Version 2016.03.

22_v2

Coordinators’ Guide
2016 National and Local Elections
 ELECTION 2016
FINAL TESTING AND SEALING ELECTION DAY
(FTS)
DATE May 2 to May 6, 2016 May 9, 2016

*Check actual schedule with the

Barangay or Local Election Office
TIME From 6:00 a.m. until end of FTS From 7:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m.

*Strong possibility that this will be

*Check actual schedule with the extended due to enabling of the VVPAT
Barangay or Local Election Office feature in all of the VCMs
VENUE Either at the Municipal/City Hall or at At the schools to be assigned as
the Polling/Voting Centers where the Polling/Voting Centers
VCM and Ballot Boxes will be located.

*Check actual venue with the *Check actual venue with the
Barangay or Local Election Office Barangay or Local Election Office
Election Statistics (National)
Registered Voters 54,363,844

Established Precincts 369,133

Voting/Polling Centers 36,788

Clustered Precincts 92,509

Total VCMs 97,517

VCMs for Local (Philippines) Voting 92,509

VCMs for Overseas Voting (including contingency) 120

Contingency VCMs for Local 4,888

Provinces 81

Cities 144

Highly Urbanized Cities 33

Municipalities 1,490
ELECTION DAY PROCEDURE
IN GENERAL

CONGRESS COMELEC

PBOC

CBOC/MBOC

BEI
ELECTION DAY PROCEDURE
FOR HIGHLY-URBANIZED CITIES

CONGRESS COMELEC

CBOC

BEI
Flow of Transmission of Election Results (Electronic
and Physical Transport)

COMELEC CENTRAL
Congress COMELEC Physical
SERVER
National Board transport
of Canvassers

Prov. COC and SOV

Provincial Board
Physical
of Canvassers transport
Mun./City COC and SOV

Municipal/City Physical
Board of
Canvassers transport
Election Returns

Precinct
 FTS Procedures
1. SWITCH-ON VCM (opening of the box, assembly and turning on of the VCM)

2. VCM DIAGNOSTICS (testing of each component of the VCM; generate Diagnostic

Report)

3. OPEN VOTING (Initialization, Generate “Zero” Initialization Report, Ready to

Accept Ballots)

4. FTS TEST VOTING

5. CLOSE VOTING (counting of votes and printing of FTS Election Returns; NO

electronic transmission of FTS election results)

6. MANUAL VERIFICATION NG FTS ELECTION RESULTS

7. RE-ZEROING PROCEDURE NG VCM (Generate “Re-Zero” Initialization Report)

8. SHUT DOWN VCM (turning off of VCM, re-packing of equipment and election
paraphernalia in preparation for Election Day)
 Election Day Procedures
1. SWITCH-ON VCM (opening of the box, assembly and
turning on of the VCM)
2. OPEN VOTING (Activate Initialization Process and
generate/print “Zero” Initialization Report)
3. VOTING PROPER
4. CLOSE VOTING (machine counting, printing of ERs and
electronic transmission)
5. SHUT DOWN VCM (turning off of VCM, re-packing of
equipment and election paraphernalia and
disposition/physical transport)
Printing of ERs and Transmission of Election Results
ELECTION
RETURNS (ERs)
• The ERs will be
printed in 8 copies
initially (for National
and Local).
• After electronic
transmission, an
additional 22 copies
will be printed (for
National and Local).
Flow of Electronic Transmission of Election
Results

AT THE PRECINCT LEVEL

BEI electronically transmits the precinct
results to three (3) Servers:
Three (3) to receive the electronically
transmitted copies:
1 Transparency Server (Entities: Dominant
Majority Party, Dominant Minority Party,
PPCRV and KBP)
2 Respective levels of board of canvassers
- City or Municipal Board of Canvassers
(CBOC/MBOC)
3 COMELEC Central Server
Distribution of Printed ERs
IN THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT, VICE-PRESIDENT, SENATORS, AND PARTY-LISTS
(2016)

1 City or Municipal Board of Canvassers (CBCO/MBOC);

2 Congress, directed to the President of the Senate;
3 COMELEC;
4 Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV);
5 Dominant majority party;
6 Dominant minority party;
7 The Ballot box;
8 Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC);
9-18 Ten (10) accredited major national parties, excluding the dominant majority and minority
parties;
19-20 Two (2) accredited major local parties in accordance with a voluntary agreement among
them;
21-24 Four (4) national broadcast or print media entities;
25-26 Two (2) local broadcast or print media entities;
27-30 Four (4) major citizens arms, including the PPCRV, and other non-partisan groups or
organization enlisted by the COMELEC.

