-~ .... "'0 Jlov.

88

VOLI NOS 22 MARCH 19+5

G THE PLANNING OF
INCENDIARY STRIKES Page 3

~ MANY TARGETS IN
DESTROYED AREAS IlIge 8

G PUZZLES AID
TARGET SPOTTING ~ll

G JAPS MAY USE

CREEPING BARRAGE Pilge19

1I1t1oatlon oan~~:e~~"-""..J!JILJlillIILJlIL... ---,_...........


It 15 Inte~ed that thIs weeltly re_
port be a source ot Infort:l/ltlon tor eO:ll.
bat cre>rs and stafr officers Who have a
1eB1t1Jaate interest In the operations of
the XXI BCQber Co=and. "Ilthin thMa
l1a1tl1 it shoulll receive the "illest pos_
1II1ble c1rcll.lotlon ))9J'llIlsstble under the
prov1Jl= or All ~80_5.
In oreler that a Q/U1alI!l or Intell1.
genee lMy be included, the report 1,
liven an OVerall elasslr1eatiun or Sec_
ret, '"lb.en th, nature of the Illaterial
warrants, lndividual artie
ceived a lower security Classification.
1., have re.
The report h so asselllblill that the
COlDpOnent sectloM may be removed and
elreulated or rUell separetely, If POI'.
tl0llS are r'JIJ'~uced. security regula_
tions Illust ba observed and the source
Cr~1ted.
CorresPondence ragarilina this PUb.
lication shauld be eddressell to the Com_
lIllrll1111i General, XXI BOIIIber
A.PO1teM, cia Postlr.llster, San l"rane1!eo'
Ca1 orn1a, Attent1on: A1; ot 8, A-e. •
J1- "'P ,&:... , -
JAl,lES D. GAlICIA
Colonel, A1r Corps
AC or 8, !I-e
TH: C.G. XXI B.C. Initials o."b
OATI rt ..... ~ 1'46
• a-~---......I
IlIAIUI If4J
THE PlANNING BEHIND THE INCENDIARY ATTACKS
the beginnIng of March 1945
a thorough reconsl~eration
and re-evaluation of the cap-
'ties of the XXI Bomber Command
ad the factors influencing its
ttorts revealed that unfavorable
...tiler for dayl1gHt precis ion bOlllb-
as by high altitude formations wa!
be biggest obstacle to the tactics
.tng ~ed.
In many inst~nces it Is nec~s­
trY to cha~a tactics to meet the
.~'s change or pace. but in this
lie it was apparent that more 1m~
.. tant than the enemy's capability
• resistance was the weather'S
lDdrance to carrying out estab~
lahed doctrine.
LEVEL ATTACIIS CONSIDERED
LOft
One poSSibility which immedi-
117 presented itself for cOn5id-
~ion was lo_level attacks. The
,lowing edvant8l5es were disclosed'
COlll:land
1. Better weetber conditions
present at low 81titu~es than
high. Winds of 2S to 36 knots
,13 be expected a!I compared to
to 180 knots at 25.000 to 3()('t(l(l
It, ID8king it unnecessary to l1m-
baabing approach diractions to
td excessive drift. Cloud COQ-
tonI are more favorable at Ie-
tudes.
~ l'RAIIIIM:; ADEQUA T!
S. More effective use of ra_
equipment tor naVigation aoo
tng is possible at law slti-
iU a!I scope detinition 11 lDuch
,ter.
3. Attacks at low level would
it greater baab loads because
decreased fuel consUlllpt-1on.
•
.• '.~.;' ••.•,.~.:.;, ;"=•.:...
4. Vll.1ntenance problems would
be ~implifie~ because of las.
.train on en,;ines and a relatlve17
eu.tained attack could be carr1.ed
out by larger number of 8_29s.
HC1If ABrol LOSSES?
But, would it be possible to
carry out Ie- level attacks without
obtainina excessive losses? 'ft1e
answer wa. e ~ectsion to attack at
night when tha enemy defenses would
be less effeetive. The Japaoese
were not belivved capable or put~
ting an efficient night fighter
torce into the air.
By setting the. bOlllbing alti~
tude ran~ from 5,000 to 8.000 feet
the danger t'rOlll a[ltiatrcratt fire
would be greatly re~uced. Auto-
llIatic weapons fire was not expected
to be effective above 5,000 teet
and heavy tlak accuracy decreases
rapidly below 10,000 feet. These
altitudes also would cancel.oat
danger from barr~e balloons.
At night. Formation Flying
wuuld not be necessary for defen-
sive tire power and the efficieftCy
of an operation would be increased
because of additional bomb load due
to increased tuel econCll7. Al.so.
smaller &IIIlUnttlon load could be
carried.
nile night bOlllbing would be •
n... uperlence for II05t 8-29 crews
it was not thought that additional
training would be required befare
temporarily dtscontlnulnc the btsh-
level dayl1sht attaclal. U1 cr....
had experience In naVIgation at

night as previous 1lI1sslons had nec_
essitated flying Snd landing during
the hours of darkness on the return
to base CrolD Honshu.
The use of incendiary bOlllbs
against vital urban area~ on Honshu
was £ logIcal conclusion once it
was determined that low-level night
bomblll8 would be attempted. ACCOrd_
Ingly, the urban areas of Tokyo,
Nagoya. Osaka and Kobe were picked
as otjectives. Since one of the
major advantages resulting frOll! the
Change In tactics Would be surprise
the tnlttal erfort was planned to
consist or four separate miSSions
on alternate nights, weather per.
mitting, against the selected tar_
get areas. Maxt1llUlll errort frOID
each wtng Was to be employed In
01'(181 to obtatn the maximum reSUlts
beCoffl the enl!T'!y COuld set up md-e
errecttve lOW-level defenses.
