PEOPLE vs.

SUELA
373 SCRA 183
FACTS: On July 26, 1995, between 11:00 P.M. and 12:00 midnight, private complainant
Director Nilo L. Rosas was at the master�s bedroom located at the second floor of
his townhouse residence at #95 B-5 A. Melchor Street, Xavierville Subdivision,
Loyola Heights, Quezon City. He was watching television thereat, together with his
adopted son, Norman Rosas, and his former co-teacher and good friend, Geronimo
�Gerry� Gabilo, who at that time was engaged in the real estate business. Suddenly,
three persons sporting ski masks, bonnets and gloves, brandishing handguns and a
knife, barged into the room. The tallest of the three, with a height of about five
feet and five inches, reached for the light switch and turned it off. The three
intruders then shouted �dapa, dapa.� So Director Rosas, Gerry Gabilo, and Norman
Rosas dropped to the floor with their faces facing the bed. Two of the malefactors
turned off the television set, and tied their hands at their backs, with the use of
hankies and telephone cord. The room remained illuminated by the light coming from
a walk-in closet and from the lamp post outside fronting the room, and from the
lights of the neighboring townhouses.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the court a quo erred in considering the extra-judicial
confessions of Edgar Suela and Nerio Suel[a] are admissible against them.
2. Whether or not the court a quo erred in considering the letter of Nerio Suela to
Director Nilo Rosas as evidence against him.
3. Whether or not the court a quo erred in convicting Edgar Suela for simple
robbery under Art. 294, no. 5, of the Revised Penal Code.
4. Whether or not the court a quo erred in convicting Edgar Suela and Nerio Suela
of robbery with homicide.

RULING: 1. With respect Edgardo Batocan, we hold that his extrajudicial confession
was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. This appellant did not
finish first year high school. Yet Atty. Rous, who is touted by the prosecution as
a competent and independent counsel, interviewed Batocan -- before the latter gave
his confession -- for only around �five minutes.� After this initial interview,
Atty. Rous just listened nonchalantly to the questions propounded by the police and
to the answers given by Batocan. Counsel was not even sure that he had explained to
appellant the consequences of his extrajudicial confession. Furthermore, Atty.
Rous� attention was divided while attending the custodial investigation as he was
also looking over another paper work on his desk.

In view of these proven circumstances, we are not convinced that counsel had fully
explained to Batocan his constitutional rights and what they entailed or the nature
and the consequences of an extrajudicial confession -- explanations that would have
enabled him to make an informed judgment on whether to confess; and if so, on what
matters. There is no showing that Atty. Rous properly explained the choices or
options open to appellant, a duty expected of any counsel under the circumstances.
In sum, he did not turn out to be the competent and independent counsel envisioned
by the Constitution.

2. This letter was properly identified. Nerio was no longer under custodial
investigation when he wrote it. In open court, he admitted having written it. Thus,
contrary to his contention, the fact that he was not assisted by counsel when he
wrote it will not make the letter inadmissible in evidence. Constitutional
procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not
elicited through questioning by the authorities. Hence, the letter is admissible in
evidence.

3. Edgardo Batocan�s confession to Rosas who is not a police officer is admissible

in evidence. The Rules state that �the declaration of an accused acknowledging his
guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may
be given in evidence against him.� Batocan�s verbal declarations are not covered by
Sections 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution,[40] because they were
not extracted while he was under custodial investigation.

4. On the trial court�s sentence of robbery in Criminal Case No. Q-96-64618, we

agree with the recommendation of the Office of the Solicitor General that Edgar
Suela should be acquitted. The OSG explained:
�Simple robbery is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons as distinguished from the use of force upon things, but the extent of the
violence or intimidation does not fall under pars. 1 to 4 of Article 294 (Revised
Penal Code) [p. 175, Criminal Law, Book II, Vol. IV, Ambrosio Padilla, 1990].
----------
PEOPLE vs MARRA
FACTS:
Jimmy Din and Nelson Tandoc were conversing with each other in front of the hotel
owned by Din�s father when a man passed by on the opposite side of the street
waving a dirty sign with his finger. Din and Tandoc followed until they caught up
with the man and demanded an explanation but they were not given any. They were
joined by two other men and a brawl ensued when Tandoc slapped one of them. The
fight ended when their opponents ran away.