* One (1) copy to be posted conspicuously on a wall within the premises of the polling place or
counting center.
Distribution of Printed ERs
IN THE ELECTION OF THE LOCAL OFFICIALS AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES

1 City or Municipal Board of Canvassers (CBCO/MBOC);

2 COMELEC;
3 Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC);
4 PPCRV;
5 Dominant majority party;
6 Dominant minority party;
7 One (1) to be posted conspicuously on a wall within the premises of the polling place or
counting center;
8 The Ballot Box;
9-18 Ten (10) accredited major national parties, excluding the dominant majority and minority
parties.
19-20 Two (2) accredited major local parties in accordance with a voluntary agreement among
them;
21-25 Five (5) national broadcast or print media entities;
26-27 Two (2) local broadcast or print media entities; and
28-30 Three (3) major citizens’ arms, including the PPCRCV, and other non-partisan groups or
organization enlisted by the COMELEC.
Physical Transport of SD Cards
• After Elections, BEI will remove the
Main Memory SD Card from SLOT A
of the VCM.
• At no times will SLOT B be opened.
It will be sealed and will be kept inside
the VCM for retrieval by Smartmatic.

• The Main SD Card will be placed inside

Envelope A18-A and seal the same.
• BEI will mark the envelope whether
“TRANSMITTED” or “NOT
TRANSMITTED” as the case may be.
• BEI will turn over the envelope to the
Reception and Custody Group
(RCG) of the City/Municipal Board
of Canvassers
Consolidation and
Canvassing
The Consolidation and Canvassing System (CCS)
CONSOLIDATION/CANVASSING
SYSTEM (CCS)
1. Switch On CCS
2. Initialization/Zero Report
3. Receiving/Monitoring Transmissions
4. Canvassing
5. Printing of COCs, SOVs and other reports
6. Actual Transmission (to the next
canvassing level)
7. Physical Transport of Data (DVDs/CDs)
CONSOLIDATION/CANVASSING
SYSTEM (CCS)
PROCEDURE AT PROVINCIAL LEVEL

CONGRESS COMELEC

PBOC

CBOC/MBOC

BEI
PROCEDURE HIGHLY-URBANIZED CITY LEVEL

CONGRESS COMELEC

CBOC

BEI
 CONSOLIDATION/CANVASSING
SYSTEM (CCS)
B. MUNICIPAL/CITY LEVEL

City and Municipal Board of Canvassers

(BOC) (1,634)
City Board of Canvassers (CBOC) (144)
Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC)
(1,490)
Composed of:
• Chairman: Election Officer (CBOC &
MBOC)
• Vice Chair: City Prosecutor (CBOC),
Municipal Treasurer (MBOC)
DUTIES OF THE MBOC/CBOC:
• Canvass the votes by consolidating the
electronically transmitted results or the results
contained in the data storage devices used in
the printing of ERs;
• Issue: [a] the City/Municipal Certificate of
Canvass (CCOC/MCOC); and [b] Statement of
Votes (SOV) by precinct; and
• Issue Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation
(COCP) for winning city/municipal officials.

• Secretary: City Superintendent of

Schools (CBOC), District School
Supervisor (MBOC)
Printing of Certificates of
Canvass (COCs)
Printing of Statement of Votes
(SOVs)
CITY/MUNICIPAL LEVEL:

City/Municipal Board Canvassers (CBOC/MBOC)

prints thirty (30) copies of the certificates of
canvass (CCOC/MCOC) and within one (1) hour after
the printing of the certificate of canvass,
electronically transmits the canvassing results to
the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC). [Section
22, Paragraph 5, RA 8436, as amended]
CITY/MUNICIPAL LEVEL:

City/Municipal Board of Canvassers (CBOC/MBOC) prints thirty (30) copies of the

Certificate of Canvass (CCOC/MCOC) and transmits as follows (subject to change upon
issuance of General Instructions for BOCs):