FIRST MISSION PLANNED
The first miSSion in the ser_
ies TaS scheduled to take Place on
9 Ma.~ch,
area 1945, against the urban
or TolQto.
PiCked crews, ~eSignated
~h;~~~:~rixed
:;::S~n~e~~et~iPin_Pfoi~~
tack was t lTIe at..
t8r~t weather ~on~~~~~s:he b~:
. ...
~~~.~ ....'"'; .•.;
~:.,
Illain force was to
proaches, utll1zi':!8 v 1Il8.lte f ';' ..::: ,~~ i!::;:~~-:
ions if POSsible for b1sUa1
There was ever
Heve the attaCks 'If~l~e~O!I
ful but there was als
"'b~
~
286 8-295 BOMB NA60YA..
bllity that some UnfOl': tbe
stance might cause the pi:tt
failure. This was an ell tt ,
use for the famed Vl1l hi ~1~1110se on the heels or the 9 lJU. Homing alrcrar-t dropped 6:z:
bomber. The plan was da~l ' ' - Warch incendiary mission a_ SOO-POund GPs on Yokkaishi. Bomb_
bac!r8round of SOUnd aM lI(, gainst Tokyo eame a similar ing of this wlbg was done from 5800
thinking and posseSsed ike aimed at a second great Jap- to e, leo feet. Five aireraft re-
element of surprise. tIle ..... e industrial center __ Nagoya. turned early and one. the only air-
craft lost on the mission, was mis_
By 1930 on the nigbt of i l sina: for un4C11t'n reasons. Seven
RESULTS EXPECTED larch 307 aircraft were airborne to aircraft in all landed on Iwo.
lake the run. From the 73rd Wing
It should be emphaS1&td,54 were put into the air. 'nl.e 39 P1GFfTm A'M'ACll:S
the deCision to mix up the SiJ!3tb suppl1ed ill a~ the 314tb
against the enemy "as not I ':.2. Of these. Ie were toreed to Thirty enemy tlghter!l made a
ion to throw out the -i ".turn early beeause of mechanical total of 39 attacks against our
aIti tude precision daYl1gh~lrticUlt1es. The remaining air- aircraft, mostly in the target area
which already had destrOYed ~aft dropped a total of 2,494 tons .~ile the 8_293 were illuminated by
aged more than 20,000 squa:1t incendiary bombS. f11'es and searchlight!. The enemy
was generally unaggressive. There
of the root area of th J
Aircraft i d e . .
1
'or an hour and 55 minutes.
n ustry (the U "dnning with 3l4th Wing planes at
were two cases of eoordinated at-
tacks against the bombers by two
~d~{i~;na~ estimated 20 per~1l9. 8 .. 29s streaked across Nagoya. enelay figbters.
o considerable ~ total of 286 of them bombed it.
other 1n dustrie.!l.
One Nick, followed by four un-
The res:.J!ts '3Xpected rr. 314TH WING ldentU'ied single engine figbters.
follCllt'e4 one group in !'rCXll 20 1Il1les
night incendiary missions.. or tbe 42 aircraft &1rborne out !'rom the target. It appeared
~h large degree complemen~om the 314th only three failed to that the Nick. probably radar e_
ose obtained by other methotliomb the primary. The 39 dropped Quipped, was acting 8!1 a guide for
was expected th,3t they -ouJteo X 500-pound &-46 IB aDd 721 X tbe others.
s troy a great deal of the -pound. 1t-.7 IB Visually and by
home factories upon which tM &dar, from 6,000 to 6,eoo faet. P'LAl\ MOSTLY HIGH
anese are dependent to a 1 Is wing, as did the others, found
gree tar industrial output. a maximum of 2/10 clOUd over 'lak, both meditm ahd beavy
an effort to burn Qut cr ~ target. Many reported no clOUd ranged trOlll meager to inteMe a~
dustrial faCilities which 1 curing the target. No personnel was generally lDaccurate. RepoJ"U
deseribed it as being continuoue17
ually might not rate a pI' a11'craft were lost by the wing.
attack. It was expected t pointed aI¥l alaO predicted concen-
d1.~ruotion of cnmmunicatlOll 313TH WING tratiotll. Autoraat1e weapons tt.re
dislocation of factory W8!l low and the heaV)' gun fire was
. ..
The 313th, over the target a lIost17 above our aireratt. SOlIe
. Would have a very adverse e:
later, put 3,169 SOO_pounders meager and inaccurate fire was re-
the war capacity' or the Japi 713 lOO-pounders on the city. ceived trOll naval vusels 1D Ise
hundred one- of the 111 alrbor....
t Additionally, it WaS There were no losses.
h~t Coming concurrently tt! beG.
Iblng altitude was from 6,000 to Cr. rept>..~ta told or ...108
reverses in the Philippines
000 teet. phosphorus ba.b burltI elch bad
a~~ ~f Iwo JimA the~e inetl s treuer. and three poean balla
fai c WOuld undermine tM 73RD WING Which appeared to tleat dGlm trc.
cut~\~n their government to
l5.ooo teet. DImQ' aDd d.e01 fUel
defend eth War successf'ully The 73rd ''lIng. last to cOllIe were reported.
e homeland. , got 146 aircraft on the target,
0 opplng 5,336 SOO_pounders and. A sub 150 lI11e. ott sbore re-
11I1ssi'lbe d'etalls of the Imll1 ,024 lOa-pounders. Two additional ported visibility l'8duced to OD8
_l1e by wood aote.
Obtai Ons and analyses of I'l 1l'cratt bClllbed Ha_lll8tsu and Shin_
lOWin ned are discussed on the
l! pages.