When Din and Tando were on their way to the hotel, they men with whom they just had
a fight ran after them which pressed them to hide in the annex of the hotel. After
a few minutes, thinking that there was no longer any danger, Tandoc decided to go
home. However, he was shot by a revolver by a man wearing a security guard�s
uniform when he opened the door. Din witnessed the shooting and was able to take a
good look at the man who fatally shot Tandoc.

Samuel Marra was identified as the man who shot Tandoc and was approached by
responding policemen while he was eating at an eatery shortly after the incident. A
series of questions were asked, particularly his tour of duty and where his issued
firearm might be. He brought the policemen to his house and showed them his
revolver with five live bullets and an empty shell. Marra denied shooting Tandoc at
first but admitted to the crime and said that he did so in self-defense. He was
then taken to the police station where he was positively identified by Din and was
consequentially detained.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was violation of rights of suspects under custodial
investigation when policemen asked the appellant questions prior to his arrest.

RULING:
In the case at bar, appellant was not under custodial investigation when he made
the admission. There was no coercion whatsoever to compel him to make such as
statement. He could have refused to answer questions from the very start. The
police inquiry had not yet reached a level wherein they considered him as a
particular suspect. Thus, there was no violation of Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution or the constitutional procedure on custodial investigation.

In addition, the law provides that the declaration of an accused acknowledging his
guilt of the offense charged or of any offense necessarily included therein may be
given in evidence against him and, in certain circumstances, this admission may be
considered as part of the res gestae or the facts that may be admitted as evidence.

The judgment finding accused-appellant Samuel Marra guilty of the crime of murder
was affirmed.�
---------------
People vs. De La Cruz, G.R. No. 118866-68, September 17, 1997
G.R. Nos. 118866-68 September 17, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RODOLFO DE LA CRUZ, alias RODOLFO DOMINGO or "OMPONG," accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:

In this appeal from three sentences of reclusion perpetua, accused-appellant

Rodolfo de la Cruz, alias Rodolfo Domingo or "Ompong," consistent with his negative
pleas when arraigned on November 5, 1992 and January 11, 1993, 1 impugns his
conviction for multiple murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 92-8029, 92-8030 and 92-8031
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 74, 2 of Antipolo, Rizal. He anchors his
entreaty for the reversal thereof mainly on the ground that he was not fully and
appropriately apprised of or allowed to exercise his constitutional rights prior to
and while undergoing custodial investigation.

In the early evening of June 23, 1992, the lifeless bodies of Teodorico M. Laroya,
Jr. and his children, 12-year old Karen Verona D. Laroya and 10-year old John
Lester D. Laroya, were discovered in their residence at 13 Emerald Street,
Greenpark Village, Cainta, Rizal by their horrified neighbors. The star-crossed
trio were all bloodied consequent to numerous stab wounds, and each of them had a
knife still embedded in and protruding from their bodies when found. Karen Verona
also bore external signs of sexual assault. 3

None of their neighbors, however, witnessed the gruesome murders. Two of them later
testified in court, namely, Harold Jim F. Balocating and Anita F. Pangan. The
former merely recounted how, while playing table tennis in front of the Laroya
residence, he and his friends stumbled upon the dead bodies of the victims. Anita
Pangan, on the other hand, recalled that at around 9:00 P.M. of June 23, 1992,
appellant, who was a brother-in-law of Teodorico Laroya, Jr., purchased some
candies at her store which is located inside the village. 4

Both Balocating and Pangan had previously executed sworn statements just three days
after the incident, the assertions in which were of the same import as their
respective testimonies in court. 5 On June 27, 1992, the police authorities
apprehended appellant at the house of his brother in Fort Bonifacio. SPO1 Carlos R.
Atanacio, Jr., a member of the Cainta Police Station in Cainta, Rizal interrogated
appellant regarding the crimes on the same day that he was arrested.

