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1I1t1oatlon oan~~:e~~"-""..J!JILJlillIILJlIL... ---,_...........

IlIAIUI If4J .• '.~.;' ••.•,.~.:.;, ;"=•.:...


the beginnIng of March 1945 4. Vll.1ntenance problems would
a thorough reconsl~eration be ~implifie~ because of las.
and re-evaluation of the cap- .train on en,;ines and a relatlve17
'ties of the XXI Bomber Command eu.tained attack could be carr1.ed
It 15 Inte~ed that thIs weeltly re_ ad the factors influencing its out by larger number of 8_29s.
port be a source ot Infort:l/ltlon tor eO:ll. ttorts revealed that unfavorable
bat cre>rs and stafr officers Who have a ...tiler for dayl1gHt precis ion bOlllb- HC1If ABrol LOSSES?
1eB1t1Jaate interest In the operations of
the XXI BCQber Co=and. "Ilthin thMa
as by high altitude formations wa! But, would it be possible to
l1a1tl1 it shoulll receive the "illest pos_ be biggest obstacle to the tactics carry out Ie- level attacks without
1II1ble c1rcll.lotlon ))9J'llIlsstble under the .tng ~ed.
obtainina excessive losses? 'ft1e
prov1Jl= or All ~80_5.
In many inst~nces it Is nec~s­ answer wa. e ~ectsion to attack at
In oreler that a Q/U1alI!l or Intell1. trY to cha~a tactics to meet the night when tha enemy defenses would
genee lMy be included, the report 1, .~'s change or pace. but in this be less effeetive. The Japaoese
liven an OVerall elasslr1eatiun or Sec_ lie it was apparent that more 1m~ were not belivved capable or put~
ret, '"lb.en th, nature of the Illaterial ting an efficient night fighter
warrants, lndividual artie
ceived a lower security Classification.
1., have re. .. tant than the enemy's capability
• resistance was the weather'S torce into the air.
lDdrance to carrying out estab~
The report h so asselllblill that the lahed doctrine. By setting the. bOlllbing alti~
COlDpOnent sectloM may be removed and tude ran~ from 5,000 to 8.000 feet
elreulated or rUell separetely, If POI'. LEVEL ATTACIIS CONSIDERED the danger t'rOlll a[ltiatrcratt fire
tl0llS are r'JIJ'~uced. security regula_
tions Illust ba observed and the source would be greatly re~uced. Auto-
One poSSibility which immedi- llIatic weapons fire was not expected
117 presented itself for cOn5id- to be effective above 5,000 teet
CorresPondence ragarilina this PUb. ~ion was lo_level attacks. The and heavy tlak accuracy decreases
lication shauld be eddressell to the Com_ ,lowing edvant8l5es were disclosed' rapidly below 10,000 feet. These
lIllrll1111i General, XXI BOIIIber COlll:land
A.PO1teM, cia Postlr.llster, San l"rane1!eo' altitudes also would cancel.oat
Ca1 orn1a, Attent1on: A1; ot 8, A-e. • 1. Better weetber conditions danger from barr~e balloons.

J1- "'P ,&:... , -

present at low 81titu~es than
high. Winds of 2S to 36 knots At night. Formation Flying
,13 be expected a!I compared to wuuld not be necessary for defen-
JAl,lES D. GAlICIA to 180 knots at 25.000 to 3()('t(l(l sive tire power and the efficieftCy
Colonel, A1r Corps It, ID8king it unnecessary to l1m- of an operation would be increased
AC or 8, !I-e
baabing approach diractions to because of additional bomb load due
td excessive drift. Cloud COQ- to increased tuel econCll7.
tonI are more favorable at Ie- smaller &IIIlUnttlon load could be
TH: C.G. XXI B.C. Initials o."b tudes. carried.
OATI rt ..... ~ 1'46 ~ l'RAIIIIM:; ADEQUA T!
S. More effective use of ra_
equipment tor naVigation aoo nile night bOlllbing would be •
tng is possible at law slti- n... uperlence for II05t 8-29 crews
iU a!I scope detinition 11 lDuch it was not thought that additional
,ter. training would be required befare
3. Attacks at low level would temporarily dtscontlnulnc the btsh-
it greater baab loads because level dayl1sht attaclal. U1 cr....
decreased fuel consUlllpt-1on. had experience In naVIgation at

• a-~---......I •
Illain force was to
proaches, utll1zi':!8 v 1Il8.lte f ';' ..::: ,~~ i!::;:~~-:
ions if POSsible for b1sUa1

There was ever

Heve the attaCks 'If~l~e~O!I
ful but there was als

286 8-295 BOMB NA60YA..
bllity that some UnfOl': tbe
stance might cause the pi:tt
failure. This was an ell tt ,
use for the famed Vl1l hi ~1~1110se on the heels or the 9 lJU. Homing alrcrar-t dropped 6:z:
bomber. The plan was da~l ' ' - Warch incendiary mission a_ SOO-POund GPs on Yokkaishi. Bomb_
bac!r8round of SOUnd aM lI(, gainst Tokyo eame a similar ing of this wlbg was done from 5800
thinking and posseSsed ike aimed at a second great Jap- to e, leo feet. Five aireraft re-
element of surprise. tIle ..... e industrial center __ Nagoya. turned early and one. the only air-
craft lost on the mission, was mis_
By 1930 on the nigbt of i l sina: for un4C11t'n reasons. Seven
RESULTS EXPECTED larch 307 aircraft were airborne to aircraft in all landed on Iwo.
