Philoponus, Against Proclus On The Eternity of The World 1-5

PHILOPONUS
Against Proclus
On the Eternity of
the World 1-5
This page intentionally left blank
PHILOPONUS
Against Proclus
On the Eternity of
the World 1-5
Translated by
Michael Share
Duckworth
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Bloomsbury Academic
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© 2004 by Richard Sorabji
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Introduction, translation and notes
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2004 by Michael Share
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Acknowledgements
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The present translations have been made possible by generous and
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Acknowledgements
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present translations haveCopyright Trustees;
been made possible the Royal
by generous andSociety
(UK); Centrofunding
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from the following sources:dithe
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Tempo (Padua); Mario Mignucci;
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of ResearchUniversity;
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Tempo (Padua); Mario Mignucci; Liverpool University; the Leventis
Scientific Research (NWO/GW); the Cultural Attaché of the Greek
Foundation; the Arts and Humanities Research Board of the British
Embassy in London. The editor wishes to thank Frans de Haas,
Academy; the Esmée Fairbairn Charitable Trust; the Henry Brown
JamesTrust;
Wilberding, andN.
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Egon; theFalcon for their
Netherlands comments
Organisation forand John
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for press.
Embassy in London. The editor wishes to thank Frans de Haas,
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press was
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Bowin,byDevin
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for preparing the series
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Printed and bound in Great Britain by
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Contents
Preface ix
Introduction 1
Departures from Rabe’s Text 13
Translation 17
Chapter 1 20
Chapter 2 32
Chapter 3 42
Chapter 4 50
Chapter 5 78
Notes 89
Select Bibliography 115
English-Greek Glossary 119
Greek-English Index 127
Subject Index 147
Index of Passages Cited in the Notes 153
Preface
Richard Sorabji
This work in eighteen chapters, of which the first five are translated
here, is one of the most interesting of all post-Aristotelian Greek philo-
sophical texts, written at a crucial moment in the defeat of paganism by
Christianity. In 529 AD, the Emperor Justinian put an end to teaching
in the pagan Neoplatonist school in Athens, where Proclus had in the
fifth century AD been the most devout pagan teacher, St Benedict is
thought to have founded the monastery in Monte Cassino, and, again on
behalf of Christianity, Philoponus in Alexandria attacked Proclus’ argu-
ments that the universe had no beginning in his Against Proclus on the
Eternity of the World. Philoponus was one of the cleverest of the Neo-
platonist philosophers, a pupil of Ammonius in Alexandria, but he was
a Christian, and he used his profound knowledge of the Neoplatonist
and Aristotelian traditions to turn the pagans’ own views against
themselves.
Our text records, and replies to, the 18 arguments of Proclus’ Against
the Christians on the Eternity of the World, as well as quoting a little of
Proclus’ Examination of Aristotle’s Objections to Plato’s Timaeus. It will
suffice to indicate just a few of the original arguments and ideas in these
chapters.
In I.3, pp. 9,14-11,17, Philoponus exploits Aristotle’s concept of infin-
ity, which the Neoplatonists accepted, as a weapon with which to refute
them. His arguments, which were deployed in a number of his works,
had already appeared in his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, origi-
nally written in 517 AD, whether or not subsequently revised, but there
they were not very prominent. Aristotle in Physics 3.4-8, had allowed
infinity to exist, but only in the way that it is still introduced in modern
schools, as an ever expandable finitude. This meant that a more than
finite number is never reached, which makes infinity seem more tract-
able. Aristotle put it by saying that infinities are potential, never actual,
and that you can never go right through them. What Philoponus points
out is that Christianity must, on this view, be right to say that the
universe had a beginning, because otherwise it would have gone right
through an actual infinity, a more than finite number, of years. Worse,
viii Preface
it would have done so by the time of Socrates, who was executed earlier,
in the fourth century BC, so since then it would have gone through more
than an actual infinity. And if there had been an actual infinity of
generations of humans, when you added in the generations of horses
and dogs, then you too would have more than an actual infinity.
Aristotle had ruled out actual infinities in Physics 3.5, 204a20-6.
There is an infinity of whole numbers in the sense that however large a
finite number you have counted, more still can always be counted. But
if you allow a more than finite number of whole numbers to exist, the
even numbers will be as numerous as the odd and even combined, and
part cannot be as large as whole. It was only in the fourteenth century
that Western philosophers were able to explain the acceptable sense in
which the set of whole numbers would be larger, and the sense in which
it would not. I have described this elsewhere.1 But in the first half of the
thirteenth century, I am told, Grosseteste’s treatise On Light seems to
be aware of the viability of this, in which case I conjecture that he will
have learnt it from Latin translations of Arabic sources, possibly of
al-Haytham. At least, it does not seem to have been known to the
Greeks, unless to Archimedes in the third century BC, who may have
referred to the point in The Method of Mechanical Theorems, of which a
fragment survives in a palimpsest that is currently being deciphered by
Reviel Netz.
In IV.9, at pp. 78-9, Philoponus offers us another impressive argu-
ment. Although God only has to will in order to create the universe, and
although he always possesses the blueprint for creating it, it does not
follow that he should make it exist always. It might be less good that it
should exist at all times, like himself. Philoponus here offers a version
of the idea that Augustine had earlier expressed in Latin, that God’s
willing a change (the universe starting to exist) does not prevent his will
being changeless. But Philoponus’ inspiration will not have come from
a Latin text. On p. 568 of Against Proclus, he is aware that his point
about willing is analogous to the point made about knowledge by
Proclus’ hero, the third- to fourth-century pagan Neoplatonist Iam-
blichus, who said that knowledge does not have to have the same status
as the known. Everlasting beings could have everlasting knowledge of
the temporary.2
Proclus’ 5th argument was that there was no time when there was
not time, and the celestial clock of revolving stars, according to Plato’s
Timaeus, is co-extensive with time. Hence time and the heavens are
both beginningless. Philoponus replies in V.4, 116,1-24, that we can talk
of when there was no time, taking the ‘when’ in a non-temporal sense.
It refers to eternity. Moreover, he gives a new account of eternity,
114,20-116,1, rejecting the conception of it as like a point. Since eternity
is regarded as a measure of everlasting things, it had better have some
kind of extension (paratasis), even though not a temporal one. We can
imagine the extension there would be if the celestial clock were stopped.
Preface ix
These three issues are merely illustrations of Philoponus’ original
and densely packed replies.
A new introduction to the Commentators appears in R.R.K. Sorabji, The

Philosophy of the Commentators, 200-600 AD: A Sourcebook (London &
Ithaca, NY, 2004).
Notes
1. I have treated the infinity arguments in my Time, Creation and the
Continuum (London & Ithaca, NY, 1983), ch. 14.
2. Time, Creation and the Continuum (London & Ithaca, NY, 1983), ch. 15,
pp. 240-2.
Introduction
This translation is made from Rabe’s 1899 Teubner edition,1 the only
modern critical edition of the Greek text. Departures from Rabe’s text,
many of which are based on Rabe’s own suggestions in the critical
apparatus, are mentioned in the notes as they occur and listed sepa-
rately in front of the translation. Words in square brackets in the
translation do not occur in the Greek but have been inserted to clarify
the sense. Greek words are occasionally given in transliteration when it
is thought their presence may help the reader.
The text is based on a single manuscript which is incomplete at either
end and Proclus’ first argument and part of Philoponus’ response to it
are missing. Fortunately, the missing argument (though not Phi-
loponus’ reply) survives in two Arabic versions and Peter Adamson has
kindly prepared an English translation of one of them for this edition.2
Another consequence of the loss of the beginning of Philoponus’ work
is that we cannot be sure of its title or of that of the work of Proclus
contained within it, and the various modern titles in currency are all
based on the few, and not very helpful, ancient references to the two
works and the conjectures of Renaissance scholars.3 In English-
language publications Philoponus’ work is most frequently referred to
by Rabe’s Latin title de Aeternitate Mundi contra Proclum or by its
English equivalent Against Proclus On the Eternity of the World and I
have chosen to use the latter on the title-page of this volume.4 In the
remainder of this introduction and in the notes, on the other hand, I
shall refer to it as Aet., an abbreviated form of the Latin title. I have not
needed to formulate a title for Proclus’ work for the present volume, but
Lang and Macro have recently edited it under the title On the Eternity
of the World.5
In their introduction Lang and Macro argue (1) that Proclus’ eighteen
proofs are not aimed at the Christians but only at pagan philosophers
like Plutarch and Atticus who took the creation myth in Plato’s Timaeus
literally, and (2) that, although Philoponus was a Christian, his quarrel
with Proclus was on purely philosophical grounds and Aet. shows no
evidence of his Christianity.6 A reviewer7 of Lang and Macro’s work
expressed unease with some aspects of their argument and the hope
that these issues would be discussed at length in the introduction to this
volume. A full discussion would go beyond the scope of this series,8 but
2 Introduction
I shall define my own position on the main points, since, as will become
apparent, it has a bearing on some of my translation decisions.
I have no quarrel with the first part of Lang and Macro’s argument.
The issue that Proclus is addressing had a long history in Greek
philosophy, going back at least to Plato and his immediate pupils, and
is one that he also addresses in his commentary on Plato’s Timaeus. The
arguments he uses all have a long pedigree in pagan philosophy, many
of them also appear in other works of his, and none of them has special
application to the Christians. There is no overt reference to Christianity
or the Christians in any of the proofs and, as mentioned earlier, I think
it highly unlikely that there was any reference to the Christians in the
title of the work.
None of this is surprising. Although he observed pagan religious
practices, openly taught a philosophy that was in direct conflict with
almost all aspects of Christian doctrine and probably came into direct
conflict with the Christian authorities in Athens on at least one occa-
sion, he does not openly attack, or even mention, Christians or
Christianity anywhere in the considerable portion of his voluminous
writings which survives.
On balance, this silence is more likely to have been the result of
disdain or discretion, or a combination of the two, than of total indiffer-
ence, and some scholars claim, I believe plausibly, to have found covert,
discreetly hostile, references to Christianity in his works.9 Are there any
such in the eighteen proofs? Some10 have seen one at 55,15-26, where
Proclus writes:
And so if someone, with the intention of paying reverence to him

who is the cause of the universe, should say that he alone is
everlasting while the world is not everlasting, he is, by denying
that the latter is everlasting, declaring that the former is in
movement and not unmoving. And if he says that he is in move-
ment and not unmoving, he is saying that he is not always perfect
but, because all movement is uncompleted activity, sometimes
imperfect, and that he has need of something that is inferior [to
himself] – I mean time of course – because of the very fact that he
moves. And by saying that he is sometimes imperfect and not
always perfect and that he has need of something inferior [to
himself] he is being irreverent in the extreme. So if someone, with
the intention of paying reverence to him who is the cause of the
universe, should say that he alone is everlasting, he is being
irreverent in the extreme.11
It seems likely that this is directed at a specific opponent or opponents

and the Christians would certainly fit well enough. Lang and Macro
suggest Plutarch or Atticus,12 and although I can see nothing in the
passages they cite13 from Proclus and Plutarch to support their case,
Introduction 3
there is a passage in Proclus’ eighteenth argument which suggests they
are right. There, in an argument explicitly directed at Atticus and his
associates,14 he says:
And most important of all, no one pays more respect to the cosmos
than Plato, who also asserts that the cosmos is disordered, when-
ever god is not always uniform and unchanging, that is, whenever
god is not an intelligible god; for the character of intelligible gods
is to be uniform, unchanging and self-identical. So, either both are
gods, both the cosmos and the demiurge, or neither; for disorder
will make the one be not a god, while failing to be uniform and
unchanging will make the other be not a god.15
In both passages the argument is at bottom the same: to downgrade the

world is to downgrade God, and to pay due reverence to God one must
pay due reverence to the world.16 I find it difficult to believe that both
arguments are not directed at the same opponents.
My guess is that after writing his commentary on the Timaeus, where
he had addressed the same issues in what was in many ways a contro-
versial work, he felt that there was room for a more systematic
treatment of the same subject-matter, something more closely resem-
bling the Elements of Theology. Of course, this does not mean that he
was not aware that his arguments could be used against the Christians,
or that a Christian reading them might be offended, or even that this
might not have given him some pleasure, but the same could be said of
much of what he wrote, and there is nothing in the proofs themselves to
support the idea that they were aimed specifically at the Christians.17
It is the second part of Lang and Macro’s argument that is problem-
atical.
I shall begin by quoting a few passages that sum up their position.
Philoponus too [sc. as well as Proclus] seems to have been writing

within an entirely philosophical context, that is, Neoplatonism.18
} there is virtually a complete absence of evidence for a Christian

commitment in Philoponus’ philosophical writings.19
Christianity has left so little mark on his philosophy that his faith
would not be known with anything like certainty – it might not
even have been suggested – except for evidence from his theological
writings.20
} evidence for the presence and importance of Christian doctrine

must be found in the De Aeternitate Mundi contra Proclum itself.
And it is not there.21
4 Introduction
Philoponus indicates no Christian interests in his De Aeternitate
Mundi contra Proclum; he does, however, indicate his commitment
to Neoplatonism } Proclus’ arguments and Philoponus’ response
to them play out in the arena of philosophy, not Christianity, and
they do not present some supposed quarrel between Christianity
and philosophy.22
I agree with some of this. Philoponus does write as a Neoplatonic insider

and his arguments are strictly philosophical. Neither his stance in the
creation debate nor most of his arguments were new to Greek philo-
sophy and the bulk of the 646 pages of Aet. does indeed read like a
contribution to an in-house philosophical debate.
However, a closer reading of Aet. shows that Philoponus frequently
identifies himself as a Christian and his philosophical opponents as
pagans, quotes from the Christian Bible, claims that Plato derived some
of his positions from the Bible, and even seems to suggest that Philo-
ponus believed that Proclus’ arguments were directed specifically at the
Christians.
Quotation of the key passages will be the best way to demonstrate
this.
I cannot help being amazed at how they brush aside arguments

refuting [their own position] of which they are well aware, often
even in the face of correctly-argued positions of their own, and
taking up arms against the truth mislead those who are inexperi-
enced in the subtleties of logical argument with every trick in the
book.23
The ‘truth’ here is the Christian truth, as the phrase ‘the truth of our
Scriptures’ in the passage quoted next, which refers back to this one,
shows.
Now that these facts have been demonstrated, how could one fail
to be amazed, as I said at the outset,24 at the trickiness of the great
Proclus in argument? Although the facts speak so clearly for
themselves, and although pretty well everyone accepts Aristotle’s
arguments } the philosopher takes no account of this – although
no one would be so bold as to impute ignorance of such theories to
him. [Instead] he has made it his one goal to arm himself by all
available means against the truth of our Scriptures and, arguing
against us as though we are novices in these matters, in the
chapter before this has stitched together a fallacious argument }
so that he can then draw the conclusion that it is either necessary
that the divine should be in movement (that is to say, should alter)
or, if that is impossible – for ‘with God’, as the Holy Scriptures
somewhere25 say, ‘there is no change of position or shadow cast by
Introduction 5
turning’ – that the world should have coexisted from everlasting
with the being of God.26
These two passages show Philoponus identifying himself as a Christian

and accusing his opponents, the pagan Neoplatonists27 in general in the
first passage (‘they’ can scarcely have any other reference) and Proclus
in the second, of resorting to fallacious arguments in their eagerness to
undermine Christian doctrine. The second passage could be seen as
evidence that Philoponus believed that Proclus had aimed his proofs
specifically at the Christians, but I am more inclined to think that
Philoponus is actually attacking the teaching of anti-creationism in the
Neoplatonic schools, of which Proclus’ proofs were but one example, as
an assault on Christian doctrine which could lead young, unsophisti-
cated Christian students astray. It may even be that he had been such
a student himself and that Aet. and the other creationist works which
followed it were the result of his revulsion at what he saw happening
after the scales had dropped from his eyes.28
Notice the quotation from the Christian Bible near the end of the
second passage. Three more will occur in the passages I shall quote and
there are seven in all in Aet.29
I shall pass over the circle of Plutarch and Atticus, who are agreed
by all to have explicitly affirmed that Plato believed the world to
be generated with respect to time and to have taken issue with
those of the contrary opinion. Past teachers of our gospel, among
them Eusebius, who led the Church in Caesarea, have already
cited lengthy extracts from them in their own works.30
Eusebius (d. circa 340) was a Christian polemicist and historian of the
church who became the bishop of Caesarea in Palestine. The extracts
from Plutarch and Atticus that are mentioned can be found in his
Praeparatio Evangelica (Preparation for the Gospel), a polemical work
in which he argues that Plato drew his inspiration from Moses and that
his teaching helped pave the way for the Christian gospel. Philoponus
shows evidence of having read the Praeparatio elsewhere in Aet.31 His
assumption that he can refer the reader to Christian writers for infor-
mation about the views of Plutarch and Atticus shows that he is, if not
exclusively, addressing a Christian audience.
And this too [he has been discussing the myth in Plato’s States-
man], as some of our [Christian writers] have correctly pointed out,
he derived from the Holy Scriptures. For what else is ‘assisting the
revolution’ of the heaven and then ‘letting it go’ ‘when its circuits
have fully completed the measure of time assigned to it’32 than for
‘the heavens to be rolled up and changed like a cloak?’33 And listen
to how Plato, once he had decided, again after hearing [the biblical
6 Introduction
words] ‘for God did not make death’, and ‘he created all things that
they might exist’,34 that the universe must remain immortal,
states, again in this same Statesman, that immortality does not
belong to the world by nature but comes to it newly acquired from
the Creator: [Quotation follows].35
It is here that Philoponus claims that Plato was inspired by the Bible,
and there may be an implication to the same effect at Aet. 142,8-11,
where he writes:
Only ‘is’, he says, should be said of God, stating this Mosaic [rule]
quite explicitly. (For, appearing to the prophet, God declared ‘I am
He who is’36).
Philoponus may well of course have found the idea that Plato was
inspired by the Bible in the Praeparatio.
Aet. was only the first of a series of either three or four books37 in
which Philoponus argued the case for a creation. None of the others
survives in its own right, but we know quite a bit about them, largely
because Simplicius attacks them at some length in his commentaries on
Aristotle’s Physics and de Caelo. The ‘fragments’ of the first of these, the
Against Aristotle On the Eternity of the World (de Aeternitate Mundi
contra Aristotelem) have been collected and translated by Christian
Wildberg in this series38 and fragments 132 and 134 contain clear
references to the Christian expectation of a new heaven and a new
earth.
Finally, Simplicius, who was Philoponus’ contemporary, attacks him
colourfully and viciously, often precisely as a Christian, and clearly had
no doubt as to where his loyalties lay.39
I justified my excursion into these matters with the claim that my
views have influenced some of my translation decisions. I particularly
had in mind my treatment of the word theos. It is still common to
translate it ‘God’ rather than ‘god’ when it occurs in a Christian author,
whereas one is often torn between ‘God’, ‘god’ and ‘the god’ when it
occurs in Plato or one of the Neoplatonists. In view of what has gone
before, it will come as no surprise that I normally translate it ‘God’ when
Philoponus uses it in one of his own arguments, and I have, for ease of
application as much as anything, but also because I think he often reads
theos as ‘God’40 in such cases, extended this to passages that he quotes from
Plato, Aristotle, Proclus, and other authors. Although Proclus uses it a
number of times in the eighteen proofs he does not, as it happens, use it in
any of the proofs contained in this volume. I have not as a rule extended
this capitalisation to pronouns or other words that refer to God.
This is probably the best place to say a few words on some of the other
key vocabulary in Aet., some of which appears as early as the title.41
In Plato’s Timaeus, from which much of the terminology used in Aet.
Introduction 7
and in the creation debate in general derives, the world, or universe, is
variously referred to as ho kosmos, ho ouranos or to pan.
kosmos originally meant ‘order’ and, secondarily, ‘adornment’ and it
never lost these connotations, but by Plato’s day the meaning ‘world-
order’ or simply ‘world’ was well-established. Common English equiva-
lents are ‘cosmos’ and ‘world’ and I have opted for the latter.42
ouranos literally means ‘heaven’ but in the Timaeus Plato uses it
interchangeably with kosmos (cf. Tim. 28B) and Aristotle at Cael. 278b
ff. says that it may be used of (a) the outermost circumference of the
universe (b) the heavens as a whole, including the stars, the sun, the
moon and the planets (c) the universe as a whole. In Aet. it normally
seems to be used in the second of Aristotle’s three senses, but it is not
always easy to see what is intended. I translate ‘heaven’.
My rendering of to pan, which literally means ‘the all’, is ‘the uni-
verse’.
I have thought it important to distinguish clearly between aiônios
(‘eternal’), aïdios (‘everlasting’) and aei (‘always’, ‘for ever’, etc.) in the
translation. Proclus always reserves aiônios for entities which are
outside of time, such as God or transcendental form, but uses aïdios or
aei either of these same entities or of things which endure for ever in
time, which, for him, include the world, matter, imminent form, genera-
tion and time itself. For Philoponus in Aet. things are a little more
complicated. In reporting and refuting Proclus’ arguments he observes
the same distinctions; for example, he nowhere claims that Proclus is
saying that the kosmos is aiônios. However, for him only eternal things
are in fact aïdios and in one fairly lengthy passage (114,19-116,1) he can
use aiônios and aïdios interchangeably to distinguish eternal things
from those which exist in time. (In his earlier commentaries where he
acted primarily as a reporter of Ammonius he was, of course, quite
prepared to use aïdios of things which exist in time; at in GC 1,9-16, for
example, he used it of the heavenly bodies and the four elements.
Surprisingly, however, apart from two occasions in Opif., he uses
aiônios only in Aet.).43
Using ‘everlasting’ for aïdios entails using ‘everlastingness’ for
aïdiotês (although, as mentioned earlier in this introduction, I retain the
by now traditional ‘eternity’ in the volume title) and I have even thought
it best to use the unlovely coinage ‘co-everlasting’ rather than ‘co-eter-
nal’ to translate sunaïdios.
Like Plato in the Timaeus, Proclus and Philoponus most commonly
refer to the maker of the kosmos as ho theos or ho dêmiourgos (although
Proclus does not use the former before Argument 8). Common transla-
tions of dêmiourgos are ‘demiurge’, ‘craftsman’ (a more or less literal
rendering of one of the senses of the Greek word) and ‘creator’. In
translating the Timaeus I would use either ‘demiurge’ or ‘craftsman’,
but in Proclus and Philoponus the term has, I think, lost much of its
original force and I have opted for ‘creator’, partly because doing so
8 Introduction
makes it easier to find English equivalents for the related words
dêmiourgein (‘to create’), dêmiourgêma (‘a creation’), dêmiourgia, (‘crea-
tion’) and dêmiourgikos (‘creative’). I have already discussed the
translation of ho theos.
Both creationists and anti-creationists were eager to enrol Plato on
their side and Philoponus’ debate with Proclus and other creationists is
in part over the correct interpretation of the Timaeus. In this debate one
of the key issues was the correct interpretation of the verb ginesthai and
related words when applied to the kosmos.
The LSJ article on ginesthai (which is there listed under its earlier
spelling gignesthai) is organised into two main sections. The first is
headed ‘abs. [sc. without a predicate], come into being’, and includes,
amongst others, subsections headed ‘to be born’, and ‘to be produced’.
The second is headed ‘folld. by a Predicate, come into a certain state,
become, and (in past tenses) to be’. There is no doubt that Plato often
uses ginesthai of the physical world to express the idea that it is in
perpetual flux, always changing and ‘becoming’ different (a usage
which, although he commonly uses the verb without a predicate, would
fall under LSJ II), and this is not a matter of dispute between Proclus
and Philoponus (see especially VI,15-16). The question at issue between
them is whether he also applies the verb to the kosmos as a whole in a
sense that would fall under LSJ I. Philoponus claims that he does, at
Tim. 28B for example, where he understands gegonen in the sense ‘it
has come into being’ (or perhaps even ‘it has been generated’, or ‘it has
been created’), while Proclus argues that he does not, unless perhaps in
a very attenuated sense. This, of course, means that the same words will
often mean something different to Proclus and Philoponus, which
makes life difficult for the translator. One popular solution, which I
shall adopt, is to translate ginesthai ‘to come to be’, which can, with
charity, be understood as embracing both ‘to come into being’ and ‘to
become’, and as therefore adequately covering most relevant senses of
ginesthai. (This only applies to contexts where the creation of the
kosmos is at issue. ginesthai is something of a portmanteau word and I
translate it in many different ways in other contexts).
The choice of ‘come to be’ for ginesthai raises the possibility of
something like ‘coming-to-be’ and ‘admitting of coming-to-be’ (or, on a
different view of the word, ‘having-come to-be’) for the related words
genesis and genêtos, as used by Hussey in his translation of the third
and fourth books of Aristotle’s Physics.44 However, the two words are
both very common in Aet. and in some passages, especially in the case
of genêtos, this would become intolerably cumbersome, so I have, rather
illogically, opted for ‘generation’ for genesis and ‘generated’ for genêtos.
The choice of ‘generated’ for genêtos raises another issue. Verbal
adjectives in -tos (of which genêtos is one) may express possibility or
have the force of a perfect passive participle. Some display only one of
these possibilities, others, including genêtos, as the entries in LSJ and
Introduction 9
Lampe when taken together show, both. Of course, when an adjective is
capable of either signification, it is not always clear which is intended.
In fact, one suspects that the writer would often not have found it easy
to say. This being so, it is not surprising that genêtos in Aet. has been
read either way. To take only two examples, Dillon,45 when translating
the excerpts from Taurus in Aet. VI, renders it ‘created’, while Judson,
in his article on generability and perishability in Philoponus,46 prefers
‘generable’. My own view is that the ‘perfect passive’ sense of the word
is usually uppermost in the minds of both Proclus and Philoponus and
it is for that reason that I have preferred ‘generated’ to ‘generable’. (In
fact, it seems to me that in VI,9, in the course of dismissing the first of
the various meanings that Taurus had proposed for genêtos, Philoponus
comes close to rejecting the meaning ‘generable’ altogether).
In philosophical texts, including Aet., ginesthai, genesis and genêtos
are often opposed to phtheiresthai, phthora and phthartos. phtheiresthai
is the passive of phtheirein (‘to destroy’) and so can be rendered ‘to be
destroyed’, but ‘to perish’, ‘to pass away’ and ‘to cease to be’ are all
commoner. I usually (but not, as the Greek-English Index shows, al-
ways) use ‘perish’ for phtheiresthai and ‘perishable’ for phthartos. For
phthora, because ‘perishing’ does not always work well, I usually use
‘passing out of existence’.47
I discuss the translation of a number of other words in the notes,
usually at their first occurrence.
The early stages of the preparation of this translation were supported
by a grant from the Australian Research Council. I would like to thank
Frans de Haas, James Wilberding, and Andrea Falcon who each read
part of a draft of the translation and made many valuable suggestions,
the Ancient Commentators on Aristotle Project editorial team for assis-
tance, patience and support, and Richard Sorabji for his advice and
encouragement.
Notes
1. H. Rabe (ed.), Ioannes Philoponus de Aeternitate Mundi contra Proclum,
Leipzig, 1899 (reprinted Hildesheim, etc., 1984).
2. For details of the version translated by Adamson, see his notes; for the
other version, which is known from two manuscripts and is apparently an
earlier and less sophisticated translation of the same Greek text, see F. Rosen-
thal, ‘From Arabic books and manuscripts VII: some Graeco-Arabica in
Istanbul’, Journal of the American Oriental Society 81 (1961), 9-10. Although
mediaeval Arabic bio-bibliographers refer to an Arabic translation of Philo-
ponus (see G. Anawati, ‘Un fragment perdu du De aeternitate mundi de Proclus’,
in Mélanges de philosophie grecque offerts a Mgr. Diès (Paris, 1956), 21-2; R.
Wisnovsky, ‘Yahyâ al-Nahwî’, Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol. 11 (Leiden, 2002),
252), it does not seem to have survived.
3. Philoponus himself refers to the present work at least half a dozen times
in later works. At Opif. 88,21 he calls it ta eis ta Proklou graphenta hêmin (‘what
has been written by us against the [writings] of Proclus’); in his Against
10 Introduction
Aristotle, as cited at Simplicius in Cael. 135,27, hoi elenkhoi pros Proklon (‘the
refutations against Proclus’); and in the Against Aristotle, as cited at Simplicius
in Cael. 136,17 and Simplicius in Phys. 1141,9; 1142,1 and 1159,2, ta pros
Proklou (‘the [writings] against Proclus’). The article on Philoponus in the Suda,
a tenth-century encyclopaedia, says that he wrote kata tôn dekaoktô Prokleiôn
epikheirêmatôn (‘against the eighteen Proclean proofs’), and the article on
Proclus includes Epikheirêmata kata Khristianôn iê (‘Eighteen Proofs Against
the Christians’) in a list of his works and later in the article states: ‘This is the
Proclus who, second only to Porphyry, used his foul and insolent tongue against
the Christians. John Philoponus wrote against him, replying most brilliantly to
his eighteen proofs (tôn i kai ê epikheirêmatôn) and showing that even for a
Hellene, amongst whom he had a high reputation, he was uncultured and
stupid’.
In all of this only Eighteen Proofs Against the Christians looks like a formal
citation and I have to agree with Saffrey (H.-D. Saffrey, ‘Allusions antichrétien-
nes chez Proclus: Le Diadoque platonicien’, Revue des sciences philosophiques
et théologiques 59 (1975), 553-63) that this looks like an invention based on the
fact that Proclus’ proofs, which are not openly anti-Christian and are therefore
unlikely to have included the words ‘Against the Christians’ in their title, were
refuted by the Christian Philoponus. It is not until the fifteenth century, when
someone wrote the words Iôannou Alexandreôs tou Philoponou kata tôn Lukiou
Philosophou Proklou peri Aïdiotêtos Kephalaiôn (‘John Philoponus of Alexan-
dria’s Against the Lycian Philosopher Proclus’ Chapters on Eternity’) and
someone else estin Iôannou Alexandreôs tou Philoponou hê parousa kata
aïdiotêtos pragmateia aristê tôn peri toutou } (‘The present work on eternity,
the best on the subject, belongs to John Philoponus of Alexandria }) in the main
manuscript of Philoponus, which itself dates from the ninth or tenth century,
that we meet a reference to Philoponus’ work containing the word ‘eternity’, and
not until the sixteenth, when the first printed edition and a late copy of the
principal manuscript both call it kata Proklou peri Aïdiotêtos Kosmou (‘Against
Proclus on the Eternity of the World’) that we find a title containing the phrase
‘the eternity of the world’.
4. Because, for reasons I shall explain later, I translate the Greek word
aïdiotês ‘everlastingness’ rather than ‘eternity’, I translate the (rather different)
Greek title that Rabe supplies at the beginning of the Greek text: ‘Against the
Arguments of Proclus Concerning the Everlastingness of the World’.
5. H. Lang and L. Macro (eds.), On the Eternity of the World (De Aeternitate
Mundi), Proclus (Berkeley, etc., 2001). Their edition includes a Greek text based
on Rabe’s, with their translation of it; a text and translation by Jon McGinnis
of the Arabic version of Proclus’ first proof that is translated in this volume; the
Latin version of Proclus’ proofs from the earlier of the two surviving sixteenth-
century Latin translations of Aet.; a substantial introduction and useful notes.
The seventeen proofs of Proclus which survive in Aet. have also been translated
into English by the English Neoplatonist Thomas Taylor in The Fragments That
Remain of the Lost Writings of Proclus, Surnamed the Platonic Successor (San
Diego, 1988) [originally published 1825], 35-92, and into German in M. Baltes,
Die Weltentstehung des platonischen Timaios nach den antiken Interpreten
(Leiden, 1976), vol. 2, 134-64. Only small portions of Philoponus’ refutations of
them have been translated into any modern language.
6. op. cit., 4-14.
7. Dirk Baltzly, Bryn Mawr Classical Reviews, BMCR 2002.10.19.
8. Which aims to provide accurate, readable translations with a minimum
of annotation.
Introduction 11
9. See especially Saffrey, ‘Allusions antichrétiennes chez Proclus’, which
Lang and Macro cite in nn. 15 and 20 to the Introduction. Although Lang and
Macro are initially rather ambivalent about the existence of such references,
they seem to come down in favour of it in the last paragraph of p. 7.
10. For example Baltes in Die Weltentstehung des platonischen Timaios
nach den antiken Interpreten, 2,139, who cites P. Bastid, Proclus et le crépuscule
de la pensée grecque (Paris, 1969).
11. My translation.
12. op. cit., 7 and 52, n. 10.
13. ibid., 52, n. 10.
14. At Aet. 606,17.
15. Aet. 608,11-18 in Lang and Macro’s translation.
16. Lang and Macro’s summary of the second passage (op. cit., 139) shows
that they read the argument as I do.
17. Nor, incidentally, do I think, as Lang and Macro do (ibid., last paragraph
on p. 7), that they were primarily intended as a refutation of the long-dead
Plutarch and Atticus. Atticus is mentioned only once and Plutarch not at all,
and although one or both of them may be in the offing from time to time on other
occasions, most of Proclus’ arguments have no direct bearing on anything they
wrote. They were adequately dealt with in the commentary on the Timaeus.
18. ibid., 7.
19. ibid., 10.
20. ibid., 11.
21. ibid.
22. ibid., 12 (with omission).
23. Aet. 61,5-9.
24. The reference is to the passage just quoted.
25. James 1,17.
26. Aet. 74,24-75,21 (with omissions).
27. Philoponus frequently refers to the pagan philosophers, or the pagans
in general, as ‘Hellenes’ or ‘children of the Hellenes’ (a phrase which occurs in
Eusebius), a practice that was common among both Jews and Christians. (For
instances see Aet. 37,13; 241,14; 245,23, etc.).
28. Of course, it is easy to imagine other possible reasons, some of them less
creditable, for Philoponus’ attack on Proclus. There is a good survey of those that
have been advanced in K. Verrycken, ‘The development of Philoponus’ thought
and its chronology’, in R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed: the Ancient
Commentators and Their Influence (Ithaca, NY, 1990), 234-6 (modern views)
and 258-60 (Arabic writers and Simplicius). There was a tradition among Arabic
philosophers that his anti-eternalist works did not represent his true convic-
tions and that his fellow Christians either bullied him into writing them or paid
him to produce them. Modern views range from a conversion from paganism to
Christianity to a reaction to Justinian’s closure of the Neoplatonic school in
Athens, motivated either by personal ambition or a desire to deflect the Em-
peror’s attention from Alexandria.
29. The three I do not quote can be found at Aet. 6,6; 6,7 and 128,15.
30. Aet. 211,10-18.
31. Perhaps the clearest instance is at 37,13-15, where the words: ‘Among
the Hellenes (par’ Hellêsi) indeed shrines and oracles [where] an evil demon
feigned the true foreknowledge of God were established in every corner of the
land’ seem to be a clear echo of the last part of the last sentence of subsection
5.3.10 of the Praeparatio, which reads: ‘On the shrines and oracles among the
12 Introduction
gentiles (para tois ethnesi) belonging to evil demons’. (para tois ethnesi and par’
Hellêsi have much the same reference in a Christian context).
32. Plato, Pol. 269C.
33. A paraphrase of Hebrews 1,12, which is itself an adaptation of Psalms
102, 27.
34. Wisdom of Solomon 1, 13 and 14.
35. Aet. 229,9-21.
36. Exodus 3,14.
37. On these see C. Wildberg (tr.), ‘Simplicius: Against Philoponus on the
Eternity of the World’, in Place, Void, and Eternity (Ithaca, NY, 1991), 100.
38. C. Wildberg (tr.), Philoponus: Against Aristotle on the Eternity of the
World (Ithaca, NY, 1987). In his ‘Prolegomena to the Study of Philoponus’ contra
Aristotelem’, in R. Sorabji (ed.), Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian
Science (London & Ithaca, NY, 1987) Wildberg argues that the Against Aristotle
ended with two or more books dealing, at least in part, with Christian eschato-
logy.
39. See Philippe Hoffmann, ‘Simplicius’ Polemics: Some Aspects of Sim-
plicius’ Polemical Writings Against John Philoponus: From Invective to a
Reaffirmation of the Transcendency of the Heavens’, ch. 3 of R. Sorabji (ed.),
Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science (London & Ithaca, NY,
1987). In Simplicius, as in earlier Neoplatonists, many of the references to
Christianity are ‘coded’, but some are quite open (the reference to the Psalms,
for example, and the use to which Simplicius puts it, which are mentioned by
Hoffmann on pp. 70-1). Simplicius could be bolder than his predecessors be-
cause his commentaries were not produced in a teaching context.
40. In fact, although he is well aware of the complexities of the Neoplatonic
system, (for evidence of this in Aet., see 90, 24ff.), he is normally able to sidestep
them and write as though he were debating creation with a fellow monotheist.
This is possible (and even reasonable) because Proclus himself writes in the
abstract, metaphysical manner of his Elements of Theology rather than from the
theological perspective of his commentary on the Timaeus or the Platonic
Theology, so that it scarcely matters, to take an example, that the dêmiourgos
is one of a triad of gods in the second hypostasis for Proclus whereas for
Philoponus he is the Christian God.
41. Lang and Macro have a useful section describing some of the difficulties
of translating Proclus and documenting some of their translation decisions. (op.
cit., 28-33).
42. For more on the history and meaning of kosmos, see W.K.C. Guthrie, A
History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1967), 110-11 and 208, n. 1.
43. For an overview of the use of aïdios, aei and other time words in
antiquity see R. Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum, 112-17. Proclus
elsewhere explicitly distinguishes temporal and non-temporal uses of aïdios
and aei and Philoponus too finds room for a non-temporal use of aei both in Aet.
(104-7) and in other works; references ibid., 115, nn. 66, 67 and 74.
44. E. Hussey (tr.), Aristotle’s Physics Books III and IV (Oxford, 1983).
45. J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists: a Study of Platonism, 80 BC to AD 220
(London, 1977), 242-3.
46. L. Judson, ‘God or Nature? Philoponus on Generability and Perishabil-
ity’, in R. Sorabji (ed.), Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science
(London & Ithaca, NY, 1987).
47. There is a good discussion of possible translations of ginesthai and
phtheiresthai in the ‘Introduction’ to C. Williams, Aristotle’s de Generatione et
Corruptione (Oxford, 1982).
Departures from Rabe’s Text
Emendations other than my own are credited. Those attributed to Rabe

are based on suggestions printed in Rabe’s apparatus. All departures
from Rabe’s text are also recorded in the footnotes, in the case of my own
emendations often with a brief justification. With the exception of his
restorations at the beginning of the text, where I reproduce his angle
brackets, I do not indicate Rabe’s own departures from the manuscript
tradition either in the translation or in the notes.
2,8 Adding hupo khronon dê kai ho after khronon (Rabe).

6,14 Changing paragesthai to paragetai (Rabe).
10,19 Adding legô dê after adunaton (Rabe).
11,3 Adding anthrôpôn before tôn (Rabe).
11,6 Adding ei after kai.
14,20 Changing proüparkhon to proüparkhoi (Rabe).
16,18 Changing ekeinôn to ekeinou (Rabe).
16,25 Deleting epeidê to phôs ditton estin.
16,26 Deleting sunupostan.
18,26 Changing hupo to epi (Rabe).
24,10 Adding kai to paradeigma ouk ên after hote ouk ên.
24,11 Deleting kai to paradeigma.
27,20 Deleting aei.
28,18 Changing genomena to ginomena (Rabe).
28,23 Deleting einai (Rabe).
29,10 Changing parakousantas to epakousantas (Rabe).
31,8 Adding kai before diapherontôs and en after it (Rabe).
33,2 Changing huphestêken to sunestêken (Rabe).
33,16 Deleting allou deomenon eis huparxin (Rabe).
33,17 Adding deomenon eis huparxin after allou (Rabe).
35,28 Repositioning ousias to follow legô (inside the bracket).
36,14 Adding allôn tôn after tôn (Rabe).
39,17 Deleting hen.
40,12 Changing touto to hoper.
40,22 Deleting hen.
43,14 Adding ginesthai after energeiâi and changing aitiou to
aitiôi.
14 Departures from Rabe’s Text
43,22 Deleting heteron (Rabe).
44,12 Adding to after hoti (Rabe).
44,21 Deleting energeiâi.
44,24 Changing ton to to (Rabe).
44,25 Changing autos to auto (Rabe).
45,12 Changing onta to gnonta (Rabe).
45,16 Adding tou before energeiâi (Rabe).
45,17 Adding tou before dunamei (Rabe).
45,18 Adding tou before energeiâi (Rabe).
46,19 Adding auta dekhesthai after pephukenai.
46,26-47,1 Changing elegeto, ê ho to elegeto einai, ho (Rabe).
47,14 Changing epitêdeiotêta to dunamin.
48,1 Changing ouketi to ouk esti (Rabe).
49,18 Changing tôn to tou (Rabe).
50,10 Adding to before axiôma (Rabe).
51,12 Changing tôn to tou (Rabe).
51,24 Changing autos to auto.
52,9 Changing houtos to houtôs.
54,19 Adding to before dunamei and changing auto to autou.
54,25 Adding autos heautôi aitios ên tês ek tou proterou dunamei
eis to energeiâi metabolês after autês.
56,10 Changing aïdiou to aïdion.
57,15 Deleting ou (Rabe).
57,21 Changing oude to ou dia.
59,4 Changing atelês ôn to atelê.
66,18 Punctuating with a comma rather than a full stop after
akhronos.
66,25 Punctuating with a full stop rather than a comma after
kinêsis.
70,11 Changing tois to hois and repositioning pôs to follow adior-
istôs.
71,15 Adding ho after hoti.
72,11-12 Changing kai thermou de homoiôs kai psukhrou to kai ho
thermainomenos de homoiôs ek psukhrou.
74,26 Changing orthotêtos to deinotêtos.
79,26 Changing eis to autou tou Sôkratous sôma to eis to auto tôi
tou Sôkratous sômati.
81,20-1 Changing ho autos nous hôste tas to ho autos anthrôpos
nosôn te tas (Rabe).
81,21 Adding ê after hugiainôn.
82,6 Changing dêmiourgêsei to dêmiourgêsai (Rabe).
82,15 Removing the existing diacritics from tauta and accenting
it with a circumflex on the first syllable.
89,14 Changing ekeino to ekeina.
90,5 Changing aitiôtaton to aitiôteron (Rabe).
90,10 Changing eti to estin.
Departures from Rabe’s Text 15
90,11-12 Changing tôi aitiôi tês kinêseôs estin to tôi aitiôteran tês
kinêseôs einai.
92,5 Adding aei before estin (Rabe).
92,18 Deleting dunamei kai after deuteros.
92,20 Changing ê to ei.
92,22 Changing ê to eiê.
95,7 Adding dedêmiourgêtai kai aei after aei (Rabe).
96,5 Changing einai to esti and closing the brackets after it
rather than after thraxeien at 96,4.
96,6 Changing the full stop after hêmin to a comma.
96,7-9 Removing the brackets around hoson } meros and punctu-
ating instead with a semicolon after estai and a full stop
after meros.
96,19 Changing dia ti to dioti.
96,21 Punctuating with a comma rather than a question mark.
98,11 Changing pote to ton te.
99,19 Changing genesthai to ginesthai (Rabe).
100,18 Changing anankê to anankazei.
101,2-3 Changing tou } parêgmenou to tôn } parêgmenôn.
101,6 Changing hôsper to eiper.
103,25 Adding aei after estin (Taylor and Rabe).
104,16 Changing tina huparxin to tinos huparxeôs.
104,27 Changing the second ên to êi (Rabe).
107,21 Changing pausetai to pauetai (Rabe).
111,27 Adding gar after ean (Rabe).
112,3 Deleting ouk.
112,5 Deleting ouk.
112,17 Adding ti after atopon (Rabe).
113,18 Deleting kai after tmêmata (Rabe).
115,2 Changing temnomenos to temnomenon (Rabe).
115,17 Adding kai kata to paradeigma tês aiôniou phuseôs after
ginêtai.
115,22 Adding ton aiôna after zôês.
116,14 Changing khronikon to khronikôs (Rabe).
117,19 Adding legonta after Platôna (Rabe).
117,27 Changing ex aiônos to exô henos (Aristotle).
118,17 Changing dei to dein (Rabe).
118,19 Adding logon after toiouton (Rabe).
PHILOPONUS
Against Proclus
On the Eternity of
the World 1-5
Translation
<John Philoponus the Alexandrian’s Against
the Arguments of Proclus Concerning the
Everlastingness of the World>1
<Preface>
<The First Argument2 of Proclus
the Successor>3
The first argument of Proclus to demonstrate that the world is 34,3
everlasting.4 He says that the first of the arguments we use to show 5
that the world is eternal is drawn from the generosity of the Creator.
No more convincing demonstration can be given than the one based
on the fact that the universe5 is like the One Who gave it reality, and
from Whom is its existence. For, because the coming-to-be of the
universe is from His generosity6 alone, [His generosity] produces it,
since one may not say that He creates it through anything other than
generosity without admitting that He is generous at one time but not
at another. He is always the cause of the existence of the world, since
the being7 of the world is equal8 to the being (kawn) of the Creator.
We do not find anything at all to which it belongs that it makes the 10
world out of generosity, yet does not make it everlastingly; [for] He is
everlastingly generous. Since He is everlastingly generous, He ever-
lastingly wants9 all things to be like Himself. If He wants all things
to be like Himself, then He is able to make all things like Himself,
since He is the ruler and lord of all things. But if He wants to make
all things like Himself, and He is able to make all things like Himself,
then He makes them everlastingly. For, everything that does not
make refrains from making either because it does not wish to make 15
or because it is unable to make – if it is susceptible to one of these two.
So if the Creator – may He be exalted10 – makes the world from His
generosity, He makes it everlastingly.
Thus it is necessary that the world did not come to be at some time
in the past, and that it will not perish at some time in the future.11
For the claim that He is unable to do what He wishes deserves
ridicule, because if He were able sometimes and not able at others, 35,1
then it would follow that He admits of change and affection. For His
losing the ability would be the reason for His receiving an affection.
Whatever alters from not being able to being able has changed,
because both power12 and lack of power belong to [the category of]
quality, and change is alteration of quality. If He is everlastingly able
20 Chapter 1, Section 2
to create, and everlastingly wishes to create, then it is absolutely
necessary that He everlastingly creates and that the universe is
everlastingly created, and that the world is everlastingly existent
5 (mawjûdan), just as the Creator13 is everlastingly creating.
However, the Creator is eternally existent, but the world eternally
comes to be. The meaning of ‘everlastingly’ is not one and the same
for both, but rather for the Creator its meaning is timelessness and
eternity. But for the world its meaning is time that is infinite, because
what is paired with14 existence is timelessness and eternity, but what
is paired with coming-to-be is time.
<The Sections of the Refutation of the First Argument>