5
 WE F/A CLAIMED 313TH SENDS 115
ust Tokyo, then llagoya, now ~e hundred fUteen planes nt
OSaka __ third on the l1st the 313th 'If1n,g got orf and 107 ot
for incendiary treatment. thm bClllbed the primary. One hit
intenance had done a Herculean Shirahama and seven tailed to bomb,
Ib and on the night ot 13 March of which five were early returns_
aircraft were airborne for the Eight landed on Iwo Jima.
,asian. Fifteen ot these even-
&lly turned beck. One, tram the ONE E/o\ CLAnrED
,3th Wing, crashed and burned ort
,keotf but the crew was safe. at Thirty to 40 enemy aircraft
295 only one railed to return. were observed in the target area.
The 25 to 30 attacks maile on the
Mission report figures tor 8_29s were reported as mostly inef-
Ceaka strike at'e 2,043 tons fective although one atteopt at
incendiary bClllbs dropped. Two r8llllOing was suspected. The right
dred seventy four aircraft gunner of a 73rd ~ing aircraft shot
,t the primary target visually d.O'II'n one ot the attackers. One in.
by radar. The wings went over etfective attack was l:l8de betore
,e target in order: 314th, 73rd, the IP and. two at Haha J1ma. Two
tho Jap fighters followed sOIDe of the
42 OF 314TH HIT PRDlARY bombers 100 miles out to sea witb-
out attacking.
The 314th hed 45 aircraft air-
, of which 42 dropped on the Flak "as lD8dium and heavy ( R -
,ary target frOID 7,000 to 7,800 er OSaka, meager to moderate and
t through 5 to 10/10 cloud. Two inaccurate to accurate. It appear-
craft returned early without ed at times to be of the predicted
tbing and one which landed on Iwo concentration type. lIeager and io-
I not included in tha beabing to_ accurbte fire also was received
Ils. Crom ships in th,! bay. The 30
73RD MOUNTS 135 searchlights which were reported
were ineffective because of cloudS
or the 135 airborne from and smoke.
ltd "ling, 107 hit the primary
1101';oya _ .. st ..got, throo'gh 5 to 6/10 clouds The"mals were worse than over
• strH'e wh 111 burning on tn - 5,800 to 9,600 teet. Four Tokyv er.1 one aircraft at 7,000
3QUlldron ~112 this photo was 't e ~orning after the l1-'eraft dropped on Kushimoto, feet had its wina: rivets loosened
below tho -.9. In the low a . n by a 3rd Reeonnal~ama, Chichi J1ma end Uji Ya- by a violent surface explosion
Castle Spot Where the er center of the photO,lea end one or these also bombed wh ich l1fted the plane several hUD-
• Sr.loke is heaviest 1s the" primary. The one a1rcrart drpd feet.
, ..sing was from this Wing. Three
~rdumb's and three homing a1r- "irst photographs a!'ter the
~t werd airborne in addition to striKe, 17 t'ereh show 8.1 square
• main force. 111l1es of Osaka destroyed •
.. .• ...
'~ : -: ~ ::;." }.".::~
7
6
 ~
.. - -_.
---.....,;.;;;.-

l~tal1ed photo lnterpretetlon CQDpany; 914, Oriental '/Jee'

.'" of the post strike photographs
ot Tokyo and Nagoya reveals
that in tne farmer city about 16.7
square miles were ~estroyed. Burned
areas 1n Nagoya are estimated to
cover 1.63 square miles.
As interesting and encouraging
as these figures are, they do not
tell the whole story. The damage
assessment report No. 17 on Tokyo,
prepared by the comblne~ photo in-
terpretation sect10ns of the 3rd
Photo Reconnaissance Squadron and
the 35tb PhotCl Tech Unit, and later
SUppll:lment, reveal 1n addition to
the &rea damaged, 16 numbered Air
Poree tnr15ets ~allleged or destroyed.
L1sted 89 destroyed are: Tar_
get 910, Rls1D8 SUn Petroleum Ter_
minal; 911, Ogura 011 Company" 912
Nlsstln Spinning Mill; 913, H~ttori
LEFT WAIST6t1N#E/f
FIRST
pany; 915, Oriental Weav~
Plants l 1449. Kanda Ulll't8t:
Koto Market. I
8-29 TO
Lis ted as damaged OJ'
were targets: 1342, Jepao
LAND
Industry; 1366. Nippon OU
1370, SUmida River Bridge,
Joban Line. where sheds "81'1
334. Nisso Steel Manufectur:
ONIWO
panyj 825. Fujikura Elect:
Works; 907, Tokyo Gas Compe."1
machi Branch; 1350, Tokyo ~
pany; 1448, Tsukiji Market 11II'
sale Warehouse.
NAGOYA DAMAGE
Final repor t is not in CIIkrt;led Marinee &Warm
ya but considerable dalll!l.ge ....r tint 9-29 to land
parent even on the smoke .. two, on 4 Maroh. Re-
photograjils studied. Total ..led ab1,. b,. the'"
burned out was rOUghly 47,.lunteer orewmen, the
square feet, concentrated ~ __ 29 returned to ite
five irregular-shaped areas". on Saipan. .A. Mar-
,'TIiles south of Nagoya Castle. Ie oueraman reoorded
ae .Tent.