lake the run. From the 73rd Wing
It should be emphaS1&td,54 were put into the air. 'nl.e 39 P1GFfTm A'M'ACll:S
the deCision to mix up the SiJ!3tb suppl1ed ill a~ the 314tb
against the enemy "as not I ':.2. Of these. Ie were toreed to Thirty enemy tlghter!l made a
ion to throw out the -i ".turn early beeause of mechanical total of 39 attacks against our
aIti tude precision daYl1gh~lrticUlt1es. The remaining air- aircraft, mostly in the target area
which already had destrOYed ~aft dropped a total of 2,494 tons .~ile the 8_293 were illuminated by
night as previous 1lI1sslons had nec_ aged more than 20,000 squa:1t incendiary bombS. f11'es and searchlight!. The enemy
essitated flying Snd landing during was generally unaggressive. There
the hours of darkness on the return
to base CrolD Honshu.
of the root area of th J
Aircraft i d e . .
'or an hour and 55 minutes.
n ustry (the U "dnning with 3l4th Wing planes at
were two cases of eoordinated at-
tacks against the bombers by two
~d~{i~;na~ estimated 20 per~1l9. 8 .. 29s streaked across Nagoya. enelay figbters.
The use of incendiary bOlllbs o considerable ~ total of 286 of them bombed it.
other 1n dustrie.!l.
against vital urban area~ on Honshu One Nick, followed by four un-
was £ logIcal conclusion once it The res:.J!ts '3Xpected rr. 314TH WING ldentU'ied single engine figbters.
was determined that low-level night follCllt'e4 one group in !'rCXll 20 1Il1les
night incendiary missions.. or tbe 42 aircraft &1rborne out !'rom the target. It appeared
bomblll8 would be attempted. ACCOrd_
Ingly, the urban areas of Tokyo, ~h large degree complemen~om the 314th only three failed to that the Nick. probably radar e_
Nagoya. Osaka and Kobe were picked ose obtained by other methotliomb the primary. The 39 dropped Quipped, was acting 8!1 a guide for
as otjectives. Since one of the was expected th,3t they -ouJteo X 500-pound &-46 IB aDd 721 X tbe others.
major advantages resulting frOll! the s troy a great deal of the -pound. 1t-.7 IB Visually and by
Change In tactics Would be surprise home factories upon which tM &dar, from 6,000 to 6,eoo faet. P'LAl\ MOSTLY HIGH
the tnlttal erfort was planned to anese are dependent to a 1 Is wing, as did the others, found
gree tar industrial output. a maximum of 2/10 clOUd over 'lak, both meditm ahd beavy
consist or four separate miSSions an effort to burn Qut cr ~ target. Many reported no clOUd ranged trOlll meager to inteMe a~
on alternate nights, weather per. dustrial faCilities which 1 curing the target. No personnel was generally lDaccurate. RepoJ"U
mitting, against the selected tar_ deseribed it as being continuoue17
get areas. Maxt1llUlll errort frOID ually might not rate a pI' a11'craft were lost by the wing.
each wtng Was to be employed In attack. It was expected t pointed aI¥l alaO predicted concen-
01'(181 to obtatn the maximum reSUlts d1.~ruotion of cnmmunicatlOll 313TH WING tratiotll. Autoraat1e weapons
dislocation of factory W8!l low and the heaV)' gun fire was

. ..
beCoffl the enl!T'!y COuld set up md-e The 313th, over the target a lIost17 above our aireratt. SOlIe
errecttve lOW-level defenses. . Would have a very adverse e:
later, put 3,169 SOO_pounders meager and inaccurate fire was re-
the war capacity' or the Japi 713 lOO-pounders on the city. ceived trOll naval vusels 1D Ise
FIRST MISSION PLANNED hundred one- of the 111 alrbor....
t Additionally, it WaS There were no losses.
The first miSSion in the ser_ h~t Coming concurrently tt! beG.
Iblng altitude was from 6,000 to Cr. rept>..~ta told or ...108
ies TaS scheduled to take Place on reverses in the Philippines
9 Ma.~ch,
000 teet. phosphorus ba.b burltI elch bad
area 1945, against the urban
or TolQto. a~~ ~f Iwo JimA the~e inetl s treuer. and three poean balla
fai c WOuld undermine tM 73RD WING Which appeared to tleat dGlm trc.
cut~\~n their government to
PiCked crews, ~eSignated teet. DImQ' aDd d.e01 fUel

defend eth War successf'ully The 73rd ''lIng. last to cOllIe were reported.
e homeland. , got 146 aircraft on the target,
tack was t lTIe at.. 0 opplng 5,336 SOO_pounders and. A sub 150 lI11e. ott sbore re-
t8r~t weather ~on~~~~~s:he b~: 11I1ssi'lbe d'etalls of the Imll1 ,024 lOa-pounders. Two additional ported visibility l'8duced to OD8
_l1e by wood aote.
. ...
