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ALCANTARA v. SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR Tayaban

IN RE ROBERT CU, CU v. REPUBLIC Abueg

adopted from another country , A rational

rule of statutory construction is that a statute adopted from another state or country will be presumed to be adopted with the construction placed upon it by the courts of that state or country before its adoption. Such construction is regarded as of great weight, or at least persuasive, and will generally be followed if found reasonable, and in harmony with justice and public policy, and with other laws of the adopting jurisdiction on the subject.

DOCTRINE: As to a statute

As to the nationality (according to the law when this petition was

filed), Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act

provides that the petition for citizenship, must state the

following:

No.

473)

1. petitioner's qualifications as enumerated in the Act,

2. petition

must

be

signed

by

the

applicant

in

handwriting; and

his

own

3. be supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons, stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act and a person of good repute

and

morally

irreproachable,

and

that

said

petitioner

has

in

their

opinion

all

the

qualifications

necessary

to

become

a

citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of the Act.

and post office

addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case."

4. The petition shall

also

set

forth the names

FACTS: Robert Cu filed a petition for naturalization. During the hearing, he stated that he was a citizen of the Philippines. The Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal found him to be “a Filipino citizen, both by right of birth and by right of selection," and dismissed the petition for

naturalization. It impliedly held that being already a Philippine citizen he did not have to be naturalized.

According to his testimony, he is a Filipino born of a Filipina mother. But when his mother died when he was about 5 months old, he was brought to China by his father. When he was 5 years old, he and his father left China and then was given to the care of Doña Mangahas.

The counsel for the Government opposed Cu’s claim that he is a Filipino. Cu continued with this testimony: “I consider myself a Filipino citizen on account of the fact that my mother is (was) a Filipi na and I was born in the Philippines. My only fault was that I failed to file my application to elect Philippine citizenship. That is why I am application to elect Philippine citizenship. That is why I am now asking this Court to make a judgment on that."

Consequently, he was asked by the court whether he knew if his parents were legally married but he was unsure thereof.

ISSUE: WON Cu is entitled to be admitted to Philippine citizenship under the law at the time of his application?

HELD: No, he is not entitled to be admitted Philippine Citizenship.

Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473) provides that the witnesses must be citizens of the Philippines and "personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act. If petitioner is born in the Philippines, time required is 5 years and if not, 10 years.

The witness provided by Cu did not meet these qualifications.

Witness Dr. Jose Ku Yeg Keng admitted that his father was a Chinese national and his mother a Filipina but he did not actually elect Philippine citizenship.

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CONFLICT OF LAWS FEU JD4301

The other witness, Dr. Pastor Gomez, he testified that "he had known Mr. Cu since liberation, about August, 1945." Dr. Pastor Gomez was eventually withdrawn as witness upon the objection of the counsel for the Government.

In United States vs. Martorana, “a petition not so verified by at least two persons who are citizen is not merely voidable but void."

In the case of In re Kornstain, A witness who is incompetent renders an

application

naturalization

importance.

The question of a witness' qualifications in

therefore a matter of more than usual

void.

proceedings

is

The above decisions are not binding upon Philippine Courts, but it is a rational rule of statutory construction that a statute adopted from

another state or country will be presumed to be adopted with the construction placed upon it by the courts of that state or country before

or at

its

adoption.

Such construction is

regarded as

of

great weight,

least persuasive, and will generally be followed if found reasonable, and in harmony with justice and public policy, and with other laws of the adopting jurisdiction on the subject. The Supreme Court finds the United States courts' reasoning to be sound and reasonable and we make it our own.

LAO CHAY v. GALANG Bacani

FACTS:

Ng Siu Luan and her three children, who are all of minor age, came to the Philippines on January 19, 1960 as temporary visitors, having been allowed to stay in this country until January 26, 1961.

Instead of departing on that date, however, appellees asked the Bureau of Immigration for the cancellation of their alien certificates of registration as well as those of their children on the basis of Lao Chay's admission to Philippine citizenship on December 12, 1960.

