CABIDOG, REY FRANZ B.

LEGAL TECHNIQUE AND LOGIC

JD 1- M7 JANUARY 9, 2018

LAGON V HOOVEN COMALCO INDUSTRIES INC

FACTS:

Sometime in April 1981 Lagon and Hooven Comalco Industries, Inc. entered into two (2) contracts, both
denominated Proposal, whereby for a total consideration of P104,870.00 HOOVEN agreed to sell and
install various aluminum materials in Lagons commercial building in Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. Upon
execution of the contracts, Lagon paid HOOVEN P48,00.00 in advance. On 24 February 1987 respondent
HOOVEN commenced an action for sum of money with damages and attorney’s fees against petitioner
Lagon before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City. On 9 October 1987, upon request of both parties, the
trial court conducted an ocular inspection of Lagons commercial building to determine whether the items
alleged in the complaint and appearing in the invoices and delivery receipts had been delivered and
installed on the premises. In due course the trial court rendered a decision partly on the basis of the result
of the ocular inspection. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its Decision of 28 April 1997,
the appellate court set aside the judgment of the trial court and resolved the case in favor of HOOVEN. It
held that the trial court erred in relying solely on the results of the ocular inspection since the delivery
and installation of the materials in question started as early as 1981, while the ocular inspection was
conducted only in 1987 or six (6) years later, after the entire mezzanine was altered and the whole building
renovated.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals
of 28 April 1997.

ISSUE:

WON The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court could not rely on the results of the ocular
inspection conducted

RULING:

The court decided on the affirmative. The ocular inspection was made by the judge himself, at the request
of both petitioner and respondent, for the exclusive purpose of determining whether the materials
subject of this case were actually delivered and installed. There is therefore no basis to give little
evidentiary value on the results of the ocular inspection, as the Court of Appeals would, and charge the
trial court with error for relying thereon. It is now rather late for any of the parties to disclaim them,
especially when they are not in his or its favor. Furthermore, a cursory reading of the decision of the court
a quo will at once show that it was not premised solely on the results of the ocular inspection but was
likewise predicated on other evidence presented by the parties and well-considered facts and
circumstances discussed by the trial court in its ratio decidendi. We cannot ignore the factual findings of
the trial court, which must carry great weight in the evaluation of evidentiary facts, and in the absence of
any indication showing grave error committed by trial court, the appellate court is bound to respect such
findings of fact.

BANTOLINO, et al V COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC.

FACTS:

On 15 February 1995 sixty-two (62) employees of respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc., and its officers,
Lipercon Services, Inc., Peoples Specialist Services, Inc., and Interim Services, Inc., filed a complaint against
respondents for unfair labor practice through illegal dismissal, violation of their security of tenure and the
perpetuation of the Cabo System. They thus prayed for reinstatement with full back wages, and the
declaration of their regular employment status. On 29 May 1998 Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera rendered a
decision ordering respondent company to reinstate complainants to their former positions with all the
rights, privileges and benefits due regular employees, and to pay their full back wages which, with the
exception of Prudencio Bantolino whose back wages must be computed upon proof of his dismissal as of
31 May 1998, already amounted to an aggregate of P1,810,244.00. On appeal, the NLRC sustained the
finding of the Labor Arbiter that there was indeed an employer-employee relationship between the
complainants and respondent company. Petitioners now pray for relief from the adverse Decision of the
Court of Appeals; that, instead, the favorable judgment of the NLRC be reinstated.

ISSUE:

WON the court should give evidentiary value to the affidavits despite the failure of the affiants to affirm
their contents and undergo the test of cross-examination.

RULING:

The petition is impressed with merit. The issue confronting the Court is not without precedent in
jurisprudence. The oft-cited case of Rabago v. NLRC[9] squarely grapples a similar challenge involving the
propriety of the use of affidavits without the presentation of affiants for cross-examination. In that case,
we held that the argument that the affidavit is hearsay because the affiants were not presented for cross-
examination is not persuasive because the rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings
before administrative bodies like the NLRC where decisions may be reached on the basis of position
papers only. To reiterate, administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of
law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and
prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e., by analogy or in a suppletory
character and effect. The submission by respondent, citing People v. Sorrel,[12] that an affidavit not
testified to in a trial, is mere hearsay evidence and has no real evidentiary value, cannot find relevance in
the present case considering that a criminal prosecution requires a quantum of evidence different from
that of an administrative proceeding. Under the Rules of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the
discretion to determine the necessity of a formal trial or hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are not even
required as the cases may be decided based on verified position papers, with supporting documents and
their affidavits.

SAMALIO V. COURT OF APPEALS (454 SCRA 699)

FACTS:

The case is about a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in the
case against an Intelligence Officer of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, the petitioner, Augusto
R. Samalio prosecuted for the crimes of Robbery and Violation of Section 46 of the Immigration Law.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the resolution of the Civil Service Commission, indorsement of then Justice
Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona confirming the penalty of dismissal from service imposed upon by the
Bureau of immigration upon petitioner on the ground of dishonesty, oppression, misconduct and conduct
grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service in connection with his act of extorting money from
Ms. Weng Sai Qin, a foreign national.

Petitioner assailed before the CA, in a petition for review, the correctness of CSC Resolution Nos. 974501
and 981925. The CA, however, dismissed the petition for review and subsequently denied the motion for
reconsideration. The petitioner challenged the decision of the CA dismissing his petition for review as well
as the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration. Petitioner claims he was not accorded due
process and the CA failed to consider the proper effects of his discharge under probation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner was not accorded due process.

Whether or not the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Civil Service
Commission is incorrect.

RULING:

Due process in an administrative proceedings does not require trial-type proceedings similar to courts of
justice. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded,
there is no denial of procedural due process. In this case, petitioner was heard through the various
pleadings which he filed with the Board of Discipline when he file his answer and two motions to dismiss,
as well as other motions and papers. He was also able to participate in all the stages of the administrative
proceeding. He was able to elevate his case to the Secretary of Justice and subsequently, to the CSC by
way of appeal. Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the
opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.

The CSC decision and resolution which upheld the resolution of the Secretary of Justice confirming the
decision of the Commissioner of the BID are supported by substantial evidence. The case was decided on
the basis of pleadings and papers submitted by the parties, and relied on the records of the proceedings
taken.

The court ruled that the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision and resolution of
the Civil Service Commission is AFFIRMED.

DOMINGO V ROBLES (453 SCRA 812)

FACTS:

The petitioner Norma Domingo and her husband, Valentino Domingo, own a lot in Concepcion, Marikina.
On this lot, Norma B. Domingo discontinued the construction of the house allegedly for failure of her
husband to send the necessary financial support. So, she decided to dispose the property.

A friend, Flor Bacani, volunteered to act as agent in selling the lot. Domingo delivered their owner’s copy
of Transfer Certificate of Title. The title was then said to have been lost. In the petition for its
reconstitution, Domingo gave Bacani all her receipts of payment for real estate taxes, Bacani then asked
her to sign what she recalled a record of exhibits. Bacani did not show up anymore.

Domingo visited the lot and was surprised to see Robles starting to build a house in the subject lot. A
verification with the Register of Deeds revealed that the reconstituted Transfer Certificate of Title had
already been cancelled with the Registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale signed by Norma Domingo and
her husband, as sellers, and Yolanda Robles, as buyer.

The petitioner claimed that she did not met any of the respondents nor having signed any sale over the
property in favor anybody, assumed that the Deed of Absolute Sale is a forgery and therefore, could not
validly transfer ownership. Robles responded alleging to be buyers in good faith and value. Sometime
later, Robles contracted to sell the lot in issue, payment was stopped because of the letter Robles received
that Domingo intends to sue her.

The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint.

The CA held that respondents were purchasers in good faith and for value. The sale was admittedly made
through petitioners agent, Bacani brought with him the original of the owners duplicate Certificate of Title
of the property and some receipts. Petitioner was not able to present any evidence to prove that
respondents had prior knowledge of any other persons right to or interest over the property in question.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to her claims.

Whether or not there was an acquisition of a valid title.

RULING:

It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are binding on this Court. The findings of the courts a quo are amply supported by the evidence
on record.

A notarized instrument enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution. Clear and
convincing evidence must be presented to overcome such legal presumption. Forgery cannot be
presumed; hence, it was incumbent upon petitioner to prove it.

The petition is denied and the assailed decision affirmed.

PEOPLE V GALLENO

FACTS:

Joeral Galleno, accused, was found guilty by the RTC for the crime of statutory rape against five
year old Evelyn Obligar Garganera. According to the original complaint filed, at 5:00 o’clock in the
afternoon of August 16, 1994 at Brgy. Balighot, Maayon, Capiz the accused, without permission of anyone,
entered the house of the victim and had carnal knowledge with her inflicting vaginal laceration causing
continuous bleeding and her admission of five days at the Roxas Memorial Hospital.

