overlooks the same; but even though it did not and only a side or oblique
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

view of the lot could be obtained from it, it could not be kept open, since this last circumstance, none of them fully comply with the conditions required
between it and the plaintiffs' property there does not intervene the distance by the law; moreover, those numbered 5, 6, 8, and 9, have the additional
required by law — that of two meters in the first case, and 60 centimeters in defect of being greater than 30 centimeters square. The trial judge therefore
the second. In reality, there is no distance at all between the said window ordered, in the judgment, that all the aforementioned windows be closed or
and the plaintiffs' lot, because, as we have said, this window is perpendicular that they be made to conform to the law with respect to their dimentions and
to the boundary line of the said lot; therefore, its opening is a manifest the placing of the iron grates embedded in the wall. The appellants maintain
violation of the provisions of article 582 of the Civil Code which reads as that these windows should have been ordered closed absolutely and finally,
follows: and, consequently, that the option allowed the defendant to keep them open,
provided that he brought them within the terms of the law, in contrary to the
Windows with direct views, or balconies or any similar openings projecting same and, therefore, illegal.
over the estate of the neighbor, can not be made if there is not a distance of,
at least, 2 meters between the wall in which they are built and said estate. It is alleged as a ground for such averment that none of the ceiling joist,
which is the first condition required by law.
Neither can side nor oblique views be opened over said property, unless
there is a distance of 60 centimeters. We understand by ceiling joist — say the appellants — in a building
composed of any given number of stories, the long pieces to which are nailed
Because of the lack of the distance required by law, the window in question the boards that form the ceiling of the last story of the building, counting the
must be closed, and consequently the judgment appealed from should be stories from below; and this interpretation which we give to the words ceiling
modified in this sense, as regards this window. joists must be that most in harmony with the spirit of article 581 of the code,
the subject of our examination, since immediately after them in the same
article, in explanation, are found the words or immediately under "los techos,"
2. Yes in order to indicate, without the least doubt, the sole place or height where
openings or windows may be made in conformity within the law. It is
needless to say that a building, though composed of several stories, can
With respect to the second assignment of error, the question raised by the have but one techo. . . .
appellants concerns the proper interpretation of article 581 of the Civil Code
which describes as follows:itc-alf Solid Manila Corporation vs. Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc.
G.R. No. 90596. April 8, 1991
The owner of the wall which is not a party-wall, adjoining anothers estate, SARMIENTO, J
may make in it windows or openings to admit light, at the height of the ceiling
joists or immediately under the ceiling, of the dimentions of 30 centimeters Facts:
square and, in any case, with an iron grate embedded in the wall and a wire
screen. Solid Manila Corp. is the owner of a parcel of land located in Ermita.
It lies in the vicinity of another parcel registered under Bio Hong Trading
The windows mentioned in this part of the appeal are those indicated by Nos. whose title came from a prior owner under a deed of sale between Bio Hong
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9, in the defendant's Exhibit A. They are all situated and the vendor with the 900 sqm lot reserved as an easement of way. The
immediately under the ceiling of the first door and are provided with wire construction of the private alley was annotated on Bio Hong’s title which
screens; some of them measure more and other less than 30 centimeters stipulates That “(6) the alley shall remain open at all times, and no
square and none of them have iron grates embedded in the wall. Owing to obstructions whatsoever shall be placed thereon; and (7) that the owner of
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the lot on which the alley has been constructed shall allow the public to use without a dominant estate,17 in this case, the public at large. Meanwhile, a
the same, and allow the City to lay pipes for sewer and drainage purposes, merger presupposes the existence of a prior servient-dominant owner
and shall not act (sic) for any indemnity for the use thereof” Sometime in relationship, and the termination of that relation leaves the easement of no
1983, the private respondent constructed steel gates that precluded use.
unhampered use over their protests.
Thus petitioner commenced suit for injunction against the private respondent, In this case however, the servitude in question is a personal
for the removal of the gates and for full access to the easement. The trial servitude, that is to say, one constituted not in favor of a particular tenement
court ruled against respondent and ordered Bi Hong to open the gates. The (a real servitude) but rather, for the benefit of the general public. So unless
latter however argued that the easement has been extinguished by merger in the owner conveys the property in favor of the public—if that is possible—no
the same person of the dominant and servient estates upon the purchase of genuine merger can take place that would terminate a personal easement.
the property from its former owner. Finding merit in this argument, the Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision. It held that an easement is a
mere limitation on ownership and that it does not impair the private Therefore judgment was reversed.
respondent's title. The said "merger"duly extinguished the easement.
Floro vs. Llenado
Issue(s): G.R. No. 75723. June 2, 1995
(1) May the easement be alienated or mortgaged separately from the ROMERO, J.
tenement?
(2) Did the fact of merger extinguish the personal easement? Facts:
Held: Floro was the owner of the Floro Park Subdivision situated in
(1) No. Bulacan. The subdivision has its own access roads from the MacArthur
Highway through road lot 4. On the other hand, Llenado, was the new owner
Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the estate to which they of Emmanuel Homes Subdivision (now Llenado Homes Subdivision)
actively or passively belong. Servitudes are merely accessories to the previously owned by Mr. De Castro. On the west side lie a Riceland by
tenements of which they form part, and even if they are possessed of a Marcial Ipapo. The Palanas Creek separates Llenado Homes from the Floro
separate juridical existence, they cannot be alienated from the tenement or Park Subdivision. Since the Llenado Homes lack passage to the MacArthur
mortgaged separately. Accordingly, the vendee of real property, herein Highway, the Floros allowed Llenados to use Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro
respondent, in which a servitude or easement exists, did not acquire the right Park since the access road through the Ipapo Riceland did not exist yet. The
to close that servitude or put up obstructions thereon, to prevent the public agreement however was merely provisional as the parties were still drafting a
from using it. contract. Later, Floro discovered grave damage to the lots in question
because of the passage of heavy machinery. As a consequence, Floro then
barricaded Road Lot 5 with a pile of rocks, wooden posts and adobe stones
(2) No. thereby impliedly warning Llenados to keep out off property. Llenado then
instituted an action against Florofor the Easement of Right of Way with
Art. 614. Servitudes may also be established for the benefit of a Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and
community, or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does Damages The trial court denied the request for reopening of lot no. 5. On
not belong. In a personal servitude, there is therefore no “owner of a appeal by LLenado, the appellate court set aside the
dominant tenement” to speak of, and the easement pertains to persons decision of the trial court. Hence this petition.
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Issue(s): Should Llenado be granted an easement of right of way upon Anastacia Quimen vs Court of Appeals and Yolando Oliveros
Floro’s property? G.R. No. 112331 May 29, 1996
BELLOSILLO,J.
Held:
Facts: Yolanda Oliveros’ property is surrounded by other properties so there
No. is no sufficient pathway for ingress and egress to the public highway.
Although one pathway leads to the municipal road, it is not adequate. There
To be entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of way under the are two possible pathways, one is with the shortest distance but is obstructed
Civil Code, the preconditions provided under Articles 649 and 650 thereof by a store made of strong materials so that one has to pass through the back
must be establishe namely: (1) that the dominant estate is surrounded by entrance and the façade of the store to reach the road. The other path is
other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, through Anastacia Quimen’s property which is unobstructed except for an
par. 1); (2) after payment of proper indemnity (Art.649, par. 1); (3) that the avocado tree standing on the middle. The trial court ruled that the path
isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. through the store was a straight path and to allow a detour by cutting through
649, last par.); and, (4) that the right of way claimed is at the point least Quimen’s property would no longer make the path straight. Hence, the trial
prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, court ruled that the store be removed as that was the shortest route to the
where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the public road. The CA reversed the ruling and held that the route through
shortest. Burden of proving the existence of the prerequisites to validly claim Anastacia Quimen’s property would cause the least damage and detriment to
a compulsory right of way lies on the owner of the dominant estate In order to the servient estate.
justify the imposition of the servitude of right of way, there must be a real, not
a fictitious or artificial necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant Issue: Can an easement of right of way be imposed on the shortest distance
estate is not what is required by law as the basis for setting up a compulsory but which is not the least prejudicial to the servient estate?
easement. Even in the face of a necessity, if it can be satisfied without Ruling: No, an easement of right of way cannot be imposed under such
imposing the servitude, the same should not be imposed. This easement can conditions.
also be established for the benefit of a tenement with an inadequate outlet, The criterion of least prejudicial to the servient estate must prevail over the
but not when the outlet is merely inconvenient. Thus, when a person has criterion of shortest distance although it is a matter of judicial appreciation.
already established an easement of this nature in favor of his tenement, he While the shortest distance may ordinarily imply least prejudice, it is not
cannot demand another, even if the first passage has defects which make always so as when there are permanent structures obstructing the shortest
passage impossible, if those defects can be eliminated by proper repairs distance; while the longer distance may be free of obstructions and the
easiest and most convenient to pass through. In other words, where the
Llenado failed to comply with these. It must be noted that there was easement may be established on any several tenements surrounding the
an original subdivision development plan presented by Llenado which dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least
included a right of way through the abandoned Ipapo ricefield. But for some damage shall be chosen. However, if these two circumstances do not concur
reasons, Llenado deemed it easier to create an easement over Floro’s in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be
property. used even if it will not be the shortest.
Therefore, Judgment was set aside and decision of court a quo was Hence, the ruling of the CA is correct and the easement should be imposed
reinstated over Quimen’s property.
Manuel De Jesus et al v. Howmart Corporation et al

