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Monograph

Protection of power systems with distributed generation

State of the art Martin Geidl

Author(s):
Geidl, Martin

Publication Date:
2005-07

Permanent Link:
https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-005009366

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In Copyright - Non-Commercial Use Permitted

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Protection of Power Systems with Distributed
Generation: State of the Art

Martin Geidl
Power Systems Laboratory
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) Zurich
geidl@eeh.ee.ethz.ch

20th July 2005

 Abstract

The integration of distributed sources into existing networks brings up sev-

eral technical, economical and regulatory questions. In terms of physical
integration, protection is one of the major issues. Therefore new protec-
tion schemes for both distributed generators (DG) and utility distribution
networks have been developed in the recent years, but there are still open
questions.
This document is the result of a literature study and intends to give
an overview of issues and current state concerning protection of DG. The
first part gives a basic introduction to distributed generation and power
system protection. In section 2 protection issues concerning DG are outlined,
then the current practice is described in section 3. In section 4 some new
approaches in this field are reported and finally section 5 concludes with an
outlook.
Contents
List of Acronyms 2

1 Introduction 3
1.1 Distributed Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Power System Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Generation and Interconnection Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3.1 Machines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3.2 Transformers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3.3 Power Electronic Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3.4 Interconnection System View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

2 Protection Issues with DG 7

2.1 Short Circuit Power and Fault Current Level . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Reduced Reach of Impedance Relays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3 Reverse Power Flow and Voltage Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4 Islanding and Auto Reclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.5 Other Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5.1 Ferroresonance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5.2 Grounding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

3 Current Practice 14
3.1 Island Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.1.1 Passive Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.1.2 Active Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.2 Interconnect vs. Generator Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.3 Examples of State-of-the-Art Relays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.3.1 Integrated Generator Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.3.2 Loss of Mains Relay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.3.3 Integrated Genset Control Device . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.3.4 General Electric Universal Interconnection Device . . 22
3.4 International Recommendations, Guidelines and Standards . 23

4 New Approaches 23
4.1 Adaptive Protection Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.2 Synchronized Phasor Measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.3 Intelligent Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

5 Conclusion and Future Work 26

References 27

1
List of Acronyms
AC Alternating Current
AEPS Area Electric Power System
AM Asynchronous Machine
APS Adaptive Protection System
CHP Combined Heat and Power
DC Direct Current
DER Distributed Energy Ressource
DG Distributed, Decentralized, or Dispersed Generation
EG Embedded Generation
GPS Global Positioning System
HV High Voltage
IED Intelligent Electronic Device
IM Induction Machine
LOE Loss Of Earth
LOG Loss Of Grid
LOM Loss Of Mains
LV Low Voltage
MV Medium Voltage
NDZ Non-Detection Zone
PCC Point of Common Coupling
PFC Power Factor Correction
PMU Phasor Measurement Unit
PV PhotoVoltaics
ROCOF Rate Of Change Of Frequency
SCADA Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
SM Synchronous Machine
SPS Special Protection Schemes
UI Universal Interconnection
VVS Voltage Vector Shift

2
1 Introduction
1.1 Distributed Generation
Distributed, dispersed, decentralized or embedded generation (DG, EG) are
keywords for an upcoming probable paradigm shift in electric power gener-
ation.1 As mentioned in [1], there is no standing international definition for
these terms, but there are a number of legal definitions in several countries.
A proposal for a definition of distributed generation is given in [4]. However,
many distributed power sources have some characteristics in common:

• Their rating is small compared to conventional power plants,

• they are often privately owned,

• they are not centrally dispatched,

• they are connected to MV or LV distribution networks,

• they do not contribute to frequency or voltage control,

• and usually they were not considered when the local grid was planed.
Hence, there are infrastructural needs as, for example, means of com-
munication.

Two major reasons for an increased utilization of DG are liberalized mar-

kets which are now opened for various kinds of participants, and the global
trend of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, which leads to more renewable,
CO2 -neutral sources which are normally small-scaled. Further reasons are
discussed in [1] and others.
Besides a number of benefits, there are some technical, economical and
regulatory issues with DG. In terms of market regulation, licensing, gov-
ernment aid and privacy are typical concerns. Economical considerations
display a possible cost increase not only for generation but also for trans-
mission and distribution. Finally, there is the technical point of view, and
protection turned out to be one of the most problematical technical issues
since its malfunction could cause serious risk for people and components.

1.2 Power System Protection

Basic power system protection principles are outlined in standard literature
[13, 14]. The primary purpose of power system protection is to ensure safe
operation of power systems, thus to care for the safety of people, personnel
1
Surveys about DG are given in [1, 2, 3].

3
and equipment. Furthermore, the task is to minimize the impact of un-
avoidable faults in the system.2 From an electrical point of view, dangerous
situations can occur from
• overcurrents and

• overvoltages.
For example, an asynchronous coupling of networks results in high currents.
Earth faults can cause high touch voltages and therefore endanger people.
The general problem is always voltage and/or current out of limit. Hence,
the aim is to avoid overcurrents and overvoltages to guarantee secure oper-
ation of power systems.
For the safety of the components it is also necessary to regard device-
specific concerns, for example oil temperature in transformers, gas pressure
in gas insulated components etc. These points are not directly related to
electrical values, but, as mentioned, they always come from or lead to unal-
lowed high voltages or currents.
Another issue is mechanical stress. Whenever power is converted elec-
tromechanically, one has to consider not only the electrical but also the me-
chanical equipment. An example is mechanical resonance of steam turbines
due to underfrequency.
Nowadays, electromechanical protection devices are replaced by micro-
processor based relays with a number of integrated features. Currents and
voltages are suitably transformed and isolated from the line quantities by
instrument transformers and converted into digital form. These values are
inputs for several algorithms which then reach tripping decisions. Further
information about computer relaying can be found in [13, 14].
For the design and coordination of protective relays in a network, some
overall rules have become widely accepted:
Selectivity: A protection system should disconnect only the faulted part
(or the smallest possible part containing the fault) of the system in
order to minimize fault consequences.

