27. VDA. DE NUECA v. MANILA RAILROAD CO.

Facts:

At 3 p.m. on Dec. 22, 1958, Fermin Nueca brought 7 sacks of palay to Manila RailroadCo. (MRC) at its
station in Barrio del Rosario, Camarines Sur, to be shipped to themunicipality of Libmanan of the same
province.

He paid P0.70 as freight charge and was issued Way Bill No. 56515.

The cargo was loaded on the freight wagon of Train 537. Passengers boarded thetrain and shunting
operations started to hook a wagon thereto.

Before the train reached the turnoff switch, its passenger coach fell on its side some40 m from the
station. The wagon pinned Nueca, killing him instantly.

Nueca’s widow and children bring this claim for damages, alleging that the Nueca

was a passenger and

his death was caused by MRC’s negligence.

MRC disclaimed liability stating: (1) it exercised due care in safeguarding thepassengers during the
shunting operation, (2) Nueca was
not a passenger

but atrespasser, (3) even if Nueca were a passenger, he illegally boarded the train withoutpermission by
not paying the fare, (4) the mishap was not attributable to any defectin MRC equipment, (5) that the
accident happened due to force majeur.

MRC presented evidence showing there was no mechanical defect, but it did notexplain why the
accident occurred or show that force majeur caused the mishap.

The lower court absolved MRC of liability and held that Nueca was a trespasser sincehe did not buy
any ticket, and in any case, was not in a proper place for passengers.

Issue:

1. W/N Nueca was a passenger? no

2. W/N MRC is liable? YES
3. Was the accident due to MRC’s negligence or force majeur? Negligence
4. Is Nueca liable for contributory negligence? NO

Held:

1. No, Nueca was not a passenger thus, MRC did not owe him extraordinary diligence.A passenger
is one who travels in a public conveyance by virtue of a contract, express orimplied, with the
carrier as to the payment of the fare, or that which is accepted as anequivalent.The relation of
passenger and carrier commences when one puts himself in the care of thecarrier, or directly
under its control, with the bona fide intention of becoming a passenger, andis accepted as such
by the carrier as where he makes a contract for transportation andpresents himself at the
proper place and in a proper manner to be transported.Even disregarding the matter of tickets,
and assuming Nueca intended to be a passenger, hewas never accepted as such by MRC as he
did not present himself at the proper place and in aproper manner to be transported.
2. Yes, the liability of railroad companies to persons upon the premises is determinedby the
general rules of negligence relating to duties of owners/occupiers of property.While railroad
companies are not bound to the same degree of care in regard to strangers whoare unlawfully
upon the premises of its passengers, it may still be liable to such strangers fornegligent or
tortious acts.Here, Nueca was not on the track, but either unlawfully inside the baggage car or
beside thetrack.It is normal for people to walk on the track or roadbed when there is no
 oncoming train and towalk beside the track when a train passes. This practice is tolerated by
MRC. Generally, MRC’s stations are not enclosed, and is easily accessible to the public.

3. MRC is negligent; doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied.The train was under the complete control
of the railroad company at the time of the accident.The baggage car would not have
been derailed if the train had been properly operated.Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence
peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes thatprima facie negligence may be
established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute forspecific proof of negligence.

4. No.An invitation to stay in the premises is implied from the lack of prohibition to outsiders to
keepoff the premises, hence, a stranger who is injured by a derailed train while staying beside
arailroad track is not guilty of contributory negligence.
Transportation Case Digest: Dangwa
Transportation Co. Inc. V. CA Et Al. (1991)
G.R. No. 95582 October 7, 1991
Lessons Applicable: Actionable Document (Transportation)
Laws Applicable: Art. 1733, Art. 1755

FACTS:
 May 13, 1985: Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to
Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc. (Dangwa)
 The bus was at full stop bet. Bunkhouses 53 and 54 when Pedro alighted
 Pedro Cudiamat fell from the platform of the bus when it suddenly accelerated
forward
 Pedro was ran over by the rear right tires of the vehicle
 Theodore first brought his other passengers and cargo to their respective
destinations before bringing Pedro to Lepanto Hospital where he expired
 Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against Dangwa for the death of
Pedro Cudiamat
 Dangwa: observed and continued to observe the extraordinary diligence required in
the operation of the co. and the supervision of the employees even as they are not
absolute insurers of the public at large
 RTC: in favour of Dangwa holding Pedrito as negligent and his negligence was the
cause of his death but still ordered to pay in equity P 10,000 to the heirs of Pedrito
 CA: reversed and ordered to pay Pedrito indemnity, moral damages, actual and
compensatory damages and cost of the suit

ISSUE: W/N Dangwa should be held liable for the negligence of its driver Theodore

HELD: YES. CA affirmed.