~~~.~ ....'"'; .•.;
Obtai Ons and analyses of I'l 1l'cratt bClllbed Ha_lll8tsu and Shin_
lOWin ned are discussed on the
l! pages.
ust Tokyo, then llagoya, now ~e hundred fUteen planes nt
OSaka __ third on the l1st the 313th 'If1n,g got orf and 107 ot
for incendiary treatment. thm bClllbed the primary. One hit
intenance had done a Herculean Shirahama and seven tailed to bomb,
Ib and on the night ot 13 March of which five were early returns_
aircraft were airborne for the Eight landed on Iwo Jima.
,asian. Fifteen ot these even-
&lly turned beck. One, tram the ONE E/o\ CLAnrED
,3th Wing, crashed and burned ort
,keotf but the crew was safe. at Thirty to 40 enemy aircraft
295 only one railed to return. were observed in the target area.
The 25 to 30 attacks maile on the
Mission report figures tor 8_29s were reported as mostly inef-
Ceaka strike at'e 2,043 tons fective although one atteopt at
incendiary bClllbs dropped. Two r8llllOing was suspected. The right
dred seventy four aircraft gunner of a 73rd ~ing aircraft shot
,t the primary target visually d.O'II'n one ot the attackers. One in.
by radar. The wings went over etfective attack was l:l8de betore
,e target in order: 314th, 73rd, the IP and. two at Haha J1ma. Two
tho Jap fighters followed sOIDe of the
42 OF 314TH HIT PRDlARY bombers 100 miles out to sea witb-
out attacking.
The 314th hed 45 aircraft air-
, of which 42 dropped on the Flak "as lD8dium and heavy ( R -
,ary target frOID 7,000 to 7,800 er OSaka, meager to moderate and
t through 5 to 10/10 cloud. Two inaccurate to accurate. It appear-
craft returned early without ed at times to be of the predicted
tbing and one which landed on Iwo concentration type. lIeager and io-
I not included in tha beabing to_ accurbte fire also was received
Ils. Crom ships in th,! bay. The 30
73RD MOUNTS 135 searchlights which were reported
were ineffective because of cloudS
or the 135 airborne from and smoke.
ltd "ling, 107 hit the primary
1101';oya _ .. st, throo'gh 5 to 6/10 clouds The"mals were worse than over
• strH'e wh 111 burning on tn - 5,800 to 9,600 teet. Four Tokyv er.1 one aircraft at 7,000
3QUlldron ~112 this photo was 't e ~orning after the l1-'eraft dropped on Kushimoto, feet had its wina: rivets loosened
below tho -.9. In the low a . n by a 3rd Reeonnal~ama, Chichi J1ma end Uji Ya- by a violent surface explosion
Castle Spot Where the er center of the photO,lea end one or these also bombed wh ich l1fted the plane several hUD-
• Sr.loke is heaviest 1s the" primary. The one a1rcrart drpd feet.
, ..sing was from this Wing. Three
~rdumb's and three homing a1r- "irst photographs a!'ter the
~t werd airborne in addition to striKe, 17 t'ereh show 8.1 square
• main force. 111l1es of Osaka destroyed •
.. .• ...
'~ : -: ~ ::;." }.".::~
.. - -_.

l~tal1ed photo lnterpretetlon CQDpany; 914, Oriental '/Jee'

.'" of the post strike photographs
ot Tokyo and Nagoya reveals
that in tne farmer city about 16.7
pany; 915, Oriental Weav~
Plants l 1449. Kanda Ulll't8t:
Koto Market. I
8-29 TO
square miles were ~estroyed. Burned
areas 1n Nagoya are estimated to
cover 1.63 square miles.
Lis ted as damaged OJ'
were targets: 1342, Jepao
Industry; 1366. Nippon OU
As interesting and encouraging
as these figures are, they do not
tell the whole story. The damage
1370, SUmida River Bridge,
Joban Line. where sheds "81'1
334. Nisso Steel Manufectur:
assessment report No. 17 on Tokyo, panyj 825. Fujikura Elect:
prepared by the comblne~ photo in- Works; 907, Tokyo Gas Compe."1
terpretation sect10ns of the 3rd machi Branch; 1350, Tokyo ~
Photo Reconnaissance Squadron and pany; 1448, Tsukiji Market 11II'
the 35tb PhotCl Tech Unit, and later sale Warehouse.
SUppll:lment, reveal 1n addition to
the &rea damaged, 16 numbered Air NAGOYA DAMAGE
Poree tnr15ets ~allleged or destroyed.
Final repor t is not in CIIkrt;led Marinee &Warm
L1sted 89 destroyed are: Tar_ ya but considerable dalll! ....r tint 9-29 to land
get 910, Rls1D8 SUn Petroleum Ter_ parent even on the smoke .. two, on 4 Maroh. Re-
minal; 911, Ogura 011 Company" 912 photograjils studied. Total ..led ab1,. b,. the'"
Nlsstln Spinning Mill; 913, H~ttori burned out was rOUghly 47,.lunteer orewmen, the
square feet, concentrated ~ __ 29 returned to ite
five irregular-shaped areas". on Saipan. .A. Mar-
,'TIiles south of Nagoya Castle. Ie oueraman reoorded
ae .Tent.