Redundancy: A protection system has to care for redundant function of

relays in order to improve reliability. Redundant functionalities are
planed and referred to as backup protection. Moreover, redundancy
is reached by combining different protection principles, for example
distance and differential protection for transmission lines.

Grading: For the purpose of clear selectivity and redundancy, relay char-
acteristics are graded. This measure helps to achieve high redundancy
whereas selectivity is not disabled.
2
Avoidable problems such as system instabilities are subjected to Special Protection
Schemes (SPS) as reported in [15].

4
Security: The security of a relay protection system is the ”ability to reject
all power system events and transients that are not faults so that
healthy parts of the power system are not unnecessarily disconnected”
[16].

Dependability: The dependability of a relay protection system is ”the abil-

ity to detect and disconnect all faults within the protected zone” [16].

Different network topologies require different protection schemes. In the

following paragraphs some typical systems should be described shortly. The
simplest network structure to protect are radial systems, therefore simple re-
lays are used [13]. Normally, time-dependent, graded overcurrent protection
is installed regarding redundancy (backup protection). More sophisticated
relays are used for the protection of rings and meshed grids. Impedance
relays trip due to a low voltage-current quotient. Since these relays allow
to determine the position of the fault on the line, they are also called dis-
tance relays. Detailed descriptions are given in [1, 13, 14]. A very common
principle for the protection of generators, transformers, busbars and lines is
differential protection. The trigger criteria is, simply speaking, a certain dif-
ference between input and output current. Furthermore, a number of other
techniques are used, also device-specific ones.

1.3 Generation and Interconnection Systems

Common distributed generators and network interfaces should be outlined
in the following paragraphs. Overviews are given in [1, 17, 18, 19, 20].

1.3.1 Machines
Synchronous Machines (SM) are widely used for larger water, steam and
combustion engine driven plants, for instance Combined Heat and Power
(CHP) plants. By varying the excitation current, it is possible to control
the reactive behavior of the SM, i.e. to regulate the voltage. The possibility
of voltage control is a major benefit and makes island operation possible.
Asynchronous or Induction Machines (AM, IM) are primarily used for
wind and smaller hydro plants. Since these machines derive their excitation
from the network, they always consume an inductive current and therefore
behave as reactive loads even if they are providing active power. Hence,
voltage control and island operation is normally not possible with AM. An
additional fact to consider is that these machines normally run with a low
power factor. The fault behavior of AM is determined by a low positive and
negative sequence impedance. With AM in the network, the fault current
level3 is normally increased.
3
The fault current level is defined in section 2.1.

5
 In order to increase the power factor, AM are sometimes equipped with
Power Factor Correction (PFC) [17, 21, 22]. So-called PFC-AM are able to
continue operation if the main supply is lost, but voltage and frequency will
not be stable.
For modern wind power stations double-fed induction machines are used.
The relation between the network frequency fn , the rotor current frequency
fr and the mechanical frequency of the shaft fm in such machines is

k2πfm + fr = fn (1)

where k is an integer constant due to the machine design. This equation ex-
plains how the machine can operate with various mechanical speed whereas
the network frequency fn is constant: The rotor circuit has to be fed with
a corresponding frequency fr . This method enables wind turbines to run in
a wider range of speed and therefore to optimize efficiency.4
DC Machines are rarely used as generators because they need to be
connected to the AC system via an expensive inverter. Another disadvantage
is that the brushes have to be serviced frequently.

1.3.2 Transformers
Whenever machines or inverters are connected to networks of different nom-
inal voltage, transformers are needed. The high voltage winding of the
transformer is usually used to meet the grounding requirements of the utility.
Delta-wye configurations are commonly installed for isolated generators. In
terms of protection, the transformer connection is important since the zero
sequence impedance depends very much on the winding type (delta/wye)
and also on the earth connection. Reference [19] compares five common
transformer connections outlining their problems and benefits.

1.3.3 Power Electronic Interfaces

Whenever primary power is not transformed via a rotating AC machine,
power electronic devices are used as a utility connection. Also wind power
stations are often connected via converters. In large wind parks a common
DC busbar collects the power and delivers it to the utility grid via one
rectifier and one transformer [23].
Microturbines usually drive a synchronous machine at very high speed
(due to efficiency). The high frequency has to be converted to the nominal
utility frequency. Photovoltaic panels and fuel cells directly produce DC
power which has to be converted.
An advantage of power electronic converters is their controllability. Any-
way, a converter has to be equipped with a controller that can be used to
4
This method is also used for pump storage hydro stations because the most efficient
speed of Pelton turbines varies with the head.

6
achieve a number of functionalities. Voltage or reactive power control could
be integrated in converters as an additional feature [20].
In terms of protection, it is a clear disadvantage of semiconductor de-
vices that their valves are almost not overloadable, i.e. overload can not
be accepted for a longer time. Therefore converter controls are designed
to prohibit high currents what leads to a lack of short circuit power which
is necessary to trip protection. In section 2.1 the fault level is discussed.
This fault level may be low in networks with a large contingent of converter-
connected power sources.