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(CA) No. 44191-R August 28, 1974 adjacent land or building is deprived of sufficient lateral or subjacent support,
LEUTERIO, J. as a result of which damage is caused, the adjacent owner shall be liable for
such damage caused.
Facts: Manuel De Jesus and Luz Miranda de Jesus owned a lot which Thus, in this case, the defense of taking necessary precautions is not
adjoined the lot owned by defendant Howmart Corporation. Over the latter sufficient. Howmart Corporation is still liable for damages to the plaintiffs De
property, a six-storey reinforced concrete building was constructed. A Jesus.
complaint for damages was filed by the plaintiffs De Jesus stating that
defendant corporation failed to observe the necessary care and precautions La Vista Association vs. CA
to protect the construction of the plaintiffs by depriving it of sufficient lateral G.R. No. 95252; September 5, 1997
and subjacent support. As a result, the building of the plaintiffs sank in some Bellosillo, J.
places and the roofing of the building was damaged with the accumulated
debris piled thereon. Sketch marks show that the buildings owned by the FACTS:
parties are so close to each other that they almost appeared to be attached Mangyan Road, a 15-meter wide roadway, was originally part of a vast tract
together. of land owned by the Tuasons. The Tuasons sold to Philippine Building
Judgment was rendered in favour of the plaintiffs stating that it is incumbent Corporation a portion of their landholdings. The Philippine Building
upon Howmart Corporation to exercise due care in making the excavation in Corporation, which was then acting for and in behalf of Ateneo in buying the
a way that will not deprive the property of plaintiffs its natural support to properties from the Tuasons, sold, assigned and formally transferred with the
prevent it from sinking, sagging or crumbling. consent of the Tuasons, the parcel of land to Ateneo which assumed the
The position of the defendant is that they took all the necessary pre- mortgage. Meanwhile, the Tuasons developed a part of the estate adjoining
construction precautions so as not to damage the lateral and subjacent the portion sold to Philippine Building Corporation into a residential village
support of the adjoining property. known as La Vista Subdivision. Thus the boundary between La Vista and the
portion sold to Philippine Building Corporation was the Mangyan Road.
Issue: Did the fact that the defendant corporation took all necessary pre- Ateneo sold to Maryknoll the western portion of the land adjacent to
construction precautions not to damage the adjoining property relieve them Mangyan Road. Maryknoll then constructed a wall in the middle of the 15-
of the duty not to deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or meter wide roadway making one-half of Mangyan Road part of its school
subjacent support and thus relieve them of liability for damages? campus. The Tuasons objected and later filed a complaint for the demolition
of the wall. Maryknoll agreed to remove the wall and restore Mangyan Road
Ruling: No, the taking of such pre-construction precautions is not sufficient. to its original width. Meanwhile, the Tuasons developed its 7.5-meter share
of the 15-meter wide boundary. Ateneo informed La Vista of its intention to
Article 684 of the New Civil Code provides “No proprietor shall make such develop some 16 hectares of its property along Mangyan Road into a
excavations upon his land as to deprive any adjacent land or building of subdivision. La Vista President Manuel J. Gonzales clarified certain aspects
sufficient lateral or subjacent support.” with regard to the use of Mangyan Road. According to him, an easement of a
right-of-way on Ateneo’s 7 1/2 m. portion was created in favor of La Vista and
A reading of the provision would show that the duty of an adjacent owner not an easement of right-of-way was created on La Vista’s 7 1/2 portion of the
to deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent road in Ateneo’s favor. Thereafter, La Vista President Manuel J. Gonzales
support is an absolute one. It does not depend upon the degree of care and offered to buy under specified conditions the property Ateneo was intending
precaution made by the proprietor in making the excavation or building in his to develop. One of the conditions stipulated by the La Vista President was
land. Otherwise, the article would have provided that the proprietor shall take that it is the essence of the offer that the mutual right of way between the
the necessary precautions and care. Even if that was the case, if the Ateneo and La Vista will be extinguished. Ateneo did not accept the offer.
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Ateneo offered to sell the property to the public subject to the condition that the servient tenement from obstructing or impairing in any manner the lawful
the right to use the 15-meter roadway will be transferred to the vendee who use of the servitude.
will negotiate with the legally involved parties regarding the use of such right
as well as the development costs for improving the access road. Solid Hence, Solid Homes Inc may demand a right of way over the Mangyan
Homes Inc. won in the bidding. It developed a subdivision known as Loyola Road.
Grand Villas. They now claimed that they have an easement of right of way
over Mangyan Road. La Vista President Manuel J. Gonzales however Alcantara vs Reta, Jr.
informed Solid Homes, Inc., that La Vista could not recognize the right-of- G.R. No. 136996; December 14, 2001
way over Mangyan Road because, first, Philippine Building Corporation and Pardo, J.
its assignee Ateneo never complied with their obligation of providing the
Tuasons with a right-of-way on their 7.5-meter portion of the road and, FACTS:
second, since the property was purchased for commercial purposes, Solid Edilberto Alcantara, Florencio Villarmia, Policarpio Obregon, Ricardo Roble,
Homes, Inc., was no longer entitled to the right-of-way as Mangyan Road Escolastica Ondong, Esteban Rallos, Henry Sesbino, Sergio Sesbino,
was established exclusively for Ateneo in whose favor the right-of-way was Manuel Centeno, Renato Cruz, Marcelo Ceneza, Buenaventura Ondong and
originally constituted. Benjamin Halasan (plaintiffs) claimed that they were tenants or lessees of the
land owned by Cornelio Reta. However, the land was converted by Reta into
ISSUE: a commercial center. Reta is now threatening to eject them from the land.
Is there an easement of right of way over the Mangyan Road? They assert that they have the right of first refusal to purchase the land in
accordance with Section 3(g) of Presidential Decree No. 1517 since they are
RULING: legitimate tenants or lessees thereof. They also claimed that the amicable
Yes, there is an easement of right of way over the Mangyan Road. settlement executed between Reta and Ricardo Roble was void for being
vilative under PD No. 1517. On the other hand, Reta claimed that the land is
From the facts of the instant case it is very apparent that the parties and their beyond the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 1517 since it has not been
respective predecessors-in-interest intended to establish an easement of proclaimed as an Urban Land Reform Zone. Reta claimed that the applicable
right-of-way over Mangyan Road for their mutual benefit, both as dominant law is Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 for failure of the plaintiffs to pay the rentals
and servient estates. The said easement was recognized in the Deed of Sale for the use of the land.
between the Tuasons and Philippine Building Corporation and the Deed of
Assignment with Assumption of Mortgage and the Deed of Sale executed in ISSUE: Can the petitioners exercise the right of first refusal under PD 1517?
favor of Ateneo. And like any other contract, the same could be extinguished
only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant RULING: No, they cannot exercise the right of first refusal.
estate. The free ingress and egress along Mangyan Road created by the
voluntary agreement between Ateneo and Solid Homes, Inc., is thus legally The area involved has not been proclaimed an Urban Land Reform Zone
demandable (Articles 619 and 625, New Civil Code) with the corresponding (ULRZ). Presidential Decree No. 1517, otherwise known as The Urban Land
duty on the servient estate not to obstruct the same so much so that when Reform Act, pertains to areas proclaimed as Urban Land Reform
the owner of the servient tenement performs acts or constructs works Zones. Consequently, petitioners cannot claim any right under the said law
impairing the use of the servitude, the owner of the dominant tenement may since the land involved is not an ULRZ. Reta allowed petitioner Ricardo
ask for the destruction of such works and the restoration of the things to their Roble to use sixty-two (62) coconut trees for P186 from where he
condition before the impairment was committed, with indemnity for damages gathered tuba. This arrangement would show that it is a usufruct and not a
suffered. An injunction may also be obtained in order to restrain the owner of lease. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the
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obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the title constituting it No. The trial court read this phrase to mean that petitioner had the right to
or the law otherwise provides. Roble was allowed to construct his house on make excavations on the side of the access road in order to install a network
the land because it would facilitate his gathering of tuba. This would be in the of water pipes. The word passage does not, however, clearly and
nature of a personal easement under Article 614 of the Civil Code. The unmistakably convey a meaning that includes a right to install water pipes on
petitioners cannot also exercise the right of first refusal because Reta has no the access road. The ordinary meaning of the word, as defined in Websters
intention to sell the property. Dictionary, is that it is the act or action of passing: movement or transference
from one place or point to another. Its legal meaning is not different. It
PROSPERITY CREDIT RESOURCES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and means, according to Blacks Law Dictionary, the act of passing; transit;
METROPOLITAN FABRICS, INC. transition. To achieve a meaning such as that which petitioner proposes
G.R. No. 114170; January 15, 1999 requires the consideration of evidence showing the parties intention in using
MENDOZA, J. the word which can only be done during trial on the merits. Until such time,
FACTS: petitioner cannot claim to have a clear and unmistakable right justifying the
In order to secure the payment of loan, private respondent Metropolitan issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in this case. Thus, the
Fabrics executed a real estate mortgage in favor of petitioner Prosperity trial court should have observed caution and denied petitioners application
Credit covering 7 parcels of land. The lots comprise a commercial compound for the preliminary writ.
with Tandang Sora Avenue as the nearest public road. Respondent defaulted
thus the 7 lots were foreclosed and sold at a public auction where petitioner BRYAN U. VILLANUEVA vs. HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO, JULIO N.
became the highest bidder and purchaser. Later, private respondent SEBASTIAN and SHIRLEY LORILLA
redeemed 3 out of the 7 lots. Since the reacquisition of these 3 lots by private G.R. NO. 130845; November 27, 2000
respondent would leave the remaining 4 lots on the northwestern side QUISUMBING, J.
without access to Tandang Sora Avenue, the parties had to execute a
Memorandum of Undertaking where it was stated that: “The above-described FACTS:
lot, being an existing private road, will remain open to ingress and egress for Petitioner Villanueva is the registered owner of the subject property. He
whatever kind of passage in favor of PROSPERITY FINANCIAL bought it from Pacific Banking Corporation which acquired it from Sps.
RESOURCES, INC. or its successors-in-interest.” Maximo and Justina Gabriel at a public auction. When petitioner bought the
Thereafter, petitioner sought the issuance of writ of preliminary mandatory parcel of land there was a small house on its southeastern portion. It
injunction because respondent, allegedly in violation of the Memorandum, occupied 1 meter of the 2-meter wide easement of right of way the Gabriel
refused to allow petitioner to make excavations on one side of the access spouses granted to the Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of private
road for the installation of water pipes; that it banned entry of petitioners respondents, in a Contract of Easement of Right of Way.
trucks and those of its tenants between 11:30 A.M. to 1:00 P.M. and 10:00 Unknown to petitioner, Sps. Gabriel constructed the said small house that
P.M. to 7:00 A.M.; and that it subjected the vehicles to unnecessary encroached upon the 2-meter easement and that private respondents
searches. The trial court issued the preliminary mandatory injunction. CA already filed a civil case to enforce the contract of easement and damages.
reversed the trial court’s ruling. Thus this case where petitioner anchors its In that said civil case, both RTC and CA ruled in favor of private respondents.
alleged right to the preliminary mandatory injunction on the said Subsequently, a writ of demolition was issued by the RTC. The sheriff tried to
Memorandum of Undertaking. demolish the small house pursuant to the writ but petitioner filed a Third
ISSUE: Party Claim with Prayer to Quash Alias Writ of Demolition. He maintains that
Does the phrase “for whatever kind of passage” include the right to install the writ of demolition could not apply to his property since he was not a party
water pipes on the access road? to the civil case. This was denied both by the lower court and CA. Thus, this
RULING: present petition for certiorari.
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Petitioner argues that the existence of the easement of right of way was not legally bound to provide the dominant estate (of private respondents in this
annotated in his title and that he was not a party to the previous Civil Case, case) ingress from and egress to the public highway.
hence the contract of easement executed by the Gabriels in favor of the Thus, petitioner is bound by the said easement of right of way.
Espinolas could not be enforced against him.
National Irrigation Administration vs. Court of Appeals
ISSUE:
Is petitioner bound by the easement of right of way despite lack of annotation
of the same on his title? Facts: Manglapus is an owner of a parcel of land in Cagayan. The National
Irrigation Administration (NIA) constructed a diggings near the property of
RULING: Manglapus. Manglapus filed with the RTC a complaint for damages against
Yes, petitioner is bound by the easement. A legal easement is one mandated NIA. Manglapus alleged that NIA's diggings and fillings destroyed the
by law, constituted for public use or for private interest, and becomes a agricultural use of his land and that no reasonable compensation was paid
continuing property right. As a compulsory easement, it is inseparable from for its taking.
the estate to which it belongs, as provided for in said Art. 617 of the Civil Issue: Are the constructions made by the NIA compliant with the Civil Code?
Code. The essential requisites for an easement to be compulsory are: (1) the Held: We note that the canal NIA constructed was only eleven (11)
dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate meters in width. This is Code provides that, "Easements are established
outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the either by law or by the will of the owners. The former are called legal and the
isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the latter voluntary easements." In the present case, we find and declare that a
right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and legal easement of a right-of-way exists in favor of the government. The land
(5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from was originally public land, and awarded to respondent Manglapus by free
the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. patent. The ruling would be otherwise if the land were originally private
property, in which case, just compensation must be paid for the taking of a
In this case, the subject easement (right of way) originally was voluntarily part thereof for public use as an easement of a right of way.
constituted by agreement between the Gabriels and the Espinolas. But as
correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the easement in the instant De Luna vs. Abrigo
petition is both (1) an easement by grant or a voluntary easement, and (2) an G.R. No. L-57455, January 18, 1990
easement by necessity or a legal easement. The small house occupying one Medialdea, J.
meter of the two-meter wide easement obstructs the entry of private
respondents cement mixer and motor vehicle. One meter is insufficient for Facts:
the needs of private respondents. It is well-settled that the needs of the De Luna donated a portion of a 75 sq. m. lot to the Luzonian University
dominant estate determine the width of the easement. Conformably then, Foundation. The donation was embodied in a Deed of Donation Inter vivos
petitioner ought to demolish whatever edifice obstructs the easement in view and was subject to certain terms and conditions. In case of violation or non-
of the needs of private respondents estate. compliance, the property would automatically revert to the donor. When the
Foundation failed to comply with the conditions, de Luna “revived” the said
Also, petitioners proposition, that he is not bound by the contract of donation by executing a Revival of Donation Inter vivos with the following
easement because the same was not annotated in the title and that a notice terms and conditions:
of lis pendens of the complaint to enforce the easement was not recorded
with the Register of Deeds, is obviously unmeritorious. As already explained, 1) The Donee shall construct on the land and at its expense a Chapel,
it is in the nature of legal easement that the servient estate (of petitioner) is Nursery, and Kindergarten School to be named after St. Veronica
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2) Construction shall start immediately and must be at least 70% completed apply to onerous donations in view of the specific provision of Article 733
three years from the date of the Deed unless the Donor grants extensions providing that onerous donations are governed by the rules on contracts. The
3) Automatic reversion in case of violation rules on prescription and not the rules on donation applies in the case at bar.
The Foundation accepted and the donation was registered and annotated in RUPERTO REYES and REYNALDO C. SAN JUAN vs. HON. LORENZO R.
the TCT. By a Deed of Segregation, the foundation was issued a TCT for MOSQUEDA, Judge of CFI, Pampanga (Branch VII), and URSULA D.
area the lot donated while the remaining area was retained by the De Luna. PASCUAL
G.R. No. L-45262 July 23, 1990
The children and only heirs of the late De Luna (died after the donation) filed
a complaint with the RTC for the cancellation of the donation on the ground PEDRO DALUSONG vs. HON. LORENZO R. MOSQUEDA, JUDGE,
that the terms were violated. The Foundation defended itself by saying that it BRANCH VII, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA, and
had partially and substantially complied with the conditions and that the URSULA D. PASCUAL,
donor granted it an indefinite extension of time to complete construction. G.R. No. L-45394 July 23, 1990
The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground of prescription (for being filed OFELIA D. PARUNGAO and ROSARIO DUNCIL vs.THE HON.
after 4 years). The heirs did not file an MR and went straight to the SC. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, (Third Civil Cases Division),
BENJAMIN P. REYES and OSCAR REYES
ISSUE: G.R. Nos. 73241-42 July 23, 1990
Will the action prescribe in 4 years (based on art. 764 NCC-judicial decree of
revocation of the donation) or in 10 years (based on art. 1144 –enforcement GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
of a written contract)?
RULING: 10 years FACTS: This is a consolidated case arose from the same facts and involve
The donation subject of this case is one with an onerous cause. similar issues.
Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule that donations with an onerous Dr. Emilio Pascual died intestate and without issue. He was survived by his
cause are governed not by the law on donations but by the rules on contract. sister, the private respondent Ursula Pascual and the children of his late
On the matter of prescription of actions for the revocation of onerous sisters, the petitioners herein.
donation, it was held that the general rules on prescription apply. The same
rules apply under the New Civil Code as provided in Article 733 thereof which The petitioners filed for the administration of his estate. Subsequently, private
provides: respondent filed a motion to exclude some properties from the inventory of
Pascual's estate and to deliver the titles thereto to her. She alleged that Dr.
Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on Pascual during his lifetime or on November 2, 1966 executed a "Donation
contracts, and remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title Mortis Causa" in her favor covering properties which are included in the
as regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden imposed. estate of Dr. Pascua and therefore should be excluded from the inventory.
Thereafter, the trial court issued an order excluding from the inventory of the
It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions for the estate the properties donated to Ursula.
revocation of a donation must be brought within four (4) years from the non-
compliance of the conditions of the donation. However, said article does not
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

The petitioners assert that the 1966 donation was null and void since it was In the case of Laureta v. Mata, et al. (44 Phil. 668), the court held that the
not executed with the formalities of a will. Therefore, the petitioners insist that donation involved was inter vivos. There, the donor Severa Magno y Laureta
the donated properties should revert to the estate of Dr. Pascual. gave the properties involved as —
... a reward for the services which he is rendering me, and as a token of my
ISSUE: Does the "Donation Mortis Causa" executed by Emilio Pascual affection toward him and of the fact that he stands high in my estimation, I
in favor of his sister Ursula Pascual was actually a Donation Inter hereby donate 'mortis causa to said youth all the properties described as
Vivos? follows:
RULING: Yes. The Donation titled Donation Mortis Causa executed by Dr. In the later case of Bonsato et al. v. Court of appeals, et al. (95 Phil. 481
Pascual in favor of private respondent is a Donation Inter Vivos. [1954]) this Court, distinguished the characteristics of a donation inter vivos
and "mortis causa" in this wise:
It is, now a settled rule that the title given to a deed of donation is not the Did the late Domingo Bonsato, make donations inter vivos or dispositions
determinative factor which makes the donation "inter vivos" or "mortis causa" post mortem in favor of the petitioners herein? If the latter, then the
As early as the case of Laureta v. Manta, et al., (44 Phil. 668 [1928]) this documents should reveal any or all of the following characteristics:
Court ruled that the dispositions in a deed of donation-whether "inter vivos" (1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
or "mortis causa" do not depend on the title or term used in the deed of transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should
donation but on the provisions stated in such deed. This Court explained in retain the ownership (fun or naked) and control of the property while alive
Concepcion v. Concepcion (91 Phil. 823 [1952]) — (Vidal v. Posadas, 58 Phil., 108; Guzman v. Ibea 67 Phil., 633);
...But, it is a rule consistently followed by the courts that it is the body of the (2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor
document of donation and the statements contained therein, and not the title at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of
that should be considered in ascertaining the intention of the donor. Here, the a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed
donation is entitled and called donacion onerosa mortis causa. From the (Bautista v. Sabiniano, G.R. No. L- 4326, November 18, 1952);
body, however, we find that the donation was of a nature remunerative rather (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
than onerous. It was for past services rendered, services which may not be transferee.
considered as a debt to be paid by the donee but services rendered to her These principles were repeated in the case of Castro v. Court of Appeals (27
freely and in goodwill. The donation instead of being onerous or for a SCRA 1076 [1969]), to wit:
valuable consideration, as in payment of a legal obligation, was more of
remuneratory or compensatory nature, besides being partly motivated by Whether a donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends upon the nature of
affection. the disposition made. 'Did the donor intend to transfer the ownership of the
property donated upon the execution of the donation? If this is so, as
We should not give too much importance or significance to or be guided by reflected from the provisions contained in the donation, then it is inter vivos;
the use of the phrase 'mortis causa in a donation and thereby to conclude otherwise, it is merely mortis causa, or made to take effect after death.'
that the donation is not one of inter vivos. In the case of De Guzman et al. v. (Howard v. Padilla and Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-7064 and L-7098, April
Ibea et al. (67 Phil. 633), this Court through Mr. Chief Justice Avancena said 22, 1955.
that if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the
fact that the donor styles it mortis causa. Applying the above principles to the instant petitions, there is no doubt that
the so-called DONATION MORTIS CAUSA is really a donation inter vivos.
The donation was executed by Dr. Pascual in favor of his sister Ursula
Pascual out of love and affection as well as a recognition of the personal
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

services rendered by the donee to the donor. The transfer of ownership over and children of Lopez were in possession of the land and made
the properties donated to the donee was immediate and independent of the improvements thereon; that the land was assessed in the tax rolls first in the
death of the donor. The provision as regards the reservation of properties for name of Lopez and later in that of his widow.; and that the deed of donation
the donor's subsistence in relation to the other provisions of the deed of was never recorded.
donation confirms the intention of the donor to give naked ownership of the
properties to the donee immediately after the execution of the deed of Upon these facts, the Court of Appeals held that the deed of donation was
donation. inoperative, and null and void (1) because the husband, Lopez, had no right
to donate conjugal property to the plaintiff appellant; and (2) because the
CONCHITA LIGUEZ vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, donation was tainted with illegal cause or consideration, of which donor and
MARIA NGO VDA. DE LOPEZ, ET AL., donee were participants.
G.R. No. L-11240 December 18, 1957
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
ISSUE: 1. Does the illicit causa rendered the donation null and void?
FACTS: A complaint was filed by petitioner-appellant against the widow and 2. Can the deceased donate the entirety of the conjugal
heirs of the late Salvador P. Lopez to recover a parcel of land. Plaintiff property?
averred to be its legal owner, pursuant to a deed of donation of said land,
executed in her favor by the late owner, Salvador P. Lopez, on 18 May 1943.
RULING: 1. NO. The Court consider that as against the deceased Salvador
The defense interposed was that the donation was null and void for having P. Lopez, who was a man advanced in years and mature experience, the
an illicit causa or consideration, which was the plaintiff's entering into marital appellant was a mere minor, 16 years of age, when the donation was made;
relations with Salvador P. Lopez, a married man; and that the property had that there is no finding made by the Court of Appeals that she was fully
been adjudicated to the appellees as heirs of Lopez by the court of First aware of the terms of the bargain entered into by and Lopez and her parents;
Instance, since 1949. that, her acceptance in the deed of donation (which was authorized by Article
626 of the Old Civil Code) did not necessarily imply knowledge of conditions
The Court of Appeals found that when the donation was made, Lopez had and terms not set forth therein; and that the substance of the testimony of the
been living with the parents of appellant for barely a month; that the donation instrumental witnesses is that it was the appellant's parents who insisted on
was made in view of the desire of Salvador P. Lopez, a man of mature years, the donation before allowing her to live with Lopez. These facts are more
to have sexual relations with appellant Conchita Liguez; that Lopez had suggestive of seduction than of immoral bargaining on the part of appellant. It
confessed to his love for appellant to the instrumental witnesses, with the must not be forgotten that illegality is not presumed, but must be duly and
remark that her parents would not allow Lopez to live with her unless he first adequately proved.
donated the land in question; that after the donation, Conchita Liguez and
Salvador P. Lopez lived together in the house that was built upon the latter's The rule that parties to an illegal contract, if equally guilty, will not be aided
orders, until Lopez was killed on July 1st, 1943, by some guerrillas who by the law but will both be left where it finds them, has been interpreted by
believed him to be pro-Japanese. this Court as barring the party from pleading the illegality of the bargain either
as a cause of action or as a defense. Memo auditor propriam turpitudinem
It was also ascertained by the Court of Appeals that the donated land allegans.
originally belonged to the conjugal partnership of Salvador P. Lopez and his
wife, Maria Ngo; that the latter had met and berated Conchita for living The appellant seeks recovery of the disputed land on the strength of a
maritally with her husband, sometime during June of 1943; that the widow donation regular on its face. To defeat its effect, the appellees must plead
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and prove that the same is illegal. But such plea on the part of the Lopez illegality of the donation. But their right to a legitime out of his estate is not
heirs is not receivable, since Lopez, himself, if living, would be barred from thereby affected, since the legitime is granted them by the law itself, over and
setting up that plea; and his heirs, as his privies and successors in interest, above the wishes of the deceased. Hence, the forced heirs are entitled to
can have no better rights than Lopez himself. Appellees, as successors of have the donation set aside in so far as in officious: i.e., in excess of the
the late donor, being thus precluded from pleading the defense of immorality portion of free disposal (Civil Code of 1889, Articles 636, 654) computed as
or illegal causa of the donation, the total or partial ineffectiveness of the provided in Articles 818 and 819, and bearing in mind that "collationable
same must be decided by different legal principles. gifts" under Article 818 should include gifts made not only in favor of the
forced heirs, but even those made in favor of strangers, as decided by the
2. NO. In this regard, the Court of Appeals correctly held that Lopez could not Supreme Court of Spain in its decisions of 4 May 1899 and 16 June 1902. So
donate the entirety of the property in litigation, to the prejudice of his wife that in computing the legitimes, the value of the property to herein appellant,
Maria Ngo, because said property was conjugal in character and the right of Conchita Liguez, should be considered part of the donor's estate. Once
the husband to donate community property is strictly limited by law (Civil again, only the court of origin has the requisite date to determine whether the
Code of 1889, Arts. 1409, 1415, 1413; Baello vs. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 213). donation is inofficious or not.
ART. 1409. The conjugal partnership shall also be chargeable with anything Pershing Tan Queto v. Court of Appeals
which may have been given or promised by the husband alone to the G.R. No. L-35648 ; February 27, 1987
children born of the marriage in order to obtain employment for them or give Paras, J.
then, a profession or by both spouses by common consent, should they not
have stipulated that such expenditures should be borne in whole or in part by Facts:
the separate property of one of them.".
ART. 1415. The husband may dispose of the property of the conjugal Restituta by way of donation and during the lifetime of her mother, received
partnership for the purposes mentioned in Article 1409.) the subject lot which was consummated while she was already married to her
ART. 1413. In addition to his powers as manager the husband may for a husband Juan Pombuena. His husband, Juan applied for torrens title for the
valuable consideration alienate and encumber the property of the conjugal land as a co-owner and was subsequently issued a TCT. An unlawful
partnership without the consent of the wife. detainer was filed against Tan Queto who was the former lessee of the
The text of the articles makes it plain that the donation made by the husband subject property. The decision of the court was in favor of the spouses, but
in contravention of law is not void in its entirety, but only in so far as it on appeal the entire case was dismissed because of an understanding of
prejudices the interest of the wife. In this regard, as Manresa points out barter between Juan and Tan Queto the latter became the owner of the
(Commentaries, 5th Ed., pp. 650-651, 652-653), the law asks no distinction subject lot.
between gratuitous transfers and conveyances for a consideration.
Restituta sued Juan and tan Queto claiming that the property was conjugal
To determine the prejudice to the widow, it must be shown that the value of property because it was received by virtue of an oral donation from her
her share in the property donated can not be paid out of the husband's share mother. Juan and tan queto, on the other hand claim the validity of the barter
of the community profits. The requisite data, however, are not available to us executed between them.
and necessitate a remand of the records to the court of origin that settled the
estate of the late Salvador P. Lopez. Issue:
Is an oral donation received during the lifetime of the donor valid?
The situation of the children and forced heirs of Lopez approximates that of Held:
the widow. As privies of their parent, they are barred from invoking the
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No, the donation is not valid. No, the donation remains valid.
Art. 749 provides that the donation should be executed in a public Under the old civil code, the acceptance may be made, in the deed of gift or
instrument. in a separate public writing; but it shall produce no effect if not made during
the lifetime of the donor.
The oral donation of the lot cannot be a valid donation interviews absent any If the acceptance is made, by separate public instrument, authentic notice
indication that the formalities under the law were complied. It cannot be also thereof shall be given the donor, and this proceeding shall be noted in both
said that there was a valid donation mortis causa for the formalities of a will instruments.
were not complied with. Moreover, the transfer was a conveyance to
Restituta of her hereditary share in the estate of her mother (or parents) In the case, the donation was accepted in a separate public instrument and
cannot be sustained for the contractual transmission of future inheritance is that it was duly communicated to the donors. Although, there is nothing in
generally prohibited. either of the two instruments showing that "authentic notice" of the
acceptance was made by Salud to Juana and Felipe and while the first
There being no compliance with the formalities required by the law, the instrument contains the statement that "the donee does hereby accept this
donation is void, making the property a conjugal one. donation and does hereby express her gratitude for the kindness and
Eufemia Pajarillo, et. al, v. Intermediate Appellate Court liberality of the donor," a literal adherence to the requirement of the law might
G.R. No. 72908; August 11, 1989 result not in justice to the parties but conversely a distortion of their
Cruz, J. intentions. It is also a policy of the Court to avoid such an intepretation. The
Facts: purpose of the formal requirement is to insure that the acceptance of the
Juana and Felipe Balane executed public instrument entitled "Extra-judicial donation is duly communicated to the donor. The Court cannot in conscience
Settlement of the Estate” over the 28 hectares of land left by their deceased declare the donation ineffective because there is no notation in the
sister Perfecta in their favor then was later extra-judicially donated to Juana’s extrajudicial settlement of the donee's acceptance. That would be placing too
daughter, Salud who immediately took possession of the land. The much stress on mere form over substance.
instruments executed as well as the acceptance of Salud were not recorded.
Juana subsequently executed a deed of absolute sale conveying the land to Thus, the donation is deemed effective.
Claudio and the corresponding TCT was issued in the latter’s name.
Salud filed a case for reconveyance claiming that she was unaware until later
of the supposed sale of the land to Claudio. In their answer, the heirs of
Claudio assailed the donation to Salud as legally inefficacious due to lack of
acceptance of the same.
Issue:
Can the execution of an acceptance in a separate instrument and the failure