}
<The Refutation of the First Argument>
1. }
2.15 } to equate what exists eternally and what [exists] indefi-
nitely in time; for he says that eternity and time are not the same.16
So let us take it as already proved by this that in his view too
eternity is infinite power.17 So if, according to both Proclus and
Aristotle, eternity is infinite power, and if, in a word, that which is
2,1 eternal is in every case also infinitely powerful, then whatever does
not partake of infinite power does not partake of eternity, and what-
ever does not even partake of eternity is not eternal. So if the divine
5 does not partake of infinite power under either of the two above-men-
tioned hypotheses, it will not be eternal under either of them, and if
it is not eternal, it is of necessity temporal; for of all things some are
eternal, others temporal.18 So even the creator of time is temporal!19
10 And if, since it is not infinitely powerful, the divine is not eternal, nor
[for the same reason] will it be everlasting;20 for if [its] power is finite,
it cannot last for ever. Therefore either it will have a beginning and
an end because of the finite and non-eternal [nature] of its power, or
there will be some other cause of being and everlastingness for it. So
15 let us once more raise the same puzzles about this [cause] as well. For
one must enquire concerning it too whether or not it could bring into
existence things that are superior to those it [actually] brings into
existence, since, if it brought the other [god] into existence and gave
3,1 it the ability to create, it too has creative power. And one must either
5 continue this absurdity ad infinitum or suppose that the creative
power of God is infinite, or rather that the divine is in all respects
infinitely powerful.
Moreover, if it is agreed that God has knowledge of all things – of
those there have been, those there are, and those there will be – but
10 the world is, as they hold, without beginning and without end, and for
that reason the things that have been and that will be are infinite, it
Chapter 1, Sections 2-3 21
is not possible for God, if his cognitive power is finite and not infinite,
to fully grasp knowledge either of what has been or of what will be.
For it is impossible to master what is infinite with finite power. And 4,1
so God will have knowledge neither of all that has been nor of all that
will be. For if he is going to have [such knowledge], either the world
will not be ungenerated and imperishable, so that what has been and
what will be would not be infinite, or it is not by means of a finite
power that God knows things. And if this is so, nor does he create by 5
means of a finite [power].
If, then, when the two above-mentioned hypotheses are advanced
([1] the one that states that the power of God is one and simple21 and
that God creates by means of a finite power, and [2] the one that
hypothesises that God has many powers, but none of them infinite), 10
the most absurd consequences follow ([namely,] [a] that God is not
eternal but temporal, and [b] that he needs another [god] to furnish
him with everlasting (eis aei) permanence, although he does not
escape the same absurdity either, and, further, if it is agreed that the 15
world is, as they hold, ungenerated and imperishable, [c] that God
has knowledge neither of what has been nor of what will be), then
neither of these hypotheses will be true.
Three hypotheses still remain: either [3] the power of God is one 20
and he effects and produces all things by means of infinite power
(whether it is a question of his creating, of his exercising providence,
of his knowing, or of anything else); or [4] his powers are many and
each of them infinite; or [5] they are many and some of them infinite,
some finite.
Now, should some be infinite and others finite [5], [any] account 5,1
will be arbitrary and full of caprice. For on what authority is it
possible to say that this power of God is infinite and that finite? For
the divine will be in part eternal and in part temporal and the very 5
power of God that brings time into existence will be temporal. And
how will he maintain things for ever if it is not infinite? For one
presumably in every case maintains what one creates by the [same]
power with which one creates it. So the third hypothesis too is shown
to be absurd and impossible.
It remains, then, than one of the remaining two is true, I mean that 10
either [4] the powers of God are many and each of them infinite, or
that [3] [his power] is one and simple and the whole of God’s activity
takes place with infinite power.
The latter [alternative] [sc. 3] is, because of the perfect simplicity
of God, both more true and consistent with [our] common conceptions 15
of God.
3. It is clear, then, from what has been said that it is impossible
that God creates things with [merely] finite power. And if it is
impossible for God’s creative power to be finite, it will of necessity be 20
infinite. (I mean infinite not only in the sense of always being able to
bring [things] into existence – for it is impossible for a power that is
not infinite in this sense to last in perpetuity – but also, if I may put
it so, that at each instant the production of each and every thing, for
6,1 example of the sun, of soul, of the heaven, by absolutely infinite power
is taking place).
A proof of this in addition to those that have already been stated
would be the fact that God brings all things into existence timelessly
5 and together with the thought.22 [Our] common conceptions teach us
that all believe this of God. Thus of our own prophets one23 says: ‘He
spoke and they came to be’, and another:24 ‘You had the thought and
they came to be; you minded it and they were present’. For he who
10 brings even time itself into existence assuredly would not have need
of temporal extension to produce things. And is it not indisputable
proof of [his] infinite power that God’s thought that he wished them
to come to be sufficed on its own for the bringing into being of all
things?25
Moreover, this being so, it is by infinite power that both the
greatest and the least of things are brought into existence.26 For if he
15 causes all things to exist by one power, as even Proclus believes – for
in his work On Ten Puzzles About Providence27 he says that ‘the
unitary knowledge of providence is, in the same undivided [entity],
the knowledge of all divided things, both of all that are most indivi-
20 dual and of all that are most universal; and just as it has caused each
thing to exist in unity (kath’ hen)’, he says, ‘so does it know each in
unity’ – so if [as I was saying] he causes all things to exist in unity,
and [his] power is not parcelled out among or completed by things
that come to be, and if things that have come to be are various, some
being superior, some inferior, and if, as has been shown, he causes all
25 things to exist by infinite power, then he has produced both the
7,1 greatest of things and the least by one and the same infinite power.
Since, then, it has been shown that it is impossible for God’s
creative power to be finite and that it is necessarily infinite, it is not
5 true that it is either on account of the productive cause alone or on
account of both [factors together] – that which produces and that
which comes to be – that neither more nor better things than those
which exist have come to be; for on [either of] these hypotheses it
would follow that God’s creative power is finite, which has been
shown to be both absurd and impossible.
10 It therefore remains that the only hypothesis left is true – the one
that states that the nature of things that are generated is the sole
reason for the impossibility of creating more or better things. And
even if one admits that both [factors], I mean that which produces and
that which comes to be, are causes of the impossibility of creating
more or better things, it is in every case necessary that it be for the
15 self same reason that a thing (to ginomenon) cannot come to be and
that that which produces cannot produce [it].
Chapter 1, Section 3 23
So let the reason that one would give for the impossibility of more
or better things coming to be than those that have come to be even
though, as has been demonstrated, God’s creative power is in all
respects infinite, be also accepted by us as the reason for the impos- 20
sibility of the world having existed from everlasting even though God
has always been good and always a creator. And the most scientific28
explanation of these things that we are able to offer is as follows.
Aristotle has proved by many arguments in the Physics29 and in 8,1
the On the Heaven30 that the infinite can in no way actually exist, and
this is agreed to be so by all without exception.31 (By infinite I here 5
mean [infinite] in magnitude as regards extension or in number;
there is every necessity that the infinite in power should exist in
things that are everlasting by nature). And since the infinite in
magnitude or in number is not of a nature to exist in actuality, it is
absolutely necessary that the number of things be finite. And this
being so, it is ridiculous to ask why more things do not exist; for, given 10
that the infinite cannot emerge in actuality, the same puzzle will still
remain, no matter how many more things one hypothesises to exist
in addition to the things that [currently] exist. So in this way it is
necessary that the number of things be finite.
And, again, things superior to those that exist have not come to be
because it is absolutely necessary that things brought into existence 15
by the Creator be inferior to him. So the more superior are the things
whose existence one hypothesises to those that [currently] exist, so
much the more, since they [nevertheless] fall short of the inconceiv-
able power of God, would one still leave the same problem [unsolved].
And so it is necessary that the quality of created things too be
circumscribed, just as their number is. 20
So if the fact that more or better things are not created has its
cause in the nature of created things and this in no way detracts from
the power or goodness of God, then we, by hypothesising consistently
with this that the world is not ungenerated, neither accuse the
creator of weakness nor [claim] that he does not always wish to bring 25
good things into existence, but find the cause in the nature of created
things. For just as it follows from the fact that the infinite cannot
actually exist that more, or an infinite number of things are not 9,1
created, so too do I say, again so as not to allow that the infinite
actually exists and make the infinite traversable, that the world
cannot coexist with God from everlasting. If the world had existed
from everlasting, it would be absolutely necessary for the number of 5
things that have come into existence in the world from the beginning
up until now – I mean men and plants and the other individuals in
each species – to have become actually infinite as well. For should one
hypothesise that the number of men or plants or of individuals of any
other kind that have come to be is finite, since each of them has had 10
its existence in a finite time, it would also be necessary for the whole
of time to be finite; for that which consists of finite [parts] is finite.32
15 So since, if the world is ungenerated, the time that has elapsed is also
actually infinite, the individual things that have come to be in this
infinite time must, I imagine, be actually infinite in number too. And
20 so it will follow that, if the world is ungenerated, an infinite number
actually exists and has occurred. But that the infinite cannot in any
way exist in actuality, whether by existing all at once or by coming
into existence bit by bit, we shall, if God permits, in due course
demonstrate at greater length in another [work],33 when, having
looked into all of the puzzles surrounding the issue of an everlasting
25 world,34 we shall finally establish on our own account that it cannot
be everlasting. And I shall cite Aristotle himself explicitly arguing
10,1 this very point – I mean that the infinite can in no manner exist in
actuality. But I believe that this is in fact self-evident. For the very
5 same reason (aitia) that the infinite cannot exist all at once and at the
same time it cannot emerge into actuality by existing a bit at a time.
For if it were at all possible for the infinite to have emerged into
actuality by existing a bit at a time, what further reason (logos) could
there be to prevent it from also existing in actuality all at once? For
it would seem much more impossible to claim that the infinite is
brought to actual birth bit by bit and, as it were, counted out one unit
10 after another than that it exists all at once and at the same time. For,
if it exists all at once, perhaps there will be no need to go through it
unit by unit and, as it were, count it off;35 but if it comes to be a bit at
15 a time and one unit always exists after another, so that eventually an
actually infinite number of units has come to exist, even if it does not
exist all at once at the same time because parts of it have ceased to
exist while parts [still] exist, it has nevertheless become traversable.
20 [But] this – I mean36 the traversing of the infinite by, as it were,
counting it off unit by unit – is impossible, even if the counter were
everlasting. For the infinite is by its nature untraversable; otherwise
it would not be infinite. So if the infinite is untraversable, but
successive generations of the [human] race, advancing individual by
individual, have descended through an infinite number of individuals
25 to those that exist now, then the infinite has become traversable,
which is impossible. Therefore the number of earlier individuals is
11,1 not infinite. For [if it were] the generations of the race would not have
reached down to each of us, for it is impossible to traverse the infinite.
And if the world had no beginning and the number of men living37
before, say, Socrates was infinite, and those living from Socrates until
5 the present time have been added to it, there will be something
greater than the infinite, which is impossible. And if38 the number of
men that have lived is infinite, the number of horses that have lived
is certainly also infinite. [So] you will be doubling the infinite again.
[And] if you add to these the number of dogs as well, you will triple
10 the infinite, and if each of the other [species] is added it will be
multiplied many times over. And this is among the greatest of impos-
sibilities, for it is not possible to be greater than the infinite, not to
mention many times greater. So if these absurdities, and, as we shall
demonstrate elsewhere,39 many others necessarily arise if the world 15
is ungenerated, it is not possible that the world is ungenerated and
without a beginning.40 For in that case the infinite will be traversable
and will exist in actuality, and the infinite will necessarily always be
growing and never stop getting bigger than itself and be many times,
not to say an infinite number of times, infinity. 20
So for the same reason then that he does not create more things
God has not created the world from everlasting. And if it was impos-
sible for the world to be created from everlasting, it is clear that no 25
question remains as to why it did not exist earlier. For the further we 12,1
progress in our reasoning [about these issues], the more the begin-
ninglessness of God’s existence occupies our thoughts,41 and as a
result the same question nonetheless remains: why not earlier? 5
And if anyone insists on maintaining that the infinite should not
be held responsible for more things not having been created, [even
though] this has to be far and away the most scientific explanation,42
but simply says that it is not only an infinite number of things that
cannot have come to be but not even any more at all than [actually]
exist, since nature only allows of as many creatures as have actually 10
come into existence, in the first place he will not be able to give any
reason for this. For if so many species have come to be, what would
prevent another, say, two or three from existing in the world? For if
men have managed to produce the mule by mating the donkey with 15
the horse and have produced many mixed species of birds, how could
it be other than absurd to claim than God could not bring natural
animals of this kind into existence? (I call [these last] natural because
men do not need to bring together different animals to breed them as 20
in the other case,43 but natural reproduction is preserved among them
as among other [animals]). Given that such animals are in existence
as a result of human techniques, why would it have been impossible
for God himself to sow the seminal principles (spermatikous logous)
[necessary] for their reproduction naturally? For in the case of the 25
other [animals], as Aristotle says,44 God, wishing to preserve the
continuity of reproduction, ‘filled up the whole in the only way that
remained, by making generation continuous’. What, then, would have 13,1
prevented him from implanting the principle of reproduction natur-
ally in such animals too – I mean in those that have arisen as a result
of human husbandry?
However, even should we admit this, there is still nothing prevent-
ing us from using the same defense, [namely,] that the world has not
existed from everlasting [unless] the infinite exists in actuality and 5
there is something greater than the infinite, and [even] many times
26 Chapter 1, Sections 3-4
greater, and the infinite has become traversable; for these are impos-
sibilities.
We have [now], then, also stated the reason why God, although he
10 has always been good, has not created the world from everlasting.
4. Another argument: If God is good, and, as Plato in his wisdom
says,45 ‘in the good no envy ever arises in regard to anything’, and [it
15 is] for this reason that he brought all things into being, why did he
not bring any of [his] creations into existence in all respects identical
to himself so that they shared in the same substance46 and power with
him? For either he could have, but did not wish to – and I shall not
mention what would follow because it would be blasphemous (for he
will not have escaped envy) – or it must be that, because he could not,
he did not even wish to; but that would be to predicate weakness of
God.
20 Actually, it would be impossible for any generated thing to be
identical to the ungenerated cause that is responsible for its creation.
If it were, God would have created himself and the uncreated would
have turned out to be created – if, that is, [God’s]47 substance is
ungenerated by nature, but would nevertheless be generated for a
25 second time if something that has been generated were of the same
substance as he is.
So, if the impossibility of anything created being identical with its
14,1 creator neither does away with [the doctrine] that God is good nor
involves the consequence that he does not wish to make all things like
himself nor inflicts any weakness or impotence upon him, then, when
we hypothesise that the world is not everlasting, we neither do away
5 with [the doctrine] that God is always good nor predicate weakness
of his creative power. Rather we are hypothesising that the world
cannot exist always because of the very nature of that which comes
to be, both because it would have been impossible for the infinite to
10 exist in actuality or to be traversable and because that which comes
to be is not of a nature to be co-everlasting48 with that which produces
it. For if the world received its being and its substance from God
through an act of creation (dêmiourgikôs), without in any way shar-
ing in his substance, how could it have been coexistent with God from
everlasting? For how could what always is be brought into existence?
15 And if what is created is in all respects inferior to its creator – in
substance, in power and in activity – it certainly must also be as a
consequence inferior in its very existence. At any rate, we observe no
20 [process of] generation, whether natural or artificial, in which the
cause does not pre-exist49 its effect. For the parallels they adduce for
the world being co-everlasting with God, [by which] they show, as
they suppose, that certain effects are coexistent with their causes,
have nothing in common, as I see it, with the [case] under investiga-
25 tion. (The sun, they claim, being responsible for light, creates it just
by being,50 and the light is neither prior nor posterior to the sun nor
the sun to the light;51 and bodies in light are responsible for shadows
that spring from them and are always coexistent with them). 15,1
5. In my opinion the second of these parallels should not even be
worthy of consideration. For who is not aware that shadow is merely
the privation of light? And privation in itself, as we showed a little
earlier,52 is non-being. So who with any sense would claim that body 5
in light is the cause and instigation of what is in itself non-being?
Non-being does not come to be; generation is of being. Just because
privation of light is referred to by a word, being called shadow or 10
darkness, one should not at once assume that it is also a kind of [real]
existent or form. Deprivation of sight is also referred to by a word,
being called blindness, and [a man or animal] that has maimed feet
and is deprived of movement because of them is said to be lame, but
nobody would say that blindness or lameness is a kind of form or
[real] existent. So nor should one regard privation of light, even if it 15
is called darkness or shadow, as a kind of form. What we were
considering was whether there is any entity that has received its
being and existence from something else through an act of creation
and that is not posterior to that which brought it into existence. But
shadow is the privation of light, not independent being. Therefore to 20
say that body is the productive cause of shadow is the same as saying
that death is that of non-being. So, just as we conceive of non-being
not as a kind of existence, but only as privation of being, so too are we
persuaded that shadow is merely privation of light and not a kind of
existence imbued with form that is created by bodies. So how could 25
one take the passing out of existence of light that arises from the
interposition of bodies as a parallel to the generation and existence of 16,1
the world which stem from God?
And it is, moreover, quite clear to those versed in the mathematical
sciences53 that it is not even universally true that a shadow automat-
ically accompanies a body in the light. For if the sun happens to be at 5
the exact zenith, as is sometimes the case among those who dwell
beneath the celestial equator and as far [north] as the Tropic of
Cancer, it is clear that bodies under it which are in unbroken contact
with the earth (so that there is none of the air in between in which 10
shadow and darkness, like light, normally exist) then become shad-
owless. (Darkness, as Aristotle holds in the On the Soul,54 exists in
the same medium as light). Hence there needs to be time, during
which [the sun’s] rays do not reach under [things],55 before [it] can,
by passing the zenith, provide room at the sides [of things] for 15
shadow. At any rate, even the earth, which always becomes shad-
owless under the impact of the rays [of the sun], little by little
produces shadow as the sun’s rays gradually withdraw.56 And so, even 20
if shadow were one of those things that exist in their own right, it
would still be unable to serve as an image of the [phenomenon] under
investigation. For it is not in every case [true] that a shadow coexists
along with an illuminated body.
25 6. About the parallel drawn from the sun we have this to say.57
On the one hand, the substantial light that coexists with [the sun]
in the sphere of the sun itself is formative and constitutive of the
17,1 nature of the sun, as is clear to one and all.58 But the essence and
being of each thing is governed by its form. And nothing is its own
creative cause. So nor is the sun the creator of its own light, since it
is informed and has existence in virtue of it. And so, if someone should
5 likewise say that the world is constitutive of the creator’s being, let
us concede that in that case the world stands in the same relation to
God as the light within it does to the sun. But in that case God would
not be the creator of the world, since neither is the sun [the creator]
10 of the light which informs its being, if the sun has not in fact created
itself. But if, on the other hand, all things that have been brought into
existence by a creative act of the divine substance are extraneous to
it and without a part in it,59 the world does not stand in the same
relation to the creator as the light in the sun does to the sun itself.
15 7. The light that is diffused in the air, on the other hand, is not
always [one and] the same. It is agreed that it is perishable, for it is
succeeded by darkness. And nor does it always remain the same, but,
like movement and time, has its being in [a process of] coming to be.60
Hence, as soon as the source of illumination61 withdraws, the light in
the air immediately passes out of existence (eis to mê on), just as there
20 is neither movement nor time in the absence of a moving object. And
so not even the very idea on account of which they used the parallel
of light and the sun – I mean [the idea] that there exists something
created by something else without its being posterior to that which
25 produces it – is true. For if the same light does not continue [in
existence], it clearly must be the case that the source of illumination
always pre-exists the light produced in the air at any moment, for
18,1 different light is continually flowing from the source of illumination
at any given time like water from a spring. But God has, as Plato
says,62 brought into existence a single, unique world. And so, what-
ever light in the air actually is – for there is much debate about its
5 [mode of] existence, whether it is an activity63 of the source of illumi-
nation or a form or property of the air – since it is not always
numerically one and the same but different at different times, the
10 generation of light in air from the sun would constitute proof that
there is [at least] one case of generation that is instantaneous and
does not take place in the extension of time (in the way that nature,
for instance, creates men over a certain period of time) and would
[therefore] image the instantaneous creation of things by God, which
occurred together with the thought;64 but it would not also be an
illustration of a created thing being co-everlasting with that which
produces it because, whereas the source of illumination is one, the 15
light is numerically different over time.
That the light in the air is perishable and numerically different
over time the facts themselves confirm and Proclus teaches in his
work On Light. Here is what he says:
If light is either material or immaterial65 in conformity with the 20

difference between fire and the sun as sources of illumination,
how, on the one hand, does the immaterial [kind] perish and
how, on the other, does the material [kind] pass through mate-
rial [objects]? For the whole of the air is clearly illuminated for
us to the same degree whether [lit by light] from the sun or by
earthly firelight; and it is certainly true that when a cloud 25
passes in front of the sun the light is cut off and is completely
absent on its other side.66
So [speaks] Proclus. And observe that he does not introduce the 19,1
proposition that light perishes as a puzzle, but takes this for granted
and derives from it a puzzle as to how, if light from the sun is
immaterial, it perishes, and, when a cloud passes in front of the sun,
is completely absent on the other side [of it].
And again, a little further on, the same [Proclus] says: 5
How could the [light] in the heaven be continuous with that in

the air? The one is perishable, the other not, and the one is
connected to its source, while the other may be cut off from it
and at times does not exist, and the perishable is not continuous
with the imperishable. They are two [separate things] and differ 10
in species.67
So even Proclus explicitly teaches that light in the air is perishable.68

And that light in the material of the heavenly spheres perishes in
the same way as light in the air and is not, as Proclus claims, 15
imperishable has, I believe, been clearly shown by the findings of
astronomy. For if the cone of the earth’s shadow comes into contact
with part of the moon’s sphere and passes over it (as eclipses, when
the whole of the moon falls into the cone of the earth’s shadow,
palpably evidence), it is, one supposes, quite clear that the light 20
diffused in the heavenly spheres is also perishable. For if, as the cone
of shadow moves round, it spreads over different parts of the moon’s
sphere in turn and prevents the sun’s light from reaching them
(which is how occultations and eclipses of the moon occur), it is clear 25
that light diffused there too is not, as Proclus claims, imperishable,
but perishable. For if the whole heaven is of the same substance, and
if the light diffused in the first and second sphere has been shown to 20,1
be perishable, and moreover the light of the moon, which derives its
existence from the sun, manifestly both comes to be and perishes, all
5 at once during eclipses of the moon and little by little the rest of the
time, it is surely clear that [dispersed light] will be perishable in the
whole heaven as well. [And this will be so] even though, because the
source of illumination is always present for the higher spheres since
nothing casts a shadow over them, it seems, through its continuity,
10 to be always one and the same light – as though a fire were contin-
uously heating or illuminating its surrounds and the heat or light
entering the air from the fire seemed, because of the continuity of the
turnover, impervious to change.
8. And should someone claim that light generated in the air does
not [ever] perish, but moves around with the source of illumination,
15 first and foremost, such a notion is not true. Even when a cloud passes
in front of the sun everything under it is thrown into shadow because
the light previously generated in the air perishes even though the sun
has not changed position. And so even when it does change position
it does not carry [such] light around with it, but the light from the
20 regions the sun leaves always perishes and new light is generated in
the regions to which it moves.
And, more generally, even if one were to concede that the light in
the air does travel around with the sun, it would clearly [have to] be
inseparable from the source of illumination. And, if this were so, it
25 would be a form or property of it. (And in fact Plato does hold that
light is a form of the source of illumination.)69 And if this is accepted,
[their] parallel will be even wider of the mark.70 For the sun, inas-
much as it is informed by it, naturally possesses its light inseparably;
21,1 for forms are inseparable from their substrata. But created things do
not inform the substance of their creator. Therefore the sun is not the
producer of light. For no substratum is the creative cause of the form
5 that informs it, and nor for that matter is anything at all that
possesses them the productive cause of its own property or attribute.
In Plotinian terms one would say the same thing [thus]:71 ‘light is
an activity of the source of illumination going out to other things’, for
which reason he also says: ‘when that which acts is present, its
activity is present, when it departs, it departs along with it’. For if the
10 light in air is an activity of the sun, either it is constitutive of its
essence or it is not.
Now if, on the one hand, it is constitutive [of its essence], it
necessarily always coexists with the sun; for the constitutive ingred-
ients of essences always coexist with them. But the world is not a
15 component of the essence of its creator. Therefore the world does not
stand in the same relation to God as light does to the sun.
But if, on the other hand, the activity of light is not constitutive of
the sun, it would be notionally possible for it72 not to exist. But that
is impossible. For if transparent objects, or, in general, those that are
20 receptive of light, are present, it is impossible for them not to be
illuminated in the presence of the sun; if they are not illuminated in
its presence, it is no longer the sun.
Therefore if the light in the air is an activity of the sun, it must be
constitutive for the sun.73
If, on the other hand, light is a property of the air, which to me at
least seems closer to the truth than all other ideas about light, it 25
would be an alteration to that which is transparent, or, in general, to
that which is receptive [of illumination]. And Aristotle in fact says74
as much in the second book of On the Soul.75 The passage goes as 22,1
follows:
Light is the activity of this – of the transparent qua transparent.

And potentially, where it is, there may also be darkness. Light
is a kind of colouration of the transparent when it is actually
transparent through the agency of fire or something similar,
such as the body above;76 for this is one and the same in these.77 5
So what the transparent is and what light is has been stated.
This then is what Aristotle has to say about light. And he is clearly
stating that light is a kind of form or perfection of the transparent.
So, if the transparent is in air or water or the like, it is clear that light 10
is a transformative property of such bodies. This being so, it is not
surprising that, if the one is suited to acting and the other to being
acted upon, as soon as the agent and the patient come together, the 15
one acts and the other is acted upon. After all, fire too, when in the
proximity of air, which is [always] potentially hot, alters it and makes
it actually hot. And if, when the source of illumination moves away,
the light that is produced in the air also disappears, there is nothing
strange about that; for it is also the case that when fire moves away
heat ceases to be produced in the air, the only difference being that 20
in the case of light its passing out of existence, like its generation, is
swift, or even instantaneous. So if the sun alters the transparent
[only] qualitatively, but God is productive of the substances them-
selves, and if alteration is different from generation and the creation 25
of substance, either let them show in the case of generation in the
strict sense (i.e. that of substances) that that which is caused is 23,1
coexistent with its cause, or let them concede that even God is not a
creator of things and does not bring their essences into existence but
only causes alteration in things which are co-everlasting [with him-
self].
And besides, they will not [be able to] show that the cause is
co-everlasting with that which is caused even on that basis. If differ-
ent effects are produced at different times in air and the [other] things 5
that are receptive of light, and the light produced in them – if, as has
been demonstrated and as Proclus believes, it is perishable – is not
[always] numerically one and the same, then it is not the case that
32 Chapter 1, Section 8 - Chapter 2
10 light, remaining one and the same, coexists with the sun, any more
than that heat in the air originating from [a fire], remaining one and
the same, does with the fire – if, that is, the sun is one and the fire is
one while the light in the air, and likewise the heat, is different at
different times.
15 After the above demonstrations it is clear that light and the sun
cannot provide an illustration of something created being able to
coexist from everlasting along with its creative cause. So even the
plausibility afforded their false [hypothesis] by such an illustration is
lost to them. So either let them show that there is something among
20 created things which as soon as its creator exists also exists along
with him, or, if all created things, whether man-made or natural, are
later78 in time than what produces them, then it is necessary on that
basis too that the world not be co-everlasting with God.
The End of the Refutation of the First Argument
24,1 The Second Argument of Proclus the Successor79

The second [argument]: If the pattern of the world is eternal, and if
5 its essence is being a pattern80 and it has this power81 not accidentally
but in itself, being a pattern by its very being,82 then, since it is
eternal in its being, it would presumably be eternally a pattern. And
if being a pattern is present to it eternally, there would necessarily
always be a copy too; for a pattern is relative to [its] copy. But if the
10 copy [ever] did not exist, when it did not exist the pattern too did not
exist, and it will not exist [at any time in the future] when the copy
does not exist, unless, there being no copy, it is not a pattern at all,
or it is not the pattern for the copy [in question];83 for neither of [a
pair] of things described as correlative exists if the other does not. If,
15 then, the pattern is eternally a pattern, the world always is, being the
copy of an eternally existing pattern.84
The Sections of the Refutation of

the Second Argument
1. That the second proof85 of Proclus is constructed from two
20 hypotheses, the one, which states that the world has come to be in
relation to an eternal pattern, being Platonic, the other, which Pro-
clus puts forward as Platonic although it is not Plato’s, [stating] that
the pattern of the world has its being in being86 a pattern.87
25 2. That there is manifestly disagreement between Aristotle and
25,1 Plato over the hypothesis of Forms, Plato holding that there are
Forms of things and Aristotle seeking to demolish the hypothesis.
3. That, even if one concedes that Plato’s hypothesis of Forms is
true, it is not also true, as Proclus thinks, that they have their being 5
in being patterns, since Plato refers to them as substances.
4. That, if it is not the essence of the Form of the world, in relation
to which [the world] has come to be, to be a pattern, no further 10
necessity remains, even if the pattern in relation to which the world
has come to be is eternal, for the world too to exist always.
5. That, even if one were to suppose that the Forms are not
substances but the creative principles in accord with which things
have come to be, not even then is there any need for created things to 15
coexist together with the creative principles; on the contrary, the
necessity is rather that the principles of things should pre-exist them.
Including [a demonstration] that God’s creative activity and know- 20
ledge extend even to the most individual [of things].
The Refutation of the Second Argument

1. Plato hypothesised that there are Forms or patterns of existing
things, looking to which the creator makes the world and everything
in it as though [producing] copies from certain archetypes, and cer- 25
tainly states that this pattern of the world is eternal.88 Proclus, using
this axiom of Plato and himself adding a second hypothesis, [namely], 26,1
that the Forms have their essence in being patterns – something
which Plato clearly nowhere states – concludes from these two hypo-
theses that it is necessarily the case that the world always exists; for
copy and pattern are relatives, and relatives are destroyed together 5
or exist together.89 So if, he says, the pattern of the world is eternal,
and [if] its essence and substance consist in its being a pattern and it
does not have its being in one way and its being a pattern in another,
and [if] a pattern is a pattern of a copy, there is every necessity that 10
the copy too of which it is the pattern, that is, the world, should
always exist; for if the copy does not exist for ever, neither will the
pattern be eternal. So if Plato has clearly stated the one [hypothesis] 15
– that the pattern of the world is eternal – he is of necessity conceding
the other as well – that the world, the copy of the eternal pattern,
always exists. Such is the second of Proclus’ proofs.
2. But perhaps we should have taken more account of the facts 20
and not simply of Plato’s hypotheses and not have come to grips with
this argument until the philosophers had resolved their differences
with each other on the subject of the Forms; for who does not know
how great was the conflict and disagreement between the [two]
foremost philosophers on this very subject?90 For throughout his 25
writings, whenever the occasion arises, Aristotle, Plato’s pupil, criti-
cises his teacher’s hypothesis of the Forms in the strongest terms, and 27,1
fills book Alpha of the Metaphysics in particular with criticism of his
views in regard to them. In it, giving an account of Plato’s ontology, 5
he says that Plato fell into his notion of the Forms through a misun-
derstanding of the teaching of Socrates. The passage goes as follows:
After the [philosophies we have] named came the work of Plato,

which in most respects followed these [thinkers], but also had
10 peculiarities [which set it apart] from the philosophy of the
Italians. For, having been a pupil of Cratylus from an early age
and [become familiar with] the Heraclitean doctrines that all
perceptible things are always in flux and that there is no know-
ledge of them, he held these views even in later years. Socrates,
15 on the other hand, had concerned himself with ethical matters
and not at all with any aspect of the world of nature, yet was
seeking the universal in them and was the first to have paid
attention to definitions, and after taking him as a teacher,
[Plato], on account of such [considerations],91 took the view that
this92 had to do with other things and not with anything percep-
20 tible;93 for a common definition cannot be of any perceptible
thing, since they are always changing. Accordingly, he called
such things Forms and [held that] all perceptible things are
separate from them and named after them; for, [he held], the
many things that have the same name as the Forms exist by
28,1 participation [in them].94
In this passage we hear Aristotle state clearly that Socrates was

the first to pay attention to the methodology of definition and that he
5 sought out and defined the common features in perceptible things.
[He would ask], for example, what knowledge as such is as seen with
common features in each of the particular branches of knowledge, in
astronomy, for instance, and geometry and the rest, and what beauty
as such is, what justice is, and similarly with everything. [But, he
10 continues,] Plato, taking up this method of Socrates, assumed that
Socrates was talking about things other than and separate from
perceptible things and not about perceptible things themselves and
the common features in them; for, he says, [Plato], as a holder of
15 Heraclitean opinions, believed that there could be no definition of
perceptible things, since there could not even be knowledge of them
because they all have their being in a state of flux and change and no
perceptible thing [ever] has stability or definition. (It is because of
this that he says in the Timaeus95 that all perceptible things come to
20 be96 and perish, and that, never truly being, they can [only] be
grasped by belief along with irrational sensation and not by know-
ledge). Believing, then, for this reason that Socrates was creating
definitions of common features associated with certain separate ent-
ities [that existed] apart from perceptible things, he called97 these
Forms and patterns of perceptible things, [holding that] perceptible
25 things exist by participation in them and are called by the same
names as they are. For both the Form of animal and the perceptible
animal itself are called animal and the same applies to man and to 29,1
the beautiful and the just, etc.
From this we can most certainly see that Aristotle’s refutations of
Plato are not directed at people who have misunderstood Plato, which 5
is a fiction created by some more recent [commentators] out of embar-
rassment at the disagreement between the [two] philosophers,98 but
[rather] constitute a rebuttal of the notions of Plato himself. For, if
Aristotle had not been attacking Plato’s own position on the Forms
but, as these [commentators] claim, [that of] people who had misun-
derstood99 him, he would have specified precisely this at the outset 10
and not have refuted the doctrine of the Forms generally and without
qualification, just as, for instance, in the passage we have [just]
quoted, he does not criticise Socrates, who defines the common fea-
tures in perceptible [things], but Plato, who has not understood 15
Socrates correctly.
You will find that this is the teaching method he practices in all his
own writings. In the physical treatises, for instance, when criticising
the views of the physical thinkers who came before him on the
principles from which things are composed, he did not demolish [the 20
position] that there are principles and elements of bodies but refuted
the hypotheses of early thinkers about the principles and then in-
structed us in his own ideas about them. And when, in On the Soul,
he was criticising [thinkers] with false conceptions about the soul, he 25
did not totally demolish [the position] that soul exists but [only] that
it is as these people believed.100 [And] similarly in his writings on
growth and generation and place and time and everything else he
first demolishes false views on the subject at hand and then sets out
what he believes are the correct ones. 30,1
He should not then in his account of the Forms, if he accepted that
they are as Plato believes, have attempted to demolish the hypothesis
totally but should [instead] have explained how some people had
misunderstood Plato’s teaching and what the correct understanding 5
of them [sc. the Forms] is. This he has clearly nowhere done. On the
contrary, in addition to [levelling] criticisms [at them], he frequently
scoffs at the notion [of their existence]. In the second of his [works] on 10
demonstration he says: ‘For we can say goodbye to the Forms; for they
are [mere] twittering’,101 that is to say, mere vocal noises that sound
like words but are devoid of any reference to things. And, again, in
[book] Alpha of the Metaphysics he declares that statements about
them are empty talk and poetic metaphor.102 And, moreover, when 15
about to launch once more into criticism of them in the introductory
part of the Ethics, he first apologises out of respect for his teacher,
saying that inquiry into these matters is arduous because he is forced
to rebut the views of a man who is dear to him – he means Plato. But, 20
he says, although Plato is dear to him, it is pious to value the truth
more highly,103 and, indeed, it is right, he says, for us as philosophers
not only to refute the hypotheses of others in the interests of preserv-
ing the truth, but also for each of us [to refute] our own if they are
25 found not to be in agreement with the truth.104 The passage goes as
follows:
31,1 Perhaps we had better consider the universal [good] and look
into the puzzles about what is meant by it, even though the
inquiry becomes arduous because it is friends of ours who have
introduced the Forms. [For] it would perhaps be thought the
5 better course, even our duty, to demolish even our own [posi-
tions] in the interest of preserving the truth, especially as we are
philosophers; for, while both are dear, it is pious to honour truth
above [our friends].105
And even Proclus himself has admitted, showing respect for the
truth, that the [two] philosophers are in disagreement on many
points and most especially in regard106 to the hypothesis of the Forms.
10 At all events, in the work he has entitled An Examination of Aris-
totle’s Criticisms of Plato’s Timaeus,107 in the first section, he writes,
to quote his exact words,108 as follows:
Aristotle has difficulties even with the very word ‘pattern’,

15 saying that it is metaphorical,109 and is much more opposed to
the doctrine that introduces the Forms in general and especially
to the living-creature-itself, as he has written in the Metaphys-
ics.110 It is probable that the man did not reject anything else of
Plato’s as [categorically] as the hypothesis of the Forms. Not
20 only does he call the Forms [mere] twittering in the logical
works,111 but he attacks the Good Itself in the Ethics,112 does not
think it appropriate to refer cases of generation to the Forms in
31,1 the physical works, as he states in On Generation and Corrup-
tion,113 [and rejects them even] more comprehensively in the
Metaphysics, in that, in the course of discussing the first princi-
ples, he spins out lengthy denunciations of the Forms at the
5 beginning, in the middle and at the end of that treatise, and in
the dialogues, where he states explicitly and vehemently that he
cannot sympathise with this doctrine even if people are going to
think that he is criticising it out of contentiousness.
Thus even Proclus himself has explicitly conceded the disagree-

ment between the [two] philosophers, or rather, demonstrated it from
10 Aristotle’s own [writings]. This being so, one might well be amazed at
the gross effrontery of those who have tried to show that Aristotle and
Plato are in agreement even on this point. So how could it be other
than superfluous for us to reply to a proof derived from an hypothesis
which is the subject of such great disagreement even among the very 15
foremost philosophers? For their successors too have consistently
followed the founders of their respective schools (tês oikeias haire-
seôs).114 However, so as not to seem to be avoiding [the task of
producing] refutations [of this argument], especially when we have
promised115 to support Plato on the issue of the generation of the 20
world, let us concede his position on the Forms and see, for the rest,
whether Proclus is correct in his assumption that it is the essence of
the Forms to be patterns. For if it can be exposed as a false assump-
tion, Proclus will no longer be able to conclude from the hypothesis of 33,1
the Forms that the world has existed from eternity alongside its own
pattern116 or that, because Plato assumed the existence of the Forms,
he also thought that the world was everlasting.
Let us [then] begin our arguments of refutation with the following. 5
3. It is necessary that the Forms of perceptible things, or [their]
patterns, should either be substances or not be substances.
Now if they are substances, as Plato believes – for he not only calls
them substances, but ‘first substances’;117 for he calls the pattern of
the world ‘living creature itself’ and ‘perfect living creature’ and 10
[describes it as] ‘truly existent’ and ‘always being the same and
unchanging’;118 and besides, if the copy of the pattern is self-subsis-
tent and a substance, then all the more would the archetype itself be
a substance and self-subsistent – if, then, the Forms are substances, 15
it is clear that they do not have their being in [their] relation to
something else; for a substance is something self-subsistent and in
need of nothing else for its existence.119 So if perceptible substances,
[which are] their copies, exist in their own right, not having their 20
being in [their] relation to something else, least of all will those
[substances] that are primary and always self-subsistent and the
same have their being in [their] relation to something else. So if the
pattern of the world is a substance, the consequence is120 that it would
have its existence in its own right and not in relation to something
else. And if it does not have its being in relation to something else, 25
then it is not its essence to be a pattern; for, as Proclus himself says,
a pattern is a relative, for it relates to a copy, and no substance is a 34,1
relative.
Further, if the Forms are relatives, as Proclus believes, and it is
their essence to be in a relation to perceptible things, whose patterns 5
they are, as right is related to left and master to slave, and if relatives
are not substances (for relatives qua relatives are accidents), then the
Forms are not even substances, but accidents. But they were sub-
stances ex hypothesi.121 Therefore they are not relatives. But a pattern 10
is a relative. Therefore it is not the essence of the pattern of the world
to be a pattern and to have its being in relation to its copy, the world.
Further, if the Forms are relatives, and if relatives do not have
their own existence, but have their being in other [things], as was 15
shown in the Categories122 – for they are either in substance, as [in the
case of] father and son, [or] master and slave (for the relation between
these occurs in the substance man), or in quantity, as [in the cases of]
many and few, greater and lesser [and] double and half, or in quality,
20 as [in the cases of] whiter and sweeter and wiser, or in one of the other
[categories] – it is, one assumes, necessary for the Forms, if they are
indeed relatives, to exist in some other subject. And the same goes for
the world, for it too is a relative. For, just as the pattern of the world
25 has its existence in being a pattern, so, one assumes, must the copy
of the pattern, the world, have its being by virtue of being a copy. But
an image is a relative. Therefore the world will be a relative in virtue
35,1 of its very being. And if this is so, [both] the Forms and the world must
be accidents and not substances. But the former are substances ex
hypothesi and the world too is a substance. Therefore they are not
relatives.
5 Further, relatives are cases of opposites.123 But no substance is a
case of an opposite. Therefore substances are not relatives.124 But
Forms are substances. Therefore Forms are not relatives. But a
pattern is, as stated,125 a relative, for a pattern is [related] to a copy.
10 Therefore Forms do not have their being in being patterns. Therefore
it must be, if they are indeed substances, that their being belongs to
them in one way and their being patterns in another.
4. But if the Forms do not have their being and existence in being
15 patterns, there is no necessity that, because the Form in relation to
which the world came to be is eternal, the world too should always
exist. Plato says126 that the heaven or world is the pattern for civic
well-being and that the true statesman looks to the order in it when
20 arranging the affairs of the state. But, since the heaven does not have
its essence in being a pattern for civic well-being, there is no necessity
that, because order exists in the heaven, its copy, I mean a successful
city, should at once exist. [And] in just the same way, one assumes,
25 even though the Forms are eternal, it is not at all necessary that their
copies (I mean the perceptible substances) should also always exist,127
since their being does not consist in being patterns if they are not
36,1 relatives but substances. The necessity in these matters holds in the
other direction. If there is a copy, a pattern must exist; but, even if a
pattern exists, though not [merely] as a pattern but because it is also
a substance, there is no necessity for a copy to exist as well. The king
5 himself is the subject of a royal portrait, but this does not mean that
as soon as the king exists a portrait of him must also exist.128 It is one
thing for the king qua king to be a man, another for him to be the
10 subject of a portrait. Whenever he is a subject, then in every case
there is also a portrait, just as whenever he becomes a father, a son
is always implied as well. But there is not immediately the subject of
a portrait as soon as a king exists, just as someone is not immediately
a father and a master, or on the right hand side, or anything else129
that falls under [the category of] relatives, as soon as he is a man. 15
5. These then [are the consequences that follow] if they assume
that the Forms are substances, as Plato believes they are.
But if they will claim that they are not substances but certain
creative principles or concepts in accord with which the creator
frames things – for what else could they be if they are not substances? 20
– even so there is no obvious necessity that products based on these
creative principles should in every case coexist together with them.
Once more the necessity is in the other direction. If [such] products
exist, the principles in accordance with which they came into exist-
ence must in every case exist as well, but [created] things will not in 25
every case follow upon [the existence of] the principles. A shipwright
or a builder may be in possession of the principles for [building] a ship
or a house but not yet be creating [anything] based on them. The 37,1
being of such principles consists in their being concepts of a certain
kind, but when the creator acts in accord with them, they become
patterns as a consequence [of that]. If, then, products based on them
do not in every case immediately follow upon [the existence of] 5
creative principles, nothing prevents the world from not always
existing even if the creative principles for the world are eternal.
And that it is not necessary that the things of which the principles
are principles should coexist with them, but rather, on the contrary, 10
that the principles should pre-exist the things, one may also learn
from the following.
All would agree that God has accurate foreknowledge of the future.
Among the Hellenes130 indeed shrines and oracles131 were established
in every corner of the land [where] an evil demon feigned the true
foreknowledge of God.132 And it is moreover a shared conception of all 15
who in any way recognise the goodness and ineffable power of God
that all things benefit from the providence that flows from God and
not even insignificant things (to tukhon) escape his attention. And in
his work On Ten Puzzles About Providence Proclus is clearly in
complete agreement with us on these matters, for in it he says this: 20
Since, as has been stated, providence is determined in accord-

ance with the One and the Good, and the Good is prior to Mind
(for Mind desires the Good, as, indeed, do all things, and not the 25
Good Mind), it is necessary that providential knowledge too
should be above intellectual and that providence should there-
fore know all things by its own unity, through which it also
makes all things good, those that know and those that do not
know, those that have life and those that do not have life, those 38,1
that have being and those that do not have being, projecting
unity upon all through the reflection of its own unity.133
And a little further on:
In summary, then, we claim that this unity produces all things

and sustains all things, and that it has an existence more real
5 than all being and clearer than all knowledge, not being dis-
persed by the objects of its knowledge nor moving among them.
It is the knowledge of the soul and of the mind that show the
characteristics of these last [conditions], for every single mind
is many in its [mode of] being and in its knowing, and every soul,
10 being movement, also knows by means of movement. But it [sc.
the unity of providence], remaining stationary and undivided in
[its] unity, also knows all things in this same mode, and not only
man and sun and everything whatsoever of that kind, but also
15 each particular thing. For nothing escapes that unity, whether
it is a question of its being or of its being known.134
And a little further on:
Thus the unitary knowledge of providence is, in the same undi-

vided [entity], the knowledge of all divided things, both of all
that are most individual and of all that are most universal; and
just as it has caused each thing to exist in unity, so does it know
20 each in unity.135
We have, then, heard Proclus clearly stating that the first cause of
all things, which is the object of desire for all things – that is, the Good
and the One, for they characterise the first [cause] in this way alone,
if one should affirm anything at all of it – both brings into existence
25 and has knowledge of even the most individual of things and extends
39,1 its providence to all things.136
And the philosopher Plotinus in On the Intelligibles, or, On the
Good137 says similar things about the creative and providential power
5 of God in these words:
Nevertheless, if it is necessary that each activity [of his] should

not be imperfect and it is not right to think of anything belong-
ing to God as other than whole and entire, all things must be
present in anything of his. So existing for ever must be too. So
10 the future must already be present too. There is no ‘later’ in that
[place]; what is already present there comes to be later else-
where. If, therefore, the future is already present, it is
necessarily present as having been provided for with a view to
later [time]; that means that nothing will need for anything
then, that nothing will be left out. All things, then, already
15 existed and always existed and existed in such a way that one
could say later that this exists on account of138 that. When it is
extended and, as it were, unfolded, it can reveal this after that,
but when it is together, it is all ‘this’;139 that is, it has its cause
too within itself.
Plotinus too, then, states that not only things that are, but things
that will be are already present to God’s foreknowledge; for he states 20
that what has existence later among generated [things] is always
present in him. Then he adds the manner in which the future is
present to God: that it is by thinking even what is not yet in existence.
‘It is necessarily present’, he says, ‘as having been provided for with 25
a view to later [time].’ So if even all things that do not yet exist are
present as existing things to God by virtue of his foreknowledge, he
doubtless knows in what manner and according to which principles 40,1
each future thing will come to be, and once it comes to be, for what
reasons it will undergo the consequences that flow from unerring
providence in each choice of a life [it makes]. ‘For all things’, says
Plotinus, ‘already existed and always existed.’ For the ‘already’ shows
that things that will exist later are present for God before they come 5
to be. And he adds ‘and always existed’ so that nobody will think that
‘already’ means there is a beginning. ‘And existed’, he says, ‘in such
a way that one could say later that this exists on account of140 that.’
[He is referring to] things the causes of whose generation we know
after their coming into existence, as for example that man alone of
animals here [on earth] has the use of hands on account of the activity 10
of reason, since the creator has made hands as tools for the reason.
So what we know [only] after [its] coming into existence – [i.e.] that
this exists on account of that – has always had prior existence in God’s
knowledge.141 And the same applies not only to whole species, but to 15
individuals with separate existence as well; at any rate, explaining
himself, he adds ‘when it is extended and, as it were, unfolded, it can
reveal this after that’, [by which he means] when it is brought to
generation, because, to take an example, after the mixing of the
elements, comes condensation and alteration, and after that shaping, 20
and after that cooling, and similarly with all things. ‘But when it is
together’, he says, ‘it is all142 “this”, that is, it has its cause too within
itself.’ By ‘together’ he means in God’s foreknowledge; for in it the 25
principles of all things are present [as a whole] without division.
So much, then, is demonstrated concerning the prescient and
provident power of God out of [our] common conceptions and the 41,1
[works of the] philosophers we have cited.
And, in addition to this, the belief in regard to fate,143 whatever it
may be – for there are various doctrines in regard to it – is believed
by the Hellenes144 to grasp all of the causes of future happenings 5
together under one time, that of the date of birth,145 and foretell them,
or even bring them about.146
So, given that we are accepting these [positions], on the basis of
10 either doctrine – I mean the one about providence or the one about
fate – there is every necessity that the principles of future happenings
should both be foreknown and pre-exist [those happenings]. And, this
being so, it is clear to all that there is no necessity that the things
[themselves] should coexist with the creative principles and causes of
created things, but that it is, on the contrary, necessary from what
15 we have shown that their principles should pre-exist all created
things. And so, even if the Forms and patterns of things are certain
ideas and principles of the creator, in accordance with which he has
brought the world into existence, it is certainly not necessary that the
20 world itself should coexist from everlasting along with God’s know-
ledge about the world.
And nor, then, will any argument compel Plato to hypothesise that
the world too has always existed because he says that the pattern of
the world is eternal. For it has been shown that the being of Forms
25 does not consist in their being patterns.
The End of the Refutation of the Second Argument
42,1 The Third Argument of Proclus the Successor