The accused presented denial as the defenses. According to the accused, he cajoled the victim
with the right hand holding the child and the left hand covering her vagina, which accidentally slipped
inside the victims’ vagina. The accused claimed that he had long nails and the insertion caused the
bleeding since the victim was not wearing any underwear.

The medical doctors that testified as expert witnesses said that the vaginal laceration could be caused by
blunt foreign object, and that it could be a penis. There were no spermatozoa found on the vagina of the
victim, and according to Dr. Maria Lourdes Laada, the first doctor who examined the child, the child said
that it was the “finger of the accused” that caused the laceration. The accuse’s father also claims that the
victim disclosed the same information to him.

The trial courted did not put credence in the version of the defense, pointing that their version hinged on
the argument that the victim’s statement as to how she sustained her vaginal laceration was mere
concoction and a plain distortion of facts by her guardian and calls it a desperate attempt to becloud the
charge of rape. Furthermore, according to the defense witness, the vaginal laceration would be caused by
a blunt instrument and a fingernail is not a blunt but a sharp instrument. The accused was sentenced with
the death penalty. The case was escalated to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

1. WON the trial court erred in giving full weight and credence to the testimonies of the medical
doctors when the same failed to conclusively and sufficiently establish the cause of the laceration in the
offended party’s vagina.

2. WON the trial court erred in not declaring the warrantless arrest of the accused as unjustified.

3. WON the trial court erred in interpreting the financial assistance extended by the parents of the
accused to the offended party as an implied admission of guilt.

4. WON the accused is guilty of statutory rape.

RULING:

1. No, the trial court did not err in giving the weight and credence to the testimonies of the medical
doctors. As a general rule, witness must state facts and must not draw conclusions or give opinions as it
is the court’s duty to draw conclusions from the evidence and form opinions upon the facts proven.
However, conclusions and opinions of expert witnesses are received in many cases, and are not confined
to expert testimony, based on the principle that either because of the special skill or expert knowledge of
the witness, or because of the nature of the subject matter under observation, or for other reasons, the
testimony will aid the court in reaching a judgement.

In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at it’s conclusion not only with the aid of the expert testimony of
the doctore who gave their opinions as to the possible cause of the victim’s laceration, but also the
testimony of the prosecution witness, especially the victim herself, hence not relying solely on the
testimony of the expert witnesses. Such testimony merely aided the trial court in the exercise of its
judgement on the facts. Hence, the facts that the experts enumerated various possible causes of the
victim’s laceration does not mean the trial court’s interference is wrong.

2. No, the trial court did not err not declaring the warrantless arrest as unjustified. It is settled on
jurisprudence that any objection involving the warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the
court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise
the objection is deemed waived. He is estopped from questioning any defect in the manner of his arrest
if he fails to move for the quashing of the information before the trial court or if he voluntarily submits
himself to the jurisdiction of the court by entering a plea or by participating in the trial. It does not appear
in the record that the accused-appellant raised this matter before entering his plea of “not guilty” to the
charge, the issue was not even touched during the trial.

3. No, the trial court did not err in it’s interpretation that the financial assistance extended by the
accused’s father is an attempt to settle the case. The father of the accused accepted the payment’s of the
victims niece when it was made clear that they would push through with the charges, hence he found that
the offer for settlement was unavailing.

4. Yes, the accused is guilty of statutory rape. The absence of spermatozoa in the victim’s vagina
does not negate the conclusion that it was the accused penis that was inserted in the victim’s vagina. In
rape the important consideration is not the emission of semen but the penetration of the female genetalia
by the male organ. Verily, it is entirely probable that climax on the part of the accused-appellant was not
reached due to the cried of pain of the victim and the profuse bleeding of her vagina.

As regards to the inconsistencies in Evelyn’s declaration , particularly as to what really caused the
laceration, the court is convinced that the child due to her tender age, was just confused, as exemplified
by Dr. Laada on her cross examination when she said that the finger the victim was referring could be the
finger in between the legs of the accused.

Of vital consideration and importance too is the unreliability, if not outright incredulity of the version of
the accused-appellant which is not in accord with ordinary human experience. There is no explanation
how the left finger (allegedly with long nails) of the accused penetrated the victim’s vagina by a depth of
four inches and why he was holding the victim’s vagina in the first place. He also failed to explain why
after injuring the victim, he left her in the company of an even younger sibling.

As to the accuses-appellant’s argument that the victim’s testimony is just a concocted story of what really
happened, the Supreme Court apply the rule that the revelation of a child whose chastity was abused
deserves full credence. It is likewise consider that her guardian supports her story , as it is unnatural for a
parent to use her offspring as an engine of malice, especially if it will subject a daughter to embarrassment
and even stigma.

Hence, the decision of the trial court is affirmed in toto.

PEOPLE V CALUMPANG
FACTS:

Accused Rico Calumpang and Jovenal Omatang were found guilty by the RTC of Dumaguete City
for two counts of murder and sentencing both to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering
them to pay damages to the heirs of the victims spouses Santiago and Alicia Catipay.

The prosecution’s lone witness, Magno Gomez said in his sworn statement that both accused
hacked Alicia first, when Santiago tried to save his wife, he was also hacked by the both accused. He
further claimed that the accused tried to hack him too but he was able to run. He passed by the house of
Alexander Ebiass and asked for dried coconut leaves and made a torch out of it. After a kilometer , he saw
the house of cousin Rolando Retada, where he spent the night and left very early in the morning, even
refusing to drink coffee. Neither of the two were informed by Gomez about the incident the night prior in
fear for his own life. However, during the trial,Gomez said that Santiago was hacked by Rico Calumpang
and Alicia by Jovenal Omatang simultaneously.

The defense on the other hand presented corroborated witness to the alibi that both accused
could not be in the crime scene at the time of the murder as accuses Omatang stayed in the store of Ana
Andagan until 7 pm and only left when his niece fetched him while Calumpang stayed in the store until 8
pm and helped Ana close her store, and walked with her home.

For the State’s part, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that reasonable doubt concerning
the guilt of the appellants exist in this case, but stresses the material inconsistencies between his
testimony during the trial and his sworn affidavit. It concluded that the appellants deserve acquittal on
reasonable doubt.

The trial court gave merit to the testimony of Magno stating that his actions are not contrary to
human experience. The case was escalated to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

WON the appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of double murder.

RULING:

No, the appellants are not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for the crime of double murder.
Generally, an affidavit, being an ex parted, is considered almost always incomplete and often inaccurate
or lacking in details and is deemed inferior to the testimony given in open court. Jurisprudence, however,
forewarns that when serious and inexplicable discrepancies exist between a previously executed sworn
statement of a witness and his testimonial declarations, with respect to a persons participation in a serious
imputation such as murder, there is raised a grave doubt on the veracity of the witness account.

The trial court believed Magno’s testimony when he was able to point the exact location of the
wounds inflicted but 19 months ago or barely a day after the incident when he was asked the same
question he failed to recall where Santiago was hit.

Similarly some of Magno’s testimony are unworthy of belief- that appellants ignored him when
he was only five feet away from the alleged unobstructed view of the murder scene, it makes no sense as
well that he only ran for 5- meters when it was unsure whether appellants ran after him or not. The act
of Gomez lighting the torch is also not an action of someone seeking to avoid peril to his life. Well settled
is the rule that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but
must be credible in itselfsuch as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances.

Appellants defense of alibi was indeed weak, since their alibis were corroborated only by their
relatives and friends, and it was not shown that it was impossible for them to be at the place of the
incident. However, the rule that an accused must satisfactorily prove his alibi was never intended to
change or shift the burden of proof in criminal cases. It is basic that the prosecution evidence must stand
or fall on its own weight and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Unless the
prosecution overturns the constitutional presumption of innocence of an accused by competent and
credible evidence proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption remains. There being no
sufficient evidence beyond reasonable doubt pointing to appellants as the perpetrators of the crime,
appellants presumed innocence stands.

The decision of the trial court is reversed and the appellants acquitted beyond reasonable doubt.

HEIR OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN VS. CORMOPOSA G.R. NO. 152807 AUGUST 12, 2003
FACTS:

The CA summarized the factual antecedents of the case as follows:

A Complaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by [petitioners] against [respondents] before
the Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur Municipal Trial Court.

The Complaint alleged that Marcos Saez was the lawful and actual possessor of Lot No. 845, Land 275
located at Darong, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur with an area of 1.2 hectares. In 1960, he died leaving all his
heirs, his children and grandchildren.

In 1965, Francisco Comorposa who was working in the land of Oboza was terminated from his job. The
termination of his employment caused a problem in relocating his house. Being a close family friend of
[Marcos] Saez, Francisco Comorposa approached the late Marcos Saezs son, [Adolfo] Saez, the husband
of Gloria Leano Saez, about his problem. Out of pity and for humanitarian consideration, Adolfo allowed
Francisco Comorposa to occupy the land of Marcos Saez. Hence, his nipa hut was carried by his neighbors
and transferred to a portion of the land subject matter of this case. Such transfer was witnessed by several
people, among them, Gloria Leano and Noel Oboza. Francisco Comorposa occupied a portion of Marcos
Saez property without paying any rental.