to record invalidate the Donation?
Held:
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sue for the annulment or reduction of the donation within four years from the
date of adoption, if the donation impairs the legitime of the adopted, taking
Eduvigis J. Cruz v. Court of Appeals
into account the whole estate of the donor at the time of the adoption of the
G.R. No. L-58671 November 22, 1985
child. (Civil Code, Articles 760, 761 and 763). Of course, the burden of proof
PLANA, J.:
is on the plaintiff-donor, who must allege and establish the requirements
prescribed by law, on the basis of which annulment or reduction of the
FACTS
donation can be adjudged. Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the complaint for
Eduvigis Cruz, a childless widow, donated a residential lot together with annulment does not allege that the subject donation impairs the legitime of
the apartment erected thereon to her grandnieces. It was accordingly the adopted child. Indeed it contains no indication at all of the total assets of
transferred to their names. the donor. Nor is there proof of impairment of legitime. On the contrary, there
Later on, she judicially adopted Cresencia Ocreto, a minor and sought to is unrebutted evidence that the donor has another piece of land (27,342 sq.
annul the donation invoking Article 760, paragraph 3 of the New Civil Code. m.) situated in Dolores, Taytay, Rizal worth P273,420.00 in 1977, although
then subject to litigation. The legal situation of petitioner-donor, as plaintiff, is
The trial court rendered the decision revoking the donation. However, the made worse by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that the
Court of Appeals reversed it and dismissed the complaint finding that: grandfather of the donees was the owner pro indiviso of one-half of the
(1) the trial court took ignored Article 761; donated land, the effect of which is to reduce the value of the donation which
(2) She owns another lot; can then more easily be taken from the portion of the estate within the free
(3) The donated lot did not belong to her entirely as ½ thereof disposal of petitioner.
belonged to her brother Maximo Cruz, grandfather of Hence, the donation may not be revoked or reduced if there is no
defendants; and adequate allegation that the legitime would be impaired and if there has been
(4) She has the burden to show that the donation has impaired the no inventory submitted.
legitime of the subsequent child; but she did not even allege it in
her complaint.
ISSUE
Can Eduvigis revoke the residential lot she donated to her
grandnieces after she adopted Cresencia?
RULING
No, she cannot do so in the case at bar.
The court applied the following articles:
Art. 761. In the cases referred to in the preceding article, the
donation shall be revoked or reduced insofar as it exceeds
the portion that may be freely disposed of by will, taking into
account the whole estate of the donor at the time of the birth,
appearance or adoption of a child. (n)
In the case of the subsequent adoption of a minor by one who had
previously donated some or all of his properties to another, the donor may
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THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE ROMAN 2. Is the resolutory condition in the deed of donation that the property
CATHOLIC BISHOP OF IMUS, and the SPOUSES FLORENCIO IGNAO donated should not be sold within a period of one hundred (100)
and SOLEDAD C. IGNAO, petitioners, years from the date of execution of the deed of donation valid?
vs.
Held:
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE OF DECEASED SPOUSES
EUSEBIO DE CASTRO and MARTINA RIETA, represented by MARINA 1. No, the action for the rescission of donation has not yet prescribed.
RIETA GRANADOS and THERESA RIETA TOLENTINO, respondents. Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an action
G.R. No. 77425 June 19, 1991 for the revocation of a donation must be brought within four (4) years from
the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation, the same is not
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE ROMAN
applicable in the case at bar. The deed of donation involved herein expressly
CATHOLIC BISHOP OF IMUS, and the SPOUSES FLORENCIO IGNAO
provides for automatic reversion of the property donated in case of violation
and SOLEDAD C. IGNAO, petitioners,
of the condition therein, hence a judicial declaration revoking the same is not
vs.
necessary (Lopez vs. Commissioner of Customs, et al.). The validity of such
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE OF DECEASED SPOUSES
a stipulation in the deed of donation providing for the automatic reversion of
EUSEBIO DE CASTRO and MARTINA RIETA, represented by MARINA
the donated property to the donor upon non-compliance of the condition was
RIETA GRANADOS and THERESA RIETA TOLENTINO, respondents. upheld in the recent case of De Luna, et al. vs. Abrigo, et al. It was held
G.R. No. 77450 June 19, 1991 therein that said stipulation is in the nature of an agreement granting a party
the right to rescind a contract unilaterally in case of breach, without need of
REGALADO, J.:
going to court, and that, upon the happening of the resolutory condition or
non-compliance with the conditions of the contract, the donation is
Facts: automatically revoked without need of a judicial declaration to that effect.
In 1930, Spouses Eusebio and Martina donated a parcel of land in favor of When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly provides for
the petitioners which provides that the donee shall not dispose or sell the automatic revocation and reversion of the property donated, the rules on
property within a period of one hundred (100) years from the execution of the contract and the general rules on prescription should apply, and not Article
deed of donation, otherwise a violation of such condition would render ipso 764 of the Civil Code. On the foregoing ratiocinations, the Court of Appeals
facto null and void the deed of donation and the property would revert to the committed no error in holding that the cause of action of herein private
estate of the donors. However, despite the prohibition in the deed of respondents has not yet prescribed since an action to enforce a written
donation, the petitioner sold the property to spouses Ignao by virtue of an contract prescribes in ten (10) years. It is our view that Article 764 was
absolute deed of sale dated June 30, 1980. Knowledge of the sale prompted intended to provide a judicial remedy in case of non-fulfillment or
the respondents to file an action for rescission of the donation and recovery contravention of conditions specified in the deed of donation if and when the
of the real property in November 29, 1984. Petitioners argued, among others, parties have not agreed on the automatic revocation of such donation upon
that the respondents' cause of action has prescribed. the occurrence of the contingency contemplated therein. That is not the
situation in the case at bar.
Issues:
Hence, the action for rescission of the deed of donation is still
1. Has the respondent's action for the rescission of the donation available.
already prescribed?
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2. No, Said condition constitutes an undue restriction on the rights Spouses Romulo and Sally Eduarte v. CA and Pedro Calapine
arising from ownership of petitioners and is, therefore, contrary to
G.R. No. 105944; Febraury 9, 1996
public policy.
Francisco, J.
Donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective
transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee. Once a
donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property Facts: Pedro Calapine owns a parcel of land in San Pablo City. He executed
donated. Although the donor may impose certain conditions in the deed of a deed entitled “Pagbibigay-Pala” ceding one-half portion to his niece, Helen
donation, the same must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, Doria. After sometime, another deed identically entitled was purportedly
public order and public policy. The condition imposed in the deed of donation executed by him ceding the whole portion to Doria. Doria donated a portion
in the case before us constitutes a patently unreasonable and undue of the lot to Calauan Christian Reformed Church, while the remaining portion
restriction on the right of the donee to dispose of the property donated, which was sold and conveyed to petitioners.
right is an indispensable attribute of ownership. Such a prohibition against
alienation, in order to be valid, must not be perpetual or for an unreasonable
period of time. Certain provisions of the Civil Code illustrative of the aforesaid Calapine sought to (1) revoke the deed of donation on the ground that Doria
policy may be considered applicable by analogy. Under the third paragraph committed an act of ingratitude and (2) annul the donation and sale to
of Article 494, a donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which Calauan Christian Reformed Church and petitioners. On the other hand,
shall not exceed twenty (20) years. Article 870, on its part, declares that the petitioners contend that falsification of a document is neither a crime against
dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for the person nor property of the donor but is a crime against public interest
more than twenty (20) years are void. under the RPC, which is not a ground for revocation.
In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition in the deed of
donation against the alienation of the property for an entire century, being an
unreasonable emasculation and denial of an integral attribute of ownership, Issue: Is the falsification of Alcapine’s signature constitutes an act of
should be declared as an illegal or impossible condition within the ingratitude which is a valid ground for revocation of the donation?
contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code.
Hence, the resolutory condition is not valid. Ruling: Yes, the falsification of Alcapine’s signature constitutes an act of
ingratitude which is a valid ground for revocation of the donation. In
commentaries of Tolentino, it is said that “all crimes which offend the donor
show ingratitude and are causes of revocation.” Petitioner attempted to
categorize the offenses according to their classification under the RPC by
deleting the first sentence. However, this is unwarranted considering that
illegal detention, threats and coercion are considered crimes against the
person of the donor despite the fact that they are classified as crimes against
personal liberty and security under the RPC. Thus, the falsification of a
document is an act of ingratitude which is a valid ground for revocation of the
donation.
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Quilala vs. Alcantara The acceptance, to be valid, must be made during the lifetime of both the
GR no. 132681 donor and the donee. It may be made in the same deed or in a separate
public document, and the donor must know the acceptance by the donee.
FACTS: Catalina Quilala executed a Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos in
favor of Violeta Quilala over a parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila. The In the case at bar, the donee’s acceptance of the donation was explicitly
Deed of Donation consisted of 2 pages. The first page contains the deed manifested in the penultimate paragraph of the deed, which reads:
itself and was signed by both Catalina (donor) and Violeta (donee), plus two “That the DONEE hereby receives and accepts the gift and donation
other instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the
made in her favor by the DONOR and she hereby expresses her
Acknowledgement, which states that only Catalina personally appeared
appreciation and gratefulness for the kindness and generosity of the
before the notary public and acknowledged that the donation was her free
DONOR”.
and voluntary act.
Below the terms and stipulations of the donation, the donor, donee and their
Subsequently, Catalina died, followed by Violeta. Thereafter, the
witnesses affixed their signature.
respondents (Gliceria Alcantara, Leonora Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan
Reyes), claiming to be Catalinas only surviving relatives within the fourth civil The lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public does
degree of consanguinity, executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement of not also render the donation null and void. The instrument should be treated
estate, dividing and adjudicating unto themselves the above-described in its entirety. It cannot be considered a private document in part and a public
property. Petitioner Ricky Quilala is the survivong son of Violeta Quilala. document in another part. The fact that it was acknowledged before a notary
public converts the deed of donation in its entirety a public instrument. The
In the action for the declaration of nullity of the donation inter vivos,
fact that the donee was not mentioned by the notary public in the
the trial court ruled in favor of respondents, saying that the deed of donation,
acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure, it is the conveyance that
although signed by both Catalina and Violeta, was acknowledged before a
should be acknowledged as a free and voluntary act. In any event, the donee
notary public only by the donor, Catalina. Consequently, there was no
signed on the second page, which contains the Acknowledgment only. Her
acceptance by Violeta of the donation in a public instrument, thus rendering
acceptance, which is explicitly set forth on the first page of the notarized
the donation null and void.
deed of donation, was made in a public instrument.
ISSUE: Is there acceptance by Violeta even if she did not appear before the Thus, the acceptance was validly made in the same public instrument.
notary public for the acknowledgement of the deed of donation?
Therefore, there was a valid donation.
HELD: Yes, there is a valid acceptance in this case despite the non-
appearance of the donee before the notary public.
Under Article 749 of the Civil Code, the donation of an immovable must be
made in a public instrument in order to be valid, specifying therein the
property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must
satisfy. As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective
transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee, and is
perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the
donee, provided the donee is not disqualified or prohibited by law from
accepting the donation. Once the donation is accepted, it is generally
considered irrevocable, and the donee becomes the absolute owner of the
property.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

Maxima Hemedes vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, Dominium confirmation of title over the subject unregistered land. Subsequently,
Realty and Construction Corporation, Enrique D. Hemedes and R & B Original Certificate of Title was issued in the name of Maxima Hemedes
Insurance Corporation married to Raul Rodriguez by the Registry of Deeds of Laguna on June 8,
1962, with the annotation that "Justa Kausapin shall have the usufructuary
G.R. No. 107132, October 8, 1999
rights over the parcel of land herein described during her lifetime or
widowhood."
R & B Insurance Corporation vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals,
Dominium Realty and Construction Corporation, Enrique D. Hemedes
R & B Insurance, on the other hand, claimed that on June 2, 1964, Maxima
and Maxima Hemedes
Hemedes and her husband constituted a real estate mortgage over the
G.R. No. 108472, October 8, 1999 subjectproperty in its favor to serve as security for a loan which they obtained
in the amount of P6,000.00. On February 22, 1968, R & B Insurance
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage since Maxima Hemedes failed to pay
GONZAGA-REYES, J.: the loan even after it became due. The land was sold at a public auction with
R & B Insurance as the highest bidder and a certificate of sale was issued by
the sheriff in its favor. Since Maxima Hemedes failed to redeem the property
Facts: On March 22, 1947 Jose Hemedes executed a document entitled within the redemption period, R & B Insurance executed an Affidavit of
"Donation Inter Vivos With Resolutory Conditions" whereby he conveyed Consolidation p and the Register of Deeds of Laguna cancelled the OCT and
ownership over the subject land, together with all its improvements, in favor issued Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of R & B Insurance. The
of his third wife, Justa Kausapin, subject to the following resolutory annotation of usufruct in favor of Justa Kausapin was maintained in the new
conditions: title.
(a) Upon the death or remarriage of the DONEE, the title to the property Despite the earlier conveyance of the subject land in favor of Maxima
donated shall revert to any of the children, or their heirs, of the DONOR Hemedes, Justa Kausapin executed a "Kasunduan" on May 27, 1971
expressly designated by the DONEE in a public document conveying the whereby she transferred the same land to her stepson Enrique D. Hemedes,
property to the latter; or pursuant to the resolutory condition in the deed of donation executed in her
favor by her late husband Jose Hemedes.
(b) In absence of such an express designation made by the DONEE
before her death or remarriage contained in a public instrument as above Enrique D. Hemedes then sold the property to Dominium Realty and
provided, the title to the property shall automatically revert to the legal heirs Construction Corporation (Dominium). While Justa Kausapin executed an
of the DONOR in common. affidavit affirming the conveyance of the subject property in favor of Enrique
D. Hemedes as embodied in the "Kasunduan" dated May 27, 1971, and at
the same time denying the conveyance made to Maxima Hemedes.
Justa Kausapin executed on September 27, 1960 a "Deed of Conveyance of
Unregistered Real Property by Reversion"conveying to Maxima Hemedes
the subject property except that the possession and enjoyment of the said Dominium then leased the property to its sister corporation Asia Brewery,
property shall remain vested with Kausapin during her lifetime, or Inc. (Asia Brewery) who constructed two warehouses. Upon learning of Asia
widowhood. Maxima Hemedes, then filed an application for registration and
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