Damage to industrial W
includes 358,000 square teKI~ . .-,,~_.~
percent of the total root

SUCKED FROM 'PLANE terget 1729, Alchl Alrcraft'. ~;I

Eitoku Plant. Lesser dPll'h&&~
done to the rollowing : ""-
PHOTO &t?;
~
tJ/d£Wak.;
N Target 187, Atsuta r~c~ 11 March thru 17 V,arch
agoya Arsenal; 247C. Deldo
At incident occurring on "3M ric Steel, Tsuki31 Plant; 251t
276 on 13 March points up a ~~alHarbol" Facil1 ties; 253, lISion No Date Area Coverage Que.l1ty
lesson Which shouldn't need re- em cal plant· Target 1799, ---
emphu1s: Gunners must keep ~achlnery Company. Kasadera J'R5!"75 10 War 45 Yurume-3asebo 6~,24·,40· Fair to good
theb harnas, attachOO:-- arget XXI 4065, Sumltomo 5~'77 11 t!a.r 45 To\7o 6",0:04",40· Good
als Plant. 5''''8 12 War 45 Nallioya-Osaka 6",24",40" Good-~18go:fa partial
smoke.
all th1s misSion the left
waist blister blew out over Ky_ The Sitoku Plant had 5't179 12 "ar 45 NQ60ya 6",24",40· Good partial slDoke
ushu and the gunner was sucked its lD8in SUb-assembly,3 5t.!80 13 Mar 45 ~!agoya 6".24",40" Fair
from the aircraft. completely eu t tedJnd.-1I1 5M81 14 \'ar 45 Osaka-froto 110 10/10 Cloud
bUildings w · d Ungoye. photograrhY
ere uestroye • 5M82 14 Msr 45 Osaka lbort ive No photo~raphy
A parachute
"as seen to op_
Ind ·t 1 alit: 5VB3 16 lIar 45 OsQkn No
en and it is hoped that the
gunner 1s alive __ And reflect_ cludes ~~ r 81 damage .. photo~rat>h] 10/10 Cloud I
t .~merous small lnu
ing on his negligence. • yPe. bUildings throughout tilt :t .:ihown as in process - ')ullr'nry or 10 "arch 45. I
ge areas.
9
8
 ~
An important eontrlbllt~ ,....... '~.c~ QI ~,_c~,."
XXI Bomber Command B...e9s 11
performed by the B..24s or tbI
Weather . Reconnaissance SN ,n "1 1
These a1rerat't, bsseCI on 0-. le~

been running regular ree~
missions tnto the Carol!.
north to the not so well knOlll(
8l'1as Islands ..
In ttddlt10n to their ~
l'unctlorts of photograph1ns
formations aDd gathering data!
rul 1n' the planning or.~
they heve been observing aal ~.,of
grapbing areas 1n which lii' ,t).. It stresses not Just the re·
of t'l'lendly aircraft might
thus add1l18 to the file! of
rescue information.
B-2'9s on
crew missions also have betln
tlng In the carolines.
On 11 Varch the ace
photos "are taken of Manonuito
whieh 1s In the northern car'
s little less than 600 mllel
east 01' Guam. Magur, at the
northern end of the atoll. sal] punles
ererlk are two of the larger
1n the atoll.
On Uagur. four or nTt
new huts were observed on the
'/fest corner and there were I
new activity by natives or J,
Also spotted was a single
Jep aircraft, believed to
or Jill. which had crashed
beacb. Th.e presence or tl
craft in the northern r.a.rol
to the SUSpicion that the
be trYing to run reconnaisl
Truk up Guam lray.
""',," ~ :or'~""
:;'~c"'l ,,4..
"1
FI&.2
_O~Vi~ quadrant puzzles l!o
the less ~ull ways to prac-
route an~ target l~entltlca·
tion of cheek.points, but puts
the relation of check-points
the course and the IP or target.
provi~es a particularly helpful
kground for the navigator or
,ar~ier able to pIck out only
or two check-points through the
cover frequent over XXI B.C.
Ites an~ target areas.
The puzzle system Is presente~
as a suggestion to 8_28 faced
the problem of familiarizing
with target areas new to tl'ell.
are readi1,y a~aptable
as useful 8!11 an aid to radar
atton traIning.
BASIC PRIM::IPLE
The basic principle 15 to train
s to complete a given are. plc-
trom e clue tn the form ot on_
one or two cheek-points. Tb.e
first learD!, with the ai~ ot
t.t~ locate the salIent iden-
ication testlll'es in eacb ot the
drants within a given radius ot
IP or aira1n,; poInt (figure 1).
11
rd:"'/ \
Then this exerehe is practiced
without the aid or a chart untll
crews can fill in the pattern tl'ClIll
memory. XXI Bomber COIICland target
areas all have a tew outstancUng
features partieularlJr adaptable to
tb15 method. The exercises should
be kept simple by using only basie
i~ent1tieation features.
As soon as tbis pattern has
been well establ1sbed in the minds
of the erew. quadrant puzzles are
tn order and "ill serve as a st1Jllu_
lating device to clinch this knew-
ledge. A quadrant puzzle coasisto.
of a clue in the forll or a stnsle
check-point as it relates to the
pontion anCl beaaiag or the 1I1pt-
ing aircraft.
P'tndlng the proper COl"J'ect1oDl
to the IP 01" locattna: the ~
point f'ro~ these clues can pPOt'ide
an endless serle' ot absorblq ...
useful exercisea.
Vethods tor laRD!.. 01" . . . . .-
pliIS-.
......
ins this S7S~ aDd saaple
will be tOUDd on tile tol1GWSal

'"
 -~ ............
Suqqe!otions For S·2s
inTRODUCinG PUlZlf~
Crews must rirst be given ba_
sic exercisell in the loc:ation of
check-points "ithin e large area
llurroUlxUng the IP or other strat_
egic points on the route, and nth:'
in a smaller radiu!I or the aiming
point. For the purpolles of this
typical exercise, assume that the
target is 357, the IP is Kotu, and
the prescribed head1D8 to the IP is
350 degrees. The practice session
"ill cCllcern the cheek-points wi th_
in a SO-mile radius of the IP at
Kotu.