1 Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC)

2 COMELEC
3 CBOC/MBOC Chairman
4 Citizens’ Arm (PPCRV)
5 Congress
6 Posted on a wall within the premises of the canvassing center
7 Dominant Majority Party
8 Dominant Minority Party
9-18 Ten (10) accredited major national parties (excluding the dominant majority and dominant
minority parties)
19- 20 Two (2) accredited major local parties
21-25 National broadcast or print media entities as determined by COMELEC
26-27 Local broadcast or print media entities as may be determined by COMELEC
28-30 Major citizen’s arms, including the accredited citizen’s arm, and other non-partisan groups
or organizations enlisted by COMELEC

The CCOCs/MCOCs shall be supported by a STATEMENT OF VOTES (SOV) BY PRECINCT

CBOC/MBOC Chair announces posting of 6th copy of CCOC/MCOC with SOV

CBOC/MBOC to PBOC
PROCEDURE AT PROVINCIAL LEVEL

CONGRESS COMELEC

PBOC

CBOC/MBOC

BEI
 CONSOLIDATION/CANVASSING
SYSTEM (CCS)
C. PROVINCIAL LEVEL
Provincial Board of Canvassers
(PBOC) (81)
Composed of:
• Chairman: Provincial Election
Supervisor (PES)
• Vice Chair: Provincial
Prosecutor
• Secretary: Provincial
Superintendent of Schools
DUTIES OF THE PBOC:
• Canvass the votes by consolidating the
electronically transmitted results or the results
contained in the data storage devices used in
the printing of ERs;
• Issue: [a] the Provincial Certificate of Canvass
(PCOC); and [b] Statement of Votes (SOV) by
Municipality/City; and
• Issue Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation
(COCP) for winning provincial officials.
Provincial CCS

Same CCS as that used by CBOC/MBOC with

identical features and procedures (i.e.,
switch on, initialization/zero report,
receiving/monitoring transmissions,
canvassing, printing of PCOCs and actual
transmission to the next canvassing level)
shall be used by the PBOC.
PROVINCIAL LEVEL:

Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) produces fourteen (14) copies of the Certificate of Canvass
(PCOC) and transmits as follows (subject to change upon issuance of General Instructions for
BOCs):

1 Congress
2 COMELEC
3 PBOC Chairman
4 Citizens’ Arm (PPCRV)
5 Congress (the provision of RA 9369 mentions Congress twice)
6 Posted on a wall within the premises of the canvassing center
7 Dominant Majority Party
8 Dominant Minority Party
9-10 Two (2) accredited major national parties representing the majority and minority, excluding the
dominant majority and minority parties
11-13 National broadcast or print media entities as determined by COMELEC
14 Another citizens’ arm or in the absence thereof, to a non-partisan group or organization
enlisted by COMELEC
The PCOCs shall be supported by a STATEMENT OF VOTES (SOV) BY CITY/MUNICIPALITY
PBOC Chair announces posting of 6th copy of PCOC with SOV
PBOC/HUCBOC to NATIONAL (Congress
and COMELEC)
PROCEDURE AT PROVINCIAL LEVEL

CONGRESS COMELEC

PBOC

CBOC/MBOC

BEI
PROCEDURE HIGHLY-URBANIZED CITY LEVEL

CONGRESS COMELEC

CBOC

BEI
NATIONAL LEVEL:
• Congress (as National Board of Canvassers for
Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections)

• COMELEC (as National Board of Canvassers

for Senate and Party-List elections)

Tasks:

1. Canvass Provincial Certificates of Canvass

(PCOC) and City/District Certificates of
Canvass (CCOC/DCOC)

2. Issue the National Certificate of Canvass

(NCOC) and proclaim winners of Presidential,
Vice-Presidential, Senatorial and Party-List
elections
Past Election Issues
2010 National and Local Elections
Past Election Issues
• Compact Flash Card Configuration

 On 03 May 2010, or a week before the May 10, 2010 Elections, a problem
with the configuration of the Compact Flash (CF) Cards arose. COMELEC
decided to make the line spacing on the local side of the ballot double-
spaced. Smartmatic failed to configure the CF Card to treat the local side
as double-spaced. This resulted in the PCOS failing to properly read the
local positions properly thinking that the spacing was still single-spaced.
 Smartmatic was able to identify the problem and had to reconfigure and
replace all 76,347 CF Cards before Election Day which involved purchasing
additional CF Cards from abroad.