The third [argument]: If the creator is the creator of something,147
either he will always be an actual creator, or sometimes [only] a
potential one [and] not always be creating.
5 Now if the creator is always an actual creator, that which is created
will likewise always be actually undergoing creation. For when,
says148 Aristotle, a cause is actual, that which is caused will likewise
be actual; if that which builds is, so will that which is being built,
[and] if that which creates health is, so will that which is being made
10 healthy. And Plato [says]149 in the Philebus that a producer (to
poioun) is a producer of something which is coming to be, not that a
producer [is a producer] of something which is capable of coming to
be, or that that which is capable of producing [produces] something
that is coming to be.
But if, on the other hand, that which is created is not actual, nor
will that which creates be actual. And if it is not actual, it will be
15 potential, being capable of creating before it creates. And everything
that is potentially something, says150 the same [Aristotle], becomes
actual from something that is actually what it is potentially, the
potentially hot from the actually hot [for example], and [similarly
20 with] the cold, the white and the black. Therefore the creator will be
an actual creator after having previously been a potential [creator],
43,1 there being another actual creator that makes this previously poten-
tial creator an actual one. And if the former is always the actual cause
of the latter’s being a creator, the latter too will always be a creator
on account of the first151 axiom, the one that states that whenever a
Chapter 3 43
cause is actual that which is caused is also actual. And therefore there 5
is always something undergoing creation. But if the former too was
at some time [only] potentially responsible for making the creator
create, it in turn will need some other [cause] to make it actually
make the creator create on account of the second axiom,152 which
states that everything potential has need of the actual if it is to 10
become actual. And the same argument will apply in turn to this one,
and we shall either go back indefinitely seeking one cause before
another for each successive potential cause becoming actual,153 or we
shall end by agreeing that there is always some cause that is actual.
But once this is agreed, it follows that [its] effects are always actual 15
too and that the world is always undergoing creation, if indeed [it]
also [follows] that the creator is always a creator, this having been
demonstrated154 with the aid of two axioms, the first that one of a pair
of relatives will always be in the same condition as the other, poten- 20
tial if it is potential, actual if it is actual, the other that everything
that exists potentially changes to155 actual [existence] through the
agency of something that is actually what it was previously poten-
tially and subsequently actually.
The Sections of the Refutation of the Third Argument 44,1

1. That in this section Proclus has cobbled together a fallacious
argument which depends on the ambiguity of potentiality and actu-
ality.
2. A setting out of the different senses of potentiality and actual- 5
ity.
3. That an actual effect does not in every case necessarily attend
a cause ‘in capacity’156 (that is to say, [actual] in the first of the senses
of actual). This being so, it is possible for God to always be an actual
creator in capacity but for there not always to be a world. 10
4. That something157 advancing from second potentiality, the kind
that is based on capacity [and] which is also first actuality, to second
actuality does not need anything else to bring it from [mere posses-
sion of] the capacity into actuality. 15
5. A setting out of Proclus’ words and a demonstration from them
that he has cobbled together a fallacious argument by using the
different senses of potentiality and actuality without qualification.
Including [a demonstration] that God, by being an actual creator in
capacity, neither necessarily implies158 a world that coexists with him 20
from everlasting nor will have need of some other creator159 to bring
him from capacity to actuality.
6. That not even in the case of first potentiality is it universally
true that the160 potential in every case needs something else which is 25
[already] actually that which it161 is [only] potentially in order to be
brought into actuality, but only something that is actual, but not in
every case of the same kind.
45,1 7. That it is possible for nature to be brought even of its own
resources from fitness162 for something to a capacity and actuality in
relation to it and not to need any external agency to accomplish this.
5 The Refutation of the Third Argument

1. That the philosopher’s proof is sophistical. What he should
have done was respected the dignity of philosophy and employed the
utmost dialectical precision. Since he was investigating matters of
such importance, he [should] not have misled us with ambiguities as
10 sophists do the young. Rather, with a care for the truth, knowing163
that potentiality and actuality are ambiguous words, [he should] have
distinguished their different senses, and explained to which of the
senses of potentiality the first of the axioms proposed by him con-
15 forms, and then to which of those of actuality164 the second [conforms],
and next, hypothesising each of the senses of potentiality and of
actuality165 in relation to the creator, have investigated the con-
sequences of each hypothesis.
Let us, then, making our only goal the discovery of the truth and
20 following the rules of dialectic, first distinguish the various senses of
potentiality and actuality, and, having done so, consider what truth
there is in the axioms of the philosopher based upon them from which
he has constructed [this] the third of his proofs.
25 In addition, for the sake of those who are inexperienced in this kind
46,1 of argument it will be a good idea to provide a brief explanation of the
concepts of potentiality and actuality.
2. One should be aware, then, that Aristotle quite explicitly
5 taught166 that potentiality is twofold and that actuality is twofold, and
this is accepted by everyone. In one way it is that which has a kind of
natural fitness to [become] something that is said to be potentially
that thing, as we say that a child is potentially a grammarian167
because its nature is receptive to acquiring from others168 the theo-
10 rems169 of grammar at the right time. This is one of the senses in the
case of potentiality. It is called first potentiality, [the kind] that is
based on fitness. And when someone has come into possession170 of
the theorems of grammar and has the knowledge of them in his mind,
15 but is not active with regard to them or externalising171 his reflec-
tion172 on them, perhaps because he is eating or because his thoughts
are engaged elsewhere or because he does not want to, he too is said
to be potentially a grammarian, but not in the same way as the first
person, for that person had not come into possession of the theorems,
20 but was said to be potentially a grammarian only through being
naturally disposed to acquire them.173 This sense [of potentiality] is
called second potentiality, or potentiality based on capacity.
And the very same thing that is called second potentiality, or
potentiality based on capacity, is also called first actuality. For, in
contrast to first potentiality, the [kind] based on natural fitness, 25
whose possessor was said to be potentially a grammarian by virtue of
being naturally disposed to acquire the theorems [of grammar], a 47,1
person who has already come into possession of the theorems would
already be an actual grammarian, having already acquired actual
possession [of them].174 But since there is also a second kind of
actuality, under which a grammarian is currently (êdê) presenting
the theorems, whether in passing them on to someone else or practic-
ing on his own, by contrast with this current (êdê) actuality, a person 5
who possesses the theorems only in capacity is, as I have stated,175
said to be a potential grammarian – potential in the second sense,
[that is]. So in this way the same person – one who only has possession
of the theorems of grammar but is not making active use of it176 – is
described both as a potential grammarian and as an actual grammar- 10
ian, but potential in contrast with second actuality, under which he
presents the theorems when teaching, and actual in contrast to first
potentiality,177 under which he did not yet have possession of the 15
theorems, but was said to be a potential grammarian because he was
capable of acquiring it at some time in the future.
3. These things being so, and potentiality being twofold, and
actuality likewise being twofold, and second potentiality coinciding 20
with first actuality, the first of the axioms, the one that says ‘when a
cause is actual, that which is caused will likewise be actual’,178 is true
only for second actuality, not for first, which is also called second
potentiality. For when a teacher is currently teaching, there must 25
also be someone being taught, and if a builder is currently building
there must also be something being built. But the axiom is not179 true 48,1
in the case of first actuality. For it is possible for a builder to have the
capacity to build but not be building and for someone who has the
capacity to teach not to be teaching. And so, whereas a cause in this
sense, I mean a builder or teacher by capacity, is actual, an effect, 5
that is, something being built or taught, is not so in every case.
I could have gone on to cite the foremost philosophers, including,
among others, the Aristotelian commentator Alexander in his com- 10
mentary on the Apodeictics,180 saying almost word for word just what
I have. But, since the matter is clear, I shall refrain from such a
course at the present time.
This, then, is the truth in regard to the first of the [two] axioms.
4. The second [axiom], on the other hand, the one that says that
when a potentiality is brought to actuality it must in every case 15
change and be brought to actuality through the agency of something
else which is actually what it is potentially, only applies to first
potentiality. For the child who is a potential grammarian changes to
being an actual grammarian through the agency of someone who is 20
an actual grammarian, and water that is potentially hot changes and
becomes actually hot through the agency of, say, fire or, [more]
25 generally, something that is actually hot. But this axiom is not true
in the case of second potentiality. For someone who is already in
possession of the theorems of grammar, and who is said to be a
49,1 potential grammarian in that sense, does not, when he changes from
this [kind of] potentiality to what is known as second actuality, in
which [state] he is currently presenting the theorems [of grammar],
change through the agency of another who is already an actual
grammarian, but changes from being inactive to being active by
5 himself, without any intermediary. And the same applies in all other
cases.
Now that we have elucidated these matters, let us get on with the
matter in hand, starting by quoting the philosopher’s [actual] words:
5. ‘If the creator’, he says,
10 is always an actual creator, that which is created will likewise

always be actually undergoing creation. For when, says Aris-
totle, a cause is actual, that which is caused will likewise be
actual.181
Observe how he does not specify with reference to which sense of

15 actuality he is hypothesising that the creator is an actual creator, but
simply and without qualification says that an actual effect follows
upon an actual cause, so that he can predicate of every case of
actuality an axiom that is [in reality only] true of one sense of182
actuality, which we have shown to be a fallacy in that it has applica-
20 tion only to second actuality. If, then, we hypothesise that God is
always an actual creator in capacity, that is, first actuality, what
further necessity is there, if God is always an actual creator in this
sense, that the world too should always exist?
25 The philosopher has acted thus with sophistical intent so that,
50,1 when we say that the world does not always exist, he may at once
totally eliminate [the possibility] that God is at the same time (kai)
always a creator, and [so that], once it is agreed that God is in no
sense an actual creator before he creates, he may [quite] consistently
5 infer that he is a potential creator in the first sense of potential. At
all events, hear what he goes on to say:
‘If, on the other hand’, he says,
that which is created is not actual, neither will that which

creates be actual.183
Observe again how he uses ‘actual’ without qualification and does

10 not add with application to which sense of ‘actual’ the184 axiom is true.
[In fact,] it is clear that it is true for second actuality but not for first.
Even when the house does not actually exist nothing prevents the
builder from actually existing in capacity. For a man who has the
capacity is a builder even when he is not building, and likewise a 15
doctor even when he is not practicing, but it is not possible to actually
build or practice medicine if there is not also in every case something
being built or someone being treated.
And it is clear from what he goes on to say that it really was from
a wish to mislead by means of [this] ambiguity that he did not 20
distinguish the different senses of potentiality and actuality, so that,
as I have said,185 when we say that the world does not always exist,
he can infer that [in that case] God was not in any sense an actual
creator before he created the world but a potential one in the first 25
[sense of potential]:
‘And if it is not actual’, he says,
it will be potential, being capable of creating before it acts. And, 51,1

according to the same writer [sc. Aristotle], everything that is
potentially something becomes actual from something that is
actually what it is potentially, the potentially hot from the
actually hot [for example], and [similarly with] the cold, the
white and the black. Therefore the creator will be an actual 5
creator after having previously been a potential [creator], there
being another actual creator that makes this previously poten-
tial creator an actual one.186
Observe how, as we have stated,187 after eliminating [the possibil-

ity] that God was an actual creator on the ground that the world did 10
not actually exist, he immediately infers that he was a potential
creator in the first [sense of] potential, as though every sense of188
actual has been eliminated. At any rate, he claims that there will be
need of another actual creator to make this previously potential one
into an actual creator – a thing that we have shown does not apply to 15
something that has a capacity, but to something that only has fitness.
And yet, if the world does not actually exist, it is not immediately
implied that the creator is a potential creator in the first [sense of]
potential. As I have said,189 capacity [on his part], that is to say, first 20
actuality, could equally be implied. But the philosopher sophistically
claims that what is said of first potentiality (I mean that it has need
of something that is [already] actually what it is [only] potentially to
be brought to actuality) follows for potentiality generally and without 25
qualification, and then, for the rest [arguing quite] consistently, adds
a lot of rubbish, stringing together creator after creator as he draws 52,1
the conclusions which follow from his first absurd hypothesis.190
But, since nobody with any sense at all would claim that God is a
potential creator in the first [sense of] potentiality before he creates,
once this absurd premiss has been eliminated, this whole tissue of 5
spiders’ webs, the philosopher’s syllogisms, collapses. For if God is a
creator in capacity before he creates, he will neither have need of
another to bring him into actuality, nor, since it is in that sense191 that
10 he is an actual creator, does he on that account straightaway bring
with him a world that coexists with him from everlasting. Just
because there is someone with the capacity to build,192 there will not
in every case also be a house. Nor, when a builder passes from [mere
possession of] the capacity to its exercise, will he have need of
15 another, actual, builder to bring him to this.
Aristotle himself has adequately shown193 in the On Interpretation
that to use ambiguities to create fallacious arguments is sophistical
and most offensive to anyone with any sense, describing this kind of
fallacy especially as an annoyance:
‘I call “opposing” ’, he writes,
20 [a statement which contradicts another by affirming or denying]

the same thing of the same thing – not ambiguously, and with
such other [restrictions] as we specify to counter sophistical
annoyances.
And it surely is the case that arguments which, neglecting the facts,
25 strive to refute those they are arguing against by purely verbal
means194 are in truth an unwanted annoyance – something the great
Proclus has not shrunk from doing to us even in these [important]
matters.
53,1 6. It is worth observing how in his very selection of an axiom the
philosopher establishes for himself an adequate supply of materials
for his fallacious arguments. For, so that he can string together his
great nonsense about creators – of a potential creator that has need
5 of another, actual, creator that will make it too an actual creator, and
of this [second] creator in its turn, because the earlier one was
potential,195 being potential itself and having need of a third, actual,
10 creator, and of this one in turn [having need] of another – and so that
he can in this way continue this absurdity ad infinitum, having said
that everything potential has need of something else that is actual to
bring it to actuality, he says that this actual thing must be of the same
kind as it is potentially; for example, if something is potentially hot,
15 that which fulfils [the potential] of [this] potentially hot [thing] must
be [something that is] actually hot.
This is true in some cases. For example, it is an actual grammarian
that makes a potential grammarian an actual grammarian, and fire
that is actually hot changes potentially hot water and makes it
20 actually hot. But the statement is not true in all cases. While there
may be need of something actual to bring something potential to its
own actuality, this actual thing need not in every case be actually
what the thing that it is bringing to actuality is potentially. It is not
an actual ship but an actual shipwright that makes timbers which 25
are potentially a ship into an actual ship. And no more is it the case
that the creative principles for a ship that are within the shipwright 54,1
are already an actual ship.196 [And], again, the potentially sweet,
bitter or red are not in every case brought to actuality through the
agency of the actually sweet, bitter or red. For the water by which
plants are watered potentially has each quality into which it changes 5
when it becomes one with the plants, and it is not, one supposes,
something actually sweet or bitter or red that changes water so that
it actually takes on these qualities197 but the creative principles in
nature, which are actual. And [similarly] the potentially hard be- 10
comes actually hard through the agency of the cold, although the cold
is not actually hard but [only] actually cold.
And so here too he has made this kind of addition to his axiom – I
mean that an actual [thing] that brings a potential [thing] to actuality 15
must be actually of the same kind as it is potentially – so as to give
himself, as I have said,198 the opportunity of stringing together [a
whole series of] creators of creators.
7. But perhaps not even a thing with a potential or a fitness for
something has need in every case of another thing to bring its
potentiality199 to actuality. It is possible for someone to be himself the 20
cause of his change from first potentiality to actuality. For according
to Plato there are, as he says200 in the Alcibiades, in fact two roads to
knowledge: learning and discovery. So it is clear that the first person
to discover an art, whether the whole of it or its parts, was himself 25
the cause of his transition from first potentiality to actuality;201 for
instance, the first person to discover log-sawing was a potential
sawyer in the first [sense of] potential before discovering it and
became an actual sawyer not through the agency of someone else who
was an actual sawyer but by bringing himself from potentiality to 55,1
actuality. And what about a new-born puppy? It is potentially capable
of sight and of barking but is not brought to actual seeing or barking 5
through the agency of another one that actually [does these things]
but comes to maturity by itself through the agency of its own nature.
Unless in the first case one holds universal mind responsible for
bringing potential mind to actuality, and in the second universal
nature. But, even if we accept this, one would not say that universal 10
mind is an actual sawyer or builder or anything like that, or that
universal nature is actually able to see or bark, but simply that they
are actual – not to prolong the argument by asking why, in the case
of universal mind, it brings the potentiality of some things but not of
others to actuality, and, in the case of universal nature, whether it
exists at all and what it exists in. For there is not a single, universal 15
world body over and above particular [bodies], and so there is no
universal nature either (for, as Aristotle holds, the universal is either
nothing or of secondary origin, existing [only] in our thought202), 20
unless one were to call the concord and mutual harmony of the parts
of the world universal nature.
The End of the Refutation of the Third Argument
The Fourth Argument of Proclus the Successor

25 The fourth [argument]: everything that comes to be from an unmov-
ing203 cause is unmoving in regard to its existence.204
56,1 For if that which produces205 is unmoving, it is unchanging, and if
it is unchanging, it produces just by being, without making a transi-
tion from producing to not producing or from not producing to
producing; for if it did make such a transition, it would undergo a
5 change – the very transition from the one to the other – and if it
underwent a change, it would not be unmoving. If, then, something
is unmoving, it will either never produce or always produce, so as not
to be in movement by producing [only] sometimes. And so, if a thing
is the unmoving cause of something, being neither never a cause nor
[only] sometimes [a cause], it must always be a cause, and if this is
10 so, it is an everlasting206 cause.207
If, then, the cause of the universe is unmoving so as not to be, by
moving, at first imperfect (atelês) and subsequently perfect (for all
movement is incomplete (atelês) activity208), and so as not, by moving,
to have need of time while bringing time into existence, it is necessary
that the universe be everlasting, coming to be through the agency of
15 an unmoving cause.
And so if someone,209 with the intention of paying reverence to him
who is the cause of the universe, should say that he alone is everlast-
ing while the world is not everlasting, he is, by denying that the latter
is everlasting, declaring that the former is in movement and not
unmoving. And if he says that he is in movement and not unmoving,
20 he is saying that he is not always perfect but, because all movement
is incomplete activity, sometimes imperfect, and that he has need of
something that is inferior [to himself] – I mean time of course –
because of the very fact that he moves. And by saying that he is
sometimes imperfect and not always perfect and that he has need of
something inferior [to himself] he is being irreverent in the extreme.
So if someone, with the intention of paying reverence to him who is
25 the cause of the universe, should say that he alone is everlasting, he
is being irreverent in the extreme.
57,1 The Sections of the Refutation of the Fourth Argument

1. An exposition of the two syllogisms in the fourth proof. Also,
5 that because of the minor premiss common to both, Proclus has
produced a fallacious argument.
Chapter 4 51
2. That they often cobble together fallacious arguments that even
fly in the face of their own doctrines in an attempt to subvert what
we hold to be the truth.210
3. That that which initially does not produce but subsequently
does produce, and in general, that which mobilises an activity out of 10
a capacity, does not move or change in any way at all.
4. That the activity of God is not movement; and what is [meant
by] an incomplete activity and what [by] a complete activity.
5. That not even activity that is incomplete and takes place over
a period of time is movement of that which acts211 but [only] of that 15
which is acted upon, since that which causes the movement does not
become different212 in any way as a result of previously not causing
movement and subsequently causing movement.
6. Evidence of the same from Aristotle.
7. Selections from Aristotle on the potential and the actual. Also, 20
that it is not through213 alteration or movement of any kind at all that
the mobilising of an activity out of a capacity occurs.
8. That it is not out of ignorance that Proclus employs fallacious
arguments of this kind but deliberately and to deceive the inexperi- 25
enced.
9. A puzzle and its solution: that by hypothesising that God is
always in capacity the creator of the world but that the world has not 58,1
been created from everlasting, we are not doing away with [the
doctrine] that God is always the same and unchanging. Including
[proofs] that, in the case of God, capacity and activity are the same,
and that it is not necessary that the things themselves (pragmata) 5
should exist simultaneously with God’s knowledge of things (onta).
10. That God’s willing a thing at one time and not willing it at
another is not an alteration [in him], and, speaking generally, that
God’s acts of will do not vary but are one and simple, always remain-
ing the same and unchanging by virtue of always being [a willing] of
the good, and that it is among the things that participate [in it] that 10
change is observed.
11. A statement and solution of the puzzle which states that, if
there has not always been a world, God was [only] potentially a
creator, and therefore imperfect, before it was generated. Including
[a demonstration] that every substance achieves its perfection by 15
itself, without relation [to anything else], through the natural powers
observed within it, [and] not through the actions that proceed out-
wards from these powers to other things.
12. That the divine is self-sufficient and self-constituting, having 20
need of nothing outside [itself] for its own perfection. And that God
has his perfection in the everlasting being of the creative principles,
not in [the act of] creating.
13. That God is the creator not only of the universal but of the
most particular of things as well. 25
14. That by the very arguments by which they think to reduce our
59,1 hypothesis about the world to absurdity, claiming that if the world
was generated, [God] was [only] potentially a creator and therefore
imperfect before it was generated, they are led into a greater absurd-
5 ity, since on their own hypotheses they make God always potentially
a creator and always imperfect.214
15. That Proclus is once more convicted of arguing unfairly.
16. That, both according to common conceptions and according to
10 the philosopher Plotinus, God is a perfect creator in and of himself
and adds nothing to this perfection by subsequently creating, because
everything is already present to God by his foreknowledge, even
things that have not yet been brought to generation.
The Refutation of the Fourth Argument

15 1. The philosopher has included in [this] the fourth of his proofs
two syllogisms, both of them with the same minor premiss, and this
and this alone (I mean the minor premiss) has, because it is false,
20 become the cause of fallacies [in the proof]. For it is a fact that, given
a single absurdity, a myriad of absurdities necessarily follows.
It will be best to begin by setting out the philosopher’s syllogisms
themselves and then proceed to the refutation of the false premiss,
that is, the minor premiss; for once this has been refuted, the fraud
25 perpetrated at the expense of the truth by the great Proclus is
undone.
The first syllogism goes like this. That, he says, which passes from
not producing to producing will undergo a change, and everything
60,1 that changes moves; for every real change is either a kind of move-
ment or not without movement. And every movement is, as has been
shown by Aristotle,215 an incomplete activity. [The process of] turning
white is an example. A thing which is turning white is neither black
5 nor as yet white; for turning white is a passage to white from black.
So if movement is incomplete activity and if God is not imperfect, he
does not move, and if he does not move, he certainly does not change,
10 and if he does not change, he will not pass from not producing to
producing; for this kind of [transition] is, he says, change and move-
ment. Such, then, is the first of the syllogisms.
And changing the major premiss of the above syllogism he leads
the argument into another absurdity. That which earlier does not
15 produce, he says, but subsequently produces changes, that which
changes moves, that which moves has need of time (for all movement
takes place in time), therefore that which earlier does not produce but
subsequently produces has need of time. So if God is the producer of
time, he does not pass from not producing to producing, or else he
20 would come to be in need of time, of which he is himself the producer.
[Finally], on the basis of these [two syllogisms], he argues that if
God is perfect, entirely unmoving and unchanging, and, as being the
producer of time, without need of time, and if that which earlier does
not produce and then produces moves and is for that reason imperfect
and has need of time, he will, so as to possess the lack of movement 25
and change [attributed to him216] in the minor premiss, either never
produce or always produce. So if the first [of these alternatives] is 61,1
false (I mean that he never produces), he will always be producing,
and if he is always producing the world, then of necessity the world
too always exists. Such is the line of argument contained in Proclus’
syllogisms.
2. I cannot help but be amazed at how they brush aside argu- 5
ments refuting [their own position] of which they are well aware,
often even in the face of correctly-argued positions of their own, and
taking up arms against the truth, mislead those who are inexperi-
enced in the subtleties of logical argument with every trick in the
book.
That every movement is an incomplete activity and that every 10
change is either a kind of movement or not without movement is true.
But we should not perhaps have to argue that that which, after not
producing, or, more generally, not acting, subsequently produces, or,
[more] generally, acts, is not undergoing any movement or alteration.
It should perhaps be enough just to cite the words in which Aristotle 15
has taught us this, with proofs, in many of his works, words against
which I think Proclus has said nothing.
But, so that we shall not seem to be depending on the opinions of
others, let us first examine the argument ourselves and then in what 20
follows put a seal on the truth by means of Aristotle’s testimony.
3. That, says [Proclus], which passes from previously not produc-
ing to producing will possess change and movement.217
The first thing one must point out here is this: it is clear to 25
everyone that that which previously does not produce but then pro-
duces is advancing from second potentiality, the kind that is based on
[the possession of] a capacity and is also first activity, to second
activity. An example is the builder. If, after initially not building, he 62,1
subsequently builds, he is mobilising the activity of building out of his
capacity for building. For the change from first potentiality to capac- 5
ity is not acting (poiêsis) but being acted upon (pêsis), and that which
changes from [having] first potentiality to [the possession of] a capac-
ity is acted upon (paskhei) rather than acting (poiei).218 For example,
when the child who is potentially a grammarian is acquiring a
capacity for the art of grammar, it is being acted upon by its teacher,
not itself acting on someone else; and the same applies in all cases. 10
And so if that which initially does not produce but subsequently
produces advances from second potentiality to second activity, and
Proclus says that such an advance from [the mere possession of] a
capacity is movement, he is clearly asserting that the advance from
15 [the possession of] a capacity to its activation constitutes movement
and change.
But if something which mobilises an activity out of a capacity
moves, then there is every necessity that either the state preceding
this producing or acting should be movement or that the production
20 or activity itself or some other state conceived of as falling between
producing and not producing should be; these are the only possibili-
ties.
But it is impossible to call the state of that which is capable of
producing prior to its producing, that is the state in which it had the
25 capacity to produce without the activity, a movement. For not produc-
ing is lack of movement rather than movement, as even Proclus holds.
‘If something is unmoving’, he says, ‘it will either never produce or
63,1 always produce’,219 clearly on the assumption that not producing is a
lack of movement and not a movement. Therefore the capacity to
produce without its activation is not movement.
And nor is it possible to conceive of any movement that falls
5 between producing and not producing. The mobilisation of an activity
out of a capacity is instantaneous. The end of not producing and the
beginning of producing occur at the same instant. A person who stops
not writing, to take an example, passes to writing at one and the same
moment; and the same goes for all [such transitions]. Therefore no
10 time elapses between not producing and producing and, [more] gen-
erally, between [the mere possession of] any capacity and the activity
[that flows] from the capacity. For if there is time between not
producing and producing, and generally between [the members of]
every [such] contradictory pair, during this [time the agent] will
neither be not producing (for he has stopped not producing), nor
producing (for he has not yet started producing). Therefore during the
15 same period of time he will be neither producing nor not producing,
which is impossible because [both sides of] a contradiction will be true
at the same time.
And if there is no time between not producing and producing, and,
[more] generally, between [the mere possession of] a capacity and an
20 activity that proceeds from it, then, since there is no third intermedi-
ate state, nor will there be any movement, nor, [more] generally, any
change, between [the two]. For every change [takes place] in time, it
has been shown that there is no intervening time, and so there is no
change.
25 Therefore that which earlier does not produce but subsequently
produces, or anything at all that mobilises an activity out of a
capacity, cannot move either before producing or between producing
and not producing.
The only remaining possibility then is that producing itself is a
64,1 movement. If this is so, and God is always producing as they claim,
then he is also always moving. ‘If something is unmoving’, he says, ‘it
will produce either never or always, so as not to be in movement by
producing [only] sometimes’.220 So if he is always producing, and if
producing is a movement (for this is the only part of the division that 5
has not been eliminated), then God is always in movement. But
movement is incomplete activity and in time. According to them,
then, the divine is always in movement and is therefore imperfect and
has need of time. So they have been trapped by their own cleverness,
for this kind of fallacy is self-revealing and collapses about its own 10
ears.
If, then, no movement is observed either before producing or
between not producing and producing, and if God’s actual producing
is not a movement, there is no way in which God can ever be in
movement when out of his capacity for producing he mobilises the
corresponding activity. 15
But why am I talking of God? In fact, nothing else that has a
capacity and then acts in accordance with it can undergo any altera-
tion or movement solely as a result of mobilising the activity that
corresponds to that capacity. For these same arguments will apply to 20
everything, and I shall demonstrate [as much] still more clearly
below.221
4. It is, I believe, clear to everyone that it is not right to suppose
that God’s producing, or his activity in general, is movement when it
brings everything into existence just by willing it and has no need of
time or any interval222 to bring things into being. For it is not the case 25
that every activity is immediately also a movement, for activity is, 65,1
according to Aristotle, wider than movement. For he says223 that
activity is of two kinds, complete and incomplete. Incomplete activity
is, he says, movement. For, according to him, movement is change 5
from first potentiality to capacity. This is how he defines it in book
three of the Physics:224 ‘movement is the realisation of what poten-
tially is, qua such’. By ‘realisation’ he means the actual (autên)
activation and fulfilment of the potential. So movement is incomplete 10
activity. By complete activity, on the other hand, he means instanta-
neous production from a capacity without the capacity becoming in
any way different. Instantaneous production is production that does
not proceed with the passage (kinêsei) of time but happens in an 15
instant, like the emanation of light from a source of illumination; for
as soon as a source of illumination such as a fire or the sun is visible,
everything capable of it is instantaneously illuminated. Of this kind
too is the activity of seeing; we instantaneously perceive sensible 20
objects the moment we look at them. It is for this reason that Aristotle
denies that the senses are in movement during the perception of
sensible objects.225 And nor is the activity of the mind movement; it
grasps the objects of thought (ta noêta) instantaneously and without
any interval. If, then, the activity of these is instantaneous, and on
25 that account complete and not movement, how could he226 have the
effrontery to say that the activity of God is movement?
5. But Aristotle does not think it right to call even activities which
66,1 are incomplete and take place in time movements of the active parties
but [thinks that they should] rather [be described as movements] of
the things that are acted on.227 A mind that is skilled in building or in
5 teaching does not itself undergo any alteration or any movement at
all by building or teaching – assuming [for the sake of the argument]
that the builder or teacher is perfect so that he is not learning through
practice because he is imperfect. If the teacher is of this kind, and
then teaches, he undergoes no alteration or any movement himself as
10 a result of teaching. The movement that results from the teaching has
taken place on the side of the pupil. He is the one who undergoes
alteration and changes from not knowing to knowing. Similarly, if a
mind skilled in building and [with] perfected skills, stirs a body to
build, it does not become in any way different from its [former] self;
15 the movement is seen among the building materials, namely, the
stones and timber. It is they that undergo alteration; and the same
applies in every case. Even though the activity in all these cases is
not instantaneous,228 the alteration and movement take place in the
20 sphere of that which is acted upon rather than in the sphere of that
which acts. For no different state of any kind arises in the mind that
is skilled in teaching or skilled in building as a result of teaching or
building. And even if the body moves, it is as an instrument, and its
movement is different and not the kind that the things under discus-
25 sion229 exhibit; for the movement of the body is local. And [anyway]
God brings all things into existence by the very [act of] willing [them]
and has no need of the assistance of an instrument.230
6. Perhaps it will not be unprofitable to quote some passages in
67,1 which Aristotle explicitly testifies231 to these very points.
In the third book of the Physics,232 soon after defining movement,
he adds the following:
That this is movement is clear from the following: when that

5 which is buildable is in actualisation in respect of the charac-
teristics in virtue of which we give it this name, it is ‘being built’
and this is ‘building’; and the same applies to learning and
healing.
And a little further on:233
For it is possible for each thing, as for example that which is

buildable, to be active at one time and not at another. And the
10 actualisation of that which is buildable, qua buildable, is [the
process of] building. For it is either [the process of] building or
an actual building. But when there is a building, the buildable
no longer exists; the buildable is what is being built. So it must
be [the process of] building which is the activity. And [the
process of] building is a kind of movement. And the same will 15
apply to other kinds of movement.
In these passages he is clearly saying that [the process of] building

is the perfection not of that which has the capacity to build, that is,
of the builder, but of that which is buildable, that is, of that which is
being built, namely, stones and timber. [And] he says the same thing
about learning and healing; learning is not the fulfilment of the 20
teacher or healing of the doctor, but of the person being taught and
the patient [respectively], and the same applies to every kind of
movement.
And a little further on again,234 in the course of solving a puzzle 68,1
about movement, he introduces much the same point. This is what he
says:
The [solution to the] puzzle is clear; movement is in the move-

able. It is its actualisation through the agency of that which is 5
able to cause movement. And the actualisation of that which is
able to cause movement is not something separate – for both
must have an actualisation. It is ‘able to cause movement’
because it has the power to, and ‘cause of movement’ through its
activity; but it is of its nature to activate the moveable.
What he is saying here is, to take an example, that even though one
and the same thing, [the process of] building, is the actualisation of 10
both the builder and of that which is being built, the movement is
nevertheless not in the builder but [only] in that which is being built;
for it is the fulfilment of that which is buildable that is being brought
about through the agency of the builder. And the same applies to all
movement.
It has, then, been shown by means of arguments drawn from 15
Aristotle as well that production is a movement not of the producer
but of that which is coming to be. So even they, constrained by the
declarations of Aristotle and our demonstrations, will perhaps agree 20
that the activity of God is not a movement. For if to create is to move,
they must necessarily suppose that the divine is always in movement,
since according to them it is always creating.
7. And our argument has adequately shown that anything which
at first does not produce but subsequently produces, and in general
anything which mobilises an activity out of a capacity, does not 25
undergo alteration or movement of any kind at all. For if it has been
shown that there is no time between not producing and producing, 69,1
and that every alteration or movement of any kind at all is in time,
there is no necessity that the creator should alter if he has always
possessed the capacity to create in [its full] perfection but has not
been bringing the world into existence from everlasting.
But perhaps it will do no harm to show Aristotle himself making
5 this very point in the second book of On the Soul, as we promised235
we would at the beginning of the present chapter. Indeed, I shall
begin the quotation somewhat earlier so as to present the division of
10 the potential and the actual that we expounded in the previous
chapter236 in Aristotle’s own words as well for those who are unac-
quainted [with them]. Here then, to quote his exact words, is what he
says in the second book of On the Soul:237
We must also make some distinctions in regard to potentiality

and actuality; for up until now we have been talking of them
15 [quite] generally. Something, then, may be a knower in the
sense that we might say a man is because man is in the class of
knowers and possessors of knowledge, or else in the sense in
which we unhesitatingly describe a man who has knowledge of
grammar as a knower. Each of these has a potential in a
20 different way; the former because his kind and stuff are such,
the latter because he can reflect238 when he wishes, provided
nothing external prevents it. (The man who is currently reflect-
ing is [an] actual [knower] and has knowledge in the strict sense
of [for example] this or that [letter] A). Both the first two are
potentially knowers,239 the former by undergoing alteration
25 through learning, and frequently by changing from a contrary
condition,240 the latter in another way, [by passing from] pos-
sessing sensation, or [a knowledge of] grammar, but not
70,1 exercising it, to exercising it.
That is what Aristotle has to say. And were I not intent on avoiding
prolixity, I would also quote the explanatory comments of the Aristo-
telian commentators themselves on the subject.241 Instead, I shall
5 attempt a brief elucidation of the text with the aim of making the
philosopher’s meaning clear to those who have not attended lectures
on these topics.
The circumstances of the division of potentiality and actuality are
pretty clear from what has already been said by us in the previous
10 section;242 for since Aristotle had used ‘potentiality’ and ‘actuality’
simply and without qualification in the earlier writings we cited
[there]243 (he indicates this by writing ‘for up until now we have been
talking of them [quite] generally’244), he carries out a division of them
15 in the passage we have [just] quoted. He says that in one way every
man is said to be potentially a knower, even though he may not yet
have possession of the knowledge [in question], for example of gram-
mar, but in another way, on the other hand, he says, it is the man who
20 has already come into possession (hexin) of the knowledge [in ques-
tion] who is said to be a potential knower. But, he says, these two are
not both knowers in the same way. The former is because his kind is
such. In explanation of the meaning of ‘kind’ he adds the words ‘or
stuff’, by which he means that which underlies the knowledge, I mean
that which is receptive of it, namely, human nature. For all men in 25
common are said to be potential knowers through being naturally
equipped to acquire knowledge; for man is ‘receptive of under-
standing and knowledge’ and is so defined, and it is this that
constitutes first potentiality. On the other hand, someone, he says,
who has already acquired the capacity for grammar is said to be a 71,1
potential knower in the sense that he will be able to externalise his
reflection245 on his knowledge whenever he wishes, unless some
outside factor prevents this. For a teacher will teach unless prevented 5
by illness or the lack of students or their unsuitability; and similarly
a builder will build, and so on. And this is second potentiality, which
is also called first actuality. So when this man with a capacity [for
grammar] is currently teaching and is presenting the theorems [of 10
grammar] – this is what he means when he says ‘this or that [letter]
A’, as clearly as though he had written ‘this or that theorem [of
grammar]’ – he becomes an actual knower under what we refer to as
second actuality.246
Having carried out a division [of the senses] of potentiality and
actuality in this way, Aristotle goes on to argue in what follows that 15
the man247 who possesses the theorems [of grammar] in capacity does
not, when he mobilises an activity out of this capacity, do so through
[undergoing any] alteration. ‘Both the first two’, he says,248 ‘are
potentially knowers, the former by undergoing alteration through
learning and frequently by changing from a contrary condition.’ A 20
man who is said to be a potential knower in the first sense, he says,
becomes an actual knower (i.e. gains possession of knowledge) by
undergoing alteration through learning. For learning is an alteration;
for learning stands in the same relation to someone who is undergo-
ing change in regard to249 knowledge as whitening does to someone 25
who250 is becoming white. Such a person, he says, often even changes
from one condition (hexis) to its contrary; for through learning a 72,1
learner changes either from ignorance to knowledge or from false
opinion to true – and the false is contrary to the true. [Only] the latter
is alteration in the strict sense. For alteration is, as Aristotle himself 5
teaches in the Physics,251 change from one form to another involving
the perishing of the form out of which there is change and the coming
to be of that into which there is change, as [in] becoming white or
becoming hot. [For] someone who becomes white changes from black 10
to white, which is [a change] from one form to another, the black
perishing and the white coming to be; and someone who becomes hot
similarly undergoes a change from cold to hot, the cold perishing and
the hot coming to be.252 On the other hand, the change from ignorance 15
to knowledge, and that from a privation to a form generally, more
closely resembles generation than alteration.253
That then is how someone who is said to be potentially [this or that]
in the first sense advances from potentiality to [the possession of] a
capacity.
But what about the second man – I mean the one who possesses a
20 capacity and then mobilises the [corresponding] activity? He, he says,
makes the transition from [the possession of] a capacity to the activity
in another way. For someone who has the capacity for [using] a sense,
sight for example, but has not been seeing [anything] because of
darkness or because his eyes are closed or for some other reason, does
25 not mobilise the activity of seeing because the sense has altered, but
only because the hindering factor has been removed. He has not, by
at first being inactive and then later active in regard to sight, changed
73,1 from one form to another or from absolute privation to the form. He
had the capacity for [using] the sense even though he was not being
active as far as it was concerned. So there is, he says, another way
than these in which an activity emerges from a capacity.
5 And again – not to protract the argument by quoting the interven-
ing material – the same [Aristotle] says a little further on:254
The possessor of knowledge will reflect,255 and this either does

not amount to undergoing alteration – for it is a development
into itself, or into actuality – or [only] to a different kind of
alteration. For this reason it is not right to say that the posses-
10 sor of wisdom alters when it uses its wisdom, any more than that
that which builds does when it builds.
Observe that he states quite explicitly that something that has

wisdom, that is, something that has knowledge by capacity, when it
uses its wisdom, that is, when it externalises its knowledge, does not
15 alter, and that it is not right to call this sort of thing an alteration. No
change from one form to another has occurred, as happens in every
case of alteration or movement; there has only been a revealing of a
capacity. Aristotle was certainly making this very point when he
added the phrase ‘for it is a development into itself, or into actuality’,
20 which is an unambiguous indication that the mobilisation of an
activity out of a capacity is not alteration. For if alteration is, as has
been stated,256 change from one form to another, the first perishing
and the second coming into existence, and if that which is advancing
25 towards its own actualisation is developing not into something else
but into itself, while remaining the same thing and only revealing a
74,1 capacity by means of the actualisation, then the mobilisation of an
activity is not an alteration or a movement or change of any kind at
all. And should it be important to someone, he says, to apply the word
alteration to this sort of thing too, this would be another kind of
alteration going under the same name and not the kind that we refer
to when we talk about qualitative change. It would be like saying that 5
night-time colour alters when, as darkness retreats, it becomes vis-
ible after previously being invisible.
But we are not discussing terminology but whether some kind of
change or alteration of form really comes about in a subject when it 10
mobilises an activity out of a capacity; and we have shown that this
does not happen. And if this kind of thing is not an alteration, nor is
it movement or change of any kind at all. There are three species of
movement: local; in growth and decay; and in alteration. It goes
without saying that anything engaging in the activity of production
after previously not producing is not exhibiting either of the first two
kinds of movement. It is neither growing nor decaying nor changing 15
from place to place. Therefore that which mobilises an activity out of
a capacity does not move in any manner at all.
Aristotle says the same things again word for word both in the 20
third book of this same work and in other places, but what has been
cited already will be enough on its own for those who are not wholly
contentious.
8. Now that these facts have been demonstrated, how could one
fail to be amazed, as I said at the outset,257 at the trickiness258 of the 25
great Proclus in argument? Although the facts speak so clearly for
themselves, and although pretty well everyone accepts Aristotle’s 75,1
arguments both in regard to the different senses of potential and
actual and [when he says] that that which mobilises an activity out
of a capacity undergoes no alteration or movement, the philosopher
takes no account of this – although no one would be so bold as to 5
impute ignorance of such theories to him. [Instead] he has made it his
one goal to arm himself by all available means against the truth of
our Scriptures and, arguing against us as though we are novices in 10
these matters, in the chapter before this has stitched together a
fallacious argument based on the ambiguity of potentiality and activ-
ity and in the present one has dared to say that that which at first
does not produce but subsequently does produce (that is to say, that
which initiates the activity of producing out of the capacity to pro- 15
duce) undergoes movement and change (that is to say, alteration), so
that he can then draw the conclusion that it is necessary either that
the divine should be in movement (that is to say, should alter) or, if
that is impossible – for ‘with God’, as the Holy Scriptures some- 20
where259 say, ‘there is no change of position or shadow cast by turning’
– that the world should have coexisted from everlasting with the
being of God.
So if it is not through movement that the mobilisation of an activity
out of a capacity takes place, it is possible for there to be a world at
one time and not at another even though God remains entirely 25
unmoving and unchanging.
9. But, he claims, the very fact of saying that he at first did not
produce but subsequently produced, that is, that he at first had the
capacity alone but subsequently [engaged in] the activity as well as
76,1 [having] the capacity, does away with [the doctrine] that God is
completely unchanging. For he will not always be the same and
unchanging if he produces at one time but not at another.
Well, in the first place, my fine fellow, our own argument has
demonstrated perfectly well, and the testimony of Aristotle con-
firmed, that the advance from a capacity to the second [kind of]
activity constitutes neither an alteration nor a movement even in
5 generated creatures, much less in God. For alteration makes its
subject different, but someone who possesses a perfected capacity and
then acts [in accordance with it] has not become different in any
respect from his [former] self.
10 But perhaps what gives rise to this notion of yours, or, better,
provides [you with] the material for producing fallacious arguments,
is the fact that among us [human beings] those who are in possession
of skills260 also invariably have need of physical movement of the body
when they want to engage in the activities that correspond to their
capacities because they cannot achieve the appropriate outcomes by
15 pure thought alone and as a result move into261 a different state of
some kind, not in the mental sphere but in the physical, I mean in the
body. It is because of this that you hold up in front of the young like
20 some kind of bugaboo [the idea] that a different state of some kind
must inevitably come about in God too if he subsequently produces
after at first not producing.
But if God is always the perfect creator of all things by virtue of
always unchangingly possessing the principles for created things and
producing all things just by willing [them] without the need of any
25 [physical] organ to bring things into being, he will not become in the
least different from his [former] self whether he produces or does not
produce. For he everlastingly possesses the concepts and principles of
things, through which indeed he is a creator, in exactly the same way,
and does not become different in any respect whether he produces or
77,1 does not produce. For, speaking generally, it is not even proper to say
that capacity and activity are different [things] in the case of God; the
two are one and the same thing and difference arises in the sphere of
that which shares [in them].
5 But I shall go back a little and try to make what I am saying clear
by means of an illustration. Every skill has two aspects; one is to be
observed in the state of mind which we call reflection or thought,262
the other goes forth into the outside world, as when we communicate
10 our thoughts to others. When we possess skills only through thinking
and reflecting, we are said to possess them as a capacity, but when
we project the mind’s reflection into the outside world, whether by
means of words,263 as is the case with the verbal skills (we call this
teaching), or by manual activity, as is the case with the practical ones,
we are then said to be making active use of those capacities.264 In the 15
case of the verbal skills, if one were to imagine our minds on their
own, stripped (gumnas) of [our] bodies, one would see that they no
longer needed any [physical] organ to reveal their private thoughts to
one another. They would make direct contact with each other’s naked 20
(gumnois)265 thoughts, so that there would no longer be any difference
between reflecting in the area of a capacity and actively engaging
with someone else on the basis of that [same] thought, and the
resulting altered state would occur in someone else,266 [namely,] the
person who is aware of the other person’s thoughts.267 And if the mind
were able in the case of reflections with a practical bearing to bring
the fulfilments of those thoughts into being by pure thought alone
without any [physical] organ whenever it wished, then surely in that 25
case too thinking about things and having the capacity for them
would in no way differ from activity and action based on them. Since 78,1
God, then, has no need of any [physical] organ for bringing things into
being, but brings all things into existence by pure thought alone
whenever he wills it, and since God possesses the concepts of things 5
neither more nor less in consequence of their being or not being, it
would follow that in God’s case capacity and activity in no way differ.
But just because he brings all things into existence by thought
alone and always possesses the concepts and principles of all things
in exactly the same way, it is not therefore at once necessary that
things should have coexisted with the thoughts of God from everlast- 10
ing. We have also shown this in chapter two.268 For God does not bring
his creations into existence willy-nilly by a necessity of nature in the 15
way that the sun illuminates and fire heats as soon as they are
present by an involuntary necessity of nature. The cause of all things
is above all necessity, for which reason it is not at all necessary that
whatever is thought by God should [automatically] exist simultane-
ously with the thought. For it is agreed that God knows even future
things that have not yet come to pass, as for example the number and 20
nature of the souls that will participate again in this bodily life, and
what kind of life each will choose, and what things will follow upon
the choice of each by [the dispensation] of unerring providence. And
even future time is already present through foreknowledge to the
creator of time himself. Even the future revolutions of the heavenly
bodies and what their relations to one another will be at any given 25
time – for the relation of the stars to one another is different at
different times – are clearly comprehended as an undivided whole by
the foreknowledge of God. God will not be ignorant of these things, of
which he is himself, without any intermediary, the creator. So if
future things are grasped by the thought of God before they come to 79,1
be, and if future things do not yet exist, for otherwise they would not
be future things, there is no necessity that a thing should exist the
moment God thinks of it.
And so, as has been shown, the creative principles for things
5 [which are] within God always possess actuality and perfection but
God brings each thing into existence and gives it being when he so
wishes, bringing all things into existence just by willing them; and he
so wishes at the time when coming into existence is good for the
things that come into existence; and what is in accordance with
nature is in every way good, and, as was shown in chapter one,269 it
10 is in accordance with nature for generated things that they not be
co-everlasting with him who brought them into existence – unless
they will claim that even to wish [something] at one time and not at
another is alteration. And if this is alteration, they will be inadvert-
15 ently committing themselves to the position that God is always in
process of alteration.270
10. For, [we ask], does God want271 each individual such as Socra-
tes and Plato to be everlasting, or not, preferring that each of them
should exist at one time and not exist at another? Clearly he does not
20 want individual things to be everlasting, for they certainly would be
everlasting if he so wished. Therefore at one time he wants an
individual thing to exist and at another he does not want it to exist.
And if this is so, he is always undergoing alteration. For if wishing
the same [state of affairs] to exist at one time and not wishing it to at
25 another is to alter, and if at one time God did not wish the soul of, let
us say, Socrates to be together with the body of Socrates,272 since
80,1 Socrates was not everlasting, but at another time, when he bound it
to the body of Socrates, did so wish, and then once again did not wish
it, when he released it from the body, then clearly, by wishing the
same thing at one time and not wishing it at another, the creator has,
5 according to them, undergone alteration. And the same argument
[will apply] to all individual things. So if there are always some
individual things coming to be and others perishing, he clearly always
wishes some things to exist and others not to exist. But this, accord-
ing to them, is change and alteration. So according to them God will
10 always be undergoing alteration. For they will certainly not claim
that he neither wishes them to come to be nor does not wish them to
come to be. For [then] both sides of a contradiction will be true at the
same time, which is impossible. And besides, if he does not wish them
to come to be, how do they come to be? And if he does not wish them
15 not to come to be, he clearly wishes them to come to be, for negation
with reversal is equivalent to simple affirmation.273 And further, if he
did not wish them to come to be, how is it that according to Plato’s
Timaeus274 he ordered the heavenly [gods] to turn to the creation of
mortal creatures, and not only ordered them [to turn to their creation]
20 but gave them the power to produce? And, moreover, if it is in the
nature of the creative cause to exercise providence, and providence
either binds souls to bodies or releases them from bodies as is best
[for them], it is clear that he sometimes wishes them to be with bodies
and sometimes to be separated from bodies. And this, so these learned
men believe, is alteration. [And] therefore, according to them, the 25
divine is always undergoing alteration.
But if this is absurd, then to wish something to be at one time and
not to so wish at another is not [to undergo] alteration. For [the
divine] always wishes the good, or rather it is goodness. And the 81,1
nature of generated things partakes of the emanation of the good
from that source (ekeithen) as far as is possible for generated things.
If, then, to will something that comes about to the advantage of its
beneficiaries, does not work any alteration in the divine, and if God 5
always possesses creative power in the same measure and brings all
things into being just by willing them, no alteration will be appre-
hended in God as a result of his producing at one time and not
producing at another, for he always wills good things. So whether he 10
produces a thing or does not produce it, it is invariably for the good;
he makes each thing that comes to be as good as the nature of
generated things permits. The will of God is therefore one and simple
and is always the same and unchanging, for he always wills the good.
It is in the sphere of things that partake of it [sc. God’s will] that 15
change and alteration are observed.
To take a similar case, the power of the sun, whether one prefers
to think of its power of illuminating or of heating, is one and simple,
but the things that partake of either [power] do not partake [of it] in
the same manner and nor does any one [of them] always partake of
the same [power] in the same manner; a bat and a man do so 20
differently, and the same man does so differently when his eyes are
unhealthy and when they are healthy, or when he has been continu-
ously in the light and when he suddenly moves from a dark place to
one that is lit up.275
Therefore change and alteration in the things that share in [an
activity]276 will not compel us to suppose that any alteration takes
place on the side of the agent (to poioun). And if God does not alter as 25
a result of not producing and then producing, nor will he have need
of time to produce, but will bring all things into existence at the
instant he wills them.
11. Now that this last point has been demonstrated, the following 82,1
[argument], which they continually trot out to the young with decep-
tive intent, is refuted by these [same arguments]. If, [their argument
goes], the world does not always exist, before the world came to be
God was [only] potentially a creator, and everything in potentiality is 5
imperfect, so that God too was imperfect before he created277 and
became perfect [only] when he had created, for everything in actuality
is, they say, more perfect than [anything] in potentiality. [And]
indeed the learned Proclus himself is hinting at this very [position] in
10 the present argument when he says ‘so as not to be, by moving, at first
imperfect and subsequently perfect’,278 and again, ‘if he says that it is
in movement rather than unmoving, he says that it is not always
perfect but is at some time imperfect’.279 And moreover in the work
15 entitled An Examination of Aristotle’s Criticisms of Plato’s Timaeus
Proclus writes, [to quote him] word for word, as follows:280
If there is always a producer, there is also always something

