Berger

Structural and Eclectic Revisions of Marxist Strategy: A Cultural Materialist Critique Allen H, Berger Current Anthropology, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Jun., 1976), 290-305. Stable URL htp://links jstor-org/siisici=001 1-3204% 28 197606%29 17%3A2%3C290%3AS AEROM%3E2.0,CO%3B2-P ‘Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at hhup:/www, stor orglabout/terms.html. ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the sc printed page of such transmission. Current Anthropology is published by The University of Chicago Press. Please contact the publisher for further permissions regarding the use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at hupulwww.jstor.org/journals/uepress.huml. Current Anthropology (©1976 The University of Chicago Press ISTOR and the ISTOR logo are trademarks of JSTOR, and are Registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office For more information on JSTOR contact jstor-info@umich edu, ©2003 JSTOR bupslwww jstor.org/ ‘Mon Oct 13 17:23:15 2003area they could serve and the number of people who could fatend them. Therefore, the main principle of economic fexchange hinged on the idea of reciprocity and, to a leser extent, redistribution, Finally, the exchange of gifts permeated the Bakiga way of life. References Cited Bouanwan, Pavi, J. 1963. Serial enlropology. New York: Holt, ‘Rineharé and Wiaston Bouannan, Pav J. and Grosce Daron. Editor. 1962. Markets “it Africe. Evanston: Northwestera University Pres Dauron, Gronce, Editor, 196). Tribal and poasent economies: Tedings im ecomoni anthroplogy. Garden City! Natural History i ALS M1 7h ge ttn, ee Engi Peres cmt cts Re a See ee rts hm Goes : * ieee ee 2 io kn: en pate Now ek Gr ae bs gt RRS et a Lin esa ate Sa eo dt oki ha nts teatae feats ger SI Sears Sessa Structural and Eclectic Revisions of Marxist Strategy ‘A Cultural Materialist Critique by Auten HL. Benore Department of Anthropology, Columbia University, New York, N.Y. 10027, USA. 19 vi 75 If for years anthropology ignored or developed in reaction to Marx (Harris 1968), the reverse is true today. Anthropologists, are attempting to integrate Marxist principles into their work, bout, as has happened in other fields, this attempt has led to acerbic politicized debate. Cultural materialism, the avowedly “Marxist strategy developed by Marvin Harris, has recently been attacked from such disparate vantage points as the “‘non- Marsist” eclecticism of Heinen (CA 16:450-53) and the French-oriented structural Marxism of Friedman (19742) Harris has responded succinetly to Heinen’s challenge to "ex plain his own epistemological position” (CA 16:454-55). Tt re= mains necessary, however, to evaluate the legitimacy of these critiques and to explore their epistemological underpinnings In 30 doing, I hope to restore some clarity to what often has ‘been an overly personalized debate. Cultural materialism, as developed by Harris, is a research strategy which states that the anthropologist is most likely to find the causes of sociocultural phenomena in the techno-ceo- nomic, techno-environmental conditions of social life. These parameters “exert selective pressures in favor of certain types ff organizational structures and upon the survival and spread of definite types of ideological complexes” (Harris 1968:241), ‘This materialist strategy rests upon the important epistemological distinction between “emie” and “etie” operational procedures. In the former phenomena are described through categories and relations which are appropriate and meaningtal to native actors in the latter they are described through categories, and relations developed independently by a community of ob servers. Etics and a materialist strategy are indisolubly joined, bby Harris ina scientific anthropology? "Cultural ecology, pre= cisely because it links emaie phenomena with the etic conditions ‘of ‘nature,’ strengthens the association between social science and the ‘harder’ disciplines” (1968:655). Harris's program has been assailed by Friedman and others of the French school (eg, Godelier) for its supposed empiricism, 290 Jopmen, W. 1892. Travels in Africa during the years 1852-1886, ‘Lond Kigee! Husrical Tet, Makerere Insitute of Social Research Li. ‘rary, Kampala, Uganda, Maguet, Jf 1971. Pane ad sie in Africa. New York: MeGraw- a Mauss, Mancss. 1966. The gift: Forms and fenton of exchange it archse secre, London: Cohen and West Mipourron, [1958 The Rilays and Kamba of Kemp, (Ethnographic Survey of Aiea) London toteraational Avena Inst Mounrenevsfernon, Af 1890: Emin Pea and he rebelion a the London. Pov, Kant. 1959. “Anthropology and economic theory.” in ‘Raa eos Bed by MH Foe, vl 2 New Yok Crowd STs, Dahomey andthe ave ade: An anal of an archaic ceoany. Setter Usher of Washington Pres Aaumbate (ges) Hater Tear. Makerere Istte of Soil cearch Library, Rampal Uganda, Seunntiben, H. K. 1959. The tubaistence role of eatle among the Pokot and in East Aiea, smerscan dnihrpalgst 89°278-30 Sestwrayrontit Bu ct al. 1868. Emin Pasha x Central Arca: Beng aaleion oa ters anda. London. Senvenson, Roweur F. 1968. Popalaion and political syeems in ropa rice. New York: Cokumbia