On January 20, 1961, appellant Commissioner of Immigration granted the petition as far as Lao Chay and the three children

were concerned, but denied the same with respect to Ng Siu Luan on the ground that "she is not qualified to acquire Philippine citizenship of her husband under the provision of paragraph 1, Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as she lacks the requirements provided for under paragraph 2 of the same Act." He therefore asked her to leave the country on January 26, 1961.

The Immigration Commissioner denied a subsequent motion for reconsideration, although he gave Ng Siu Luan a five-day extension within which to arrange for her departure.

To stop the threatened deportation of Ng Siu Luan appellees filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition in the Court of

of

First

Instance

of

Manila

and

secured

from

it

a

writ

preliminary injunction.

After trial, the court granted the petition, and held that the law

does

for

naturalization, it being enough that she is not otherwise disqualified.

same

not

require

as

that

an

those

alien

wife

should

of

have

the

qualifications

required

applicants

From this decision, the Commissioner of Immigration appeals.

ISSUE: Whether the wife of a Chinese who obtained papers of Philippine citizenship, automatically follows the citizenship of her husband if not otherwise disqualified under the Naturalization Law.

HELD: YES.

Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended) provides in part as.

Effect of the naturalization on wife and Any woman who is now or may here-after be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might

herself

shall be deemed a citizen of the

Philippines.

be

lawfully

naturalized,

an alien woman, who is

married to a citizen of the Philippines acquires the citizenship of her

It

is

now settled that under this

provision,

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CONFLICT OF LAWS FEU JD4301

husband only if he has all the qualifications prescribed in Section 2 and

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino

none of the disqualifications provided in Section 4 of the law.

citizen

upon

her

marriage

to

a

Filipino

citizen.

Since Ng Siu Luan admittedly does not possess the qualifications for

naturalization,

vesting in her Filipino citizenship.

her marriage to Lao Chay be deemed as automatically

LIM YAO v. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION Baldonado

DOCTRINE: An alien woman, upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen, becomes lawfully naturalized ipso facto, provided that she does not possess all of the disqualifications enumerated in CA 473.

FACTS: On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. During the interview, she stated that she was a Chinese citizen living in Hong Kong and desired to have a pleasure trip in the Philippines to visit her great grand uncle Lau Ching Pin for one month. Immigration allowed her to stay from March 13, 1991 to April 13 of the same year. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period provided. The date of visit was extended till February 13, 1962. On January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim a Filipino Citizen.

Because of the contemplated action of respondent to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought this action for injunction with preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.

HELD: YES. Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law which states.

SEC.

15.

Effect of the naturalization on wife and children.

Any

woman,

who is

now or may

hereafter be married to a

citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.

A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of

the

naturalization

of

the

parent,

shall

automatically

become

a

Philippine

citizen,

and

a

foreign-born

child,

who

is

not

in

the

Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.

A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his

parent, shall be considered a Philippine citizen unless within one year after reaching the age of majority he fails to register himself as a

Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the country where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance.

SECTION 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside herein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen-hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and

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CONFLICT OF LAWS FEU JD4301

Spain

ninety-eight.

signed at Paris

December tenth,

eighteen hundred and

an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently

naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.

Likewise,

This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently. As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it every time she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos),

but such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be,

for the truth

is

that

the

situation

obtains

even as to native-born

Filipinos.

Everytime

the

citizenship

of

a

person is material or

indispensable in a judicial or administrative case. Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.

naturalization under Commonwealth Act 473 for the purpose of

cancelling

avers that she is of legal age, married to Florencio Burca, a Filipino citizen, and a resident of Real St., Ormoc City; that before her marriage, she was a Chinese citizen, subject of Nationalist China; that she was born on March 30, 1933 in Gigaquit, Surigao.

with the Bureau of Immigration". 1 She

her

Alien

Registry

By constitutional and legal precepts, an alien woman who marries a Filipino citizen, does not by the mere fact of marriage - automatically become a Filipino citizen.