coming to be which comes to be through the agency of him who
is always producing. For either not even God always produces,
or he does always produce but the universe is not always coming
to be, or he always produces and the universe is always coming
20 to be. But if God does not always produce, clearly he will [at first]
be potentially producing and then actually producing and
[therefore] an imperfect creator and [one who] needs time [in
which to produce]. And if he always produces, but the universe
comes to be [only] at some [particular] time, it is impossible;281
for whenever that which produces is actually [producing], that
which comes to be is also actually coming to be. Therefore of the
25 two the one is always coming to be, the other producing.
And how on earth, my learned friend, can something which, as has

been shown, undergoes no alteration whether it is creating or not be
83,1 imperfect? In what respect does a teacher become more perfect when
teaching than he was when not teaching or a builder when building
than when not building? Look at the matter this way. The sun is a
kind of bright and luminous body. If one [hypothetically] assumed
5 that none of the things that share in the luminous power of the sun
existed (as though the heavenly bodies and the air were not translu-
cent and could not benefit from the energy of the light), would the sun
10 be imperfect? I do not believe that anyone would say so. The powers
that are constitutive of substances do not have their being in their
relation to external things. [If we did adopt such a position], we would
be unwittingly accepting Anaxagoras’ argument that nothing has a
definite nature but all things have their existence in their relation to
one other.282 And this kind of position has been vigorously refuted by
15 both Plato and Aristotle.283 If, then, each substance has its being not
in its relation to something else, but has the powers which constitute
it within itself independent [of anything else], it clearly follows that
20 the sun too would be complete in its own being even if none of the
things that partake of its illuminative power existed. Therefore, even
should they partake [of it], it will not be the least bit greater in regard
to its constitutive powers. And the same applies in the case of the
heating power of fire: even if there is nothing that is being heated, fire
25 is nonetheless complete under the definition of its essence, and,
conversely, when something is being heated, it will not be any more
complete, since heat is not present to fire or the power of illuminating 84,1
to the sun relationally; for powers which are constitutive of sub-
stances, [those] without which [their] substratum could not survive, 5
inhere in things independently and without relation [to anything
else]. Even at the bottom of the sea a shell has the principle of colour
in its entirety, even though it does not come under observation.284 And
if these things are so in the case of corporeal things, how can someone
who does not even concede as much to the creative cause of existing
things and does not want its essential powers to be independent of 10
external relations be other than truly blasphemous and egregiously
impious? For just as fire is hot and the sun bright by nature and of
themselves but they heat or illuminate in their relation to external
things, so assuredly is God always a creator by virtue of his perfect
possession of creative principles (as is a builder even though he is not 15
building), whereas he creates only when he also directs his own
activity outwards, no longer being constituted by it. For everything
in existence is characterised not by the activities that proceed from it 20
but by its essential powers. Man is capable of speech by virtue of
having the capacity and it is by virtue of this that he has his being,
not by virtue of speaking; if he does not speak, he is nonetheless
capable of speech, and snow is cold even if it is not cooling [anything]
because there is nothing present to be cooled. And the same applies
for each and every activity. 25
But if they persist in claiming that God can only be perfect if he
has created the world from everlasting, let them answer one small
question for us.
12. Is it or is it not the case that the divine is self-sufficient and 85,1
constitutive of its own power and substance? If it is not self-sufficient
– let the blasphemy be on the heads of others! If it is self-sufficient
and suffices for itself so that it is in want of nothing and perfect and
stands in need of nothing outside itself – for everything that has been 5
brought into being by the divine substance through an act of creation
is completely external to it and removed from any essential relation
to it – then God will be perfect, being perfected through his own 10
agency even should none of his creations exist.
Another argument. Either the perfection and absence of need of
the divine substance are present in it from within from its own
resources and have need of absolutely no external impulse, or they
are supplied from some other source. If they [are supplied from] some
other source, the supplier is more blessed than the recipient and 15
greatly superior and more free of need. For how could it have given
what it did not have? So what is this [other source]? What else,
according to them, than created things, without which, they do not
fear to claim, God would not be perfect? For if God cannot be perfect
unless created things also exist, then his products will be perfective 20
of the producer himself. Such, then, is the situation if perfection has
come to God not from his own substance but from outside. But if [it
comes] from nowhere outside – for this is taken for granted even by
those with the most inadequate285 ideas about God – and his absence
25 of need and perfection have come to God from his very substance, but
86,1 he could not be perfect unless things brought into being by him are
always coexistent with him, then all things are part of the divine
substance, even the very least of things, matter. For things that are
constitutive of substances are parts of substances. For if it was agreed
5 earlier that perfection is present in God from his very substance, and
if, on the hypotheses of the Hellenes, God could not be perfect unless
the world existed together with him from everlasting, and if things
which are constitutive and perfective of substances are parts of
[those] substances, as the rational faculty is of man and the hand
10 [and] the foot of our body, then the world will be part of the substance
of God. They can work out the consequences of this themselves. For,
if it is so, God will be body and will be affected by all that goes with
bodies.286
Another argument. If perfection could not be present in God unless
15 things have existed along with him from everlasting, God will get
back from the things he creates more than he gives them. He will give
them being but get back from them perfect being, and it is much
better to be perfect that simply to be. And so God will create things
20 not as a result of his own goodness, so that there will be things to
share in it, but so that he can lead a life without pain or need with the
cause of his perfection always alongside him, just as we, for instance,
for our own protection, produce dwellings and clothing and the like,
25 not so as to benefit these things, but providing for our own comfort.
These learned men then have, by means [of the very arguments]
by which they intended to ascribe perfection to him, inadvertently
87,1 represented God as imperfect and not himself sufficing for his own
perfection but dependent on things that are brought into being
through his own agency for his existence.
But perhaps someone will say to this: ‘We are not saying that it is
the [created] things that contribute to God’s perfection, but rather the
5 activity creative of all things which is present in God as part of his
essence, of which the existence of things is an inevitable conse-
quence.’ But no less absurd consequences follow from this too. If his
activity is imperfect if nothing has come into existence, and if God is
10 not perfect if his activity is imperfect, then his perfection has come to
him from created things via his activity. But, men of wisdom, activi-
ties in relation to external things are not perfective of those who act.
For this reason Aristotle himself says287 that a teacher, and in general
15 anyone engaged in any activity at all, does not undergo alteration as
a result of externally directed activity, since a thing that is being
perfected has something done to it and is altered, but, as we have
often shown, one who acts has nothing done to him and undergoes no
alteration. And so even a teacher is not being perfected when he
teaches. And if teaching is not perfective of the teacher’s [already]
perfected capacity, neither will creating be constitutive of the crea- 20
tor’s substance. Only his creative capacity or power itself will be, lest
the being of God should lie in his relation to created things. For if
creating is constitutive of the divine substance, and if creating has its 88,1
being in relation to created things – for he who creates creates by
being the creator of created things – then the divine substance will
find its completion and perfection in its relation to created things.
And this being so, it would have need for its existence of things to 5
which it has itself given being. And what could have a more sacri-
legious effect on our notion of God than this?
So if thinking or saying this sort of thing about God is the extrem-
ity of impiety, and if the statement ‘if the world does not always exist,
God will be imperfect before the world comes to be’ has led to this, 10
then God is perfect even when none of the things brought into being
by him [yet] exists.
13. It is also of value to look at the matter this way.
The doctrine that the origin of things is single compels belief that 15
God is the cause of all things from the first to the last. ‘All things’,
says Plato, ‘exist in relation to the king of all, and all things exist on
his account, and he288 is the cause of all beautiful things.’289 And he
further says that God embraces the beginning, the end and the
middle of things.290 ‘The rule of many is not a good thing; let there be
one ruler’, as both Homer and Aristotle hold.291 For even if some of the 20
things that come to be come to be through the agency of certain
intermediate causes, it is nevertheless quite clear that what is most
of all their cause is the primary cause of their existence, which also
furnishes the intermediate causes with the power to be causes. 25
That the primary cause is more a cause than the immediate cause 89,1
is clear from the facts themselves, if it has, as I said,292 even furnished
the secondary causes with the power to be causes. But there is
nothing like [being able] to cite Aristotle to exactly the same effect. 5
For in the eighth book of the Physics, after saying293 that something
which is moved is moved by a mover and that the mover either moves
[it] directly or through [one or] more intermediaries, as when one
moves a door with a stick – where the first mover is the soul and the
last the stick, for the soul moves the hand, the hand the stick, and the 10
stick the door – after saying this, he concludes as follows:294
We say that both these [earlier movers] and the last impart
movement, for they move the last but not on account of that the
first, and without the first [mover] the last will not impart 15
movement, but the first will without [the last]: the stick, for
example, will not impart movement if the man does not impart
movement [to it].295
And again a little further on296 he says:
For it is clear that everything that is moved is moved by a mover

20 that is earlier [in the series], and more so by the first of these
movers.
And again a little further on:297
There will be no first mover if each of the two [parts] is to move

itself; for that which is earlier [in the series of movers] will be
more the cause of the movement than that which follows it and
90,1 will more [truly] impart movement; for there were two ways to
impart movement, (1) by being oneself moved by something else,
and (2) by oneself; and that which is further from the thing that
is moved is closer to the source [of movement] than that which
is intermediate.
In these passages he clearly states that even if there are a number

of intermediate movers it is, as is the case in the example he has
5 provided, the first cause of the movement that is more a cause298 of
the movement. For the soul is more the cause of the door’s moving
than is the stick, and for this reason he rightly says that the more
10 remote mover is closer to the thing that is moved, as the soul is closer
to the door than is the stick, not in place but through its power and
by being more the cause of the movement.299 Since, then, the soul is
the first cause of the movement, he says that the soul is closer to the
door than is the stick.
15 And what Aristotle says about movement is also clearly true of
every cause. Even should a teacher teach using an actor as an
intermediary, the teacher is more the cause of the [the pupil] being
taught than is the actor who plays the part of a teacher.
20 And the same applies to generation. The first cause of generation
is more a cause than the more immediate causes. Even though the
father is a cause of generation, God, who sows the creative power in
nature, is clearly more the cause. (Even if they do not want the
25 creator to be the first cause, since their ‘first god’ is the cause of the
91,1 creator’s being a creator, he in turn would be the chief cause of the
existence of all [other] things as well.)
So, in view of these proofs, there is every necessity that the first
5 god should also be the cause of the generation of particular things,
even if they assume ten thousand intermediate causes.
And moreover in chapter two we cited passages from Proclus’ own
work On Ten Puzzles About Providence in which Proclus clearly
10 states that the creative and provident power of God extends to the
meanest and most insignificant of things. Here is what he says:
In summary, then, we claim that this unity produces all things
and sustains all things and that it has an existence more real
than all being and clearer than all knowledge.300
And again:
But it [sc. the unity of providence], remaining stationary and

undivided in [its] oneness, also knows all things in this same 15
mode, and not only man and sun and everything whatsoever of
that kind, but also each particular thing. For nothing escapes
that unity, whether it is a question of its being or of its being
known.301
And again:
Thus the unitary knowledge of providence is, in the same un- 20

divided [entity], the knowledge of all divided things, both of all
that are most individual and of all that are most universal; and
just as it has caused each thing to exist in unity, so does it know
each in unity.302
From all of this, then, it is clear that the creative power of God 25
necessarily reaches to the most individual of things.
14. Since, then, God is the cause of the existence of the particular 92,1
and most individual, such as Socrates and Plato and this horse and
this plant, let them tell us whether or not God is always the actual
creator of all individuals. If, on the one hand, he is always303 the 5
actual creator of all things, how is it that all things are not present at
the same time, but some have perished, some exist [now], and some
are going to [exist in the future]? And if he is the actual creator of
future things, how is it that future things are not [now] present? But
if he is a potential [creator], and the potential is in their view 10
imperfect, then God is in their view always imperfect, if it is always
the case that of individual things some perish and others are yet to
come into existence. And if, as the learned Proclus holds, [it is the case
that] if the world exists potentially, its creator too will exist poten-
tially (as he argues in the third proof304), and because of this there is 15
need of another [creator] to bring him to actuality, and if, on the one
hand, the second one is actual, the first one too must be an actual
creator, but if the second too is potential, there is, he says, once more
need of another, third, [creator],305 and so on ad infinitum, [then] it
certainly follows on the same hypothesis, if306 the proximate cause of 20
future individuals is307 a potential cause, that the cause of the proxi-
mate cause is potential as well, and making our way in this fashion
all the way to the first [cause], we shall be compelled to say that it too
is potential; for if the first cause is the actual cause of the existence 25
of the second, the second too will be an actual cause, and if this is so,
the third in its turn will be an actual cause, and so on until the last
93,1 cause, just as, if the last cause, the father for example, is potential,
the first too will necessarily be potential. Since, then, some individu-
als are going to come to be (I mean men and plants and all the rest),
5 the proximate cause of their generation is clearly a potential cause;
and so the cause of their cause too will be potential, and likewise all
the way to the first [cause]. And everything potential is, according to
them, imperfect. So, according to them, the first cause will always be
10 potential and imperfect. For even if God is the actual creator of things
that have already come into existence, he will certainly be the poten-
tial [creator] of future things. So either one must admit that
potentiality based on [the possession of] a capacity is perfect or God
will certainly always be an imperfect creator of future things; for he
will always be a potential creator of future things.
15 And this must be the case not only in the creation of particulars
but of universals too, of which God is the creator without any inter-
mediary; for, as Plato says, the creator brought the heaven and all the
species into being without any intermediary. At any rate, in the
Timaeus,308 after the generation of man, the creator spoke to the
20 intelligible and perceptible gods of the heaven, the sun and the moon
and the rest, to this effect. Here is the passage:
When all of the gods, both those who revolve unseen and those
who are visible when they so will, had come to be, he who
25 fathered this universe addressed them as follows: ‘Gods, off-
94,1 spring of gods, works of which I am the creator and father }.’309
And a little further on:310
‘Listen now to my instructions. Three kinds of mortal beings still

remain ungenerated. If they do not come to be, the heaven will
5 be imperfect, for it will not have within it every kind of living
creature, and it must if it is going to be fully perfect. But if they
were to come to be and receive life through my agency, they
would be equal to the gods. Therefore in order that they may be
mortal and that this universe may truly be a universe, turn, in
accordance with your [respective] natures, to the creation of
10 living creatures, imitating the power I used in your generation.
I shall make a beginning by sowing in them the part of them
which is called divine (in so far as anything in them is appropri-
ately named for the immortal gods), and the guiding principle,
[and then] I shall hand them over.’
If, then, everything in the heaven, and in general everything that

is in their opinion everlasting, is brought into existence by the creator
without any intermediary, is God always bringing them into exist- 15
ence, or has he stopped bringing them into existence, having created
them once and for all, thereafter [only] preserving and maintaining
them?
Now, if he has stopped bringing them into existence, he definitely
also began; for everything that has ceased must certainly also have 20
begun. But if he is always creating – for this is what they believe, as
Proclus himself has stated a number of times in what has preceded;
in the third proof,311 for example, he says: ‘Now, if the creator is
always a creator in actuality, that which is being created will likewise
always be [in the process of] being created in actuality’; and again in 25
the same [proof]:312 ‘it follows that its effects are always in a state of
actualisation too and that the world is always [in the process] of being 95,1
created’; and he says the same in the fourth and fifth [proofs], and in
the recently cited313 work which he wrote against Aristotle’s interpre-
tation of the Timaeus Proclus says, [to quote his] exact words, ‘the
world is always [in the process of] being created’, and ‘just as the 5
creator has always created and is [always] creating, so has the world
always been created314 and [so] is it always being created, and [it is
always] coming to be [although] it has [already] come to be, and
although it has [already] come to be, it is [nevertheless] always
coming to be’, and, a little further on, ‘and so the world is always being
created, and just as [the creator] has always created and is [always] 10
creating, so has the world always been created and [so] is it always
being created, and [it is always] coming to be [although] it has
[already] come to be, and although it has [already] come to be, it is
[nevertheless] always coming to be’ – if, then, this is true, I am
amazed that he has not seen that he will be hoist with his own petard.315
For if God has both created the world already and is creating it now, 15
and for this reason the world for its part has already come to be and
is coming to be now and will come to be in the time to come because
it does not have its entire existence present to it all at once as eternal
things do but parcelled out along with time, it is, one assumes,
necessary that the [world] that is coming to be now should, in so far 20
as it is [in the process of] coming to be, have existed potentially before
being present in the here and now. For if it had actual existence
earlier as well, it did not have actual existence in respect of its present
existence, but in respect of its having come to be and existed then; for
if it had actual existence earlier in respect of its coming to be and 25
existing now before being present in the here and now, the world
would not always be in the process of coming to be and its being is not
divided up along with the division of time, but it has its existence all
at once as eternal things do.
But not even Proclus believes that this is the nature of the exist- 96,1
ence of the world. At any rate, in the work that has [just] been cited,
he says:
And if Timaeus calls the world ‘a god that is going to exist at
some time’316 – [which] could perhaps cause some to worry that
5 he may be attributing generation within a part of time to it, for
‘some time’ is a part of time – we must say that everything that
is in time, whether infinite or finite [time], will always exist at
some [particular] time; for as much of it as there is [at a given
time] is in a particular [part of] time;317 for time does not exist
all at once but bit by bit.318 So if something is in time, even if it
10 lasts for an infinite time, it [always] exists at some [particular]
time – but it comes to be ad infinitum, not at some [particular]
time,319 always changing from one [particular] time to another
[particular] time; and it has existed at a [particular] time [in the
past], and it exists at a [particular] time [now], and it will exist
at a [particular] time [in the future]; and this ‘[particular] time’
is always a different one, but nevertheless it is in the [particu-
15 lar] time it is in. So that which has its existence in a part of time
comes to be at some [particular] time and exists at some [par-
ticular] time and will exist at some [particular] time; but that
which [has its existence] in the whole of time exists at some
[particular] time but is always coming to be, mimicking by
always coming to be that which always is.
If, then, as Proclus himself believes, the world, on account of its

20 being in time, always exists at some [particular] time (because320 as
much of the world as is in existence exists in some part of time, since
the whole of time does not exist at once but [only] bit by bit), and [if]
it [sc. the world] is always passing from one [particular] time to
another [particular] time, and just as it was at a [particular] time and
is now at a [particular] time, so will it be at a [particular] time, and
97,1 what will exist at a [particular] time, in so far as it is going to exist
at a [particular] time, does not now as yet actually exist, since neither
does the part of time that is going to exist at some time [in the future]
actually exist now (for [otherwise] the future would already be actu-
5 ally present), [then] it is, one assumes, necessary that the existence
of the world that is to occur at some time [in the future] should be a
potential [existence] now. And likewise therefore he who is the cause
of the future existence of the world is its potential cause now; for just
as the fact that the world already actually exists at a point in time
does not prevent it from having potential existence, since, because its
10 existence is parceled out along with time, it is going to exist at some
time [in the future], in the same way the fact that he has already
actually been its cause, in that it has already existed, does not
prevent him who is the cause of the existence of the world from being
so potentially in that he will be the cause of its being again; for that
which produces must have the same status as that which comes to be,
15 and, conversely, that which comes to be as that which produces, as
Proclus himself has often said321 in what has gone before; for if,
because the world will exist at some time [in the future], God is now
its actual cause, and when that which causes and produces is actual,
that which is caused and comes to be will also be actual, as we have
recently heard Proclus say322 in the passages we have just quoted, 20
then even the existence of the world that is to occur at some time [in
the future] will [already] be actual now; and so the future time in
which the future existence of the world will at some point occur will 25
also be actual now; [and] therefore the future is already actually
present, which is ridiculous and impossible. Therefore it is not possi-
ble for God to be the actual creator of the world now on the ground
that it is going to exist at some time [in the future]. Therefore if, 98,1
because the world is going to exist at some time [in the future], it does
not yet exist actually but only potentially, then he who is the cause of
its future existence is, in relation to its future coming to be, now its
potential cause, since God is also in the here and now the potential
cause of future time. And there will always be [future] time and the 5
world will always be going to exist at some [future] time, so God too
will always be the potential cause of both time and the world; for just
as the fact that he has already built does not prevent a builder from
being the potential builder of things that are to be built in the future,
but in so far as he has built he is an actual builder and in so far as he 10
is going to build a potential [builder], so too, one assumes, is God, in
so far as he has brought the world and time323 into existence, their
actual cause, but in so far as the world and time are going to exist at
some time [in the future], he was and is their potential cause; and the 15
world and time are always going to exist at some time in the future,
so God will always be their potential creator.
So, because of the expert nature of their reasoning and the una- 20
voidability of its truth, the more inferior and imperfect it is to be
always potential than to be so [only] on one occasion, the deeper does
their hypothesis of the continuous generation of the world fall into
absurdity.
15. It is, I believe, worth looking closely at Proclus’ villainous way
with arguments in the words we have just quoted324 as well.
Having seen where the argument is heading, I mean, of course, to
the [conclusion] that the creator is always potential, he attempts to 25
mask this by the ingenuity of his argument, but even so he is readily
exposed by the truth. For having said325 ‘everything that is in time, 99,1
whether infinite or finite [time], always exists at some [particular]
time, because as much of it as there is [at a given time] is in a
particular [part of] time,326 for time does not exist all at once but bit
by bit’ and again327 ‘if something is in time, even if it lasts for an 5
infinite time, it exists at some [particular] time’ and328 ‘it is always
moving from one [particular] time to another, and it existed at a
[particular] time, and exists at a [particular] time, and will exist at a
[particular] time’ and329 ‘the “[particular] time” is always a different
one, but nevertheless it is in the [particular] time it is in’ – having
made these statements, and seeing, as I said,330 that on his hypo-
10 theses he who is the cause of something that is going to exist at some
time in the future must, in so far as it is going to exist at some time
in the future, be its potential cause in the here and now (certainly not
its actual one, if it is indeed impossible for something that is going to
exist, in so far as it is in the future, to be actual in the here and now),
wanting to mask this he adds that it exists at some [particular] time,
15 but comes to be indefinitely rather than at some [particular] time,
and [says] next331 ‘that, then, which has its existence in a part of time
comes to be at some [particular] time and exists at some [particular]
time and will exist at some [particular] time, but that which [has its
existence] in the whole of time exists at some particular time but is
always coming to be’, so that by saying that it comes to be332 always
and not at some [particular] time he could avoid, or so he supposed,
saying that the creator of that which comes to be is a potential
[creator].
20 And yet, if the world does indeed always exist in a continuous and
uninterrupted [state of] generation and has its being in coming to be,
if it comes to be not at some [particular] time but always, it will exist
not at some [particular] time but always; for its being has its exist-
ence in its coming to be. But if, because the world exists in time and
100,1 does not have the whole of its appointed existence present to it all at
once as eternal things do (because neither does the whole of time exist
at once as eternity does), the world is for that reason always in a
[particular] time, and was at some [particular] time and is at some
[particular] time and will be at some [particular] time, always moving
5 from one particular time to another particular time, and its being is
the same thing as its coming to be, it necessarily follows that just as
it was at some [particular] time and is at some [particular] time and
will be at some [particular] time, so did it come to be at some
[particular] time and so is it coming to be at a [particular] time and
so will it come to be at a [particular] time; for it only participates in
10 being by coming to be. So if its coming to be is the same thing as its
being or if its coming to be is the cause of its being, there is every
necessity that its coming to be should have the same characteristics
as its being – should it be the same thing, for that very reason, and
should it be [its] cause because they too believe that a cause has the
15 same characteristics as its effect, and, conversely, an effect as its
cause. And so if the world exists at a [particular] time it necessarily
also comes to be at a [particular] time.
And quite apart from its coming to be, just to say that the world
will exist at some time [in the future], unless it is going to exist
20 without a creative cause, renders it necessary,333 on their own hypo-
theses, that the cause of the future [world], since it is future, be
potential now. So if it is the case that the world is always going to
exist in the future because time is also going to, it is necessary that
the cause of that which is always going to exist, in so far as it is going
to exist, be a potential [cause]. And so, even without saying that the
world will be coming to be in the future, the argument is, thanks to
their own irrefutable reasoning, reduced to the same absurdity, I
mean to [the conclusion] that God is always a potential creator and 25
always imperfect. [And] therefore not even by ingenuity has Proclus
been able to obscure the absurdity of their hypotheses.
16. If, as pious conceptions of God have it, God himself is his own 101,1
plenitude and he has need of none of the things334 he has brought into
existence for his perfection, it is clear that he does not derive anything 5
that contributes to his perfection from the existence of things and
that he will not be any less perfect than he is335 if they do not exist,
if,336 as Plotinus holds, even things that do not yet exist are present
as existing things to God. In fact, we earlier337 quoted a passage of his
from his treatise On the Intelligibles, or, On the Good,338 which is
worth looking at again now. In it, speaking of God’s creative power, 10
he says:339
But surely if it is necessary that each activity [of his] should not
be incomplete and it is not right to think of anything belonging
to God as other than whole and entire, all things must be
present in anything of his. So existing for ever must be too. So 15
the future must already be present too. There is no later in that
[place]; what is already present there comes to be later else-
where. If, therefore, the future is already present, it is
necessarily present as having been provided for with a view to
later [time]; that means that nothing will need for anything 20
then, that nothing will be left out. All things, then, already
existed and always existed and existed in such a way that one
could say later that this exists on account of that. When it is
extended and, as it were, unfolded, it can reveal this after that,
but when it is together, it is all ‘this’; that is, it has its cause too
within itself. 25
If, then, as the philosopher Plotinus holds, that which is going to exist
but has not yet come to be is already present in God and nothing is
later as far as he is concerned, but what is going to exist later is 102,1
already present for God and is always present and is present as
having been provided for with a view to later time, and if because of
this every activity of God is perfect in that it grasps what is going to 5
exist later through foreknowledge, so that God’s activity does not fall
short in any respect or need for anything when it eventually brings
into existence what was previously in the future – if these things are
true, they must, one assumes, accept [that] the same things [are true]
even if the world has its existence from some beginning. And so,
10 clearly, even before the world existed it was present to God as having
been provided for a later time. And for this reason God’s creative
activity is perfect in that nothing is later as far as God is concerned,
because what is going to exist later is already present to him through
15 foreknowledge, and in that he does not need to add anything else later
for the production of the world.
So since, on this showing, even they, in conformity with [our]
common conceptions about God, accept all of this, they can only be
entirely without shame and in contradiction of sound doctrine of their
own when they say that, unless the world is everlasting, its creator
20 will be imperfect before it comes to be, and that, when he creates it,
he will need time and will not be exempt from alteration. God, then,
since he is his own plenitude in every respect, will not make use of
anything arising from an external relation in perfecting himself.
25 The End of the Refutation of the Fourth Argument
103,1 The Fifth Argument of Proclus the Successor

The fifth and next340 [argument]: if time exists341 together with342 the
heaven and the heaven together with time, there is no heaven if there
is no time nor any time if there is no heaven.
5 But there was no ‘when’ time343 did not exist and there will be no
‘when’ it will not exist. For if there was a ‘when’ time did not exist,
time, as it seems, existed when time did not exist; for what exists at
some time344 is said to exist at some time because it does not exist at
another time, existing neither always nor never, but [somewhere]
between the two; and wherever there is ‘some time’ there is time. And
10 if there will be a ‘when’ there is no time because [time] has changed
from being [in existence] at one time to not being [in existence] at
another time, then, since time will not exist, there will then be time
when time does not exist; for ‘some time’ is temporal.345
So if there neither was a ‘when’ there was no time nor will be [one]
when there is none – for in either case, even though there is no time,
15 there will be a ‘some time’, which is [a part] of time, in existence –
then there is always time; for either [‘always’] or ‘never’ will be
opposed to ‘at some time’; it cannot be ‘never’, for time certainly
exists; so there is always time.
And the heaven does exist together with time and time together
with the heaven; for [time] is the measure of the movement of the
20 heaven, as eternity is of the life of the living-creature-itself. (In fact,
this of itself shows that time always exists, [for it must be so] so that
it will not be the case either that eternity, though remaining eternity,
is not a pattern for anything because there is no time, or that it does
not even itself have the [characteristic of] always remaining what it
is because it changes from not being a pattern to being one or to not
being one from being one). 25
So the heaven, like time, exists for ever,346 being born together with 104,1
time and having come to be neither before nor after time, but, as
[Plato] says,347 having existed and existing and going to exist for all
of time.
The Sections of the Refutation of the Fifth Argument

1. That Proclus sophistically highlights348 the inadequacy349 of the 5
words [employed] rather than the meaning of what is said.
2. That the time expression ‘some time’ does not in every case and
in every context350 indicate a segment of time.
3. That nor are the other time words always and everywhere 10
indicative of time.
4. That even if we say ‘there was some time when time did not
exist and there will be some time when it does not exist’, we are
understanding [the words] ‘was’ and ‘some time’ appropriately to the
nature of the subject and intending them to be indicative not of a 15
segment of time but of a sort of existence351 of eternity, in which there
neither was nor will be time.
5. That even if eternity were the pattern for time, there [would be]
no necessity that time should always exist as eternity always exists.
The Refutation of the Fifth Argument352 20

1. This proof too is excessively sophistical. He has directed his
response not to the sense of the text but to its wording. If, he says,
there was a ‘when’ time did not exist and there will be a ‘when’ it does
not exist, there was some time when time did not exist353 and there 25
will be some time when it does not exist. But, he says, ‘some time’ is
indicative of time and wherever there is354 ‘some time’ there is time.
Therefore there was time when time did not exist and there will be 105,1
time when time does not exist.
Thus argues the philosopher, even though he is not unaware that
words are not wholly able to image pure thought. What, then, if, to
evade his over-close scrutiny of the words, rather than say ‘there was 5
some time when time did not exist’ or ‘there will be some time when
[time] does not exist’, we simply [say] that there is not always time
but it has a beginning and an end to [its] existence? And if, when we
say this, the philosopher, so as to drag in the words ‘some time’,
argues that what does not always exist must, because it neither 10
always exists nor never exists, exist at some [particular] time and not
exist at another time, let him allow us to imitate his sophistical
manner [of arguing] and engage in a little wordplay [of our own]; for
15 Homer in his wisdom rightly holds355 that a man gets his own words
back. So let him evade his own sophistry as best he can.
2. Given, then, that part of time has passed and part is in the
future, will a future part of time such as tomorrow exist at some
20 [particular] time or not? For if tomorrow does not always exist, it will
exist at some [particular] time, since, to use [Proclus’] own words,356
‘either “always” or “never” will be opposed to “at some time” ’. So if
both of these alternatives are wrong (for what is in the future exists
neither always nor never, since it would no longer be in the future),
there is every necessity that it should exist at some [particular] time.
25 So if ‘at some [particular] time’ is indicative of time, and if the future
part of time is also time, then there will be a time when there is going
to be time. [And] therefore there [will be] a time in which future time
106,1 such as tomorrow will exist. And the same puzzle arises again in
regard to that [time]; for it too will exist either at some [particular]
time or always or never. And since ‘always’ and ‘never’ are wrong (for
‘some [particular] time’ refers to a part of time), some [particular]
time will exist at some [particular] time; but some [particular] time
5 is time; so this time too will be in time, and so on ad infinitum.
But in my opinion arguments, or rather fallacies, of this kind will
be better suited to boys at play, who, with little interest in the truth
10 or meaning of what is said, pull statements apart and manage to
obscure the drift of the argument by babbling on about its com-
ponents,357 rather than to men who claim to have some common
sense; for one should focus on the sense of what is said even when the
weakness of the language fails to achieve the accurate expression of
15 what is meant. So just as when we say here [in this present state-
ment] that a future part of time such as tomorrow will exist at some
time, we are not by [using the words] ‘at some time’ introducing any
[particular] time, even though [the word] ‘at some time’ is indicative
of a temporal signification, but only indicating that the future does
not always exist, in the same way, one supposes, even if one says that
20 time does not exist at some time or will not exist at some time, one is
not in saying ‘at some time’ referring to another time in which time
did not or will not exist but only indicating by ‘at some time’ that
[time] neither always exists nor never exists; for in terms of existence
‘at some time’ will be midway between ‘always’ and ‘never’. For if
25 when one says that time does not exist at some time ‘at some time’ is
indicative of time, then clearly when one says that the future segment
of time exists at some time, ‘at some time’ also signifies time; for to
exist at some time is the positive of to not exist at some time. So
107,1 whatever ‘at some time’ may mean in the affirmative it will also
necessarily mean in the negative. So if when one says that [some part
of] the future, such as tomorrow, exists at some time and not always,
5 ‘at some time’ does not in itself refer to any specific time, then neither
when one says that time does not exist at some time is ‘at some time’
indicative of any specific time; for just as in the case of a particular
time like tomorrow, which will exist at some time and not always, ‘at
some time’ does not refer to time, in the same way in the case of time
as a whole, which is said to exist or not exist at some time rather than 10
always, ‘at some time’ of necessity does not refer to time; in either
case all that is meant is that the time of which ‘at some time’ is used
does not always exist.
So how can it be anything other than ridiculous, given that it is not
possible to refer to things that have a beginning and an end to their
existence other than by means of time words of this sort, that a
philosopher who is eager to hold to the truth alone should not focus 15
on the meaning of the argument but attack its wording?
3. And it is clear from the following considerations that the use of 20
this or that time word does not in every case at once introduce the
idea of time.358
If someone should say ‘when something in movement stops359
moving, then it also begins to be at rest’, has the speaker immediately
also indicated a time just because he has used the time words ‘when’
and ‘then’? That would be impossible. The moving object stops moving
and starts being at rest at one and the same instant, for neither the 25
end of the movement nor the beginning of the rest is in time. A thing
whose nature it is to be at rest or in movement must do so in time,
but what is under discussion is neither movement nor rest but the 108,1
end of movement and the beginning of rest, [and] therefore ‘when’ and
‘then’ are not here indicative of [a period of] time but indicate the end
of the time in which the movement has taken place and the beginning
of the succeeding time in which there will be rest. 5
So when time expressions are used they do not in every case at once
indicate time. So why should it not be the case in the present instance
that if the words ‘there will be some time when time will not exist’ are
uttered, ‘some time’ should refer not to [a period of] time but to the
end of time, with which time will cease existing? And if time is said 10
to have come to be ‘at some time’ [and] not to exist from everlasting,
that [it] should in that case refer to360 the beginning of time and the
first instant or moment with which it began to exist?
And, indeed, in the same way ‘was’ and ‘will be’ do not always
involve a reference to time in every context where they are used. The 15
verb ‘is’ is in the first place indicative of existence, but there is also a
concomitant indication of time – just as there is a concomitant indi-
cation of a segment of time in the case of verbs with other meanings
– but this certainly does not mean that ‘is’ and ‘will be’ will always
indicate time in every context where they are used. If someone were 20
to say ‘even before all men, or even any of them, knew God, God was’,
does ‘was’ as predicated of God here refer to time or some aspect of
time, such as its beginning or end? That is impossible; the divine is 25
not in time. So the verb ‘was’ is here indicative only of God’s existence.
For if ‘was’ is always indicative of time, then, since it is indicative of
109,1 past time, and the past does not exist, one must suppose that, as far
as the learned Proclus is concerned, when Plato says361 of God ‘he was
good, and in the good no envy ever arises in regard to anything’, he
5 has located God in time, and in past time at that, and that therefore
he is either no longer God or no longer good or [his existence] is
divided up along with the division of time and not all at once and
eternal. For if ‘was’ is predicated of something, ‘is’ is not predicated
10 of it; if someone says ‘Socrates was’, he is clearly saying it of someone
who does not exist now. For this reason one cannot just simply say
‘the heaven was’ because it still is. Similarly, if a man has a good
disposition, it is not possible to say of him without qualification ‘he
15 was good’, but only ‘he is good’, whereas of a man who is no longer
good but has been converted to vice one may say ‘he was good’ because
he is now clearly no longer good; for even though it is said of things
that have their existence over a period of time and still exist that they
20 both were and are – of the heaven, for instance, for the heaven both
was and is – nevertheless in so far as they were, they clearly are not
now. The existence that was theirs in past time now is not; if it were,
the past would be present. And so, in so far as ‘was’ is predicated of
something, it does not exist now as far as that individual existence [it
25 had then] is concerned. So if when Plato says of God ‘he was good’ he
is not locating the divine in time or dividing [its existence] up along
with the segments of time, then ‘was’ does not always indicate time
in every context.
110,1 And, besides, there is every necessity that they either concede that
among intelligible and divine entities there are some that are supra-
mundane and free of any relation with bodies – especially362 God
himself, the first cause and origin of intelligible entities and of simply
5 everything – or [that] they will deny that any intelligible entity is
divorced from all association and relation with body. Now, if none of
the things that exist, not even the very first of them, exists with its
substance and being free of any relation with body, they could not
10 even exist without body; for if bodies were eliminated, things whose
existence lay in a relation with bodies would necessarily be elimi-
nated along with them; and in that case bodies would contribute to
their being and be in a sense the cause of their existence. But if this
is absurd, then there is every necessity that the intelligible sub-
15 stances, and immeasurably more so God, the cause of all things,
should have their being above and beyond any relation to bodies and
the world. But it is certainly agreed by all363 that time is nothing other
than the number of the movement of bodies and that, in a word, it has
20 its being in the ambit of bodies; for years and months, days and
nights, which are parts of time, have no being apart from bodies. And
if time is the number of movement, it clearly takes third place, behind
bodies; for all natural movement is the movement of bodies, and time
is a measure of movement, or simply something [associated with] 25
movement. [And] therefore the things that transcend [all] relation to
bodies are, one supposes, very much further removed from [any]
relation to time, which comes third, after bodies. So if this is true and 111,1
we can say in regard to intelligible entities and in regard to God that
God was even before this or that came into existence, and if not only
the everyday speech of men but the entire usage of philosophers is full 5
of [this way of talking] (for there are occasions when we cannot
express ourselves in any other way because the expression of the
subject matter demands it), then ‘was’ does not invariably introduce
[the idea of] time in all of its usages and in every context. After all,364
we also say ‘there was a time’ and ‘was’ is certainly not indicative of
time there; otherwise there would be two times [in existence] at once, 10
the time of which we predicated ‘was’ and the ‘was’ itself, which is
absurd. And there will even be three times in existence at once if
someone says ‘there was a time when Socrates was’, and each of the
two instances of ‘was’ is separately understood temporally.
But I imagine that this sort of thing must seem ridiculous to 15
everyone. One could contrive [to have] four or five times at once by
using ‘was’ that many times in the same statement. If, therefore, ‘was’
in these examples is clearly indicative only of the existence of the
things it is predicated of, and not at all of time, then ‘was’ will not 20
invariably indicate time in all of its usages and in every context.
And, indeed, in the same way nor do the words ‘will be’ always in
themselves signify the future segment of time in every context, and
therefore, should we happen to say ‘there will be a “when” there is no 25
time’, it is [only] by interpreting ‘will be’ temporally365 that they [can]
draw the conclusion that there will be a time when there is no time.
For366 if someone declares that ‘just as there was time and there is
time now, so too will there be time [in the future]’, and then someone 112,1
[else], using this ingenious mode of argument, interprets the ‘will be’
temporally, he will obviously draw the conclusion that there will be a
time when there will be time.367 For if it is true that time will be, and 5
if ‘will be’ has temporal reference, then there will be a time when
there is time.368 And what is the difference between these ‘times’, I
mean the ‘will be’ and the ‘when there will be’? And it is just as
possible to say the same about the time in which there will be time.
And in this way we shall go on searching out more times of times ad
infinitum. But it is impossible for there to be two times simultane- 10
ously and at the same time, ([as there would have to be] for us to
concede an infinite number) unless one were part of the other and
embraced by it, as if one were to say that a month, for instance, and
its tenth day are present at the same time. But the affirmation that 15
‘there will be time’ means not this but simply that time will not cease
now but will [continue to] be hereafter.
So if, on Proclus’ reasoning, an absurdity369 has followed from the
affirmation ‘there will be a time’, namely, that there is a ‘time of time’,
or that time is in time, then, if there is every necessity that of a pair
of contradictory propositions either the affirmative one or the nega-
20 tive one must be true, it must be false and its negation true. So if, as
far as Proclus’ reasoning goes, the affirmation ‘there will be a time’ is
25 false, its negation is true; therefore there will not be a time. And
consequently the argument has been turned on its head by means of
this [same] marvelous mode of argument.
And, since it is also possible to state that there will be a time when
there will be rain, say, or anything else that can happen, if here again
113,1 not only the first but also the second ‘will be’ is – on the assumption
that ‘will be’ is always indicative of time – interpreted temporally, not
to mention the time word ‘when’, how, when we come out with ‘time’
5 four times in a row, could the iteration be other than laughable and
silly? And it is certainly possible by means of [appropriate] examples
to lead the philosopher’s reasoning into innumerable other such
absurdities.
10 If, then, ‘was’ or ‘will be’ do not in themselves indicate time in the
above [examples], but in saying ‘there will be a time’ [the speaker] is
only indicating the future existence of time, and in ‘there will be a
time, when there will be rain’ the first ‘will be’ again conveys the
existence of time, the second that of the rain, then we shall not, if
15 someone says ‘there will be a “when” there will not be time’, take ‘will
be’ as indicative of time but [only] that there will be a state of affairs
in which there will be no time.
And not only is it the case that ‘was’ and ‘will be’ are indicative of
segments of time,370 the one of the past, the other of the future, but
20 ‘is’ itself refers to the present segment of time, which is contrasted
with both the past and the future. And when we say ‘God is’ we
certainly do not intend ‘is’ to refer to a segment of time but only to
God’s eternal existence. For it is not necessarily the case that when
25 there is inadequacy in the words the subject matter is inadequate too.
We should accept from [the words] whatever is useful for the expres-
sion of the thought, and reject anything foreign to the nature of the
thought that is expressed incidentally.
114,1 In all of the above examples, then, the time words are not, in the
context, [to be] taken at all costs as by themselves indicating a time,
5 even if the parts of time are concomitantly signified by them. Instead,
as we have shown by means of the above examples, they indicate
either the existence of something or the end or beginning of some
[period] of time. And in the same way we shall not, if it is said that
time at some time was not, or at some time will not be, be forced
because of the time expression ‘at some time’ to say either that there
10 was time before time or will be after time. Instead we say that time’s
being said not to have been at some time is indicative of its having a
beginning and not being eternal, and that [its being said] to be going
not to exist at some time [is indicative] of its ceasing and not being
endless.
But this present argument of mine will not concern itself with 15
whether time will cease or not; it will be enough if what has been said
demonstrates that the present proof of Proclus not only lacks cogency
but even degenerates into absurdity.
4. One can also say this against the present [proof].
If eternity is the measure of the existence of everlasting things, as 20
time is that of the movement of the heaven, as Proclus himself says
in these words: ‘time is the measure of the movement of the heaven,
as eternity is of the life of the living-creature-itself’ – if, as I say,
eternity is the measure of the life of the living-creature-itself, that is 25
to say, of everlasting things, there is, one supposes, every necessity
that eternity should not be a single point, but a kind of plane or
extension, if I may put it so, which is coextensive with the being of 115,1
eternal things. It is not, like time, cut371 into various segments, into
years, months, days and nights, I mean. Rather, it is as though one
were in imagination to stop the heaven and the movement of the sun. 5
The various segments of time would no longer be part of one’s mental
picture, but there would still nevertheless be a kind of uniform
extension keeping pace with the existence of the world. In the same
way, I suppose, one could say in regard to everlasting things that,
even though for eternity, which measures their being, there is no 10
movement of temporal duration, nevertheless it is certainly the case
that a kind of self-uniform extension is thought of in connection with
their being. For, as I have said, eternity is not a kind of point without
parts and eternal things do not exist just at some one point.
It was for this reason that Proclus, and Plato before him, said that
eternity is the measure of the life of everlasting things; for [Plato] 15
says:372
Time came to be along with the heaven, in order that, having

