ELCANO VS.

HILL

77 SCRA 100 – May 26, 1977

Torts and Damages – Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from Crimes
Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against Reginald
but Reginald was acquitted for “lack of intent coupled with mistake.” Elcano then filed a civil action against
Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil
action is barred by his son’s acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been
extinguished by the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.
HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate civil action. A
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also criminally, to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e)
of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished
even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed
by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by
law.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and
under Article 397, emancipation takes place “by the marriage of the minor child”, it is, however, also clear that
pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus “Emancipation by
marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child’s person. It shall enable the
minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real
property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the
assistance of his father, mother or guardian.” Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill – the SC however
ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvin’s liability should be subsidiary only – as a
matter of equity.

DULAY VS. CA

FACTS:
 December 7, 1988: Due to a heated argument, Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at Big Bang Sa
Alabang carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay
 Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor
children filed an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela for wanton and reckless discharge of the
firearm and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., (Safeguard) and/or Superguard Security Corp.
(Superguard) as employers for negligence having failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in
the supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury
 Superguard:
 Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and was committed with deliberate intent
(dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. — Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.

 civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
 CA Affirmed RTC: dismising the case of Dulay
ISSUE: W/N Superguard and Safeguard commited an actionable breach and can be civilly liable even if Benigno
Torzuela is already being prosecuted for homicide
 HELD: YES. Petition for Review is Granted. remanded to RTC for trial on the merits
 Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action ,
reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33,
34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused
 Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of
the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176
covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional.
 Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character; whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action
against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on
both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards
made in the two cases vary
 extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused
 It is enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter's death;
that the shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD
was Torzuela's employer and responsible for his acts.

ANDAMO VS. IAC

FACTS:
 Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation, built through its agents, waterpaths, water
conductors and contrivances including an artificial lake within its land
 inundated and eroded the spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo's land, caused a young man to drown,
damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their
laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction
 July 1982:spouses instituted a criminal action
 February 22, 1983: spouses filed a civil case for damages
 CA affirmed trial court issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case until after judgment in the
related Criminal Case
 spouses contend that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case since it is predicated
on a quasi-delict
ISSUE: W/N there is quasi-delict even if done in private propety

HELD: YES. REVERSED and SET ASIDE

 All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit:
 (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff
 (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond
 (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred
by the plaintiff
 While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property subject of the
instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners
have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation
 It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code
provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third
 person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and
reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe
upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his
land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be
dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures
cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the
injury or damage suffered.
 Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
 whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and
the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter

PHIL. RABBIT VS. PEOPLE

Facts: Napoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple
homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to pay
damages. The court further ruled that in the event of the insolvency of accused, petitioner shall be liable for the civil
liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and executory.

Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case
implied the institution also of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case
against the accused-employee, the employer’s subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.

Issue: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal
the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.

Held: No. It is well-established in our jurisdiction that the appellate court may, upon motion or motu proprio,
dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. This rule is based on the rationale that appellants
lose their standing in court when they abscond.

2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution.
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal
action; that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or
institutes it prior to the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the
employee.

What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se,
but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed
separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to
the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest
therein.

The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not
parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. Although in substance and in effect, they have an
interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their
employees to the extent of supplying the latter’s lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently
on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.

As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,
employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latter’s
insolvency. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the
subsidiary liability of the employer. In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the offended
party, the judgment of conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily liable. In effect and implication, the
stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability.

To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify or
defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal
conviction of their employees without the latter’s consent would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or
defeating the judgment. The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the
employer not only with regard to the former’s civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an
employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.

The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the accused-
employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the
former’s subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that
the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.

PADILLA VS. CA

FACTS:
1. The information states that on February 8, 1964 at around 9AM, the accused prevented Antonio Vergara and his
family to close their stall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by
subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying said stall and
the furnitures therein by axes and other massive instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise

Contentions:

Vergara Family
1. accused took advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest
of the accused being policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte,
and that it was committed with evident premeditation.