Thus, by Article IV of the Constitution, citizenship is limited to:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. (2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands. (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship. (5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

And, on the specific legal status of an alien woman married to a citizen of the Philippines, Congress in paragraph 1, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law legislated the following:

Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether Zita Ngo Burca is deemed a Filipino citizen in accordance to the provisions in the Revised Naturalization Law vis -à- vis the Constitution of the Philippines?

NGO BURCA v. REPUBLIC Carloman

FACTS: On petition to declare Zita Ngo also known as Zita Ngo Burca "as possessing all qualifications and none of the qualifications for

HELD: No. Petitioner did not meet the requirements specified in the Revised Naturalization Law. The petition is fatally defective for

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CONFLICT OF LAWS FEU JD4301

failure to contain or mention the essential allegations required under Section 7 of the Naturalization Law, such as, among others, petitioner's former places of residence, and the absence of the affidavits of at least two supporting witnesses.

We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this country must apply therefor by

filing a petition for citizenship reciting that she possesses all the

the

Revised

Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of First

Instance

disqualifications

qualifications

set

forth

under

in

Section

4,

2,

and

of

none

the

of

Section

both

resided at least one year immediately

preceding the filing of the petition; and (3) Any action by any other office, agency, board or official, administrative or otherwise other

than

declaring that an alien wife of the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino

citizen, is hereby declared null and void.

certifying or

where petitioner has

judgment

of

a

the

competent

court

of

justice

We note that the petition avers that petitioner was born in Gigaquit, Surigao that her former residence was Surigao, Surigao, and that presently she is residing at Regal St., Ormoc City. In court, however, she testified that she also resided in Junquera St., Cebu, where she took up a course in home economics, for one year. Section 7 of the Naturalization Law requires that a petition for naturalization should state petitioner's "present and former places of residence". Residence encompasses all places where petitioner actually and physically resided. 13 Cebu, where she studied for one year, perforce comes within the term residence. The reason for exacting recital in the petition of present and former places of residence is that "information regarding petitioner and objection to his application are apt to be provided by people in his actual, physical surrounding". And the State is deprived of full opportunity to make inquiries as to petitioner's fitness to become a citizen, if all the places of residence do not appear in the petition. So it is, that failure to allege a former place of residence is fatal.

We find one other flaw in petitioner's petition. Said petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons, "stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and

that said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of this Act". Petitioner likewise failed to "set forth the names and post-office addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case". 16

The necessity for the affidavit of two witnesses cannot be overlooked. It is important to know who those witnesses are. The State should not be denied the opportunity to check on their background to ascertain whether they are of good standing in the community, whose word may be taken on its face value, and who could serve as "good warranty of the worthiness of the petitioner". These witnesses should indeed prove in court that they are reliable insurers of the character of petitioner. Short of this, the petition must fail.

VELLILLA v. POSADAS Custodio

DOCTRINE: To effect the abandonment of one's domicile, there must be a deliberate and provable choice of a new domicile, coupled with actual residence in the place chosen, with a declared or provable intent that it should be one's fixed and permanent place of abode, one's home.

FACTS:

This case arose from the death of one Arthur Graydon Moody, who died in Calacutta, India on February 18, 1931.

He executed in the Philippines a will where he bequeathed all his property to his only sister, Ida M. Palmer (Palmer), who is a citizen and resident of New York, USA.

On July 14, 1931, Palmer was declared to be the sole and only heiress of Moody.

Moody’s estate consisted of bonds and shares of stock corporations organized under the laws of the Philippines, bank deposits, and other personal properties shown in the inventory.

BIR prepared an inheritance tax return and income tax return for the estate of Moody.

The estate of Moody paid under protest.

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CONFLICT OF LAWS FEU JD4301

Both parties

introduced evidence which appears that Moody,

and engaged in

an American citizen came to

business here up to the time of his death in Calcutta, India.

the Philippines

That he had no business elsewhere, and all of said property at the time of his death was located and had its situs within the Philippines.