Francisco Comorposa left for Hawaii, U.S.A. He was succeeded in his possession by the respondents who
likewise did not pay any rental and are occupying the premises through petitioners tolerance.

On 7 May 1998, a formal demand was made upon the respondents to vacate the premises but the latter
refused to vacate the same and claimed that they [were] the legitimate claimants and the actual and
lawful possessor[s] of the premises. A [C]omplaint was filed with the barangay office of Sta. Cruz[,] Davao
del Sur, but the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement. Thus, the corresponding Certificate to
File Action was issued by the said barangay and an action for unlawful detainer was filed by petitioners
against respondents.

Respondents, in their Answer, denied the material allegations of the [C]omplaint and alleged that they
entered and occupied the premises in their own right as true, valid and lawful claimants, possessors and
owners of the said lot way back in 1960 and up to the present time; that they have acquired just and valid
ownership and possession of the premises by ordinary or extraordinary prescription, and that the Regional
Director of the DENR, Region XI has already upheld their possession over the land in question when it
ruled that they [were] the rightful claimants and possessors and [were], therefore, entitled to the issuance
of a title.

The Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur rendered judgment in favor of petitioners but the
Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, on appeal, reversed and set aside the said decision. x x x[6]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Affirming the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the CA upheld the right of respondents as claimants and
possessors. The appellate court held that -- although not yet final -- the Order issued by the regional
executive director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) remained in full force
and effect, unless declared null and void. The CA added that the Certification issued by the DENRs
community environment and natural resources (CENR) officer was proof that when the cadastral survey
was conducted, the land was still alienable and was not yet allocated to any person.

According to the CA, respondents had the better right to possess alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, because they have suffiently proven their actual, physical, open, notorious, exclusive,
continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof since 1960. The appellate court deemed as self-serving,
and therefore incredible, the Affidavits executed by Gloria Leano Saez, Noel Oboza and Paulina Paran.

Hence, this Petition.

ISSUES:

In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues for the Courts consideration:

(1) Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and [err] in sustaining the ruling of the Regional
Trial Court giving credence to the Order dated 2 April 1998 issued by the regional executive director?

(2) Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and err in sustaining the Regional Trial Courts
ruling giving weight to the CENR Officers Certification, which only bears the facsimile of the alleged
signature of a certain Jose F. Tagorda and, [worse], it is a new matter raised for the first time on appeal?

(3) Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and err in holding that the land subject matter of
this case has been acquired by means of adverse possession and prescription?

(4) Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion, and err in declaring that, neither is there error
on the part of the Regional Trial Court, when it did not give importance to the affidavits by Gloria Leano
Saez, Noel [Oboza], and Paulina Paran for allegedly being self serving?

RULING:

The Petition has no merit.

First Issue:

The DENR Order of April 2, 1998

Petitioners claim that the reliance of the CA upon the April 2, 1998 Order issued by the regional director
of the DENR was erroneous. The reason was that the Order, which had upheld the claim of respondents,
was supposedly not yet final and executory. Another Order dated August 23, 1999, issued later by the
DENR regional director, allegedly held in abeyance the effectivity of the earlier one.

Under the Public Land Act, the management and the disposition of public land is under the primary control
of the director of lands (now the director of the Lands Management Bureau or LMB), subject to review by
the DENR secretary. As a rule, then, courts have no jurisdiction to intrude upon matters properly falling
within the powers of the LMB.

The powers given to the LMB and the DENR to alienate and dispose of public land does not, however,
divest regular courts of jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted by occupants or applicants to
protect their respective possessions and occupations. The power to determine who has actual physical
possession or occupation of public land and who has the better right of possession over it remains with
the courts. But once the DENR has decided, particularly through the grant of a homestead patent and the
issuance of a certificate of title, its decision on these points will normally prevail.

Therefore, while the issue as to who among the parties are entitled to a piece of public land remains
pending with the DENR, the question of recovery of possession of the disputed property is a matter that
may be addressed to the courts.
Second Issue:

CENR Officers Certification

Petitioners contend that the CENR Certification dated July 22, 1997 is a sham document, because the
signature of the CENR officer is a mere facsimile. In support of their argument, they cite Garvida v. Sales
Jr. and argue that the Certification is a new matter being raised by respondents for the first time on appeal.

We are not persuaded.

In Garvida, the Court held:

A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and
graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or
tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current. x x x

Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best exact copies. As such, they
are not admissible in evidence, as there is no way of determining whether they are genuine or authentic.

The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a facsimile of the signature of CENR
Officer Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the same as that which is alluded to in Garvida.
The one mentioned here refers to a facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature produced by
mechanical means but recognized as valid in banking, financial, and business transactions.

Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification. In fact, the DENR regional director has
acknowledged and used it as reference in his Order dated April 2, 1998:

x x x. CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda, in a CERTIFICATION dated 22 July 1997, certified among others, that:
x x x per records available in his Office, x x x the controverted lot x x x was not allocated to any person x x
x.

If the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims, then the regional director would not have used it as
reference in his Order. Instead, he would have either verified it or directed the CENR officer to take the
appropriate action, as the latter was under the formers direct control and supervision.

Petitioners claim that the Certification was raised for the first time on appeal is incorrect. As early as the
pretrial conference at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), the CENR Certification had already been marked
as evidence for respondents as stated in the Pre-trial Order. The Certification was not formally offered,
however, because respondents had not been able to file their position paper.

Neither the rules of procedurenor jurisprudencewould sanction the admission of evidence that has not
been formally offered during the trial. But this evidentiary rule is applicable only to ordinary trials, not to
cases covered by the rule on summary procedure -- cases in which no full-blown trial is held.

Third Issue:

Affidavit of Petitioners Witnesses

Petitioners assert that the CA erred in disregarding the Affidavits of their witnesses, insisting that the Rule
on Summary Procedure authorizes the use of affidavits. They also claim that the failure of respondents to
file their position paper and counter-affidavits before the MTC amounts to an admission by silence.

The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value. Admissibility refers to the
question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to
the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a particular item of evidence may
be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by
the rules of evidence.
While in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the witnesses respective testimonies, the
failure of the adverse party to reply does not ipso facto render the facts, set forth therein, duly proven.
Petitioners still bear the burden of proving their cause of action, because they are the ones asserting an
affirmative relief.

Fourth Issue:

Defense of Prescription

Petitioners claim that the court a quo erred in upholding the defense of prescription proffered by
respondents. It is the formers contention that since the latters possession of the land was merely being
tolerated, there was no basis for the claim of prescription. We disagree.

For the Court to uphold the contention of petitioners, they have first to prove that the possession of
respondents was by mere tolerance. The only pieces of evidence submitted by the former to support their
claim were a technical description and a vicinity map drawn in accordance with the survey dated May 22,
1936. Both of these were discredited by the CENR Certification, which indicated that the contested lot
had not yet been allocated to any person when the survey was conducted. The testimony of petitioners
witnesses alone cannot prevail over respondents continued and uninterrupted possession of the subject
lot for a considerable length of time.

MILLARES V. PLDT

FACTS:
For resolution is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, assailing the decision and resolution dated rendered by the Court of Appeals in the case of
Edgardo D. Millares vs. National Labor Relations Commission, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., Inc.
and Ambrosio Hugo.

Sometime in May, 1989, Edgardo D. Millares, petitioner, was employed by the Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Co., Inc. (PLDT), respondent company, as cable splicer helper. At the time of his dismissal from
the service, he was a junior cable splicer at the OPSIM II, Tondo Exchange, receiving a monthly salary of
P7,300.00.

On August 1995, Ambrosio B. Hugo, Manager of respondent company Tondo Exchange, received a
complaint from a prospective telephone subscriber. According to Celestina Ignacio, the prospective
subscriber, Millares promised to install a telephone line at her residence for a service fee of 3,800.00 but
that he failed to do so; and that despite her demand, he refused to return to her said amount.

During the clarificatory hearing, petitioner denied that he knew Celestina Ignacio and that he received
3,800.00 from her. But eventually, he admitted his offense and promised to repay her the amount.

Thereafter, respondent company sent him two (2) separate inter-office memoranda (IOM) charging him
with willful violation of company rules and regulations and directing him to submit a written explanation.
However, he refused and remained obstinate.
Meantime, on September 1995, petitioner paid Celestina the amount of 3,800.00. Consequently, she
executed a written retraction stating that she was forced to file a complaint against petitioner when he
failed to pay his loan of 3,800.00.

Respondent company found petitioner guilty of extortion and serious misconduct. Consequently, he was
dismissed from the service effective July 19, 1996.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages against
respondent and Ambrosio B. Hugo. The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision holding that petitioner was
illegally dismissed from employment and ordering respondent company to reinstate him to his former
position and to pay him P263,901.08 representing his backwages, allowances and other benefits.