1.3.4 Interconnection System View

Reference [24] gives a review of DG interconnection systems and states some
trends and research needs. Also the commercial status of interconnection
equipment (list of manufacturers, cost and pricing, etc.) is outlined. In-
terconnection systems are defined as ”the means by which the DER unit
electrically connects to the outside electrical power system and provides
protection, monitoring, control, metering and dispatch of the DER unit,”
where DER are Distributed Energy Resources [24]. Network interfaces are
described from a system point of view using functional schemes as shown in
figure 1. Several typical schemes and configurations are outlined according
to:
1. Does the system use an inverter?
2. Does the system have a parallel connection to the local grid?
3. Can the system export power to the local grid?
4. Is the system remotely dispatchable?
A test report of a Universal Interconnection (UI) device is given in [25].
The device that was designed by General Electrics connects the DG with
the local load as well as with the grid. The UI device is further described in
section 3.3.4.

2 Protection Issues with DG

The overall problem when integrating DG in existing networks is that distri-
bution systems are planned as passive networks, carrying the power unidi-
rectionally from the central generation (HV level) downstream to the loads
at MV/LV level. The protection system design in common MV and LV dis-
tribution networks is determined by a passive paradigm, i.e. no generation
is expected in the network [20].
With distributed sources, the networks get active and conventional pro-
tection turns out to be unsuitable. The following sections will outline the
most important issues.

7
 local loads,
distribution

conversion local transfer switch PCC

DER Meter AEPS
conditioning protection parall. switchgear

DER
DER control monitoring dispatch and
metering control

interconnection system

power flow
information flow

Figure 1: Interconnection system functional scheme [24]; AEPS. . . Area Elec-

tric Power System; DER. . . Distributed Energy Resource; PCC. . . Point of
Common Coupling.

2.1 Short Circuit Power and Fault Current Level

The fault current level describes the effect of faults in terms of current or
power. It gives an indication of the short circuit current or (apparent) power
boost. In [1] the fault level in p.u. is defined as
1
fl = i = (2)
|z th |

whereas i is the fault current related to the nominal current and z th is

the inner impedance of the Thevenin representation of the network in p.u.
Examples for this value are given in [1], typical fault levels in distribution
networks are in a range of 10–15 p.u., where 1 p.u. corresponds to the rated
current.
This is, phase-phase or phase-earth faults normaly result in an overcur-
rent which is significantly higher than the operational or nominal current. 5
This is a very basic precondition for the function of (instantaneous) overcur-
rent protection. The fault current has to be distinguishable from the normal
operational current. To fulfill that, there has to be a powerful source pro-
viding a high fault current until the relay triggers. This is not the case for
all kinds of generation devices (see section 1.3). Especially power electronic
converters are often equipped with controllers that prevent high currents. If,
for example, a remote part of a distribution network is equipped with large
PV installations, it could happen that in case of a failure there is almost no
significant rise of the phase current and the fault is therefore not detected
from the overcurrent protection system. The question arises, why one needs
to care about a fault if there is no fault current. The answer is that dan-
5
The amplitude of the fault current is dependent on the fault impedance, for phase-
earth faults it is also highly dependent on the grounding.

8
PSfrag replacements

G
b1 b2 b3 b4
Idg
T
R Inw If a

L1 L2 L3

Figure 2: Short circuit at a. Current from transmission network Inw , current

from embedded generator Idg .

gerous touch voltages may occur even if the current is low. Furthermore
permanent faults may spread out and destroy more equipment.
With DG in the network, the fault impedance z th can also decrease
due to parallel circuits, therefore the fault level increases and there could
be unexpected high fault currents in case of a failure. This situation puts
components at risk since they were not designed to operate under that cir-
cumstances.
For correct operation it is also important that the relay measures the real
fault current which was expected and taken under consideration when the
relay was configured. Figure 2 shows a distribution feeder with an embedded
generator that supplies part of the local loads. Assuming a short circuit at
point a, the generator will also contribute to the total fault current

If = Inw + Idg (3)

but the relay R will only measure the current coming from the network infeed
Inw . This is, the relay detects only a part of the real fault current and may
therefore not trigger properly. As mentioned in [26, 27] there is an increased
risk especially for high impedance faults that overcurrent protection with
inverse time-current characteristic may not trigger in sufficient time.
One can find another influence of DG on fault currents when assuming
a short circuit at the busbar b2. In this case, the fault current contribution
from the generator passes the relay in reverse direction what could cause
problems if directional relays are used. DG can also affect the current di-
rection during normal operation, this issue is explained in section 2.3.
Concluding the issues concerning short circuit faults it can be stated that
dispersed generation affects the
• amplitude,

• direction and

• duration (indirectly)

9
of fault currents. The last point is a result of inverse time-current charac-
teristics (or grading respectively).