Roy Padilla, et al
1. finding of grave coercion was not supported by the evidence
2. the town mayor had the power to order the clearance of market premises and the removal of the complainants'
stall because the municipality had enacted municipal ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was a nuisance
per se
3. violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy two (72) hours to
vacate the market premise

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) Trial court: conviction. Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedenia guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion, and hereby imposes upon them to suffer an imprisonment
of FIVE (5) months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory damages in the
amount of P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages,
jointly and severally, and all the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay the proportionate costs of this
proceedings.
(2) Court of Appeals: acquittal but ordered them to pay solidarily the amount of 9,000. The petitioners were
acquitted because these acts were denominated coercion when they properly constituted some petitioners were
acquitted because these acts were denominated coercion when they properly constituted some other offense such as
threat or malicious mischief

Roy Padilla et al for petition for review on certiorari - grounds

1. where the civil liability which is included in the criminal action is that arising from and as a consequence of the
criminal act, and the defendant was acquitted in the criminal case, (no civil liability arising from the criminal case),
no civil liability arising from the criminal charge could be imposed upon him
2. liability of the defendant for the return of the amount received by him may not be enforced in the criminal case
but must be raised in a separate civil action for the recovery of the said amount

ISSUE: whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil
indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge.
RULING:
No, the Court of Appeals is correct.
1. A separate civil action is not required. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was
acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its
attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that when a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with it.
The exceptions are when the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it
separately.
Civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a
crime.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration
that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal
where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt.
Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides:
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant. That the same punishable act or omission can create two kinds of civil
liabilities against the accused and, where provided by law, his employer. 'There is the civil liability arising
from the act as a crime and the liability arising from the same act as a quasi-delict.Either one of these two
types of civil liability may be enforced against the accused, However, the offended party cannot recover
damages under both types of liability.
Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited, that "when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted."
What Article 29 merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same
criminal act or omission.
The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil action. A separate
civil case may be filed but there is no statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode
of recovering damages. Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review
stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be filed.

CANGCO VS. MANILA RAILROAD

On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Co (MRC). He was an employee of the latter
and he was given a pass so that he could ride the train for free. When he was nearing his destination at about 7pm,
he arose from his seat even though the train was not at full stop. When he was about to alight from the train (which
was still slightly moving) he accidentally stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed to notice due to the fact
that it was dim. This caused him to lose his balance at the door and he fell and his arm was crushed by the train and
he suffered other serious injuries. He was dragged a few meters more as the train slowed down.
It was established that the employees of MRC were negligent in piling the sacks of watermelons. MRC raised as a
defense the fact that Cangco was also negligent as he failed to exercise diligence in alighting from the train as he did
not wait for it to stop.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages.
HELD: Yes. Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a common practice and a lot of people are
doing so every day without suffering injury. Cangco has the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no
means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or
feeble person. He was also ignorant of the fact that sacks of watermelons were there as there were no appropriate
warnings and the place was dimly lit.
The Court also elucidated on the distinction between the liability of employers under Article 2180 and their liability
for breach of contract [of carriage]:

NOTES: But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection and direction of the
servant, he is not liable for the acts of the latter, whatever done within the scope of his employment or not, if the
damage done by the servant does not amount to a breach of the contract between the master and the person injured.
The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without
willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another.
These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by
contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists
the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes the source of an extra-
contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.
Manresa: Whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the performance of a contractual undertaking or in
itself the source of an extra-contractual undertaking obligation, its essential characteristics are identical.
Vinculum Juris: (def) It means “an obligation of law”, or the right of the obligee to enforce a civil matter in a court
of law.
 AIR FRANCE VS. CARRASCOSO

In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were tourists en route to Rome from Manila.
Carrascoso was issued a first class round trip ticket by Air France. But during a stop-over in Bangkok, he was asked
by the plane manager of Air France to vacate his seat because a white man allegedly has a “better right” than him.
Carrascoso protested but when things got heated and upon advise of other Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave up
his seat and was transferred to the plane’s tourist class.
After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued Air France for damages for the
embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In court, Carrascoso testified, among others, that he when he was forced
to take the tourist class, he went to the plane’s pantry where he was approached by a plane purser who told him that
he noted in the plane’s journal the following:
First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene
The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court eventually awarded damages in favor of
Carrascoso. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers that the issuance of a first class ticket to
Carrascoso was not an assurance that he will be seated in first class because allegedly in truth and in fact, that was
not the true intent between the parties.
Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascoso’s testimony regarding the note made by the purser
because the said note was never presented in court.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not Air France is liable for damages and on what basis.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not the testimony of Carrasoso regarding the note which was not presented in court is
admissible in evidence.
HELD 1: Yes. It appears that Air France’s liability is based on culpa-contractual and on culpa aquiliana.
Culpa Contractual
There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was a contract to furnish Carrasocoso
a first class passage; Second, That said contract was breached when Air France failed to furnish first class
transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when Air France’s employee compelled Carrascoso to
leave his first class accommodation berth “after he was already, seated” and to take a seat in the tourist class, by
reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages.
The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air France’s claim that the issuance of a first class ticket to a passenger
is not an assurance that he will be given a first class seat. Such claim is simply incredible.
Culpa Aquiliana
Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso, there is also a
tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be
treated by the carrier’s employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be
protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that
any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages
against the carrier. Air France’s contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of
Carrascoso’s action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the Air France — a
case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
HELD: 2: Yes. The testimony of Carrascoso must be admitted based on res gestae. The subject of inquiry is not the
entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule.
Such testimony is admissible. Besides, when the dialogue between Carrascoso and the purser happened, the impact
of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down.
Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. The utterance of the purser regarding
his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its
trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
 SANTOS VS. PIZARDO