Brewery's constructions upon the subject property, R & B Insurance sent it a binding contract has been executed between the parties, it occurs to one of
letter informing the former of its ownership of the property and of its right to them to allege some defect therein as a reason for annulling it, the alleged
appropriate the constructions since Asia Brewery is a builder in bad faith. defect must be conclusively proven, since the validity and fulfillment of
contracts cannot be left to the will of one of the contracting parties.
Maxima Hemedes also wrote a letter addressed to Asia Brewery asserting

that she is the rightful owner of the subject property by and that she has the Although a comparison of Justa Kausapin's thumbmark with the thumbmark
right to appropriate Asia Brewery's constructions, to demand its demolition, affixed upon the deed of conveyance would have easily cleared any doubts
or to compel Asia Brewery to purchase the land. In another letter addressed as to whether or not the deed was forged, the records do not show that such
to R & B Insurance, Maxima Hemedes denied the execution of any real evidence was introduced by private respondents and the lower court
estate mortgage in favor of the latter. decisions do not make mention of any comparison having been made. It is a
legal presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced. The failure of private respondents to refute the due execution of
Dominium and Enrique D. Hemedes then filed a complaint for the annulment the deed of conveyance by making a comparison with Justa Kausapin's
of TCT issued in favor of R & B Insurance and/or the reconveyance to thumbmark necessarily leads one to conclude that she did in fact affix her
Dominium of the subject property, alleging that Dominium was the absolute thumbmark upon the deed of donation in favor of her stepdaughter.
owner of the subject property by virtue of the deed of sale executed by
Enrique D. Hemedes, who in turn obtained ownership of the land from Justa
Kausapin, as evidenced by the "Kasunduan" dated May 27, 1971. They Morever, at the time the present case was filed in the trial court in 1981,
asserted that Justa Kausapin never transferred the land to Maxima Hemedes Justa Kausapin was already 80 years old, suffering from worsening physical
and that Enrique D. Hemedes had no knowledge of the registration infirmities and completely dependent upon her stepson Enrique D. Hemedes
proceedings initiated by Maxima Hemedes. for support. It is apparent that Enrique D. Hemedes could easily have
influenced his aging stepmother to donate the subject property to him.
Issue: Which of the two conveyances by Justa Kausapin, the first in favor of
Maxima Hemedes and the second in favor of Enrique D. Hemedes, Lastly, to the contention that Maxima Hemedes failed to comply with article
effectively transferred ownership over the subject land? 1332 of the Civil Code, which states:
Held: The conveyance made in favor of Maxima Hemedes effectively When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a language
transferred ownership over the subject land. not understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing
the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to
the former.
The finding that the "Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property By
Reversion" executed by Justa Kausapin in favor of Maxima Hemedes is
spurious is not supported by the factual findings in this case. It is grounded Art. 1332 was intended for the protection of a party to a contract who is at a
upon the mere denial of the same by Justa Kausapin. A party to a contract disadvantage due to his illiteracy, ignorance, mental weakness or other
cannot just evade compliance with his contractual obligations by the simple handicap.
expedient of denying the execution of such contract. If, after a perfect and
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

In this case, Justa Kausapin disclaims any knowledge of the "Deed of not an innocent purchaser for value since Enrique D. Hemedes did not
Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by Reversion" in favor of Maxima present any certificate of title upon which it relied.
Hemedes. In fact, she asserts that it was only during the hearing conducted
on December 7, 1981 before the trial court that she first caught a glimpse of
the deed of conveyance and thus, she could not have possibly affixed her
thumbmark thereto. It is private respondents' own allegations which render
article 1332 inapplicable for it is useless to determine whether or not Justa
Kausapin was induced to execute said deed of conveyance by means of SIGUAN, vs. LIM
fraud employed by Maxima Hemedes, who allegedly took advantage of the G.R. No. 134685 November 19, 1999
fact that the former could not understand English, when Justa Kausapin
denies even having seen the document before the present case was initiated DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
in 1981.
FACTS:
It has been held by this Court that ". . . mere preponderance of evidence is
not sufficient to overthrow a certificate of a notary public to the effect that the
On 1990, LIM issued two Metrobank checks. Upon presentment by petitioner
grantor executed a certain document and acknowledged the fact of its
with the drawee bank, the checks were dishonored for the reason account
execution before him. To accomplish this result, the evidence must be so
closed. As a consequence, a criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa
clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all reasonable controversy as to
Blg. 22 was filed by petitioner against LIM. Meanwhile, on 1991, a Deed of
the falsity of the certificate, and when the evidence is conflicting, the
Donation conveying parcels of land and purportedly executed by LIM on
certificate will be upheld." In the present case, we hold that private
1989 in favor of her children, Linde, Ingrid and Neil, was registered and new
respondents have failed to produce clear, strong, and convincing evidence to
transfer certificates of title were thereafter issued in the names of the donees.
overcome the positive value of the "Deed Conveyance of Unregistered Real
Property by Reversion" — a notarized document. The mere denial of its
execution by the donor will not suffice for the purpose. Thereafter, petitioner filed an accion pauliana against LIM and her children to
rescind the questioned Deed of Donation as she claimed that LIM
conspiredwith her children in antedating the questioned Deed of Donation, to
In upholding the deed of conveyance in favor of Maxima Hemedes, we must
defraud the creditors. According to Article 759 of the New Civil Code, which
concomitantly rule that Enrique D. Hemedes and his transferee, Dominium,
provides: The donation is always presumed to be in fraud of creditors when
did not acquire any rights over the subject property. Justa Kausapin sought
at the time of the execution thereof the donor did not reserve sufficient
to transfer to her stepson exactly what she had earlier transferred to Maxima
property to pay his debts prior to the donation. On the other hand,
Hemedes — the ownership of the subject property pursuant to the first
respondents argue that petitioner failed to present convincing evidence that
condition stipulated in the deed of donation executed by her husband. Thus,
the Deed of Donation was antedated and executed in fraud of petitioner.
the donation in favor of Enrique D. Hemedes is null and void for the
purported object thereof did not exist at the time of the transfer, having
already been transferred to his sister. Similarly, the sale of the subject The trial court ordered the rescission of the deed. On appeal, the CA
property by Enrique D. Hemedes to Dominium is also a nullity for the latter reversed the said decision.
cannot acquire more rights than its predecessor-in-interest and is definitely
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

ISSUE: Was the deed of donation executed in fraud of creditors? RODOLFO NOCEDA vs COURT OF APPEALS and AURORA ARBIZO
DIRECTO
G.R. No. 119730 September 2, 1999
HELD: GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
NO. The general rule is that rescission requires the existence of creditors at
the time of the alleged fraudulent alienation, and this must be proved as one
of the bases of the judicial pronouncement setting aside the contract. Without FACTS
any prior existing debt, there can neither be injury nor fraud. In the instant
case, the alleged debt of LIM in favor of petitioner was incurred in August Plaintiff Aurora Directo, defendant Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria
1990, while the deed of donation was purportedly executed on 10 August Arbizo, the daughter, grandson, and widow, respectively, of the late
1989. We are not convinced with the allegation of the petitioner that the Celestino Arbizo, who died extrajudicially settled a parcel of land. On the
questioned deed was antedated to make it appear that it was made prior to same date, plaintiff Directo donated a part of her share to defendant Noceda,
petitioners credit. Notably, that deed is a public document, it having been who is her nephew being the son of her deceased sister. However, about two
acknowledged before a notary public. As such, it is evidence of the fact which months after, another extrajudicial settlement-partition of The lot was
gave rise to its execution and of its date, pursuant to Section 23, Rule 132 of executed by plaintiff Directo, defendant Noceda, and Maria Arbizo. Three
the Rules of Court. fifths of the said land went to Maria Arbizo while plaintiff Directo and
defendant Noceda got only one-fifth each. Defendant Noceda constructed his
house on the land donated to him by plaintiff Directo. Plaintiff Directo fenced
Article 759 of the same Code, second paragraph, states that the donation is the portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement, excluding the
always presumed to be in fraud of creditors when at the time thereof the donated portion, and constructed thereon three huts. But later, defendant
donor did not reserve sufficient property to pay his debts prior to the Noceda removed the fence earlier constructed by plaintiff Directo, occupied
donation. For this presumption of fraud to apply, it must be established that the three huts (3) and fenced the entire land of plaintiff Directo without her
the donor did not leave adequate properties which creditors might have consent. Plaintiff Directo demanded from defendant Noceda to vacate her
recourse for the collection of their credits existing before the execution of the land, but the latter refused. Hence, plaintiff Directo filed the present suit, a
donation. As earlier discussed, petitioners alleged credit existed only a year complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership and
after the deed of donation was executed. She cannot, therefore, be said to rescission/annulment of donation, against defendant Noceda before the
have been prejudiced or defrauded by such alienation. Besides, the evidence lower court. The Regional Trial Court, rendered a decision Declaring the
disclose that when the deed of donation was executed, LIM had several second Extra-Judicial Settlement-Partition valid and Declaring the Deed of
properties. Donation revoked. Rodolfo Nocedo appealed to the respondent Court which
affirmed the trial court.
Petitioner's arguments
1. Petitioner claims that the subject property could not be partitioned

based on the second extrajudicial settlement-partition since the
distributive share of the heirs were different from the first
extrajudicial settlement indicating that they never intended that
any of the deeds to be the final determination of the portions
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

2. Also, he alleges that since there was no effective and real partition of It was established that petitioner Noceda occupied not only the portion
the subject lot there exists no basis for the charge of usurpation and donated to him by private respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo but he also
hence there is also no basis for finding ingratitude against him. fenced the whole area of part which belongs to private respondent Directo,
3. Finally, petitioner contends that granting revocation is proper, the thus petitioner's act of occupying the portion pertaining to private respondent
right to enforce the same had already prescribed since as admitted Directo without the latter's knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation
by private respondent, petitioner usurped her property in the first which is an offense against the property of the donor and considered as an
week of September 1985 while the complaint for revocation was filed act of ingratitude of a donee against the donor.
on September 16, 1986, thus more than one (1) year had passed
from the alleged usurpation by petitioner of private respondent's 3. NO. The action by the donor here to revoke her donation has not
share in The Lot. prescribed.
ISSUES Art. 769 of the New Civil Code states that: "The action granted to the
donor by reason of ingratitude cannot be renounced in advance. This
1. Was the subject property validly partitioned? action prescribes within one year to be counted from the time the donor
2. Is there a basis for finding ingratitude against the petitioner as to had knowledge of the fact and it was possible for him to bring the
effectively revoke the donation made to him? action." As expressly stated, the donor must file the action to revoke his
3. Assuming the revocation of donation was proper, did the right to donation within one year from the time he had knowledge of the ingratitude of
enforce it already prescribed? the donee. Also, it must be shown that it was possible for the donor to
institute the said action within the same period.
RULING
The concurrence of these two requisites must be shown by defendant
1. YES. There was a valid partition. Noceda in order to bar the present action. Defendant Noceda failed to do so.
He reckoned the one year prescriptive period from the occurrence of the
usurpation of the property of plaintiff Directo in the first week of September,
The discrepancies between the two extrajudicial settlements executed by
1985, and not from the time the latter had the knowledge of the usurpation.
plaintiff Directo, defendant Noceda and Maria Arbizo would show his
Moreover, defendant Noceda failed to prove that at the time plaintiff Directo
conformity to the new apportionment of The Lot among the heirs of the late
acquired knowledge of his usurpation, it was possible for plaintiff Directo to
Celestino Arbizo. The fact that defendant Noceda occupied the portion
allotted to him in the extrajudicial settlement, as well as the donated portion institute an action for revocation of her donation.
of the share of plaintiff Directo, presupposes his knowledge of the extent of
boundaries of the portion of the lot allotted to him. Hence, the action has not yet prescribed.
2. YES. There was ingratitude on the part of respondent.
The law does not require conviction of the donee; it is enough that the
offense be proved in the action for revocation.
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Heirs of Cesario Velasquez v. The Court of Appeals and Heirs of No. The donation made by the spouses Aquino in favor of Cesario Velasquez
Anatalia de Guzman and his family still subsists.
G.R. No. 126996; February 15, 2000 A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer
of title over the property from the donor to the donee and the donation is
GONZAGA-REYES, J:
perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee.
Once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the
Facts: property donated.
The spouses Leoncia de Guzman and Cornelio Aquino owned six parcels of In this case, petitioners were able to adduce the uncontroverted and ancient
land located in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. The spouses, however, died documentary evidence showing that during the lifetime of the Aquino
intestate and were childless. Leoncia was survived by her sisters Anatalia de spouses they had already disposed of four of the six parcels of land subject
Guzman and Tranquilina de Guzman. The heirs of Anatalia de Guzman filed of the complaint as follows: (a) Escritura de donation propter nuptias in favor
a complaint for annulment, partition and damages against Cesario of the future spouses Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman conveying
Velasquez, son of Tranquilina. It was alleged that Cesario, upon demand, to them a portion of the second parcel in the complaint and the entirety of the
refused to partition the properties of the spouses Aquino. Both the trial court third and sixth parcels; (b) Deed of donation inter vivos conveying the first
and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents ruling that both parcel in favor of petitioners Anastacia Velasquez and Jose Velasquez; (c)
Anatalia de Guzman and Tranquilina de Guzman are legal heirs of spouses Escritura de Compraventa conveying another portion of the second parcel in
Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman. favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman with a P500
consideration; (d) Deed of Conveyance in favor of Cesario Velasquez and
Petitioners’ argument: Petitioners alleged that during the lifetime of the Camila de Guzman conveying to them the remaining portion of the second
spouses, the properties subject of this case were donated in favor of the parcel for a consideration of P600 and confirming in the same Deed the
spouses Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman, and their children Jose Escritura de donation propter nuptias and Escritura de compraventa
and Anastacia Velasquez, and some were also disposed in favor of third abovementioned.
parties.
The donation of the first parcel made by the Aquino spouses to petitioners
Respondents’ argument: The heirs of Anatalia de Guzman claimed that a Jose and Anastacia Velasquez who were then nineteen (19) and ten (10)
conference was held between Leoncia, Anatalia, Tranquilina de Guzman and years old respectively was accepted through their father Cesario Velasquez,
Cesario Velasquez wherein Leoncia told them that the Deed of Donation that and the acceptance was incorporated in the body of the same deed of
she and her husband executed were left by them unsigned because it was donation and made part of it, and was signed by the donor and the acceptor.
never their intention that all of their properties be disposed in favor of Cesario Legally speaking there was delivery and acceptance of the deed, and the
due to the fact that Anatalia had several children to support. donation existed perfectly and irrevocably. The donation inter vivos may be
revoked only for the reasons provided in Articles 760, 764 and 765 of the
Civil Code. The donation propter nuptias in favor of Cesario Velasquez and
Issue: Camila de Guzman over the third and sixth parcels including a portion of the
Were the transfer of the properties effected by the spouses Leoncia de second parcel became the properties of the spouses Velasquez since 1919.
Guzman and Cornelio Aquino repudiated by them before their death. The deed of donation propter nuptias can be revoked by the non-
performance of the marriage and the other causes mentioned in article 86 of
the Family Code. The alleged reason for the repudiation of the deed, that the
Ruling: Aquino spouses did not intend to give away all their properties since Anatalia
had several children to support, is not one of the grounds for revocation of
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donation either inter vivos or propter nuptias, although the donation might be ISSUE:
inofficious.
Should the property subject of the deed of donation, which was not
registered when P.D. No. 27 took effect, be excluded from the Operation
Land Transfer?
RULING:
No, the property subject of the deed of donation is not excluded from the
Ignacio Gonzales v. Court of Appeals
Operation Land Transfer.
G.R. No. 110335; June 18, 2001
Melo, J.
Article 749 of the Civil Code provides inter alia that "in order that the donation
of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document,
FACTS: specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which
the donee must satisfy." Corollarily, Article 709 of the same Code explicitly
states that "the titles of ownership, or other rights over immovable property,
Deceased spouses Ignacio and Marina Gonzales were registered owners of which are not duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of property shall not
two parcels of agricultural land. Marina Gonzales dies intestate. Prior to prejudice third persons." From the foregoing provisions, it may be inferred
partition of the said estate, Ignacio donated his share of the property in favor that as between the parties to a donation of an immovable property, all that is
of his 14 grandchildren, herein petitioners. The donation was not registered. required is for said donation to be contained in a public document.
When PD 27 took effect, the landholdings of the spouses were placed under Registration is not necessary for it to be considered valid and effective.
Operation Land Transfer. Private respondents are farmers and tenants of the However, in order to bind third persons, the donation must be registered in
spouses who were cultivating the parcels of land. They were issued the Registry of Property (now Registry of Land Titles and Deeds). Although
Certificates of Land Transfer and Emancipation Patents. The administratix the non-registration of a deed of donation shall not affect its validity, the
filed an application for retention with the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform, necessity of registration comes into play when the rights of third persons are
requesting that the property be excluded from the coverage of the law. It was affected, as in the case at bar.
initially denied, but after reinvestigation, it was recommended that the land
donated be exempt from Operation Land Transfer. The certificates issued in
favor of private respondents were cancelled. The Department of Agrarian It is undisputed in this case that the donation executed by Ignacio Gonzales
Reform (DAR) Secretary reason that the donation had already been in favor of his grandchildren, although in writing and duly notarized, has not
perfected, after having been duly accepted by the donees, who have been registered in accordance with law. For this reason, it shall not be
acquired a valid title to the portion donated on the date the instrument was binding upon private respondents who did not participate in said deed or had
executed. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the action of the DAR. no actual knowledge thereof. Hence, while the deed of donation is valid
Petitioners insist that the deed of donation executed by Ignacio Gonzales between the donor and the donees, such deed, however, did not bind the
validly transferred the ownership and possession of subjects land to his 14 tenants-farmers who were not parties to the donation. So it is of no moment
grandchildren. that the right of the tenants-farmers in this case was created by virtue of a
decree or law. They are still considered "third persons" contemplated in our
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laws on registration, for the fact remains that these tenants-farmers had no action over an immovable” allots undue credence to private respondents’
actual knowledge of the deed of donation. description of their complaint, as one for “Annulment of Documents,
Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession of Property”, which suggests the
action to be, in part, a real action enforced by those with claim of title over
Thus, the parcel of land donated is not excluded from the Operation Land the disputed land.
Transfer.
Unfortunately for private respondents, a claim for legitime does not amount to
a claim of title. In the recent case of Vizconde vs. Court of Appeals, we
declared that what is brought to collation is not the donated property itself,
but the value of the property at the time it was donated. The rationale for this
is that the donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership upon its
acceptance, hence, any increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof
is for the account of the heir or donee.
What, then, is the prescriptive period for an action for reduction of an
Eloy Imperial vs. Court of Appeals inofficious donation? The Civil Code specifies the following instances of
G.R. No. 112483; October 08, 1999 reduction or revocation of donations: (1) four years, in cases of subsequent
GONZAGA-REYES, J. birth, appearance, recognition or adoption of a child; (2) four years, for non-
FACTS: Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a parcel of compliance with conditions of the donation; and (3) at any time during the
land. He had two sons: petitioner Eloy Imperial, acknowledged natural son, lifetime of the donor and his relatives entitled
and Victor Imperial, adopted son. Leoncio sold the said lot for P1.00 to From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? The case of Mateo vs.
petitioner. Twenty-four years after the death of Leoncio, and after the death Lagua, 29 SCRA 864, which involved the reduction for inofficiousness of a
of Victor, Victor’s siblings from his natural father’s side, herein private donation propter nuptias, recognized that the cause of action to enforce a
respondents, filed a complaint for the annulment of the Deed of Absolute legitime accrues upon the death of the donor-decedent. Clearly so, since it is
Sale on grounds of officiousness, inter alia. Both Petitioner and private only then that the net estate may be ascertained and on which basis, the
respondents admitted that despite the contract’s designation, the transaction legitimes may be determined.
was in fact a donation. Petitioner alleged that the action had already
prescribed. The trial and appellate courts both ruled in favor of private It took private respondents 24 years since the death of Leoncio to initiate this
respondents, holding that the action was a real action over an immovable case. The action, therefore, has long prescribed.”
and thus prescribes in 30 years, under Article 1141 of the Civil Code. The
donation was found inofficious and was accordingly reduced.
ISSUE: Has the action prescribed?
RULING: Yes, the action has prescribed.