LEFT WAIST6t1N#E/f Damage to industrial W
includes 358,000 square teKI~ . .-,,~_.~
percent of the total root

SUCKED FROM 'PLANE terget 1729, Alchl Alrcraft'. ~;I

Eitoku Plant. Lesser dPll'h&&~
done to the rollowing : ""-
PHOTO &t?;
N Target 187, Atsuta r~c~ 11 March thru 17 V,arch
agoya Arsenal; 247C. Deldo
At incident occurring on "3M ric Steel, Tsuki31 Plant; 251t
276 on 13 March points up a ~~alHarbol" Facil1 ties; 253, lISion No Date Area Coverage Que.l1ty
lesson Which shouldn't need re- em cal plant· Target 1799, ---
emphu1s: Gunners must keep ~achlnery Company. Kasadera J'R5!"75 10 War 45 Yurume-3asebo 6~,24·,40· Fair to good
theb harnas, attachOO:-- arget XXI 4065, Sumltomo 5~'77 11 t!a.r 45 To\7o 6",0:04",40· Good
als Plant. 5''''8 12 War 45 Nallioya-Osaka 6",24",40" Good-~18go:fa partial
all th1s misSion the left
waist blister blew out over Ky_ The Sitoku Plant had 5't179 12 "ar 45 NQ60ya 6",24",40· Good partial slDoke
ushu and the gunner was sucked its lD8in SUb-assembly,3 5t.!80 13 Mar 45 ~!agoya 6".24",40" Fair
from the aircraft. completely eu t tedJnd.-1I1 5M81 14 \'ar 45 Osaka-froto 110 10/10 Cloud
bUildings w · d Ungoye. photograrhY
ere uestroye • 5M82 14 Msr 45 Osaka lbort ive No photo~raphy
A parachute
"as seen to op_
Ind ·t 1 alit: 5VB3 16 lIar 45 OsQkn No
en and it is hoped that the
gunner 1s alive __ And reflect_ cludes ~~ r 81 damage .. photo~rat>h] 10/10 Cloud I
t .~merous small lnu
ing on his negligence. • yPe. bUildings throughout tilt :t .:ihown as in process - ')ullr'nry or 10 "arch 45. I
ge areas.
An important eontrlbllt~ ,....... '~.c~ QI ~,_c~,."
XXI Bomber Command B...e9s 11
performed by the B..24s or tbI
Weather . Reconnaissance SN ,n "1 1
These a1rerat't, bsseCI on 0-. le~

""',," ~ :or'~""
been running regular ree~
missions tnto the Carol!. :;'~c"'l ,,4..
north to the not so well knOlll(
8l'1as Islands .. "1 rd:"'/ \
In ttddlt10n to their ~ FI&.2
l'unctlorts of photograph1ns
formations aDd gathering data!
_O~Vi~ quadrant puzzles l!o
rul 1n' the planning or.~
they heve been observing aal ~.,of the less ~ull ways to prac-
route an~ target l~entltlca· Then this exerehe is practiced
grapbing areas 1n which lii' ,t).. It stresses not Just the re· without the aid or a chart untll
of t'l'lendly aircraft might tion of cheek.points, but puts crews can fill in the pattern tl'ClIll
thus add1l18 to the file! of the relation of check-points memory. XXI Bomber COIICland target
rescue information. the course and the IP or target. areas all have a tew outstancUng
provi~es a particularly helpful features partieularlJr adaptable to
B-2'9s on kground for the navigator or tb15 method. The exercises should
crew missions also have betln ,ar~ier able to pIck out only be kept simple by using only basie
tlng In the carolines. or two check-points through the i~ent1tieation features.
cover frequent over XXI B.C.
On 11 Varch the ace Ites an~ target areas. As soon as tbis pattern has
photos "are taken of Manonuito been well establ1sbed in the minds
whieh 1s In the northern car' The puzzle system Is presente~ of the erew. quadrant puzzles are
s little less than 600 mllel as a suggestion to 8_28 faced tn order and "ill serve as a st1Jllu_
east 01' Guam. Magur, at the the problem of familiarizing lating device to clinch this knew-
with target areas new to tl'ell. ledge. A quadrant puzzle coasisto.
northern end of the atoll. sal] punles are readi1,y a~aptable of a clue in the forll or a stnsle
ererlk are two of the larger as useful 8!11 an aid to radar check-point as it relates to the
1n the atoll. atton traIning. pontion anCl beaaiag or the 1I1pt-
ing aircraft.
On Uagur. four or nTt BASIC PRIM::IPLE
new huts were observed on the P'tndlng the proper COl"J'ect1oDl
'/fest corner and there were I The basic principle 15 to train to the IP 01" locattna: the ~
new activity by natives or J, s to complete a given are. plc- point f'ro~ these clues can pPOt'ide
Also spotted was a single trom e clue tn the form ot on_ an endless serle' ot absorblq ...
Jep aircraft, believed to one or two cheek-points. Tb.e useful exercisea.
or Jill. which had crashed first learD!, with the ai~ ot
beacb. Th.e presence or tl t.t~ locate the salIent iden- Vethods tor laRD!.. 01" . . . . .-
craft in the northern r.a.rol
to the SUSpicion that the
be trYing to run reconnaisl
Truk up Guam lray.
ication testlll'es in eacb ot the
drants within a given radius ot
IP or aira1n,; poInt (figure 1).
ins this S7S~ aDd saaple
will be tOUDd on tile tol1GWSal

-~ ............