 Although a majority of the CF Cards were replaced nationwide, this

resulted however, in some precincts failing to get their CF Cards on time
which lead to some delays in the conduct of elections in those areas.

 To note, no cases of electoral fraud related to this issue have been

substantiated.
Past Election Issues
• Transmission Issues

The available telecom infrastructure at the time was not able to

sufficiently cover all precincts with the required quality of service
via the General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) protocol and was only
able to cover approximately 70% of the precincts nationwide. This
required the use of satellite phones such as Broadband Global Are
Network (BGAN) and Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT). This,
however, still did not enable some precincts to electronically
transmit their respective election return data which resulted to
resorting to the contingency measure of manually delivering the CF
Cards to the canvassing centers and uploading the data into the
CCS manually.

The effect is that the Transparency Server and COMELEC Central

Server were not able to receive the data from the PCOS concerned
which resulted in incomplete collection of PCOS election return data
at the national level.
Past Election Issues
• Ultraviolet (UV) Mark

Printing problems prevented the PCOS to read the UV marks on a

consistent basis which constrained COMELEC to disable the security
feature in all PCOS machines.

COMELEC also decided to change the Smartmatic designed UV mark

to one made by the National Printing Office. This effectively
prevented re-enabling the UV security feature in the event that the
printing problems were resolved.

The BEIs were later issued UV lamps to allow them to inspect the
UV marking manually. But not all BEIs were properly oriented to the
added procedure which resulted in some areas not using the said
UV lamps.
Past Election Issues
• Time Stamps

 Included as a security feature, some PCOS machines reported wrong

transmission dates and times. This was mainly due to inaccurate internal
clocks that were caused by either a loss of battery that resulted in a reset
or an incorrect configuration of said internal clocks.

• Final Testing and Sealing (FTS) Results

 On Election Day, some PCOS erroneously electronically transmitted FTS

results instead of the actual precinct election return/results data.
Approximately 262 clustered precincts in 177 municipalities accounting for
186,275 votes were affected by this issue. Main cause was due to BEIs
filing to follow procedure in re-zeroing the PCOS during FTS.

 Due to this issue, COMELEC was constrained to allow manually making

changes in the CCS itself.
Past Election Issues
• Hardware Failure

 There had been instances of hardware equipment failure. On Election Day,

a total of 450 PCOS machines failed, representing a failure rate of 0.6 %
or well below the 2.75% estimate. Moreover, only 4 CCS laptops our of
1,717 failed, resulting in a failure rate of 0.2%.

• Replacement of Defective CF Cards

 As a contingency measure, COMELEC distributed CF Card writes to its

personnel in the filed. This move was intended to speed up the
replacement of damaged/defective CF Cards on the ground during Election
Day.

 It is worth pointing out that, similar to the previously stated CF Card

configuration issue, no cases of electoral fraud related to this issue have
been substantiated.
Past Election Issues
• Thermal Paper

There have been reports that the printing on the thermal papers
began fading well before the guaranteed 5-year period.

Additional reports of thermal paper running out on some areas

which constrained the use of ordinary, non-COMELEC authenticated
thermal paper.

Main cause for the depletion of the thermal paper was attributed to
accidental over-printing of copies of ERs.

A similar situation may be encountered during the May 9, 2016

elections given that the Voters' Verification Paper Audit Trail
(VVPAT) function is now enabled in all the VCMs.
Past Election Issues
• Long Lines

 Still susceptible in the May 9, 2016 elections especially due to the enabling
of the VVPAT function in all VCMs.

• Ballot Stuffing

 Cases involve filling out of unused ballots at the end of Election Day or by
pre-shading of ballots, particularly in controlled/compromised precincts.

 Still susceptible in the May 9, 2016 elections.

• Vote Buying

 Still susceptible in the May 9, 2016 elections.

Past Election Issues
• Inaccurate Voters' List

 Still susceptible in the May 9, 2016 elections.