CLASS PREPARATION
Prior to the inlltruction per_
iod, prepare on the blackboard or
on large sheets or paper, at least
three boldly drawn circles diVided
into qU!drants, 1'he vertical quad-
rant diVision represents the pre-
scribed headtng to the IP. So They
are Visible Imly to the instructor,
1Ddicate l1ghtly within the quad_
rants or the ei~les the IDa in eh«k:.
Points "ithin the 50-mue radlUS of
Xoru (see figure 1). Also draw on
thE. blaekboard or on paper l3everal
quadrant PUzzles USing strong, ob-
Vious check-poinh as cluel3 for
thu f:lre-t 1e3900.
Notice that although the a1r.
craft is represented as flying on
the proper heading, it il3 too far
to the right or lett of the check_
point.s to intercept the IP. In
some puzzleJ!l the aircraft is repre_
sented 83 haVing overShot the IP
(Ul!1 f~gures 2,6,7 and 8).
Have a SuffiCient quantity ot
charts and aerial photos or 1II013a1c13
it a'laUable to prOVide a set far
each. crew member. Abo I3UPPly them
with quadrant "blank!" consisting
of letter-81ze Sheets on 1I'hict. a
C1J.·cle diVided into quadrants has
·"een lI1meographed, aM 1I'ith lIli_eo.
graphed Copies or the quadrant
puzzlu to be 130lved. (Several
PU%Zle~
Sheet, ) lZl8y be IIl1meographed on one
-
,
--- .. ~.- .~~ .:~.~.
12
EX&lCISE
Begin With a gener
~
00 the Virtues ot theal _
tem, streSSing the valUe~~"~t'
ing cheek-pOints not as or ~ ~
items but 8S part ot 11ld~ •
pattern. Tell the crews 'I
think of check-POint! to _
to the route, IP or a~l~;::
'lftstll"
Starting nth the u A few simple... deductions are co,,,,"
hand. quadrant or one 0 / : ' " to J!Iolve quadrant puzzles.HeJOe
board quadrant diagrams ~ the solution to the puzzle shown
class to inspect the1r'e~ figure 2:-
photos and suggest the Illll11
)r••••••••••'I
points which occur in each r:t~"IIIII'!!!!
four quadrants arOund tile
USing the light lines pr'J1~
I"
gUide, select the maln cheeL~
offered by the class and 4rIi /OSlflillI' W
in wi th chalk or grease PI AlRCAA,ff
s/,II',tl' (K ""fi'
/lINEII' OlE
Colored. chalk or pencil,.
used to distinguish riven
roads, etc. S1multaneoual1:
crew member fills in OQll
quadrant blanks With the
points selected.
FI6.2\- "AC~O'
Now repeat the same Itl
the class t'Urnishing the
points, but without reellUI'
IIl8pS, photos, or their Cllt'n 4rI A/RCAAF'
Fill in ally impartant P0111l1
class fails to recall anll, L' First step: Reconst!'uot the
t1me permits, have the Cl'tllll II'se of the aircraft as 1 t should
in one more blank without..aate to the check_point by recal-
sistance. II the quadrant pattern learned
the basic exercise (figul'e 3).
This same process 1s ~
far exact target and aim1n« '- Second s'tep: Locete the IP on
identification exercises, ill course by recalling its rola-
the area stUdies should be ~ . . to the check-point (figure 4).
Small radius (one mUe at
radius !':rom the aiming point Third step: A line drs"n trOlll
ly will Suffice). In thM' position of the aircraft to the
clses, let the quadran" be termines the correction neces_
around the prescribed axis
to reach the IP !'rom the point
tack. ieh the check-point was sight-
t1gure 5).
A't the beginning or .acII
Ceeding instruction period,
each area previously coverfllt.
ious cQlIbinations can be ptI
as qUick re!':reshers. A tf/I
With very l1ttle practice, the
tion of this line can be ar-
r
at wlthout sketching in t4e
prescribed course, IP, and
.. "
c.··.er'
lXIarks can be given with tht lee ting 11ne. The same simple
to~ "What 10ca11 ty is it'':'1 ,les etion is followed J!Iolving the
based on the target anlS
a llIarks can be given ... ,01 point, MlDel)', recaU1nc
question "Where and what 18
IIh of the entire arM picture
~r target?" However the
urns in practical 'maw:
,t relates to the given clae to
lte the poiDt dASire4.
obtained P8inlessJ.y by sol'
JOant puz zles.
 '0'
3 t;V,4PAANf PIIUU

~,
LOCAT{ I.P. AT XOfU

3'\ .... AIRCRAFT

~@l . "
<>-ij ,. ~" '
I'O$/f/Olll,
A/llel/AFT

Flli.6
!!!!:/ \-'~1~~'j,~;T
AIItC/I,MT

pVADRANr PI/lUI
lOCATl U '" (()II

\
[
{ #
\-
"'-----~
,,,,,,,,.
JI M CAA"

_ _ f"lleN OF
"'I"'eIlA"
Ju,\. how to &0
'own 8-29' o~er
whioh 11 ",bing
J.p~
J.bout knocking
1. .. preble.
the Jap. cauUer-
able trouble. !hey'•• worked out a
, . angl.. tor their tighter deten-.
unit. and prl"'nwd thelll.in ....t
ot "Inetruotlon.·. A copy of the••
_. oaptur.d in the Philippine..
lI,n it. 11.