University Pres. ‘Tavtom, Bian Ks 1962. The western arsine Bat, (Ethnographic Sorvey af Alea.) London: International Afiean Invite Uzoiewk, GN. 1972. Precolonial markets in Bunyoro-Kitara (Comparatce Stier in Sart ond History 15(8), inductionism, antirationalism, positivism, and rejection of di alectcs, For the structural Marxist, dialectics assumes a role far broader than the traditional chess-antthesis-synthesisinterpre- tation of macroshistory it becomes a philosophy, an episte- ‘mology, and a strategy diametrically opposed to posiivism.! Act cording tothe struccuralists, positivism assumes @ homology between models provided by the senses and the external world reason is subordinated to the authority ofthe immediate given facts. This rationalist ertique of positivism has become a com- ‘mon theme in many recent articles in Marxist journals. Hindess (1973:240) writes, for example: “Since it asserts the radical ex- teriority of experimental phenomena to theary—the facts are always giter to theory—positiviam denigrates the theoretical character of the production and determination of these phenomena. To that extent positivism... must denigrate the ‘theoretical conditions of scientific work.” ‘This critique, by confusing operationalism with a belief in valuesiree objectivity, totally distorts the import of posit ism. Cultural materialists do not deny that “no social scientife paradigm—empiricism included—could ever hope to be ‘presuppositionless™ (Scholte 1974:688). Rather, they insist that presuppositions be specified and intersubjectivity maximized to the greatest degree pavibe. ‘The whole point of an operational approach is to specify the observational activities of the indi- vidual and to make explicit the interplay between "subjective" and “objective” factors in order to foster intersubjective repli- Emics/eties is an epistemological, not an ontological, distinction. It is crucial to the social sciences, which face the unique alternative of two different operational procedures: (1) elicitation from individuals of their thoughts, felings, or ideas, or (2) observation of their behavior, whether verbal or physical. Harris does not attempt to surmount the Kantian problem that we can never approach the “true” phenomenal reality, since all empirical data are organized by categories fur- nished independently by the human brain. Rather, his point land that of etics is that we cannot let the ontological problem paralyze us, Scientific investigation of empirical data ean pro- This interpretation of dialectics i also put forward by Marcuse (1960), 28 “negative thinking,” and by Murphy (1971), a6 "mega: tive attitude” Murphy argues (p. 90): "Tes the mood and syle of dislecties more than sets of dogena that ean inform social anthro- pologistsceed through operational intersubjective procedures. Kant’s metaphysical paradox need not restrict us to a Lévi-Sirausian Dsut ofthe deep structure of the human mind ‘The antipositvists, on the other hand, start their epistemological excursion by emphasizing the inner autonomous sruc- {ures ofthe mind that work through, but do not necessarily e- fcr the outside material world. Gommonsenae fact ae fe jected: "To the extent that thee concepts disregard the Iatal contradictions vshich make up reality, they abstract from the very process of realty” (Marcuse 1960:vi). To attain knowle tdge of reality one must move “beyond” of “beneath” the facts as they appear tothe senses. This, according to Fried- man, an antiposivst epistemology presupposes xtractralsm, Empiricism, whether idealist or materially, is rejected. At a strategy, Friedman proposes dialectics based upon rejec: tion of the ordered systems of sructural/functional anthropology: not only does the mind poses a certain autonomy, but the illusions it produces, by becoming socal, attain am appar= ent reality of ther own. The structural Marxist position i that fince thee “cultural forms” are In a reciprocal relation with “social conditions,” the dialectician must facus on development through confer. Rather than eause and effect, he lols for contradiction, inerelatin, and structural transformation “Thus there are two primary aspects to Friedman's strategy (1) the search for an underlying, nonapparent “structural” reality and (2) the attempt to idently the basic “contradic~ tions” which explain the socal formation. Thies the exence af the French-Marsist synthesis. Both Friedman and. Godelier langue that a scienife anthropology must combine the stue- turalsm of Lévi-Strauss with the dialectics of Marx. These wo fepeets of ther strategy, structures and contradictions, wil be examined in tir 1. Simply stated, the lesion taken from LéviStraus (1967 271) ie that stuctutes do not exist on an empirical level: "The term ‘soil structure’ has nothing to do with empirical reality tut with models which are bule up ater it social relay tions const ofthe aw material out of which the models mak ing up the social sructure are bull.” Echoing this sentiment, Godelier (1972:xxv) has argued that “what is visible i a realy concealing anathe, dceper reality, which is hidden and the discovery of which isthe very purpose of scentfe cogni- tion?” Supposedly