Facts:

Dionisio M. Sibayan was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to multiple homicide and multiple
physical injuries due to the vehicle collision between Viron Transit bus driven by Sibayan and a Lite Van Ace.
However the municipal circuit trial court was no pronouncement of civil liability. The petitioners filed a complaint
for damages to the respondents pursuant to their reservation to file a separate civil action citing Sibayan’s judgment
conviction. And it was moved to dismiss by the Viron Transit. The petitioners opposed and contends that the motion
to dismiss that be ten (10) years from the judgment of criminal action is the prescription and therefore it is within the
period since it was just barely two (2) years had elapse.

The complaint was dismissed by the trial court due to the ground that the cause of action had prescribed;
based on quasi-delict that it prescribes four (4) years from the accrual of the cause of action. Again the petitioners
filed a reconsideration that the complaint is not based on quasi- delict but on the final judgment of conviction in the
criminal case which prescribes ten (10) years upon the finality of the judgment. The motion for reconsideration of
the petitioners was denied by the trial court based on quasi-delict in Article 1146 of the Civil Code that the
complaint was filed more than four (4) years after the vehicular activities therefore it prescribes already.

On the petition for certiorari the petitioners filed to the Court of Appeals it was dismissed the same error in
the choice or mode of appeal. It also denies the petitioners’ motion for and the petitioners failed to allege that the
petition was brought within the recognized exceptions for the allowance of certiorari in lieu of appeal. Petitioners
insist that it should be enforced in the complaint that arose in ex delicto and not based on quasi-delict. Since the
action is based on the criminal liability of private respondents, the cause of action accrued from the finality of the
judgment of conviction. Private respondents insisted, pointing out the averments in the complaint make out a cause
of action for quasi delict in Article 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period of four (4) years should
be reckoned from the time the accident took place. Viron transit also alleges that its subsidiary liability cannot be
enforced since Sibayan was not ordered to pay damages in the criminal case, in sitting Art. 103 of Revised Penal
Code the civil aspect of the case were instituted in the criminal case and no reservation to file a separate civil case
was made. Respondents likewise allege that the petitioners should have appealed the adverse order of the trial court.
Petitioners filed a reply and the private respondents also filled a rejoinder both in reiteration of their arguments.
Hence this petition.

Issues:

Whether or not the dismissal of the action was based on culpa aquiliana is a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary
liability of the employer?

Held:

The dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the subsidiary liability of the employer. Because
the Article 103 of the R.P.C. operates with controlling force to obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party being
deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment convicting the employee. The trial court should
not have dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription, but instead allowed the complaint for damages ex
delicto to be prosecuted on the merits, this does not offend the policy that the reservation or institution of a separate
civil waives the other civil actions but this is merely an avoidance of multiple suits. The action for damages based on
quasi- delict should be considered waived no occasion for petitioners to file multiple suits against private respondets
as available to them is to pursue damages ex delicto.
 CASUPAN VS. LAROYA

FACTS: As a result of a vehicular accident between two vehicles, one driven by Mario Llavore Laroya and the other
owned by Roberto Capitulo and driven by Avelino Casupanan, two cases were filed before the MCTC of Capas,
Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property.
This case was on its preliminary investigation stage when Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya
for quasi-delict. However, upon motion of Laroya on the ground of forum-shopping, the MCTC dismissed the civil
case. On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capituloinsisted that the civil case is a separate civil action
which can proceedindependently of the criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo then filed a petition for certiorari
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Capas, Tarlac. But the RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the
MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case and therefore, the proper remedy should have been an appeal.
Hence, Casupanan and Capitulo filed this petition.

Casupanan and Capitulo’s contention: that if the accused in a criminal case has a counterclaim against the private
complainant, he may file the counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper time. They contend that an action
on quasi-delict is different from an action resulting from the crime of reckless imprudence, and an accused in
a criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising from the same incident. They maintain that under
Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case can proceed independently of the criminal action. Finally, they
point out that Casupanan was not the only one who filed the independent civil action based on quasi-delict but
also Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a party in the criminal case.