This police officer declared in the trial court that before he questioned appellant
as to his participation in said crimes, all steps were undertaken to completely
inform the latter of his rights and this he did in the presence of appellant's
supposed counsel, one Atty. Lorenza Bernardino-Villanueva. Appellant then signed,
likewise in the presence of said counsel, an extrajudicial confession wherein he
narrated in detail how he allegedly snuffed out the lives of the victims. 6

When presented as the lone witness for himself, appellant was observed by the trial
court to be afflicted with a problem in expressing himself and an impediment in his
speech (ngo-ngo). By appellant's own account, he only reached the fourth grade of
elementary schooling and, although conversant with Tagalog, he is unable to read
and write, although he can sign his name. He bluntly repudiated the version of SPO1
Atanacio, Jr. and insisted that he was never assisted by any counsel of his choice,
much less met said Atty. Lorenza Bernardino-Villanueva, when he was interrogated at
the police headquarters in Cainta, Rizal and signed his supposed extrajudicial
confession. Parenthetically, his answers to the questions appearing therein are in
surprisingly fluent, flawless and expressive Tagalog, 7 which could not have been
done by him because of his defect in speech and articulation.

He further claims that he was instead tortured by the police authorities into
signing the same, and not that he did so voluntarily. While he admits having been
at the residence of the victims on the night that they were murdered, he flatly
denied having killed them as he left the trio well and alive that same night when
he proceeded to his brother's place in Fort Bonifacio. 8

1. In unambiguous and explicit terms, Section 12, paragraph 1, of Article III of

the Constitution requires that "[a]ny person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot
be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." Corollary thereto,
paragraph 3 thereof declares that any confession or admission obtained in violation
of the same shall be inadmissible in evidence against the confessant.

An accused person must be informed of the rights set out in said paragraph of
Section 12 upon being held as a suspect and made to undergo custodial investigation
by the police authorities. 9 As explained by this Court in People vs. Marra, 10
custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement
authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant manner. And, the rule begins to operate at
once as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime and direction is then aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into
custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory question which tend
to elicit incriminating statements.

Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose, as a requisite function of
the investigating officer, the duty to explain those rights to the accused but also
that there must correspondingly be a meaningful communication to and understanding
thereof by the accused. A mere perfunctory reading by the constable of such rights
to the accused would thus not suffice.

The defendant in the dock must be made to understand comprehensively, in the

language or dialect that he knows, the full extent of the same. A confession made
in an atmosphere characterized by deficiencies in informing the accused of all the
rights to which he is entitled would be rendered valueless and inadmissible,
perforated, as it is by non-compliance with the procedural and substantive
safeguards to which an accused is entitled under the Bill of Rights and as now
further implemented and ramified by statutory law. 11

2. In the present case, SPO1 Atanacio, Jr., admitted in his testimony before the
lower court that the investigation of appellant in connection with the murders
actually commenced at around 9:00 A.M. on June 27, 1992 at the police headquarters
in Cainta, Rizal, at the time when appellant was still without counsel. 12 The
sworn statement containing appellant's extrajudicial confession itself shows that
it was taken at around 11:00 A.M. 13 Further, while SPO1 Atanacio, Jr. informed
appellant in Tagalog of his right to remain silent, that any statement he made
could be used for or against him in any court, and that he could have counsel
preferably of his own choice, he nonetheless failed to tell appellant that if the
latter could not afford the services of counsel, he could be provided with one. 14

The foregoing lapses on the part of the police authorities are all fatal to the
admissibility of the extrajudicial confession supposedly executed by appellant
before SPO1 Atanacio, Jr. Jurisprudence along these lines have all been too
consistent � an accused under custodial interrogation must continuously have a
counsel assisting him from the very start thereof. Indeed, Section 12, Article III
of the Constitution, could not be any clearer.