Plaintiff now contends that that there is no valid law or regulation of the Government of the Philippine Islands under or by virtue of which any inheritance tax may be levied, assessed or collected upon transfer, by death and succession, of intangible personal properties of a person not domiciled in the Philippine Islands, and the levy and collection by defendant of inheritance tax computed upon the value of said stocks, bonds, credits and other intangible properties as aforesaid constituted and constitutes the taking and deprivation of property without due process of law contrary to the Bill of Rights and organic law of the Philippine Islands…

Plaintiff alleged that Moody, at the time of his death, was a non- resident of the Philippine Islands under the following circumstances:

from 1902 or 1903 forward during which time he accumulated a fortune from his business here.

He lived in the Elks' Club in Manila for many years and was

the date he left Manila the latter part of

Moody

was

never married and was in the Philippine Islands

living

February, 1928.

there

up

to

Moody was afflicted with leprosy in an advanced stage and had been informed by Dr. Wade that he would be reported to the Philippine authorities for confinement in the Culion Leper Colony as required by the law.

He promised Dr. Wade that he would voluntarily go to Culion.

But distressed at the thought of being segregated, he left the Philippines under cover of night, on a freighter, without ticket, passport or tax clearance certificate.

In March and April

where

of 1929, he lived with a friend in Paris,

at the

France

Pasteur Institute.

he was

receiving treatment for leprosy

On November 26, 1930, the latter date when he wrote a letter to Harry Wendt of Manila, offering to sell him his interest in the Camera Supply Company, a Philippine corporation, in which Moody owned 599 out of 603 shares.

He stated in the letter: “Certainly I'll never return there to live or enter business again…”

Defendant answered that Moody, was and prior to the date of his death, was a resident in the Manila, Philippines where he was engaged actively in business.

ISSUE: Whether or not Moody was legally domiciled in the Philippines on the day of his death?

HELD: YES, Moody was legally domiciled in the Philippine Islands on the day of his death.

As Moody died of leprosy less than two months after the letters were written, there can be no doubt that he would have been immediately segregated in the Culion Leper Colony had he returned to the Philippine Islands.

confinement in the Culion

Leper Colony in accordance with the law of the Philippine Islands, not from justice.

There is no statement of Moody, oral or written, in the record that he had adopted a new domicile while he was absent from Manila.

Though he was physically present for some months in Calcutta prior to the date of his death there, the appellant does not claim that Moody had domicile there although it was precisely from Calcutta that he wrote and cabled that he wished to sell his business in Manila and that he had no intention to live there again.

Thus, the claim that he established a legal domicile in Paris in February 1929 is much less plausible.

The record contains no writing whatever of Moody from Paris.

Therefore,

he was

a fugitive from

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CONFLICT OF LAWS FEU JD4301

There is no evidence as to where in Paris he had any fixed abode that he intended to be his permanent home; no evidence that he acquired any property in Paris or engaged in any settled business on his own account there.

There is no evidence of any affirmative factors that prove the establishment of a legal domicile there; the negative evidence that he told Cooley that he did not intend to return to Manila does not prove that he had established a domicile in Paris.

His short stay of three months in Paris is entirely consistent with the view that he was a transient in Paris for the purpose of receiving treatments at the Pasteur Institute.

The evidence indicates clearly that Moody's continued absence from his legal domicile in the Philippines was due to evade confinement in the Culion Leper Colony; for he doubtless knew that on his return he would be immediately confined, because his affliction became graver while he was absent than it was on the day of his precipitous departure.

And also, he could not conceal himself in the Philippines where he was well known, as he might do in foreign parts.

Our [then] Civil Code (art. 40) defines the domicile of natural persons as "the place of their usual residence".

The record leaves no doubt that the "usual residence" of Moody, who was described as a "fugitive" and "outcast", was in Manila where he had lived and toiled for more than a quarter of a century, rather than in any foreign country he visited during his wanderings up to the date of his death in Calcutta.