 A public utility once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders
(EVEN when moving as long as it is still slow in motion)
 Duty of the driver: do NOT make acts that would have the effect of increasing peril
to a passenger while he is attempting to board the same
 Premature acceleration of the bus in this case = breach of duty
 Stepping and standing on the platform of the bus is already considered a passenger
and is entitled all the rights and protection pertaining to such a contractual relation
 Duty extends to boarding and alighting
 GR: By contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport
the passenger to his destination safely and observe extraordinary diligence with a
due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the
passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier
 EX: carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in
Art. 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code
 Failure to immediately bring Pedrito to the hospital despite his serious condition =
patent and incontrovertible proof of their negligence
 Hospital was in Bunk 56
 1st proceeded to Bunk 70 to allow a passenger (who later called the family of Pedrito
on his own will) to alight and deliver a refrigerator
 In tort, actual damages is based on net earnings
LRT vs. NAVIDAD
G.R. No. 145804. February 6, 2003

FACTS:

Navidad was drunk when he entered the boarding platform of the LRT. He got into an
altercation with the SG Escartin. They had a fistfight and Navidad fell onto the tracks and
was killed when a train came and ran over him.

The Heirs of Navidad filed a complaint for damages against Escartin, the train driver,
(Roman) the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization and Prudent Security Agency (Prudent).
The trial court found Prudent and Escartin jointly and severally liable for damages to the
heirs. The CA exonerated Prudent and instead held the LRTA and the train driver Romero
jointly and severally liable as well as removing the award for compensatory damages and
replacing it with nominal damages.

The reasoning of the CA was that a contract of carriage already existed between Navidad
and LRTA (by virtue of his havA ing purchased train tickets and the liability was caused by
the mere fact of Navidad's death after being hit by the train being managed by the LRTA
and operated by Roman. The CA also blamed LRTA for not having presented expert
evidence showing that the emergency brakes could not have stopped the train on time.

ISSUE: Whether the company is liable as a common carrier

Ruling:

 In case of death or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have

been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755
 Art. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers
through the negligence or wilful acts of the former’s employees, although such
employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the
orders of the common carriers

This liability of the common carriers does NOT cease upon proof that they
Exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employees

 Art. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on

account of the wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the
common carrier’s employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father
of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
La Mallorca v. CA

Facts:

Mariano Beltran and his family rode a bus owned by petitioner. Upon reaching their desired destination,
they alighted from the bus. But Mariano returned to get their baggage. His youngest daughter followed
him without his knowledge. When he stepped into the bus again, it suddenly accelerated. Mariano’s
daughter was found dead. The bus ran over her.

Issue:

Whether the liability of a common carrier extends even after the passenger had alighted

Held:

The relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the
carrier’s vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the
passenger has had a reasonable time or reasonable opportunity to leave the current premises.
Aboitiz Shipping Corp. vs. CA Case Digest
Aboitiz Shipping Corp. vs. Court of Appeals

(179 SCRA 95)

Facts: On May 11, 1975, Anacleto Viana boarded M/|V Antonio from Occidental Mindoro bound for
Manila. Upon arrival on May 12, 1975, the passengers therein disembarked through a gangplank
connecting the vessel to the pier. Viana, instead of disembarking through the gangplank,
disembarked through the third deck, which was at the same level with the pier. An hour after the
passengers disembarked, Pioneer stevedoring started to operate in unloading the cargo from the
ship. Viana then went back, remembering some of his cargoes left at the vessel. At that time, while
he was pointing at the crew of the vessel to where his cargoes were loaded, the crane hit him,
pinning him between the crane and the side of the vessel. He was brought to the hospital where he
died 3 days after (May 15). The parents of Anacleto filed a complaint against Aboitiz for breach of
contract of carriage.

The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. Then both Aboitiz and Pioneer filed a motion for
reconsideration, upon which the trial court issued an order absolving Pioneer from liability but not
Aboitiz. On appeal, CA affirmed the trial court ruling. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not Viana is still considered a passenger at the time of the incident?

Held: Yes. The La Mallorca case is applicable in the case at bar.

The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed
at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner’s dock or premises. Once created, the
relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely
alighted from the carrier’s conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s
premises. All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance
are to be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule
is to be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his
baggage and prepare for his departure. The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely
by the fact that the person transported has been carried to his destination if, for example, such
person remains in the carrier’s premises to claim his baggage.

The reasonableness of the time should be made to depend on the attending circumstances of the
case, such as the kind of common carrier, the nature of its business, the customs of the place, and
so forth, and therefore precludes a consideration of the time element per se without taking into
account such other factors.