the empirical level not ony hides this truce tural level; ft “contradict” it, For example, Mars demon trated that the vidble capitalist wage relation, which asumes that the worker is paid wages equivalent to the value of his labor, hides the fact tha the worker i also responsible for the creation of additional value, that which ip translated into capital "This same theme has been picked up by Sahline (1972) in his analysis of the domestic mode of production in Sloe Age Econom. Sabla argues that the centrifugal tendency of the aystem (“households of greater working capacity are not autor matically extending themselves on behalf of the poorer” [1972 51-92) is repressed and overlain by the expansion of kinship obligations. Dispersion proceeds in reality only to the extent that ite not checked by institutions greater than the domestic group. Therefore, Saline argues, empiric vill get us no- Where near the ue underlying structure. Appearancss are de- Signed to “repres” the Hobbesian “understructure” of primitive society (1972173) So itis imagined in away that seem more like prychoanayss than Dye: by probing fors hidden subsirctae hati outward be Favir i dagulaed and rafigured nt is opposite that event, {he dedsction ofthe prin tate nota dre extension of expert ‘mental appronimatony, sll contest with the eropircal ern a iisprojerted beyond the observable The elie here counterposed to the empirical, and we ae forced to understand the appearance of thingy athe negaton rather than the expresion of tle uct characte. ‘This analogy with peychoanalysis is revealing. ‘That struc Vol. 17 + No.2 + Jane 1976 turalism, like psychoanalysis is intuitive and speculative is not 4 fault, for s0 is all good science. Rather, the problem is that structuralism puts few empirical reins upon the observer: i i subjece neither to replication nor to falsification. There can be ro observation and data collection for the purpose of testing hypotheses, since Sablins and the other structuraliss offer us no operational rules for “negating” the empirical level. Un- fortunately, as Asad (1974:217) suggests, anthropologists have seldom restricted themselves to “empirical reality”: “Indeed it is sometimes justifiably argued that the anthropologist has ‘geen’ relations where they do not in fact exist. If all anthro~ pologists deseribed only what ‘really existed” the work of many ff them would be far more valuable than iti.” ‘This evtiiam increasingly has been leveled at Lévi-Strauss, ‘who has tended to ignore important empirical data for the sake of achieving neat sets of “oppositions” (cf. Korn 1973, Harris 19758). As Scholte (1974:683) has indicated, “the danger [is] of inventing rather than discovering latent structures.” Equally disturbing, however, isthe structuralists claim to exclusivity in, the attempt to probe beneath apparent reality. As Kottak: (1974:9) has suggested, the notion that reality isnot directly visible, but exists beyond visible relations, “is merely the basic intellectual posture of every serious modern social scientist and philosopher.” Or, as Asad (1974:217) has argued, itis perhaps a consequence, ater all, of ‘anthropological training.’ De- spite theoretical differences, ic is as characteristic of functional- ists, such as Radcliffe-Brown and Evans-Pritchard, as itis of structuraiss, such as Friedman and Godelier, o delve beneath, reality as it appears to the untrained eye Curiously enough, in a recent essay on the Incas, the purpose of which is “to produce a synthetic definition of the exact nature of the diversity and unity of the economie and social relations Which characteriee a concrete society at a given epoch” (1974:72), Godelier never needs to invoke the primacy of an underlying structural reality. Rather, his esay is a cogent explora ‘ion ofthe relationship between various on-the-grovind relations ‘of production and ideological superstructures, For example, Go- delier argues (p. 65) that when the Incas conquered surroutd= ing tribes, thus supplanting an earlier mode of production based upon the cooperation of direct producers with a new, dominant “Asiatic” mode, “the ideology and ritual which corresponded to + (the earlier form]... now served to the functioning of direct relations of exploitation and economic servitude.” To the extent that an ideology of politico-economie reciprocity was maintained, the domination and oppression inherent in Asiatic relations of production could be concealed. Similarly, following the Spanish conquest of the Incas, it was necessary that new “mechanisms of competition and redistribution took a form corresponding to the catholic ideology of the dominant clases and were expressed in a manner tolerated by them" (p. 67). ‘The prestige economy of cargo competition was an adaptive r= sponse to the conquest situation, not an archaic survival. ‘Thus Godelir’s subjects the fanction of ideology in the con= text of exploitative economic relations. Structuralism ig rele~ vant neither tothe production nor to the evaluation of his specific hypotheses about Inca history (cf. Harris 1964:25~43). Similar theories have long been proposed by nonstructural ma terials (eg, Wolf 1955). In practice, Godelie’s