“Having ascertained this action as one for reduction of an inofficious
donation, we cannot sustain the holding of both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals that the applicable prescriptive period is thirty years, under Article
1141 of the Civil Code. The sense of both courts that this case is a “real
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Republic of the Philippines v. Leon Silim Here, a school building was immediately constructed after the donation was
G.R. No. 140487. April 2, 2001 executed. Respondents had knowledge of the existence of the school
Kapunan, J.: building. It was when the school building was being dismantled and
transferred to the new site and when Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was
FACTS: Spouses Silim and Mangubat donated a 5,600 sq. m parcel of land in
constructing a house on the donated property that respondents came to
favour of the Bureau of Public Schools, Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur. In
know of the Deed of Exchange. The actual knowledge by respondents of the
the Deed of Donation, respondents imposed the condition that the said
property should "be used exclusively and forever for school purposes only." construction and existence of the school building fulfilled the legal
This donation was accepted by Gregorio Buendia, the District Supervisor of requirement that the acceptance of the donation by the donee be
communicated to the donor.
BPS, through an Affidavit of Acceptance and/or Confirmation of Donation. A
school building was constructed on the donated land. However, the Bagong Under Art. 745, the law requires the donee to “accept the donation
Lipunan school building that was supposed to be allocated for the donated personally, or through an authorized person with a special power for the
parcel of land could not be released since the government required that it be purpose, or with a general and sufficient power; otherwise the donation shall
built upon a one (1) hectare parcel of land. To remedy this predicament be void.”
Buendia was authorized to officially transact for the exchange of the old
The respondents claim that the acceptance by Buendia of the donation was
school site to a new and suitable location which would fit the specifications of
ineffective because of the absence of a special power of attorney from the
the government. Pursuant to this, Buendia and Teresita Palma entered into a
Republic of the Philippines. The donation was made in favor of the Bureau of
Deed of Exchange whereby the donated lot was exchanged with the bigger Public Schools. Such being the case, Buendia’s acceptance was authorized
lot owned by the latter. The Bagong Lipunan school buildings were under Section 47 of the 1987 Administrative Code which states:
constructed on the new school site and the school building previously
erected on the donated lot was dismantled and transferred to the new SEC. 47. Contracts and Conveyances. - Contracts or conveyances may be
location.The Silim spouses learned of the Deed of Exchange when thay executed for and in behalf of the Government or of any of its branches,
learned that Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, whenever demanded by the
donated property. They filed a complaint to annul the donation claiming that exigency or exigencies of the service and as long as the same are not
there was no valid acceptance made by the donee and that there was a prohibited by law.
violation of the condition in the donation. No. The condition was not violated.
ISSUE: The exclusivity of the purpose of the donation was not altered or affected
Was there a valid acceptance based on Arts. 745 and 749 of the when Buendia exchanged the lot for a much bigger one. It was in furtherance
NCC? and enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The acquisition of the
bigger lot paved the way for the release of funds for the construction of
Was the condition in the donation violated?
Bagong Lipunan school building which could not be accommodated by the
RULING: Yes. There was a valid acceptance. limited area of the donated lot.
The last paragraph of Art. 749 reads: “If the acceptance is made in a
separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form,
and this step shall be noted in both instruments.” The purpose of the formal
requirement for acceptance of a donation is to ensure that such acceptance
is duly communicated to the donor.
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SECRETARY OF EDUCATION vs. HEIRS OF RUFINO DULAY, SR.
G.R. No. 164748 January 27, 2006 RULING:
CALLEJO, SR., J.: 1. NO, the donee (DECS) failed to comply with the condition imposed in
the deed of donation.
The contention of petitioners has no merit. As gleaned from the CA

FACTS:
decision, petitioners failed to prove that the donated property was
On August 3, 1981, the spouses Dulay executed a deed of donation over a used for school purposes as indicated in the deed of donation.
portion of their property in favor of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS). The deed provided that the property should be intended for
school purposes for and in consideration of the benefits that may be derived We find it difficult to sustain that the defendant-appellants have
therefrom. However, the property was not used for school purposes and complied with the condition of donation. It is not amiss to state that
remained idle. other than the bare allegation of the defendant-appellants, there is
nothing in the records that could concretely prove that the condition
of donation has been complied with by the defendant-appellants. In
The spouses Dulay requested that the property be returned to them the same breadth, the planting of palay on the land donated can
considering that the land was never used since 1981. When Rufino Dulay, hardly be considered and could not have been the "school purposes"
Sr. passed away, his heirs filed a complaint for the revocation of the deed of referred to and intended by the donors when they had donated the
donation on August 31, 1997. Respondents alleged that the DECS did not land in question. Also, the posture of the defendant-appellants that
fulfill the condition and that the land remained idle up to the present. the land donated is being used as technology and home economics
laboratory of the Rizal National High School is far from being the
truth considering that not only is the said school located two
Petitioners interposed the defenses that the DECS complied with said kilometers away from the land donated but also there was not even a
condition because the land was being used by the school as its technology single classroom built on the land donated that would reasonably
and home economics laboratory and has been used for the planting of palay, indicate that, indeed, classes have been conducted therein. These
and that the action of the respondents had already prescribed. observations, together with the unrebutted ocular inspection report
made by the trial court which revealed that the land donated remains
idle and without any improvement thereon for more than a decade
since the time of the donation, give Us no other alternative but to
ISSUES: conclude that the defendant-appellants have, indeed, failed to
comply with what is incumbent upon them in the deed of donation.
1. Was DECS able to comply with the condition imposed in the deed of
donation?
2. Are the respondents already barred by prescription and laches in In its Order, the RTC reiterated that during the ocular inspection of
exercising their right to seek the revocation of the deed of donation? the property conducted in the presence of the litigants and their
counsel, it observed that "the land was barren; there were no
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improvements on the donated property though a portion thereof was
planted with palay [and a demolished house built in 1979.]"
xxx With this, [we] decline to apply the four-year prescriptive
period for the revocation of donation provided under Article
764 of the New Civil Code and instead apply the general
Moreover, petitioners failed to adduce a shred of evidence to prove
that the palay found in the property was planted by DECS personnel rules on contracts since Article 733 of the same Code,
or at its instance or even by students of the Rizal National High specifically provided that onerous donations shall be
governed by the rules on contracts.
School. No evidence was adduced to prove that there were existing
plans to use the property for school purposes. Petitioners even
debilitated their cause when they claimed in the trial court that the
Corollarily, since a deed of donation is considered a written contract,
barangay acquired the property by purchase, relying on the
it is governed by Article 1144 of the New Civil Code, which provides
certification of former Barangay Captain Jesus San Juan.
that the prescriptive period for an action arising from a written
contract is ten (10) years from the time the cause of action accrues.
2. NO, the right to seek the revocation of donation had not yet In the case of donation, the accrual of the cause of action is from the
prescribed when respondents filed their complaint. expiration of the time within which the donee must comply with the
conditions or obligations of the donation. In the instant case,
however, it must be noted that the subject donation fixed no period
According to the CA, the respondents’ cause of action for the within which the donee can comply with the condition of donation. As
revocation of the donation should be reckoned from the expiration of such, resort to Article 1197 of the New Civil Code is necessary. Said
a reasonable opportunity for the DECS to comply with what was article provides that if the obligation does not fix a period, but from its
incumbent upon it. nature and the circumstances it can be inferred that a period was
intended, the courts may fix the duration thereof. Indeed, from the
nature and circumstances of the condition of the subject donation, it
Anent the second issue, we reject the contention that respondents’ can be inferred that a period was contemplated by the donors. The
cause of action is already barred by prescription under Article 764 of donors could not have intended their property to remain idle for a
the New Civil Code, or four years from the non-compliance with the very long period of time when, in fact, they specifically obliged the
condition in the deed of donation. Since such failure to comply with defendant-appellants to utilize the land donated for school purposes
the condition of utilizing the property for school purposes became and thus put it in good use. Xxx
manifest sometime in 1988 when the DECS utilized another property
for the construction of the school building, the four-year prescriptive
period did not commence on such date. Petitioner was given more In Central Philippine University v. Court of Appeals, a case squarely
than enough time to comply with the condition, and it cannot be in point, we have established that the legal possibility of bringing the
allowed to use this fact to its advantage. It must be stressed that the action begins with the expiration of a reasonable opportunity for the
donation is onerous because the DECS, as donee, was burdened donee to fulfill what has been charged upon it by the donor.
with the obligation to utilize the land donated for school purposes. Likewise, we held that even if Article 1197 of the New Civil Code
Under Article 733 of the New Civil Code, a donation with an onerous provides that the courts may fix the duration when the obligation
cause is essentially a contract and is thus governed by the rules on does not determine the period but from its nature and circumstances
contract. We fully agree with the ruling of the appellate court: it can be inferred that a period was intended, the general rule cannot
be applied because to do so would be a mere technicality and would
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serve no other purpose than to delay or lead to an unnecessary and lots without the objection of MATUSCO. In fact, the board of directors of
expensive multiplication of suits. MATUSCO passed a resolution to negotiate with Multi-realty for the purchase
of all 72 unsold and unallocated parking lots. During negotiations, Multi-realty
requested MATUSCO to allow two Muti-realty executives to park in two
Altogether, it has been 16 years since the execution of the deed of unallocated slots. This request was denied by MATUSCO which, for the first
donation. Petitioner DECS failed to use the property for the purpose time after 11 years from the registration and execution of the master deed,
specified in the deed of donation. The property remained barren and asserted ownership over the unallocated parking lots as part of the common
unutilized. Even after respondents sought the return of the property areas provided in the master deed which were transferred to it.
before the courts, petitioner DECS still failed to draw up plans to use Consequently, Multi-realty filed before the RTC of Makati a complaint for
the property for school purposes. In fine, petitioner DECS has no use reformation of instrument with damages against MATUSCO alleging that it
for the property; hence, the same shall be reverted to the committed a mistake in stating in the master deed that all unallocated lots
respondents. shall be part of the common areas for it was never its intention to transfer
ownership of said lots to MATUSCO. The RTC dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action. On appeal, the CA affirmed the dismissal
on a different ground that is prescription, since the action for reformation is
founded on a written contract and under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, such
actions prescribe within 10 years. Hence, this appeal.
Multi-realty Development Corporation v. Makati Tuscany Condominium

Corporation ISSUE:
G.R. No. 146726, June 16, 2006. Does an action for reformation of an instrument on the ground of mistake in
drafting its terms cpntrary to the true intention of the parties prescribe within
Callejo, Sr., J. 10 years from the registration or execution of the instrument subject of the
action?
FACTS:
Petitioner Multi-realty Development Corporation (Multi-realty) constructed a RULING:
condo with 270 parking lots. As reflected in the condo's floor plan, 164 of the NO. The statute of limitations does not begin to run against an equitable
parking lots were allocated to unit owners, 8 to guests and 98 were retained cause of action for the reformation of an instrument because of mistake until
by Multi-realty for sale to unit owners who want to have additional slots. the mistake has been discovered or ought to have been discovered. The
Subsequently, the Condominium Act took effect, pursuant to which mere recording of a deed does not charge the grantor with constructive
respondent Makati Tuscany Condominium Corporation (MATUSCO) was notice of a mistake therein, but is to be considered with other facts and
created to manage the condominium units. Accordingly, Multi-realty executed circumstances in determining whether the grantor be charged with notice
the master deed and declaration of restrictions of MATUSCO stating that actual or constructive.
parking lots other than those allocated to each unit owner shall be part of the
common areas and then it executed a deed of transfer in favor of MATUSCO
over all such common areas. It appeared therefore, that Multi-realty has Here, Multi-realty only discovered the mistake after its request to allow its
transferred ownership of all unallocated parking lots to MATUSCO. executives to park in the common areas was denied by MATUSCO in 1989.
Nevertheless, Multi-realty was able to sell 26 of the 98 unallocated parking
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

It was only then that petitioners cause of action for a reformation of the April and July 1985, and it was only when his demands were not heeded,
Master Deed accrued. Prior to that, Multi-realty could not be charged with that he decided to file a case.
actual or constructive notice of the mistake, considering that it had sold 26
lots without the objection of MATUSCO and it was likewise negotiating the
sale of the remaining unallocated lots to MATUSCO before the latter decided Issue: Should the respondent’s claims be barred by laches?
to assert ownership over the same. Indubitably, the action for reformation
filed in 1990 had not yet prescribed.
Ruling:
No. Article 1144 of the Civil Code, provides that actions upon a
written contract, such as a contract of agency in this case, prescribes in ten
(10) years from the time the right of action accrues. It is only from the
moment when there is breach of right that creditor’s right of action accrues.
De Castro v. Court of Appeals and Francisco Artigo
Artigo’s claim was filed on May 29, 1989 or almost 4 years after he made a
GR No. 115838, July 18, 2002 demand on July 1985, which is still within the prescriptive period of 10 years.
This delay does not constitute as unreasonable delay as to bar the claimant’s
Carpio, J.
actions, because it is within the prescriptive period. Laches is only a recourse
in equity, and is only applied in absence of statutory law. Thus. Laches
Facts: cannot bar the collection sit filed within the prescriptive period. The defense
of laches finds no support in law, equity or jurisprudence.
Private respondent Francisco Artigo sue the petitioners Constante

De Castro for the collection of the unpaid balance in his broker’s commission.
Artigo alleged that he was authorized by the petitioners to act as a real estate
broker in the sale of the property and pursuant to their contract, he is to
receive 5% as commission. The petitioner’s property was sold to Times
Transit Corp., and Artigo received P48,893.76 as commission. Artigo now Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation vs. Heirs of Raymundo Baba
claims that his total commission should have been P 352,000, which is 5% of GR no. 138945
the agreed price of P 7.05 million, since it was him who first introduced the
FACTS: The property involved is a land conjugally owned by spouses
buyer to the petitioners. On the other hand, the petitioners argued that the
Raymundo Baba and Dorotea Inot. After Raymundo’s demise in 1947, an
respondent Artigo got more than what he deserve, as he was not the only
extrajudicial settlement of his estate, including the land in question, was
agent in the transaction. They claimed that there were other agents who
executed among Dorotea and his 2 sons, Victoriano Baba and Gregorio
were more instrumental to the consummation of the sale. But because of
Baba. One half of the land was adjudicated in favor of Dorotea and the other
their liberality, they gave him the bigger share of the commission. They also
half between Victoriano and Gregorio. Subsequently, in 1966, the 2 sons
argued that Artigo’s claim should be barred by laches, because he only filed
sold their share of the land to herein petitioner Felix Gochan and Sons
his complaint in court on May 29, 1989 or almost four (4) years later. Artigo Realty. In 1968 a Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in favor of petitioner.
for his part, denied that he neglected his claims, as he made his demands on
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