2.2 Reduced Reach of Impedance Relays

The phenomena of reduced reach of distance relays due to embedded power
infeed is mentioned in [26, 27, 29] and other references. In [14] this problem
is considered for conventional power systems.
The reach of an impedance relay is the maximum fault distance that
triggers the relay in a certain impedance zone, or in a certain time due to
its configuration. This maximum distance corresponds to a maximum fault
impedance or a minimum fault current that is detected.
Considering figure 2, one can calculate the voltage measured by the relay
R in case of a short circuit at a6

Ur = Inw Z23 + (Inw + Idg ) Z3a (4)

where Z23 is the line impedance from bus b2 to bus b3 and Z3a is the
impedance between bus b3 and the fault location a. This voltage is increased
due to the additional infeed at bus b3. Hence, the impedance measured by
the relay R
Ur Idg
Zr = = Z23 + Z3a + Z3a (5)
Inw I
| nw{z }
disturbance

is higher than the real fault impedance (as seen from R) what corresponds to
an apparently increased fault distance. Consequently, the relay may trigger
in higher grading time resp. in another distance zone.
For certain relay settings which were determined during planning studies,
the fault has to be closer to the relay to operate it within the originally
intended distance zone. The active area of the relay is therefore shortened,
its reach is reduced. Note that the apparent impedance varies with Idg /Inw .
A possible solution to this problem is outlined in section 4.1.

2.3 Reverse Power Flow and Voltage Profile

Radial distribution networks are usually designed for unidirectional power
flow, from the infeed downstream to the loads. This assumption is reflected
in standard protection schemes with directional overcurrent relays. With a
generator on the distribution feeder, the load flow situation may change. If
the local production exceeds the local consumption, power flow changes its
direction [30]. Reverse power flow is problematic if it is not considered in
the protection system design. Moreover, reverse power flow implies a reverse
voltage gradient along a radial feeder.
6
Load currents are neglected for this consideration.

10
PSfrag replacements

G
b1 b2 b3 b4
Idg
T
I23 I34

Inw

Il1 Il2 Il3

U

x
∂U
∂x

Figure 3: Voltage profile and gradient on a distribution feeder with and

without contribution of generator G. Solid line: Idg = 0, downstream power
flow; dahsed line: Idg > Il2 + Il3 , reverse power flow between b2 and b3.

Dispersed generation always affects the voltage profile along a distri-

bution line. Beside power quality issues, this could cause a violation of
voltage limits and cause additional voltage stress for the equipment. The
voltage increase/drop ∆U due to power in-/outfeed can be approximated
with [1, 29, 31]
Pdg Rth + Qdg Xth
∆U ≈ (6)
Un
where Un is the nominal voltage of the system, Rth + j Xth is the line
impedance (Thevenin equivalent respectively) and Pdg + j Qdg is the power
infeed of the DG.
An analytical method of calculating the influence of DG on the voltage
profile of distribution feeders is presented in [32, 33, 34].
Figure 3 pictures the voltage gradient along a distribution feeder with
and without embedded generation. The power flow direction corresponds to
the sign of the voltage gradient. In this situation the power flow direction
between bus b2 and b3 is changed due to the infeed at bus b3.
Especially in highly loaded or weak networks dispersed generation can
also influence the voltage profile in a positive way and turn into a power
quality benefit.
Reference [35] describes another issue concerning the voltage profile on
distribution feeders. Usually tap-changing transformers are used for the
voltage regulation in distribution networks which change the taps, i.e. their

11
turns ratio, due to the load current. If the DG is located near the network
infeed (e.g. at bus b2 in figure 3), it influences tap-changing because the DG
infeed decreases the resulting load for the transformer. Hence tap-changing
characteristics will be shifted, the infeed voltage will not be regulated cor-
rectly.

2.4 Islanding and Auto Reclosure

Critical situations can occur if a part of the utility network is islanded and
an integrated DG unit is connected. This situation is commonly referred
to as Loss Of Mains (LOM) or Loss Of Grid (LOG). When LOM occurs,
neither the voltage nor the frequency are controlled by the utility supply.
Normally, islanding is the consequence of a fault in the network. If
an embedded generator continues its operation after the utility supply was
disconnected, faults may not clear since the arc is still charged.
Small embedded generators (or grid interfaces respectively) are often
not equipped with voltage control, therefore the voltage magnitude of an
islanded network is not kept between desired limits, and undefined voltage
magnitudes may occur during island operation.
Another result of missing control might be frequency instability. Since
real systems are never balanced exactly, the frequency will change due to
active power unbalance. Uncontrolled frequency represents a high risk for
machines and drives.
Since arc faults normally clear after a short interruption of the supply,
automatic (instantaneous) reclosure is a common relay feature. With a con-
tinuously operating generator in the network, two problems may arise when
the utility network is automatically reconnected after a short interruption:

• The fault may not have cleared since the arc was fed from the DG
unit, therefore instantaneous reclosure may not succeed.

• In the islanded part of the grid, the frequency may have changed due
to active power unbalance.7 Reclosing the switch would couple two
asynchronously operating systems.

Extended dead time (ti in figure 4) has to be regarded between the

separation of the DG unit and the reconnection of the utility supply to
make fault clearing possible. Common off-time settings of auto reclosure
relays are between 100 ms and 1000 ms. With DG in the network, the total
off-time has to be prolonged. Reference [27] recommends a reclosure interval
of 1 s or more for distribution feeders with embedded generators.
A linear approximation for the frequency change during island operation
is given in [1, 36]. The rate of change of frequency is expressed as a function
7
Even if there is active power control, the island will not run synchronously with the
utility system.