Where a passenger dies or is injured, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently. This gives rise to an action for breach of contract where all that is required of
plaintiff is to prove the existence of the contract of carriage and its non-performance by the carrier,
that is, the failure of the carrier to carry the passenger safely to his destination, which, in the instant
case, necessarily includes its failure to safeguard its passenger with extraordinary diligence while
such relation subsists.
Air France vs. Carrascoso

Fact The plain±f, Ra²ael Carrascoso, paid ²or and was issued a “First class” ±cket by Air France ²rom
Manila to Rome. During a stopover in Bangkok, the manager o² Air France asked the plain±f to vacate his
seat because a white man has a “be³er right” than him. At ´rst, the plain±f protested, but, as things got
heated up, he was asked by the other Filipinos on board to give up his seat and trans²er in the tourist
class. Aµer the trip, Carrascoso sued Air France ²or the embarrassment and inconvenience he sufered.
The trail court awarded damages to the plain±f which was a¶rmed by the Court o² Appeals. Air France
assailed the decision. According to them, the issuance o² a ´rst class ±cket does not guarantee
Carrascoso a seat in the ´rst Class.

Issue: Whether or not Air France is liable ²or the damages to Carrascoso and on what basis

Decision: Yes. Air France is liable based on culpa contractual and culpa aquiliana. Culpa Contractual
There exists a contract o² carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was a contract to ²urnish
Carrasocoso a ´rst class passage; Second , That said contract was breached when Air France ²ailed to
²urnish ´rst class transporta±on at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad ²aith when Air France’s
employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his ´rst class accommoda±on berth “afer he was already,
seated” and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason o² which he sufered inconvenience,
embarrassments and humilia±ons, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
²eelings and social humilia±on, resul±ng in moral damages. The Supreme Court did not give credence to
Air France’s claim that the issuance o² a ´rst class ±cket to a passenger is not an assurance that he will be
given a ´rst class seat. Such claim is simply incredible. Culpa Aquiliana Here, the SC ruled, even though
there is a contract o² carriage between Air France and Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act based on
culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not contract merely ²or transporta±on. They have a right to be treated by
the carrier’s employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due considera±on. They are en±tled to be
protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indigni±es and abuses ²rom such employees.
So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part o² employees towards a passenger gives the
la³er an ac±on ²or damages against the carrier. Air France’s contract with Carrascoso is one a³ended
with public duty. The stress o² Carrascoso’s ac±on is placed upon his wrong²ul expulsion. This is a
viola±on o² public duty by the Air France — a case o² quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
MARANAN VS PEREZ
20 SCRA 412

FACTS:
Rogelio Corachea, a passenger in a taxicab owned
and operated by Pascual Perez, was stabbed and killed by
the driver, Simeon Valenzuela. Valenzuela was found
guilty for homicide by the Court of First Instance and was
sentenced to suffer Imprisonment and to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased in the sum of P6000. While pending
appeal, mother of deceased filed an action in the Court of
First Instance of Batangas to recover damages from Perez
and Valenzuela. Defendant Perez claimed that the death
was a caso fortuito for which the carrier was not liable. The
court a quo, after trial, found for the plaintiff and awarded
her P3,000 as damages against defendant Perez. The claim
against defendant Valenzuela was dismissed. From this
ruling, both plaintiff and defendant Perez appealed to this
Court, the former asking for more damages and the latter
insisting on non-liability.

Defendant-appellant relied solely on the ruling

enunciated in Gillaco vs. Manila Railroad Co. that the
carrier is under no absolute liability for assaults of its
employees upon the passengers.

ISSUE:
Was the contention of the defendant valid?

RULING:
No. The attendant facts and controlling law of that
case and the one at bar were very different. In the Gillaco
case, the passenger was killed outside the scope and the
course of duty of the guilty employee. The Gillaco case was
decided under the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889
which, unlike the present Civil Code, did not impose upon
common carriers absolute liability for the safety of
passengers against willful assaults or negligent acts
committed by their employees. The death of the passenger
in the Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous event which
exempted the carrier from liability. It is true that Art. 1105
of the old Civil Code on fortuitous events has been
substantially reproduced in Art. 1174 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines but both articles clearly remove from their
exempting effect the case where the law expressly provides
for liability in spite of the occurrence of force majeure. The
Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers
are new and were taken from Anglo-American Law. The
basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on passengers
committed by its drivers rested either on the doctrine of
respondent superior or the principle that it was the
carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely.
Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by
the later cases, it was enough that the assault happens
within the course of the employee's duty. It was no defense
for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority
or in disobedience of the carrier's orders. The carrier's
liability here was absolute in the sense that it practically
secured the passengers from assaults committed by its own
employees.