People v Jumawan

FACTS:

Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married and have four children.

On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the
accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in Cagayan de Oro
City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex
with him.

As to the charge of rape according to KKK, conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital
problems between her and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He treated
her well and she, of course, responded with equal degree of enthusiasm. However, in 1997, he started to
be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in
her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would resist his
sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission.

One night, in the spouse’s bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed
but she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near the
bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: “Why are you lying on the cot?”, and to
instantaneously order: “You transfer here to our bed.”

KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain due to
her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the
bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up
from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed.

The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to
copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and
reiterating that she was not feeling well.

The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by
holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides. KKK stayed defiant
by refusing to bend her legs.
 The accused-appellant then raised KKK’s daster,41 stretched her legs apart and rested his own
legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As
he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by desperately shouting: “Don ‘t do that
to me because I’m not feeling well.”

Accused raised the defense of denial and alleged that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as
her revenge because he took over the control and management of their businesses, and to cover up her
extra-marital affairs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there can be a marital rape.

HELD:

YES. The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property rights over their wives’
bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape.

Violation of equal protection clause

The Court ruled that to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in terms
of the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal
protection clause.

The Court found that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and non-
marital rape. The various rationales which have been asserted in defense of the exemption are either
based upon archaic notions about the consent and property rights incident to marriage or are simply
unable to withstand even the slightest scrutiny.
 The Court declared the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be
unconstitutional.

Said exemption states that a husband was endowed with absolute immunity from prosecution
for the rape of his wife. The privilege was personal and pertained to him alone. He had the marital right
to rape his wife but he will be liable when he aids or abets another person in raping her.

Moreover, Section 1 of RA 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist’s legal
relationship with his victim.

Implied consent theory untenable

The Court also ruled against the application of implied consent theory which was raised by the
accused. The accused argued that consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting husband and
wife unless the contrary is proved.

According to the Court, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists
within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits sexual
violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration,
defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.

People v Genosa

CASE DIGEST: People v. Genosa, GR No. 135981

Title: People v. Genosa, GR No. 135981

Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Art. 11(1) and Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code

Facts:

Marivic Genosa, the appellant, on November 15, 1995, attacked and wounded his husband which
ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant, she did not provoke her husband when she got
home that night and it was her husband who began the provocation. The appellant said she was
frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby
safely.
The appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five times,
but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. The appellant said that the reason why
Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because he was crazy about his recent girlfriend,
Lulu Rubillos. The appellant, after being interviewed by specialist, has been shown to be suffering from
Battered Woman Syndrome. The appellant with a plea of self-defense admitted the killing of her
husband. She was found guilty of the crime of parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery,
for the husband was attacked while asleep.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense.

(2) Whether or not treachery attended the killing.

Held:

For the first issue, the SC held that the defense failed to establish all the elements of self-defense arising
from battered woman syndrome, to wit: (a) Each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven
to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimated partner;
(b) The final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the
battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that
she needed to use force in order to save her life, and; (c) At the time of the killing, the batterer must
have posed probable – not necessarily immediate and actual – grave harm to the accused based on the
history of violence perpetuated by the former against the latter.

For the second issue, the SC ruled out treachery as an aggravating circumstance because the quarrel or
argument that preceded the killing must have forewarned the victim of the assailant’s aggression.

People v Macal

Manuel killed his wife using an improvised bladed weapon (belt buckle) and a kitchen knife. He did not
refute the allegations of the prosecution that he killed his wife. What crime did he commit?

He committed the crime of Parricide. The essential elements of parricide are duly established. First, the
fact of Auria's death is incontestable. Second, there is no doubt that Auria was killed by the accused. The
stabbing incident was acknowledged by the accused himself. Third, the spousal relationship between
Auria and the accused is beyond dispute. This is admitted by the accused. The prosecution also produced
a copy of the couple's marriage certificate which the defense admitted to be a genuine and faithful
reproduction of the original.
People v Abarca

Recall the following FACTS:

Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco Abarca, Jenny, had illicit relationship. The illicit
relationship apparently began while the accused was in Manila reviewing for the 1983 Bar examinations.
The accused missed his itineraries that day so he decided to go home. Upon reaching home, the accused
found his wife, Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and Koh noticed
the accused, the wife pushed her paramour who got his revolver. The accused who was then peeping
above the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ran away.

The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. He went to the house of a PC soldier, got an M-
16 rifle, and went back to his house but he was not able to find his wife and Koh there. He proceeded to
the “mahjong session” as it was the “hangout” of Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh playing mahjong.
He fired at Kingsley Koh three times with his rifle hitting Koh, as well as Arnold and Lina Amparado who
were occupying a room adjacent to the room where Koh was playing mahjong. Kingsley Koh died
instantaneously. Arnold Amparado was hospitalized and

operated on in the kidney to remove a bullet Arnold’s wife, Lina Amparado, was also treated in the
hospital as she was hit by bullet fragments.

The accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of murder with double
frustrated murder as charged in the amended information, and pursuant to Art. 63 of the Revised Penal
Code which does not consider the effect of mitigating or aggravating circumstances when the law
prescribes a single indivisible penalty in relation to Art. 48, he is sentenced to death.

In the above Abarca case, the issue is NOT really on the nature of Art. 247 but the alleged errors:

I.

IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIME AS CHARGED INSTEAD OF ENTERING A

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION UNDER ARTICLE 247 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE;

II.

IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING WAS AMENDED BY THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF

TREACHERY.

The defense believes that a conviction under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code is proper instead of
COMPLEX CRIME OF MURDER WITH DOUBLE FRUSTRATED MURDER. The Court believes so. “We agree
with the Solicitor General that the aforequoted provision applies in the instant case. There is no question
that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in this case, in the act of illicit
copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate outburst. Article
247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in
the act or immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this case. The trial court, in convicting
the accused-appellant of murder, therefore erred.”
To support the ruling that the trial court in convicting the accused of murder (as complexed with double
frustrated murder), the Supreme Court cited Araquel that Article 247 does not define an offense, that
PUNISHMENT IS NOT INFLICTED UPON THE ACCUSED, that the accused is BANISHED, but that is intended
for his protection. Recall that the original purpose of this pronouncement in Araquel is to settle the issue
of jurisdiction and double jeopardy. Here in Abarca, the purpose is to establish that THERE IS, AND
THERE CAN BE, NO MURDER because THERE IS NO CRIME TO QUALIFY AS MURDER.

“It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death under exceptional circumstances, not being a punishable
act, cannot be qualified by either aggravating or mitigating or other qualifying circumstances, We cannot
accordingly appreciate treachery in this case.” There is nothing in this pronouncement that Art. 247 is
not felonious. What is meant by the Supreme Court is that Art. 247 is NOT A CRIME separate and distinct
from homicide and physical injuries which is necessarily included under the same family of crimes
against person. Up to this point of the decision, the Supreme Court is still consistent with its ruling with
the En Banc case of Araquel.In resolving the liability of the accused as to Spouses Amparado, the
Supreme Court disagrees with the recommendation of the Solicitor General in finding of DOUBLE
FRUSTRATED MURDER against the accused. Instead,here was a finding of NEGLIGENCE on the part of the
accused. This is where the CONFUSION starts. Having relied on the phrases “Article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code does not define and provide for a specific crime” and “punishment is not inflicted”, the
Supreme Court apparently have inadvertently made another phrase that leads to a very stray concept –
“not a punishable act”.