12
of the active power unbalance
X X
∆P = Pdg − Pl (7)

the inertia constant of the machine H, the machines’ rated power Sn and
the frequency before LOM fs :
df ∆P fs
= (8)
dt 2Sn H
It is straight forward to calculate the frequency change
∆P fs
∆f = · ti (9)
2Sn H
This approach does only consider the frequency change due to islanding, the
fault is not regarded.
Figure 4 shows an example for an auto reclosure procedure where an
embedded generator is not disconnecting although it is islanded with the
local grid. HereP it is assumed
P that there is a lack of active power after
islanding, i.e. Pdg < Pl , therefore the island frequency decreases.
LOM and automatic reclosure are some of the most challenging issues of
DG protection and therefore a lot of research has been done in that area.
The only solution to this problem seems to be disconnecting the DG unit
as soon as LOM occurred. Thus it is necessary to detect islands fast and
reliably. Several islanding detection methods are presented in section 3.1.

2.5 Other Issues

Besides the issues mentioned in the previous sections, there are some other
problems concerning the integration of DG. These issues are already known
from experience with conventional power systems.

2.5.1 Ferroresonance
As described in [26, 27], ferroresonance can occur and damage customer
equipment or transformers. For cable lines, where faults are normally per-
manent, fast-blowing fuses are used as overcurrent protection. Since the
fuses in the three phases do not trigger simultaneously, it may happen that
a transformer is connected only via two phases for a short time. Then, the
capacitance of the cable is in series with the transformer inductance what
could cause disorted/high voltages and currents due to resonance conditions.

2.5.2 Grounding
In [18, 19, 26, 27, 37] possible grounding problems due to multiple ground
current paths are mentioned. If a DG unit is connected via a grounded delta-
wye transformer, earth faults on the utility line will cause ground currents

13
PSfrag replacements

P
fs fi Pdg
S
G

P
Pl
S
on
off
ti t
fi
∆f

tf td tr t

Figure 4: Auto reclosure procedure: fault occurs at tf , disconnection of at

td , reconnection at tr , reclosure interval ti ; state of utility switch S, utility
synchronous frequency fs , island frequency fi , frequency drop ∆f .

in both directions, from the fault to the utility transformer as well as to the
DG transformer. This is normaly not considered in the distribution system
ground fault coordination.
In [37] the problem of Loss Of Earth (LOE) for single point grounded
distribution systems is demonstrated. Whenever the utility earth connection
is lost, the whole system gets ungrounded.

3 Current Practice
3.1 Island Detection
The difficulties with islanded DG have been outlined in section 2.4. To
prevent island operation, the protection system has to detect islands quickly
and reliably. This is the task of loss of mains protection. References [21, 38]
divide island detection into passive and active methods. Some of them will
be outlined in the following sections.

3.1.1 Passive Methods

These methods detect loss of mains by passively measuring or monitoring
the system state.

Under-/Overvoltage A clear indication of lost utility supply is very low

voltage. If there are uncontrolled generators in the network, the voltage

14
 b1 b2 b3

S I dg
G
PSfrag replacements I nw

Il

I nw Z nw S Z dg I
dg

E nw Ul Zl E dg

E nw Ul E dg

Figure 5: Voltage vector shift after islanding. Thevenin eqivalent of the

network with E nw , Z nw and of the generator with E dg , Z dg respectively.

can also rise (for example due to resonance) and exceed the upper limit.
Therefore, under- and overvoltage relays are a simple islanding protection
method. In larger islands the voltage collapse will take some time, therefore
this kind of LOM protection is often too slow.

Under-/Overfrequency As mentioned, real systems are never balanced

exactly. After LOM happened, the frequency in the island changes due to
equation (8). Hence frequency out of limits can indicate island operation.
The frequency does not change instantaneously but continuously, thus fre-
quency relaying is a rather slow method.

Voltage Vector Shift (VVS) This method is outlined in [1] and others,
it is also referred to as phase displacement [38] or phase jump [25] method.
Figure 5 shows the situation when part of the load is fed from an embedded
generator and the rest is supplied from a distribution network. The distri-
bution network and the embedded generator are represented by equivalent
circuits, both operating on the local load. After the utility switch S dis-
connects, the local load has to be supplied from the generator G. Assuming
constant load, the transmission angle, i.e. the voltage phase difference be-

15
 ul (t)

π π+ϑ

PSfrag replacements ωt

Figure 6: Extended half cycle due to voltage vector shift of ϑ = 15◦ ; ul (t) is
the voltage at the load terminal, ω is the nominal angular frequency of the
system.

tween the generator and the load terminal has to rapidly increase due to
the sudden power flow increase. This increased transmission angle is shown
in figure 5. Dotted lines represent parallel supply, solid phasors show the
situation after islanding. Figure 6 pictures the situation in the time domain.
Due to the vector jump, the duration of the concerned period is extended.
Voltage vector relays monitor the duration of every half cycle and initiate
tripping if a certain limit is exceed. Common voltage vector shift relays trip
with ϑpickup = 6. . . 12◦ [1, 17].

Rate of Change of Voltage Loss of mains detection due to the rate of

change of voltage is introduced in [39]. Usually voltage changes are slow in
large interconnected power systems. If a distribution system gets separated,
a rate of change of voltage occurs that is significantly higher than during
normal operation. Therefore rate of change of voltage can be used to detect
island operation. A major handicap of this method is that it is sensitive to
network disturbances other than LOM.

Rate of Change of Frequency (ROCOF) As discussed in section 2.4,

the frequency in an island will change rapidly due to active power unbalance.
The corresponding frequency slope can be used to detect loss of mains.
Whenever df /dt exceeds a certain limit, relays are tripped. Typical pickup
values are set in a range of 0.1 to 1.0 Hz/s, the operating time is between 0.2
and 0.5 s [1, 17]. A problem with ROCOF protection is unwanted tripping
resulting from frequency excursions due to loss of bulk supply, for example
faults in the transmission grid. Another reason for malfunction is phase
shifts caused from other network disturbances.