• Ballot Printing

 Errors in the printing of ballots which resulted in rejection by the PCOS machines

 Still susceptible in the May 9, 2016 elections.

• Null Votes

 PCOS failing to properly count the votes as appearing on the ballots.

 Still susceptible in the May 9, 2016 elections.

Past Election Issues
• Lowering of Threshold

 Reports that some municipalities were quick to lower their threshold, while
others refused to lower despite an insurmountable lead by the local
candidate.

 For the May 9, 2016 elections, it was proposed that lowering of thresholds
would only affect local positions while continuing the counting for the
national positions. The current AES is configured to handle this situation.

• Other Issues

 There have been reports of BEIs failing to adhere to protocol in return and
retrieval of equipment and paraphernalia which resulted in PCOS machines
and CF Cards being brought outside the polling areas.
Critical Areas (Red Flags)
CRITICAL AREAS (Red Flags)
1. Final Testing and Sealing (FTS)

2. Random Manual Audit

3. Transmission of Election Results

4. Canvassing of Votes
CRITICAL AREAS (Red Flags)
1. Final Testing and Sealing (FTS)

 This shall serve as the final testing of the VCM and other equipment
upon delivery to the voting areas to check for errors and/or
malfunctions.

 Final Testing and Sealing will be conducted within May 2 to 6, 2016.

 Pollwatchers deployed at the Polling/Voting Centers and the canvassing

centers in the cities/municipalities/provinces to IMMEDIATELY
REPORT to their respective coordinators of any discrepancies and/or
irregularities following the Communications Protocol

Procedure:

1. Test ballots to be manually counted.

2. Test ballots to be fed into VCM for automated count.
3. Manual count to be compared with automated count.
4. If no discrepancy, VCM to be re-sealed (GREEN sticker).
CRITICAL AREAS (Red Flags)
2. Random Manual Audit (RMA)
 Coverage: 1 Clustered Precinct (1 VCM) per Legislative District based on
proportionate allocation of VCMs per Legislative District.
 To be conducted immediately after the sealing of the ballot boxes by the BEI and
at the polling places of the selected VCMs.
 Notice by COMELEC of the selected VCMs shall not be later than May 5, 2016
or 4 days prior to the May 9, 2016 Elections.
 Pollwatchers deployed at the Polling/Voting Centers and the canvassing centers
in the cities/municipalities/provinces to IMMEDIATELY REPORT to their
respective coordinators of any discrepancies and/or irregularities following the
Communications Protocol
Procedure:
1. Randomly chosen Clustered Precincts to conduct manual count of ballots
after electronic transmission of results.
2. If there’s discrepancy (exceeds allowable margin of aggregate difference of
10 ballots), RMA Team to notify candidates, conduct manual count and turn
over results to COMELEC Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) to
determine root cause.
3. Effect of discrepancy: Results shall not delay the proclamation of the
winning candidates based on the results reached by the AES.
CRITICAL AREAS (Red Flags)
3. Transmission of Election Results
 Pollwatchers shall ensure that the election results
transmitted from the VCM (at BEI level) to the
CCS (at BOC level) contain no discrepancy.
 Pollwatchers to secure (5th) copy of the ER.
 Pollwatchers shall follow the Communications
Protocol to IMMEDIATELY REPORT results and
any incidents to their respective coordinators.
 All pollwatchers must turn over the printed
ERs to their respective coordinators
CRITICAL AREAS (Red Flags)
3. Canvassing of Votes

 Provincial and City Coordinators shall follow

the Communications Protocol to
IMMEDIATELY REPORT results and any
incidents to National HQ (Balay)

 Provincial and City Coordinators must

secure all printed copies of ERs, COCs
and SOVs and physically transport to the
National HQ (Balay)!
Continuity Plan
CONTINUITY PLAN
Types of Systems Breakdown
1. VCM fails to scan/count
2. VCM able to scan but fails to print ER
3. VCM able to print ER but fails to
transmit
4. Consolidation/Canvassing System
(CCS) able to receive transmission
but fails to consolidate
CONTINUITY PLAN
1. VCM Failure to Scan/Count/Print: BEI shall wait for
spare VCM to complete its process before it is reconfigured
for scanning and/or printing of ballots.