been generated together, they may also be dissolved together,
should their dissolution ever come to pass. And [it was made]
after the pattern of the eternal nature,373 so that [the heaven]
might be as similar as possible to [the pattern]. For the pattern
is for all eternity, while [the heaven is] throughout the whole of 20
time.
And so, if Plato says that the pattern for the world has being for all
eternity and that eternity is the measure of the life of everlasting
things,374 he clearly does not believe that eternity is a kind of single
point (for ‘all’ is not a point and a measure is not without parts), but
[rather that it is] a kind of single and uniform extension of the life of 25
everlasting things, not [internally] divided by any differentiation, but
always staying the same and remaining self-identical.375 116,1
This being so, when we say ‘there was a “when” time did not exist,
and there will be a “when” it will not exist’, we do not intend ‘was’ and
‘will be’ temporally. It is the same as when we say ‘God was even
5 before men knew it’ and ‘time was’376 and ‘God is’ and ‘time is’, or when
Plato says377 ‘He was good’. We are not [in such cases] referring to
segments of time by using ‘was’ and ‘is’. On the contrary, we claim
that these time words, given the nature of the subject, are indicative
10 of the eternity, or the simple, unadorned existence of the things [they
refer to], since we cannot say anything without some reference to
time. In just the same way [then], when we say ‘there was a “when”
time did not exist, and there will be a “when” it will not exist’, we do
not intend ‘was’ and ‘will be’ temporally,378 but claim that they point
15 to the existence of eternity. For eternity existed even when there was
no time, and eternity will exist when there is no time.
And if someone uses the words ‘some time’ in [the sentence] so that
it reads ‘there was some time when time did not exist, and there will
be some time when time does not exist’, we shall in that case too
20 understand ‘some time’ as referring to eternity, because there is a sort
of existence or extension, or whatever else one would like to call it, of
eternity in which there was no time and there will be eternity when
there is again no time.
As I said379 [earlier], a sensible person should focus on the intention
of a statement and not on any inadequacy in its expression. In our
25 thought about the divine, for example, our understanding does not
have the strength to contemplate it without mental imagery. As Plato
also says, imagination always goes hand in hand with our conceptions
117,1 about God, assuming on our behalf that it apprehends shape and
mass in connection with him. And nor can we think about things that
transcend time timelessly. But this weakness of our contemplative
5 faculty does not necessarily mean that things are [really] like this.
[So, to avoid any such idea,] we keep at bay any inappropriate
features that [threaten to] find their way into our conceptions about
God and incorporeal things by applying a mental test. And the same
applies, indeed more so, to verbal presentations of a subject: if words
10 cannot always express our thoughts or the subject matter perfectly,
we should not focus on the weakness of the expression and base our
criticism on the wording rather than the intention of the speaker.
[The question at issue is a case in point,] for our argument has shown
in a number of ways that time is not in every case part of what is
indicated by time words.
15 And so, in summary, it is rightly held by Plato and the truth380 that
time came into existence along with the heaven (for time is the
measure of heavenly movement), and nobody will be able to show that
Plato anywhere says381 that time does not have a beginning; it is on
20 his own initiative that Proclus has been attempting to prove [that it
does not].
That time does indeed have a beginning I shall show elsewhere.382
And Plato too clearly states383 that it came to be along with the heaven
and did not exist before the heaven came to be and says that the
heaven came into existence and had a beginning, as Aristotle, Plato’s
pupil, attests in the eighth book of the Physics,384 confirming that this 25
is the opinion of his teacher. Here is what he says:
But as far as time is concerned, all with one exception385 are in

clear agreement. They hold that it is ungenerated. Indeed, it is 118,1
on this account that Democritus shows that it is impossible for
all things to have come to be. Plato alone generates it. He holds
that it came to be along with the heaven and that the heaven
[itself] came to be.386
That this is true will be shown by many proofs in chapter six,387 and 5
it has [already] been shown in [chapter] one that it is impossible for
the existence of the world to be without a beginning. And if one or the
other of them, whether time or the world, had a beginning to its
existence, the other must have had a beginning to its existence as
well. And even were one to concede that it is still unclear whether the 10
world and time have a beginning to their existence or not, our 15
argument has adequately demonstrated that the philosopher’s pre-
sent proof at least, by which he hopes to prove that time is without a
beginning or an end, is more appropriate to a sophist than to a
philosopher.
5. And if he says that eternity is the pattern for time and that
therefore there must388 always be time as well in order that eternity
may everlastingly be a pattern, we adequately refuted that kind389 of
argument in the philosopher’s second proof, in which he raised the 20
question of patterns. For if, just as living-creature-itself is the pattern
for the world, eternity, which is the measure of the life of living-crea-
ture-itself, is the pattern for time, which is the measure of the
existence of the world, and if it has been shown that living-creature- 119,1
itself does not have its being in being the pattern for the world, then
eternity, which is the measure of the life of living-creature-itself, will
not have its being in being the pattern for time. For if time is related
to the world as eternity is to living-creature-itself, then by permuta- 5
tion eternity will be related to time as living-creature-itself is to the
world. But we showed in that [earlier discussion] that just because
living-creature-itself, or, more generally, a world-pattern, exists,
there is no necessity that the world should also exist. And therefore
just because eternity exists, there is no absolute necessity that time 10
should also exist.
The End of the Refutation of the Fifth Argument
Notes
1. (1) The title, headings and section numbers printed in angle brackets
at the beginning of the Greek text are Rabe’s restorations. The title has been
discussed in the introduction. There is no direct evidence that Aet. had a
preface, but we know that it once had an epilogue and that there was room
for one in the missing part of the main manuscript. (According to Rabe, this
was equivalent to about forty pages of Greek in his edition, and Proclus’
argument and the missing part of Philoponus’ reply are unlikely to have
taken up any more than twenty. On the other hand, some of the missing
leaves may have been blank, and we cannot be sure that the manuscript did
not contain anything other than Aet.). The other restorations are based on
the formatting of the remaining chapters and are certain.
(2) Perhaps this is the best place to say something about the terminology
used to describe the various divisions of Aet. In the preserved headings for
chapters 2-18, which may or may not be Philoponus’ own, Proclus’ arguments
are logoi, Philoponus’ replies are luseis and the sections into which they are
divided are kephalaia. In the work itself Philoponus’ terminology is less
consistent. An argument of Proclus is frequently an epikheirêma (26,20, etc.),
a logos may be either an argument of Proclus (126,23, etc.) or Philoponus’
reply (69,5, etc.), and a kephalaion may be an argument of Proclus (94,22,
etc.), a reply of Philoponus (70,9, etc.), or a section of the last (130,11, etc.),
in which case it is always a kephalaion of a logos. In headings I translate logos
‘argument’, kephalaion ‘section’ (a good case could be made for translating
kephalaia ‘Summaries of the Main Points’ in these headings – see H.D.
Saffrey and L.G. Westerink, Proclus, Théologie platonicienne, vol. 1 (Paris,
1968), Notes complémentaires, p. 1, n. 2 – but I have been influenced by
Philoponus’ usage in the text, which I have outlined above) and lusis ‘refuta-
tion’. In the work itself I translate epikheirêma ‘proof’, logos ‘argument’ when
it refers to one of Proclus’ arguments, but ‘chapter’ when it refers to one of
Philoponus’ replies, and use ‘proof’, ‘chapter’ or ‘section’ for kephalaion
depending on whether the reference is to an argument of Proclus, a reply of
Philoponus or a section of such a reply.
2. As mentioned in the Introduction, the translation of an Arabic version
of Proclus’ first argument which follows was produced for this series by Peter
Adamson.
3. The version of Proclus’ first argument translated here is that of Ishâq
ibn Hunayn. The text used is A. Badawî, Neoplatonici apud arabes (Cairo,
1955), 34.4-35.8. For Jon McGinnis’ very helpful translation of the argument,
with a modified Arabic text based on Badawî, see Proclus, On the Eternity of
the World, translated with commentary by H.S. Lang and A.D. Macro
(Berkeley, 2001). I have made use of McGinnis’ work in revising my own
translation. For a French translation, see G.C. Anawati, ‘Un fragment perdu
90 Notes to page 19
du de Aeternitate Mundi de Proclus’, in Mélanges de Philosophie Grecque
offerts à Mgr. Diès (Paris, 1956), 23-5. For a German translation by P. Heine,
see M. Baltes, Die Weltentstehung des platonischen Timaios nach den antiken
Interpreten, vol. II (Leiden, 1976), 134-6.
4. The term used throughout for ‘everlasting’ is abadî; the adverb abadan
(from the same root) I translate as ‘everlastingly’. It is at first used as a
synonym for ‘eternal’ (azalî). But at the end of the argument there is a
distinction between two senses of ‘everlasting’: God is everlasting in the sense
of being outside of time, the world everlasting as existing at all times. God’s
everlastingness is there defined as dahr and azaliyya, which I translate on
the basis of the context as ‘timelessness’ and ‘eternity’. As McGinnis points
out these two terms may correspond to ho aiôn and aïdios, whereas abadî
probably translates aei.
5. Literally ‘the all’, al-kull, which could translate to pan.
6. McGinnis may well be right to suspect that the Arabic words jûd and
jawâd, which I translate ‘generosity’ and ‘generous’ (their normal English
equivalents), render the Greek words agathotês and agathos, the normal
English equivalents of which would be ‘goodness’ and ‘good’. (To the passages
he cites add Proclus, in Tim., 1.366,20-368,11, which closely parallels Pro-
clus’ present argument and where agathotês and agathos are used
throughout, and a number of passages in Philoponus’ refutation (Aet. 7,18-24;
8,20-27; 13,26-14,6) in which God’s creative activity is related to his good-
ness). However, they could also render aphthonia and aphthonos (more
literally ‘lack of envy’ and ‘without envy’ or ‘ungrudging’) and there are in fact
two passages in Aet. in which God’s creative activity is directly related to his
lack of envy, or ‘generosity’. At Aet 13,12 (again in his refutation of the
present argument) Philoponus writes: ‘If God is good, and, as Plato in his
wisdom says, “in the good no envy (phthonos) ever arises in regard to
anything” [Tim. 29E], and [it is] for this reason he brought all things into
being, why did he not bring any of [his] creations into existence in all respects
identical to himself so that they shared in the same substance and power with
him? For either he could have, but did not wish to – and I shall not mention
what would follow because it would be blasphemous (for he will not have
escaped envy (phthonos)) – or it must be that, because he could not, he did
not even wish to; but that would be to predicate weakness of God’, and at Aet.
224,25, paraphrasing a passage from a lost work of Proclus, he writes: ‘Plato
says “for he was good, and in the good no envy (phthonos) ever arises in regard
to anything” [Tim. 29E], from which Proclus concludes } that if God is
always free of envy (aphthonos), [then], since he is also always good, the
world too will always exist’. This second passage in particular shows that,
despite the evidence of his commentary on the Timaeus, we cannot rule out
the possibility that Proclus did in fact relate God’s creative activity to his
‘generosity’ and not just directly to his goodness in the present argument.
7. Kawn, which is the same word translated as ‘coming-to-be’ in the
previous sentence.
8. Musâwiyyan: perhaps meaning ‘equal in duration’.
9. Reading yuhibbu with Badawî and McGinnis, and rejecting Anawati’s
emendation to yajibu.
10. This interjection, as Anawati rightly says, is surely not based on the
Greek.
11. Note that here the word kawn (in the form mukawwin) needs to refer
to generation in time, not just bestowal of existence generally, both because
Notes to pages 19-20 91
of the context generally and because it is opposed to fasâd, ‘corruption’ or
‘perishing’.
12. quwwa: this word can also mean ‘potentiality’. Because of this double
meaning quwwa is a closer synonym for dunamis than qudra, which has been
translated above as ‘ability’.
13. Up until now the verb ‘create’ has translated khalaqa and the noun
‘Creator’ has translated al-bârî’. In this case the noun ‘Creator’ is khâliq. But
this, I take it, is synonymous with al-bârî’.
14. Musâwiq, which means ‘going along with’ or ‘continuous with’, ‘ac-
companying’. This may translate the Greek suzugos (cf. Proclus in Tim.
1.281,3 and 1.295,11).
15. The Greek text as we have it begins part way through a sentence
some way into the second section of Philoponus’ refutation of Proclus’ first
argument. To judge from what follows, the missing portion of Philoponus’
argument probably went something like this. ‘Contrary to what Proclus says,
a once-off creation of the world is compatible with eternal and unvarying
goodness and power in the creator. A once-off creation would in effect be one
aspect of God’s failure to create ‘more or better’ things than he actually has.
If it can be shown that this failure in no way detracts from God’s goodness or
power, the same will automatically follow for a once-off creation. [The
advantage of this line of argument is that the issue of God’s failure to create
‘more or better’ thing arises for a Neoplatonist as much as for a Christian].
Now, if ‘more or better’ things are not created, this is due either (1) to the
productive cause (God), or (2) to that which comes into being (the world), or
(3) to both [cf. 7,4-12]. If it is wholly (1) or partly (3) due to God, this implies
a limitation to his goodness, which would be intolerable [although there is no
sign in what remains of the argument that Philoponus dealt with this
possibility, I assume that he must have at least mentioned it, if only to
dismiss it] or to his power or powers. The possibilities in regard to God’s
power(s) are that it, or they, is, or are (1) one, simple and finite (2) many and
each finite (3) one and infinite (4) many and each infinite, and (5) many and
some infinite, some finite [cf. 4,7-24]. Now, all agree that God is eternal, and
as Aristotle argues, with, as the following passage shows, the approval of
Proclus, that which is eternal has infinite power }’. Given that the first
sections of Philoponus’ refutations are normally short, averaging just over
two pages in Rabe’s edition, with only one (8.1 at 7 1/2 pages) much over
three, it is quite likely that this material took up most, if not all, of the
missing part of the first refutation.
16. Rabe suggests that Philoponus is quoting Proclus, who is in turn
referring to Aristotle, and in particular to his remarks on time and eternity
at Cael. 279a11-b3, and punctuates accordingly. He may be right, but it
seems more likely that Proclus is the subject of legei (‘he says’), that the
reference is to the last few sentences of the first argument (which Rabe did
not have) and that Aristotle was cited earlier, so I have omitted Rabe’s closing
quotation mark.
17. For a discussion of the role of ‘infinite power’ arguments in the
creation debate in ancient and mediaeval philosophy with references to
earlier literature, see R. Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion (London & Ithaca,
NY, 1988), ch. 15. For Philoponus’ contribution in Aet. and elsewhere, see
especially pp. 254-9. (The same material appears in abbreviated form in R.
Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed (London & Ithaca, NY, 1990), ch. 9).
18. i.e. everything there is must be either eternal or temporal. (The
clause takes the form of a step in a formal division by dichotomy.)
92 Notes to pages 20-24
19. Accepting Rabe’s suggested restoration of the (only partially legible)
Greek text at 2,8.
20. The distinction between aiônios (‘eternal’) and aïdios (‘everlasting’) is
discussed in the Introduction.
21. i.e. not complex.
22. In most contexts hama noêmati, which also occurs at 18,33 and 149,9,
is merely a colourful way of saying ‘very quickly’ or ‘instantaneously’ (‘quick
as thought’), but the reference to creation by thought at lines 10-11 below
suggests that it may have further connotations here and I have translated
accordingly.
23. Psalms 33,9.
24. Judith 9,5-6.
25. For Proclus too, of course, creation results from intellection; see e.g.
ET 174.
26. Changing paragesthai to paragetai at 6,14, as suggested by Rabe in
the critical apparatus.
27. The Ten Puzzles, is one of three short, closely-connected essays on
providence by Proclus which survive only in thirteenth-century Latin ver-
sions by William of Moerbeke. The present passage (5,32-5 in the edition of
Boese, 5,43-8 in that of Isaac), one of three, all from the same chapter near
the beginning of the work, which Philoponus makes use of in Aet., is also
quoted at 38,16-20; 91,19-23 and 570,14-18.
28. i.e. physical rather than metaphysical.
29. Phys. 204a8-206a8.
30. Cael. 271b1-276a17. (In the translation I translate all titles into
English, but in the notes I normally use the traditional abbreviations, which
are frequently formed from the Latin versions of titles.)
31. Aristotle’s arguments against the possibility of an actual or traversed
infinity and Philoponus’ use of them against Aristotle himself and the
Neoplatonists in Aet. and elsewhere are discussed by Sorabji in Time, Crea-
tion and the Continuum (London & Ithaca, NY, 1983), ch. 14, and in
1987), ch. 9.
32. This last statement is clearly false as it stands, but perhaps we
should regard it as shorthand for something like ‘for that which consists of a
finite number of finite parts is finite’. (Philoponus seems to have been
influenced by the phrasing of the similar argument at Cael. 271b19-23 where
Aristotle initially says that if the parts of a composite body are finite, it too
must be finite, even though he immediately makes it clear that this means
‘finite in both number and magnitude’.)
33. Other possible references to this work occur at 11,16; 117,20-1;
259,3-5 and at in Phys. 430,9-10. (References from Verrycken, ‘The Develop-
ment of Philoponus’ Thought and Its Chronology’ in R. Sorajbi (ed.), Aristotle
Transformed (London & Ithaca, NY, 1990), 254. Incidentally, given the
similarities between their respective contexts, Verrycken seems needlessly
tentative when suggesting that the in Phys. reference and the present one
refer to the same work). Although it has not survived in its own right, it may
be the work known through an Arabic summary translated into English by
Pines (S. Pines, ‘An Arabic Summary of a Lost Work of John Philoponus’,
Israel Oriental Studies 2, 1972, 320-52) and, according to Wildberg, possibly
also the work attacked by Simplicius at in Phys. 1326,38-1336,34. (See C.
Wildberg, Simplicius: Against Philoponus on the Eternity of the World (Lon-
don & Ithaca, NY, 1991), 100; but Wildberg also cites evidence from Arabic
bibliographies which suggests that this may be yet another work on the
perishability of the world).
34. i.e. after completing Aet. and probably, as Verrycken (‘The Develop-
ment of Philoponus’ Thought and Its Chronology’, 251) argues, the contra
Aristotelem as well.
35. The verb (exarithmeisthai) is presumably middle, which is unusual
in this sense.
36. Inserting legô dê after adunaton at 10,19, one of two possible correc-
tions suggested by Rabe in the critical apparatus. (Another possibility is that
the words to hoionei aparithmoumenon kata monada diexelthein to apeiron
are a marginal gloss that has entered the text).
37. Adding anthrôpôn before tôn at 11,3, as suggested by Rabe in the
critical apparatus. (The case for the addition is improved by the occurrence
of the same phrase in a closely related passage at in Phys. 428,25-6.)
38. Adding ei after kai at 11,6.
39. See the note on 9,22 above.
40. 9,14-11,7 are translated in R. Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Contin-
uum, 214-15.
41. More literally ‘runs alongside the thought of [our] mind’.
42. See the note at 7,25.
43. sc. that of mules.
44. GC 336b31-2.
45. Tim. 29E.
46. ousian. In this section, as often, the choice between ‘being’, ‘sub-
stance’ and ‘essence’ to render ousia is not clear-cut. The linking of ousia with
dunamis (‘power’) here and with dunamis and energeia (‘activity’) later in the
section (14,16-17) perhaps suggests ‘essence’, but the fact that the ousia
under discussion might, hypothetically at least, be created (13,24-25), sug-
gests that ‘being’ or ‘substance’ might be more appropriate. A case could be
made for either, but I have opted for ‘substance’, largely because I need ‘being’
for to einai when the phrase to einai kai tên ousian occurs at 14,11. (Inciden-
tally, later in Aet. I several times translate this same phrase ‘being and
essence’.)
47. Literally ‘that substance’, or ‘substance there’. ekeinos and ekei are
frequently used to contrast things in the divine or intelligible sphere with
things here.
48. Because I reserve ‘eternal’ for aiônios and translate aïdios ‘everlast-
ing’, I have coined the unlovely word ‘co-everlasting’ to render sunaïdios
rather than use the more usual ‘coeternal’.
49. Changing proüparkhon to proüparkhoi at 14,20, one of two possible
corrections suggested by Rabe in the critical apparatus.
50. For Neoplatonists from Plotinus onwards the three hypostases One,
Intellect and Soul exercise causation while themselves remaining absolutely
immutable. They give rise to the things that participate in them without
deliberation or action on their part just by being what they are. The present
phrase (autôi tôi einai) was probably first used to express this mode of
causation by Syrianus and became a stock formula with later Neoplatonists,
being a favourite with Proclus, who uses it in the second, fourth and sixteenth
arguments (see 24,5; 56,2; 560,22; 561,25.26), and occurring 27 times in Aet.,
mostly in Ch. 7, where the manner in which soul initiates life and movement
is at issue. It is to the extent that the sun can be said to produce light ‘just
by being’ that it provides a suitable analogy for the manner in which the
creator produces the world. (For the Plotinian background and the meaning
and employment of autôi tôi einai see C. D’Ancona Costa, ‘Plotinus and later
Platonic philosophers on the causality of the First Principle’ in L.P. Gerson
(ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (Cambridge, 1996), 356-68).
51. For the parallel between the propagation of light and creation, see
e.g. Plotinus, 5.1.6,25-39; Proclus, in Tim., 1.290,29-291,1. For Proclus all
higher-level causes produce their effects ‘just by being’. (See e.g. J. De Groot,
Aristotle and Philoponus on Light (New York & London, 1991), 84 ff. with
earlier literature cited there, and R.J. Hankinson, Cause and Explanation in
Ancient Greek Thought (Oxford, 1998), 415 ff. for the antecedents of the
doctrine in Plotinus and others).
52. Evidently in the missing part of the present chapter.
53. Astronomy and geometry perhaps, or even optics.
54. DA 418b9-11.
55. Rabe is of the opinion that the words I translate ‘Hence there has to
be a period, during which [the sun’s] rays do not reach under [things]’ are
corrupt, and it does seem possible that the words ‘during which [the sun’s]
rays do not reach under [things]’ (en hôi hai aktines oukh hupoballousin) are
an explanatory gloss on ‘a time’ (khronou tinos) which has found its way into
the text. However, if we assume that hupoballein is being used intransitively
(although LSJ gives no instances of the intransitive use of hupoballein there
are instances where epiballein is so used in similar contexts) and that
‘reaching under’ includes striking objects from an angle rather than from
directly above, it seems possible to retain the text of the manuscripts.
56. Changing ekeinôn to ekeinou at 16,18, as suggested by Rabe in the
critical apparatus.
57. In what follows Philoponus tries to show that an analogy between the
propagation of light and the generation of the universe fails to support the
Neoplatonic view of generation on any view of the nature and propagation of
light. This being so, some of his arguments are intended to be perfectly
general, some are directed specifically at Proclus or other unnamed oppo-
nents, and some presuppose his own position on the propagation of light,
which he does not reveal until near the end of the chapter, at 21,24 ff.
58. As Rabe suggests (‘haec vix sana’), the clause beginning epeidê to phôs
(16,25 ff.) is unsatisfactory as it stands. I suspect that the phrase epeidê to
phôs ditton estin (’since the light is twofold’) was originally a gloss on to men
phôs explaining the occurrence of men (‘on the one hand’), which is not taken
up by its de (‘on the other hand’) until the first line of the following section,
and that the word sunupostan (‘having come into existence simultaneously
with it’) was originally a gloss on ousiômenon and have accordingly omitted
both in the translation.
59. More literally, ‘foreign and alien’. (See the entries in Lampe for
similar usages of the two words).
60. en tôi ginesthai to einai ekhei. The phrase, which is common in
Philoponus and Simplicius and is used by a number of the other commenta-
tors, goes back at least to Alexander (Mixt. 227,22; in Sens. 50,25; 154,16; in
Meteor. 73,1; 83,1). At in Phys. 465,25 Philoponus uses it to distinguish
processes or events, such as a day or a contest, which unfold little by little
and are never present as a whole, from substances, such as a man or a horse.
However, in the Platonic tradition substances, and indeed the world as a
whole (see Tim. 27E ff.), are regarded as ever-changing entities and in Aet.
the phrase is most commonly used to distinguish the physical from the
intelligible and the temporal from the eternal.
61. Rather more literal renderings would be: ‘the illuminating [body]’, or
‘that which illuminates’.
62. Tim. 31B.
63. The word energeia may be used to describe (1) the process whereby a
form is realised (= ‘actualisation’). (2) the manifestation of the realised form
– where it is a virtual synonym of entelekheia – (= ‘actuality’) (3) the active
putting forth of power (= ‘activity’). In practice these senses often overlap and
it can be hard to settle on a translation. In what follows it may be that
‘actuality’ best describes the light ‘in’ the sun, ‘activity’ the light radiated by
the sun as Plotinus understands it, and ‘actualisation’ light present in a
transparent medium as Aristotle and Plotinus himself understand it, but I
have thought it best on balance to keep to the single rendering ‘activity’.
64. For the phrase see the note at 6,3.
65. Or perhaps ‘either implicated in matter or free of matter’, but ta enula
at 18,22 seems to mean ‘material objects’.
66. Changing hupo to epi at 18,26, as suggested by Rabe in the critical
apparatus. (Proclus’ On Light has not survived.)
67. Or perhaps ‘in [their] form’.
68. For a brief account of Proclus’ rather complex metaphysics and
physics of light, see L. Siorvanes, Proclus: Neo-Platonic Philosophy and
Science (New Haven & London, 1996), 241-4.
69. There does not seem to be anything to this effect in Plato, although
he may have in mind Rep. 508E-509A, where Socrates says that it is right to
think of light and vision as hêlioeidê, or ‘sun-like’. (Did he perhaps read hêliou
eidê, or ‘forms of the sun’?).
70. More literally ‘will fall even further from the matter under investiga-
tion’.
71. cf. Enn. 4.5.6-7. (Neither of the statements is a genuine quotation).
72. sc. the actuality of light.
73. Plotinus himself would not accept this conclusion. Although the
following passage uses the example of fire and heat, it illustrates his actual
position particularly well. ‘In each and every thing there is an activity
(energeia) which belongs to substance and one which goes out from substance;
and that which belongs to substance is the active actuality (energeia) which
is each particular thing, and the other activity derives from that first one,
and must in everything be a consequence of it, different from the thing itself:
as in fire there is a heat which is the content of its substance, and another
which comes into being from that primary heat when fire exercises the
activity which is native to its substance in abiding unchanged as fire. So it is
also in the higher world }’. (Enn. 5.4.2,27-34, tr. Armstrong). It is because
radiated light is not constitutive of a light-source for Plotinus that he can use
it to illustrate the procession of everything else from the One without any
effect on it. (For light as a metaphor for procession in Plotinus, see F.M.
Schroeder, ‘Plotinus and language’, in The Cambridge Companion to
Plotinus, ed. L.P. Gerson (Cambridge, 1996), 341-3, who quotes the above
passage on p. 340).
74. Philoponus sometimes puts verbs introducing quotation or report in
the present tense and sometimes (as here) in a past tense. In either case I
normally use the present tense in the translation.
75. DA 418b9-14. In fact Philoponus’ own views on the nature and
propagation of light are developed in the course of commenting on DA 2.7
(from which the present passage is quoted) and are in essential agreement
with those of Aristotle. There is a detailed account of the key passage from
in DA (324,23-342,16) and of relevant passages in other commentaries in J.
De Groot, Aristotle and Philoponus on Light; later developments in Phi-
loponus’ theory of light in Opif. can be found in C. Scholten, Antike
Naturphilosophie und christliche Kosmologie in der Schrift ‘De Opificio
Mundi’ des Johannes Philoponus (Berlin & New York, 1996), 235-70; there
is an assessment of Philoponus’ originality vis à vis Aristotle in R. Sorabji,
1987), 26-30.
76. i.e. aether, the material of the spheres that carry the heavenly bodies.
77. Aristotle has ‘for to this too belongs something that is one and the
same’ (kai gar toutôi ti huparkhei hen kai tauton), which must mean that
aether has something in common with fire – something which accounts for
the fact that it too can illuminate the transparent. In Philoponus ‘this’
presumably refers to something like ‘the ability to activate the transparent’
and ‘these’ to fire and other things with similar properties, including aether.
78. Literally ‘second’.
79. Proclus had the title Successor (Diadokhos) as head of the Academy
at Athens in the line of succession from Plato.
80. A closer rendering would be ‘and this is its essence, being a paradigm’.
Similar phrases occur later in the chapter at 25,8; 26,8; 32,22; 33,25; 34,4.11,
where I also telescope the construction. On the phrase to ti ên einai and the
possessive (?) datives that frequently accompany it (in this case autôi and
paradeigmati), both of which originated with Aristotle, see J. Owens, The
Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian ‘Metaphysics’ (Toronto, 1963), 180-7.
(Owens does not approve of the translation ‘essence’.)
81. Or perhaps ‘property’, or ‘function’ (see LSJ dunamis II.b).
82. autôi tôi einai. For the implications of the phrase, see the note at
14,25.
83. Something is clearly wrong with this sentence and Rabe writes: ‘9 sq.:
haec vix sana’. On balance it seems to me most likely that a phrase referring
to the paradeigma has dropped out after hote ouk ên at l. 10 and I have added
the words kai to paradeigma ouk ên at that point and deleted kai to
paradeigma at 24,11 on the hypothesis that the words kai to paradeigma
became displaced at some point in the transmission of the text and that ouk
ên was then deleted as a dittograph. (Another possibility is that kai to
paradeigma was accidentally omitted because of the repetition of the same
phrase in the next line and ouk ên again deleted as a dittograph. In that case
I would translate the last part of the sentence: ‘unless the very pattern, there
being no copy, is not a pattern at all, or is not the pattern for the copy [in
question].’ – Baltes would simply add aei estin after eikôn at 24,9.)
84. Translations into modern languages of the seventeen arguments of
Proclus which survive in Aet. are listed in the Introduction.
In the notes to this translation I normally do no more than identify direct
quotations and obvious references, often merely repeating Rabe’s identifica-
tions from his critical apparatus. In the case of Proclus’ arguments, a wider
range of comparative material can be found in the notes to H.S. Lang and
A.D. Macro (eds.), On the Eternity of the World (De Aeternitate Mundi),
Proclus (Berkeley, etc., 2001).
85. For epikheirêma, LSJ gives: [I] undertaking, attempt } II. in the
Logic of Arist., attempted, i.e. dialectical, proof } (at Top. 162a16 Aristotle
himself defines it as ‘a dialectical deduction’). This being so, one might be
tempted to think that Philoponus’ application of it to Proclus’ arguments is
tendentious, but in the commentaries he routinely describes Aristotle’s
arguments as epikheirêmata and it seems probable that he is simply using it
as a neutral word for a proof or line of argument. (At Aet. 406,7 and 19 it is
actually used of his own arguments, though admittedly in a contents sum-
mary).
86. More literally ‘has its being in this, in being }’. Philoponus uses
expressions of this form very frequently both in Aet. and elsewhere when
stating a thing’s essence. Outside Philoponus they are not very common (a
TLG search turns up four in Alexander, two in Porphyry, eight in Simplicius
– one of them in a quotation from Philoponus – and a handful in other later
commentators), and I cannot account for the mannerism. I have not made
any attempt to preserve the construction in translation.
87. Proclus does not explicitly claim that either hypothesis is Platonic or
to be found in Plato. He would doubtless have held, as Philoponus himself
does, that the first is, citing the Timaeus, but might not have claimed
Platonic warrant for the second, which is expressed in Aristotelian language.
Later, in the argument itself (at 26,14-18 and 33,3-4), Philoponus writes as
though it was, or would have been, Proclus’ position that the first premiss
implies the second and that, since the first is in Plato, he would have had to
accept the second. Both here and there Philoponus seems to be putting words
into Proclus’ mouth. Perhaps there was something in the pages missing from
the beginning of Aet. to explain why he writes in this way.
88. cf. Tim. 28A-29A.
89. This principle of the simultaneity of relatives was first enunciated by
Aristotle (Cat. 7b15-22), although he immediately (7b22-8a12) cast doubt on
its universality.
90. As Philoponus well knew, the orthodox later Neoplatonic position
was that there was in reality no such disagreement. (See the note at 29,6 for
further detail).
91. The precise reference of to toiouton is unclear. Initially it is natural
to take it as referring to Socrates’ interest in ethical questions and neglect of
the world of nature, but the final clause of the sentence suggests that
Aristotle has in mind the Heraclitean opinions that Plato absorbed from
Cratylus. Perhaps the truth is that, despite being in the singular, it encom-
passes both. In any case, it should refer back to something that has gone
before and not forward to the next clause, as Ross, the Oxford translator,
seems to believe. (Philoponus’ paraphrase at 28,9-18 perhaps suggests that
he took to toiouton to refer to Socrates’ methods and the final clause of the
sentence to Plato’s Heracliteanism.)
92. sc. the search for the universal and the construction of definitions.
93. Omitting aei, which does not occur in Aristotle and, in view of the
occurrence of tinos aei in the next line, looks suspiciously like a case of
dittography.
94. Metaph. 987a29-b10.
95. Tim. 28A.
96. Changing genomena to ginomena at 28,18, as suggested by Rabe in
97. Omitting einai at 28,23. (Rabe writes ‘einai suspectum’.)
98. From Porphyry onwards most of the Neoplatonic commentators on
Aristotle held that, contrary to appearances, Aristotle and Plato were in
agreement on most matters. The view that there was no disagreement
between them on the theory of Forms can be traced back at least to Iam-
blichus (Elias in Cat. 123,1-3) and was the orthodox Neoplatonic position
from the time of Ammonius, who claimed that for both Plato and Aristotle
the Forms were creative principles (dêmiourgikoi logoi) in the creative
Intellect and that Aristotle’s criticism of the Forms is not directed at Plato,
but at an incorrect interpretation of his theory which gave independent
existence to the Forms. This position can be found in Asclepius in Metaph.
and in the unrevised portions of Philoponus’ earlier commentaries, where,
certainly in the first case and probably in the second, the teaching of
Ammonius is reported, and in Simplicius. The ‘more recent [commentators]’
(neoteroi) referred to are, therefore, probably Ammonius and his pupils and
Philoponus is attacking a position that was in some sense at least once his own.
This being so, it is perhaps a little surprising that he should accuse those who
adopted it of gross effrontery (huperbolên tês anaideias) at 32,11. (For further
details and references to the commentaries, see the discussions of Sorabji (pp.
2-5) and Verrycken (pp. 215-26) in R. Sorabji (ed), Aristotle Transformed and the
latter’s ‘Philoponus’ Interpretation of Plato’s Cosmogony’, Documenti e Studi
Sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 8 (1997), 270-81; of course the location of
the Forms in the mind of God was already Middle Platonist doctrine.)
99. Changing parakousantas to epakousantas at 29,10, one of two possi-
ble corrections suggested by Rabe in the critical apparatus.
100. DA 1.
101. An. Post. 83a32-3.
102. Metaph. 991a20-2.
103. The saying occurs again at 144,21-2. For Philoponus’ part in the
development of the topos see L. Tarán, ‘Amicus Plato sed magis amica
veritas, from Plato and Aristotle to Cervantes’, Antike und Abendland 30
(1984), 112-15. Verrycken also discusses Philoponus’ use of it in ‘Philoponus’
Interpretation of Plato’s Cosmogony’, 274-7.
104. Verrycken (op. cit., 275) suggests that Philoponus must have seen a
parallel between Aristotle’s ‘delicate position’ in relation to Plato and his vis
à vis his own teacher Ammonius. This is likely enough, but I cannot agree
with him when he goes on to suggest that Philoponus’ preoccupation with his
own situation has led him to (consciously or unconsciously?) paraphrase
Aristotle inaccurately. The issue seems to turn on the meaning of the phrase
ta oikeia anairein at 31,3-6. Philoponus paraphrases this tas oikeias [hu-
potheseis elenkhein], or ‘[to scrutinise] our own [hypotheses]’, which
Verrycken rejects in favour of Rackham’s ‘to sacrifice } one’s closest personal
ties’ in the Loeb Classical Library translation. But, although Verrycken
proceeds as though there can be no doubt that Rackham’s interpretation is
the ‘correct’ one, this is by no means obvious; Ostwald, for instance, takes the
same view of the passage as Philoponus and translates ‘[to] give up }
[theories that once were] his own’. This is not the place to consider the pros
and cons of the two interpretations. (As it happens, I find that of Philoponus
the more plausible). It is enough to point out that the issue is not clear cut
and that there is no reason to see Philoponus’ interpretation of the phrase in
question as evidence of any discomfort or guilt on his part, as Verrycken
suggests. In fact, it is quite possible that it did not occur to him that there
was any other way of understanding the phrase. (I have deliberately been
speaking of interpretation rather than translation because the versions of
Rackham and Ostwald are as interpretative as that of Philoponus. The
precise reference of ta oikeia (more neutral renderings of which would be
‘[one’s] own things’, or ‘what is [one’s] own’) is left unclear and a translator
probably does best to retain the imprecision of the Greek, as does Ross’s ‘to
destroy what touches us closely’ in the Revised Oxford Translation – notwith-
standing which in the next paragraph I shall translate Aristotle’s words ‘to
demolish even our own [positions]’ in line with Philoponus’ understanding of
their meaning).
105. EN 1096a11-17.
106. Adding kai before diapherontôs and en after it at 31,8, as suggested
by Rabe in the critical apparatus.
107. This work is not extant. Philoponus quotes from it or refers to it
some twenty times in Aet., Proclus himself refers to it in his commentary on
Plato’s Timaeus and Simplicius probably draws on it in a number of his
commentaries. The quotations in Aet. and some probable quotations in
Simplicius’ in Cael. are translated by Thomas Taylor in The Fragments That
Remain of the Lost Writings of Proclus, Surnamed the Platonic Successor
(London, 1925), 2-31 and the work is discussed in L. Siorvanes, Proclus: Neo-
Platonic Philosophy and Science (New Haven & London, 1996), 216-23. Phi-
loponus’ citations are listed in Rabe’s index of proper names under ‘Proclus’.
108. The expression epi lexeôs, which literally means something like
‘verbatim’ or ‘word for word’ and which I here translate ‘to quote his exact
words’, was one method used to mark direct quotations in the absence of
typographic indications and a case could be made for not translating it at all.
109. Metaph. 991a20-2.
110. The word here translated ‘living-creature-itself’ (autozôion) is fre-
quently used by Proclus in his commentary on the Timaeus to refer to the
intelligible living creature (zôion) of which the universe is a copy in the
Timaeus. Aristotle does not use the word with this reference and does not
discuss the zôion of the Timaeus in the Metaphysics. He does, however, use
the words zôion and autoanthrôpos (man-himself) when criticising the para-
digmatic function of the theory of Forms immediately after describing the
word ‘pattern’ as metaphorical (991a28-9), and Proclus may have had this
passage in mind.
111. An. Post. 83a33.
112. EN 1096a11-1097a14.
113. GC 335b9-24.
114. Not quite, of course (see the note at 29,6).
115. The promise must have been made in the pages lost at the beginning
of Aet.
116. Changing huphestêken to sunestêken at 33,2, as suggested by Rabe
in the critical apparatus.
117. The term ‘first substance’ is actually Aristotelian and Aristotle
applies it to individuals in the physical world, but he would have agreed that
Plato is treating the Forms as first substances by giving them separate
existence.
118. For ‘perfect living creature’ see Tim. 31B and for ‘always being the
same and unchanging’ Tim. 29A. ‘Living creature itself’ (I have assumed that
auto zôion is equivalent to the more usual autozôion), although much used
by the Neoplatonists, does not occur anywhere in Plato. The pattern of the
world is nowhere said to be ‘truly existent’, although sensible objects are said
not to be at Tim. 28A and the phrase is applied to Forms in other dialogues.
119. Deleting allou deomenon eis huparxin at 33,16 and adding
deomenon eis huparxin after allou at 33,17, as suggested by Rabe in the
critical apparatus.
120. The construction is awkward and Rabe may be right to suggest that
hôst’ at 33,23 has replaced malist’, which would take up hêkista at 33,20. I
would then translate: ‘So if the pattern of the world is a substance, it above
all would have }’.
121. cf. 33,7-8.
122. The reference appears to be to the second ‘definition’ of relatives at
8a31-2.
123. cf. Aristotle, Cat. 10.
124. Philoponus could have invoked the authority of Cat. 8a-b24 for this
position.
125. 33,26-34,2.
126. Rep. 592B.
127. Repositioning ousias to follow legô (within the parentheses) at
35,28.
128. The words translated ‘subject’ and ‘portrait’ in this and the next few
sentences are the words I have been translating ‘pattern’ and ‘copy’.
129. Adding allôn tôn after tôn at 36,14, as suggested by Rabe in the
critical apparatus.
130. It is often appropriate to translate Hellênes ‘Greeks’ and in a num-
ber of passages in Aet. I do, but for Jews and Christians alike, including those
of Greek culture like Philoponus himself, the word is often equivalent to
‘heathen’ or ‘pagan’, and in contexts where it seems to have that connotation
I translate ‘Hellenes’ rather than ‘Greeks’. (For this expedient, cf. L.G.
Westerink (ed.), Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy (Amster-
dam 1962), xiii).
131. The two Greek words (manteia and khrêstêria) can both be trans-
lated ‘oracular shrines’.
132. The Olympian gods, to whom these ‘shrines and oracles’ were
normally dedicated, are frequently referred to as daimones, or ‘demons’, by
the Christians. For the pagans daimones were minor deities or spirits
(normally without pejorative overtones), and the Olympians were theoi, or
‘gods’. The word here translated ‘pretended’ (hupokrinesthai) can also mean
‘replied’ or ‘interpreted’ and is one of the words that is used of giving an
oracular response; there seems to be a play on words. As I indicated in the
introduction, the sentence is a clear echo of the last part of the last sentence
of Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica, 5.3.10. Evil demons appear again in
Aet. at 241,16; 635,15 and 644,2.
133. 5,1-8 (Boese) (= 5,1-11 (Isaac)).
134. 5,15-25 (Boese) (= 5,21-34 (Isaac)). Also quoted at 91,10-18 (with the
omission of 5 lines in the middle) and at 570,1-13.
135. 5,32-5 (Boese) (= 5,43-8 (Isaac)). Also quoted at 6,17-21; 91,19-23
and 570,14-18.
136. Philoponus’ language here is obviously more appropriate to the
Christian God than to the Neoplatonic One, but although in other works
Proclus is usually careful to avoid attributing specific activity of any kind to
the One itself, the language he uses in the theodicy of the Ten Puzzles does
go some way towards justifying it. (Elsewhere, although both extend to all
three hypostases, the primary locus of creative activity is in Intellect and that
of providence at the level of the divine Henads in the first hypostasis).
137. Enn. 6.7.1,45-57. The usual title of the treatise is How the Multitude
of the Forms Came Into Being, and On the Good.
138. Although Philoponus makes much of this ‘on account of’ (dia) in the
explication of this passage which follows, the text of Plotinus actually has
meta (‘after’) as it does in the line after next.
139. hen (‘one’) does not occur in the text of Plotinus and is absent both
when Philoponus quotes this sentence at 40,22 during his analysis of this
passage and on the two other occasions when he quotes this passage (101,24
and 572,7), and I have omitted it from the translation.
141. Changing touto to hoper at 40,12 rather than adding auto de before
touto at 40,13 as Rabe suggests in the critical apparatus.
142. Omitting hen, which Rabe inserts here on the strength of its occur-
rence in the manuscripts at 39,7.
143. The ‘belief in regard to fate’ is, as the rest of the sentence makes
clear, astrology, or perhaps astrology along with other methods of prognosti-
cation. As a Christian, Philoponus could only be hostile to astrology and he
attacks it at some length in the later work Opif. Here he is going to concede
its validity for the sake of the argument, so a direct attack on it would not
serve his purposes, but the failure to name it directly, the use of the word
hupolêpsis, which, like hupothesis, often has a pejorative ring when used to
describe the beliefs of others (in Opif. he refers (p. 195) to the ‘absurd notions’
(atopoi hupolêpseis) of those who believe in astrology and devotes a whole
section (pp. 199-204) to arguing that it does not deserve to be called an art),
the references to lack of consensus and to ‘pagans’ and the brevity of the
treatment all combine to show his distaste for it.
hupolêpsis, however one translates it (other possible renderings are ‘sup-
position’, ‘assumption’, ‘notion’, ‘prejudice’), makes an awkward subject for
the main verb of the sentence. Perhaps Philoponus thought of the phrase as
equivalent to ‘the pseudo-science astrology’, or something similar, or perhaps
he just lost the thread, but I would not rule out the possibility that something
has gone wrong with the text.
144. Literally ‘the children of the Hellenes’, but the phrase is merely
periphrastic for ‘the Hellenes’, or ‘the pagans’. (For the usage, see LSJ pais
I.3).
145. According to LSJ, katarkhê was a technical astrological term for a
forecast concerning an undertaking or voyage. However, the literal meaning
of the word is ‘starting-point’, and the anonymous author of the gloss in the
chief manuscript of Philoponus, who suggests that it is here equivalent to
‘date of birth’, is probably on the right track, in which case the reference is
specifically to ‘nativities’ or horoscopes.
146. In Opif. (pp. 195-7) Philoponus reproduces from Origen a proof that
even if astrology is able to predict future events it does not bring them about.
147. On balance I think it likely that Proclus is already talking about the
creator of the universe and not, as Lang and Macro’s translation ‘If the
demiurge of something is a demiurge’ implies, about any creator at all, and
have translated accordingly.
148. Rabe believes that Philoponus has An. Post. 98a35 ff. in mind and
in view of the reference to Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on An. Post.
at 48,10 he may well be right, but Phys. 195b16-21; 27-8 is also a possibility.
149. 26E-27A.
150. At e.g. Metaph. 1049b24-9.
151. Literally ‘former’, ‘earlier’. The axiom was stated at 42,7-8.
152. Stated at 42,15-17.
153. Adding ginesthai after energeiâi and retaining the manuscript read-
ing aitiôi at 43,14. (Another possibility would be to change energeiâi to
energein, again retaining aitiôi).
154. The awkwardness of the construction at this point reflects a corre-
sponding awkwardness in the Greek.
155. Omitting heteron at 43,22. (Rabe writes ‘heteron suspectum’, al-
though Baltes, who also omits it, reports that the Arabic translator Ishâq ibn
Hunayn appears to have found it in the Greek).
156. For the translation of hexis see the note at 46,12.
157. Inserting to after hoti at 44,12, as suggested by Rabe in the critical
apparatus.
158. eisagein often seems to invite this translation in Philoponus and,
even though ‘God’ is a rather awkward subject for ‘implies’, it seems to work
better here than alternatives such as ‘introduce’, ‘import’, ‘bring [with him]’.
159. Omitting energeiâi at 44,21. (Rabe suggests transposing dêmiour-
gou and energeiâi but in light of 52,8 it is perhaps more likely that energeiâi
is a gloss that has found its way into the text).
160. Changing ton to to at 44,24, as suggested by Rabe in the critical
apparatus.
161. Changing autos to auto at 44,25, as suggested by Rabe in the critical
apparatus.
162. For literature on this concept of ‘fitness’ or ‘suitability’ see Siorva-
nes, Proclus: Neo-Platonic Philosophy and Science (New Haven & London,
1996), 200, n. 23. (The reference there to pp. 104-9 of Sambursky must be to
his earlier discussion in The Physical World of Late Antiquity (London,
1962)).
163. Changing onta to gnonta at 45,12, as suggested by Rabe in the
critical apparatus.
164. Adding tou before energeiâi at 45,16, as suggested by Rabe in the
critical apparatus.
165. Adding tou before dunamei at 45,17 and before energeiâi at 45,18,
as suggested by Rabe in the critical apparatus.
166. See especially DA 417a21-b2, which Philoponus quotes and expli-
cates in IV.7, and on which his own account in this section is largely based.
167. Since for Aristotle grammatikê probably meant reading and writing
(cf. Top. 142b31-3 and his use of the letter A as an example of the sort of thing
that a practitioner of the art has knowledge of at DA 417a29) and in DA
300,3-5 shows that Philoponus appreciated this, a case could be made for
translating grammatikê ‘reading and writing’ and grammatikos ‘literate’.
However, in similar contexts in his Categories commentary (cf. especially
142,21-6), Philoponus clearly has in mind the academic discipline of ‘gram-
mar’, which in Philoponus’ day embraced philology, literary criticism and
much else in addition to grammar, and in Aet. too he seems to have in mind
something more elaborate than elementary reading and writing, so I have
opted for ‘grammar’ in the case of grammatikê and, construing it substan-
tively, for ‘grammarian’ in the case of grammatikos. (Philoponus, who was
known as ‘the Grammarian’, may well have taught ‘grammar’ himself).
168. The verb translated ‘acquiring from others’ may, but need not, imply
a formal teaching situation.
169. At in DA 301,21-3 in a similar context Philoponus uses the example
of geometrical theorems and on balance it seems best to use ‘theorem’ to
translate theôrêma here in Aet. even though the sole example of a grammati-
cal theôrêma in Aet. is tode to alpha (‘this particular A’) at 71,10-12, which,
coupled with the fact that Lampe (s.v. 5) cites a passage in which parts of
speech are described as theôrêmata, suggests that the theôrêmata of gram-
mar are not what we would normally call theorems. (in Cat. 193,13-27
perhaps suggests that they would include letters, syllables, words and sen-
tences). Perhaps something like ‘the basic elements identified by theory’
would catch the sense of the word, but that would be far too cumbersome. (Of
the alternatives offered by the lexica ‘datum or rule of art’ (LSJ II.1.b) seems
to come closest, but it does not quite fit the bill).
170. It is difficult to find a satisfactory single rendering for hexis when it
is used as part of the Neoplatonic vocabulary of potentiality and actuality.
Here, and in a number of other passages, I have opted for ‘possession’ (see
LSJ I.1), but more often something in line with LSJ II (‘a being in a certain
state, a permanent condition as produced by practice’) seems appropriate. In
this vein ‘disposition’ is attractive, not least because ‘dispositional[ly]’ would
often provide a neat solution for the sometimes difficult phrase kath’ hexin,
but I have opted for ‘capacity’ (cf. LSJ II.3 ‘trained habit, skill’) because all of
Philoponus’ examples involve the acquisition of a capacity or skill and
because it seems to work better in contexts like 48,2-4. Finally, at 69,25 ff.,
where Philoponus quotes and comments on one of the Aristotelian passages
that lies behind the Neoplatonic scheme, neither ‘possession’ nor ‘capacity’
works and I use ‘condition’.
171. When the verb prokheirizesthai has energeian (‘activity’) as its direct
object (13 times), I translate it ‘mobilise’, but when it occurs with theôrian
(here and at 71,3) or epistêmên (‘knowledge’) (at 73,13), I prefer ‘externalise’
(for the externalisation of thought or knowledge, cf. 77,7-15), and when with
theôrêmata (‘theorems’) (4 times), ‘present’.
172. ‘Thought’ would be a reasonable rendering of theôria in this and the
next chapter, but, for reasons explained in the note at 77,5, I have opted for
the not altogether satisfactory ‘reflection’. In fact, as 77,5-7 and 73,13 show,
Philoponus could equally well have written ‘externalising his knowledge of
them’, which would have been easier. Perhaps he does not because he has
just used ‘knowledge’ and wants to avoid repetition.
173. Inserting auta dekhesthai after pephukenai at 46,19. (Rabe suggests
inserting dekhesthai).
174. Changing elegeto, ê ho to elegeto einai, ho at 46,26-47,1, one of two
possible corrections suggested by Rabe in the critical apparatus.
175. 46,17-22.
176. More literally ‘not being active with respect to it’.
177. Changing prôtên epitêdeiotêta (‘first receptivity’) at 47,14, which is
neither in accord with Philoponus’ normal usage nor good sense – what would
second receptivity be? – to prôtên dunamin. (Another possibility would be
phusikên epitêdeiotêta, or ‘natural receptivity; cf. 46,6, etc.).
178. 42,6-8.
179. Changing ouketi to ouk esti at 48,1, as suggested by Rabe in the
critical apparatus.
180. Presumably commenting on An. Post. 98a35-b38. The commentary
is not extant.
181. 42,4-8.
182. Changing tôn to tou at 49,18, as suggested by Rabe in the critical
apparatus.
183. 42,13-14.
184. Inserting to before axiôma at 50,10, as suggested by Rabe in the
critical apparatus.
185. 49,25-50,6.
186. 42,14-43,2.
187. 49,25-50,6 and 50,22-5.
188. Changing tôn to tou at 51,12, as suggested by Rabe in the critical
apparatus.
189. 49,20-4.
190. Changing autos to auto at 51,24.
191. Changing houtos at 52,9 to houtôs rather than to autos as suggested
by Rabe in the critical apparatus. (The reference of houtôs (‘in that sense’)
will be to kath’ hexin (‘in capacity’) two lines earlier).
192. More literally ‘There being a builder by capacity’.
193. Int. 17a34-7.
194. A rather more literal translation of the phrase translated ‘by purely
verbal means’ would be: ‘by words and phrases’.
195. Rabe’s suspicion of ton at 53,7 seems misplaced. When the first
creator is only potentially a creator, the second creator is only potentially the
cause of its becoming an actual creator and so it makes perfectly good sense
to attribute the potentiality of the latter to that of the former.
196. In other words, even if one were to argue that it is the mental
blueprint of a ship in the mind of the shipwright rather than the shipwright
himself that brings the ship to actuality, that is no more an actual ship than
is the shipwright.
197. Literally ‘becomes such’.
198. 53,3-10.
199. Changing tou dunamei auto to tou to dunamei autou at 54,19. (cf.
53,21-2; 54,15-16; 55,14).
200. Alc. 1 106D.
201. The clause dêlon oun } agagôn (54,24-55,1) seems to be defective in
some way. For purposes of translation I have supplied after autês (54,25) the
words autos heautôi aitios ên tês ek tou proterou dunamei eis to energeiâi
metabolês (‘was himself the cause of his transition from first potentiality to
actuality’) from 54,20-2, but it is not difficult to think of other possible
supplements.
202. In Metaph. Aristotle states on a number of occasions that the
universal is not a substance or a ‘this’ and in An. Post. that we gain a
knowledge of it only by examining particulars, but he does not use the same
language of it as Philoponus does here.
203. Two points need to be made about the translation of akinêtos. First,
it shows the same kind of ambiguity as genêtos and could equally well be
translated ‘unmovable’ or ‘unmoved’. Because Proclus’ akinêton aition is a
direct descendant of Aristotle’s unmoved mover, it is tempting to opt for
‘unmoved’, but ‘unmoving’ seems to work best as the argument unfolds and
God and the universe are introduced. Second, kinêsis, which I normally
translate ‘movement’, and related words such as akinêtos cover a wide range
of ‘movements’, many of which are more naturally described as ‘changes’ in
English and a good case could be made for translating akinêtos ‘unchanging’
and both kinêsis and the associated verb kineisthai, which occur later in the
argument, ‘change’, but because Proclus goes on to say that being akinêtos
implies being ametablêtos, and ametablêtos itself needs to be rendered by
‘unchanging’ or a synonym, I have opted for ‘unmoving’, etc. (For the range
of ‘movements’ or ‘changes’ covered by kinêsis, see 256,19-22, where Philo-
ponus in fact treats kinêsis and metabolê, or ‘change’, as synonyms).
204. That is, it will not come into being or pass out of existence. (Here in
particular ‘unchanging’ might be thought a better rendering of akinêtos than
‘unmoving’).
205. Here, in the argument, and where possible in the refutation (for an
exception, see the note at 62,7), I translate poiein ‘produce’ (and poiêtês
‘producer’, etc.). Another possible rendering, and one which would at times
work better, would be ‘create’, but I reserve that for dêmiourgein, which also
occurs with some frequency in the refutation.
206. Changing aïdiou to aïdion at 56,10.
207. The argument of this paragraph is close to that of Proclus ET
76,5-12.
208. I use ‘perfect’ / ‘imperfect’ to translate teleios / atelês when they
describe God or human agents, ‘complete’ / ‘incomplete’ when they describe
activities or movements.
209. On the question of the identity of this ‘someone’, see the Introduc-
tion.
210. The ‘truth’ referred to here is Christian doctrine, as is clear from
75,7-9 below. Other instances of alêtheia of which this may be so occur at
59,24; 61,8; 98,20; 117,16; 120,20; 127,3; 312,10.
211. Omitting ou at 57,15, as suggested by Rabe in the critical apparatus.
212. In the present refutation, and often in other works, Philoponus
seems to use the comparative form of this adjective where one would expect
the positive. I have not attempted to indicate this in the translation.
213. Changing oude at 57,21 to ou dia (cf. 75,21-2).
214. Changing atelês ôn to atelê at 59.4. (Rabe suggests atelê auton).
215. In Phys. 3.2 (especially 201b31-2).
216. At 60,21-2.
217. cf. 55,25-56,6 (especially the last three lines) – but the wording is
much closer to that of Philoponus’ own paraphrase of Proclus’ argument at
59,26-7.
218. The antitheses poiêsis / pêsis and poiein / paskhein and the phrase
ouk auto poiei eis heteron (‘not itself acting on someone else’) suggest that
poiêsis and poiein here need to be translated ‘acting’ and ‘act’. The charitable
view is that the argument is shorthand for something like: (1) the change
from first potentiality to the possession of a capacity is not a case of acting
(poiêsis ) but of being acted upon; (2) ‘production’ (poiêsis ) is a case of acting
(poiêsis ); (3) therefore ‘production’ (poiêsis ) cannot be an instance of a change
from first potentiality to the possession of a capacity. However, it is difficult
to avoid the suspicion that the argument actually depends on the ambiguity
of poiêsis and poiein (the way having been prepared at 61,12-14) and that
they are meant to retain (or at least include) the meanings ‘producing’ and
‘produce’. (Two further points. (1) One might be tempted to ask oneself at this
point whether Philoponus has been reading Proclus’ poiein as ‘act’ rather
than ‘produce’ all along, but poiein at 61,2 and poiêsis at 60,18 ff. show that
this is not so. (2) How should one read poiein and related words in the rest of
the section? I suspect that the answer is that the equivocation, once intro-
duced, runs at least to the end of the section, but in the translation I have
opted for ‘produce’ throughout).
219. 56,6-7.
220. 56,6-7.
221. Over the next four sections.
222. There is initially some temptation to translate diastasis ‘extension’,
but 65,23-4 shows that this would be incorrect.
223. The passages shedding most light on this distinction between per-
fect and imperfect activity, or, as he sometimes puts it, between movement
and activity or actuality, are Phys. 201b27-202a3; Metaph. 1048b18-36;
1065a14-1066a26; DA 431a6-7; EN 1174a13-b9.
224. Phys. 201a10-11.
225. He probably has in mind DA 431a4-7.
226. Rabe suggests supplying tis (‘anyone’) as the subject of the verb, but
the reference seems to be to Proclus and his claim that an act of creation
would involve God in movement.
227. Phys. 202a13-b29; cf. DA 417b2-9.
228. Punctuating with a comma rather than a full stop after akhronos at
66,18.
229. sc. minds.
230. Punctuating with a full stop rather than a comma after kinêsis at
66,25.
231. Or perhaps ‘to quote verbatim some passages in which Aristotle
testifies }’.
232. 201a15-18.
233. 201b7-15.
234. 202a13-17.
235. 61,12-22.
236. 46,3-47,17.
237. 417a21-b2.
238. theôrein is difficult to translate. The activity described is, I think,
that of attending to, or calling into consciousness, previously acquired knowl-
edge, possibly, as the next clause would seem to suggest, in the course of
applying it to a particular situation; or, to put it differently, active, as opposed
to passive or potential, knowing. None of the usual renderings of theôrein
really gets this across, and I have settled on ‘reflect’ (the choice of Smith in
the Revised Oxford Translation), largely because ‘reflection’ works tolerably
well as a rendering of theôria in what follows. (Although Philoponus’ inter-
pretation of the present passage differs in some respects from the one
outlined above (see the note at 71,13), what he says at 77,5-10 shows that he
too understands theôrein here as descriptive of a mental act which is identical
with, or at least embodies, knowing).
239. After ‘knowers’ Ross (Aristotle, De Anima (Oxford, 1961)) adds ontes
energeiâi ginontai epistêmones (‘who become actual knowers’) and Smith (op.
cit.) follows his text.
240. Philoponus’ paraphrase at 71,21 ff. shows that this is how he
understood this phrase. Ross (op. cit. 233-4) and other modern scholars (e.g.
Smith in the Revised Oxford Translation) take a different view of it. (I use
‘condition’ to render hexis here because ignorance can hardly be described as
a capacity).
241. Or perhaps ‘on the passage’.
242. 4.6.
243. Changing tois to hois and repositioning pôs to follow adioristôs at
70,11. The text printed by Rabe would read: ‘The circumstances of the
divisions of potentiality and of actuality are pretty clear from what has
already been said by us in the last section; for since we have set out quite
generally and without distinctions in earlier chapters [or perhaps “passages”,
or “arguments”] how Aristotle has used “potentiality” and “actuality” (he
indicates this by writing “for up until now we have been talking of them quite
generally”), he carries out a division of them in the passage we have quoted’.
This obviously cannot stand. In particular, the shift from ‘we’ to ‘he’ in the
second part of the sentence is clearly unacceptable. (A case could be made for
more radical surgery. One might, for example, change tôn êdê hêmin
proeirêmenôn en tôi pro toutou kephalaiôi at 70,9-10 to, say, tôn legomenôn
and omit the words parethêkamen pôs – or perhaps just parethêkamen – at
71,11 and translate: ‘The circumstances of the divisions of potentiality and
of actuality are pretty clear from what is said; for since Aristotle has used
“potentiality” and “actuality” in a rather general and loose manner in earlier
passages (he indicates this by writing “for up until now we have been talking
of them quite generally”), he carries out a division of them in the passage we
have quoted’. Although this is remote from the transmitted text, someone
who failed to see that Philoponus is moving straight into the promised
elucidation of Aristotle’s words could have revised the passage under the
influence of 69,7-11).
244. 69,13-14.
245. For ‘externalise’ and ‘reflection’, see the notes at 46,14 and 15.
246. It should be noted that the above exegesis of Aristotle’s words,
together with what he says elsewhere (see especially 3.2 and 77,5 ff.), shows
that for Philoponus the three phases in Aristotle’s illustration of the potenti-
ality / actuality contrast are (1) the potential for acquiring knowledge; (2) the
possession of (latent) knowledge; (3) the ‘mobilisation’ of knowledge (which
appears to mean its ‘externalisation’ or presentation or use in the world),
whereas on my understanding of them (for which see the note at 69,20) they
would be (1) the potential for acquiring knowledge; (2) the possession of
(latent) knowledge; (3) conscious, or active, knowing. (Under the first of these
schemes theôria is a virtual synonym for ‘knowledge’ (see 77,5-7), and (1) is
a potentiality, (3) an actuality, and (2) an actuality relative to (1) but a
potentiality relative to (3); under the second, theôria is the ‘conscious, or
active knowing’ of (3), and (1) and (2) are different kinds of potentiality, and
(3) an actuality).
247. Adding ho after hoti at 71,15.
248. 69,22-5.
249. eis epistêmên is rather odd; perhaps Philoponus actually wrote
either kata epistêmên or eis epistêmôna (‘into a knower’).
250. The Greek here could be rendered ‘something which’, but later at
72,9 the Greek, rather oddly perhaps, has a masculine rather than a neuter
form.
251. Perhaps he has 5.1-2 in mind, and in particular 224a30-b8 and
225b23-4 for alteration as change of form and 225a12-20 and b3-5 (which,
incidentally, seems to contradict Philoponus’ claim) for the change from
privation to form.
252. Changing kai thermou de homoiôs kai psukhrou at 72,11-12 to kai
ho thermainomenos de homoiôs ek psukhrou, which is, apart from the addi-
tion of ho, a correction suggested by Rabe in the critical apparatus.
253. i.e. the coming into existence of a new substance rather than a
qualitative change.
254. DA 417b5-9.
255. See the note at 69,20 on the difficulties of translating theôrein.
Smith in the Revised Oxford Translation has ‘For what possesses knowledge
becomes an actual knower’, which, although not literal, doubtless catches the
sense.
256. 72,4-8.
257. 61,5 ff. The whole section should be compared with this one.
258. Changing orthotêtos at 74,26 to deinotêtos. (orthotês should mean
‘correctness’ or ‘rectitude’ and could conceivably stand if one assumes that
Philoponus is being ironic. However, Philoponus wrote deinotêtos rather than
orthotêtos at 61,9 in the passage to which he has just directed the reader and
it seems likely that that is what he wrote here).
259. James 1,17.
260. Until now I have been translating epistêmê ‘knowledge’, but it can
also be rendered ‘skill’ or ‘science’ and on balance ‘skill’ seems to work best
in this section.
261. iskhein. Perhaps ‘maintain’ would be more literal.
262. Or ‘contemplating and thinking’. theôria (‘contemplation’) clearly
owes its presence here to Aristotle’s use of theôrein in the passage from DA
that was cited in section 7 and noêsis (‘thought’) is in effect an interpretative
gloss on it. In what follows, Philoponus uses the two words interchangeably,
and often ‘thought’ or ‘thinking’ would be the most satisfactory rendering of
theôria, but I have thought it best to maintain a distinction between the two
words in the translation.
263. Or possibly ‘ideas’ (cf. Lampe s.v. A).
264. More literally ‘we are then said to be active with respect to the
capacities’.
265. i.e. not clothed in words.
266. sc. in someone other than the thinker.
267. Although I have used personal forms in the translation, the entities
that reflect and communicate are, from ‘reflecting’ to the end of the sentence,
impersonal (i.e. in the neuter gender) in the Greek.
268. 2.5.
269. 13,26-23,22.
270. Philoponus returns to the question of the nature of God’s will in
16.1-4.
271. Philoponus appears to use the verbs boulesthai and thelein inter-
changeably in this section and I shall not attempt any systematic distinction
between them in the translation.
272. Changing eis to autou tou Sôkratous sôma to eis to auto tôi tou
Sôkratous sômati at 79,26. (cf. LSJ autos III.1 and the synonymous phrase
einai meta tôn sômatôn at 80,23; Rabe writes ‘einai eis suspecta’ in the critical
apparatus).
273. i.e. the second negative cancels, or reverses, the first.
274. 41C-D.
275. Changing ho autos nous hôste tas to ho autos anthrôpos nosôn te tas
at 81,20-1, as suggested by Rabe in the critical apparatus, and further adding
ê after hugiainôn at 81,21.
276. As patients rather than agents.
277. Changing dêmiourgêsei to dêmiourgêsai at 82,6, as suggested by
Rabe in the critical apparatus.
278. 56,11-12.
279. 56,18-20.
280. Removing the existing diacritics from tauta at 82,15 and accenting
it with a circumflex on the first syllable (cf. 96,2).
281. Rabe may be right in thinking that something has gone wrong with
the Greek text at this point, but the sense is clear enough.
282. He presumably has in mind Anaxagoras’ doctrine that there is a
portion of everything in everything (cf. Diels-Kranz frs. B6 and B11).
283. In the case of Plato the reference must be to Phd. 72A-D; Aristotle
criticises the relevant doctrine of Anaxagoras in a number of places, in most
detail in Phys. 1.4.
284. More literally ‘even though no perception grasps it’.
285. Whether by being low, mean and trivial, or by being sketchy and
undeveloped. In the former case he would have people like the Epicureans in
mind, in the latter the uneducated.
286. i.e. ‘will be heir to all the ills of the body’ – and so not be perfect and
free of need.
287. DA 417b5-16.
288. The original has ‘that’.
289. Epist. 2, 312E.
290. Laws 715E.
291. Il. 2. 204; Metaph. 1076a4.
292. In the previous sentence.
293. Phys. 256a5-8.
294. 256a8-13.
295. The first few lines of the quotation differ markedly from the text of
Aristotle and seem to be somewhat garbled. I have, however, resisted the
temptation to fall back on the text of Aristotle and, apart from changing
ekeino to ekeina at 89,14, have done my best with the transmitted text.
(Aristotle has: ‘Now we say that both the first and the last of the movers
imparts motion, but more so the first, for it moves the last but not it the first,
and without the first }’.)
296. Phys. 257a10-12.
297. 257b15-20.
298. Changing aitiôtaton to aitiôteron at 90,5, as suggested by Rabe in
299. Retaining estin, the manuscript reading, at 90,10 and changing tôi
aitiôi tês kinêseôs estin to tôi aitiôteran tês kinêseôs einai at 90,11-12.
300. 5,15-18 (Boese) (= 5,21-4 (Isaac)). Also quoted at 38,3-6 and 570,1-4.
301. 5,22-5 (Boese) (= 5,30-4 (Isaac)). Also quoted at 38,10-15 and 570,8-
13.
302. 5,32-5 (Boese) (= 5,43-8 (Isaac)). Also quoted at 6,17-21; 38,16-20
and 570,14-18.
303. Adding aei before estin at 92,5, as suggested by Rabe in the critical
apparatus.
304. 42,12-43,15.
305. Omitting dunamei kai after deuteros at 92,18.
306. Changing ê at 92,20 to ei.
307. Changing ê at 92,22 to eiê.
308. 41A.
309. The meaning (and, consequently, the correct translation) of the
words translated ‘Gods, offspring of gods, works of which I am the creator }’
is far from clear. The rendering adopted here is unlikely to represent Plato’s
intention but has a better chance of reflecting Philoponus’ understanding of
it. (Anyone interested in the issues involved should consult F.M. Cornford,
Plato’s Cosmology, the Timaeus of Plato (London, 1937), 367-70).
310. 41B-C.
311. At 42,4-6. One might have expected epikheirêmati rather than
kephalaiôi, but see the note at 1,14.
312. 43,16-17.
313. 82,13.
314. Inserting dedêmiourgêtai kai aei after aei at 95,7, as suggested by
315. i.e. that he will be trapped by his own arguments. The literal
meaning of the Greek is ‘that he will be caught by his own feathers’ and the
reference is to eagles shot with arrows feathered with their own plumes. The
saying, which appears in some fifteen Greek authors, including Philoponus’
critic Simplicius, goes back to the dramatist Aeschylus (Fr. 139) and the
Shakespearean phrase is, as LSJ suggests, a good equivalent.
316. Plato Tim. 34A.
317. Although 96,20-1 shows that this is how Philoponus understands
this clause, I think that Proclus intended something like ‘for whatever is
there [sc. in time], is in a particular [part of] time’.
318. Changing einai in line 5 to esti and (1) closing the brackets after it
rather than after thraxeien in line 4 (2) changing the full stop after hêmin in
line 6 to a comma (3) removing the brackets around hoson } meros (lines
7-9), and punctuating instead with a semicolon after estai in line 7 and a full
stop after meros in line 9.
319. The words hoson } ou pote (‘for as much as } not at some [particu-
lar] time’) are quoted again at 167,17-20, but there the words hoson } meros
(‘for as much as } bit by bit’) are placed after estin men pote (‘not at some
[particular] time’).
320. Changing dia ti at 96,19 to dioti (cf. 99,2), and punctuating with a
comma rather than a question mark at 96,21.
321. Philoponus probably has passages such as 82,15-25 and 95,5-12 in
mind, but much in Proclus’ second, third and fourth proofs might be thought
to imply the same principle.
322. 94,23-5.
323. Changing pote at 98,11 to ton te. (In the critical apparatus Rabe
raises the possibility of inserting ton te but not at the expense of pote.)
324. At 96,2-18.
325. 96,6-9.
326. For the translation of this last clause, see the note at 96.8.
327. 96,9-10.
328. 96,11-13.
329. 96,13-14.
330. 98,23-5.
331. 96,14-17.
332. Changing genesthai to ginesthai at 99,19, as suggested by Rabe in
333. Changing anankê to anankazei at 100,18. (Rabe suggests a more
complex correction in the critical apparatus).
334. Changing tou } parêgmenou at 101,2-3 to tôn } parêgmenôn (cf.
85,5; 87,1; 88,10).
335. Literally ‘more imperfect than himself’.
336. Changing hôsper to eiper at 101,6.
337. At 39,5-18. (The passage is quoted for a third time at 571,20-572,8).
338. On this title, see the note at 39,3.
339. Enn. 6.7.1,45-57.
340. Although Proclus frequently uses epi toutois with an ordinal number
in this sense in lists of points in other works, this is the only time he uses it
at the beginning of an argument in Aet.
341. In what follows I use ‘exist’ and ‘be’ interchangeably to translate the
verb einai.
342. Or ‘at the same time with’, but it seems best to avoid an obvious
temporal connotation.
343. Thomas Taylor and Lang and Macro assume that ouranos (‘the
heaven’) is the unexpressed or lost subject of the second ên in line 5, but I
believe, like Philoponus (see, for example, section one of the refutation) and
Baltes (see his translation at Die Weltentstehung, 2, 139) that the part of the
argument that runs from line 4 to line 18 depends entirely on the supposed
implications of talking of ‘when’ time did not, or will not, exist. If this is right,
the present sentence would seem to read ‘But there was no time when it [sc.
time] was not and will be [none] when it will not be’, which is unexpected
because later in the argument (on my reading of it) Proclus studiously avoids
seeming to pre-empt the argument by talking directly of ‘a time (khronos)
before time (khronos)’ by using such unnatural locutions as ên hote ouk ên
(‘there was a “when” there was not }’; see lines 5, 10 and 13; I use ‘a when’
in translating these expressions so as to avoid the more natural rendering ‘a
time when’, which would risk confusion). I suspect (and have translated
accordingly) that the solution to the difficulty, if a difficulty it is, is that
khronos de ouk ên hote ouk ên is an inversion of ou de ên hote khronos ouk ên
brought about by a desire to avoid the juxtaposition ou de, which Proclus, like
many other writers (cf. J.D. Denniston, The Greek Particles (Oxford, 1934),
187), normally shuns. (A TLG search of Proclus’ oeuvre shows only two
instances of ou de, both of which could be written oude). The subject of the
second ên in line 5 would then be expressed and there would be no possibility
of understanding ouranos. (If I am wrong about there being an inversion, I
would supply khronos as the subject of ên and translate ‘But there was no
time when [time] did not exist and there will be none when it does not exist’
but harbour a suspicion that something had gone wrong with the text).
344. pote (’some time’) is an indefinite adverb of time closely related in
form and meaning to the relative adverb of time hote (‘when’); to talk of ‘when’
a thing exists is to talk of it existing ‘at some time’. Unfortunately, I have not
been able to find a satisfactory English representation of pote which does not
include the word ‘time’. In what follows (both in the argument and in the
refutation) the reader needs to be aware that ‘time’ on its own normally
translates khronos and that phrases such as ‘some time’, ‘at some time’, ‘at
one time’, ‘at another time’ normally translate pote.
345. sc. ‘is a time expression’; or perhaps ‘is [a part] of time’.
346. Adding aei after estin at 103,25, as suggested by both Thomas Taylor
and Rabe. (According to Baltes the need for the addition is confirmed by Ishâq
ibn Hunayn’s Arabic translation).
347. Tim. 38C.
348. perixeei. The word, which is uncommon, actually means ‘polish all
around’, and I have not found other instances of its being used figuratively.
349. More literally ‘weakness’.
350. More literally ‘of whatever it may be predicated’.
351. Changing tina huparxin to tinos huparxeôs at 104,16 (cf. 116,1-22,
especially 14-15 and 20).
352. Many of the arguments Philoponus uses in the first four sections of
the refutation are also found at in Phys. 456,17-458,32, which is translated
in M.J. Edwards (tr.), Philoponus: On Aristotle’s Physics 3 (London & Ithaca,
NY, 1994), 119-21.
353. Philoponus uses the phrase ên pote hote ouk ên (‘there was some
time when } did not exist’) on a number of occasions both here and in in
Phys. Since neither Proclus nor Aristotle actually uses it (although Proclus
comes close) and he can hardly have been unaware that it had been used in
controversy by the Arian heretics and was one of a number of phrases
anathematised by the church at the Council of Nicea in 325 (cf. Edwards, op.
cit., 171, n. 206), I am tempted to believe that Christian readers were meant
to read its attribution to Proclus here as a subtle anathematisation of his
position. (The more direct relevance of the arguments in which it occurs to
Proclus’ argument than to anything in the Physics suggests that they were
developed for Aet. and reused in in Phys., which would be consistent with
Verrycken’s argument (see ‘The Development of Philoponus’ Thought and Its
Chronology’, 244-54) that the latter was revised after 529).
354. Changing the first ên to êi at 104,27, as suggested by Rabe in the
critical apparatus.
355. At Il. 20. 250.
356. At 103,15-16.
357. sullabai are normally syllables and the image here could conceiv-
ably be one of young children breaking words up into their syllables to create
nonsense words, but a meirakion is normally an adolescent or a young man,
and at in Phys. 508,10-11 Philoponus writes that the elements of a syllogism
are its premisses and those of a premiss its sullabai, by which he presumably
means its component terms rather than their syllables.
358. For the history of the use of time words in non-temporal senses in
ancient philosophy see R. Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum, 112-16.
359. Changing pausetai to pauetai at 107,21, as suggested by Rabe in the
critical apparatus. (Both verbs should be of the same tense and 107,25-6
favours the present).
360. One would expect something like to pote palin mê noein rather than
tote palin noein at 108,12, but Philoponus himself may have lost sight of the
construction and I have done my best with the text printed by Rabe.
361. Tim. 29E.
362. Literally ‘yet more’.
363. cf. Aristotle Phys. 219b1-2; Plotinus Enn. 3.7.9.
364. The Greek actually has ‘since’.
365. Or perhaps, ‘interpreting “will be” as a time’; or even ‘changing “will
be” into a time’. (The same phrase occurs at 112,1 and 113,1).
366. Adding gar after ean at 111,27, as suggested by Rabe in the critical
apparatus.
367. Deleting ouk at 112,3.
368. Deleting ouk at 112,5.
369. Adding ti after atopon at 112,17, as suggested by Rabe in the critical
apparatus.
370. Omitting kai after tmêmata at 113,18, as suggested by Rabe in the
critical apparatus.
371. Changing temnomenos to temnomenon at 115,2, as suggested by
372. Tim. 38B-C.
373. I have restored the words kai kata to paradeigma tês aiôniou
phuseôs from the text of Plato after ginêtai at 115,17. Without them, the next
phrase would have to be construed ‘so that [time] may be as similar as
possible to [the heaven]’. This can hardly have been what Philoponus in-
tended, and the missing words are in fact present when he quotes the passage
again at 141,1-7 and at 554,10-16, so it seems likely that the phrase has
dropped out during the transmission of the text.
In the Greek neither the subject of êi at 115,18 nor the reference of ho d’
at 115,19 is immediately clear. Among modern translators, Jowett opted for
‘time’ and ‘the heaven’ respectively, Lee (if I read him correctly) for ‘time’ in
both places, and Cornford (see Plato’s Cosmology, 99, n. 1) for ‘the heaven’ in
both places. Although certain aspects of what Philoponus goes on to say in
this chapter might be thought to imply that he understood ‘time’ in both
places, when he quotes the present lines again at 554,10-22 he goes on to
paraphrase them in a way that makes it clear that he actually believed that
Plato is talking about the kosmos at both points, and I have translated
accordingly. (My own view is that Cornford is right when he claims that
comparison with Tim. 37C8 and 39E1 suggests that the subject of êi should
be ouranos, but that in the present state of the text one inevitably reads it as
khronos. Accordingly, I would argue that ho ouranos should be restored after
êi in the text of the Timaeus).
374. Adding ton aiôna after zôês at 115,22. Accepting Rabe’s text, one
would have to translate either: ‘And so, if Plato says that the whole of infinity
is the pattern for the world and the measure of the life of everlasting things
}’, or: ‘And so, if Plato says that the pattern for the world has being for all
eternity and is the measure of the life of everlasting things }’. The first
translation would not only make infinity the pattern for the world and not
just for time, but would radically change the status of the phrase panta ton
aiôna, which is clearly adverbial in the Timaeus passage; the second would
make the pattern for the world, rather than infinity, ‘the measure of the life
of everlasting things’. (A comment of John Bowin, one of the editors of this
volume, pointed me in the right direction here).
375. 114,20-116,1 are translated and discussed by R. Sorabji in Time,
Creation and the Continuum (London & Ithaca, NY, 1983), 117-19.
376. Or perhaps ‘there was a time’.
377. Tim. 29E.
378. Changing khronikon to khronikôs at 116,14, one of three possible
corrections suggested by Rabe in the critical apparatus.
379. 106,6-14.
380. The construction is such that ‘the truth’ is coordinate with ‘Plato’
with the result that it is almost personified and there may be a reference to
Christian scripture, or more strictly speaking to the ‘truth’ embodied in it. If
this is so, such a reference would be a little surprising in what seems to be a
summary of what has gone before, since there has been no direct reference
to the Christian position earlier in the argument, and the words kai têi
alêtheiâi could be an interpolation.
381. Adding legonta after Platôna at 117,19, as suggested by Rabe in the
critical apparatus.
383. Tim. 38B (time); 28B (the heaven).
384. 251b14-19.
385. Translating Aristotle’s exô henos rather than the ex aiônos of M,
which Rabe retains. (Although M also has ex aiônos at 218,22, where the
passage is quoted again, the substitution is more likely to be due to a copyist
than to Philoponus).
386. Arist. Phys. 251b14-19 (with minor differences).
387. In sections 7-29.
388. Changing dei to dein at 118,17, as suggested by Rabe in the critical
apparatus.
389. Adding logon after toiouton at 118,19, one of two possible corrections
suggested by Rabe in the critical apparatus.
Select Bibliography
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De Groot, J., Aristotle and Philoponus on Light (New York & London, 1991).
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(London, 1977).
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116 Select Bibliography
LSJ, see Liddell, H.G.
Lampe, G.W.H., A Patristic Greek Lexicon (Oxford, 1961).
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English-Greek Glossary
able to see: horatikos argue unfairly: kakourgein en tois