16
Rate of Change of Power and Power Factor Loss of grid algorithms
based on the rate of change of the generator active power output are outlined
in [38, 40]. In [40] the instantaneous power is derived from the generator
voltages and currents and then the rate of change of power is used in a
limiting function that prohibits mal-function due to system disturbances.
The results of the studies in [40] show that the algorithm needs at least six
cycles (120 ms) to detect LOM what is rather slow compared with other
LOM detection methods. Reference [39] presents simulation results arguing
that the most sensitive variables to system disturbances are time derivative
of voltage, current, impedance, absolute change of voltage, current, current
angle, impedance and changes in power factor, whereas some of these are
redundant. Certain situations are studied and a suitable logic for a LOM
relay is derived using the rate of change of voltage and changes in power
factor.

Elliptical Trajectories Whenever a fault occurs on a line, the corre-

sponding voltage an current changes at the sending end are related to each
other by an elliptical trajectory [41]. The trajectory of voltage and cur-
rent change (in combination with scaling factors) is described by an orbital
equation. The investigations in [41] show that the shape of this trajectory
changes significantly after islanding.

3.1.2 Active Methods

Beside passive measurements and monitoring, there are active methods of
LOM detection where the detection system (relay) is actively interacting
with the power system in order to get an indication for island operation.

Reactive Error Export This highly reliable means of LOM detection is

shortly discussed in [21]. For this method, the generator is controlled on
a certain reactive power output. Whenever islanding occurs, it is assumed
that it is not possible to deliver the specified amount of reactive power to the
local grid since there is no corresponding load. This reactive export error is
taken as an indicator for LOM.

Fault Level Monitoring The fault level in a certain point of the grid
can be measured using a point-on-wave switched thyristor [21]. The valve
is triggered close to the voltage zero crossing and the current through a
shunt inductor is measured. The system impedance and the fault level can
be quickly calculated (every half cycle) with the disadvantage of slightly
changed voltage shape near the zero crossover.

System Impedance Monitoring In [21] a method is introduced that de-

tects LOM by actively monitoring the system impedance. A high frequency

17
 U hf
PSfrag replacements
C
Z nw S Z dg

E nw M E dg

Figure 7: System impedance monitoring. The meter M will measure an

increased HF signal when the utility network is disconnected.

source (a few volts at a frequency of a few kHz) is connected via a coupling

capacitor at the interconnection point. As pictured in figure 7, the capaci-
tor is in series with the equivalent network impedance. When the systems
are synchronized, the impedance Z dg ||Z nw is low, therefore the HF-ripple
at coupling point is negligible. After islanding, the impedance increases
dramatically to Z dg and the divided HF-signal is clearly detectable.

Frequency Shift Inverter-interfaced DG can be protected against LOM

using frequency shift methods [42, 43]. The output current of the converter is
controlled to a frequency which is slightly different to the nominal frequency
of the system. This is done by varying the power factor during a cycle and
re-synchronization at the begin of a new cycle. Under normal conditions,
the terminal frequency is dictated by the powerful bulk supply. If the mains
supply is lost, frequency will drift until a certain shutdown level is exceed.

Voltage Pulse Perturbation and Correlation In [43, 44] two methods

of islanding detection for inverter-connected DG are presented that use a
perturbation signal of the output voltage. For the first method, the inverter
output is perturbed with a square pulse. This square pulse appears in both
the inner voltage of the source and the voltage at interconnection point.
If islanding happens, the apparent impedance at the generator terminal
increases and therefore the perturbation can be measured at the point of
common coupling (similar to system impedance monitoring). The second
method uses a correlation function to detect LOM. The inner voltage of the
source is randomly perturbed and correlated with the voltage change at the
interconnection point. During normal operation, the apparent impedance is
low and the voltage waveform at the interconnection point will not reflect
the perturbation signal. After islanding the modulation signal will appear
in both the inner voltage and the voltage at the interconnection point what

18
PSfrag replacements
87

G
51N
81 51V

27,59 32

LOG 40

Figure 8: Protection scheme for a generator embedded in an MV utility grid

[1]. Relay numbers are explained in table 1.

results in a strong correlation.

3.2 Interconnect vs. Generator Protection

Protection concerns both the distribution grid as well as the distributed
generator itself. Therefore protection schemes have to be implemented on
both sides of the Point of Common Coupling (PCC). In [18, 19] the whole
protection system is split into two parts:
Interconnect protection: It protects the grid from the DG unit, i.e. it
provides the protection on the grid-side for parallel operation of the DG
and the grid. The requirements for this part are normally established
by the utility.
Generator protection: It is installed at the generator-side of the PCC and
protects the DG from internal faults and abnormal operating condi-
tions. Usually, the utility is not responsible for this kind of protection.
A typical multifunction interconnect relay configuration is outlined in
[19], whereas [1] presents some generator protection schemes.
Figure 8 pictures a typical relay configuration for a generator embedded
in a MV utility grid [1]. This system protects the generator from internal
faults and abnormal operating conditions. The relay function numbers are
listed in table 1 on page 20. Figure 9 shows the assembly of functionalities
included in a typical multifunction interconnect relay.

3.3 Examples of State-of-the-Art Relays

A number of companies are offering generator protection and control systems
[24]. Three examples of generator protection devices are presented in this
section.