E
PRESSING THE ATTACK
Although a.ple illumination
be provided by searchlights,
t interception 18 bindered by
other raetors_ It is dirt1-
to shoot down or sat tire to
airplane such as a B-29 by gun_
• C'a.bat, iocludlna night tight-
"0 !\:1l1\U'& of X Flying Regllll8nt
the B_29 raid ot 15 June 1944
,...,.e4 hits on one airplane. but,
the airplane cUd not burs t into
I he deterMined to ra. it.
I .upl.n., .ent into a steep
L_ ~ and rinall1 into a IIp1n.
suctl t.actics an enelllY 8-29 was
brou&bt dO'lfn.
ODce an attack 15 d1rected a-
ga1n5t an enemy airplane, it must
b. pressed to the limit with the
intention or rallDing. Do not allO'lJ
a single airplane to escape. (Ed_
itorial note. On XXI B.C. missions
to date , co1.lUion between 8_295 anti
tighters has occurred during only
Ob.e tenth of one percent of all etl-
elllT attacks. P'ew. it atl1 or thiS
small percentage of coll1sions could
be determined .. dallberate f'U!l1np.)
COORDINATED NIGHT FIQRTIBG
Ow-1na thiS cC*bat, urgene:r
necessitated indiY1dual co.bat.
Hotraver, • slnsle airplane does not
have IlUCb chance or succeu against
an a11'p!ane as large all the 8_29.
ina, _ t be eoordlaated so &II to
cooc.ntrata rue potrero '!'be .dYaD-
teae gelDed by tbe adYaoce f1ghters
can be turther azplotte4 to co--
pleta th. I\ICC"II. In thill 1IaDD8I'.
• greater ....... ot .~ a1rp1aDes
can be ~aur;ht In the tlAht8Z' net.
By

15
~-- P.\S3~ JLCUJ ,' .... ' A"_
nd tire
F!'ontal pa~~es J
frontal pass fa O;osttton' to the
by a dive and
a el1mb to && na:e reeommendttd Me-
rear and belO1t' hi h speed ot
ties. Because ot the g sse! trom
the ell811l1 airplanes J p8 h tIme to
the f8!l1' require too, !DUe
cl0.9& !.n. ..... airplane began.
W'.1en the ene......
to tab evasive action against dO.
.ttaek by Jl
nk1
calved the enell11 b Y
wo Kimura
l18 , feinting 8 pasS
to the l'QSlde of the turns. At t e
IMtant the enemy reversed direc-
tions 1t1l11Ul'& drove In directly be-
low the enemy airplane. He held
his pOSlt1oo at elose range and ex-
pended ell his 8DIlUUnltlon In e
Single hurst. F'1re broke out In
the section between the two right
engines and caused the enemy
era.sb.
NIGHT USE OF TADAN
(1./3 q. hollO'lf charge aerial
bombs packed in clusters or 76)
tnea it Is difficult to
'l
lal'ge airplanes I particularly
tbe B-29s. by gunfire alone
and bEeause the number of rJlids wUI
inersesa in the fUture, plel1S must
be mata to use TADAN even at night.
ill armodng preparetions for
machiaa guns and machine ea~non am_
munit~on and TADAR must be complet_
ed during the alert so as to be
read, for changes in the Situation.
It is essential to equip with TADlN
rtghtera other then those special_
iZing as n1ght tighters in order to
empl07 these to auglll8nt the strength
and tbus ensure cOlDplete destruc_
tion ,)f the enelllY.
In regard to the use of
~t night. the plans of . attack must
e c1eviaed after establiShing the
number of enelllY atrpl1.t.nes caU'""t b
the !86rChl1eUts ~.
'J
IKPORTANCE OF TRAINING
~h:U~ ~IYing Regiment haa llI1de
. . its ::einterception! Since
biBb+' tlghtJ ~~~tiob as a special
went into action i· HOtrever. 1t
lI1au.te.) after the -:~dg1ahttely (e!«ht
-Vnlng. air raid
'tna.n tugu" I:U..l"pJ.anes - ....
or a air at aoyt1llle. the re lrfltol -.-.--....
ed SUbstantial SUcces~lla1Qt~ DESrRUCTION OF EHElIY PATMP'IIIDEl'l;S (trom 400 to 450 km/hr) during this
this may be attributed.' ~ cOllb8t, shells from AA guns were
that enemy airplanes to n the ruture the enemy My ger...!.·ally bursting behin~ the tar-
intervals in small numbP~ plan to empioy pathfinders to g' 1 an(! have thus haClpered the at-
should be credited t ePa. lead the airplanes, or he MY t .....:ks by our righters. Future plans
training the regiment 0 tIit e flares, incendiaries or bOlllbing and treining lllU5t streS5 part1eular-
l'tetb," pathfioders to point out targets ly the effectiveness of coordina-
ur
" APPLICATION OF DAIL
uring this 11'
or the min strength.
! ~...ery effort must be IllBde to de-
troy the pathfinders
Therefore,
qUickly in
tion or the combine(! COlllbat strength
of AA batteries Bnd Clying units.
h
...
fiJ"
"lly
"a
plans were a 1'&14 J'der to hamper the movements or
earried. ",' be main strength.
as for1llU1ated
training. The completenes 11
'
Do not be diverted by the en-
formulatoo during dally ~ •. , approaching from one direction
~ly1ng units ~ust seize oppor-
tunities, reterdless of
zones, to down enemy airplanes by
co~bat
unhesitatingly penetrating the bar~
rages from our AA guns. AA bat_
a direet bearing on the lIIDd th.?-, lIliss airplanes approaching teries IllUSt temporarlly suspend
failure of air defense ot,-",-.uteneously or in waves from flre 'IItlen our f1.ghters are pressing
zones during an emergen I,*her directions aM altitudes. in to attack the en~7 elrplane.
quently, every means 1IIU!~' COLLECTING AIRPlArlE
ized to formulate complete ~
UAT~IEL
THOROUGHNESS OF PURSUIT
tc AND IH'l'FIiJDING
~
uring
this cOClbat, types of
However. because aetlll , enemy airplanes participating
tions during enemy air I'l~' nemy e1rplanes which are flee- in the raid were not positive_
vary greatly from conditiol1 ing after eluding our attacks y recognized even by air crews due
ing when the plallB were must be pursued stubbornly end to darkness aM other reasons.
every Commanding Officer troyed completely before they There WBS, in general, much laxity
decisions to meet existi "'eh their baSes. Use Rq. reeon- in preservation of crashed enemy
(lawn
tions llIa1ssance planes (Dinah), etc., to airplanes.