absurd: atopos logois
absurdity: atopia, to atopon argument: apodeixis, logos,
accept: homologein, sunkhôrein sullogismos
accident: to sumbebêkos ask: zêtein
accomplish: teleioun assert: apophainesthai
account (n.): logos association: koinônia
accuse of: katêgorein assume: hupotithenai, lambanein
act: energein at all: holôs
acted upon, be: paskhein at rest, be: êremein
active, be: energein attack: prosballein
activity: energeia attribute (n.): to sumbebêkos
actual: energeiâi, kat’ energeian authority: exousia
actualisation: entelekheia axiom: axiôma
actuality: energeia, entelekheia
actually: energeiâi, entelekheiâi, be: huphistasthai
kat’ energeian become: ginesthai
ad infinitum: eis apeiron, ep’ beginning: arkhê
apeiron beginningless: anarkhos
add: epagein being: ousia, ousiôsis
admit: sunkhôrein belief: doxa
affection: pêsis believe: pisteuein
affirm: apophainesthai, belong: huparkhein
kataphaskein better (a.): kreittôn
affirmation: kataphasis bind to: sundein
agent: to poioun birth: genesis
agree: homologein, sunkhôrein blasphemous: blasphêmos
air: aêr blasphemy: blasphêmia
all at once: athroos body: sôma
also exist: sunuparkhein born together with: homogonos
alter (trans.): alloioun, metaballein bright: phôteinos
alteration: alloiôsis bring: paragein
always: aei bring into existence: huphistanai
ambiguity: homônumia bring to maturity: teleioun
ambiguous: homônumos bringing into being: ousiôsis
ambiguously: homônumôs build: oikodomein
animal: zôion buildable: oikodomêtos
apprehend: noein builder: oikodomos
archetype: arkhetupon building (sc. the process):
argue: kataskeuazein, sunagein oikodomêsis, oikodomia
building: oikia
120 English-Greek Glossary
by a creative act: dêmiourgikôs consist: sunkeisthai
consistent (with): akolouthos
call: onomazein constitute: sumplêroun
can: endekhesthai constituting: sumplêrôtikos
capable of: epitêdeios constitutive: sumplêrôtikos
capable of coming to be: genêtos construct: sunistanai
capable of producing: poiêtikos contentious: philoneikos
capable of sight: horatikos contentiousness: philoneikia
capable of speech: logikos continuity: sunekheia
capacity: hexis continuous: sunekhês
cast a shadow over: episkiazein continuous becoming: aeigenesia
cause: aitia, to aition contradiction: antiphasis
cause of: aitios contrary (a.): enantios
cause to exist: huphistanai contrast (v.): antidiastellein
caused, that which is: to aitiaton contribute to: suntelein
cease: pauesthai copy (n.): eikôn
cease to exist: phtheiresthai corporeal thing: sôma
change (v.: intrans.): metaballein count off: aparithmein, exarithmein
change (n.): metabasis, metabolê count out: exarithmein
characterise: kharaktêrizein counter: to arithmoun
characteristic: idiotês create: dêmiourgein
cite: paratithesthai create fallacious arguments:
civic: politikos paralogizesthai
clear (a.): enargês created thing: dêmiourgêma
clearly: enargôs creating: poiêsis
co-everlasting: sunaïdios creation: dêmiourgêma,
coexist: suneinai, sunuparkhein, dêmiourgia, to genêton,
sunuphistasthai hupostasis
coexistent with, be: creation of substance: ousiôsis
sumparateinesthai, creative: dêmiourgikos
sunuparkhein creative activity: dêmiourgia
cognitive: gnôstikos creator: ho dêmiourgêsas,
colour (n.): khrôma dêmiourgos, poiêtês
come to be: ginesthai creature: zôion, to genêton
coming into existence: huparxis criticise: apelenkhein
comment (n.): exêgêsis criticism: elenkhos
commentary: hupomnêmata
commentator: exêgêtês darkness: skotos
common: koinos death: thanatos
common feature: koinotês decay (v.): phthinein
compel: anankazein decay (n.): phthisis
complete (v.): sumplêroun declaration: apophansis
complete (n.): teleios declare: apophainein
component of, be a: sumplêroun deduce: sullogizesthai
concede: homologein, sunkhôrein define: horizesthai
conceive of: ennoein, noein definite: hôrismenos
concept: noêsis definition: horismos, horos, logos
conception: ennoia demolish: anairein, anaskeuazein
conclude: sullogizesthai demon: daimôn
conclusion, to draw a: sumperainein demonstrate: apodeiknunai,
concord: sumpnoia deiknunai
condition: hexis demonstration: apodeixis
consequence: to hepomenon deprived of, be: stereisthai
destroy together: sunanairein exist together (intrans.):
determine: aphorizein sunuphistasthai
devoid of, be: stereisthai existence: hupostasis, huparxis
dialectical: dialektikos existent: huparxis
didactic: didaskalikos explain: exêgeisthai
difference: diaphora explanation: aitia
different: alloioteros, diaphoros explanatory: hupomnêmatikos
differentiation: diaphorotês explicitly: epi lexeôs
disperse: merizein exposition: didaskalia
dissolution: lusis expression: dêlôsis, sêmasia
dissolve: luein extension: ektasis, paratasis
distinguish: diairein, externalise: prokheirizesthai
prosdiorizesthai
divide: merizein facts, the: enargeia, pragmata
divide up along with: sundiïstanai fall upon: prosballein
divine: theios fallacious argument: paralogismos
divisible: meristos fallacy: paralogismos
division: diairesis, diastasis fate: heimarmenê
do away with: aphaireisthai father (v.): gennan
doctrine: dogma, doxa finite: peperasmenos
duration: diastêma finite, be: perainesthai
dwelling: oikos fire: pur
fit (a.): epitêdeios
earth: gê fitness: epitêdeiotês
eclipse (n.): ekleipsis flux: rhusis
effect (n.): to aitiaton, pathos follow (upon): akolouthein,
element: stoikheion hepesthai
eliminate: anairein for ever: aei
eliminate along with (also): forecast: katarkhê
sunanairein foreknow: progignôskein
empty talk: kenologia foreknowledge: prognôsis
end (n.): peras, telos form: eidos
endless: ateleutêtos Form: eidos, idea
envy (n.): phthonos formative: eidopoios
equivalent, be: isodunamein frame: sunistanai
essence: ousia fraud: skeuôrêma
essence, as part of the: ousiôdôs free of any relation: askhetos
essence, of the: ousiôdês free of need: anendeês
essential: ousiôdês from everlasting: ex aïdiou
establish: kataskeuazein fulfilment: teleiôsis
eternal: aiônios furnish: khorêgein
eternally: aiôniôs future (a.): mellôn
eternity: aiôn future (n.): to mellon
ethical: êthikos
everlasting: aïdios generally: haplôs
everlastingly: aïdiôs generate: gennan
everlastingness: aïdiotês generated: genêtos
evil: ponêros generation: genesis
examine: skopein give being: ousioun
example: hupodeigma go hand in hand with:
exercise providence: pronoein sumparathein
exist: huparkhein go on to say: epagein
goal: skopos
god: theos in time: khronikôs
God: theos inadequacy: astheneia
going under the same name: inappropriate: atopos
homônumos incomplete: atelês
good (thing), (n.): to agathon incorporeal: asômatos
Good Itself: autoagathon indefinitely: eis apeiron, ep’ apeiron
Good, the: to agathon indicate: noein, sêmainein
goodness: agathotês indication: apodeixis, dêlôsis
grammar: hê grammatikê indicative: dêlôtikos
grammar, of: grammatikos individual (a.): atomos
grammarian: ho grammatikos individuals: ta atoma
grammatical: grammatikos inexperienced: apeiros
grow (intrans.): auxesthai infer: eisagein
growth: auxêsis infinite: apeiros
infinitely powerful: apeirodunamos
harmony: harmonia inform: eidopoiein
have (its) essence: ousiousthai ingenious: sophos
have existence: huphistasthai ingenuity: deinotês
have prior existence: inhere in: enuparkhein
proüphistasthai initiative: hormê
having the capacity to build: inquire: zêtein
oikodomikos inquiry: zêtêsis
heaven: ouranos inseparable: akhôristos
heavenly: ouranios instant (n.): sêmeion
house: oikia, oikos instantaneous: akhronos, athroos
human: anthrôpinos, anthrôpos instantaneously: athroos, athroôs
hypothesis: hupothesis instruct: didaskein
hypothesise: hupotithenai instruction: didaskalia
instrument: organon
idea: hupolêpsis intellectual: noeros
identical: aparallaktos intelligible (n.): to noêton
ignorance: agnoia intelligible (a.): noêtos
ignorant, be: agnoein intelligible entity: to noêton
illuminate: katalampein, phôtizein intend: noein
illuminating, of: phôtistikos intention: dianoia, nous, skopos
illuminative: phôtistikos interpret: metalambanein
illustration: eikôn interval: diastasis
imagination: phantasia introduce: eisagein
imbue with form: eidopoiein involuntary: aboulêtos
immaterial: aülos irrational: alogos
immortal: athanatos irreverent, be: asebein
imperfect: atelês
imperishable: aphthartos keep pace with: sumparathein
impervious to change: apathês kind: eidos, genos, idea
impiety: asebeia know: ginôskein, noein
impious: asebês knower: epistêmôn
imply: eisagein knowledge: epistêmê, gnôsis
impossible: adunatos
impulse: rhopê lack of movement: akinêsia
in (its) own right: kath’ hauto last (v.): exarkein
in a word: haplôs learn: manthanein
in contact, be: haptesthai learned: sophos
in general: holôs, haplôs learning: mathêsis
life: bios, zôê notion: hupolêpsis, huponoia
life, to have: zên notionally: kat’ epinoian
light (n.): phôs novice: apeiros
light up: katalampein number (n.): arithmos
live (v.): zên
living creature: zôion object of desire: to orekton
living-creature-itself: autozôion object of knowledge: to gnôston
local: kata topon object of thought: to noêton
luminous: phôtoeidês observe: horan, skopein
obvious: enargês
maintain (sc. preserve): sunekhein occultation: epiprosthêsis
make: poiein of any kind at all: holôs
make direct contact with: of dialectic: dialektikos
prosballein of the mind: noeros
make good: agathunein One, the: to hen
man (sc. human being): anthrôpos ontology: philosophia ontôn
manifestly: enargôs opinion: doxa
manner: tropos opposed, be: antikeisthai
material: enulos opposite: to antikeimenon
mathematical science: mathêma order (n.): taxis
matter (n.): hulê organ: organon
mean: noein, sêmainein origin: arkhê
meaning: dianoia outcome: apotelesma
measure (v.): metrein
measure (n.): metron parallel: eikôn, hupodeigma
measure of: metrêtikos parcel out along with: sundiairein
mental sphere: to noêtikon part (n.): meros
metaphor: metaphora partake: metekhein
metaphorical: metaphorikos particular: merikos
method: tropos passage: khrêsis, lexis
middle (n.): mesotês passing out of existence: phthora
mind (n.): nous, psukhê pattern: paradeigma
mobilisation: prokheirisis pay reverence to: eusebein
mobilise: prokheirizesthai perceptible: aisthêtos
mode: tropos perception: antilêpsis
moon: selênê perfect (a.): teleios
moon, of the: selêniakos perfect (v.): teleioun
moon’s: selêniakos perfected: teleios
mortal: thnêtos perfecting: teleiôsis
move (intrans.): kineisthai perfection: to teleion, teleiotês
movement: kinêsis perfective: teleiôtikos
movement, be in: kineisthai period: paratasis
mover: to kinoun perish: phtheiresthai
perishable: phthartos
named for: homônumos permanence: diamonê
natural: phusikos philosopher: philosophos, ho sophos
naturally: phusikôs philosophy: philosophia
nature: huparxis, phusis physical: organikos, phusikos
necessarily: anankaiôs pious: eusebês
necessary: anankaios place: topos
necessity: to anankaion plant: phuton
negation: apophasis plausibility: pithanotês
negative (n.): apophasis plenitude: plêrôma
point: sêmeion refer to: noein, sêmainein
portrait: eikôn reference: sêmasia
position: dogma, doxa refutation: elenkhos, lusis
possession: hexis refute: elenkhein, luein
possible, be: endekhesthai region: topos
potential: dunamei, dunamis relation: skhesis
potentiality: dunamei, dunamis relatives: ta pros ti
potentially: dunamei remain: hupomenein, menein
power: dunamis remove: aphairein
precision: akribeia represent: kataskeuazein
predicate of: katêgorein reproduce: gennan
pre-exist: proüparkhein responsible for: aitios
premiss: arkhê, protasis rest (n.): êremia
present (v.): prokheirizesthai reveal: deiknunai
present, be: huparkhein, pareinai reversal: metathesis
present in, be: enuparkhein revolution: periphora
preserve: diasôizein, sôizein ridiculous: geloios
prevent: kôluein rigour: akribeia
principle (n.): arkhê, logos
privation: sterêsis sacrilegious: asebês
produce (v.): poiein say of: katêgorein
producer: poiêtês, ho poiêsas, to scientific: phusikos
poioun scripture: logion
product: apotelesma secondary origin, of: husterogenês
production: paragôgê section: logos
productive: poiêtikos see: horan, sunaisthanesthai
proof: apodeixis, epikheirêma seeing: opsis
property: pathos, dunamis seek: zêtein
prophet: theologos seem: phainesthai
prove: apodeiknunai, kataskeuazein self-subsistent: authupostatos
provide for: pronoein self-sufficient: autarkês
providence: pronoia seminal: spermatikos
provident: pronoêtikos sensation: aisthêsis
providential: pronoêtikos sense: aisthêsis
pupil: mathêtês sense: nous
put together: sunistanai sense (sc. meaning): to
puzzle (n.): aporia sêmainomenon, tropos
puzzle over: aporein separate (a.): kekhôrismenos,
khôristos
quality: poiotês, to poion separate (v.): khôrizein
question (n.): zêtêsis shadow (n.): skia
quote: paratithesthai shadow, throw into: skiazein
share (in): koinônein, metekhein
race (n.): genos show: apodeiknunai, deiknunai
raise a puzzle: aporein sight (n.): opsis
rational faculty: to logikon signification: sêmasia
ray: aktis signify: sêmainein
realisation: entelekheia simple: haplous
reason (n.): aitia, logos simply: haplôs
reasoning: epikheirêsis skill: epistêmê
rebuttal: antilogia skilled in building: oikodomikos
receive: lambanein sometimes: pote
receptive: dektikos sophist: sophistês
sophistical: sophistikos tool: organon
soul: psukhê touch (v.): haptesthai
soul, of the: psukhikos transformative: alloiôtikos
source: arkhê transition: metabasis
source of illumination: to transparent: diaphanês
phôtistikon, to phôtizon traversable: diexitêtos
species: eidos treatise: logos, pragmateia
specify: prosdiorizesthai trickiness: deinotês
sphere: sphaira true: alêthês
spring: pêgê true at the same time, be:
stability: stasis sunalêtheuein
state (v.): apophainesthai true, be: alêtheuein
state of affairs: katastasis truth: alêtheia
statement: lexis, logos turn: periagein
statesman: ho politikos
stationary: ametabatos unacquainted: apeiros
stop: pauesthai unaware, be: agnoein
stuff (n.): hulê unchanging: ametablêtos
subject (n.): to hupokeimenon undergo: hupomenein
substance: ousia undergo alteration: alloiousthai
substratum: to hupokeimenon understand: noein
subtlety: deinotês understanding: nous
successful: eudaimôn undertaking: hormê
successor: diadokhos undivided: adiairetos
suffice: exarkein undo: luein
sun: hêlios unerring: aparalogistos
sun’s: hêliakos ungenerated: agenêtos
superior: kreittôn uniform: homoeidês, homoiomerês
supply (v.): khorêgein unique: monogenês
suppose: hupotithenai unit: monas
supramundane: huperkosmios unitary: heniaios
survive: sôizesthai unity: to hen
syllogism: sullogismos universal (a. or n.): holikos,
katholou
take: lambanein universally: katholou, en tôi
teach: didaskein katholou
teacher: didaskalos universe: to pan
teaching: didaskalia unmoving: akinêtos
temporal: hupo khronon, khronikos untraversable: adiexitêtos
temporally: khronikôs usage: khrêsis
tense (n.): khronos use (n.): khrêsis
theory: theôrêma use of: katêgorein
thing: pragma
think (about): ennoein, noein various: diaphoros
thought: dianoia, ennoia, epinoia, verbal: logikos
noêma, noêsis vice: kakia
through an act of creation: view (n.): doxa
dêmiourgikôs villainous way: kakourgia
time (n.): khronos visible, be: phainesthai
time, at a (at some): pote vision: opsis
time, of: khronikos
timelessly: akhronôs water: hudôr
to quote his exact words: epi lexeôs way: tropos
weakness: astheneia, to asthenes without mental imagery:
well-being: eudaimonia aphantastôs
whole: holos without origin: anarkhos
will (n.): boulêsis without parts: amerês
will (v.): ethelein without qualification: adioristôs
will, act of: boulêsis without relation: askhetôs
wish (v.): boulesthai, ethelein word(s): lexis, onoma, prosrêma
with infinite power: apeirodunamôs work (sc. book): logos, pragmateia
without any intermediary: amesôs work (sc. creation): poiêma
without beginning: anarkhos world (a.): kosmikos
without end: ateleutêtos world: kosmos
Greek-English Index
This index lists a selection of more important words from the Greek text
together with my translations of them. I have not attempted to distinguish
between Philoponus’ own words and those of Proclus and other authors he
quotes. The rubric ‘other tr[anslation(s)]’ covers cases where a word has been
translated in such a way that there is no one-to-one correspondence between
the Greek and the English. The page and line references are to Rabe’s Greek
text and the occurrence of ‘etc.’ at the end of a listing of such references means
that it is incomplete.
aboulêtos, involuntary, 78,12 agein, to bring, 10,11; 44,15.22.26;