19
Table 1: Explanation of relay numbers [1, 46].
Number Application
21 distance
25 synchronizing
27 undervoltage
27N neutral undervoltage
32 directional power
40 loss of excitation
46 neg. seq. current
47 neg. seq. voltage
50 instantaneous overcurrent
50N neutral instantaneous overcurrent
51N neutral time overcurrent
51V voltage-restrained overcurrent
59 overvoltage
59I instantaneous overvoltage
59N neutral overvoltage
60FL voltage transformer fuse failure
67 directional overcurrent
79 reclosing
81 frequency (under and over)
81R rate of change of frequency
87 differential
LOM loss of mains

20
PSfrag replacements

T
G

25 32 27 50N 27N

60FL 59 51N 59N

21 81

51V 81R

67 47

46 59I

50 79

standard optional

Figure 9: Typical multifunction interconnect relay [19]. Relay numbers are

explained in table 1.

3.3.1 Integrated Generator Protection

The digital generator protection DGP54BABA from General Electrics In-
dustrial Systems is an integrated generator protection with all features of
classical protection [47]: overvoltage, under-/overfrequency, loss of excita-
tion and overexcitation, unbalanced current, differential protection etc.
The device offers remote programming and data acquisition via a RS-
232 serial interface. Fault reports of the last three faults are stored in the
internal memory.

3.3.2 Loss of Mains Relay

Tyco Electronics offers the loss of mains protection relays 246-ROCL and
256-ROCL which are designed for applications where generators are running
in parallel with a mains supply [48].
Both rate of change of frequency and voltage vector shift measurement
are integrated to detect disconnection of a generator.

21
 The user can adjust the setting for
• VVS from 2 to 24◦ in steps of 2◦ ,
• ROCOF from 0.10 to 1.00 Hz/s in steps of 0.05 Hz/s, and
• startup delay from 2 to 12 s.
Phase steps and rate of change of frequency can be monitored contin-
uously using the fibre-optic digital data and status output. The response
time for phase angle shifts is up to 2 cycles, for frequency rate changes it is
within 32 cycles. A relay time of 5 ms has to be added.
In [48] it is mentioned that voltage vector shifts correspond to rates
of change of frequency, what has to be considered in the relay settings.
Otherwise it is not possible to get a clear distinction between ROCOF and
VVS trips.

3.3.3 Integrated Genset Control Device

Woodward offers the Easygen-1000 genset control for single unit operation
[49]. The device integrates a number of features for measurement, protection
and control.
In terms of protection it provides voltage, frequency, overload, reverse
and reduced power, load imbalance, definite and inverse time-overcurrent,
ground fault and loss of mains detection.

3.3.4 General Electric Universal Interconnection Device

General Electric has developed a universal interconnection device for the
interconnection of distributed energy resources (also mentioned in section
1.3.4) [25]. Its main components are:
• A so-called Intelligent Electronic Device (IED), based on existing relay
technology, that provides protection, control and other features, also
remote control.
• Two switches that enable operation of the DG in parallel to the grid
or on the local load.
• Two circuit breakers for emergency protection.
• Measurement transformers for metering and monitoring.
• Power supply for the IED, the contact relays, and a battery charger.
The test report of this device especially emphasizes the issue of LOM [25].
It is mentioned that passive detection methods fail if the frequency/voltage
deviation after islanding does not exceed a certain threshold. This results
in a so-called Non-Detection Zone (NDZ) of the relay. This problem can be
solved by adding a directional power protection.

22
3.4 International Recommendations, Guidelines and Stan-
dards
Besides a number of national and utility-specific interconnection rules, there
are several international standards and recommendations published [20, 50,
51]. The probably most important are:
• IEEE C37.95-1989 Guide for Protective Relaying of Utility-Consumer
Interconnections [52]
• IEEE 929-2000 Recommended Practice for Utility Interface of Photo-
voltaic (PV) Systems [53]
• IEEE 242-2001 Recommended Practice for Protection and Coordina-
tion of Industrial and Commercial Power Systems [46]
• IEEE 1547 Series of Standards for Interconnection [54] (in progress)

4 New Approaches
4.1 Adaptive Protection Systems
Adaptive protection is as ”an online activity that modifies the preferred
protective response to a change in system conditions or requirements. It
is usually automatic, but can include timely human intervention” [55]. An
adaptive relay is ”a relay that can have its settings, characteristics or logic
functions changed online in a timely manner by means of externally gener-
ated signals or control action” [55].
In other words, adaptive protection systems are systems which allow to
change relay characteristics/settings due to the actual system state. For
example, the primary zone pickup value of a distance relay can be changed
online according to power infeed from a T-connected generator (see section
2.2).
There are several adaptive techniques proposed in [55] which use online
information of the system to optimise the protection system function. Some
examples are:
• Adaptive system impedance modeling (an up-to-date impedance model
of the network that provides input data for a relay)
• Adaptive sequential instantaneous tripping (for faults near the remote
station)
• Adaptive multi-terminal distance relay coverage (regarding infeed from
T-connections in the relay settings)
• Adaptive reclosure (prevent unsuccessful reclosure for permanent faults,
high-speed reclosure in case of false trips).

23
 POWER SYSTEM
VOLTAGES AND CURRENTS

NETWORK RELAY
TOPOLOGY STATE SETTING
BREAKER PROGRAM ESTIMATOR PROGRAM RELAY
STATUS SETTINGS

FAULT
ANALYSIS
PROGRAM

Figure 10: Block diagram of adaptive relay coordination software [57].