Laroya’s contention: that the petition is fatally defective as it does not state the real antecedents. Laroya further
alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeitedtheir right to question the order of dismissal when they failed to avail
of the proper remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that there is no question of law to be resolved as the order of
dismissal is already final and a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.

ISSUE/HELD: WON an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously
and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case.
AFFIRMATIVE

RATIO DICIDENDI:

The Court held that the MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-shopping under
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not state in its order of dismissal that the
dismissal was with prejudice. Under the Administrative Circular, the order of dismissal is without prejudice to
refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly states that it is with prejudice. Thus, the MCTC's
dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a dismissal without prejudice. Section 1 of Rule 41 provides that an order
dismissing an action without prejudice is not appealable. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a special civil
action under Rule 65. Clearly, the Capas RTC's order dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that the
proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.

Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based on the Revised Penal
Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
Although these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have different causes of action. The criminal
case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa
aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. And par 6, sec 1 of Rule 111.

Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action,
there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil action.
Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option to file a separate civil action to recover civil
liability ex-delicto by reserving such right in the criminal action before the prosecution presents its evidence. Also,
the offended party is deemed to make such reservation if he files a separate civil action before filing the criminal
action. If the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed separately but its trial has not yet commenced,
the civil action may be consolidated with the criminal action. The consolidation under this Rule does not apply to
separate civil actions arising from the same act or omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code.

Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that the separate civil action, filed to recover
damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the criminal action. Section 2 of the present Rule 111 also
prohibits the filing, after commencement of the criminal action, of a separate civil action to recover damages ex-
delicto.

Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended 1985 Rules, expressly allows the "offended
party" to bring an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. As stated in Section
3 of the present Rule 111, this civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the "offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action."

There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an independent civil action for quasi-
delict against the accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly states that the "offended party" may bring
such an action but the "offended party" may not recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended party in the criminal action, not to the accused.

Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case where the
civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict —
without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of
each other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-
delict. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused may be insolvent,
necessitating the filing of another case against his employer or guardians.

Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in
the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the
counterclaim of the accused "may be litigated in a separate civil action." This is only fair for two reasons. First, the
accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal
case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused
does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to
run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.

Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same
way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the
accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in
the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.Thus, the
civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper.
 LIGHTTRAIL TRANSIT VS. MARJORIE NAVIDAD

FACTS:

1. Nicanor, who was drunk, entered the EDSA LRT after purchasing of a ticket. While Nicanor was standing on
the platform near the LRT tracks, JunelitoEscartin, the security guard assigned in the area (working under the
Prudent Security Agency) approached Nicanor and the two had a misunderstanding and fought. No evidence
was presented to show who started the fight.
1. Marjorie,widow of Nicanor, and children filed a complaint for damages against Escartin, Roman, LRTA, Metro
Transit, and Prudent for the death of her husband.
a. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and
Prudent.
b. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection
and supervision of its security guards
2. RTC judged in favor of Navidad and ordered Prudent Security and Escartin to pay damages while Roman and
LRTA was dismissed for lack of merit.
3. Prudent appealed to the CA and the CA ruled that Prudent and Escartin were not liable and that Roman and
LRTA was the ones liable.

a. CA ruled saying that although Navidad had not boarded the train yet, a contract of carriage had
already existed when Navidad entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after
paying the fare and getting the token and
b. LRTA and Roman failed to show that emergency brakes could not have stopped the train in time.
Prudent was exempted because there was no showing that Escartin inflicted blows upon Navidad. CA
denied MR. hence this petition.
4. Hence this present petition
a. Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court, contended that a contract of carriage was
deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the
premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual
relation, and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of
Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier.

ISSUES:

1. W/N Prudent is liable? No.

2. NO, Prudent is not liable.

Prudent in this case may only be liable for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 and related provisions, in
conjunction with Art 2180. The premise, however, for the employers liability is negligence or fault on the part of
the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption
juristantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimipatrisfamilies (diligence of a good father) in the
selection and supervision of its employees.

The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the
employee, a factual matter that has not been shown.

A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting
in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Art of the Civil Code can apply.
Liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract

When an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual
liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby
allowing the rules on tort to apply.

In other words, when an act which constitutes the breach of contract, tantamounts to a quasi-delict, if there
had been no contract, the contract can be said to be have been breached by tort which would mean that the
rules on tort can apply.

There is nothing that links Prudent to the death of Nicanor, for the reason that the negligence of its employee,
Escartin, has not been duly proven.
There is also no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission, he
must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not
itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own
fault or negligence.