Upon appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) promulgated a Decision dated September
29, 2000 reversing the Arbiters assailed Decision affirming the dismissal of complainant as they found the
actions of the latter constitutes grave misconduct by all standards, a just cause for termination under
Article 281 of the Labor Code.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON the Court of Appeals erred in:

(1) finding that there is substantial evidence to support Millares’ dismissal from the service.

(2) holding that respondent company’s two inter-office memoranda issued to petitioner show that he was
not deprived of his right to due process.

RULING:

(1) There is substantial evidence to support the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioners dismissal
from the service is valid. Well-entrenched is the rule that substantial proof is sufficient as basis for the
imposition of any disciplinary action upon the employee. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied
where the employer, as in this case, has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible
for the misconduct and his participation therein renders him unworthy of trust and confidence demanded
by his position.[4] That petitioner violated respondent PLDTs rules and regulations and committed serious
misconduct in the performance of his duties, have been proved by Celestina Ignacio. Respondent thus lost
its trust and confidence in petitioner. Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended, these are just
causes for dismissing him from the service.

(2) There is no cogent reason why the Court should not accord deference and finality to the Appellate
Court’s finding that petitioner was accorded his right to due process. Well-entrenched rule that procedural
due process requires the employer to give the employee two notices. First is the notice apprising him of
the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought. Second is the subsequent notice
informing him of the employers decision to dismiss him. In the case at bar, respondent company sent
petitioner the required notices. Clearly, he was not deprived of his right to due process.
QUIAMBAO V. COURT OF APPEALS 454 SCRA 17
FACTS:

This is a petition assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the resolution by the
National Appellate Board (NAB) of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) to dismiss petitioner PO3
Felino Quiambao from the police service.

On December 22, 1990, Espie Catolico was inquiring as to the whereabouts of her house maid
who left the house the day before. She was later informed that a certain policeman was looking for her
as her housemaid was in his custody. She went to the area as directed by the old woman but there she
was allegedly accosted by petitioner, PO3 Felino Quiambao, a member of the Philippine National Police
(PNP), Western Police District Command, and five (5) other persons. Quiambao and his companions
forcibly took Catolico’s handbag and carried away its contents consisting of precious assorted
merchandise, jewelry and other personal items worth approximately nine thousand pesos (P9, 000.00).
Thereafter, petitioner forcibly herded Catolico to his owner-type jeep and brought her to the dimly lit
portion of North Harbor and, while thereat, he slapped her on the face several times and warned her not
to look anymore for her housemaid.

In view of the incident, Catolico filed a sworn statement on 24 June 1991 with the PNP Inspectorate
Division, accusing petitioner and six (6) others, with robbery-holdup and mauling. She also later filed
another administrative complaint with the Office of the Hearing Officer at NAPOLCOM, charging
petitioner with grave misconduct for the same incident. On March 30, 1993, the case was forwarded to
the City of Manila’s People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) for adjudication.

An investigation was conducted and on October 31, 1992, the Summary Dismissal Hearing Officer (SDHO)
recommended the dismissal of petitioner. This recommendation was approved by Acting PNP Chief and
Police Deputy Director General.

Petitioner appealed the October 31, 1992 resolution to the NAB of the NAPOLCOM. On October 25, 1993,
the Third Division of the NAB, rendered a decision affirming the dismissal of petitioner from police service.
The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied in a Resolution dated December 27, 1993
but it was only on September 23, 1996 when petitioner received a certified xerox copy of the Resolution
of the NAB denying his petition for reconsideration.

On October 7,1996, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals and on January 10,
1997, the appellate court dismissed the petition for review for lack of merit, hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition is meritorious.

Sub-issues:

(1) Whether or not the appellate court acted with grave abuse of discretion in holding that the petition
was not meritorious since the petition filed with the appellate court did not state the date when petitioner
received a copy of the Resolution of NAB dated 27 December 1993 to determine if the petition was indeed
filed within the reglementary period.

(2) Whether or not the Acting Chief of the PNP had authority to conduct summary dismissal proceedings
over members of the PNP.

(3) Whether or not the appellate court erred in affirming the findings of the Acting PNP Chief and the NAB
without hearing and substantial evidence.
RULING:

The petition is not imbued with merit.

Upon examination, the petition filed by petitioner is entitled "Petition for Review on Certiorari." The title
would immediately lead the Court to conclude that the petition is primarily anchored on Rule 45 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Under this mode of appeal, only questions of law may be
entertained by this Court and factual issues raised are beyond the ambit of this review. Yet, the issues
raised by petitioner in the petition are fundamentally factual in nature which are inappropriate for
resolution via the mode of review he availed of. However, a perusal of issues in the petition would indicate
that the petition is actually anchored on Rule 65 as the issues principally sought to assail the resolution
rendered by the appellate court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.

(1) No, the appellate court did not act with grave abuse of discretion. A reading of the foregoing allegation
disclosed the fact that on 27 December 1993, NAB rendered a resolution denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. Although it would seem anomalous as it is unnatural that the purported resolution was
received only by petitioner on 23 September 1996, the Court is inclined to sustain petitioner’s assertion
for the same is supported by the certified xerox copy of the resolution and the evidence is bereft of any
showing that will warrant a contrary conclusion. Thus, the aforecited allegation substantially complied
with the requirements under Section 6. The appellate court believed that petitioner had already been
served with a copy of the resolution prior to 23 September 1996. Such a conclusion, however, is bereft of
any evidentiary basis and, thus, has no leg to stand on. It is noteworthy that the date when petitioner
received NAB’s resolution denying his motion for reconsideration is material in determining when the
fifteen (15)-day reglementary period for filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals starts to run.

The failure to specifically state in the petition on material dates such as the date when the resolution or
order denying a motion for reconsideration was received is a ground for dismissal in accordance with
Section 7 of the administrative circular and Rule 43. But the scenario is not present in the case at bar for
the aforecited paragraph 18 of the petition filed with the appellate court reflected the date when
petitioner actually received the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration, which is 23 September
1996. Procedural rules must be liberally interpreted and applied so as not to frustrate substantial justice
that this Court seeks to achieve.

(2) Yes. R.A. 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990 provides that a
complaint against a PNP member which would warrant dismissal from service is within the jurisdiction of
the PLEB. Moreover, reading Section 41 and 42 of the same statute, the PNP Chief and regional directors
are vested with the power to summarily dismiss erring PNP members if any of the causes for summary
dismissal enumerated in Section 42 is attendant. Thus, the power to dismiss PNP members is not only the
prerogative of PLEB but concurrently exercised by the PNP Chief and regional directors. This shared power
is likewise evident in Section 45.

Once a complaint is filed with any of the disciplining authorities under R.A. No. 6975, the latter shall
acquire exclusive original jurisdiction over the case although other disciplining authority has concurrent
jurisdiction over the case. Paragraph (c) of Section 41 explicitly declares this point.

Clearly, the PLEB and the PNP Chief and regional directors have concurrent jurisdiction over administrative
cases filed against members of the PNP which may warrant dismissal from service.

(3) No. Summary dismissal proceedings are governed by specific requirements of notification of the
charges together with copies of affidavits and other attachments supporting the complaints, and the filing
of an answer, together with supporting documents. It is true that consistent with its summary nature, the
duration of the hearing is limited, and the manner of conducting the hearing is summary, in that sworn
statements may take the place of oral testimonies of witnesses, cross-examination is confined only to
material and relevant matters, and prolonged arguments and dilatory proceedings shall not be
entertained.
Notably, the recommendation of the SDHO was approved by the Acting PNP Chief whose decision was
affirmed by the NAB. The findings of the NAB was also affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The unanimity in
their conclusions cannot just be disregarded and their factual determinations are conclusive upon this
Court for the records show that petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to defend his side, as he
filed position papers to substantiate his defense and arguments and even filed motions for
reconsideration to set aside adverse decisions rendered against him. This opportunity to defend himself
was more than sufficient to comply with due process requirements in administrative proceedings.

In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion is required. Thus, findings of fact of
quasi-judicial agencies are generally accorded respect and even finality by the Supreme Court, if
supported by substantial evidence, in recognition of their expertise on the specific matters under their
consideration. Hence, factual determinations made by the SDHO and the NAB as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals are undoubtedly beyond review and conclusive upon this Court, they being triers of facts.

PEOPLE V. NEGOSA G.R. NO. 142856-57. AUGUST 25, 2003

FACTS:

RTC Camiguin Branch 28 convicted the appellant Robert Negosa alias Jovin of rape and acts of
lasciviousness for willfully, feloniously, and unlawfully having sexual intercourse with Gretchen Castao, his
12-year old (10 at the commission of the crime) stepdaughter.