To reiterate, prior to the commencement of the investigation, the accused must

perforce be informed, on top of all his other rights enumerated therein, that where
he lacks a counsel of his choice because of indigence or other incapacitating
cause, he shall be provided with one. Without this further safeguard, the
cautionary right to counsel would merely impress upon the accused, more so upon an
impecunious person like appellant who is hardly educated, that his right thereto
would mean simply that he can consult a lawyer if he has one or has the financial
capacity to obtain legal services, and nothing more.

Curiously, the record is completely bereft of any indication as to how appellant

was able to engage the services of Atty. Lorenza Bernardino-Villanueva, the counsel
who was allegedly present when appellant executed his confession and who was not
even subpoenaed to testify thereon. This significant circumstance lends credence to
the latter's denial that he ever met in person, much less executed the confession
in the presence of, said counsel. What emerges from a perusal of the record is that
this counsel was merely picked out and provided by the law enforcers themselves,
thus putting into serious doubt her independence and competence in assisting
appellant during the
investigation 15 as to affect its admissibility.

Moreover, had she been equal to her responsibility in the face of such serious
charge involved in the cases, the failure of SPO1 Atanacio, Jr. to fully apprise
appellant of all his rights, particularly the requirement that if he could not
afford the services of a lawyer he shall be provided with one would have been
rectified by said counsel at that very stage of the investigation. Indeed, from our
earliest jurisprudence, the law vouchsafes to the accused the right to an effective
counsel, one who can be made to act in protection of his rights, 16 and not by
merely going through the motions of providing him with anyone who possesses a law
degree.

Again, about the only matter that bears out the presence of such counsel at that
stage of custodial interrogation are the signatures which she affixed on the
affidavit. Withal, a cursory reading of the confession itself and SPO1 Atanacio's
version of the manner in which he conducted the interrogation, yields no evidence
or indication pointing to her having explained to the appellant his rights under
the Constitution.

In People vs. Ayson, etc., et al., 17 this Court aptly emphasized these
constitutional safeguards in this wise:

In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid down for
a person in police custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as the
commencement of an adversary proceeding against the suspect.

He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent,
that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the
right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one
will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to
exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After
such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may
knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a
statement. But unless and until such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the
prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be
used against him.

The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado" interrogation of individuals in a

police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without
full warnings of constitutional rights.

The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or

"in-custody interrogation of accused persons." And, as this Court has already
stated, by custodial interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." The situation
contemplated has also been more precisely described by this Court.

. . . After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins, a

confrontation arises which at best may be termed unequal. The detainee is brought
to an army camp or police headquarters and there questioned and "cross-examined"
not only by one but as many investigators as may be necessary to break down his
morale. He finds himself in strange and unfamiliar surroundings, and every person
he meets, he considers hostile to him. The investigators are well-trained and
seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods and means that experience and
study have taught them to extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the
detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional
rights. And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive presence of the
officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence. Section 20
of the Bill of Rights seeks to remedy this imbalance.

3. Necessarily, even while there is evidence of the corpus delicti in this case,
appellant's conviction must be set aside for his extrajudicial confession is
obviously inadmissible in evidence against him. The rule is that an extrajudicial
confession, where admissible must be corroborated by evidence of the corpus delicti
in order to sustain a finding of guilt. 18 Both must co-exist. The insistence of
the Office of the Solicitor General that appellant's confession could nonetheless
be treated as an "admission" which could therefore be admitted in evidence is
misplaced, for the Bill of Rights treats of both "confessions" and "admissions" in
the same light. 19 In addition, it should be stressed that in appellant's case, no
eyewitnesses to the actual killings were ever presented to testify in court, and
the prosecution relied primarily on circumstantial evidence to inculpate appellant
in crimes wherein he was meted three penalties of reclusion perpetua.

It is significant that, with the exception of appellant's putative extrajudicial

confession, no other evidence of his alleged guilt has been presented by the
People. The proposition that the medical findings jibe with the narration of
appellant as to how he allegedly committed the crimes falls into the fatal error of
figuratively putting the horse before the cart. Precisely, the validity and
admissibility of the supposed extrajudicial confession are in question and the
contents thereof are denied and of serious dubiety, hence the same cannot be used
as the basis for such a finding. Otherwise, it would assume that which has still to
be proved, a situation of petitio principii or circulo en probando.