Suqqe!otions For S·2s EX&lCISE
Begin With a gener
00 the Virtues ot theal _
tem, streSSing the valUe~~"~t'
ing cheek-pOints not as or ~ ~
items but 8S part ot 11ld~ •
Crews must rirst be given ba_ pattern. Tell the crews 'I
sic exercisell in the loc:ation of think of check-POint! to _
check-points "ithin e large area to the route, IP or a~l~;::
llurroUlxUng the IP or other strat_ 'lftstll"
egic points on the route, and nth:' Starting nth the u A few simple... deductions are co,,,,"
in a smaller radiu!I or the aiming hand. quadrant or one 0 / : ' " to J!Iolve quadrant puzzles.HeJOe
point. For the purpolles of this board quadrant diagrams ~ the solution to the puzzle shown
typical exercise, assume that the class to inspect the1r'e~ figure 2:-
target is 357, the IP is Kotu, and photos and suggest the Illll11

points which occur in each r:t~"IIIII'!!!!
the prescribed head1D8 to the IP is
350 degrees. The practice session
"ill cCllcern the cheek-points wi th_
four quadrants arOund tile
USing the light lines pr'J1~
in a SO-mile radius of the IP at gUide, select the maln cheeL~
Kotu. offered by the class and 4rIi /OSlflillI' W
in wi th chalk or grease PI AlRCAA,ff
s/,II',tl' (K ""fi'
CLASS PREPARATION Colored. chalk or pencil,.
used to distinguish riven
Prior to the inlltruction per_ roads, etc. S1multaneoual1:
iod, prepare on the blackboard or crew member fills in OQll
on large sheets or paper, at least quadrant blanks With the
three boldly drawn circles diVided points selected.

FI6.2\- "AC~O'
into qU!drants, 1'he vertical quad-
rant diVision represents the pre-
scribed headtng to the IP. So They Now repeat the same Itl
are Visible Imly to the instructor, the class t'Urnishing the
1Ddicate l1ghtly within the quad_ points, but without reellUI'
rants or the ei~les the IDa in eh«k:. IIl8pS, photos, or their Cllt'n 4rI A/RCAAF'
Points "ithin the 50-mue radlUS of Fill in ally impartant P0111l1
Xoru (see figure 1). Also draw on class fails to recall anll, L' First step: Reconst!'uot the
thE. blaekboard or on paper l3everal t1me permits, have the Cl'tllll II'se of the aircraft as 1 t should
quadrant PUzzles USing strong, ob- in one more blank without..aate to the check_point by recal-
Vious check-poinh as cluel3 for sistance. II the quadrant pattern learned
thu f:lre-t 1e3900. the basic exercise (figul'e 3).
This same process 1s ~
Notice that although the a1r. far exact target and aim1n« '- Second s'tep: Locete the IP on
craft is represented as flying on identification exercises, ill course by recalling its rola-
the proper heading, it il3 too far the area stUdies should be ~ . . to the check-point (figure 4).
to the right or lett of the check_ Small radius (one mUe at
point.s to intercept the IP. In radius !':rom the aiming point Third step: A line drs"n trOlll
some puzzleJ!l the aircraft is repre_ ly will Suffice). In thM' position of the aircraft to the
sented 83 haVing overShot the IP clses, let the quadran" be termines the correction neces_
(Ul!1 f~gures 2,6,7 and 8). around the prescribed axis
to reach the IP !'rom the point
tack. ieh the check-point was sight-
t1gure 5).
Have a SuffiCient quantity ot A't the beginning or .acII
charts and aerial photos or 1II013a1c13
it a'laUable to prOVide a set far
each. crew member. Abo I3UPPly them
with quadrant "blank!" consisting
Ceeding instruction period,
each area previously coverfllt.
ious cQlIbinations can be ptI
as qUick re!':reshers. A tf/I
With very l1ttle practice, the
tion of this line can be ar-
at wlthout sketching in t4e
prescribed course, IP, and
.. "
of letter-81ze Sheets on 1I'hict. a lXIarks can be given with tht lee ting 11ne. The same simple
C1J.·cle diVided into quadrants has
·"een lI1meographed, aM 1I'ith lIli_eo. to~ "What 10ca11 ty is it'':'1 ,les etion is followed J!Iolving the
based on the target anlS
graphed Copies or the quadrant a llIarks can be given ... ,01 point, MlDel)', recaU1nc
puzzlu to be 130lved. (Several question "Where and what 18
IIh of the entire arM picture
Sheet, ) lZl8y be IIl1meographed on one ~r target?" However the
urns in practical 'maw:
,t relates to the given clae to
lte the poiDt dASire4.
--- .. ~.- .~~ .:~.~.
obtained P8inlessJ.y by sol'
JOant puz zles.


3'\ .... AIRCRAFT

~@l . "
<>-ij ,. ~" '

!!!!:/ \-'~1~~'j,~;T

lOCATl U '" (()II

{ #

_ _ f"lleN OF
Ju,\. how to &0
'own 8-29' o~er
whioh 11 ",bing
J.bout knocking
1. .. preble.
the Jap. cauUer-
able trouble. !hey'•• worked out a
, . angl.. tor their tighter deten-.
suctl t.actics an enelllY 8-29 was
brou&bt dO'lfn.
ODce an attack 15 d1rected a-
ga1n5t an enemy airplane, it must
b. pressed to the limit with the
intention or rallDing. Do not allO'lJ
a single airplane to escape. (Ed_
unit. and prl"'nwd ....t itorial note. On XXI B.C. missions
ot "Inetruotlon.·. A copy of the•• to date , co1.lUion between 8_295 anti
_. oaptur.d in the Philippine.. tighters has occurred during only
lI,n it. 11. Ob.e tenth of one percent of all etl-
elllT attacks. P'ew. it atl1 or thiS
small percentage of coll1sions could
be determined .. dallberate f'U!l1np.)