Negosa and Castao’s mother has been living together without the benefit of marriage. The victim initially
lived with her grandmother and eventually joined to live together with her mother and appellant. On June
28, 1997, eve of their sitio’s fiesta, the victim was sexually abused by the appellant who warned the victim
not to tell anyone. Gretchen kept the harrowing experience to herself and experienced sexual abuse from
the appellant every now and then. She soon revealed her ordeal to some of her friends, decided to write
about it in the pages of a notebook, tore and hid them in one notebook placed with her things. Castao’s
aunt happened to read the sexual abuse account of her niece by his stepfather on the torn pages of her
diary inserted in her notebook. The said diary was written by the victim a year after the first sexual abuse
was done. The victim was brought for a physical examination wherein the doctor found abrasions on the
vagina and bloody discharge at the cervical os. Finding a prima facie case against appellant for two counts
of statutory rape, two information were filed to the RTC.

Appellant denied accusations but was found guilty of rape in Criminal Case No. 918 and and found him
guilty only of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 919. He was sentenced to: (1) supreme penalty of
death for rape and (2) an indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor maximum, as minimum,
four years and two months of prision correccional medium, as maximum for acts of lasciviousness.
Appellant was also ordered to pay the victim the sum of P50, 000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto for rape
and P25, 000.00 for acts of lasciviousness.

Appellant assails the decision contending that the lower court gravely erred in: (1) giving credence to the
testimony of the victim despite the long delay in reporting the incident of rape, (2) finding the accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and in (3) appreciating the aggravating
circumstance of stepfather-stepdaughter relationship between the accused and complainant as alleged
in the information when the accused is not legally married to complainant’s mother.
ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the victim’s testimony has a probative weight in court despite the lapse of
time in reporting the incident.

(2) Whether or not Negosa is guilty of qualified rape.

RULING:

(1) Yes, the victim’s testimony has a probative weight. The fact that Gretchen started making
entries in her diary only on September 2, 1998, more than a year after the first rape incident occurred,
does not lessen the probative weight of the said entries. It bears stressing that Gretchen was only in Grade
V, barely eleven years old when the appellant raped her on June 28, 1997. At such a tender age, still
inexperienced in the vagaries of life, she could not be expected to act and react like an adult. Being
subjected to a vicious sexual assault was an emotional and psychological experience on the part of the
young victim. This Court has repeatedly ruled that "the workings of the human mind placed under a great
deal of emotional and psychological stress are unpredictable, and different people react differently. There
is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling,
frightful or traumatic experience -some may shout, some may faint, and some may be shocked into
insensibility." Some may choose to keep to themselves the harrowing and debilitating experience rather
than suffer the embarrassment, humiliation and ostracization from relatives after divulging the terrible
secret. In this case, the evidence on record shows that the victim was the secretive and silent type, who
chose not to confide in her relatives.

(2) No, Negosa is not guilty of qualified rape. He is guilty only of simple statutory rape and not of rape in
its qualified form under Article 335, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecution
was burdened to prove the allegation in the Information that the appellant was the stepfather of the
victim. However, the prosecution failed to prove the same. The evidence on record shows that the
appellant was merely the common-law husband of the victim’s mother. This special qualifying
circumstance, that the appellant was the common-law husband of the mother of the victim, was not
alleged in the Information. Even if such special qualifying circumstance was proved, it cannot be
appreciated against the appellant in order to qualify the crime; otherwise, the appellant would be
deprived of his right to be informed of the charge lodged against him. Thus, the appellant is guilty only of
simple statutory rape for which the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659. The trial court also directed the appellant to pay
the victim the amount of P50,000 for moral damages which the trial court did not award.

PEOPLE VS. CANLAS (372 SCRA 401)

FACTS:

Rex Canlas together with six other unidentified men were charged of the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles City on January 19, 2000.

That the information alleges that on or about the 14th day of June, 1998, in Brgy. Palat, municipality of
Porac, province of Pampanga, Philippines the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, with intent of gain, and with violence, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away with them merchandise consisting of assorted
clothes worth P4,000.00 and cash money in the amount of P1,000.00, belonging to the deceased, Jing
Garcia Flores, with a total value of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) Philippine Currency, and on the
occasion of said robbery and for the purpose of enabling them to take, steal and carry away the said
articles, accused in pursuance of their conspiracy, and taking advantage of their superior strength and
with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal
violence upon the deceased, Jing Garcia Flores with the use of a lead pipe and a hunting knife, inflicting
upon him mortal and fatal injuries which caused his death.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Lower Court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged
thru circumstantial evidence.

2. Whether or not the Lower Court failed to appreciate the evidence of the accused-appellant in
order to acquit him.

RULING:

1. There is no direct evidence in the case that link the appellant to the commission of the crime. As
stated by the trial court nobody saw how the victim was killed and how the robbery was committed. The
trial court was compelled to rely on circumstantial evidence. Conviction is not always based on direct
evidence. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the
facts in issue may be established by inference. It is founded on experience, observed facts and
coincidences establishing a connection between the known and proven facts and the facts sought to be
proved. Conviction may be warranted on the basis of circumstantial evidence provided that: (1) there is
more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. With
respect to the third requisite, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an
unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of others, as the guilty person.

Based on these requisites, the circumstantial evidence invoked by the trial court raises doubt rather than
moral certainty as to the guilt of appellant. The circumstantial evidence of the prosecution fails to muster
the quantum of proof required in criminal cases guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, the
circumstances enumerated by the trial court do not completely discount the possibility that other than
appellant, there could be another person or persons who could have perpetrated the crime.

2. Every criminal conviction requires the prosecution to prove two things: (1) the fact of the crime,
i.e., the presence of all the elements of the crime for which the accused stands charged, and (2) the fact
that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. Here, appellant was charged with the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide. To be liable for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, it is
incumbent upon the prosecution to prove: (a) the taking of the personal property with the use of violence
or intimidation against a person; (b) the property thus taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is
characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason
thereof, the crime of homicide was committed. What is crucial for a conviction for the crime of robbery
with homicide is for the prosecution to firmly establish the offenders intent to take personal property
before the killing, regardless of the time when the homicide is actually carried out. There must be a
showing that the death of the victim occurred by reason or on occasion of the robbery.

No shred of evidence is on record that could support the conclusion that appellants primary motive was
to rob the victim and that he was able to accomplish it. While the trial court noted that there were no
eyewitnesses to the robbery, nonetheless, it ruled that the robbery aspect of the special complex crime
of robbery with homicide was sufficiently proven because the assorted clothings and other items of the
victim was them carrying to be sold to customers were nowhere to be found near the scene where the
victim’s body was recovered. They were later found inside the house of Jose Tamayo. Hence, the robbery
angle is also beyond dispute.

The trial courts conclusion that there was robbery simply because the items belonging to the victim were
found in the house of the grandfather of appellant is speculative. The evidence is not definitive as to
whether appellant regularly slept in the house of his grandfather or specifically, on the bamboo bed under
which the personal effects and items peddled by the victim were found. Mere speculation and
probabilities cannot substitute for proof required in establishing the guilt of an accused beyond
reasonable doubt.

Therefore, the criminal case of the appellant is reversed and set aside and appellant is acquitted of the
crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE VS. LARRAῆAGA G.R. NO.138874-75 JULY 1, 2005

FACTS:

On July 16, 1997 Larraῆaga and seven others kidnapped Chiong sisters (Marijoy and Jacqueline)
in the Ayala Center Cebu near the west wing entrance of the mall. The two were raped and Marijoy’s body
with tape on her mouth and handcuffs on her wrists was found at Tan-awan, Carcar, Cebu while her
sister’s body was never found. The accused-appellants were charged and later convicted of the crimes of
(a) special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and (b) simple kidnapping and serious
illegal detention. David Valiente Rusia, co-defendant appeared ten months after the incident stating his
testimony in exchange of his immunity. He testified against his co-defendants that he was with Larraῆaga
in Ayala Center Cebu on the day the Chiong sisters were kidnapped. Larraῆaga raised in his defense that
he was in Quezon City at the time the crime is said to have taken place. His friend and teachers testified
under oath to prove his claimed but all were rejected by the Court and further claimed that the body
found on the deep ravine at Tan-awan, Carcar was not Marijoy’s but someone else’s. And the other
appellants questioned Rusia’s testimony for being incredible, inconsistent and unworthy of belief.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Court erred in according credence to Rusia’s testimony

2. Whether or not the Court erred in rejecting the appellant’s alibi

3. Whether or not the Court erred in holding that the Trial Court did not violate the rights of the
accused to due process of law

4. Whether or not the Court erred in holding that the body found In Tan-awan, Carcar was that of
Marijoy.

RULINGS:

1. In giving credence to Rusia’s testimony, the Trial Court took into consideration the physical
evidence and the corroborative testimonies of other witnesses. Physical evidence is one of the highest
degrees of proof. It speaks more eloquently than all witnesses put together. The presence of Marijoy’s
body in a deep ravine of Tan-awan, Carcar with tape on her mouth and handcuffs on her wrists certainly
bolstered Rusia’s testimony on what actually took place from Ayala Center Cebu to Tan-awan. Indeed, the
details he supplied to the trial court are of such nature and quality that only a witness who actually saw
the commission of the crimes could furnish. Reinforcing his testimony is its corroboration by several other
witnesses who saw incidents of what he narrated. Even assuming that his testimony standing alone might
indeed be unworthy of belief in view of is character, it is not so when considered with the other evidence
presented by the prosecution.