In [56] it is proposed to use real-time synchronized phasor measurements

of bus voltages and line currents as a source of information for adaptive
relays.
A feasibility study for adaptive protection of a part of a real distribution
system is demonstrated in [57]. The paper shows the basic requirements for
implementing adaptive relaying concepts:
1. Microprocessor-based relays

2. Appropriate software for relay modelling, relay coordination and com-

munication

3. Appropriate means of communication

A relay coordination software model as shown in figure 10 is introduced
which makes real time changes of relay configurations possible.
In [58] adaptive and conventional reach settings for distance relays are
compared for a certain network structure. The simulation results show dif-
ferences between conventional settings due to offline worst case studies and
optimal adaptive reach settings of about 10%.
An adaptive scheme for optimal coordination of overcurrent relays is
presented in [59]. The sum of the first zone operating times Tii of n relays
is taken as an objective function to minimize, whereas the coordination
time interval between the zones ∆T builds the constraint. The optimization
problem is then formulated as
n
X
minimise F = Tii (10)
i=1
with Tji ≥ Tii + ∆T (11)

Tii is assumed to be a function of certain relay parameters which are results

of the optimization. After a change in the network, the optimization was
executed and relay settings have been updated with the optimal parameters.
The algorithm was successfully applied to the IEEE 30-bus test system.

24
 ANALOG VOLTAGE AND
GPS CLOCK
CURRENT INPUT

TRANSFORMER ANALOG FILTER A/D mP

COMMUNICATION
INTERFACE

PHASOR
OUTPUT

Figure 11: Block diagram of PMU [60]. After the analog voltage and current
signals are transformed and filtered, they are converted into digital form and
represented as phasors.

4.2 Synchronized Phasor Measurement

A power systems’ state can be determined using so-called Phasor Measure-
ment Units (PMU). Such PMUs provide synchronized measurement of ter-
minal voltage and current phasors in time intervals down to 20 ms [60].
Synchronisation of the phasors is achieved using the Global Positioning Sys-
tem (GPS). A block diagram of a PMU is pictured in figure 11.
In so-called Wide Area Protection Systems, the measured voltage and
current phasors are transferred to a central computer where they are pro-
cessed and used for monitoring, state estimation, protection, control and
optimization [15, 61]. Such systems offer great opportunities for protection
and control. The possibility of using PMU measurement data for adaptive
protection schemes is outlined in [62].
A possible application of synchronized phasor measurements could be
LOM detection. The data gathered from PMUs installed at either side of
the coupling point (PCC) could be used for real-time phasor comparison
(a kind of phase differential protection). However, PMUs are quite costly
devices (up to EUR 10’000 and more), therefore this technically feasible
alternative will hardly be economically justifiable for this application.

4.3 Intelligent Systems

Reference [63] gives an overview of intelligent systems in electric power de-
livery. Autonomous systems and computational intelligence are proposed as
possible solutions for decentralized control.
An adaptive distance protection using an artificial neural network is
demonstrated in [64]. In this case adaption is reached by training the neural
network to a certain performance, i.e. characteristic. As pictured in figure

25
 X

PSfrag replacements
R

Figure 12: Adaption of an impedance relay characteristic to fault impedance

by the use of artificial neural networks. Solid line: normal relay character-
istic; dotted line: trained characteristic for high impedance faults [64].

12, the neurons can be trained in such a way that the normal behavior
(circle) is adapted for high impedance faults. In [64] the relay errors are
significantly reduced with the described method.

5 Conclusion and Future Work

Much literature is available concerning protection of distributed generation.
Many publications demonstrate the same problems and issues, but solutions
are rare. A general approach is still missing, but first steps are visible [24].
In [29] it is discussed that the numerical relations of typical values such
as line impedances, generator ratings etc. are equal in different networks
(HV, MV, LV) if per-unit values are considered. The scaled system aspects
in terms of power flow are almost the same for small-scaled distributed gen-
eration and for large-scaled centralized plants. This point indicates once
more that the key issues concerning integration of DG are related to infras-
tructural items such as data acquisition, operation, protection and control.
Adequate infrastructure, as it is commonly installed in HV transmission
networks and conventional, centralized power plants, is missing.
From the authors’ point of view, there are three key issues to solve:

1. Information: Integrating DG into existing distribution networks is an

issue because data acquisition systems are not available. The installa-
tion of an information system such as as the Supervisory Control And
Data Acquisition (SCADA) system (usually installed in transmission
systems) would help to solve many problems. The internet is already
easily accessible, therefore it could be a great chance to utilize it for
the purpose of power system operation [65].

2. Coordination: Proper coordination is a fundamental requirement for

satisfying operation of protective relays. System studies and analysis

26
 have to be performed case-by-case to properly coordinate the protec-
tion settings. Software could be implemented that offers special coor-
dination features for the integration of DG in distribution systems.

3. Adaptation: As mentioned in [64], the implementation of adaptive pro-

tection is a challenging task since information which is normally not
available in distribution networks is needed to update the relay set-
tings.

Visions, future trends and expected developments in the field of electric

power delivery are presented in [66, 67, 68, 69, 70]. The general view is that
distributed generation is expected to play an important role in future energy
systems.
Future work could be related to the points discussed in the previous
paragraphs, whereas three major questions arise:

• How should future distribution systems be designed to simplify inte-

gration of DG (towards a plug-and-play system)?

• How can islanded parts of distribution systems be operated and re-

synchronized?

• How can DG be dispatched centrally (if wanted), and what data in-
frastructure is needed to achieve this?

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