In 1996, or after 28 years from the issuance of the TCT, respondents (the 5 of some of the co-owners. It was held that the sale of the realty is void in so
other children of Raymundo, all surnamed Baba), filed a complaint for far as it prejudiced the shares of said co-owners and that the issuance of a
Quieting of Title and Reconveyance with damages, alleging that petitioners certificate of title over the whole property in favor of the vendee does not
connived with Dorotea and the 2 sons in executing the extrajudicial divest the other co-owners of the shares that rightfully belonged to them. The
settlement and the deed of sale. Thus, the said transactions are void insofar nullity of the said sale proceeds from the absence of legal capacity and
as their shares are concerned because they never consented to the same, consent to dispose of the property.
which only came into their knowledge barely a year prior to the filing of this Assuming that the allegations in respondents complaint are true, their claim
complaint. that the execution of the extrajudicial settlement and the deed of sale
The trial court ruled that respondents’ action is one for enforcement of involving Lot No. 3537, which led to the issuance of a certificate of title in the
implied or constructive trust based on fraud, which prescribes in 10 years name of Gochan Realty, was without their knowledge or consent, gives rise
from the issuance of title over the property. Hence, respondents’ action was to an imprescriptible cause of action to declare said transactions inexistent
barred by prescription and laches for having been filed after 28 years from on the ground of absence of legal capacity and consent. Hence, the
the time Gochan Realty obtained title to the property. dismissal of respondents’ complaint on the ground of prescription was
erroneous.
ISSUE: Is the action of respondents barred on the ground of prescription?
HELD: No, prescriptive periods are not applicable to the action of the
respondents in the case at bar.
For purposes of determining whether respondents’ action has prescribed,
fraud in the conveyance of the disputed lot and the possession thereof by the
respondents are not material. The fact that the conveyance of a property was
fraudulent, either because it was procured without the knowledge of some of Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals
the co-owners or by virtue of the owners forged signature or by a fictitious G.R. NO. 143377; February 20, 2001
deed of sale, does not automatically make fraud the basis for reconveyance
of the disputed property. The real question in the instant case (without, Melo,J.
however, prejudging the validity or invalidity of the sale to Gochan Realty), is
whether or not from the allegations of the complaint, there exists a cause of
action to declare the inexistence of the contract of sale with respect to the FACTS: Original Certificate of Title was issued in favor of Rafael Galvez over
shares of respondents in the land involved on the ground of absence of any 4 parcels of land. 2 lots were conveyed by Rafael Galvez to Filipina Mamaril,
of the essential requisites of a valid contract. If the answer is in the negative, Cleopatra Liana, Regina Bustos and Erlinda Balatbat by virtue of a Deed of
then the dismissal of the complaint must be upheld, otherwise, the dismissal Sale. Consequently a Transfer Ceritificate of Title was issued in favor of the
on the ground of prescription is erroneous because actions for the buyers. Mamaril, et al. sold Lots 1 and 4 to Lepanto Consolidated Mining
declaration of inexistence of contracts on the ground of absence of any of the Company, the latter not knowing that the CFI of La Union issued an order
essential requisites thereof do not prescribe. declaring the OCT issued in the name of Rafael Galvez null and void and
ordering the cancellation thereof. Lepanto sold to petitioner Lots 1 and 4 and
In Heirs of Romana Ingjug-Tiro v. Casals, the Court, applying Article 1410 of a Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in favor of petitioner. Rafael Galvez
the Civil Code declared that a claim of prescription is unavailing where the filed a motion for reconsideration against the order declaring the OCT issued
assailed conveyance is void ab initiowith respect to those who had no in his favour null and void which was denied and its denial is affirmed by the
knowledge of the transaction. The case involved a fraudulent sale and CA. The Court of Appeals issued an entry of Judgment certifying that its
extrajudicial settlement of a lot executed without the knowledge and consent
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decision became final and executor. The trial court issued a writ of execution government. While it is true that prescription does not run against the State,
of the judgment. 24 years after the writ of execution was issued, the office of the same may not be invoked by the government in this case since it is no
the Solicitor General filed a complaint for the revival of judgment and longer interested in the subject matter. While Camp Wallace may have
cancellation of the disputed titles. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the belonged to the government at the time Rafael Galvez’s title was ordered
ground that the cause of action of the plaintiffs is barred by prescription since cancelled in Land Registration Case No. N-361, the same no longer holds
25 years have already lapsed since the issuance of the writ of execution, true today. With the transfer of Camp Wallace to the BCDA, the government
there can be no action for revival of judgment which may be instituted no longer has a right or interest to protect. Consequently, the Republic is not
because Art 1144 states that such action may only be brought within 10 a real party in interest and it may not institute the instant action. Nor may it
years from the time the judgment has been rendered. An opposition to the raise the defense of imprescriptibility, the same being applicable only in
motion to dismiss was filed by Solicitor General alleging that the real party-in- cases where the government is a party in interest.
interest is the Republic of the Philippines and prescription does not run
against the state.
Solid Homes, Inc., vs Spouses Ancheta Tan and Corazon de Jesus Tan
ISSUE: Is the action imprescriptible for being an action against the Republis
of the Philippines? G.R. No. 145156-57; July 292, 2005
Garcia, J.
HELD: No. The action instituted by the Solicitor General in the trial court is
one for revival of judgment which is governed by Article 1144(3) of the Civil FACTS:
Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. Article
1144(3) provides that an action upon a judgment must be brought within 10 On April 7, 1980, Solid Homes sold to spouses Uy a subdivision lot and the
years from the time the right of action accrues." On the other hand, Section latter sold the same to respondent spouses sometime in February 1985 .
6, Rule 39 provides that a final and executory judgment or order may be When the Tan spouses visited the property, they found out that there was no
executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry, but that development at all and squatters are living in the place. On December 19,
after the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of 1995, the spouses demanded from petitioner that they be given full access
limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. Taking these two and possession of the lot but was ignored by the developer. They filed a
provisions into consideration, it is plain that an action for revival of judgment complaint with the HLURB on April 1, 1996. The Board ordered the petitioner
must be brought within ten years from the time said judgment becomes final. to perform its obligations. Petitioner alleges that the action has already
From the records of this case, it is clear that the judgment sought to be prescribed and should be dismissed. On the other hand, the spouses
revived became final on October 23, 1973. On the other hand, the action for contend that its cause of action accrued when it made a written demand on
revival of judgment was instituted only in 1999, or more than twenty-five (25) the developer on December 18, 1995.
years after the judgment had become final. Hence, the action is barred by
extinctive prescription considering that such an action can be instituted only
within ten (10) years from the time the cause of action accrues. ISSUE:
Does the 10 year prescriptive period commence to run upon perfection of
The Solicitor General argues that the States cause of action in the the contract?
cancellation of the land title issued to petitioners predecessor-in-interest is
imprescriptible because it is included in Camp Wallace, which belongs to the RULING:
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

No it begins when the cause of accrues.. YINLU BICOL MINING CORPORATION V. TRANS-ASIA OIL & ENENRGY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
“Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years
from the time the right of action accrues: G.R. No. 207942; January 12, 2015
(1) Upon a written contract; Bersamin, J.
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment (Emphasis supplied).” FACTS: The case involves 13 mining claims over the area located in Barrio
Larap, Municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, a portion of which
was owned and maintained by Philippine Iron Mines, Inc. (PIMI), which
In law, a cause of action exists when the following requisites concur, to wit: ceased operations in 1975 due to financial losses. PIMI’s portion (PIMI Larap
(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law Mines) was sold in a foreclosure sale to the Manila Banking Corporation
it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part on the defendant to (MBC) and Banco de Oro (BDO).
respect such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant
The government, after an evaluation of the ore reserve of said
violative of the right of the plaintiff.
mining area, decided to restore the mine to normal commercial mining
In short, it is from the time an act is performed or an omission incurred which production. It then opened the area for exploration. The respondent explored
is violative of the plaintiff's right, that signals the accrual of a cause of action. the area from 1986 onwards. In 1996, it entered into an operating agreement
And it is from that time that the 10-year prescriptive period commences to with Philex Mining Corporation. Thereafter, it filed an application for the
run. approval of a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) with the Mines
Here, it was only on December 18, 1995 when respondents made a written and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) of DENR. The said application was
demand upon petitioner to construct subdivision roads, put up utility facilities approved, which gave it the exclusive right to explore, develop and utilize the
and rid the premises of squatters, obligations which are unquestionably in the mineral deposits in the portion of the said mining area. However, petitioner
nature of an obligation to do. And under Article 1169 of the Code, a party informed DENR that it had acquired the mining patents of Philippine Iron
who is under obligation to do something incurs delay only from the time that Mines, Inc. (PIMI) from Manila Banking Corporation and Banco de Oro by a
the obligee demands, either judicially or extrajudicially, for the fulfillment of way of deed of absolute sale, stating that the areas covered by its mining
the obligation. patents were within the areas of respondent’s MPSA.
Clearly, the petition was filed on time.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s mining patents constitute vested rights.
RULING: It is not disputed that petitioner acquired the disputed mineral lands
pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and were subsisting prior to the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In Republic v. CA, the Court stated that
mining rights acquired under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and prior to the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution were vested rights that could not be
impaired even by the Government. Consequently, petitioner and its
predecessors-in-interest had acquired vested rights in the disputed mineral
lands that could not and should not be impaired even in light of their past
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

failure to comply with the requirement of registration and annual work Dolores Campos v. Dominador Ortega, Sr. and James Silos
obligations. G.R. No. 171286; June 2, 2014
A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the PERALTA, J.:
property of some particular person as a present interest. It is the “privilege to
enjoy property legally vested, to enforce contracts, and enjoy the rights of
property conferred by existing law” or “some right or interest in property FACTS: Petitioner Dolores Campos occupied the entire second level as well
which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or
as the front portion of the ground level of a residential structure located at Lot
controversy.” The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested
rights. A state may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the 18, Block 7 of the Hulo Estate in Mandaluyong City. The lot on which the said
enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a structure is standing is owned by the government, while the structure itself is
change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the owned by Dominga Boloy from whom plaintiff leased the same beginning in
police power. 1966.
Petitioner was among those qualified beneficiaries under Zonal Improvement

HISTORY
Program Guideline Circular No. 1 of National Housing Authority (NHA). As a
• Spanish colonization: Royal Decree of May 14, 1867 (The Spanish consequence of having qualified, she was assigned an identifying house tag
Mining Law). The Regalian doctrine was observed, to the effect that
number 77-00070-08. According to the aforementioned circular, only
minerals belonged to the State wherever they could be found, whether
in public or private lands. occupants who have been actually residing in the ZIP project area either as
• American occupation: Philippine Bill of 1902. All valuable mineral sharer or renter before August 15, 1975 are qualified beneficiaries under this
deposits in public lands in the Philippine Islands, both surveyed and NHA program. The plaintiff was given until December 19, 1987 within which
unsurveyed, are hereby declared to be free and open to exploration, to buy the property located at Lot 17, Block 7 Phase III of the Hulo estate but
occupation, and purchase, and the land in which they are found to did not exercise her right because the property involved is different from what
occupation and purchase, by citizens of the United States, or of said she had been occupying since 1966 until they left. Before any clarification
Islands. Therefore, once a mining claim was made or a mining patent
was issued over a parcel of land in accordance with the relative was made on this matter and before plaintiff could exercise her right to
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, such land was considered purchase, she learned that the property occupied by them was already sold
private property and no longer part of the public domain. The claimant or to respondents Dominador Ortega, Sr. and James Silos in violation of her
patent holder was the owner of both the surface of the land and of the vested right. This prompted the petitioner to file a case for specific
minerals found underneath. (APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR) performance with damages.
• 1935 Constitution. The alienation of natural resources, with the
exception of public agricultural land, was expressly prohibited. The
Respondents countered that the complaint stated no cause of action, and
natural resources being referred therein included mineral lands of public
domain, but not mineral lands that at the time the 1935 Constitution took that, if any, such cause of action is already barred by prior judgment. They
effect no longer formed part of the public domain. Consequently, such also argued that they are registered owners of the land in question as well as
prohibition against the alienation of natural resources did not apply to a the house built thereon by virtue of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
mining claim or patent existing prior to November 15, 1935. 13342 and tax declarations, and that the Torrens title cannot be altered,
modified or cancelled except through a direct proceeding.
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General Mariano Alvarez Services Cooperative, Inc. (GEMASCO) vs.
ISSUE: Does petitioner has vested right over the subject property when the National Housing Authority (NHA) and General Mariano Alvarez Water
NHA recognized her as qualified beneficiary with a corresponding tag District (GMAWD)
G.R. No. 175417/G .R. No. 198923. February 9, 2015.
number?
Peralta, J,:
RULING: No, petitioner does not have vested right over the subject property. FACTS:
A completed water works system in San Gabriel, Carmona, Cavite
A vested right is one that is absolute, complete and unconditional and no (now General Mariano Alvarez, Cavite) was turned over by the NHA to
obstacle exists to its exercise. It is immediate and perfect in itself and not GEMASCO to be managed by the latter. The water works system is
dependent upon any contingency. To be vested, a right must have become a comprised of six (6) artesian deep wells with pumping facilities, five (5) water
tanks, pipe mainline and distribution system. Thereafter, an illegal dismissal
title – legal or equitable – to the present or future enjoyment of property.
case was filed against GEMASCO. The Labor Arbiter, affirmed by the NLRC
and CA, found GEMASCO liable for illegal dismissal and consequently
Contrary to petitioner's position, the issuance of a tag number in her favor did issued a writ of execution against GEMASCO. Pursuant to the writ, the
not grant her irrefutable rights to the subject property. The "tagging of sheriff issued a Notice of Garnishment as well as a Notice of Sale/Levy on
structures" in the Bagong Barrio area was conducted merely to determine the Execution of Personal Property covering three water tanks which are part of
qualified beneficiaries and bona fide residents within the area. It did not the water works system transferred to GEMASCO. Consequently,
necessarily signify an assurance that the tagged structure would be awarded GEMASCO, together with GMAWD who alleged to be the rightful manager of
the water tanks subject of the Notice of Garnishment and Sale, questioned
to its occupant as there were locational and physical considerations that the propriety of the writ of execution.
must be taken into account, as in fact, the area where petitioner's property
was located had been classified as Area Center (open space). The ISSUE:
assignment of a tag number was a mere expectant or contingent right and Whether personal properties devoted to public use can be subject of
could not have ripened into a vested right in favor of petitioner. Her a writ of execution to satisfy a labor judgment?
possession and occupancy of the said property could not be characterized as
HELD:
fixed and absolute.
NO, properties devoted to public use cannot be subject to a writ of
execution.
As such, petitioner cannot claim that she was deprived of her vested right
when the NHA ordered her relocation to another area. Quoting the Court, “It is interesting to note that the water works
system in General Mariano Alvarez, Cavite, including the three (3) water
tanks subject of the assailed Writ of Execution, is devoted to public use and
thus, property of public dominion, which GMAWD has the right to operate,
maintain, and manage. Properties of public dominion, being for public use,
are not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or private
sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of
public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Otherwise,
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essential public services would stop if properties of public dominion would be Committee Report which declared OCT No. 994, the source of the titles of
subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale. the contending parties, was only issued in 1917 and thus, respondent
Bonifacio’s title which was registered in 1912 was null and void.
ISSUE
Is the Action to Quiet Title over the subject land already prescribed
and was therefore improper?
HELD
No, petitioners’ action has not yet prescribed.
Under PD 1529, upon the expiration of said period of one year, the
Imelda, Leonardo, Fidelino, Azucena, Josefina, Anita and Sisa, all decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall become
surnamed Syjuco v. Felisa Bonifacio and VSD Realty & Development incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any
Corporation (CASE 136) case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or
G.R. No. 148748; January 14, 2015 any other persons responsible for the fraud. However, an exception is in
Leonardo-De Castro, J. case of land ownership disputes that the filing of an action to quiet title is
imprescriptible if the disputed real property is in the possession of the
FACTS plaintiff. The reason for the rule being that his undisturbed possession gives
Petitioners are the registered owner of a parcel of land known as the him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and
Maysilo Estate. They have been in open, continuous, and uninterrupted determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his
possession of the subject land, by themselves or through their predecessors- own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
in-interest, since 1926. There were two (2) lease agreements annotated on In this case, petitioners have duly established during the trial that
their TCT, one is in favor of Manufacturer’s Bank and the other, in favor of a they and/or their predecessors-in-interest have been in uninterrupted
certain Chan Heng. In 1994, petitioners learned that the subject land was possession of the subject land since 1926 and that it was only in 1994 when
being offered for sale by a broker and they later found out that the purported they found out that respondent Bonifacio was able to register the said
owned of the subject land, respondent Bonifacio, was the sub-lessee of property in her name in another title. It was also only in 1995 when
Kalayaan Development Corp, which was the sub-lessee of Manufacturer’s petitioners learned that respondent Bonifacio was able to sell and transfer
Bank. Respondent Bonifacio was able to register the subject land in her her title over the subject land in favor of respondent VSD Realty.
name because of a Deed of Assignment executed by one Eleuteria Accordingly, petitioners’ filing of an action to quiet title over the
Bonifacio. Subsequently, petitioners filed an Action for Quieting of Title subject land is in order.
instead of Action for Reconveyance. However, respondent Bonifacio was
still able to sell the subject land to VSD Realty with corresponding transfer of
certificate of title despite such pending action. Respondent Bonifacio was
claiming that her title was registered in 1912 while that of the petitioners was
only registered only in 1917, hence, in point of priority in issuance, the title
the former prevails over that of the latter. Furthermore, respondent
contended that the action of the petitioners had already prescribed based on
PD 1529. Petitioners prayed that the Court take judicial notice of DOJ
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MARIFLOR T. HORTIZUELA, REPRESENTED BY JOVIER ISSUE:
TAGUFA, Petitioner, v. GREGORIA TAGUFA, ROBERTO TAGUFA AND
ROGELIO LUMABAN, Respondents. Does an action for reconveyance and recovery of possession
G.R. No. 205867; February 23, 2015 constitute an indirect or collateral attack on the validity of the subject
MENDOZA, J.: certificate of title which is proscribed by law?
FACTS:
Petitioner Hortizuela filed an action for reconveyance and recovery of RULING:

possession against herein Respondents for the peaceful surrender of a
parcel of land located in Tumauini, Isabela, which was allegedly fraudulently No, an action for reconveyance and recovery of possession does not
registered in the name of Respondent Gregoria Tagufa (Gregoria, for constitute a collateral attack on a Torrens title.
brevity). The said property was originally owned by Hortizuela’s parents The Supreme Court cited Art. 1459 of the New Civil Code and Sec.
Epifanio Tagufa and Godofreda Jimenez. Although untitled, the said property 53 of PD 1529.
was mortgaged to the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). The DBP Says the Supreme Court: “Contrary to the pronouncements of the
subsequently foreclosed the said mortgage and the property was eventually MCTC and the CA, however, the complaint of Hortizuela was not a collateral
sold to Runsted Tagufa, husband of Gregoria, using funds sent by Hortizuela attack on the title warranting dismissal. As a matter of fact, an action for
subject to the agreement of subsequent reconveyance of such property. reconveyance is a recognized remedy, an action in personam, available to a
Hortizuela later discovered that Gregoria was able to register the subject person whose property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens
property in her name via free patent application obtained from the DENR. system in another’s name. In an action for reconveyance, the decree is not
And the execution of Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the late sought to be set aside. It does not seek to set aside the decree but,
spouses Leandro Tagufa and Remedios Talosig. The MCTC dismissed the respecting it as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, seeks to
complaint of Hortizuela for having resorted to a wrong cause of action. The transfer or reconvey the land from the registered owner to the rightful owner
RTC reversed the MCTC decision and ruled in favor of Hortizuela. On xxx ARTICLE 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
appeal, the CA ruled against Hortizuela because in the said action for person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust
reconveyance and recovery of possession, she questioned the validity of the for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. The remedy of
Torrens Title (OCT No. P-846609) issued in favor of Gregoria, in reconveyance, based on Section 53 of P.D. No. 1529 and Article 1456,
contravention of Sec. 48, PD No. 1529. In the present petition, Hortizuela prescribes in ten (10) years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the
asserts that the action for reconveyance was not a collateral attack on the property xxx In this case, in filing the complaint for reconveyance and
said title because she was not seeking nullification of the title but rather the recovery of possession, Hortizuela was not seeking a reconsideration of the
reconveyance of the property covered by the said title which Gregoria was granting of the patent or the decree issued in the registration proceedings.
holding in trust for her benefit as the real owner. Respondents argue that the What she was seeking was the reconveyance of the subject property on
action for reconveyance and recovery of possession was a collateral attack account of the fraud committed by respondent Gregoria xxx Finally,
on the title held by Gregoria over the subject property; that Hortizuela failed respondents’ supposition that Hortizuela was ineligible to own the subject
to avail of the remedy under Sec. 38 of Act 496 which prescribed in one (1) property pursuant to B.P. Blg. 223 because she was no longer a Filipino
year, counted from the issuance of the free patent by the government; that citizen cannot be considered for having been raised only for the first time on
even if reconveyance was ordered, Hortizuela was ineligible to own the appeal.
property pursuant to BP 223 because she was an American Citizen (this Hence, Hortizuela is entitled to the reconveyance of the property
assertion was made for the first time on appeal). subject of the legal dispute. The action she instituted at the outset of the
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

controversy was not an indirect or collateral attack against the validity of a lifetime, the couple distributed their real and personal properties in favor of
certificate of title over the land. their ten (10) children. Upon distribution, petitioners alleged that they
received the subject property and the house constructed thereon as their
share. They also deny any participation in the execution of the
aforementioned Deed of Adjudication dated September 21, 2004 and the
Agreement of Subdivision.
The RTC, through its May 27, 2012 Decision, dismissed petitioners’
complaint and ordered the partition of the subject lots between the plaintiffs
QUINTOS ET. AL. VS. NICOLAS ET. AL.
and the defendants-spouses Candelarios.
GR No. 210252; June 16, 2014
VELASCO, JR., J.
Issues:
1) Is partition already barred by laches?
Facts:
2) Or res judicata?
Petitioners Vilma Quintos, Florencia Dancel, and Catalino Ibarra, and
Rulings:
respondents Pelagia Nicolas, Noli Ibarra, Santiago Ibarra, Pedro Ibarra,
1) No. The counterclaim for partition is not barred by laches.
David Ibarra, Gilberto Ibarra, and the late Augusto Ibarra are siblings. Their
parents, Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, were the owners of the subject
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
property, a 281 sqm. parcel of land situated along Quezon Ave., Poblacion
of time, to do that which––by the exercise of due diligence––could or should
C, Camiling, Tarlac, covered by Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. 318717.
have been done earlier. It is the negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable period, warranting the presumption that the party entitled
By 1999, their parents had already passed away, leaving to their ten (10)
to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it.
children ownership over the subject property. Subsequently, sometime in
2002, respondent siblings brought an action for partition against petitioners.
As correctly appreciated by the lower courts, respondents cannot be said to
Said action was dismissed due to the failure of the parties and counsels to
have neglected to assert their right over the subject property. They cannot be
appear despite due notice and became final on August 22, 2008. On
considered to have abandoned their right given that they filed an action for
September 21, 2004, respondent siblings instead resorted to executing a
partition sometime in 2002, even though it was later dismissed. Furthermore,
Deed of Adjudication to transfer the property in favor of the ten (10) siblings.
the fact that respondent siblings entered into a Contract of Lease with Avico
Subsequently, respondent siblings sold their 7/10 undivided share over the
Lending Investor Co. over the subject property is evidence that they are
property in favor of their co-respondents, the spouses Recto and Rosemarie
exercising rights of ownership over the same.
Candelario. By virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 17, 2007
executed in favor of the spouses Candelario and an Agreement of
2) No. The counterclaim for partition is not barred by prior judgment.
Subdivision purportedly executed by them and petitioners, TCT No. 390484
was partially canceled and TCT No. 434304 was issued in the name of the
There is res judicata when the following requisites are present: (1) the formal
Candelarios, covering the 7/10 portion.
judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or order on the
merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or
On June 1, 2009, petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and
stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case; (3) it must have
Damages against respondents wherein they alleged that during their parents’
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period
of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended
by a new agreement.
In the case at bar, respondent siblings admit that they filed an action for
partition docketed as Civil Case No. 02-52, which the RTC dismissed through A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed
an Order dated March 22, 2004 for the failure of the parties to attend the twenty years. Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.
scheduled hearings. Respondents likewise admitted that since they no longer No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-
appealed the dismissal, the ruling attained finality. Moreover, it cannot be owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
disputed that the subject property in Civil Case No. 02-52 and in the present ownership. (emphasis supplied).
controversy are one and the same, and that in both cases, respondents raise
the same action for partition. And lastly, although respondent spouses
Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right granted
Candelario were not party-litigants in the earlier case for partition, there is
to co-owners under Art. 494 of the Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To
identity of parties not only when the parties in the case are the same, but
construe otherwise would diminish the substantive right of a co-owner
also between those in privity with them, such as between their successors-in-
through the promulgation of procedural rules. Such a construction is not
interest.
sanctioned by the principle, which is too well settled to require citation, that a
28
substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule. This further finds
With all the other elements present, what is left to be determined now is
support in Art. 496 of the New Civil Code, viz:
whether or not the dismissal of Civil case No. 02-52 operated as a dismissal
on the merits that would complete the requirements of res judicata. The
general rule is that dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute is to be Article 496.Partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by
regarded as an adjudication on the merits and with prejudice to the filing of judicial proceedings. Partition shall be governed by the Rules of Court insofar
another action, and the only exception is when the order of dismissal as they are consistent with this Code.
expressly contains a qualification that the dismissal is without prejudice. In
the case at bar, petitioners claim that the Order does not in any language say Thus, for the Rules to be consistent with statutory provisions, we hold that
that the dismissal is without prejudice and, thus, the requirement that the Art. 494, as cited, is an exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to
dismissal be on the merits is present. the effect that even if the order of dismissal for failure to prosecute is silent
on whether or not it is with prejudice, it shall be deemed to be without
Truly, we have had the occasion to rule that dismissal with prejudice under prejudice.
the above-cited rule amply satisfies one of the elements of res judicata. It is,
thus, understandable why petitioners would allege res judicata to bolster their This is not to say, however, that the action for partition will never be barred
claim. However, dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules by res judicata. There can still be res judicata in partition cases concerning
of Court cannot defeat the right of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time, the same parties and the same subject matter once the respective shares of
provided that there is no actual adjudication of ownership of shares yet. the co-owners have been determined with finality by a competent court with
Pertinent hereto is Article 494 of the Civil Code, which reads: jurisdiction or if the court determines that partition is improper for co-
ownership does not or no longer exists.
Article 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership.
Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in
common, insofar as his share is concerned.
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

Fe U. Quijano v. Atty. Daryll A. Amante Code gives the heir the right to exercise acts of ownership. Accordingly,
G.R. No. 164277; October 8, 2014 when Eliseo sold the disputed property to the respondent, he was only a co-
BERSAMIN , J. owner along with his siblings, and could sell only that portion that would be
allotted to him upon the termination of the co-ownership. The sale did not
FACTS: Petitioner and her siblings (Eliseo, Jose and Gloria) inherited vest ownership of the disputed property in the respondent but transferred
from their father a parcel of land. Eliseo sold a portion of his share to only the seller’s pro indiviso share to him, consequently making him, as the
respondent with the affected portion described in the deed of absolute sale. buyer, a co-owner of the disputed property until it is partitioned.
Thereafter, Eliseo, sickly and in need of money, sold an additional 1/3 portion
of his share in the property to the respondent. Afterwards, Fe, Eliseo, Jose Therefore, respondent has no right to possess the specific property, which
and Gloria executed a deed of extrajudicial partition to divide their father’s should belong to herein petitioner pursuant to the partition agreed upon.
estate among themselves. The partition resulted in the portions earlier sold
by Eliseo to the respondent being adjudicated to the petitioner instead of to
Eliseo. Due to the petitioner’s needing her portion that was then occupied by
2. Yes, he has such right.
the respondent, she demanded that the latter vacate it. The respondent
refused to vacate, prompting her to file against him a complaint for ejectment Article 497 states that the creditors or assignees of the co-owners may take
and damages in the MTCC. The latter rendered its decision in favor of the part in the division of the thing owned in common and object to its being
petitioner. On appeal, the RTC reversed the judgment of the MTCC. CA effected without their concurrence. But they cannot impugn any partition
affirmed. Hence, this petition. already executed, unless there has been fraud, or in case it was made
notwithstanding a formal opposition presented to prevent it, without prejudice
to the right of the debtor or assignor to maintain its validity.
ISSUE:
As Eliseo’s successor-in-interest or assignee, the respondent was vested
1. Does the respondent have the right to possess the specific portion of the with the right under Article 497 of the Civil Code to take part in the partition of
property? the estate and to challenge the partition undertaken without his consent.
2. Does the respondent have the right to take part in the partition? Therefore, Eliseo can take part. However, in this case, the SC ruled that at
the time of the sale respondent already knew that the property he was buying
was not exclusively owned by Eliseo. He knew, too, that the co-heirs had
entered into an oral agreement of partition vis-à-vis the estate, such
RULING: knowledge being explicitly stated in his answer to the complaint. He cannot
therefore impugn the partition already executed.
1. No, respondent has no such right.
Even if an heir’s right in the estate of the decedent has not yet been fully
settled and partitioned and is thus merely inchoate, Article 493 of the Civil
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Vicente Torres, Jr., et al. v. Lorenzo Lapinid and Jesus Velez Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect
only his own share but not of those of the other co-owners who did not
G.R. No. 187987; November 26, 2014
consent to the sale.
PEREZ, J.
Hence, the sale to Lapinid was valid up to the extent of Jesus’ share
in the co-owned property.
FACTS:
Vicente Torres, Jr., Mariano Velez and Carlos Velez filed a complaint
for nullification of the sale of real property by Jesus Velez in favor of Lorenzo
Lapinid.
Petitioners alleged that they and Jesus were co-owners of several
parcels of land including the disputed land in this case. Allegedly, Jesus filed SPOUSES DOMINADOR MARCOS and GLORIA MARCOS v. HEIRS OF
an action for partition of the parcels of land where a judgment based on a ISIDRO BANGI and GENOVEVA DICCION
compromise agreement signed by the parties authorizing Jesus, Mariano and
Vicente to sell and receive the proceeds to be distributed to the co-owners. G.R. No. 185745 October 15, 2014
The agreement was amended to exclude Jesus as an authorized seller. It Reyes, J.
was found out however that Jesus sold a specific portion of the land to
Lapinid. Facts:
The trial court and the CA dismissed the complaint. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari. The heirs of Isidro Bangi and Genoveva Diccion (respondents), filed with the
RTC a complaint for annulment of documents, cancellation of TCTs
restoration of OCT and recovery of ownership against spouses
ISSUE: Marcos(petitioners).
May a co-owner sell a portion of the property he co-owns in favor of
another person? In their complaint, the respondents averred that, their parents, Isidro and
Genoveva, bought the one-third portion of a 2,138-square meter parcel of
land from Eusebio Bangi as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed
RULING: by the latter. The OCT was registered in the name of Alipio Bangi (Alipio),
Eusebio’s father. After the sale, the respondents claimed that Isidro and
Yes. A co-owner has an absolute ownership of his undivided and pro Genoveva took possession of the subject property until they passed away.
indiviso share in the co-owned property. He has the right to alienate, assign, The respondents then took possession of the same.
and mortgage it, even to the extent of substituting a third person in its
enjoyment provided that no personal rights will be affected.
Further, the respondents alleged that they learned that the title to the subject
A co-owner is an owner of the whole and over the whole he property, including the portion sold to Isidro and Genoveva, was transferred
exercises the right of dominion but he is at the same time the owner of a to herein petitioner through a Deed of Absolute Sale, supposedly executed
portion which is truly abstract. Hence, he cannot be enjoined by his co- by Alipio with the consent of his wife. The respondents claimed that the said
owners if he intends to alienate his abstract portion of the property. deed of absolute sale is a forgery since Alipio died prior to the deed of
absolute sale.
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Consequently, by virtue of the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale, the OCT was actually been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the
cancelled and a TCT was issued to Dominador, Primo, Jose and Emilio. exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to
Primo, Jose and Emilio in turn executed another deed of absolute sale over each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties
the same property in favor of herein petitioners. The old TCT was cancelled thereunder. Thus, it has been held or stated in a number of cases involving
and a new one was issued in the names of herein petitioners. Thus, the an oral partition under which the parties went into possession, exercised acts
respondents sought the nullification of the Deeds of Absolute Sale and of ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, that
likewise sought the restoration of the OCT in their favor. equity will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in
accordance with the possession in severalty.”
Petitioners maintain that the said sale of the one-third portion of the subject
property was not valid. They insinuate that the subject property, at the time of Here, The evidence presented by the parties indubitably show that, after the
the sale, was still owned in common by the heirs of Alipio; that Eusebio could death of Alipio, his heirs – Eusebio, Espedita and Jose Bangi – had orally
not validly sell the one-third portion of the subject property as there was no partitioned his estate, including the subject property, which was assigned to
partition yet among the heirs of Alipio. Eusebio. when the latter executed the deed of sale in favor of Isidro Bangi,
Eusebio already had acquired interest in the property covered by the OCT
Both RTC and CA upheld the validity of the sale to the precedessor of through succession from his father, Alipio Bangi.
respondents
That there was no written memorandum of the partition among Alipio Bangi’s
Issue: heirs cannot detract from appellee’s cause. It has been ruled that oral
partition is effective when the parties have consummated it by the taking of
possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership of the respective
Was there partition already even in the absence of a deed of extra-judicial
portions set off to each. Here, it is obvious that Eusebio took possession of
partition?
his share and exercised ownership over it. Thus, the preponderant evidence
points to the validity of the sale executed between Eusebio Bangi and Isidro
Held: Bangi over the one-third portion of the property covered by OCT.
Yes there was partition already even in the absence of a deed of extra-
judicial partition.
Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and
legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition. Partition may be inferred Marietta Barrido v. Leonardo Nonato
from circumstances sufficiently strong to support the presumption. Thus, after G.R. No. 176492 October 20, 2014
a long possession in severalty, a deed of partition may be presumed. In
J. Peralta
Hernandez v. Andal, the court held that “On general principle, independent
and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforced oral
partition when it has been completely or partly performed. FACTS:
A complaint for partition was filed by Nonato for the partition of a house and
Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and
lot he owned with his former wife, Barrido, after the declaration of nullity of
enforceable at law, equity will in proper cases, where the parol partition has
their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. The MTCC
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adjudicated the property to Barrido on the basis of Article 129 of the Family Esperanza C. Carinan v. Spouses Gavino Cueto and Carmelita Cueto
Code as she is the spouse with whom majority of the common children chose
G.R. No. 198636; October 8, 2014
to remain. The RTC reversed the decision and adjudicated the property
equitably to the former spouses as the MTCC incorrectly applied Article 129. REYES, J.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision but applied Article 147 of the Family
Code.
FACTS: The respondents alleged that petitioner acquired rights over a parcel
of land in Laguna under the name of GSIS through a Deed of Assignment
ISSUE: and Transfer of Rights with Assumption of Obligations. Petitioner and her
husband failed to pay several amortizations, resulting in an impending
Did the CA err in applying Article 147 of the Family Code in the partition of
cancellation in 2005 of GSIS’ conditional sale of the subject property. The
property owned by former spouses whose marriage was declared void on the
petitioner who was a widow by then, sought financial assistance from his
ground of psychological incapacity?
brother Gavino. Respondents paid the total obligation to GSIS. Petitioner and
her son, Jazer, undertook to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale with a
condition to buy the said land within 3 years. Respondents demanded from
RULING:
the petitioner to fulfill the execution of the Deed of Sale. Respondents filed a
No. The CA correctly applied Article 147 of the Family Code. complaint for specific performance with the RTC after petitioner and her son
failed to comply. Petioner argued that there was no written or verbal
agreement for the transfer of the property nor a promise for the repayment of
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their the amounts that were paid by the respondents. She claimed that it was a
work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal coownership. Any donation, and payment was made out of sheer generosity and pity upon her
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been by her brother. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents and reasoned that
obtained through their joint efforts. In the liquidation and partition of the such substantial amount paid by respondent was a loan, and not a donation.
property that they owned in common, the provisions on coownership under It is bolstered by the fact that the petitioner transferred the possession of the
the Civil Code should aptly prevail. The rules which are set up to govern the title of the property to respondents. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of
gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages, are
irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common- ISSUE: Did the CA erred in declaring that a contract of loan was created
law spouses or spouses of void marriages. when respondent[s] paid [Esperanza’s] arrears with the GSIS and not a
donation or help extended by respondent[s] to [Esperanza]?
Therefore, the subject property remains to be owned in common by Nonato