Although a.ple illumination Ow-1na thiS cC*bat, urgene:r
be provided by searchlights, necessitated indiY1dual co.bat.
t interception 18 bindered by Hotraver, • slnsle airplane does not
other raetors_ It is dirt1- have IlUCb chance or succeu against
to shoot down or sat tire to an a11'p!ane as large all the 8_29.
airplane such as a B-29 by gun_
• C'a.bat, iocludlna night tight-
"0 !\:1l1\U'& of X Flying Regllll8nt ina, _ t be eoordlaated so &II to
the B_29 raid ot 15 June 1944 cooc.ntrata rue potrero '!'be .dYaD-
,...,.e4 hits on one airplane. but, teae gelDed by tbe adYaoce f1ghters
the airplane cUd not burs t into can be turther azplotte4 to co--
I he deterMined to ra. it. pleta th. I\ICC"II. In thill 1IaDD8I'.
I .upl.n., .ent into a steep • greater ....... ot .~ a1rp1aDes
can be ~aur;ht In the tlAht8Z' net.
L_ ~ and rinall1 into a IIp1n. By

~-- P.\S3~ JLCUJ ,' .... ' A"_
'tna.n tugu" I:U..l"pJ.anes - ....
nd tire or a air at aoyt1llle. the re lrfltol -.-.--....
F!'ontal pa~~es J
frontal pass fa O;osttton' to the
by a dive and ed SUbstantial SUcces~lla1Qt~ DESrRUCTION OF EHElIY PATMP'IIIDEl'l;S (trom 400 to 450 km/hr) during this
this may be attributed.' ~ cOllb8t, shells from AA guns were
a el1mb to && na:e reeommendttd Me- that enemy airplanes to n the ruture the enemy My ger...!.·ally bursting behin~ the tar-
rear and belO1t' hi h speed ot intervals in small numbP~ plan to empioy pathfinders to g' 1 an(! have thus haClpered the at-
ties. Because ot the g sse! trom should be credited t ePa. lead the airplanes, or he MY t .....:ks by our righters. Future plans
the ell811l1 airplanes J p8 h tIme to training the regiment 0 tIit e flares, incendiaries or bOlllbing and treining lllU5t streS5 part1eular-
the f8!l1' require too, !DUe l'tetb," pathfioders to point out targets ly the effectiveness of coordina-
cl0.9& !.n. ..... airplane began.
W'.1en the ene......
to tab evasive action against dO.
uring this 11'
or the min strength.
! ~...ery effort must be IllBde to de-
troy the pathfinders
qUickly in
tion or the combine(! COlllbat strength
of AA batteries Bnd Clying units.

.ttaek by Jl
calved the enell11 b Y
wo Kimura
l18 , feinting 8 pasS
to the l'QSlde of the turns. At t e
IMtant the enemy reversed direc-
plans were a 1'&14 J'der to hamper the movements or
earried. ",' be main strength.
as for1llU1ated
training. The completenes 11
Do not be diverted by the en-
formulatoo during dally ~ •. , approaching from one direction
~ly1ng units ~ust seize oppor-
tunities, reterdless of
zones, to down enemy airplanes by

unhesitatingly penetrating the bar~

rages from our AA guns. AA bat_
tions 1t1l11Ul'& drove In directly be-
low the enemy airplane. He held a direet bearing on the lIIDd th.?-, lIliss airplanes approaching teries IllUSt temporarlly suspend
his pOSlt1oo at elose range and ex- failure of air defense ot,-",-.uteneously or in waves from flre 'IItlen our f1.ghters are pressing
pended ell his 8DIlUUnltlon In e zones during an emergen I,*her directions aM altitudes. in to attack the en~7 elrplane.
Single hurst. F'1re broke out In quently, every means 1IIU!~' COLLECTING AIRPlArlE
ized to formulate complete ~
the section between the two right THOROUGHNESS OF PURSUIT
engines and caused the enemy tc AND IH'l'FIiJDING

this cOClbat, types of However. because aetlll , enemy airplanes participating
NIGHT USE OF TADAN tions during enemy air I'l~' nemy e1rplanes which are flee- in the raid were not positive_
(1./3 q. hollO'lf charge aerial vary greatly from conditiol1 ing after eluding our attacks y recognized even by air crews due
bombs packed in clusters or 76) ing when the plallB were must be pursued stubbornly end to darkness aM other reasons.
every Commanding Officer troyed completely before they There WBS, in general, much laxity
tnea it Is difficult to decisions to meet existi "'eh their baSes. Use Rq. reeon- in preservation of crashed enemy

lal'ge airplanes I particularly tions llIa1ssance planes (Dinah), etc., to airplanes.
