Petitioners now assail Section 45(j) as unconstitutional for vagueness as it does not

refer to any particular provision of RA No. 8189. Petitioners claim a violation of their
constitutional right under the due process clause.[3] Petitioners assert that a penal
statute must provide fair notice of what is a criminal act and what is a lawful
act. Petitioners claim that Section 45(j), a penal law that carries the penalty of
imprisonment from one to six years,[4] violates their constitutional right to fair notice
because it is vague.

Prof. Erwin Chemerinsky, a distinguished American textbook writer on

Constitutional Law, explains clearly the exception of overbreadth to the rule
prohibiting third-party standing in this manner:

The third exception to the prohibition against third-party

standing is termed the overbreadth doctrine. A person generally can
argue that a statute is unconstitutional as it is applied to him or her; the
individual cannot argue that a statute is unconstitutional as it is applied
to third parties not before the court. For example, a defendant in a
criminal trial can challenge the constitutionality of the law that is the
basis for the prosecution solely on the claim that the statute
unconstitutionally abridges his or her constitutional rights. The
overbreadth doctrine is an exception to the prohibition against third-
party standing. It permits a person to challenge a statute on the ground
that it violates the First Amendment (free speech) rights of third parties
not before the court, even though the law is constitutional as applied to
that defendant. In other words, the overbreadth doctrine provides that:
Given a case or controversy, a litigant whose own activities are
unprotected may nevertheless challenge a statute by showing that it
substantially abridges the First Amendment rights of other parties not
before the court.[8]

The overbreadth doctrine is closely related to the vagueness doctrine.[9] Both

doctrines are often simultaneously invoked to mount facial challenges to statutes
violating free speech.[10]

The doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness, as devices to mount facial

challenges to penal or non-penal statutes violating free speech, are not applicable
to the present petition for two reasons. First, petitioners here assert a violation of their
own constitutional rights, not the rights of third-parties.Second, the challenged
statute - Section 45(j) of RA No. 8189, does not involve free speech. Thus, any
invocation of the doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness to mount a facial challenge
in the present case is grossly misplaced.
The term election campaign or partisan political activity refers to an act designed to
promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office
which shall include:

(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons

for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a
candidate;

(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar
assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a candidate.

(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or

against the election of any candidate for public office;

(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or

oppose the election of any candidate; or

(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a

candidate.

It should be clear that the phrase partisan political activities, in its statutory context,
relates to acts designed to cause the success or the defeat of a particular candidate or
candidates who have filed certificates of candidacy to a public office in an election.
The taking of an oath of office by any incoming President of the Republic before the
Chief Justice of the Philippines is a traditional official function of the Highest
Magistrate. The assailed presence of other justices of the Court at such an event could
be no different from their appearance in such other official functions as attending
the Annual State of the Nation Address by the President of the Philippines before the
Legislative Department.

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on
January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of
Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued for
recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his
filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case,
the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be
produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority
and also for its presumed validity. 2

Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no
shirking of the task for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any
other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.

It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in
precise and unmistakable language to avoid controversies that might arise on their
correct interpretation. That is the Ideal. In the case of the due process clause,
however, this rule was deliberately not followed and the wording was purposely kept
ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was submitted in the
Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel,
Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it. He
was sustained by the body. 10