Evidently, herein appellant cannot be made to suffer the extreme penal consequences
of the crimes on account of the shaky and decrepit circumstantial evidence
proffered by the prosecution. While the defense of alibi advanced by appellant is
by nature a weak one by itself, it assumes commensurate significance and strength
where the evidence for the prosecution itself is frail and effete. For, needless to
state, the prosecution must not rely on the weakness of the evidence of the defense
but upon the vigor of its own. 20 In sum, the presumption of innocence enjoyed by
appellant has remained intact and impervious to the prosecution's assault thereon.

ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises, the judgments of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 74, of Antipolo, Rizal in Criminal Cases Nos. 92-8029, 92-8030 and 92-8031
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant Rodolfo de la Cruz, alias Rodolfo
Domingo or "Ompong," is hereby ACQUITTED. His immediate release is accordingly
ordered unless there be any other lawful cause for his continued incarceration.
SO ORDERED.

CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION - any questioning initated by law enforcement officers

after a person who has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of freedom of
action in any significant way.
Miranda rights begins to operate as soon as the investigation ceases to be a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime and direction is then aimed upon a
particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would
then direct interrogatory questions which tend to elicit incriminating statements.

Embraces in custodial investigation:

- invited for questioning
- re-enactment not embraced in custodial investigation: police line up and
ultraviolet ray examination
- normal audit examination by COA of the accountability of public officer
-------------
PEOPLE VS. AGUSTIN [240 SCRA 541; G.R. NO. 110290; 25 JAN 1995]
Facts: Dr. Bayquen, a dentist, together with his son, Anthony; Anthony's
girlfriend, Anna Theresa; his daughter, Dominic; and Danny, a family friend, were
on their way aboard their Brasilia to the doctor's residence at Malvar Street,
Baguio City. While they were cruising along Malvar Street and nearing the Baptist
church, a man came out from the right side of a car parked about two meters to the
church. The man approached the Brasilia, aimed his armalite rifle through its
window, and fired at the passengers. The Brasilia swerved and hit a fence. The
gunman immediately returned to the parked car which then sped away. All those in
the car were hit and Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa died on the spot. Dominic was
bale to get out of the Brasilia to run to the Alabanza store where she telephoned
her mother. Later, she and her mother brought her father and Anthony to the
hospital. Danny went home and was then brought to the Hospital for treatment.

Accused Quia�o, an alleged former military agent who had been picked up by the
police authorities, confessed during the investigation conducted by Baguio City
Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia in his office that he was the triggerman. He implicated
Abenoja, Jr., who engaged him to kill Dr. Bayquen for a fee, Cartel, who provided
the armalite, and a certain "Jimmy." During the investigation, Wilfredo Quia�o was
assisted by Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom. Stenographic notes of the proceedings during
the investigation as transcribed with the sworn statement of Quia�o was signed,
with the assistance of Atty. Cajucom, and swore to before City Fiscal Balajadia.
The following day, Agustin was apprehended, and was investigated and was afforded
the privileges like that of Quijano. Agustin�s defense interpose that he was forced
to admit involvement at gunpoint in the Kennon Road. He further declared that
although he was given a lawyer, Cajucom (a law partner of the private prosecutor),
he nevertheless, asked for his uncle Atty. Oliver Tabin, and that Atty. Cajucom
interviewed him from only two minutes in English and Tagalog but not in Ilocano,
the dialect he understands. The promise that he would be discharged as a witness
did not push through since Quijano escaped. However the RTC convicted him, since
conspiracy was established. Hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not accused-appellant�s extrajudicial statements admissible as

evidence.