To effect the abandonment of one's domicile, there must be a deliberate and provable choice of a new domicile, coupled with actual residence in the place chosen, with a declared or provable intent that it should be one's fixed and permanent place of abode, one's home.

There is a complete dearth of evidence in the record that Moody ever established a new domicile in a foreign country.

VILLAHERMOSA V. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION Cristobal

DOCTRINE: Mere birth in the Philippines of a Chinese father and Filipino mother does not ipso facto confer Philippine citizenship and that Jus Sanguinis instead of Jus Soli is the predominating factor on questions of citizenship.

Commonwealth

Act

No.

63

does

not

provide

that

upon

repatriation of a Filipina her children acquire Philippine citizenship

FACTS:

Florentina Villahermosa married a Chinese National named Co Suy. They had a child named Delfin who was born in Paniqui, Tarlac.

In 1946, Delfin left the Philippines for China on board S/S Cushman as a Chinese repatriate, in company with

his relative.

Due to financial difficulties in China, Delfin took steps

to

informed him of a plan to smuggle their compatriots

into this country, thus, he agreed to lead the party (69 Chinese) to Ilocos Sur where his mother had relatives who could render valuable assistance.

apprehended

He met a Chinese who

return to the Philippines.

The immigrants

were

discovered

and

immediately after arrival.

Delfin Co was examined by the Commissioner of Immigration and recommended that said Delfin Co be deported to China as a Chinese citizen. They rendered a decision ordering the deportation of Delfin Co.

In

1947,

Florentina

Villahermosa

after

knowing

the

apprehension

of

her

son

Delfin,

filed

in

the

civil

registry of Tarlac under Commonwealth Act No. 63 an

resuming her

had lost upon her

Philippine

oath

of

allegiance

for

the

purpose

she

of

Citizenship

which

marriage to Co Suy.

On the strength of such reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Florentina, it was contended before the

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CONFLICT OF LAWS FEU JD4301

Immigration authorities that Delfin, being a minor, followed the citizenship of his mother, and was a national NOT subject to deportation.

These contentions were overruled.

ISSUEs: Whether the reacquisition of Villahermosa’s Philippine citizenship affects Delfin’s citizenship as a minor, therefore, not subject for deportation?

Will we consider Delfin as Filipino citizen because his mother reacquired Philippine Citizenship?

HELD: No. Delfin is not a Filipino citizen. Even granting that he is, at the time he entered this (Phils.) country from China he was a Chinese subject to deportation, and any subsequent change in his status cannot erase the taint of his unlawful, surreptitious entry.

Section 1 of Article IV of the Constitution enumerates who are citizens of the Philippines, as follows:

those

1)

Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;

2)

Those

born

in

the

Philippine

Islands

of foreign

parents

who,

before

adopstion

of

this

Constitution,

had

been

elected

to

public

office in the Philippine

Islands;

 

3)

Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines;

4)

Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines

and

upon

reaching

the

age

of

majority,

elect

Philippine citizenship;

 

5)

Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Delfin Co’s claim to citizenship can only be predicated, if at all, on Par. 4 of the above section. But, being a minor, he has not had the opportunity

to elect Philippine citizenship, and therefore he is yet an alien, his father being a Chinese.

The Court therefore held that, after the Constitution, mere birth in the Philippines of a Chinese father and Filipino mother does not ipso facto confer Philippine citizenship and that Jus Sanguinis instead of Jus Soli is the predominating factor on questions of citizenship.

It is contended that Florentina Villahermosa being a Filipina, Delfin CO, should likewise be a Filipino. Commonwealth Act No. 63 does not provide that upon repatriation of a Filipina her children acquire Philippine citizenship. It would be illogical to consider Delfin as repatriated like his mother, because he never was a Filipino citizen and could not have reacquired such citizenship.