study of a particular social formation relies upon an empiricism no differ tent than that espoused by the supposed “mechanical” materiale ist and positivist ‘The structural Marxists also claim that they derive from Lévi-Straussian structuralism the important notion of a sys tem of transformations." The idea, developed in The Elemen- lary Stractres of Kinship (LévisStraise 1969), is that of “struc tural variation on one level of organization in time or space” (Friedman 1974451), The system of wansformations is a ‘group of structures all generated by the same st of fundamental properties. The concept is supposed to allow the structural Marist to study digchronic processes such as evolution through 201adaptive radiation. His problem then becomes to explain the the pattern ofthe distribution ofthe various structures. For an adequate historical explanation, the anthropologist must functionally relate these structures to other levels of the socal for- ‘LévicStrauss himself, however, has never used strueturalism to explain adaptive radiations, either of myths or of kinship structures. His work has tended increasingly to divorce the study of form from that of function. Recently he even seems to have abandoned an earlier concern with variations for a grow- {ng preoccupation with the invariant properties of the human ‘mind. Lévi-Strauss himself objec to this interpretation: “Some critics claim that I am only teying to probe the structure ofthe hhuman mind and to seek what they disparagingly call ‘Lévi- Straussian universal.” If chs were the case, the nature of the cultural context in which mind operates and manifests itself ‘would become unimportant” (1972:6). This statement is a non sequitur, for in reality Lévi-Strauss purses his universale through the cultural and ecological contexts. They provide the material through which the universal principles ate realized, ‘This is made clear when he describes rotemism as “conceived by speculative thought on the basis of empirical observations” (1963389). ‘The object for Lévi-Strauss isto explain myth in terms of rental structure, not t0 relate mytht functionally to other facets and levels of social existence. (“The coherence of each system of clastification ean only be accounted for by calling Uupon another type of explanation, namely constraints specific to the human mind” [1972:7}) He speaks of a “second type ‘of determinism” (1972:9)—that steraming from the ecology and from techno-economie actvities—but in practice he considers ‘only correspondences, not causes, Different myths correspond to different ecologies. Friedman (1974a:482) attempts to defend structuralis against this eiiism by arguing that Lévic ‘Strauss, atleast in his kinship studies, is aware ofthe problem of the indeterminacy of purely formal analysis, Though causal hypotheses cannot be generated from Lévi-Strauss structur ism, Friedman would stil label it “a major breakthrough in the social sciences” (p. 452). This failing is crucial, however, and that is why Godelier sees the structural Marxist synthe ‘a theoretical revolution designed to rescue anthropology “from the dead-ends of functionalist empiriism andthe Ae lesmess of stracurliom in fe of istry" (1972: p. xl, italics added). ‘Godelier’s optimism regarding the posibility of transform= ing structuralism into a scientifi, historical materials strategy seems groundless, however. Lévi-Strauss own work has been consistently ahistorical and antifunctional. It cannot be labeled Scientific since structures have been invented through unfasi= able fights of intuition and speculation. On the other hand, structuralism’s interest in underlying realities and system terdependences is shared by many other strategies, including cultural materialism, 2 Friedman has constructed a diagram (p. 445) which he believes illustrates Marx's model of the socal formation as developed in Capital (Fig. 1). Through an application of this framework, Godelier (1972:vi) believes he ean understand the rationality of various economic systems—"vhat is thee hidden logie and the underlying necesity for them to exist, oto have existed "and Friedman (1974a:448) believes he can get at a ‘eal theoretical history—"for unless we assume that history takes place outside the object of study and according to some ‘meta-social laws of its own, then the problem of diachrony and synchrony must dissolve in the understanding of the dynamic properties of social systems." In other words, history is dete mined from within the social formation, by the “internal pos ics” of development or transformation which inhere in the structures analytically represented in the diagram, Godelier and Friedman both concentrate on the inrastruc- ture, The relationship between the forees of production and the 202 social formation ri infrastructure superstructure Iorces of relations of, jjuridica- ideological production production politcal means of production Fie. 1, Ma's model of the social formation, according to Fried ‘man (reprinted from Friedman 1974a:443, by permision of the publishes). organization of ‘production relations of production is supposedly conditioned by two types of “contradiction.” “Intrasystemic” contradictions