tbe B-29s. by gunfire alone • rail the enemy from combat zones,
and bEeause the number of rJlids wUI r intrude by anticipating the re- Identification of' enemy air-
inersesa in the fUture, plel1S must The Commanding Ortictwn route after establishing their plane types is not only extremely
quiekly deeide Just what tIII'turn air bases. important for ~etermining movecents
be mata to use TADAN even at night. of the enemy are and IIWt. and plans of the eneltl1 and for
trate or distribute ttl. I R q . reconn81ssance planes wtdch proper cCllllbat COl!Llll8nd, but the ap-
ill armodng preparetions for strength of the various • • trailing the enera:y must con- pearance or new a1rplane types (such
machiaa guns and machine ea~non am_ cordingly. He must displlr_ntly broadcast the movements or 85 the present B-egg) exerts tre-
munit~on and TADAR must be complet_
ed during the alert so as to be
leadership so as to.Upld~nelllY in order to allow rairly mendous technical influence upon
trol of the strength to lete planning aM preparations our tactics, weapons, materiel, etc.
read, for changes in the Situation. ever changing s ituat1OD, interception from all areas. It is vitally lraportant that rrvery-
It is essential to equip with TADlN must not be jeopardUed b1 h i t My be night, it is vit- one engaged in air defense study
rtghtera other then those special_ to eX1sting plans illPortant ~o carry out these constantly and be thoroughly famil-
iZing as n1ght tighters in order to • ods at all costs. iar with IMAteriel ot enemy air-
empl07 these to auglll8nt the strength planes.
and tbus ensure cOlDplete destruc_ In order to meet evc, COOP~~ATION WITH SEARCHLIGHTS
tion ,)f the enelllY. tion, the position of till
Commanding Officer of the "I he areas covered by search_
REX:OGNITIOlI OF' ~TF:rm eft Erll2Y

In regard to the use of

~t night. the plans of . attack must
e c1eviaed after establiShing the
number of enelllY atrpl1.t.nes caU'""t b
the !86rChl1eUts ~.

must be selected frOIl till
Point of control ot a11'
He should be 1n a positi-
able him to observe c~
lights can be very 11.raited
according to the positions in
,Ob they are placed. Theref'ore,
Its mus t be launched opportune-
and immediately against targets
a lthough recognit1otl of triem
~or enemy was s1lllple in tho
beginning because eDeaY air-
planes kept their wing 118bts 0 -
t1ngulshe~, it subsequent17 beca.e
tlons over the areas whicll ,ted by searchlight5. The !Dis- ditticult becaUSIe the eMID1 later
absolute proteetion. .uat be accompliShed within appeared with wing 11shts OD. thus •
short time that searchllghtSi swift ectioa on OW" part w.. not
~h:U~ ~IYing Regiment haa llI1de erfective. In regard to these posSible.
. . its ::einterception! Since
biBb+' tlghtJ ~~~tiob as a special
Plans for doal1ng wil
air ra1ds taus t provide trll,
tlcipation of f1ghter uD1
,ters. constant coordinated train-
is eSisential. All _os or deception that the
eMIIlY llll1y adopt in the future INIt
went into action i· HOtrever. 1t thsn air defense tUb' COOPERATION WITH AA GURS be taken into cODlideratioa aad
lI1au.te.) after the -:~dg1ahttely (e!«ht However, sueb part ielP ...aauru to e1azoltJ ihat1ticatlan
-Vnlng. air raid not be permitted to tnj Because target speeds were hill;h or friend or eDlll1" WIt be d...i ....
the regular dutie~ ot
Northern Area
(Hokka1do - """11_1
24 (All Aroy)
MAVJ~Wc11~ The fuze Is estimated and
boxes or shells set at the v>\rious
fuze tlmes are kept at the gun po-
The common type of antiaircraft sitions. Having the tuzes pre-set
rage fire - the "box· barrage- greatly incre~es the total nu:nber
n be recognized by the wide scat- of rounds that can be fired at any
_ ring of bursts over 8 large area one target.
at the sky. This type of !'ire gen-
Empire i9 the most ineffective of F1rlD& shells, all of "hlch
(HOnshu-Northern RaiFthree type's usuolly encountered have been set to the sace tuze. and
Shoto and Jl:YushU) ontinuous!y pointed,· predicted at the same time leading the air-
Fighters entratlon end barrage). craft in azimuth and elevation an_
gles causes the first bursts to ap_
, An aoaly,i, of the flak-en- pear low and leadine;. Cradually,
ntered reports for ~ission No.29 the bursts appear to -creep" up
'Okyo) on 10 February 1945 indi- towards the aircraft.
,tes that the Japanese llI8y be us-
a ne" type of fire w1)ich "ill The sketch below shows hOW' the
referred to as tI. "creeping bar- creeping barrage "ould appear tor
e". the various posItions of the air_
craft. The dotted Una represents
I MORE EFFa:rrvE a line or constant !'Uze ,only shells
of t\e same fuze being fired at any
This type is much !IIore erree- one burrage point •
.Ye than the usual box barrage,
I is characterized by bursts that
generally low and leading, the
'e becoming more accurate and
Thlt creeping barrage, although
foreign to our Army antlsircratt
artillery, nas been used by the
Navy rOl' ~otDe time with good re-
I e in line with the aircratt as
progresses along coursa.
,lanation of these characteris_
can be seen by re1'erring to
j :8
accOlllpanying diagram. Basically, the method employed
I consists of continuously computing
Deviations ot bursts, cO;Qmen- -he predicted aZi~uth and eleYation
'ate with the above characteris_ angles or the target aircrart and
'8 • •6re reported in six cases in f1ri~ lIll!Lny she11.!l with pre-ut
PLANES NO BE."rTER THAN THEIR Puars ~ing Consolidated Flak Reports tuzes at various points along the
The .rre'tlo.n... or a 0111tary weapon, in quant I'
p r1ghterl.
tha ""'11ty and training or tha Soldier USing it. Theit • isonde.