2. It is settled rule that the defense of an alibi is inherently weak and crumbles in the light of positive
declarations of truthful witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. Alibi becomes less plausible as a
defense when it is corroborated only by relatives or close friends of the accused. In the case at bar,
Larraῆaga failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to
be at Ayala Center Cebu during the abduction. His presence in Cebu City on July 16.1997 was proved to
be not only a possibility but a reality.
3. Professor Jerome Bailen was properly excluded for being not a finger-print expert but an
archaeologist and his report consists merely of the results of his visual inspection of the exhibits already
several months old. On the other hand, Atty. Florencio Villarin, NBI, Regional Director failed to testify
before the Trial Court the affidavit for it only contains his own unsubstantiated opinions, his self-
congratulatory remarks, and his unmitigated.

PEOPLE V CALUMPANG
FACTS:

Accused Rico Calumpang and Jovenal Omatang were found guilty by the RTC of Dumaguete City
for two counts of murder and sentencing both to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering
them to pay damages to the heirs of the victims spouses Santiago and Alicia Catipay.

The prosecution’s lone witness, Magno Gomez said in his sworn statement that both accused
hacked Alicia first, when Santiago tried to save his wife, he was also hacked by the both accused. He
further claimed that the accused tried to hack him too but he was able to run. He passed by the house of
Alexander Ebiass and asked for dried coconut leaves and made a torch out of it. After a kilometer , he saw
the house of cousin Rolando Retada, where he spent the night and left very early in the morning, even
refusing to drink coffee. Neither of the two were informed by Gomez about the incident the night prior in
fear for his own life. However, during the trial,Gomez said that Santiago was hacked by Rico Calumpang
and Alicia by Jovenal Omatang simultaneously.

The defense on the other hand presented corroborated witness to the alibi that both accused
could not be in the crime scene at the time of the murder as accuses Omatang stayed in the store of Ana
Andagan until 7 pm and only left when his niece fetched him while Calumpang stayed in the store until 8
pm and helped Ana close her store, and walked with her home.

For the State’s part, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that reasonable doubt concerning
the guilt of the appellants exist in this case, but stresses the material inconsistencies between his
testimony during the trial and his sworn affidavit. It concluded that the appellants deserve acquittal on
reasonable doubt.

The trial court gave merit to the testimony of Magno stating that his actions are not contrary to
human experience. The case was escalated to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

WON the appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of double murder.

HELD:

No, the appellants are not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for the crime of double murder.
Generally, an affidavit, being an ex parted, is considered almost always incomplete and often inaccurate
or lacking in details and is deemed inferior to the testimony given in open court. Jurisprudence, however,
forewarns that when serious and inexplicable discrepancies exist between a previously executed sworn
statement of a witness and his testimonial declarations, with respect to a persons participation in a serious
imputation such as murder, there is raised a grave doubt on the veracity of the witness account.

The trial court believed Magno’s testimony when he was able to point the exact location of the
wounds inflicted but 19 months ago or barely a day after the incident when he was asked the same
question he failed to recall where Santiago was hit.

Similarly some of Magno’s testimony are unworthy of belief- that appellants ignored him when
he was only five feet away from the alleged unobstructed view of the murder scene, it makes no sense as
well that he only ran for 5- meters when it was unsure whether appellants ran after him or not. The act
of Gomez lighting the torch is also not an action of someone seeking to avoid peril to his life. Well settled
is the rule that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but
must be credible in itselfsuch as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances.

Appellants defense of alibi was indeed weak, since their alibis were corroborated only by their
relatives and friends, and it was not shown that it was impossible for them to be at the place of the
incident. However, the rule that an accused must satisfactorily prove his alibi was never intended to
change or shift the burden of proof in criminal cases. It is basic that the prosecution evidence must stand
or fall on its own weight and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Unless the
prosecution overturns the constitutional presumption of innocence of an accused by competent and
credible evidence proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption remains. There being no
sufficient evidence beyond reasonable doubt pointing to appellants as the perpetrators of the crime,
appellants presumed innocence stands.

The decision of the trial court is reversed and the appellants acquitted beyond reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE V LEE HOI MING

FACTS:

This is an appeal from the decision dated September 20, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
143, in Criminal Case No. 99-2200, convicting Lee Hoi Ming a.k.a Joey Ong and Pic, of violation of Section
15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P10,000,000.00.

In a buy-bust operation dated September 24, 1999, appellant Lee Hoi Ming was caught in flagrante delicto
for selling one point five kilograms (1.5kg) of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, otherwise known as
Shabu, to poseur buyer SPO4 Rolando M. Sayson of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force
(PAOCTF).

In the Regional Trial Court, accused Lee Hoi Ming was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
The Dangerous Act of 1972 and was sentenced to imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and a fine of ten
million pesos (P10,000,000.00).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the buy-bust operation is legitimate.

Whether or not the warrant of arrest, which is addressed to a certain Joey Ong, can validly be used against
appellant Lee Hoi Ming.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that issue on the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation was satisfactorily proven
by the prosecution, in the trial court, for having laid down the (1) identity of the buyer and seller, object,
and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore.

Consequently, the Supreme Court said that although it was not the name of the appellant that was in the
warrant of arrest, it cannot be denied that it is not the warrant that has caused appellant to be charged
with the offense of violating the Dangerous Drugs Law instead it was because he was caught in flagrante
delicto during the buy-bust operation.

Appellant’s claim that he was not Joey Ong is weak vis--vis the prosecutions positive testimonies. Quite
simply, appellants denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The
Court is not unaware of the reality that, in some instances, law enforcers resort to the practice of planting
evidence to extract information or even to harass civilians. However, like alibi, the defense of frame up is
viewed with disfavor as it can easily be concocted and is commonly used as a standard line of defense in
most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, which is harmful to the society.

As such, the Supreme Court affirms the decision of the trial court and finds appellant Lee Hoi Ming guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Article III, Sec. 15 of Republic Act 6425, as amended,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay a fine of
P10,000,000.00.

ALEXANDER P RUGAS V PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

At around 9:00 oclock in the evening of September 16, 1997, Herberto (or Gerberto) Rafol was conversing
with Perla Perez in the street fronting the house of Anda Romano in barangay Taclobo, San Fernando,
Romblon, when the accused Alexander P. Rugas, suddenly stabbed him at his left thigh. He faced him to
know who stabbed him but the accused stabbed him on his stomach. Rafol ran and shouted for help.
Somebody helped him in boarding him to a tricycle and he was brought to the hospital at Cajidiocan where
a timely and able medical assistance was rendered to the victim which prevented his death.

Dr. Fatalla found a fatal stab wound on the right upper quadrant of Rafol’s abdomen and a second stab
wound located at the lower left quadrant or at the uppermost part of the left lateral thigh which was not
a fatal wound. Rafol spent a total of P25,390.00 as a result of these injuries he sustained.

Petitioner Rugas invoked self-defense. He testified that at about 9:00 a.m. on September 16, 1997, he was
in the house of his aunt at Barangay Taclobo, San Fernando, Romblon, taking care of his aunt’s children.
While he was in the kitchen slicing lemon, he heard someone shouting outside the house: Get out those
who are brave! Rugas then pocketed the knife he was using and went out of the house to find out what
the commotion was all about.

Outside, the petitioner saw Crispulo Romano, Joval Rones and Herberto Rafol. Rafol was armed with a
bolo. He went out of the gate and asked Rafol, Why are you like that? Peeved, Rafol handed his bolo over
to Rones and approached the petitioner, kicking him on the left arm, for which Rugas claimed to have
been hit on the eyebrow. The two then had a fistfight. When the petitioner saw Rones raise his bolo, he
pulled out the knife from his pocket to defend himself. Rafol also pulled out a knife of his own. The
petitioner then stabbed Rafol on the front portion of his body, and the latter’s knife fell to the ground.

The petitioner picked up his knife and stabbed Rafol anew. He then faced Rones, who ran away. The
petitioner did not notice where Romano had gone. He then fled from the scene of the crime and
proceeded to the house of his aunt.

In the trial court, petitioner was rendered judgment convicting him of the crime of frustrated homicide
and to pay for the actual expenses of Rafol in his medical attendance. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court with modifications.
ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner Rugas can validly invoke self-defense.