• rail the enemy from combat zones,
r intrude by anticipating the re- Identification of' enemy air-
The Commanding Ortictwn route after establishing their plane types is not only extremely
quiekly deeide Just what tIII'turn air bases. important for ~etermining movecents
of the enemy are and IIWt. and plans of the eneltl1 and for
trate or distribute ttl. I R q . reconn81ssance planes wtdch proper cCllllbat COl!Llll8nd, but the ap-
strength of the various • • trailing the enera:y must con- pearance or new a1rplane types (such
cordingly. He must displlr_ntly broadcast the movements or 85 the present B-egg) exerts tre-
leadership so as to.Upld~nelllY in order to allow rairly mendous technical influence upon
trol of the strength to lete planning aM preparations our tactics, weapons, materiel, etc.
ever changing s ituat1OD, interception from all areas. It is vitally lraportant that rrvery-
must not be jeopardUed b1 h i t My be night, it is vit- one engaged in air defense study
to eX1sting plans illPortant ~o carry out these constantly and be thoroughly famil-
• ods at all costs. iar with IMAteriel ot enemy air-
planes.
In order to meet evc, COOP~~ATION WITH SEARCHLIGHTS
tion, the position of till
Commanding Officer of the "I he areas covered by search_
REX:OGNITIOlI OF' ~TF:rm eft Erll2Y
rADAR
must be selected frOIl till
Point of control ot a11'
He should be 1n a positi-
able him to observe c~
lights can be very 11.raited
according to the positions in
,Ob they are placed. Theref'ore,
Its mus t be launched opportune-
and immediately against targets
a lthough recognit1otl of triem
~or enemy was s1lllple in tho
beginning because eDeaY air-
planes kept their wing 118bts 0 -
t1ngulshe~, it subsequent17 beca.e
tlons over the areas whicll ,ted by searchlight5. The !Dis- ditticult becaUSIe the eMID1 later
absolute proteetion. .uat be accompliShed within appeared with wing 11shts OD. thus •
short time that searchllghtSi swift ectioa on OW" part w.. not
erfective. In regard to these posSible.
Plans for doal1ng wil
air ra1ds taus t provide trll,
tlcipation of f1ghter uD1
,ters. constant coordinated train-
is eSisential. All _os or deception that the
eMIIlY llll1y adopt in the future INIt
thsn air defense tUb' COOPERATION WITH AA GURS be taken into cODlideratioa aad
However, sueb part ielP ...aauru to e1azoltJ ihat1ticatlan
not be permitted to tnj Because target speeds were hill;h or friend or eDlll1" WIt be d...i ....
the regular dutie~ ot
Planes.
17
 Northern Area
(Hokka1do - """11_1
Fighters
24 (All Aroy)
JA PS
MAVJ~Wc11~ The fuze Is estimated and
boxes or shells set at the v>\rious
fuze tlmes are kept at the gun po-
The common type of antiaircraft sitions. Having the tuzes pre-set
rage fire - the "box· barrage- greatly incre~es the total nu:nber
n be recognized by the wide scat- of rounds that can be fired at any
_ ring of bursts over 8 large area one target.
at the sky. This type of !'ire gen-
Empire ..ally i9 the most ineffective of F1rlD& shells, all of "hlch
(HOnshu-Northern RaiFthree type's usuolly encountered have been set to the sace tuze. and
Shoto and Jl:YushU) ontinuous!y pointed,· predicted at the same time leading the air-
Fighters entratlon end barrage). craft in azimuth and elevation an_
gles causes the first bursts to ap_
, An aoaly,i, of the flak-en- pear low and leadine;. Cradually,
ntered reports for ~ission No.29 the bursts appear to -creep" up
'Okyo) on 10 February 1945 indi- towards the aircraft.
,tes that the Japanese llI8y be us-
a ne" type of fire w1)ich "ill The sketch below shows hOW' the
referred to as tI. "creeping bar- creeping barrage "ould appear tor
e". the various posItions of the air_
,
craft. The dotted Una represents
I MORE EFFa:rrvE a line or constant !'Uze ,only shells
of t\e same fuze being fired at any
This type is much !IIore erree- one burrage point •
.Ye than the usual box barrage,
I is characterized by bursts that
generally low and leading, the
'e becoming more accurate and
Thlt creeping barrage, although
foreign to our Army antlsircratt
artillery, nas been used by the
Navy rOl' ~otDe time with good re-
I e in line with the aircratt as
progresses along coursa.
,lanation of these characteris_
(An
can be seen by re1'erring to
NIts.