adêlos, unclear, 118,10 45,3; 48,15.17; 51,24; 52,9.14;
adiairetos, undivided, 38,11; 91,14 53,12.21.24; 54,4.15; 55,1.4.14;
adiakopos, uninterrupted, 99,21 92,16; to lead, 88,8; eis tauton
adiexitêtos, untraversable, agein, to equate, 1,15
10,21.22 agenêtos, ungenerated, 4,3, etc.
adioristôs, without qualification, agnoein, to be ignorant, 78,28; to
29,12; 44,17; 49,16; 50,9; 51,24; be unaware, 105,2
70,10; 109,13 agnoia, ignorance, 57,24; 72,2.14;
adunamia, impotence, 14,3 75,6
adunatein, cannot, 116,11 agôgê, line [of argument], 61,4
adunatos, impossible, 3,15; aïdios, everlasting, 2,10, etc.; ex
5,10-23; 7,2.9, etc.; adunatos aïdiou, from everlasting, 7,22,
[einai], cannot be, 27,20; etc.; aïdiôs, everlastingly,
103,17; 111,5; [to] adunaton, 76,27, etc.
impossibility, 11,12; 13,9 aïdiotês, everlastingness, 2,13
aei, always, 5,21; 7,23; 8,25, etc.; aiôn, eternity, 1,16, etc.
for ever, 2,11; 101,15; eis (es) aiônios, eternal, 1,20; 2,3-12; 4,12,
aei, everlasting, 4,13; for ever, etc.; aiôniôs, eternally, 1,14;
5,7 24,6-15
aeigenesia, continuous becoming, aisthêsis, observation, 84,7;
98,18 sensation, 28,20; 69,26; sense,
aêr, air, 16,10-23,13; 83,7 65,20; 72,22.24; 73.1
agathos, for the good, 81,10; good, aisthêtos, perceptible, 27,12, etc.;
7,23, etc.; [to] agathon, good, [to] aisthêton, sensible object,
good thing, 80,28; 81,2.9.14; 65,19.21
88,19; the Good, 37,23.24; 38,22; aitia, cause, 13,22; 39,18; 40,8.23,
39,3 etc.; explanation, 7,25; 12,7;
agathotês, goodness, 8,23; 37,18; reason, 7,11.16.18; 10,3-13,9;
80,28; 86,20 72,23
agathunein, to make good, 37,28; aitiasthai, to find the cause in, 8,27;
81,11 to hold responsible, 12,6; 55,7
128 Greek-English Index
[to] aitiaton, effect, 14,20, etc.; 23,3; alloiousthai, to alter
that which is caused, 22,26, etc. (intrans.), to be in process of
aitios, cause of, 15,6; 43,2; alteration, to undergo alteration,
56,16.24; 88,13, etc.; its (their) 66,11-87,16
cause, 97,7; 98,4.12.14; 99,11; allotrios, without a part in, 17,11
responsible for, 14,27; 43,7; alogos, irrational, 28,20, etc.
aitiôteros, more a (the) cause, ameibein, to change, 60,13
89,1-90,22; aitiôtatos, most of amêkhanos, impossible, 13,21
all a cause, 88,23; the chief amerês, without parts, 115,12.24;
cause, 91,1; [to] aition, cause, [to] ameres, undivided entity,
2,14; 7,4.13; 8,22; 14,20-15,22; 6,18; 38,17; 91,20; amerôs,
17,2; 21,3-23,15, etc.; that which without division, 40,24; 78,27
causes, 97,18 amesôs, directly, 89,7; without any
akhôristos, inseparable, 20,23.29; intermediary, 49,5; 78,29;
inseparably, 20,28 93,16.18; 94,15
akhronos, instantaneous, 22,21; ametabatos, stationary, 38,11;
63,4; 65,24; 66,18; akhronôs, 91,14
timelessly, 6,3; 117,2 ametablêtos, unchanging, 56,1;
akinêsia, lack of movement, 75,29; [to] ametablêton, lack of
62,24.27 change, 60,26
akinêtos, unmoving, 55,25, etc.; amphisbêtêsis, disagreement,
[to] akinêton, lack of 32,16
movement, 60,26 anagein, to continue, 3,4
akolouthein, to follow, 4,11; 27,9; anairein, to demolish, 29,21.25.29;
32,18; 112,17 31,5; to eliminate, 50,1; 51,9.12;
akolouthos, consistent, 5,15; 52,5; 110,9
akolouthon einai to follow, anakhôrein, to move away, 22,17;
52,2; 78,5; 92,19; kata to 74,6
akolouthon, as a consequence, analambanein, retrace one’s
14,17; consistently, 51,25; steps, 77,3
akolouthôs, consistently, 8,23; anamphilektos, indisputable,
32,16; 50,4 6,12; unambiguous, 73,20
akribeia, precision, 45,8 anankaios, necessary, 23,21;
aktis, ray, 16,16.17.19 other tr., 61,25; [to]
alêtheia, truth, 30,21, etc.; kat’ anankaion, necessity, 35,28;
alêtheian, really, 50,19 36,24; anankaiôs, necessarily,
alêthês, correct, 30,1.6; true, 4,18, 21,12
etc.; real, 38,5; 91,12; anankazein, to compel, 41,21;
alêthesteros, closer to the 81,25; 88,15; 92,24; to force,
truth, 21,25 30,20; 114,9
alêtheuein, to be true, 49,18; 50,11 anapherein, to refer, 31,22
alloiôsis, alteration, 21,26; 22,24; anaplêroun, to fill up, 12,27
40,20; 57,21; 58,7; 61,14; 64,17; anarkhos, without (a) beginning,
66,4-18; 69,1; 71,16-76,7; 3,9; 11,17; 118,7.13; other tr.,
79,13-81,24, etc.; turnover, 11,2; [to] anarkhon,
20,11; kata alloiôsin, beginninglessness, 12,3
qualitatively, 22,22 anaskeuazein, to demolish, 25,2
alloioteros, altered, 77,23; [eis] anatropên, in an attempt to
different, 57,17; 65,12; 66,14.20; subvert, 57,7
76,7.9.16.20.25.29 anendeês, free of need, 85,16;
alloiôtikos, transformative, 22,11 other tr. 85,5; [to] anendees,
alloioun, to alter (trans.), 22,16; to absence of need, 85,11.26;
cause qualitative change in, anendeôs, without need, 86,21
anepitêdeiotês, unsuitability, 71,5 infinitum, 3,4; 53,10; 92,19;
antestrammenôs, in the other 96,11; 106,6; indefinitely, 1,15;
direction, 36,1 99,15
anthrôpinos, human, 12,22 apelenkhein, to criticise, 27,1;
anthrôpos, human (adj.), 13,2; 29,13
70,25; man (sc. human being), aperkhesthai, to depart, 21,9
9,7, etc. aphairein, to remove, 72,26;
antidiastellein, to contrast, 113,21 aphaireisthai (middle), to do
antikeisthai, to be opposed, away with, 13,28; 14,5; 57,27;
oppose, 52,19; 103,16; 105,20; 75,29; to prevent, 97,8.12
[to] antikeimenon, opposite, aphanizesthai, to disappear, 22,18
35,5 aphanôs, unseen, 93,23
antilambanein, to get back, aphantastôs, without mental
86,16.17; antilambanesthai, to imagery, 116,26
be aware of, 77,24; perceive, aphistanai (intrans. forms), to
65,20; other tr. 84,6 leave, 20,20; to move away,
antilegein, to criticise, 29,20; 32,7; 22,19; to withdraw, 17,19
to reply to, 32,13; to say against, aphorizein, to determine, 37,23
61,18 aphormê, material, 76,10; supply
antilêpsis, perception, 65,21 of materials, 53,2
antilogia, rebuttal, 29,7; other tr., aphôtistos, dark, 81,22
30,19 aphthartos, imperishable, 4,3.17;
antiphasis, contradiction, 63,16; 19,9-26
80,11; contradictory pair, 63,12; aphuktos, irrefutable, 100,26;
pair of contradictory other tr., 98,20
propositions, 112,21 apodeiknunai, to argue, 61,7; to
antiphraxis, interposition, 15,28 demonstrate, 7,21; 32,10; 41,2;
antistrophôs, in the other 76,3; 118,15; to prove, 8,1; to
direction, 36,23 show, 68,26; 118,5
apagein, to lead, 59,3; 60,13; to apodeixis, argument, 75,1;
reduce, 58,27; 100,24 demonstration, 30,10; 44,16;
aparallaktos, identical, 116,1 proof, 6,12; 18,10; 61,17;
aparalogistos, unerring, 40,2; indication, 73,20
78,21 apodekhesthai, to take as a
aparithmein, to count off, 10,19; teacher, 27,18; to take up, 28,10
other tr., 70,21 apodidonai, to give, 7,18; to offer,
apathês, impervious to change, 7,25
20,11 apoklêrôtikos, arbitrary, 5,1
[to] apauston, continuity, 12,26 apokrinesthai, to answer, 84,27
apeikonizein, to image, 105,4 apologia, defence, 13,5
apeirakis, an infinite number of apophainein, to declare, 56,18;
times, 11,21 apophainesthai, to assert,
apeirodunamos, infinitely 62,16; to say, 21,28; 74,21; to
powerful, 2,1.9; 3,7; state, 91,10; 112,27; other tr.
apeirodunamôs, with infinite 111,27
power, 5,13 apophansis, declaration, 68,19
apeiros (A), inexperienced, 45,26; apophasis, negation, 80,14;
57,25; 61,8; novice, 75,9; 112,20.24; negative, 107,2;
unacquainted, 69,11 112,22
apeiros (B), infinite, 1,18-12,8; apopheugein, to evade, 105,5.16
96,6.10; 99,1.5; eis apeiron, ad aporein, to derive a puzzle, 19,3;
infinitum, 112,8; indefinitely, to introduce as a puzzle, 19,1; to
43,13; ep’ apeiron, ad look into the puzzles, 31,1; to
raise a puzzle, 2,15; [to] 10,3.9.12.17; 20,4; 95,17.27;
aporoumenon, puzzle, 68,3 99,26; 109,7; instantaneous,
aporia, puzzle, 8,11.18; 9,24; 18,8.12; 65,12.13; athroon,
57,27; 58,12; 68,1; 106,1; lack, instantaneously, 65,17; athroôs,
71,5 instantaneously, 65,23; 81,22
aporrhein, to flow from, 18,1 atomos, individual, 109,24; [ta]
aporrhoia, emanation, 81,2 atoma, individuals, 9,8.11.17;
apotelein, to bring about, 41,7 10,23; 92,4.11.21; 93,3; [ta]
apotelesma, outcome, 76,15; atomôtata, the most individual
77,27; product, 36,23.24; 37,6 (things, people, etc.), 6,19; 25,19;
apotemnein, to cut off from, 19,9 38,18.24; 91,21.24; 92,2
arakhnion, spider’s web, 52,6 atopia, absurdity, 4,14; 59,3;
ardeuein, to water, 54,4 98,18; 100,24.27
aristeros, left (opp. right), 34,6 atopos, absurd, 4,11, etc.;
arithmos, number, 8,2-11,10; inappropriate, 117,7; [to]
12,10; 110,18, etc.; [tôi] atopon, absurdity, 3,4; 53,10;
arithmôi, numerically, 18,7; 59,20; 60,13; 112,17; 113,7;
kat’ arithmon, numerically, 114,17
18,16.17; 23,7 aülos, immaterial, 18,20.21; 19,3
[to] arithmoun, counter, 10,20 autarkês, enough on its own,
arkhê, beginning, 2,11; 40,6; 63,6, 74,22; self-sufficient, 58,19;
etc.; origin, 88,14; 110,4; outset, 85,1.3.4
74,25; premiss, 52,5; principle, authis, again, 78,19; 97,13;
29,19.21.22; 32,2; source, 19,8; hereafter, 112,16; subsequently,
90,3, etc. 57,9; 82,21
arkhetupon, archetype, 25,25; authupostatos, self-subsistent,
33,14 33,12.14.16
asebeia, impiety, 88,8 autoagathon, Good Itself, 31,21
asebein, to be irreverent, 56,23.25 autonomia, caprice, 5,2
asebês, impious, 84,8; sacrilegious, autozôion, living-creature-itself,
88,5 31,16; 103,20; 114,24.25;
askhetos, free of any relation, 118,21.23; 119,1.3.5.6.8
110,8; independent of relations, auxêsis, growth, 29,27; 74,13
84,10; askhetôs, without auxesthai, to grow (intrans.),
relation, 58,15; 84,4 11,19; 74,17
askholeisthai, to be engaged, axiôma, axiom, 25,27, etc.
46,16
askios, shadowless, 16,8.17 baktêria, stick, 89,8.10.11.12.16;
asômatos, incorporeal, 117,7 90,8.11.14
astheneia, inadequacy, 104,6; basileus, king, 36,5.6.8; 88,15
weakness, 8,24; 13,20; 14,2.5; basilikos, royal, 36,5
113,24; 116,23; 117,4.9 bios, life, 40,2; 78,19.20; 94,6
[to] asthenes, weakness, 106,13 blaptein, to maim, 15,13
astronomia, astronomy, 19,15; blasphêmia, blasphemy, 85,4
28,7 blasphêmos, blasphemous, 13,18;
asunkritôs, immeasurably, 110,14 84,8
atelês, imperfect, 39,5; 56,11-66,6; boulêsis, act of will, 58,8; will,
82,5-102,19; incomplete, 81,13, etc.
56,13-65,10 boulesthai, to wish, 14,1, etc.
ateleutêtos, endless, 114,13; buthos, bottom of the sea, 84,5
without end, 3,10; 118,13
athanatos, immortal, 94,11, etc. daimôn, demon, 37,15
athroos, all at once, 9,21; dei, must, 39,7.8; 53,12; 54,15, etc.;
ought, 30,1; should, 15,2; 26,20; diairêteon, we must make
45,7, etc.; to be necessary, 8,14; distinctions, 69,13
39,5; 101,12; to be one’s duty, dialektikos, dialectical, 45,8; of
31,4; there needs (to be), there is dialectic, 45,21
need, etc. 16,14 etc.; other tr., dialuein, to resolve, 26,24
74,16; deôn, right, 46,9 diamenein, to continue, 17,25
deiknunai, to demonstrate, 9,23; diamonê, permanence, 4,13
11,16; 23,8, etc.; to reveal, 39,16; dianoia, intention, 117,12;
101,23; to show, 5,10; 6,25; 7,1, meaning, 70,6; 104,6; thought,
etc.; other tr., 23,14; 68,19, etc. 46,16; understanding, 116,26;
deinos, versed, 16,3 other tr., 27,17
deinotês, ingenuity, 98,25; 100,27; dianoein, to have the thought, 6,7
subtlety, 61,9; trickiness, 74,26 diaphanês, transparent,
(emended from orthotês) 21,19-22,23; 83,6
deisthai, to be in need of, 33,16; to diapherein, to be different from,
have need of, (there is) need of, 22,24; 77,1; to differ, 19,11;
6,10; 43,11; 44,21, etc. (esp. 77,28; 78,5
52,8-64,25); to need, 4,13; 12,19; diapherontôs, egregiously, 84,8;
43,8, etc.; to need for, 39,13; in particular, 27,1; in the
101,20; 102,5 extreme, 56,24.26; (most)
dekhesthai, to accept, 7,22; to especially, 31,8.16
acquire, 46,25; 70,27 diaphora, difference, 18,21;
dektikos, receptive, 21,19.27; 23,6; 77,3.21; 112,6
70,24.28 diaphoros, different, 12,19, etc.;
dêlôsis, expression, 106,14; 111,6; various, 6,23, etc.; other tr.,
indication, 108,17 58,8; [to] diaphoron,
dêlôtikos, indicative, 104,11, etc. difference, 26,24
dêmiourgein, to create, 3,2, etc.; diaphorotês, differentiation,
[ho] dêmiourgêsas, creator, 115,26
13,28 diaplasis, shaping, 40,21
dêmiourgêma, created thing, 21,1; diasêmainein, to refer to, 15,8.12
25,16; 76,22; 85,17.20; 87,10.23; diasôizein, to preserve, 12,21;
88,3; creation, 85,10 94,17
dêmiourgia, creation, 80,18; diastasis, division, 95,26; interval,
93,14; 94,9; creative activity, 64,24; 65,23
25,19 diastêma, duration, 115.9
dêmiourgikos, creative, 2,15, etc.; diatattesthai, to arrange, 35,20
dêmiourgikôs, by a creative diathesis, state, 62,18.20.22;
act, 17,12; through an act of 63,19; 66,20; 76,16.20; 77,6.23
creation, 14,12; 15,19; 85,7 didaskalia, teaching, 27,5; 29,18;
dêmiourgos, creator, 2,8, etc. 30,5; 66,10; 77,13
despotês, master, 34,6.16; 36,14 didaskalikos, for teaching, 48,3;
dexios, on the right hand side, skilled in teaching, 66,3
36,14; right, 34,6 didaskalos, teacher, 27,1, etc.
diadekhesthai, to succeed, 17,16 didaskein, to explain, 30,4; 45,14;
diadokhê, generations, 11,1; to instruct, 29,23; to teach, 6,4;
reproduction, 12,20.24.26; 13,3; 18,19; 19,12, etc.
successive generations, 10,23 didonai, to allow, 9,3; to attribute,
diadokhos, successor, 24,1; 42,1; 96,4; to concede, 26,16; to give,
55,24; 103,1 59,20; 80,19; 85,16; 86,15.16;
diairein, to distinguish, 45,13.22 88,5; to permit, 9,23; to provide,
diairêsis, division, 64,4; 69,9; 76,11
70,8.15; 71,14 dielenkhein, to refute, 52,24
[eis to] diênekes, in perpetuity, imply, 44,20; 51,18.20; 52,10; to
5,23 infer, 50,4.22; 51,10; to
dieukrinein, to elucidate, 49,7 introduce, 31,3.16; 106,16; to
diexerkhesthai (incl. diexienai), involve the consequence, 14,2
to go through, 10,13; to traverse, eisballein, to launch into, 30,16
10,19; 11,2 ekbainein, to emerge, 8,10; 10,5.6
diexitêtos, traversable, 9,4; ekdidonai, to produce, 16,18
10,18.24; 11,17; 13,8; 14,9 eklambanein, to understand, 29,4;
diïenai, to pass through, 18,22 104,14
diplasiazein, to double, 11,9 ekleipsis, eclipse, 19,18.25; 20,4
dogma, doctrine, 31,15; 32,6; ekpheugein, to avoid, 99.19; to
position, 29,9 escape, 4,14; 13,19; 38,14; 91,17
doulos, slave, 34,6.16 ekpiptein, to degenerate, 114,17;
doxa, belief, 28,20; doctrine, 29,13; to fall, 27,7; 98,18
41,4.9; 88,15; idea, 85,25; ektasis, extension, 8,2
opinion, 28,14; 61,19; 72,3; ekthesis, exposition, 57,2; setting
117,26; position, 32,21; 83,15; out, 44,5.16; statement, 58,12
view, 27,4; 29,29 ektithesthai, to expound, 69,10; to
drattesthai, to drag in, 105,11 quote, 49,8; to set out, 59,21
dunamis, potential, 54,18, etc.; elattôn, inferior, 6,24; lesser,
potentiality, 49,1, etc.; power, 34,19; minor (premiss), 57,3;
1,18-8,22, etc.; property, 24,5; 59,16.18.23
dunamei, potential, 42,3-48,26, elenkhein, to convict, 59,7; to
etc.; potentiality, 44,2, etc.; expose, 32,24; to look into, 9,24;
potentially, 22,2.16; 42,16-48,21, to refute, 29,22, etc.
etc. elenkhos, criticism, 30,7.16;
duskherainein, to have 117,12; refutation, 29,4, etc.;
difficulties with, 31,13 solution, 58,12; other tr., 61,6
emphasis, reference, 116,12;
eidopoiein, to imbue with form, reflection, 38,2
15,26; inform, 17,3.9; 20,28; empiptein, to fall into, 19,19
21,1.4 empoliteuesthai, to participate in,
eidopoios, formative, 16,27 78,19
eidos, form, 15,10.14.17; 17,1; 18,6; enantios, contrary, 69,25;
20,24-21,4, etc.; Form, 71,20.27; 72,1.3
26,1-35,14; kind, 106,7; species, enargeia, the facts, 18,18
9,8; 12,13.15; 40,15; 74,13; 93,17 enargês, clear, 48,11; 89,1;
eikôn, copy, 24,8, etc.; illustration, enargôs, clearly, manifestly,
18,14; 23,14.17; 77,4; parallel, 19,18; 20,3; 22,8; 24,25; 64,21;
14,21; 15,28; 17,23; 20,27; 74,26
portrait, 36,5.7.9.12 endekhesthai, to be possible,
eikonizein, to image, 18,12; to 11,13; 21,17, etc.; can, 9,21.25,
serve as an image, 16,21 etc.; may, 36,27
einai, to be, 1,18, etc.; to exist, 7,6, energeia, activity, 5,14; 14,17;
etc.; esomenos, future, 78,24, 18,5; 21,7-22,1, etc.; actuality,
etc.; [to] einai, being, 2,13, etc.; 8,6.10.28; 9,20; 10,1.5, etc.;
existence, 9,12, etc.; [to] on, energeiâi, actual, 42,20.21;
being, 15,8, etc.; [to] mê on, 43,1.2, etc.; actually, 7,26;
non-being, 15,4, etc.; [ta] onta, 9,17.18, etc.; kat’ energeian,
things, 4,5, etc.; [to] ti ên einai, actual, 10,12; 42,3.4.7.8, etc.;
essence, 24,3; 25,8; 26,8; 32,23; actually, 9,3.9.16; 10,16; 42,6,
33,26; 34,4.11 etc.
eisagein, to accept, 83,11; to energein, to act, 21,9, etc.; to
actively engage with, 77,22; to epigraphein, to entitle, 31,10;
be active, 46,14, etc.; to become 82,13
active, 62,18, etc.; to effect, 4,20; epikheirein, to attempt, 98,26;
to engage in, 87,14; to exercise, 117,20
69,26; 77,15; to make active use epikheirêma, proof, 24,19, etc.
of, 47,10; [ho] energôn, agent, epikheirêsis, reasoning, 98,20;
66,1 112,17.23; 113,8
[to] energes, actuality, 79,4 epikhorêgein, to supply, 85,14
energêtikos, of a nature to epiluesthai, to dismantle, 68,1
activate, 68,8 epinoein, to contrive, 111,15; to
enginesthai, to arise, 13,13; 109,3; imagine, 77,17; other tr., 115,5
to be produced in, 23,7; to enter, epinoia, thought, 12,2; 55,20; kat’
20,11 epinoian, in imagination,
enistanai, (intrans. forms) to be 115,4; notionally, 21,18
present, 95,20.24; 97,25; 112,12; epipherein, to add, 67,3
to be directed at, 29,5 epiprosthêsis, occultation, 19,25
enestêkôs, present, 99,26; epirrhêma, expression, 114,9
113,20 episkiazein, to cast a shadow over,
enkataspeirein, to implant, 13,3 20,8
ennoein, to conceive of, 63,4; to epistêmê, knowledge, 28,6, etc.;
mind, 6,7; to think (about), 88,7; skill, 76,11
117,3 [ho] epistêmôn, knower,
ennoia, concept, 46,1; conception, 69,15.16.17.23; 70,16.19.21.26;
5,15, etc.; meaning, 106,9; sense, 71,2.12.19.22
106,12; thought, 77,19; 117,10 [ho] episunaptein, to add, 51,26
entelekheia, actuality, 73,7.19; epitêdeios, capable of, 65,17;
actualisation, 68,4.6.10; 69,13; epitêdeiôs ekhein, to be
realisation, 65,8.9; receptive, 46,8; be suited, 22,13
entelekheiâi, actual, 69,21; epitêdeiotês, fitness, 45,2;
71,12; actually, 22,4 46,7.11.25; 47,14; 51,16; 54,19
entelekhês, continuous, 12,27 epitêdeusis, husbandry, 13,2
enulos, material, 18,20.22 êremein, to be at rest, 107,21.26.28
enuparkhein, to be present in, êremia, rest, 107,27; 108,1.2.5
39,7; 101,14; to inhere in, 84,4; eruthros, red, 54,2.3.7
85,12; 87,5 ethelein, to intend, 86,27; to
epagein, to add, 40,6.17; 70,23; to prefer, 81,17; to will, 58,6.7;
argue, 71,17; to conclude, 89,12; 64,24; 66,26; 76,23; 78,2;
to go on to say, 50,6.25; to 81,3.6.9; 93,24; to wish, 6,11;
introduce, 68,2 12,26; 13,17.19; 79,7-80,28
epanapauesthai, to depend on, êthikos, ethical, 27,15
61,19 eudaimôn, successful, 35,24
epekhein, to obscure, 106,10; to eudaimonia, well-being, 35,16.21
spread over, 19,23 euergetein, to benefit, 86,25;
ephaptein, to come into contact, euergeteisthai, to be a
19,17 beneficiary, 81,4
ephistanai, (trans. forms) to pay eusebein, to pay reverence to,
attention to, 27,17; 28,4 56,15.24
epiballein, to project, 38,2; [to] eusebês, pious, 101,1
epiballon, impact, 16,17 euthunein, to criticise, 29,14.25;
epidekhesthai, to allow of, 12,10; other tr., 27,4
to permit, 81,12 euthus, at once, 35,23; 50,1;
epididonai, to develop, 73,25 107,19.23; 108,7; automatically,
epiginesthai, to come (to), 27,8
16,4; immediately, 17,20; 22,15; graphein, to write, 31,17; 63,7.8;
36,12, etc. 95,4
exarithmein, to count off, 10,14; to
count out, 10,11 hairesis, choice, 40,2; 78,21;
exarkein, to last, 2,11; 5,22; to school, 32,17
suffice, 6,10; 85,4; 87,1 hama, (all) at once, 10,7; 96,8.21,
exartan, to connect to, 19,8 etc.; along with, together (with),
exêgeisthai, to explain, 40,16; with, 6,3; 14,23; 16,22; 18,13,
other tr., 70,22 etc.; as soon as, 17,19; 22,14,
exêgêsis, comment, 70,3 etc.; at the instant, 81,27; at
exêgêtês, commentator, 48,10; 70,3 (one and) the same time,
[to] exetastikon, close scrutiny, 10,3.9.17; 92,6, etc.;
105,5 immediately, 37,5;
exousia, authority, 5,2 simultaneously, 58,4; 112,10;
the moment, 79,3
gê, earth, 16,10, etc. haplotês, simplicity, 5,16
geloios, ridiculous, 8,8; 97,26; haploun, to unfold, 39,16; 40,18;
107,13; 111,14 101,23
genesis, birth, 10,11; generation, haplous, simple, 5,13; 58,8; 80,15;
13,1; 16,1; 18,8, etc. 81,12-16; haplôs, as such,
genêtos, capable of coming to be, 28,6.8; generally, 29,12; 48,23;
42,11; generated, 7,11; 13,21, 51,24, etc.; in a word, 1,20;
etc.; [to] genêton, creation, 110,18; in general, 21,19.26;
13,15; creature, 12,10 31,15; in the strict sense, 22,25;
gennan, to father, 93,25; to only, 44,26; simply, 12,8; 49,15;
generate, 20,21; 115,16; 118,3 55,12, etc.
genos, kind, 69,19; 70,22.23; 73,8; haptesthai, to be in contact, 16,10
74,3; 94,3.5; race, 10,23; 11,1 harmonia, harmony, 55,21
geômetria, geometry, 28,8 harmozein, to apply, 64,20; to be
ginesthai, to be, 3,8.11.13; 4,1.15; suited to, 106,7
to be produced, 17,26; 22,20; to heimarmenê, fate, 41,3.10
be created, 17,24; 23,20; to be hêliakos, sun’s, 16,19; 19,24
generated, 13,25; 20,14.17; to be hêlios, sun, 5,24, etc.
present, 20,17; to become, 10,16; hêmionos, mule, 12,15
10,25, etc.; to come to be, 6,11; [to] hen, the One, 37,23; 38,22;
8,13; 10,14, etc.; to occur, 18,13; unity, 6,20.21; 37,28; 38,2-20;
to spring, 14,28; to reach, 19,25; 91,11-23
numerous other translations heniaios, unitary, 6,17; 38,16;
ginôskein, to have knowledge of, 91,19
know, 4,5.22; 6,21; 37,19.28; henousthai, to become one with,
38,11.15.19.25; 40,13; 66,11; 54,6
91,15.18.23; 108,22; 116,5; to hepesthai, to attend, 44,9; to
recognise, 37,19 follow, 7,7; 13,18; 43,16, etc.; to
glukus, sweet, 34,20; 54,2.3.7 follow upon, 36,27; 37,5; 49,16,
gnôsis, knowledge, 3,8, etc. etc.; [to] hepomenon,
gnôstikos, cognitive, 3,12 consequence, 40,3; 45,19; 86,11
[to] gnôston, object of knowledge, hermêneia, verbal presentation,
38,6 117,8
grammatikos, grammatical, of hermêneuein, to express, 117,11
grammar, 46,9-62,8; [ho] heteroiôsis, alteration, 74,9; 81,24
grammatikos, grammarian, hexis, capacity, 44,7, etc. (esp.
46,7-62,8; [hê] grammatikê, 44,7-78,6); condition, 69,25;
grammar, 69,18-71,1
71,20.27; possession, hulaktein, to bark, 55,5
46,12-48,25; 70,17-84,15 hulaktikos, able to bark, 55,12;
hippos, horse, 11,8; 12,14; 92,3 capable of barking, 55,3
histanai, (trans. forms) to stop, hulê, matter, 86,3; stuff, 69,20;
115,4; (intrans. forms) to stay, 70,23
115,26 huparkhein, to be, 7,24; 16,5;
holikos, universal, 6,19; 38,18; 17,16, etc.; to be in existence,
91,21 103,15; to be present, 21,19;
holos, all, 96,8; 99,3; whole, 12,27; 84,2; 86,5.14, etc.; to belong,
18,23; 19,28, etc.; other tr., 35,11; to exist, 9,5; 26,13; 79,4,
27,15; holôs, at all, 10,5; 12,9; etc.; to happen, 74,11; to have
38,23, etc.; certainly, 103,17; existence, 95,23; to remain,
completely, 18,26; 19,5; 103,22; other tr., 109,12;
generally, 72,15; in any sense, huparkhesthai, to make a
50,23; in any way at all, 57,11; beginning, 94,12
in general, 57,10; 64,23; 68,24, huparxis, coming into existence,
etc.; more generally, 20,22; 40,9.13; existence, 14,18; 15,23;
63,10-25; 119,9; of any kind at 16,1, etc.; existent, 15,10.14;
all, 57,21; 68,25, etc.; speaking nature, 18,5
generally, 58,7; 76,29 huperbainein, to pass over, 19,17
homoeidês, uniform, 115.11 huperkosmios, supramundane,
homogonos, born together with, 110,1
104,1 huperteros, above, 78,15; above
homoiomerês, uniform, 115,6 and beyond, 110,16
homologein, to accept, 46,5; hupexistasthai, to gradually
102,17; to agree, 3,8; 8,4; 17,16, withdraw, 16,19
etc.; to concede, 32,9; to conform, huphiesthai, to be inferior, 8,14;
45,15; to grant, 19,2; 31,9 14,15.18
homônumia, ambiguity, 44,2; huphistanai, (trans. forms) to
45,10; 50,19; 52,16; 75,11 bring into existence, 12,17;
homônumos, ambiguous, 45,12; 13,16; 18,3, etc.; to cause to
going under the same name, exist, 6,15.20.22.25; 38,19;
74,4; named for, 94,11; 91,22; (intrans. forms) to be in
homônumôs, ambiguously, existence, 12,22; to have
52,20 existence, 39,21; 102,9; to exist,
horan, to observe, 14,19; 49,13; to 7,23-10,17, etc.; to consist, 37,2;
see, 14,23; 55,4; 72,22.24, etc.; other tr., 8,16
horasthai, to become visible, hupoballein, to reach under, 16,16
74,7 hupodeigma, example, 90,6;
horatikos, able to see, 55,12; 111,18; 113,7; 114,1.7; parallel,
capable of sight, 55,3 15,1; 16,24
horismos, definition, 27,17; hupokeisthai, to be ex hypothesi,
28,4.15.22 35,2; to be under discussion,
horizesthai, to define, 28,5; 29,15; 66,24; 107,28; to underlie, 70,24;
65.7; 67,2; hôrismenos, hupokeimenos, under, 16,9;
definite, 83,12 [to] hupokeimenon, subject,
horos, definition, 27,20; 28,17 34,22; 74,9; 76,8, etc.;
hudôr, water, 18,2, etc. substratum, 20,29; 21,3; 84,3,
huetos, rain, 112,28; 113,12.14 etc.
hugiainein, to be healthy, 81,21 hupokrinesthai, to feign, 37,15; to
hugiazein, to create health, 42,9; play a part, 90,19
make healthy, 42,9 hupokritês, actor, 90,17
huios, son, 34,16; 36,11 hupolambanein, to accept, 30,2;
to assume, 28,11; to suppose, katalampein, to illuminate, 65,18;
117,2; to think, 61,18; other tr., to light up, 81,23
29,24 kataleipein, to leave, 8,18;
hupoleipesthai, to remain, 4,19 kataleipesthai, to remain,
hupolêpsis, belief, 41,3; idea, 11,25; 12,4
21,25; 29,23; notion, 27,6; 88,6; katanoein, to consider, 45,24; to
understanding, 30,6 look closely at, 98,22
hupolêpteon, one should assume, katantan, to descend, 10,24; to
15,11; one should regard, 15,17 reach down, 11,1
hupomenein, to remain, 17,17; kataphasis, affirmation, 80,15;
23,10; to undergo, 61,14, etc. 112,14.17.21.22; affirmative,
hupomnêmata, commentary, 48,11 107.1; positive, 106,28
hupomnêmatikos, explanatory, kataphaskein, to affirm, 38,23
70,3 katarkhê, forecast, 41,6
huponoein, to suppose, 81,25 kataskeuazein, to argue, 9,27;
huponoia, notion, 20,15; 29,7; 61,15; to establish, 9,25; to make
30,8; 76,10 a point, 73,18; to prove, 117,19;
hupostasis, creation, 18,12; 118,12; to represent, 86,28
existence, 12,3, etc. katastasis, state of affairs, 113,16
hupothesis, hypothesis, 2,4; katêgorein, to accuse (of), 8,26;
4,7-5,9; 7,7.10; 24,18-33,1, etc. 13,20; to predicate of, 14,6;
hupotithenai, to advance, 4,7; to 49,19; 109,8.9; 111,11; to use of,
assume, 33,3; 83,4, etc.; to 107,12; other tr., 104,9; 108,23
establish, 53,3; to hypothesise, katêgoria, denunciation, 32,3
4,10; 8,10.24, etc.; to put kath’ hauto, in its (their) own
forward, 24,22; to set out, 30,1; right, 16,20; 33,23; in itself,
to suppose, 3,6; 25,13, etc. 15,4.6; 24,4; 107,4; 111,23;
hupotrekhein, to pass in front of, 113,10; independent, 15,20; of
18,25; 19,4; 20,16 itself, 84,11; other tr., 100,16
husterogenês, of secondary origin, katholou, generally, 63,12; totally,
55,19 29,25; 30,3; 50,1; universal (adj.
or noun), 27,16; 30,25; 55,6-20;
iatreuein, to practice (medicine), 58,24; 93,16; universally, 44,23;
treat, 50,16.17.18; [ho] en tôi katholou, universally,
iatreuomenos, patient, 67,22 16,3
iatreusis, healing, 67,7.20.21 kenologia, empty talk, 30,13
iatros, doctor, 50,16; 67,21 kephalaion, proof, 94,22; section,
idea, Form, 24,25-41,24; kind, 24,17, etc.
52,19; 57,26 kephalê, head, 85,3
idiotês, characteristic, 38,8 kharaktêrizein, to characterise,
isêmerinos [kuklos] celestial 38,22; 84,20
equator, 16,6 khein, to diffuse, 17,15; 19,21.26;
isodunamein, to be equivalent, 20,1
80,15 kheir, hand, 40,12; 77,14; 86,10;
89,11
kakia, vice, 109,15 khiôn, snow, 84,23
kakourgein en tois logois, to khôlos, lame, 15,14
argue unfairly, 59,6 khôlotês, lameness, 15,15
kakourgia, villainous way, 98,22 khôra, opportunity, 54,13; room,
kanôn, rule, 45,21 16,15; khôran ekhein, to apply
kataballein, to sow, 12,24; 90,23 to, 48,18; to have application,
katagraphein, to draw, 208,17 49,20
khorêgein, to furnish, 4,13; kosmikos, world (adj.), 55,17; 119,9
supply, 85,14.15 kosmos, world, 3,10, etc.
khôrein, to proceed, 59,23; to krasis, mixing, 40,20
progress, 12,1 kratein, to overwhelm, 272,13
khôristos, separate, 28,22 kreittôn, better, 7,6-8,20; 86,18;
khôrizein, to divorce, 110,6; to superior, 3,3; 6,24; 8,13.15
separate, 80,24; kritêrion, test, 117,6
kekhôrismenos, separate, 28,11 kuôn, dog, 11,10
khrêsis, passage, 91,6; usage, 111,5 kuriôs, especially, 52,18; in the
khrêstêrion, oracle, 37,14 strict sense, 69,22; 72,4
khrôma, colour, 74,6; 84,6;
colouration, 22,3 lambanein, to accept, 113,26; to
khronikos, of time, 103,15; 106,3; acquire, 71,1; to assume, 66,5; to
113,23; 116,7; temporal, 6,9; come into, 70,20; to derive,
103,12; 106,17, etc.; time (adj.), 32,14; to gain, 102,4; to receive,
104,8, etc.; to time, 116,11; 15,19; to take, 1,17; 14,12; 16,2;
khronikôs, in time, 1,15; to take for granted, 19,3; other
temporally, 111,14; 116,3 tr., 44,17
khronos, time, 1,16; 2,8; 5,5, etc. lêpsis, selection, 53,2
(esp. ch. 5); hupo khronon, leptos, insignificant, 91,9
temporal, 2,6.8; 4,12; 5,5.6 leukainesthai, to become white,
khuma, material, 19,13 71,25; 72,9; to turn white, 60,5
kinein, to cause movement, leukansis, becoming white, 72,8;
57,16.17.18; to impart turning white, 60,4.6; whitening,
movement, 89,23; to raise, 71,25
118,20; to stir, 66,13; [to] leukos, white, 34,20; 42,19; 51,4;
kinoun, cause of movement, 60,5.6; 72,9.11
68,7; mover, 89,7-90.9; lexis, expression, 117,9; language,
kineisthai (intrans.), to be in 106,13; passage, 21,28; 27,7;
movement, 56,7, etc.; to exhibit 30,25, etc.; statement, 106,9;
(movement), 66,24; 74,15; to 116,23; word(s), 44,16; 49,8;
move, 17,21, etc. 69,11, etc.; wording, 104,23;
kinêsis, movement, 15,13, etc. 107,15; 117,11; epi lexeôs,
kinêtikos, able to cause explicitly, 9,27; 66,28; to quote
movement, 68,5.6 his exact words (see note at
koinônein, to share in, 13,16; 14,13 31,12), 31,12; 69,12; 95,4; word
koinônia, association, 110,5 for word, 48,9; 74,21; kata
koinos, common, 5,15; 6,4; 27,20; lexin, word for word, 82,15; 96,2
41,1; 57,4; 59,8; 102,16; lithos, stone, 66,15, etc.
everyday, 111,4; in common, logikos, capable of speech,
14,23; shared, 37,17; the same, 84,20.22; logical, 31,19; verbal,
59,17; koinôs, in common, 77,12.15; [to] logikon, rational
70,25; with common features, faculty, 86,9
28,6 logion, [Christian] scripture,
koinotês, common feature, 75,8.20
28,5.14.21; 29,15 logizesthai, to take account of, 75,5
kôluein, to prevent, 10,7; 12,12; logos, account, 5,1, etc.; argument,
13,1.4; 37,6; 50,13; 69,21; 71,4.6; 1,8, etc.; book, 65,7, etc.;
other tr., 108,7 chapter, 69,5.10, etc.;
kônos, cone, 19,16.20.22 consideration, 15,2; definition,
koruphaios, foremost, 26,25; 32,15 83,26; lecture, 70,7; matter,
[to kata] koruphên, zenith, 48,12; 83,3; principle, 10,7; 13,3;
16,5.15 25,14-18; 36,18-37,10, etc.;
question, 118,21; reason, 40,1, menein, to remain, 38,11; 73,26;
etc.; relation, 71,24; section, 75,24; 91,14, etc.
70,11, etc.; statement, 30,14, merikos, particular, 28,6; 107,7;
etc.; text, 104,22; treatise, 101,9, [to] merikon, individual
etc.; work, 6,16, etc.; other tr., (thing), 79,16-80,6; particular
12,5, etc.; [ho] autos logos, the (thing), 58,25; 92,1; 93,14
same applies, 40,16; 49,6; 62,11; merizein, to divide, 6,18; 38,17;
66,17, etc.; logon (logous) 91,20; to disperse, 38,6
poieisthai, to argue, 75,10; to meros, part, 19,17.22; 54,25;
discuss, 74,8 86,1-10, etc.; kata meros, a bit
loipos, else, 29,28; left, 7,9; other, at a time, 10,4.6.14; bit by bit,
9,8; 12,18; 104,10, etc.; 9,22; 10,10; 96,9; 99,4; little by
remaining, 5,11; rest, 20,5; 28,8; little, 16,19; particular, 55,17;
93,3, etc.; other tr., 94,3; kai ta 91,3
loipa, etc., 29,2; [to] loipon, mesotês middle, 88,18
eventually, 10,15; finally, 9,25; metabainein, to make a
for the rest, 32,21; 51,25; in transition, 56,2.3; to pass, 52,13;
what follows, 61,20; no longer, 59,27; 60,10.19; 61,24; 63,8;
77,20; thereafter, 94,17 100,4
luein, to dissolve, 115,17; to refute, metaballein, to alter (trans.),
82,1; to release, 80,2.22; to undo, 22,22; to bring, 55,8; to change
59,24 (intrans.), 27,21; 43,22;
lusis, dissolution, 115,17; 48,17-49,5, etc.; to change
refutation, 1,10, etc. (trans.), 53,18; 54,7; to convert,
109,15; to undergo change,
makhê, conflict, 26,26 71,20.26
makhesthai, to be opposed, 31,15 metabasis, change, 62,5;
manteion, shrine, 37,14 transition, 56,5; 72,21; other tr.,
manthanein, to learn, 37,11; to 74,18
listen, 94,3 metabolê, change, 28,16; 54,22;
mathêma, mathematical science, 56,4.5; 58,10, etc.
16,3 metalambanein, to interpret,
mathêsis, learning, 54,23; 67,20; 111,25; 112,2; 113,1
69,24; 71,19.23.24.26; 72,2 metaphora, metaphor, 30,14
mathêtês, pupil, 26,28; 66,10; 71,5; metaphorikos, metaphorical, 31,14
117,25 metapiptein, to change (intrans.),
megethos, magnitude, 8,2.5 103,10
meignunai, to mate, 12,14 metathesis, reversal, 80,14
meioun, detract from, 8,22 metekhein, to partake, 2,1-5;
melainesthai, to be black, 60,4 81,3-18; 83,20.21; to participate
melas, black, 42,19; 51,4; 60,6; 72,9 (in), 58,10; 100,8; to receive,
mellein, to be about to, 30,15; to be 94,7; to share (in), 77,3; 81,24;
going to, 37,11; 92,7; 93,2, etc.; 83,6, etc.
to be yet to, 92,12; would, 29,11; methistanai (intrans. forms), to
[to] mellon, the future, change, 96,12; to change
39,8.11.23; 97,3.25, etc.; [ta] position, 20,18; to move, 81,23;
mellonta, future happenings, to pass, 96,23
41,4.10; future things, 78,17; methodos, method, 28,10;
79,1.2; 92,8.9; 93,10; things that methodology, 28,3; mode,
will be, 39,19; mellôn, future 112,1.26; technique, 12,23
(adj.), 78,22; 92,21, etc.; in the metrein, to measure, 115,9
future, 102,7; 105,22.23 metrêtikos, the measure of,
114,20; 118,22.24; 119,2
metron, measure, 103,19; 110,25; oikhesthai, to be lost, 23,16; to
114,22.25; 115,14.22.24; 117,17 collapse, 52,5
monas, unit, 10,10.13.15.16.19 oikia, building, 67,11; house,
monogenês, unique, 18,2 36,28; 50,13
oikodomein, to build, 42,9, etc.
naupêgos, shipwright, 36,27; oikodomêsis, building (sc. the
53,26.27 process), 67,6.10.11.13.14.16;
naus, ship, 53,25.26; 54,1 68,9
nephos, cloud, 18,25; 19,4; 20,16 oikodomêtos, buildable,
noein, to apprehend, 81,8; 117,2; to 67,4.9.10.12.18; 68,13
conceive of, 15,24; to intend, oikodomia, building (sc. the
104,15; 113,23; 116,3.14; to process), 62,3
indicate, 114,3; to know, 37,29; oikodomikos, having the capacity
38,9.10; 40,9; to think, 39,23; to build, skilled in building,
77,9; 78,17; to refer to, 108,9; 66,3.12.21; 67,17
116,7; to understand, 111,14; oikodomos, builder, 36,27, etc.
[to] nooumenon, thought, oikos, house, 52,12; dwelling, 86,24
113,26.27 onoma, word, 15,8.11; 31,13;
noêma, thought, 6,3; 18,13; terminology, 74,7
77,20.24; 105,3 onomasia, phrase (paraphrase
noeros, of the mind, 38,7; used), 52,24
intellectual, 37,27 onomazein, to call, 73,14
noêsis, concept, 36,19; 37,2; 41,17; onkos, mass, 117,1
76,26; 78,7; thought, 6,11; 76,15; onos, donkey, 12,14
77,7-79,3, etc. opsis, (pl.) eyes, 81,21; seeing,
[to] noêtikon, the mental sphere, 65,18; sight, 15,11; 72,22.27
76,17 [to] orekton, object of desire, 38,21
noêtos, intelligible, 93,20; 110,14; organikos, physical, 76,13.17
[to] noêton, intelligible entity, organon, instrument, 66,23.26;
110,1.3.5; 111,1; object of tool, 40,11; organ, 76,24;
thought, 65,23; the intelligible, 77,18.26; 78,1
39,2; 101,9 orthotês, 74,26 (emended to
nous, (common) sense, 15,5, etc.; deinotês)
intention, 116,24; mind, 37,24, ostrakon, shell, 84,5
etc.; understanding, 70,27; ouranios, heavenly, 19,13, etc.
huper noun, inconceivable, 8,17 ouranos, the heaven, 6,1, etc.
nukteris, bat, 81,20 ousia, being, 38,4; 83,19; 91,12;
nun, already, 74,22; at any essence, 21,11.13.15; 23,2;
moment, 17,26; at the present substance, 13,16-26,8;
time, 48,12; here, 8,1; now, 9,6; 33,7-36,20; 58,15; 83,10-88,4;
10,24; 69,13, etc.; present, 110,7.14
118,12; nun de, instead, 70,4; ousiôdês, essential, 84,10.19; 85,8;
[to] nun, instant, 5,24; 63,7; of the essence, 83,25; ousiôdôs,
65,15, etc.; moment, 108,13; the as part of the essence, 87,5
here and now, 95,20; 96,24; the ousiôsis, bringing into being, 6,10;
present time, 11,5 creation of substance, 22,25;
nux, night, 74,6; 110,20; 115,3 being, 81,7; other tr., 64,25;
76,24; 78,1
oikeios, appropriate, 76,15; its, ousioun, to give being [to], 79,6;
19,8; own, 29,17; 30,24; 31,5, ousiousthai, to have [its]
etc.; private, 77,19; respective, essence, 26,2; 35,20; other tr.,
32,17 16,26
oikêsin ekhein, dwell, 16,7
paidion, child, 46,7; 48,18; 62,7 21,8.9; 24,8; 39,9-40,5, etc.;
paides Hellênôn, Hellenes, 41,7 other tr., 21,21; 22,14
[to] pan, universe, 56,10-25; parempiptein, to find [their] way,
82,18-22; 93,25; 94,8 117,6
[to] panteleion, perfection, 79,5 parepesthai, to accompany, 16,4;
pantelês, absolute, 72,28; perfect, to be concomitant, 108,17.18;
5,16; 33,10; pantelôs, para tou parepomenou,
absolutely, 85,12; completely, concomitantly, 114,4
85,6 parelêluthôs, past, 108,28; 109,5;
pantôs, absolutely, 6,1; 8,7.14, etc.; 113,19
certainly, 14,17; 41,19, etc.; in paristanai, (trans. forms) to
every case, 2,1; 5,8; 7,15, etc.; it convey 113,13;, to make, 70,7; to
must be, 13,19; quite, 16,2; present, 69,11; (intrans. forms)
19,20, etc. to be present, 6,7
paradeigma, pattern, 24,2-41,24; paskhein, to be acted upon,
103,22-104,17; 115,19.21; 22,13.15; 57,16; 62,9; 66,2.19; to
118,16-119,9 have [something] done to one,
paradekhesthai, to acquire, 46,9 87,16; [to] paskhon, patient,
paradidonai, to hand over, 94,13 22.14
paragein, to adduce, 14,22; to patêr, father, 34,16, etc.
bring, 13,14; 14,15; 59,12; 81,7; pathos, effect, 23,5; property, 18,6;
to bring into being, 77,27; to 20,24; 21,4.5.24; 22,10; other tr.,
bring into existence, 3,1-17,12; 87,17
38,24, etc. pauesthai, to cease, 22,20; 94,19;
paragôgê, production, 5,24; 102,15 108,10; 112,15; 114,13.15; to
parakeisthai, to be in the stop, 11,19; 63,7.13; 107,21.25
proximity of, 22,16; [ta] pêgê, spring, 18,2
parakeimena, surrounds, 20,10 perainesthai, to be finite, 9,13;
parakolouthein, to be a peperasmenos, finite,
consequence, 87,6; to become as 2,10-9,14; 96,7
a consequence, 37,3 peras, end, 63,5; 108,3.10.24; 114,6
paraktikos, productive of 22,24; periagein, to turn, 112,25
other tr. 15,7; 38,3; 91,11 peridexios, expert, 98,19
paralambanein, to take, 113,16; peridrattesthai, to grasp fully,
114,2; to use, 17,23; 108,6; 3,14
111,17 periekhein, to embrace, 88,19;
parallagê, change of position, 112,12
75,19 perierkhesthai (incl. periienai),
parallatein, to pass, 16,15 to move around, 19,22; to be
paralogismos, fallacious trapped, 64,9
argument, 44,3.18; 52,18; 53,2; perigraphein, to place a limit on,
57,4.7.25; 75,12; fallacy, 59,19; 8,19
106,7 perikratein, to master, 3,15
paralogizesthai, to create periphora, revolution, 78,24
fallacious arguments, 52,16; pêsis, affection, 62,5
76,11 phainesthai, to be visible, 65,16;
paratasis, extension, 6,9; 18,8; 93,24; to seem, 10,9; 111,15;
114,27; 115,6.25; 116,20; period, other tr., 36,21; 117,28; (+
57,14; 109,17 participle), clearly, 18,23; 26,3;
parathein, to occupy, 12,2 30,7, etc.
paratithesthai, to cite, 61,16; phaneros, clear, 68,3; 77,4
74,22; to quote, 70,4; 73,5 phanerôsis, revealing (noun),
pareinai, to be present, 20,7; 73,17.26
phantasia, imagination, 117,1 pithanotês, plausibility, 23,17
pherein, to use, 116,17; [epi ta] plagia, at the sides, 16,15
pheresthai, to head, 98,24; platos, plane, 114,27
phere eipein, say, 12,12 plêrês, full, 111,3
pheugein, to avoid, 32,18 plêrôma, plenitude, 101,2; 102,22
philoneikia, contentiousness, 32,7 poiein, to achieve, 76,15; to act,
philoneikos, contentious, 74,23 22,13.15; 49,24; 62,7; to base,
philosophia, philosophy, 27,10; 117,12; to carry out, 70,15; to
45,7 create, 28,23; to constitute, 29,8;
philosophia ontôn, ontology, 27,5 to direct, 104,23; to do, 52,26; to
philosophos, philosopher, locate, 109,4.26; to make, 9,4;
26,23-53,3, etc. 12,27; 22,17; 40,12, etc.; to
phora, drift, 106,11; motion, produce, 4,21; 6,9; 7,1-18, etc.
115,5.8 (esp. 55,26-68,27 and
phôs, light, 14,25, etc. 75,13-86,23); to undergo, 72,13;
phôteinos, bright, 84,12 other tr., 26,21; 30,20; 45,9.11;
phôtistikos, illuminative, 83,20; of 73,27, etc. (chiefly with a noun
illuminating, 81,17; [to] as periphrasis for its verb; cf.
phôtistikon, source of LSJ II.5); [ho] poiêsas,
illumination, 65,16 producer, 85,21; [to] poioun,
phôtizein, to illuminate, agent, 22,14; producer, 42,10;
17,19-21,21; 78,13; 84,12; [to] 68,16; 82,16
phôtizon, source of poiêma, work, 85,21
illumination, 18,20; 20,7-22,18; poiêsis, action, 62,5.19; creating,
65,15 63,27; 64,12.22; 68,16
phôtoeidês, luminous, 83,4.5 poiêtês, creator, 60,18.20.23; 99,20;
phronein, to understand, producer, 21,2
73,9.11.12 poiêtikos, capable of producing,
phthartos, perishable, 17,16; 42,12; 62,22; poetic, 30,13;
18,16-20,6; 23,8 productive, 15,22; 21,5
phtheiresthai, to cease to exist, [to] poion, quality, 8,19; kata to
10,17; to perish, 18,22-20,17; poion, qualitative, 74,5
72,7.10.13; 73,23; 80,6, etc. poiotês, quality, 54,5
phthinein, to decay, 74,17 politikos, civic, 35,16.21; [ho]
phthisis, decay, 74,13 politikos, statesman, 35,19
phthonos, envy, 13,13.18; 109,3 pollaplasios, many times greater,
phthora, passing out of existence, 11,13; 13,8
15,27, etc. poluplasiazein, to multiply many
phusikos, natural, 12,17.18.20; times over, 11,11
14,19; 23,21; 46,6, etc.; physical, ponêros, evil, 37,15
29,18.19; 31,17.21; scientific, pote (esp. in chs. 3 & 4), (at) a
7,25; 12,17; phusikôs, (this) time, 96,12.13; 96,23;
naturally, 12,23; 13,3 97,1.2, etc.; (at) some time, 43,7;
phusis, nature, 7,11; 8,4.6.21.26, 47,16; 82,12, etc.; at times, 19,9;
etc. sometimes, 16,8; 42,3; 56,7, etc.;
phuton, plant, 9,7.10; 54,4.6; 92,3; pote } pote, (at) one time }
93,3 (at) another (time), 58,6; 75,24;
pikros, bitter, 54,2.3.7 76,1, etc.
pisteuein, to believe, 6,4; 41,7; pous, foot, 15,12; 86,10
other tr., 88,14 pragma, thing, 23,2; 25,17; 30,11;
pistousthai, to be persuaded, 36,26, etc.; [ta] pragmata,
15,27; to confirm, 18,18; to affairs, 35,20; the facts, 26,20;
prove, 19,18
52,26; 74,27, etc.; subject prosdiorizesthai, to distinguish,
(matter), 111,6; 113,25; 117,8.10 50,20; to specify, 29,11; 49,13;
pragmateia, treatise, work, 27,8; 52,21
29,19; 32,5; 61,16; 74,20 prosêmainein, to foretell, 41,6
praktikos, practical, 77,14.25 proslambanein, to add, 102,14
praxis, action, 77,29 prosphiloneikein, to insist, 12,5;
prisis, sawing, 54,26 to persist, 84,25
pristês, sawyer, 54,26.27; 55,10 prosrêma, word, 104,8.10;
proagein, to direct, 84,17 107,17.19.22; 108,6; 113,4;
proballein, to engage in, 74,16; 114,1; 116,9
76,12; to initiate, 75,15 prostithenai, to add, 11,9, etc.
probolê, production, 65,12.13 prostribesthai, to inflict upon, 14,3
proerkhesthai (incl. proienai), to protasis, premiss, 57,3;
advance, 10,23; 44,14; 62,1.13; 59,17.18.23; 60,12
72,18; 73,25; to go forth (out), proüparkhein, to pre-exist, 14,20,
21,8; 77,7; to proceed, 58,17; etc.
63,19; 79,1; proïôn, below, proüphistasthai, to have prior
64,21; in due course, 9,22 existence, 40,14
progignôskein, to foreknow, 41,11 psilos, unadorned, 116,10
prognôsis, foreknowledge, psukhê, mind, 46,13;
37,12.15; 39,20.26; 40,24; 59,12; 77,6.11.17.26; soul, 6,1;
78,22.27; 102,4.14 29,24.25; 38,9; 78,19; 79,25;
prognôstikos, prescient, 40,26 80,22; 89,10.11
prokeisthai, to be present, 69,5; psukhein, to cool, 84,24
114,18.19, etc.; prokeimenos, psukhikos, of the soul, 38,7
present, 69,5; 114,18.19; psukhôsis, cooling, 40,21
successive, 43,14; [to] psukhros, cold, 42,18; 51,4;
prokeimenon, matter in hand, 54,10.11.12; 72,12.13; 84,23
49,7; present instance, 108,8; ptêna, birds, 12,15
subject, 70,4 pur, fire, 18,21, etc.
prokheirizesthai, to externalise,
46,14; 71,3; 73,13; to mobilise, rhopê, impulse, 85,13
57,10; 62,3.17; 63,26; 64,15.19; rhusis, flux, 28,16
68,25; 71,16; 72,19.25; 74,10.19;
75,4; to present, 47,4.13; 49,2; selênê, moon, 19,19, etc.
71,9 selêniakos, moon’s, 19,17.23; of
prokheirisis, mobilisation, 57,22; the moon, 20,2
63,5; 73,21; 74,1; 75,22 sêmainein, to indicate, 106,23;
pronoein, to exercise providence, 108,7; 113,11; to mean, 71,10;
4,21; 80,20; to provide for, 107,1.2.11; 112,14; to refer to,
39,12.24; 86,25; 101,19; 102,2.10 106,21; 107,4-16; 108,23; 113,20;
pronoêtikos, provident, to signify, 106,27; 111,23; other
providential, 37,26; 39,4; 40,26; tr., 108,18; [to]
91,8 sêmainomenon, sense,
pronoia, providence, 6,16.17; 44,6-46,21; 49,14-51,12; 75,2;
37,16-41,9; 78,21; 80,21; 91,7.19 104,22; 106,14
propherein, to project, 77,12 sêmantikos (einai), to involve a
[ta] pros ti, relatives, 26,6; reference to, 108,15; to mean,
34,1-36,15; 43,19 40,6; to point to, 116,15
prosaptein, to ascribe, 86,27; sêmasia, expression, 113,26;
impute, 75,6 reference, 30,11; signification,
prosballein, to make direct 106,17
contact with, 77,20
sêmeion, instant, 108,13; point, sumbainein, to apply to, 51,16; to
114,26; 115,12.13.23.24 arise, 11,15; to be the case,
skeuôrêma, fraud, 59,25 93,15; to exist, 40,16; to follow,
skhesis, relation, 33,15-34,17; 9,1.18; to happen, 73,16; to
78,26.27; 83,9-88,2, etc. occur, 9,19; 34,17; to turn out,
skia, shadow, 14,28-19,22 13,24; other tr., 16,7; 19,25; [to]
skiazein, to throw into shadow, sumbebêkos, accident, 34,7.9;
20,16 35,1; attribute, 21,5; kata
sklêros, hard, 54,10.11 sumbebêkos, accidentally, 24,4
skopein, to examine, 61,20; to look summerizein, to parcel out
at, 83,3; 88,12; to observe, 19,1; among, 6,22
50,8; 51,8 summiktos, mixed, 12,16
skopos, goal, 45,19; 75,7; intention, sumparateinesthai, to be
116,23 co-extensive with, 115,1
skotos, darkness, 15,9.16; 16,11.13; sumparathein, to go hand in hand
17,17; 22,3; 72,23; 74,6 with, 116,27; to keep pace with,
skulakion, puppy, 55,2 115,7
sôizein, to preserve, 12,26; sumperainein, to draw a
sôizesthai, to survive, 84,3 conclusion, 52,2
sôma, body, 14,27; 15,6, etc.; sumperiagein, to carry around,
bodily, 78,19; corporeal thing, 20,19
84,7 sumperipolein, to travel around
sophistês, sophist, 45,10 with, 20,14.22
sophistikos, sophistical, 45,6; sumpêxis, condensation, 40,20
52,15.21; 105,12; sophistikôs, sumpherein, to be best for, 80,21
sophistically, with sophistic sumphônos, in agreement, 30,24;
intent, 49,25; 51,21; 104,5 sumphônôs, without exception,
sophos, in his wisdom, 13,13; 8,4
105,14; ingenious, 112,1; sumplêrôtikos, constituting,
learned, 80,24; 82,9.26; 92,12; 58,19; constitutive, 16,27; 17,5;
109,4; wise, 34,20; [ho] sophos, 21,11.12.13.16.23; 83,10.22;
man of wisdom, 87,13; 84,2; 85,2; 86,3.8; 87,21.25;
philosopher, 111,4; [to] sophon, which constitutes, 83,17
cleverness, 64,8; sophistry, sumplêroun, to complete, 6,22; to
105,15 constitute, 84,17; to be a
sôstikos einai, to sustain, 38,4; component of, 21,14; [to]
91,11 sumplêrousthai, completion,
[epi] sôtêriâi, in the interest of 88,3
preserving, 30,23; 31,4 sumpnoia, concord, 55,21
spermatikos, seminal, 12,23 sunagein, to argue, 60,20; 105,9;
sphaira, sphere, 16,26, etc. to bring together, 12,19; to
stasis, stability, 28,17 conclude, 26,3; 32,24; to draw a
stereisthai, to be deprived of, conclusion, 75,16; 111,26; 112,2;
15,13; to be devoid of, 30,12 to work out the consequences,
sterêsis, privation, 15,3-25; 86,12
72,15.28 sunaïdios, co-everlasting,
stoikheion, element, 29,21; 40,19 14,10.21; 18,13; 23,3.4.22; 79,10
sullabê, component, 106,10; idea, sunaisthanesthai, to see, 98,23;
77,11 99,9
sullogismos, (logical) argument, sunalêtheuein, to be true at the
61,9; 106,7; syllogism, 52,6; 57,3; same time, 63,16; 80,11
59,14.21.26; 60,11.12; 61,3 sunanairein, to destroy together,
sullogizesthai, to argue, 92,14
26,6; to eliminate along with, sunuphistanai, (intrans. forms) to
110,11 coexist, exist together, 16,23.26;
sunapienai, to depart along with, 26,6; 75,21
21,9
sunasthenein, to be inadequate taxis, order, 35,18, etc.; place,
too, 113,25 110,23
sundein, to bind to, 80,1.21 tekhnê, art, 54,25; 62,8
sundiairein, to parcel out along tekhnêtos, man-made, 23,21
with, 95,19; 97,9 tekhnikos, artificial, 14,19
sundiïstanai, to divide up along tekmêrion, proof, 6,2
with, 95,26; 109,6.26 teleios, complete, 57,13;
sundokein, to be agreed, 110,19 65,3.11.25; 83,18.25.27; fully,
suneinai, to be also, 36,10; to 84,5; in perfection, 69,3; perfect,
coexist with, 21,12.13 56,12-60,21; 82,6-88,10; 93,11;
sunekheia, continuity, 20,8; kata 94,5; 102,3.11; perfected, 66,13;
sunekheian, continually, 18,1; 76,8; 87,20; [to] teleion,
unbroken, 16,9 perfection, 58,16; 85,11.26;
sunekhein, to maintain, 5,7.8; 86,27; 87,9
94,17 teleiôsis, fulfilment, 65,10; 67,20;
sunekhês, continuous, 19,6.10; [to] 68,13; perfecting, 101,3.5; 102,24
sunekhes, continuity, 20,11; teleiotês, perfection, 22,8;
kata to sunekhes, 58,21.23; 59,11; 67,16; 85,23;
continuously, 81,21; sunekhôs, 86,4.14.22; 87,1.3
continually, 82,2 teleiôtikos, perfective, 85,20; 86,8;
sunepinoein, to imply, 36,11; to 87,12.19; [to] teleiôtikon, that
introduce the idea of, 107,19; to which fulfils, 53,14
think of in connection with, teleioun, to accomplish, 45,4; to
115,11 bring to maturity, 55,5; to
sunergein, to assist (paraphrase perfect, 85,9; 87,15.18; other tr.,
used), 66,26 88,3
sunistanai, (trans. forms) to telos, end, 2,12, etc.; dia telous,
frame, 36,19; (intrans. forms) to throughout, 115,20
be, 26,26; to be composed, 29,20; temnein, to cut, 115,2; to cut off,
to be constructed, 24,19 18,26; to divide, 115,25
sunkeisthai, to consist, 9,13 thanatos, death, 15,22
sunkhôrein, to accept, 20,26; 55,9, thaumasios, fine fellow, 76,3
etc.; to admit, 13,4; 93,11; to thaumastos, marvellous, 112,26;
agree, 4,16; 7,13; 43,15.16, etc.; surprising, 22,12
to allow, 105,12; to concede, thaumazein, to be amazed, 32,10;
17,6; 20,22; 23,1, etc.; other tr., 61,5; 74,24; 95,13
11,14 theios, divine, 2,5, etc.
sunônumos, having the same thelein, see ethelein
name, 28,1; sunônumôs, by the themitos, proper, 77,2
same name, 28,25 theologos, prophet, 6,5
sunoran, to see, 29,3; 95,13 theôrein, to conceive of, 62,21; to
suntelein, to contribute to, 87,3; contemplate, 116,26; to observe,
110,12 58,10; 64,12; 77,6; 81,15; to
[eis tauto] suntrekhein, to reflect, 69,20.21; 73,5; 77,9.21;
coincide with, 47,20 to see, 28,7; 66,15
sunuparkhein, to also exist, theôrêma, theory, 46,9-75,6
23,19; to be coexistent with, theôria, contemplative faculty,
14,14, etc.; to coexist, coexist 117,4; reflection, 46,15; 71,3;
with, 9,2, etc. 77,7.11.25
theos, god, God, 3,5, etc. 38,12; 91,15; sense, 50,3; way,
therinos tropikos, Tropic of 7,26; 9,20; 12,27; 46,6, etc.; other
Cancer, 16,7 tr., 114,3
thermainein, to heat, 20,10; tuphlotês, blindness, 15,12.15
78,13; 83,24.26; 84,12 tupos, shape, 117,1
thermansis, becoming hot, 72,8
thermantikos, heating, 83,23; of xenos, extraneous, 17,11; strange,
heating, 81,18 22,19
thermos, hot, 22,16.17; 42,18, etc. xulon, log, 54,26; timber, 53,25;
thermotês, heat, 20,12; 22,20; 66,16; 67,19
23,11.13; 84,1
thnêtos, mortal, 80,18, etc. zên, to have life, 38,1
thura, door, 89,9.12; 90,7.10.14 zêtein, to ask, 8,8; 55,13; to
tithenai, to hold, 24,26; to include, consider, 15,17; to inquire, 3,3;
59,16; to introduce, 19,2; to to seek, seek out, 27,16; 28,5;
propose, 45,15; other tr., 50,10 43,13, etc.; other tr., 20,27;
tmêma, segment, 104,9.15; 106,27; zêteisthai, to be under
108,19; 109,27; 111,23; investigation, 14,24; 16,21
113,18.20.23; 115,2.5; 116,7 zêtêsis, debate, 18,5; inquiry,
tomê, division, 109,6 30,18; 31,2; question, 11,25; 12,4
topos, place, 29,27; 74,17; 81,23, zêtêteon, [we] should ask, 205,23
etc.; region, 20,20.21; kata zôê, life, 114,24-115,25; 118,22;
topon, local, 66,24; 74,13 119,3
triplasiazein, to triple, 11,10 zôion, animal, 12,17-13,1; 28,26;
tropê, turning, 75,19 29,1; 40,10; creature, 80,18;
tropikos, see therinos tropikos living creature, 33,9.10; 94,5.9
tropos, manner, 10,1; 39,22.27;
74,18, etc.; method, 29,17; mode,
Subject Index
For the most part I index topics rather than attempt to summarise argu-
ments, but I have included extremely brief summaries of the arguments of
Proclus under the entry for Proclus. (Summaries of the sections of Phi-
loponus’ refutations of these, perhaps by Philoponus himself, appear in the
translation). I have also included all proper names that occur in the trans-
lation with a full list of occurrences or, in a few cases, an indication of the
number of times they occur. References are to the page and line numbers of
Rabe’s Greek text, which are printed in the margins of the translation, those
to Proclus’ arguments, or to substantial quotations from other works of his,
being in bold. An exception to this are references to Proclus’ first argument,
which take the form ‘Arg.1’.
activity, see potentiality and capacity, see potentiality and