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s claim of self-defense. First. The determination of the
unlawful aggressor’s identity, as between the appellant or the victim, is a factual issue. In this case, the
trial court ruled that the appellant, not the victim, was the unlawful aggressor, and that the appellant’s
evidence to prove his defense was incredible as can be gleaned on the injuries sustained by the victim and
the fact that no injury was exhibited by Rugas, not even the slightest scratch.

Second. Like alibi, self-defense is inherently a weak defense which can be easily fabricated. When the
accused interposed self-defense, he hereby admitted having caused the injuries of the victim. The burden
of proof then shifted on him to prove, with clear and convincing evidence the confluence of the essential
requisites for self-defense, which Rugas failed to justify.

Third, the petitioner’s reliance on the Court’s ruling on People v. Sabio is without merit. In that case, the
Court ruled that a slap on the face is an unlawful aggression since the face represents a person and his
dignity. In this case, there is no evidence that the victim slapped the petitioner.The petitioner merely
claimed that he was hit on his eyebrow, with no apparent injury, which the trial court and the Court of
Appeals found to be baseless. Also, the act of Rugas of stabbing Rafol three times to defend himself from
the latter’s imminent assault is inconsistent with the claim to defend petitioner’s honor.

Granting arguendo that the victim and his companion have had shouted, get out those who are brave, the
accused’s name was never mentioned or called out. The victim was then in the street but the accused
went out from the house and asked the victim why they were like that which only shows that the accused
exposed himself to the consequences of a fight.

As such, the Supreme Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals with modification. The petitioner
is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide and is directed to pay Rafol P25,000.00,
as moral damages, and P25,000.00, as exemplary damages.

JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC., PETITIONER, VS. MUNICIPALITY (NOW
CITY) OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, RESPONDENT.
FACTS

The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street, a municipal road near the Pasig
Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig. The residents in the area needed the road for water
and electrical outlets. The municipality then decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the 1,791-square
meter property of the Ching Cuancos, which is abutting E. R. Santos Street. The Fire Code requires that it
be at least three meters in width so that fire trucks could pass through in case of conflagration.
On April 19, 1993, The Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an Ordinance authorizing the municipal
mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings to acquire the said property and appropriate the fund
therefor. The ordinance stated that the property owners were notified of the municipality’s intent to
purchase the property for public use as an access road but they rejected the offer.

The municipality filed a complaint against the Ching Cuancos for the expropriation of the property under
Section 19 the Local Government Code. The plaintiff alleged therein that it notified the defendants, by
letter, of its intention to construct an access road on a portion of the property but they refused to sell the
same portion. The plaintiff deposited with the RTC 15% of the market value of the property based on the
latest tax declaration covering the property. On plaintiff’s motion, the RTC issued a writ of possession over
the property sought to be expropriated.

On November 26, 1993, the plaintiff caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the dorsal portion
of TCT No. PT-92579 under the name of the Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Incorporated
(JILCSFI) which had purchased the property.

In their answer, the defendants claimed that, as early as February 1993, they had sold the said property
to JILCSFI as evidenced by a deed of sale bearing the signature of defendant Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho
and his wife.

JILCSFI filed a motion for leave to intervene as defendant-in-intervention, which motion the RTC granted.
During trial, Rolando Togonon, the plaintiff’s messenger, testified on direct examination that on February
23, 1993, he served a letter of Engr. Jose Reyes, the Technical Assistant to the Mayor on Infrastructure, to
Lorenzo Ching Cuanco at his store at No. 18 Alkalde Jose Street, Kapasigan, Pasig. A lady received the same
and brought it inside the store. When she returned the letter to him, it already bore the signature of Luz
Bernarte. He identified a photocopy of the letter as similar to the one he served at the store. On cross-
examination, he admitted that he never met Luz Bernarte.

The plaintiff offered in evidence a photocopy of the letter of Engr. Jose Reyes addressed to Lorenzo Ching
Cuanco to prove that the plaintiff made a definite and valid offer to acquire the property to the co-owners.
However, the RTC rejected the same letter for being a mere photocopy.

The RTC held that, as gleaned from the declaration in Ordinance No. 21, there was substantial compliance
with the definite and valid offer requirement of Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, and that the expropriated
portion is the most convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid.

The CA affirmed and agreed with the trial court that the plaintiff substantially complied with Section 19
of R.A. No. 7160, particularly the requirement that a valid and definite offer must be made to the owner.
The CA declared that the letter of Engr. Reyes, inviting Lorenzo Ching Cuanco to a conference to discuss
with him the road project and the price of the lot, was a substantial compliance with the valid and definite
offer requirement under said Section 19. In addition, the CA noted that there was also constructive notice
to the defendants of the expropriation proceedings since a notice of lis pendens was annotated at the
dorsal portion of TCT No. PT-92579 on November 26, 1993.

JILCSFI filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision alleging that the CA erred in relying on the
photocopy of Engr. Reyes letter to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco because the same was not admitted in evidence
by the trial court for being a mere photocopy.

The CA denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. It held that it was not precluded from
considering the photocopy of the letter, notwithstanding that the same was excluded by the trial court,
since the fact of its existence was duly established by corroborative evidence. This corroborative evidence
consisted of the testimony of the plaintiffs messenger that he personally served the letter to Lorenzo
Ching Cuanco, and Municipal Ordinance No. 21 which expressly stated that the property owners were
already notified of the expropriation proceeding. The CA noted that JILCSFI failed to adduce controverting
evidence, thus the presumption of regularity was not overcome.
ISSUES

(1) Whether or not the Supreme Court can weigh the evidence on factual issues all over again.

(2) Whether or not the respondent complied with the requirement, under Section 19 of the Local
Government Code, of a valid and definite offer to acquire the property prior to the filing of the complaint.

RULING

(1) At the outset, it must be stressed that only questions of law may be raised by the parties and
passed upon by the Supreme Court in petitions for review on certiorari. Findings of fact of the CA, affirming
those of the trial court, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal.

Nonetheless, where it is shown that the conclusion is a finding grounded on speculations,

surmises or conjectures or where the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts, the Supreme Court
may reexamine the evidence on record.

(2) The respondent was burdened to prove the mandatory requirement of a valid and definite offer
to the owner of the property before filing its complaint and the rejection thereof by the latter. It is
incumbent upon the condemnor to exhaust all reasonable efforts to obtain the land it desires by
agreement. Failure to prove compliance with the mandatory requirement will result in the dismissal of
the complaint.

The offer must be complete, indicating with sufficient clearness the kind of contract intended and
definitely stating the essential conditions of the proposed contract. An offer would require, among other
things, a clear certainty on both the object and the cause or consideration of the envisioned contract.

In the present case, the respondent failed to prove that before it filed its complaint, it made a written
definite and valid offer to acquire the property for public use as an access road. The only evidence adduced
by the respondent to prove its compliance with Section 19 of the Local Government Code is the photocopy
of the letter purportedly bearing the signature of Engr. Jose Reyes, to only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo
Ching Cuanco.

It bears stressing, however, that the respondent offered the letter only to prove its desire or intent to
acquire the property for a right-of-way. The document was not offered to prove that the respondent made
a definite and valid offer to acquire the property. Moreover, the RTC rejected the document because the
respondent failed to adduce in evidence the original copy thereof. The respondent, likewise, failed to
adduce evidence that copies of the letter were sent to and received by all the co-owners of the property,
namely, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Kho.

The respondent sought to prove, through the testimony of its messenger, Rolando Togonon, that Lorenzo
Ching Cuanco received the original of the said letter. But Togonon testified that he merely gave the letter
to a lady, whom he failed to identify. He stated that the lady went inside the store of Lorenzo Ching
Cuanco, and later gave the letter back to him bearing the signature purportedly of one Luz Bernarte.
However, Togonon admitted, on cross-examination, that he did not see Bernarte affixing her signature on
the letter. Togonon also declared that he did not know and had never met Lorenzo Ching Cuanco and
Bernarte.

Even if the letter was, indeed, received by the co-owners, the letter is not a valid and definite offer to
purchase a specific portion of the property for a price certain. It is merely an invitation for only one of the
co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, to a conference to discuss the project and the price that may be
mutually acceptable to both parties.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The RTC is ordered to dismiss the complaint of the respondent
without prejudice to the refiling thereof.
AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY CO. AYING (G.R. NO. 144773. MAY 16, 2005)
FACTS

The disputed property is Lot No. 4399 with an area of 34,325 square meters located at Dapdap, Lapu-Lapu
City. Crisanta Maloloy-on petitioned for the issuance of a cadastral decree in her favor over said parcel of
land. After her death in 1930, the Cadastral Court issued a Decision directing the issuance of a decree in
the name of Crisanta Maloloy-on’s eight children, namely: Juan, Celedonio, Emiliano, Francisco, Simeon,
Bernabe, Roberta and Fausta, all surnamed Aying. The certificate of title was, however, lost during the
war. The siblings extra-judicially sold the lot to Aznar Brothers Realty Company. However, three siblings,
namely, Roberta, Emiliano and Simeon Aying did not participate in the extra-judicial partition. After the
partition the lot was sold. 29 years after, the Roberta, Emiliano and Simen filed a case for the ejectment
of the present occupants.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent’s cause of action is imprescriptible.