IlFTHOD EXPLAINED
j :8
accOlllpanying diagram. Basically, the method employed
I consists of continuously computing
Deviations ot bursts, cO;Qmen- -he predicted aZi~uth and eleYation
'ate with the above characteris_ angles or the target aircrart and
'8 • •6re reported in six cases in f1ri~ lIll!Lny she11.!l with pre-ut
PLANES NO BE."rTER THAN THEIR Puars ~ing Consolidated Flak Reports tuzes at various points along the
The .rre'tlo.n... or a 0111tary weapon, in quant I'
p r1ghterl.
tha ""'11ty and training or tha Soldier USing it. Theit • isonde.
thO
Vission No. 29. eourse of the plane.

traini~
ed abo"e and their erfectiveness depend to a marked extent
program.

bons other documents captured and translated

Ph1lip;lines was the diary ot a tormer "hot Jap
cOlllbat with a total of 200 flYIng hoursl His
ll.0'lt' ObSolete Nate. He had approX1l1lately 20 hOUl's
rled him to his abcestors. (Q.!r pilota average at
1Itllch are in the Plane they will fly In Combat.)

~
A weapon, be It bayonet or bomber. is never better than

~
it"
,-
 The sketch below sb""S ho'" a creeping barrage me.
controlled at varioos points along the aircraft's
each point requiring shells of different fuze times. ht,
The Japanese already bave used
this type or fire against dive_
O down Just beyond the break-up'a7 are meteorological
b Illb1n,g aircraft, and it is quite
posUble that the same lIIetnods
Ill1gt.t be employed against our oper_
at1on! •
NAVY ENCctJUTEits IT
In a strike by Carrier Air
Gro'lp 7 at HOngKong Harbor, in_
tense and damagina antiaircraft
fir, was encountered. Excerpts
,I trOll. the action report tollow:
-Pilots reported that never
had they seen so mucb or so sccu_
rste entiaircraft tire or 811 cali_
bers.
-JI'1 r st, When the 8ttackin,g di_
rection was establisbed, the enemy
thr. up a concentrated creepit1ll
barrege. about 3,000 feet in depth,
rl~
be
~p~
Balloons Over Tokyo
en lIission Ro. 39 on 4 Karcb
,5 f1 ve tree, wbite balloons were
orted aseendin,g over To~o. 'nle
100n51 were estlmated to be two
t in di8lDeter, and each carried
Ireetangular black object.
ntree of them exploded level
,th the forillstion of aircraft
000 to 28.500 feet) and two ex..
,ed at estimated altitudes of
!.ooo to 40,000 .feet. The white
·:e explosions appeared to go up..
It is possible that these bal-
are antiaircraft devices, but
is cODsidered unlikely. The
,lems involved in accurately
hing tree balloon51 against
altitude aircraft wwld be ex-
lely dif!1cult. 'nle magDitude
the winds at altitudes over the
nese 1Il81nlaDd are such that ef-
ive cODtrol of free balloons
ns t our aircraft Is next to Im-
.ible.
PROBABLY \'lEATRER DEVICES
A lIlore plausible explal18tiob
which followed the dive bGi these balloons would be that
devices
. tb. a sel1'-destroying element. It
-"A s1milar barrage was dUll-ooeon practice in antiaircraft
ed at the second level of i l e r y to send such balloon.:!
planes executing glide_bomb... to obtain "wd intorlJl8tion
tacks. Then they quickly tt corractions to tiring data.
tbe barrage down to the 1 devices mayor may not carry e
1,500 _ 3.000 feet __ the redio transmitter.
steady dive and bomb release.
losses are a melancholy ~ Several Cleans might be employ_
to explode such ballo ons. It
to the effectiveness of thll' balloons are antiaircraft de.
Ods." (From JICPOA Flak H....
tar No.1, 24 February 1945). (and as stated before this is
,ttu1) a proximity fUze might be
Tbe losses referred to
"ere "five pilots and tour
men" out or 14 SBaCs at'
to detonate them when they
near aircraft. These fUzes
ly are of the sonic or elec ..
c type and ere constructed so
"Actually only eight 4Of' explode upon reaching a given
ShiPPing. _ nee troc the aircral't. It is
known thst the Japanese are
C'ombet crews are UJ'~ ,cing th1s type of llIeCh8t)1S1lI as
as Observant -as possible 01. but they do have the ift!orlJl8-
and intensity of antia1J'C: and tacilities to do so.
and to report any and all
tions made.
el
The fact that two of the bal_
loons exploded at altitudes between
35 000 and 40,000 teet which was
well above our air craft, would seell
to dispel accurate proxi~itr fuzes
in this instance.
AmBOID BELW1't'S SUSPECTED
Another more definite possi-
bility is an 8neroid-bellows mech-
anism controlling a contact SWitch.
'nle aneroid-bellows works on chaMe
in external pre:h,Yre and, tbere_
fore, may be adjusted to operate at
g1ven altitudes. Such instruments
have been found on Japanese tree
balloons which landed in the United
States, Canada, K:Ulska and the Ha-
waHan Islan:1s.
Available interlll8tiOD on these
balloons is too fragmentary to draw
definite conclusions as to their
purpose. It 1s requested that any
additional int'orlll8tion or other
such balloon incidents be transmit_
ted to Headquarters XXI Bo:nber Com-
mand.
1:tIlJi!Er~. .w . ~ a ..en
EFP'ECTI1TENESS OF HEAVY PLAK
AT DIFFERENT ALTITUDES
l'iD6'J~~~
The purpose of this study is
to show the relati"nsh1p between
the effectiveness of Japanese heavy
flak and the altitude of attacking
B-29s.
The matheoatical analysis em_
ployed is basad on the following
aS5umpt10[lS :
1. An attack on an avaraae
well-defended target by e slusle
aircraft.
2. Rectilinear flight by the
attacking aircraft at COnstaDt
speed and altitude OD aD averas e
course over the tuget.
3. Altitude not lUI than
10,000 feet.