While his Chinese father lived, Delfin was not a Filipino. His mother was not a Filipina; she was Chinese. After death of such father, Villahermosa continued to be a Chinese, until she reacquired her Filipino citizenship in April 1947. After that reacquisition Delfin could claim that his mother was a Filipina within the meaning of Par. 4, Sec.1,

Art. IV of the Constitution; but according to the same organic act, he had to elect Philippine citizenship upon attaining his age of majority. Until he becomes of age and makes the election, he is the Chinese citizen that

he

deportation.

was

at

the

time

his

father’s

demise.

Hence, he is subject to

NOTTEBOHM Castillo

Doctrine: Nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be said to constitute the juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon whom it is conferred, either directly by the law or as the result of an act of the authorities, is in fact more closely connected with the population of the State conferring nationality than with that of any other State. Conferred by a State, it only entitles that State to exercise protection vis - à-vis another State, if it constitutes a translation into juridical terms of

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CONFLICT OF LAWS FEU JD4301

the

national.

individual's

connection

with

the

State

which

has

made

him

its

Facts. Nottebohm, a German by birth, lived in Guatemala for 34 years, retaining his German citizenship and family and business ties with it. He however applied for Liechtenstein citizenship a month after the outbreak of World War II. Nottebohm had no ties with Liechtenstein but intended to remain in Guatemala. The naturalization application was approved by Liechtenstein after submitting all the requirements uder the law and impliedly waived its three-year residency requirement. After this approval, Nottebohm travelled to Liechtenstein and upon his return to Guatemala, he was refused entry because he was deemed to be a German citizen. His Liechtenstein citizenship was not honored. Liechtenstein thereby filed a suit before the International Court to compel Guatemala to recognize him as one of its national. Guatemala challenged the validity of Nottebohm’s citizenship, the right of Liechtenstein to bring the action and alleged its belief that Nottebohm remained a German national.

Issue: Whether Nottebohm, having acquired the nationality of Liechtenstein may compel other State (Guatemala) to recognize it?

Held: NO.

Guatemala is under no obligation to recognize a nationality granted by

not entitled to extend its

Guatemala and its claim must, for

this reason, be held to be inadmissaible.

protection to Nottebohm vis-à-vis

Liechtenstein.

Liechtenstein consequently

is

there was no relationship between Liechtenstein and Nottebohm. The change of nationality was merely a subterfuge mandated by the war and as such, Guatemala was not forced to recognize it.

Nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment,

a genuine connection of existence,

with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be said to constitute the juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon whom it is conferred, either directly by the law or as the result of an act of the authorities, is in fact more closely connected with the population of the State conferring nationality than with that of any other State. Conferred by a State, it only entitles that State to exercise protection vis-à-vis another State, if it constitutes a translation into juridical terms of the individual's connection with the State which has made him its national.

and sentiments, together

interests

International

States

necessarily or automatically have international effect, which are not necessarily and automatically binding on other States or which are binding on them only subject to certain conditions.

not

practice provides

exercise

of

their

many

examples

of acts performed by

which

do

in

the

domestic

jurisdiction

NAZARETH CANDY CO, LTD v. SHERWOOD GROUP, INC. Dino

DOCTRINE: The paramount reasons for alienage jurisdiction are present

in this case. Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a): "(1) to give protection to foreigners under treaties that states may fail to recognize; and (2) to

prevent

from

entanglements

with

other

sovereigns

that

might

ensue

failure to treat the legal controversies of aliens on a national level."

As general general rule, issues relating to citizenship are solely the concern of the granting nation.

But it does not mean that other states will automatically accept the conferring state’s designation unless it has acted in conformity with the general aim of forging a genuine bond between it and its national aim. In this case, the naturalization of Nottelbohm was an act performed by Liechtenstein in the exercise of its domestic jurisdiction. Moreover,

FACTS: On November 4, 1987, Nazareth Candy Company, Ltd. (Nazareth) filed this complaint against the defendants Sherwood Group, Inc. (Sherwood Group), Sherwood Foods, Inc. (Sherwood Foods), and Uziel Frydman alleging that the defendants failed to pay for chocolate and candies ordered from Nazareth. Defendants moved to

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dismiss plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1987).