Held: No. Extrajudicial statement is not extrajudicial confession. In a confession,

there is an acknowledgment of guilt of the accused, while an admission is a
statement direct or implied of facts pertinent to the issue. The rule on
inadmissibility, however expressly includes admissions, not just confessions.The
extrajudicial admission of the appellant, contained in twenty-two pages appear to
be signed by him and Atty. Cajucom but for reasons not explained in the records,
the transcript of the notes which consists of twelve pages was not signed by the
appellant. Since the court cannot even read or decipher the stenographic notes it
cannot be expected that appellant, who is a farmer and who reached only the fourth
grade, to read or decipher its contents. The appellant, therefore was deprived of
his rights under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. Firstly, he was
not fully and properly informed of his rights. The appellant was not explicitly
told of his right to have a competent and independent counsel of his choice,
specifically asked if he had in mind any such counsel and, if so, whether he could
afford to hire his services, and, if he could not, whether he would agree to be
assisted by one to be provided for him. He was not categorically
informed that he could waive his rights to remain silent and to counsel and that
this waiver must be in writing and in the presence of his counsel. He had, in fact,
waived his right to remain silent by agreeing to be investigated. Yet, no written
waiver of such right appears in the transcript and no other independent evidence
was offered to prove its existence. In short, after the appellant said that he
wanted to be assisted by counsel, the City fiscal, through suggestive language,
immediately informed him that Atty. Cajucom was ready to assist him. Moreso said
counsel is not independent since he is an associate of the private prosecutor.
-------------
People vs Mahinay
G.R. No. 122485.��February 1, 1999
Facts: �Appellant was charged with rape with homicide for the sexual assault and
death of Maria Victoria Chan, 12 years old.� Evidence disclosed that Maria, on that
fateful afternoon, went to the second floor of the house where appellant was
staying.� Appellant pulled her hand and her head hit the table causing her to
become unconscious.� At this stage, appellant, who was then drunk, had sexual
intercourse with her.� He then dumped the still unconscious victim inside the
septic tank and thereafter took flight.� The body of the victim was retrieved the
following day wearing only a blouse without underwear.� Recovered in the unfinished
house where accused slept on the night of the incident was the victim�s pair of
shorts, brown belt and yellow hair ribbon.� Weight was given to appellant�s
extrajudicial confession containing details consistent with the post mortem
findings on the victim that she was raped.� The trial court, notwithstanding the
absence of direct evidence relative to the commission of the crime, rendered
judgment of conviction. It based its judgment on circumstantial evidence.

Issue: ������� Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused merely on
ground of circumstantial evidence
Whether or not Mahinay�s rights to lawful custodial investigation was violated.

Held:��� ������ No. No.

The proven circumstances of this case when juxtaposed with appellant�s proffered
excuse are sufficient to sustain his conviction beyond reasonable doubt,
notwithstanding the absence of any direct evidence relative to the commission of
the crime for which he was prosecuted. Absence of direct proof does not necessarily
absolve him from any liability because under the Rules on evidence�and pursuant to
settled��jurisprudence,�conviction may be had on circumstantial evidence provided
that the following requisites concur:
-there is more than one circumstance;
-the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
-the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Simply put, for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction,
all circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that
of guilt.�Facts and circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with
innocence, constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force, may surpass
even direct evidence in its effect upon the court.
In the case at bench, the trial court gave credence to several circumstantial
evidence, which upon thorough review of the Court is more than enough to prove
appellant�s guilt beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt.
�
IMPORTANT: So-called Miranda rights
-The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be
informed in a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest
and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings,
information or communication must be in a language known to and understood by said
person;
-He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he
makes may be used as evidence against him;
-He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the
presence of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;
-He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a
lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any
person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person
arrested or one acting in his behalf;
-That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no
custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of
his counsel or after a valid waiver has been made;
-The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to
communicate or confer by the most expedient means � telephone, radio, letter or
messenger � with his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his
immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any
one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly
accredited national or international non-government organization.��It shall be the
responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished;
-He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it
is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the
same;
In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be
informed that it must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise,
he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and
chooses to speak;
-That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at
any time or stage of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with
warning that once he makes such indication, the police may not interrogate him if
the same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation must ceased if it has already
begun;
-The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to
remain silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from
invoking it at any time during the process, regardless of whether he may have
answered some questions or volunteered some statements;
-He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be,
obtained in violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory,
in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.