2. VCM Failure to Transmit: Defective VCM shall be

connected to another functioning VCM or transmission facility
(modem/satellite phone). If this fails, the Main SD Card
shall be physically transported to canvassing center in
the presence of pollwatchers and security escorts.

3. CCS Failure to Consolidate: Removable storage device of

defective CCS shall be transferred to available functioning
CCS.
Continuity Plan
 In all cases, Pollwatchers shall follow the
Communications Protocol to
IMMEDIATELY REPORT results and/or any
incidents to their respective coordinators

 In all cases, Provincial and City Coordinators

shall follow the Communications Protocol
to IMMEDIATELY REPORT results and/or
any incidents to National HQ (Balay)
Communications
Protocol
Communications Protocol
• The Communications Protocol (CP) shall serve as the
rules and procedures for communication and sharing of
information/data from the National HQ (Balay), as the legal
coordinating body of the Liberal Party (LP), to the various
Lawyers, Coordinators and Pollwatchers on the ground for
the 2016 National and Local Elections;

• Communication includes, but not limited to: (a) Election

Results for President and Vice-President as appearing on the
printed ERs for each VCM (clustered precinct); and (b)
description of Red Flags/Alerts and other contingencies.
Periods and Timelines
Final Testing and Election Day Post-Election and
Sealing Canvassing

May 2 to 6, 2016 May 9, 2016 onwards Once VCM transmissions

are received by the
Municipal/City/Provincial
CCSs onwards

Until FTS ends for all VCMs Once VCM transmissions May 19, 2016
and CCSs begin and onwards (Canvassing)

Further scheduled FTS (in National (Congress) begins

case of breakdown/recall receiving transmission
of VCMs/CCSs) from CCSs of PBOCs and
HUC BOCs

Random Manual Audit

(RMA) Results/Reports
Flow and Type of Information
• Poll Watchers at the VCM level to Lawyers and Coordinators
concerned:
(a) report results of Final Testing and Sealing;
(b) transmit election results; and
(c) relay developments/contingencies (e.g., manual count)
via SMS

• Lawyers, City/Municipal Coordinators or Pollwatchers at

the CCS level to Provincial Coordinators & National HQ:
(a) report results of Final Testing and Sealing;
(b) transmit election results; and
(c) relay developments/contingencies (e.g., manual count)
via SMS
Flow and Type of Information
• Lawyers, Provincial Coordinators to National HQ:
(a) report results of Final Testing and Sealing;
(b) transmit election results; and
(c) relay developments/contingencies (e.g., manual count) via SMS

• National HQ (Balay) to Lawyers, Coordinators, and when exigencies require,

to Pollwatchers:
(a) instructions;
(b) election results;
(c) election data/information; and
(d) other relevant information
SMS Templates
For Election Results
• For President, text:
“ER_PRES_CP#_VC_BINAY/MIRIAM/DUTERTE/POE/MAR/SENERES”
“ER PRES 123458765 800 20/30/20/20/555/0”
• For Vice-President, text:
“ER_PRES_CP#_VC_CAYETANO/CHIZ/GRINGO/MARCOS/LENI/TRILLANES”

For Other Information/Data/Reports:

“ALERT_CITY/MUNICIPALITY_CP#_[Description of Report/Incident/Other
Information]”
“ALERT MANILA 123458765 NO TRANSMISSION ANG VCM”
*Legend: ER- Election Returns, CP#- Clustered Precinct no., VC- Votes Cast
Communications Protocol
• The BANTAY BOTO (BB) PHONE DIRECTORY will be
distributed before FTS period (May 2 to 6, 2016)

• Please make sure to save the numbers in your mobile

phones as soon as possible to avoid delay during FTS
and Election Day

• Please make sure your phone has enough load to

make calls, text and/or have data connectivity
 AMING
SALAMAT SA INYONG LAHAT!
Prepared by the Liberal Party Legal-IT Group (LIG)
Members:
Atty. Eloi Sy
Atty. Gladys Cagadoc-Velasco
Atty. Beng Sardillo
Atty. Patrick Mabbagu
Atty. Kin Firme
Atty. Arthur Alicer

EMAIL: lplegal.16@gmail.com