actuality actuality
actuality, see potentiality and cause(s)
actuality primary, 88,20-91,5
Alexander, of Aphrodisias, 48,10 unmoving: has unmoving,
Alexandrian, 1,1 everlasting, effect, 55,25;
ambiguity, see meanings – need to 56,10; produces just by being,
define and distinguish; 55,26; so always a cause, 56,9
dialectic, rules of – resolving intermediate, secondary,
ambiguity; Proclus – exploits 88,20-91,5
ambiguity an actual cause has an actual
Anaxagoras effect, 42,6
nothing has a definite nature, must be an actual cause in a
83,11 causal chain, 43,15; 47,21-48,13
Aristotle, 1,19, etc. (mentioned 53 pre-exists effects, 14,18
times) first cause of all things
held that an actual infinity (Neoplatonic), 38,20; 90,24
impossible, 7,25; 9,27 change
on light, 16,11; 22,1 always involves movement, 61,10
rejected Platonic forms, common conceptions, etc.,
26,26-32,18 concerning God
on potentiality and actuality, he creates instantaneously and
46,3; 60,4; 61,15; 64,26-68,17; by thought alone, 6,4
69,4-74,3; 87,13 his perfect simplicity, 5,15
on series of movers, 89,4-90,14 his foreknowledge, 40,26 (cf.
held that Plato generates time, 37,12); 102,16
118,2 his providence, 37,15; 40,26
astrology, 41,2-7 his self-sufficiency, 85,25
blasphemy, 13,18; 85,4 contradictions
148 Subject Index
both sides cannot be true, 63,16; measure of life of everlasting
80,11; 112,20 things, 103,2; 114,20-115,20
copy (see also pattern) pattern for time, 118,16-119,11
relation to pattern, 24,7-16; use of time-words in relation to,
25,22-26,14 ;33,6-36,15 116,4-12.19-22
Cratylus, 27,11 everlastingness
created things naturally everlasting things have
as good as their nature allows, infinite power, 8,3
81,1 evil demons, 37,15
natural that they not be fate, 41,3
co-everlasting with creator, fitness, see potentiality and
79,10 actuality
creative principles Forms (Platonic)
are forms, 36,17 Aristotle’s criticism of,
are concepts in accord with which 26,24-32,18, directed at Plato’s
God (36,19) or men (36,27) own theory, 29,2-32,13
create substances, not relatives,
always possessed by God, 33,6-35,12
76,22-9; 78,4.7 not their essence to be patterns,
existence does not imply 36,3-35,12
employment, 36,21; 78,7-79,15 as creative principles, see
become patterns only when creative principles
applied, 37,3 God
must pre-exist products based on power(s): one, simple and
them, 37,8-11; as proved by infinite, 1,14-5,16;
God’s foreknowledge inconceivable, 8,17; ineffable,
(37,11-41,2) and by fate (41,2-7) 37,19; not parcelled out among
creation (see also God) created things or completed by
a movement from second them, 6,22; 102,22; or
potentiality to second circumscribed by nature of
actuality, 61,26 creation, 8,22
act of does not involve change in wrong to predicate weakness of
creator, 61,12 God, 13,20; 14,2
creator (see also God) creative power, 39,3; 91,7; single,
first cause not the creator for 6,14; and infinite, 4,6; 5,19;
Neoplatonists, 90,24 6,13; 7,20; constitutive of God’s
creator and product must have essence, 87,2
same status, 97,13 always able to create, 5,21; 7,23;
an actual creator necessitates an 81,5
actual product, 82,15-25 creates instantaneously and by
Democritus, 118,1 thought alone, 6,3; 78,2.7; by
dialectic, rules of, 45,21 act of will, 64,24; 66,25; 76,22;
resolving ambiguity, 45,12.21; 78,2; 79,7; 81,6; without any
52,15 instrument, 66,26; 76,24; 78,1
examining axioms, 45,24 creates continuously, 5,24
discoverers of arts, 54,22-55,16 always possesses creative
divine, the, see God principles, 76,22-9; 78,4.7
eternity possession of creative principles
is infinite power, 1,18 does not necessitate use,
the eternal exists all at once, 78,7-79,15
95,17.20 always potential creator of world,
plane rather than point, 94,18-98,20; 100,16-18
114,26-116,1
Subject Index 149
creates best possible world, 3,3; use of time-words in relation to,
81,1 108,21-111,8
sustains world, 5,7; 94,12 god, first (Neoplatonic), see One
creation inferior to him, 8,14; (Neoplatonic)
14,15 Good (Neoplatonic), 38,22
free of relation to body, heaven
109,28-110,16 exists for ever, 103,25
no less perfect whether he heavenly bodies, 78,24; 83,6
creates or not, 76,25; heavenly spheres, 19,21
82,25-102,24 Hellene, see pagan
cannot create another such as Heraclitean, 27,11; 28,14
self, 13,15; 13,21-14,8 Homer, 88,20; 105,14
creator of time, 2,8; 5,5; 6,8; as imagination
such must be eternal, 2,8; 5,5; role in thought about God,
6,8; does not need time to 116,26-117,7
create, 2,8; 5,8; 56,13.21; impiety, see piety
64,24; 81,25; 82,22; 102,21; is individuals
free of relation to time, finite in number, 9,4-11,14
110,25-8 God ultimate creator of, 92,1
first cause of all things, 110,3.15 God wills that they not be
creator of all things great and everlasting, 79,16-80,24
small, 6,13.26; 88,12-91,25 infinite regress arguments, 2,13;
creator of intelligibles, 110,3 42,12-43,15; 50,19-55,22;
delegates creation of mortals, 92,12-93,14; 105,17-106,6;
80,17 111,27-112,9
creation involves change in infinity, the infinite
things created, not God, actual infinity cannot exist, 7,26;
81,14-24 8,28; 9,3.20; 13,6; 14,8;
world not everlasting because of whether all at once, 10,3; or bit
own nature, not God’s, 14,6 by bit, 10,4
foreknowledge, 3,7; 37,11-41,2; everlasting things have infinite
78,17-79,4; 101,4-102,15 power, 8,3
goodness, 7,23; 8,23; 13,10; infinity not traversable, 9,4;
13,12-14,11; 37,18; 80,28; 86,19 10,18; 13,8; 14,9
lack of envy, 13,13.18 intelligibles
omniscience, 3,7 originated by God, 110,3
providence, 37,15-41,2; supramundane, 110,1
78,17-79,4; providential power, free of relation to body, 110,3; to
91,8 time, 110,25
simplicity, 5,15 use of time-words in relation to,
no change or movement in, 110,28-111,8
55,25-81,28 Italians, 27,10
self-sufficiency, 85,1-88,11 language, inadequacy of, 105,3;
perfection, 56,12.19; 85,1-88,11 110,28-111,6; 113,24;
capacity and activity the same in 116,22-117,14 (see also
God, 77,1; 78,5 time-words, meaning and use
will, 8,25; 13,17; 14,1; one, of)
simple, unchanging, 81,12; light
willing does not involve production of by sun as parallel
change, 79,12-81,28; always to continuous creation of world
wills the good, 80,28; 81,9-14 by God, 14,20-27; 16,24-23,22;
above all necessity, 78,15 78,11; 81,16-23
our thought about, 116,24-117,7 sun’s own light constitutive of it,
150 Subject Index
so not produced by it, 24,7-16; 35,13-36,15;
16,24-17,14 118,21-119,10
radiated light perishable and so philosophers
posterior to sun 17,15-20,21, should pursue truth, 107,13
therefore better parallel to should focus on sense, not words,
instantaneous creation, 18,6-13 107,14
radiated light as property of sun unable to avoid using time-words
and therefore constitutive of it, of eternal things, 110,28-111,6
20,21-21,23 piety, impiety, 56,15.23; 84,8; 88,5;
light of heavens perishable, 101,1
19,12-20,12 Plato, 13,14, etc. (named 55 times)
light as property of air and other his version of Forms criticised by
transparent media, 21,24-23,13 Aristotle, 26,24-32,13
emanation of likened to efforts to ‘harmonise’ Plato and
instantaneous production from Aristotle, 32,10; 29,2
a capacity, 65,15 ‘Plato is dear but the truth
lives, choice of, 40,2; 78,20 dearer’, 30,15-31,7
living-creature-itself, see pattern held time and world created,
for world 117,15-118,3
meanings Plotinus, 21,7; 39,2.18; 40,3; 59,9;
need to define and distinguish, 101,6.26
45,6-25 on light, 21,7
mind on divine providence and
universal, 55,6-15 foreknowledge, 39,2-40,25;
movement 101,6-25
is incomplete actuality, 56,12.20; potentiality and actuality
61,19; 64,5; 65,4 two types of potentiality and two
nature of actuality, 46,3-47,17;
universal, 55,12-22 69,7-74,23
what is natural is good, 79,9 first potentiality is natural
negation with reversal equals fitness, 46,5
affirmation, 80,14 second potentiality is possession
Neoplatonists (see also Proclus) of a capacity, 46,12
shameless, 102,17 first actuality is same as second
contradict own positions, 102,18 potentiality, 46,22
non-being, 15,2-27 the advance from first
privation a form of, 15,4 potentiality to first actuality is
One (Neoplatonic), 38,22; 90,25 incomplete actuality or
causes existence of all things, movement, 65,4; is movement
91,1 of the thing acted on, not of the
oracles, pagan, 37,13 actor, 62,4; 65,27-68,17;
origin 71,13-72,18
origin of things single, 88,14 the advance from second
pagans (see also oracles, pagan), potentiality to second actuality
86,6 is not movement or change,
belief in astrology, 41,2-7 62,11-64,21; 68,23-69,4;
pattern for world (see also copy), 72,18-74,23; 76,2-9
24,2-16; 25,21-41,25; second actuality is deployment of
118,21-119,10 a capacity, 47,3
eternal, 24,2 complete actuality is
its essence to be a pattern, 24,3; instantaneous deployment of a
33,6-35,12; 36,17-41,25 capacity, 65,11; and involves
implies existence of a copy,
Subject Index 151
no change in the capacity, together; time always exists; so
65,12; or the agent, 87,14 the heaven always exists, 103,1
actualisation of the potential, on light, 18,18-20,12
42,15; 48,14-49,6; 53,15-55,22 on divine providence and
power (see also God – power(s)) foreknowledge, 37,19-39,1;
eternity as infinite power, 1,18 91,5-23
finite power cannot last for ever, providence, 31,16ff.; 80,21
2,10 unerring, 40,3; 78,21
privation, 15,4-16,2 relatives
Proclus (see also Neoplatonists), pattern and copy, 24,7-14
1,3, etc. (named 60 times) do not have independent
the learned (ho sophos), 82,9; existence, 24,12; 34,13-21
92,12; 109,4; the great (ho the Forms not relatives,
megas), 59,25; 74,26 33,6-35,12
no respect for philosophy, truth, are accidents, 34,7-8
etc., 45,7.11; 59,25 are opposites, 35,4-5
fallacious, sophistical, etc., either both potential or both
argument, 45,6; 49,24; 50,19; actual, 43,19
51,21; 52,5.15; 53,2; 59,19; seminal principles, 12,23
64,9; 59,16; 74,26; 76,2; 76,11; shadow
98,22; 104,21; 105,12; 106,6; production of by body as parallel
114,17; 118,14 to God’s creation of world,
attends to words rather than 14,20-16,23
substance, 52,23; 104,22; is privation of light, 15,3-16,2
105,2; 107,13 not always cast by an
exploits ambiguity, 45,12; 49,13; illuminated body, 16,2-23
50,19; 52,15; 75,9 Socrates, 11,4.5; 27,5.14;
deliberately misleads young, 28,3.10.12.23; 29,14.15;
inexperienced, 45,10; 61,8; 79,16.25.26.27; 80,1; 92,2;
75,9; 76,18; 82,2 109,9; 111,13
contradicts own positions, 61,7 souls
trapped by own argument, 64,8; reincarnation, 78,18
105,12 choice of life, 78,20
attacks Christians, 75,7 species
admits disagreements between created by men, 12,14
Plato and Aristotle, 31,7; on God could have created more,
their disagreement over the 12,12
Forms, 31,12-32,13 substances
arguments for everlastingness of essence internal, 86,3.8; not in
the world: (I) God’s everlasting external relations, 83,9-84,23
generosity, will, and power sun
require it, Arg.1; (II) The production of light by as parallel
pattern for the world is for continuous creation of
eternal, so the world, its copy, world by God, see light –
must always exist, 24,1; (III) production of by sun as parallel
The creator must always be an to continuous creation of world
actual creator, and so the by God
world must always be as parallel to God’s not
undergoing creation, 42,1; (IV) depending on creation for his
An unchanging cause is always perfection, 83,3
a cause and therefore produces thought
an everlasting effect 55,24; (V) that about God accompanied by
Time and the heaven exist imagery, 116,24-117,7
152 Subject Index
thought experiments, 77,3-29; does not share in God’s
115,3-13 substance, 14,12; 85,5-87,2;
time 101,2
coexistent with the heaven, inferior to him in substance,
103,2-4.18-25 power and activity, 14,15
measure of the movement of why does not contain more or
heaven, 103,19; 110,16-25 better things, 7,1-8,20
always exists; 103,4-18 God could have created more
image of eternity, 103,19-25; things, 12,5
which implies its everlasting as copy of an eternal pattern,
existence, 103,20-25; 24,2-16; 25,22-41,25
118,16-119,11 a substance, not a relative,
had a beginning, 117,14-21 33,12-13; 34,23-35,4
will cease, 114,14 always exists at a particular time
time words, meaning and use of, but comes to be indefinitely,
107,15-17; 107,18-20; 108,5-7; 98,23-100,16
117,13 existence parcelled out by time,
‘sometime’ (pote), 103,7-18; 95,19.26
106,15-107,17; 108,7-13; no universal world-body, 55,16
114,7-14; 116,17-22 did not come to be, Arg.1;
‘when’ / ‘then’ (hote, tote), ungenerated, 4,17;11,14;
107,20-108,5 beginningless, 3,9; 11,2.16;
tenses of ‘to be’, 108,14-114,14; 102,8; 118,6
116,1-16; of verbs in general, will not perish, Arg.1;
108,16-19 imperishable, 4,17
used of God, intelligibles, always exists, 24,15; 26,12;
108,21-111,8 35,16; 37,7; 41,22; 61,1; 88,9
truth always being created, 43,17;
goal of Philoponus, 45,20 94,26; always coming to be,
not sought by Proclus, 45,11 82,19; 95,8-100,28
truth, the Christian (see note at everlasting, Arg.1; 9,25;
57,8), 57,7; 59,24; 61,8; 75,7-9; 56,14-26; 102,19
98,20; 117,16 without end, 3,10
universal has not existed ‘from everlasting’,
either nothing or in thought, 7,22; 9,2; 11,22
55,18 not co-everlasting with God,
God creates directly, 93,14-94,13 14,21; 23,22; 41,19; 75,20; 78,9;
universe, see world 79,10
world (see also Proclus – arguments young, inexperienced, the,
for everlastingness of the 45,10.26; 61,8; 69,11; 70,6
world)
Index of Passages Cited
in the Notes
Numbers in bold type refer to the notes, those preceded by ‘i’ to the notes to
the introduction.
215; bk. 5, chs 1-2 251;
AESCHYLUS 195b16-21 148; 195b27-8 148;
TrGF 3, Fr. 139 315 201a10-11 224; 201a15-18 232;
ALEXANDER 201b7-15 233; 201b27-202a3
in An. Post. 148 180 223; 201b31-2 215; 202a13-17
in Meteor. 73,1 60; 83,1 60 234; 202a13-b29 227;
in Sens. 50,25 60; 154,16 60 204a8-206a8 29; 219b1-2 363;
Mixt. 227,22 60 224a30-b8 251; 225a12-20 251;
ANAXAGORAS 225b3-5 251; 225b23-4 251;
Diels-Kranz Frs. B6 and B11 282 251b14-19 384 386; 256a5-8
ARISTOTLE 293; 256a8-13 294; 257a10-12
An. Post. 202; 83a32-3 101; 296 257b15-20 297
83a33 111; 98a35-b38 180; Top. 142b31-3 167; 162a16 85
98a35 ff. 148 ASCLEPIUS
Cael. 271b1-276a17 30; in Met. 98
271b19-23 32; 279a11-b3 16 BIBLE
Cat. ch. 10 123; 7b15-22 89; Exodus 3,14 i36
7b22-8a12 89; 8a-b24 124; Hebrews 1,12 i33
8a31-2 122 James 1,17 i25 259
DA bk. 1 100; bk. 2, ch. 7 75; Judith 9,5-6 24
417a21-b2 166 237; 417a29 Psalms i39; 33,9 23; 102,27 i33
167; 417b2-9 227; 417b5-9 254; Wisdom of Solomon 1,13-14 i34
417b5-16 287; 418b9-11 54; ELIAS
418b9-14 75; 431a4-7 225; in Cat. 123,1-3 98
431a6-7 223 EUSEBIUS
EN 1096a11-17 105; Praep. Ev. 5.3.10 i31 132
1096a11-1097a14 112; HOMER
1174a13-b9 223 Iliad 2.204 291; 20.250 355
GC 335b9-24 113; 336b31-2 44 PHILOPONUS
Int. 17a34-7 193 contra Arist. i3 35
Metaph. 110 202; 987a29-b10 94; in Cat. 142,21-6 167; 193,13-27
991a20-2 102 109; 991a28-9 169
110; 1048b18-36 223; in DA 300,3-5 167; 301,21-3 169;
1049b24-9 150; 324,23-342,16 75
1065a14-1066a26 223; 1076a4 in Phys. 353; 428,25-6 37;
291 430,9-10 33; 456,17-458,32
Phys. bk. 1, ch. 4 283; bk. 3, ch. 2 352; 465,25 60; 508,10-11 357
154 Index of Passages Cited in the Notes
Opif. 75; 88,21 i3; 195 143; 195-7 5.1.6,25-39 51; 5.4.2,27-34 73;
146; 199-204 143 6.7.1,45-57 136 339
PLATO PROCLUS
Alc. 1 106D 200 Decem dub. (Isaac) 137; 5,1-11
Epist. 2, 312E 289 133; 5,21-4 300; 5,21-34 134;
Laws 715E 290 5,30-4 301; 5,43-8 27 135 302
Phd. 72A-D 283 ET i40; 76,5-12 207; 174 25
Phil. 26E-27A 149 An Examination of Aristotle’s
Pol. 269C i32 Criticisms of Plato’s Timaeus
Rep. 508E-509A 69; 592B 126 107
Tim. 110; 26E-27A 149; 27E ff. in Tim. i17 i40 107 110; 1.281,3
60; 28A 95 118; 28A-29A 88; 14; 1.290,29-291,1 51; 1.295,11
28B 383; 29A 118; 29E 6 45 14; 1.366,20-368,11 6
361 377; 31B 62 118; 34A 316; PT i40
37C8 373; 38B 383; 38B-C 372; SIMPLICIUS
38C 347; 39E1 373; 41A 308; in Cael. 107; 135,27 i3; 136,17 i3
41B-C 310; 41C-D 274 in Phys. 1141,9 i3; 1142,1 i3;
PLOTINUS 1159,2 i3; 1326,38-1336,34 33
Enn. 3.7.9 363; 4.5.6-7 71; SUDA
‘Philoponus’ i3; ‘Proclus’ i3

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PHILOPONUS

First published in 2004 by

First published in 2004 by Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd.

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ISBN HB: 978-0-7156-3233-8

A new introduction to the Commentators appears in R.R.K. Sorabji, The

And so if someone, with the intention of paying reverence to him

It seems likely that this is directed at a specific opponent or opponents

In both passages the argument is at bottom the same: to downgrade the

Philoponus too [sc. as well as Proclus] seems to have been writing

} there is virtually a complete absence of evidence for a Christian

} evidence for the presence and importance of Christian doctrine

I agree with some of this. Philoponus does write as a Neoplatonic insider

I cannot help being amazed at how they brush aside arguments

These two passages show Philoponus identifying himself as a Christian

Emendations other than my own are credited. Those attributed to Rabe

2,8 Adding hupo khronon dê kai ho after khronon (Rabe).

<The Sections of the Refutation of the First Argument>

If light is either material or immaterial65 in conformity with the 20

How could the [light] in the heaven be continuous with that in

So even Proclus explicitly teaches that light in the air is perishable.68

Light is the activity of this – of the transparent qua transparent.

24,1 The Second Argument of Proclus the Successor79

The Sections of the Refutation of

The Refutation of the Second Argument

After the [philosophies we have] named came the work of Plato,

In this passage we hear Aristotle state clearly that Socrates was

Aristotle has difficulties even with the very word ‘pattern’,

Thus even Proclus himself has explicitly conceded the disagree-

Since, as has been stated, providence is determined in accord-

In summary, then, we claim that this unity produces all things

And a little further on:

Thus the unitary knowledge of providence is, in the same undi-

Nevertheless, if it is necessary that each activity [of his] should

42,1 The Third Argument of Proclus the Successor

The Sections of the Refutation of the Third Argument 44,1

5 The Refutation of the Third Argument

10 is always an actual creator, that which is created will likewise

Observe how he does not specify with reference to which sense of

that which is created is not actual, neither will that which

Observe again how he uses ‘actual’ without qualification and does

it will be potential, being capable of creating before it acts. And, 51,1

Observe how, as we have stated,187 after eliminating [the possibil-

20 [a statement which contradicts another by affirming or denying]

The Fourth Argument of Proclus the Successor

57,1 The Sections of the Refutation of the Fourth Argument

The Refutation of the Fourth Argument

That this is movement is clear from the following: when that

And a little further on:233

For it is possible for each thing, as for example that which is

In these passages he is clearly saying that [the process of] building

The [solution to the] puzzle is clear; movement is in the move-

We must also make some distinctions in regard to potentiality

The possessor of knowledge will reflect,255 and this either does

Observe that he states quite explicitly that something that has

If there is always a producer, there is also always something

And how on earth, my learned friend, can something which, as has

For it is clear that everything that is moved is moved by a mover

And again a little further on:297

There will be no first mover if each of the two [parts] is to move

In these passages he clearly states that even if there are a number

But it [sc. the unity of providence], remaining stationary and

Thus the unitary knowledge of providence is, in the same un- 20