and Barrido, which should be divided in accordance with the rules on co- RULING: No, the CA is correct in ruling that the agreement was a contract of
ownership. loan and not a donation.
The Court adopts the RTC’s and CA’s finding that between Esperanza and
the respondents, there was a clear intention for a return of the amounts
which the respondents spent for the acquisition, transfer and renovation of
the subject property. The respondents then reasonably expected to get their
money back from Esperanza. Esperanza’s claim that the expenses and
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payments in her behalf were purely gratuitous remained unsupported by thereof by the court in Civil Case No. 15357 decided on August 8, 1978.
records.
The Court, in said case, cancelled the titles of the petitioner and his
As the Court ruled in Moreño-Lentfer v. Wolff, a donation must comply with predecessors in interest because they were obtained through the
the mandatory formal requirements set forth by law for its validity. When the
misrepresentation of the predecessor. The respondents further contended
subject of donation is purchase money, Article 748 of the NCC is applicable.
Accordingly, the donation of money as well as its acceptance should be in that the petitioner adamantly refused to surrender his title to the property to
writing. Otherwise, the donation is invalid for non-compliance with the formal them, or to the Register of Deeds, despite their formal demand. Hence, the
requisites prescribed by law. respondents filed a new action for annulment and cancellation of title with the
The respondents’ statement that they paid for Esperanza’s obligations RTC on August 15, 2003, docketed as Civil Case No. 18421.
because they wanted to help her did not contradict an understanding for the The petitioner opposed the respondents’ action and argued that the August
return of the claimed amounts. Clearly, the aid then needed by Esperanza 8, 1978 decision in Civil Case No. 15357, which declared his title null and
was for the immediate production of the money that could pay for her
void, could no longer be enforced because its execution was already barred
obligations to the GSIS and effect transfer of title, in order that her payments
and interest over the property would not be forfeited. The help accorded by by the Statute of Limitations, as the said decision was never executed within
the respondents corresponded to such need. It did not follow that the 10 years from July 19, 1979 - the date of finality of the judgment.
respondents could no longer be allowed to later demand the repayment. Issue:
Hence, there is no donation in this case for non-compliance with the formal
Is the action to recover the subject property barred by the statute of
requisites prescribed by law.
limitations, as there was no execution of the 1978 judgment within the time
limit prescribed by law?
Held:
NO. The reconveyance of the property is not subject to prescription.
Notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the Torrens title, the registered owner
can still be compelled under the law to reconvey the property registered to
Juanario Campit v. Isidra Gripa, Pedro Bardiaga and Severino Bardiaga, the rightful owner under the principle that the property registered is deemed
represented by his son Rolando Bardiaga to be held in trust for the real owner by the person in whose name it is
G.R. No. 195443; September 17, 2014 registered. The party seeking to recover title to property wrongfully registered
in another person’s name must file an action for reconveyance within the
Brion, J.
allowed period of time.
Facts:
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
The subject of the controversy is a parcel of land in Pangasinan presently prescribes in ten (10) years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the
occupied by respondents Isidra Gripa, Pedro Bardiaga and Severino property. There is, however, an exception to this rule where the filing of such
Bardiaga (as represented by his son, Rolando Bardiaga) who claim to be the action does not prescribe, i.e. when the plaintiff is in possession of the
rightful owners of the subject property, and earlier adjudged as owners subject property, the action, being in effect that of quieting of title to the
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PROPERTY DIGESTS

property, does not prescribe. the same mother, being an indirect violation of donation between spouses,
void?
In the present case, the respondents, who are the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
18421 (the action for annulment and cancellation of title filed in 2013), have
always been in possession of the subject property.
Ruling:
Considering that the action for annulment and cancellation of title filed by the
Void.
respondents is substantially in the nature of an action for reconveyance
What would invalidate the conveyances now under scrutiny is the fact that
based on an implied or constructive trust, combined with the fact that the
they were resorted to in order to circumvent the legal prohibition against
respondents have always been in possession of the subject property, we donations between spouses contained in Article 1334, paragraph 1, of the
shall treat Civil Case No. 18421 as an action to quiet title, the filing of which Civil Code of 1889, then prevailing. That illegal purpose tainted the contracts.
does not prescribe. Thus, we find the respondents’ filing of Civil Case No.
18421 to be proper and not barred by the time limitations set forth under the The illicit purpose then becomes illegal causa within the terms of the old Civil
Rules of Court in enforcing or executing a final and executory judgment. Code.
Unfortunately for herein appellant, in contracts invalidated by illegal subject

matter or illegal causa, Articles 1305 and 1306 of the Civil Code then in force
apply rigorously the rule in pari delicto non oritur action, denying all recovery
to the guilty parties inter se. And appellant is clearly as guilty as her husband
Concepcion Felix Vda. De Rodriguez vs. Geronimo Rodriguez et. Al. in the attempt to evade the legal interdiction of Article 1334 of the Code,
already cited. Wherefore, her present action to reivindicate the, conveyed
properties was correctly repulsed by the Court below.
Facts: Concepcion contracted a second marriage with Rodriguez.

Concepcion is the owner of two(2) fish ponds. During the marriage, she
executed a contract of sale of the two(2) fish ponds with her daughter of the
first marriage. Then the daughter sold the property to Concepcion and
Rodriguez. Titles were thereafter registered in the name of the
spouses. Rodriguez died. The relationship of Concepcion and the children of
Rodriguez turned sour. Now Concepcion wants to pull back her fish ponds,
the children resists.
Issue: Is the transter of a property from a mother to a daughter of first

marriage then back to the conjugal partnership of a subsequent marriage of
139
PROPERTY DIGESTS

SOCORRO VS. VAN WILSEM 2. Can a foreign national be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
G.R. NO. 193707; December 10, 2014 unjustified failure to support his minor child?
PERALTA, J:
HELD:
YES. A foreign national may be liable to support his minor child
FACTS: under the Philippine law.
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan
Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on September 25,
The court agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on
1990. They were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem.
Article 195 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent,
The couple separated and was granted a Divorce Decree by the Court of
who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New Civil Code stresses the
Holland. Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines. principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the
support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in
same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies
the Philippines, respondent never gave the said support. Not long thereafter,
to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to
respondent came to the Philippines and remarried and also live in Cebu near
family rights and duties. The obligation to give support to a child is a matter
the petitioner’s area of residence. Petitioner demanded support but due to
that falls under family rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of
respondent’s refusal, she filed a complaint for violation of RA 9262 “ Violence
Holland or the Netherlands, the Supreme Court agree with the RTC that he is
against Women and Children”.
subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is
obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure
to do so.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime
charged. On February 19, 2010, the court issued an order dismissing the
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to
instant criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged
support petitioner’s son under Article195 of the Family Code as a
in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the respondent
consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not,
who is an alien. Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration
however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son
thereto reiterating respondent’s obligation to support their child under Article
altogether. In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law
195 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable under R.A.
applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the
No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who are
present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the
obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligor’s nationality."
Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and
The Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present Petition for capacity to support. While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands
Review on Certiorari. in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never
proved the same. In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of
the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall
ISSUES:
govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded
1. Is a foreign national may be held liable to support his minor child under and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our
Philippine law? local or domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as
140
PROPERTY DIGESTS

regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved (i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the
in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and
enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or
noncompliance therewith. In addition, in accordance with Section 24, Rule
custody of minor children of access to the woman's child/children.
132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al.
vs.Sy Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability. Thus, when
the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial
public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be support to the child is considered an act of violence against women and
applied. Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or children. In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the
property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and Philippines, we find strength in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code,
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of
country. public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in
Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to
treaty stipulations."On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing
acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed
here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the
Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over
2. YES. Respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A.
the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that
No. 9262 for for unjustly refusing or failing to give support to petitioner’s son.
jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
R.A. No. 9262 provides:

Therefore, respondent is liable under RA 9262 “Acts of Violence
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. The crime Against Women and Their Children” for failure to render support as provided
of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the under the Family Code.
following acts:
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in
conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist
from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or
attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of
movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or
threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman
or child. This shall include, butnot limited to, the following acts committed
with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her
child's movement or conduct: or her family, or deliberately providing the
woman's children insufficient financial support; x x x x
141
PROPERTY DIGESTS

Jose Yulo Agricultural Corporation v. Spouses Davis Do Spouses Davis have better rights as far as Lot 91,92 and 96 are
G.R. No. 197709, August 03, 2015 concerned as it derived its ownership from Yulo who registered them
DEL CASTILLO, J.: as early as October 18, 1972?
FACTS: Yulo registered Lot 62-A in his name which was subdivided RULING: Yes, Spouses Davis has a better right thereto.
into lots covered by TCT Nos. 36824 to 36852. TCT 36852 was further
subdivided into Lots 24, 25, 72, 91, 92, and 96. The titles to Lots 91, 92 and The Court stated that CA's citation of Manila Waterworks and
96 were issued in 1971. Sewerage System v. Court of Appeals is correct. The pronouncement in said
case was reiterated in Spouses Carpo v. Ayala Land, Inc.,thus:
Except Lot 72, all were subsequently mortgaged to Nation Bank, which
eventually foreclosed and became owner of the same. At that time, the In this jurisdiction, it is settled that '(t)he general rule is that in the
case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same
previous occupants already made improvements in the form of a house and
land, the earlier in date prevails xxx. hi successive registrations,
fence. It then sold said lots to Spouses Davis and TCTs were issued in their where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular
favor on December 11, 1992. estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior
certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person
On the other hand, TCT covering Lot 72 was cancelled and a new one was is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder
issued in favor of petitioner in 1979. It was further subdivided into Lots 3, 4, of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the
person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in
and 5 and was a registered in 1982. Spouses Trajera bought Lot 5 and was
respect thereof x x x.'
issued TCT thereof in 1994.
Tracing the origins of the titles involved will disclose that they all came from a
Respondents received demand letters requiring them to remove a portion of single individual - Yulo - who caused his landholding (Lot 62-A) to be
the home and fence which the petitioner and Trajeras claim encroached subdivided into what are now the contested lots. Indeed, what he did each
upon their respective properties. time -his business model, so to speak - was to subdivide his large
landholding into several small plots and one large plot. The small plots he
On the other hand, petitioner argues that there could be no overlapping sold, while he kept for future use the single large parcel - to be subdivided
once more if he desired to. Thus, in 1963, Yulo subdivided Lot 62-A into
because Lots 91, 92 and 96 are nonexistent and the titles thereto are several small plots and one large plot (Lot 29). In 1969, he once more
spurious. Thus, void ab initio. Petitioner also argues that respondents were subdivided Lot 29 into several plots and one large plot (Lot 72). At this point,
not buyers in good faith as they did not cause the survey of the properties at the titles from which respondents' titles were derived were issued. Lot 72, on
the time they bought the same; that had they inspected and gone beyond the the other hand, was titled in the name of petitioner Jose L. Yulo Agricultural
titles, they would have discovered it encroached upon adjacent lots. Corporation - which, judging from the nomenclature alone, can safely be said
belonged to Yulo, or is connected to him. Then again, in 1982, Lot 72 was
further subdivided into several lots and registered in petitioner's name. At this
ISSUE
point, the Trajeras purchased one of the subdivided lots. Given the foregoing,
Yulo - and petitioner for that matter, which is a corporation that belonged to
142
PROPERTY DIGESTS

Yulo himself or is connected to him and which became his successor-in- by mere tolerance, the property is in adverse possession for almost 40 years.
interest - knew everything as far as his land is concerned, or is charged with The petitioner insists that the respondents’ right to the property has been
knowledge at least. Yulo was the sole owner of the properties involved, and barred by laches.
he and his outfit were the sellers of the properties which eventually were
acquired by the respondents and the Trajeras. They cannot claim to be Issue: Has the right of respondents over the subject lot been barred by
ignorant of everything that went on with the properties they owned. They laches or prescription?
cannot be allowed to benefit from their own mistakes at the expense of the
respondents. Indeed, if there is anybody who must be considered in bad Held: No, the right of respondents over the subject lot been has not been
faith, it is they; they should have known that there was an overlapping of barred by laches or prescription. In Sarona v. Villegas, it was ruled that “acts
titles in their very own lands. merely tolerated” are those which, by reason of neighborliness or familiarity,
the owner of property allows his neighbor or another person to do on the
Hence, the Court denies the petition. property. Even though this is continued for a long time, no right will be
acquired by prescription. Considering that the occupation of the subject lot is
by mere tolerance of the respondents, the petitioner, without any contract
between them, is bound by an implied promise that it will vacate the same
upon demand. Hence, until such demand to vacate was communicated by
the respondents to the petitioner, respondents are not required to do any act
to recover the subject the land.
Department of Education v. Delfina C. Casibang, et. al.

G.R. No. 192268; January 27, 2016
Peralta, J.
Facts: Juan Cepeda, the respondents’ late father, owns a property in Solana,
Cagayan. Sometime in 1965, upon the request of the then Mayor Justo
Caronan requested, he allowed the construction and operation of Solana Heirs of Zosimo Maravilla vs. Privaldo Tupas
North Central School. Sometime in 2000, the respondents entered and G.R. No. 192132
occupied a portion of the property. When the school officials demand them to Peralta, J.
vacate, they refused to do so. Hence, the petitioner filed a complaint for
Forcible Entry against respondents. The MCTC ruled in favor of the Facts: According to respondent, Privaldo Tupas, he along with the other
petitioner. On appeal, the RTC affirmed said decision. heirs of the late Asiclo S. Tupas, has maintained the occupation and
possession of certain portions of the property situated in Diniwid, Barangay
The respondents filed an action for the Recovery of Possession and/or Sum Balabag, Malay, Aklan which is the subject of this case. Thereafter, the late
of Money against the petitioner. They contend that since their late father did Zosimo Maravilla claimed ownership over 10,000 square meters of said
not have any immediate need of the land in 1965, he consented to the property by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated February 8, 1975, purportedly
temporary construction and operation of the school. On the other hand, the executed between him and the late Asiclo S. Tupas.
petitioner contends that contrary to respondents’ claim that the occupation is
143
PROPERTY DIGESTS

Maravilla filed a case for quieting of title with recovery of possession and
damages to which the RTC decided the validity of the sale as to the ½ of the Issue: Can private individuals, the Maravillas in this case, may acquire
property sold or 5,000 square meters. Due to this, Maravilla appealed to CA, vested right of ownership over the island, considering that they have been in
questioning the decision of RTC that he is entitled to only ½ despite open and continued possession for several years?
upholding the validity of the sale. CA ruled in favor of Maravilla, entitling him
the whole of the property sold. Held: No, private individuals, specifically the Maravillas, in the case at bar,
cannot acquire vested right of ownership over the island, considering that
Maravilla filed another case for partition and damages before the RTC while they have been in open and continued possession for several years.
ruled in favor of him. Tupas then appealed the decision with the CA, but the
latter dismissed the appeal on the ground of res judicata. Duer to this, At the time of the sale of the subject property, the late Asiclo S. Tupas had
Maravilla then filed a Motion for Execution. While the motion for execution no right to sell a property that has not been declared alienable by the State;
was declared Boracay as government property in the consolidated cases of hence, he cannot pass unto another any right or title to own or possess the
The Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources land. Therefore, the "Sale of Unregistered Land" entered into between the
(DENR), et al. v. Yap, et al. and Sacay, et al. v. the Secretary of the DENR, late Asiclo S. Tupas and the late Zosimo Maravilla on February 8, 1975,
et al. (Boracay Decision) previously considered valid and legitimate and became the basis used by the
RTC to settle the dispute between the parties as to who has the better to
However, On February 2, 2009, a Resolution was issued by the RTC right to the property, has become null and void because the subject property
granting the motion for execution. Tupas then filed a motion for of the contract is a forest land and cannot be alienated at the time the said
reconsideration, but the RTC denied the same. Thus, Tupas filed a petition deed of sale was executed. Article 1347 of the Civil Code provides that only
for certiorari with the CA assailing the Resolution and the Order issued by the things, which are not outside the commerce of man, including future things,
RTC. He raised as an issue that the grant of the motion for execution is not in may be the objects of the contracts and Article 1409 of the Civil Code also
accordance with this Court's decision in The Secretary of the Department of states that contracts whose objects are outside the commerce of man are
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), et al. v. Yap, et al. and Sacay, non-existent and void ab initio.
et al. v. the Secretary of the DENR, et al., a supervening event, and that the
RTC erred in not declaring as null and void the deed of sale of unregistered
land considering that Boracay has been classified as an inalienable land.
144

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ISSUE: Are the machineries and equipment considered immovable

On 1988, Alfonso Roxas Chua executed a public instrument denominated as

FACTS: RODIL is leasing a property in Binondo from the government.

On September 24, 1974, Nabasa was issued Original Certificate of

G.R. No. 72876, January 18, 1991

Contention of Petitioner: Art. 448 is not applicable since it contemplates a FACTS:

Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the

46. PACIFIC FARMS, INC., vs. ESGUERRA, ET AL.

FACTS: Petitioners and Respondents are co-owners of a parcel of land with

52. ROSALES v. CASTELLTORT

FACTS: Spouses-petitioners Rodolfo V. Rosales and Lily Rosqueta-Rosales

In the case at bar, the sudden change of course of the Cagayan

RULING: Yes. Tax Declaration not sufficient evidence to prove ownership

It was also held in Meneses v. Court of Appeals that accretion, as a mode of

Therefore, the land was not acquired by defendants through prescription.

74. IGNACIO WONG, V. HON. LUCAS D. CARPIO

The RTC found the existence of tax declarations in the names of

Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and

Therefore, the value of fruits received by Manuel be applied to the HELD:

Manuel De Jesus et al v. Howmart Corporation et al

Can the execution of an acceptance in a separate instrument and the failure

Maxima Hemedes also wrote a letter addressed to Asia Brewery asserting

1. Petitioner claims that the subject property could not be partitioned

2. YES. There was ingratitude on the part of respondent.

RULING: Yes, the action has prescribed.

The contention of petitioners has no merit. As gleaned from the CA

Multi-realty Development Corporation v. Makati Tuscany Condominium

Private respondent Francisco Artigo sue the petitioners Constante

Clearly, the petition was filed on time.

Petitioner was among those qualified beneficiaries under Zonal Improvement

Petitioner Hortizuela filed an action for reconveyance and recovery of RULING:

Therefore, the subject property remains to be owned in common by Nonato

Unfortunately for herein appellant, in contracts invalidated by illegal subject

Facts: Concepcion contracted a second marriage with Rodriguez.

Issue: Is the transter of a property from a mother to a daughter of first

R.A. No. 9262 provides:

Department of Education v. Delfina C. Casibang, et. al.

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