ISSUE: Whether or not a citizen with dual citizenship (Frydman), could be sued under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)?

Nazareth is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Israel, with its principal place of business in Nazareth, Israel. Nazareth

is a wholly-owned subsidiary of "Elite" Israel Chocolate & Sweets

Manufacturing

and existing under the laws of Israel. Defendants Sherwood Group and Sherwood Foods are North Carolina corporations whose principal place of business is in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Defendant Frydman is president of Sherwood Group and Sherwood Foods. He resides in

and he

Winston-Salem,

also a corporation organized

Company,

Ltd.,

which is

North Carolina.

Frydman was

born in Israel,

became a naturalized citizen of the United States in 1977. He claims both American and Israeli citizenship, and he travels to Israel on an

Israeli passport.

A dispute arose between the parties regarding the purchase of

chocolates and candies that plaintiff sold defendants. On 1982, the

parties

right to market, sell, and distribute plaintiff's goods. Sherwood Foods assumed all liabilities of Sherwood Group on July 28, 1983. Plaintiff claims that from February 1984 to the present, the defendants have repeatedly ordered chocolate from the plaintiff and that the defendants have repeatedly failed or refused to pay the plaintiff pursuant to the October agreement.

entered into an agreement giving the defendants the exclusive

Courts

alienage jurisdiction.

and

commentators

refer

to

these

sections

of the statutes

as

Plaintiff alleges that it falls within 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) because it is an alien corporation suing Frydman, an American citizen. It contends that the cases indicate this court should ignore Frydman's dual citizenship and find that complete diversity exists in this fact situation.

Defendants

matter jurisdiction since Frydman's dual citizenship defeats diversity.

filed

this

motion

alleging

that

this

court

lacks

subject

HELD: In its discussion of dual citizenship, the Sadat court, like the Raphael court, determined that for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), it would only recognize the American citizenship of the party claiming dual citizenship. That court only recognized the American citizenship for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction since the rationale behind alienage jurisdiction was not present in Sadat.

First, the Sadat court applied the dominant nationality theory where courts analyze the citizen's conduct, residence, and his relationship in the countries in which he claims dual citizenship. Although, it found that Egypt still recognized the plaintiff as an Egyptian citizen, it held that his American citizenship defeated diversity jurisdiction since:

(1) He retained his American passport, and he manifested his intent to return to the United States even though he worked in the Middle East.

(2) He registered at the United States States citizen.

embassy

in Cairo as a United

(3) He voted in the 1976 presidential election.

This court agrees with the reasoning in Sadat and Raphael. Under the dominant nationality theory, Frydman would be an American citizen for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Although he travels to Israel on an Israeli passport, he has purchased a home in Winston-Salem, North Carolina where his family resides, and he operates his business in that city.

Second, the court agrees with the Raphael court noting that he took an oath renouncing his allegiance to foreign states or sovereignties when he became an American citizen. 8 U.S.C. § 1448 (1987). Thus, his Israeli citizenship is irrelevant for the purposes of determining diversity jurisdiction.

The paramount reasons for alienage jurisdiction are present in this

§ 1332(a): "(1) to give protection to

case.

Congress

passed 28 U.S.C.

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foreigners under treaties that states may fail to recognize; and (2) to

that might ensue from

failure to treat the legal

Sadat, 615 F.2d at 1182. Nazareth may face severe prejudice in state court as a result of the violent events taking place on the West Bank between the Palestinians and the Israeli government.

prevent

of aliens on a national level."

entanglements

with

other

sovereigns

controversies

The court disfavors Frydman's argument to defeat jurisdiction since that result would allow American citizens with dual citizenship to control subject matter jurisdiction in the federal courts. Congress did

not intend for citizens with dual citizenship to have the power to defeat

to the federal courts based upon their selection of

or to gain access nationality.

Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED.

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