RULING

The facts on record show that petitioner acquired the entire parcel of land with the mistaken belief that
all the heirs have executed the subject document. Thus, the trial court is correct that the provision of law
applicable to this case is Article 1456 of the Civil Code which states:

ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.

The rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription ownership over property entrusted to him until and
unless he repudiates the trust, applies to express trusts and resulting implied trusts. However, in
constructive implied trusts, prescription may supervene even if the trustee does not repudiate the
relationship. Necessarily, repudiation of said trust is not a condition precedent to the running of the
prescriptive period. An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce
prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for
reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the
Torrens title over the property.

With regard to petitioner’s argument that the provision of Article 1104 of the Civil Code, stating that a
partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, should be applied,
suffice it to say that the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale is not being
rescinded. In fact, its validity had been upheld but only as to the parties who participated in the execution
of the same.

As discussed above, what was conveyed to petitioner was ownership over the shares of the heirs who
executed the subject document. Thus, the law, particularly, Article 1456 of the Civil Code, imposed the
obligation upon petitioner to act as a trustee for the benefit of respondent heirs of Emiliano and Simeon
Aying who, having brought their action within the prescriptive period, are now entitled to the
reconveyance of their share in the land in dispute.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. HERSON TAN Y VERZO, ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.
FACTS:

Accused-appellant Herson Tan, along with Lito Amido, were charged with the crime of highway robbery
with murder after they allegedly conspired to take, steal and carry away a Honda TMX motorcycle with a
sidecar from Freddie Saavedra, and that on the occasion of said robbery and by reason thereof, the said
accused attacked and stabbed with bladed and pointed weapons Saavedra which directly caused his
death.
 Relying on this information, the Lucena Philippine National Police (PNP) led by Lt. Carlos Santos
invited appellant in connection with the instant case and with respect to two other robbery cases reported
in Lucena City. During their conversation, appellant allegedly gave an explicit account of what actually
transpired in the case at bar. He narrated that he and co-accused Amido were responsible for the loss of
the motorcycle and the consequent death of Saavedra.

However, upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge.

Lt. Carlos, on cross-examination, testified that when he invited appellant to their headquarters,
he had no warrant for his arrest. He admitted that he did not inform appellant of his constitutional rights
to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel; nor did he reduce the supposed confession to writing.

ISSUE:

May the confession of an accused, given before a police investigator upon invitation and without the
benefit of counsel, be admissible in evidence against him?

RULING:

It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or admission and whatever
information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against the confessant.

Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy the
following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent
and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.

The evidence for the prosecution shows that when appellant was invited for questioning at the police
headquarters, he allegedly admitted his participation in the crime. This will not suffice to convict him,
however, of said crime. The constitutional rights of appellant, particularly the right to remain silent and
to counsel, are impregnable from the moment he is investigated in connection with an offense he is
suspected to have committed, even if the same be initiated by mere invitation. This Court values liberty
and will always insist on the observance of basic constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non against
the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of government.[12]

What remains of the evidence for the prosecution is inadequate to warrant a conviction. Considering the
circumstances attendant in the conduct of appellants investigation which fell short of compliance with
constitutional safeguards, we are constrained to acquit the appellant.

FE J. BAUTISTA AND MILAGROS J. CORPUS V HON. MALCOLM G. SARMIENTO

FACTS:

Petitioners Fe Bautista and Milagros Corpus were charged with Estafa before the sala of Judge Malcolm
G. Sarmiento. To prove its case, the prosecution presented during the trial the private complainant, Dr.
Leticia C. Yap, as its only witness. Believing that the prosecution failed to prove their guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, the petitioners moved to dismiss the case by way of demurrer to the evidence.
However, the respondent judge denied said motion. The Court believes that the prosecution established
a prima facie case of Estafa alleged in the Information against said accused on evidence presented so far
on record.

Accordingly, a motion for reconsideration was duly filed but was likewise denied "for lack of merit.” Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:

Whether or not conviction can be had in a criminal case on a mere prima facie case and not upon beyond
reasonable doubt.

RULING:

There is no denying that in a criminal case, unless the guilt of the accused is established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an acquittal. But when the trial court denies petitioners' motion to
dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution had established a prima facie
case against them, they assume a definite burden. It becomes incumbent upon petitioners to adduce
evidence to meet and nullify, if not overthrow, the prima facie case against them. This is due to the shift
in the burden of evidence, and not of the burden of proof as petitioners would seem to believe.

When a prima facie case is established by the prosecution in a criminal case, as in the case at bar, the
burden of proof does not shift to the defense. It remains throughout the trial with the party upon whom
it is imposed—the prosecution. It is the burden of evidence which shifts from party to party depending
upon the exigencies of the case in the course of the trial.

A prima facie case need not be countered by a preponderance of evidence nor by evidence of greater
weight. Defendant's evidence which equalizes the weight of plaintiff's evidence or puts the case in
equipoise is sufficient.

In the case at bar, the order denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, required them to present their
evidence. They refused and/or failed to do so. This justified an inference of their guilt. The inevitable result
was that the burden of evidence shifted on them to prove their innocence, or at least, raises a reasonable
doubt as to their guilt.

WHEREFORE, finding the order complained of to be well-taken and there being no grave abuse of
discretion that attended its issuance, the instant petition is DISMISSED with costs against petitioners.

PHILIPPINE PRYCE ASSURANCE CORPORATION V THE COURT OF APPEALS, (FOURTEENTH

DIVISION) AND GEGROCO, INC.,
FACTS:

Gegroco Inc., filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against petitioner Interworld Assurance
Corporation (now Philippine Pryce Assurance Corporation). The complaint alleged that petitioner issued
two surety bonds in behalf of its principal Sagum General Merchandise for P500,000 and P1,000,000,
respectively. Petitioner admitted having executed the said bonds, but denied liability.

After the issues had been joined, the case was set for pre-trial conference. On the scheduled date
for the pre-trial, however, only the counsel for petitioner appeared while both the representative of
respondent and its counsel were present. The pre-trial was reset to October 14, 1988, since the counsel
of the petitioner manifested that his client intended to file a third party complaint against its principal.
This Third-Party Complaint was filed on October 14, 1988. On this same day, the pre-trial was reset to
December 1, 1988.

On scheduled conference in December, petitioner and its counsel did not appear notwithstanding
their notice in open court. The pre-trial was then again reset to February 1, 1989. However, when the case
was called for pre-trial conference on February 1, 1989, petitioner was again not presented by its officer
or its counsel, despite being duly notified. Hence, upon motion of respondent, petitioner was considered
as in default and respondent was allowed to present evidence ex-parte.

On March 6, 1989, the decision rendered by the trial court was in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant Interworld Assurance Corporation. Petitioner's "Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial"
having been denied, it elevated its case to the Court of Appeals which however, affirmed the decision of
the trial court as well as the latter's order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
petition.

The petitioners assigns as error CA’s declaration that the case was already ripe for pre-trial
conference when the trial court set it for the holding thereof. They argue that since the last pleading,
which was supposed to be the third-party defendant's answer, has not been filed, the case is not yet ripe
for pre-trial.

ISSUE:

Two purely technical, yet mandatory, rules of procedure frustrated petitioner's bid to get a favorable
decision from the Regional Trial Court and then again in the Court of Appeals. 1 These are non-appearance
during the pre-trial despite due notice, and non-payment of docket fees upon filing of its third-party
complaint. Just how strict should these rules be applied is a crucial issue in this present dispute.

Whether or not the non-appearance in a pre-trial would put a party in default.

Can a court assume jurisdiction over a subject matter when there is non-payment of docket fees?

RULING:

Petitioner cannot just disregard the court's order to be present during the pre-trial and give a flimsy
excuse, such as that the case was not ripe for a pre-trial because the third-party defendant’s answer has
yet to be filed.

The pre-trial is mandatory in any action, the main objective being to simplify, abbreviate and expedite
trial, if not to fully dispense with it. Hence, consistent with its mandatory character the Rules oblige not
only the lawyers but the parties as well to appear for this purpose before the Court 10 and when a party
fails to appear at a pre-trial conference he may be non-suited or considered as in default. 11

In those instances where a party may not himself be present at the pre-trial, and another person
substitutes for him, or his lawyer undertakes to appear not only as an attorney but in substitution of the
client's person, it is imperative for that representative or the lawyer to have "special authority" to enter
into agreements which otherwise only the client has the capacity to make.

With regards to the non-payment of docket fees, unless and until the corresponding docket fees are paid,
the trial court would not acquire jurisdiction over the third-party complaint. It is not simply the filing of
the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests
a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the
fee within a reasonable time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglamentary period.