Vission No. 29. eourse of the plane.

ed abo"e and their erfectiveness depend to a marked extent

bons other documents captured and translated

Ph1lip;lines was the diary ot a tormer "hot Jap
cOlllbat with a total of 200 flYIng hoursl His
ll.0'lt' ObSolete Nate. He had approX1l1lately 20 hOUl's
rled him to his abcestors. (Q.!r pilota average at
1Itllch are in the Plane they will fly In Combat.)

A weapon, be It bayonet or bomber. is never better than

The sketch below sb""S ho'" a creeping barrage me.
controlled at varioos points along the aircraft's rl~

each point requiring shells of different fuze times. ht,

Balloons Over Tokyo

en lIission Ro. 39 on 4 Karcb The fact that two of the bal_
,5 f1 ve tree, wbite balloons were loons exploded at altitudes between
orted aseendin,g over To~o. 'nle 35 000 and 40,000 teet which was
100n51 were estlmated to be two well above our air craft, would seell
t in di8lDeter, and each carried to dispel accurate proxi~itr fuzes
Ireetangular black object. in this instance.
ntree of them exploded level AmBOID BELW1't'S SUSPECTED
,th the forillstion of aircraft
000 to 28.500 feet) and two ex.. Another more definite possi-
,ed at estimated altitudes of bility is an 8neroid-bellows mech-
!.ooo to 40,000 .feet. The white anism controlling a contact SWitch.
·:e explosions appeared to go up.. 'nle aneroid-bellows works on chaMe
in external pre:h,Yre and, tbere_
fore, may be adjusted to operate at
It is possible that these bal- g1ven altitudes. Such instruments
are antiaircraft devices, but have been found on Japanese tree
is cODsidered unlikely. The balloons which landed in the United
,lems involved in accurately States, Canada, K:Ulska and the Ha-
hing tree balloon51 against waHan Islan:1s.
altitude aircraft wwld be ex-
lely dif!1cult. 'nle magDitude Available interlll8tiOD on these
the winds at altitudes over the balloons is too fragmentary to draw
nese 1Il81nlaDd are such that ef- definite conclusions as to their
ive cODtrol of free balloons purpose. It 1s requested that any
ns t our aircraft Is next to Im- additional int'orlll8tion or other
.ible. such balloon incidents be transmit_
ted to Headquarters XXI Bo:nber Com-

The Japanese already bave used A lIlore plausible explal18tiob 1:tIlJi!Er~. .w . ~ a ..en
this type or fire against dive_ which followed the dive bGi these balloons would be that EFP'ECTI1TENESS OF HEAVY PLAK
O down Just beyond the break-up'a7 are meteorological devices AT DIFFERENT ALTITUDES
b Illb1n,g aircraft, and it is quite
posUble that the same lIIetnods . tb. a sel1'-destroying element. It l'iD6'J~~~
Ill1gt.t be employed against our oper_ -"A s1milar barrage was dUll-ooeon practice in antiaircraft
at1on! • ed at the second level of i l e r y to send such balloon.:! The purpose of this study is
planes executing glide_bomb... to obtain "wd intorlJl8tion to show the relati"nsh1p between
tacks. Then they quickly tt corractions to tiring data. the effectiveness of Japanese heavy
tbe barrage down to the 1 devices mayor may not carry e flak and the altitude of attacking
NAVY ENCctJUTEits IT 1,500 _ 3.000 feet __ the redio transmitter. B-29s.
steady dive and bomb release.
losses are a melancholy ~ Several Cleans might be employ_ The matheoatical analysis em_
In a strike by Carrier Air to explode such ballo ons. It ployed is basad on the following
Gro'lp 7 at HOngKong Harbor, in_ to the effectiveness of thll' balloons are antiaircraft de. aS5umpt10[lS :
tense and damagina antiaircraft Ods." (From JICPOA Flak H....
fir, was encountered. Excerpts tar No.1, 24 February 1945). (and as stated before this is
,ttu1) a proximity fUze might be 1. An attack on an avaraae
,I trOll. the action report tollow:
-Pilots reported that never
had they seen so mucb or so sccu_
Tbe losses referred to
"ere "five pilots and tour
men" out or 14 SBaCs at'
to detonate them when they
near aircraft. These fUzes
ly are of the sonic or elec ..
c type and ere constructed so
well-defended target by e slusle
2. Rectilinear flight by the
rste entiaircraft tire or 811 cali_
bers. "Actually only eight 4Of' explode upon reaching a given attacking aircraft at COnstaDt
ShiPPing. _ nee troc the aircral't. It is speed and altitude OD aD averas e
known thst the Japanese are course over the tuget.
-JI'1 r st, When the 8ttackin,g di_ C'ombet crews are UJ'~ ,cing th1s type of llIeCh8t)1S1lI as
rection was establisbed, the enemy as Observant -as possible 01. but they do have the ift!orlJl8- 3. Altitude not lUI than
thr. up a concentrated creepit1ll and intensity of antia1J'C: and tacilities to do so. 10,000 feet.
barrege. about 3,000 feet in depth, and to report any and all
tions made.