are internal to a particular structure (eg, the class conflict inherent in capitalist production relations, the profit of one class being primarily the unpaid labor of another). Friedman selects an ‘example closer to the heart of anthropology: the conflict between the accumulation of prestige and the egalitarian politcal structure implied by the closure of asymmetrical marriage sys= tems, Friedman argues that thete contradictions are part of the very working of the systems in which they are founds; they are not simply semantic oppositions. They play a real role in ‘the evolution of the socal formation. "The intrasystemic contradictions do not determine that evo- lusion, however. At a more fundamental level, Friedman in- tints, are the “intersyatemic™ contradictions, those between structures ie., between the forces and the relations of produce tion. For example, in Capital Marx analyzed how the increasing, socialization of the productive forces “contradicted” the ex ploitative production relations based upon the private owner hip of those forces. The relations became fetters upon the forces. Friedman is careful to emphasize that these intersystem~ je contradietions are in the nature of the mode of production; they are not willed by any individuals or groups. “The elements of the infrastructure are not linked by simple cause and effect. Rather, they are in a relationship of “mutual constraint.” Friedman (1972:12) argues: It is the relative autonomy of structures which entail the necessary existence of ‘ovo distinet kinds of relationships, those within and those between.” But there is not a perfect balance: the relations of production are dominant, since they determine how the forces of production are to be organized and used. In turn, the domi nance of the relations is limited by prior constraints imposed by the technological and ecological conditions. ‘These conditions are not static: the natural operation of the system may change them. Thus, Friedman argues (p. 17), there is a continual “interaction between the structural dominance of the higher level, and the constraints impoted by the lower level.” "This model of the forces and relations of production evinces Friedman's willingness to extend the applicability of Marx's specific analysis of bourgeois society to all social formations. In order for his intersystemic contradictions to be the motive force behind all sociocultural evolution, the forces of production ‘rough an inner dynamic must tend toward their maximum reali zation. Only in this way do they come into confit or opposition With the relations of production. Obviously, he is basing his ‘argument on Marx's remark that “no social order is ever de~ stroyed before all the productive forces for which itis suficient have been developed” (1970 [1859]-21). But why should this be to? Is it for Friedman an empirical statement of a universal tendency or a matter of blind faith? More important, if there issuch a drive in history, i it more productive to invoke a tele~ ‘ological inner dynamic or ta search for specific causal explanations (ef. Harris 19750:3)? ‘To complicate matters further, Friedman never offers any specific definitions of the categories in his diagram or proce-dures forthe identification of contradictions, The mere wse of the term contradiction does not helps identify what the ert fal contradictions are, Nor does explain the exact nature of the ration between the forces andthe relations of production, ‘As Harris (197543) has writen “the problem ist idently the eri causal parameters. To call these ‘ontradcton rmerly to engage in metaphor.” The stuctral Mars stress on the labling of contradictions digits and doesnot explain the complex relation between diferent part of the wcial formation, Scentife dncoure depends upon eareflly defined concept not enchwords What then, are we to make of Marx's commitment to di lecix? Need it be dropped ina scientife materia? Harris, for example, labels dialectics “ponderous doubletalk” (1968: 219), derdes “Maras Hegeian infatuation with ‘contradic tions!" (p. 223), and argues that “the decisive advantage of the Marcan models that ti diachronic and evolutionary, not ‘hac itis dalectic™(p. 236. Hari argc hat ll evolutionary proces simply the transformation of earlier forms. Hegelian Tibet suchas “negation ofthe negation’ cam only be apie in the absence of definite criteria, Change isthe universal props ry ofall evolution, ofen through such minor increments that itis impossible o pinpoict when the “negation” ofthe eater system has occured. Leacock (1972:63} has disputed Harries interpretation “Two comments mut be made. Fn itis not just collape of the ld but replacement by the ne that cent the proce fever ton that hae bee called neption’” Second since Tree sees that eroken is Uanibrmaton, there & prenimably a pout at src the sccumlaton of tin strane ts rant Sr aqalitatve change in accordance with te principio Maras Heglian diese In this argument Harris and Leacock draw no distinction between the trcture of Man's dialectic and that of Hege'. Te would appear from their statements that Marx merely de- tached Hegel's dialect from its ontological base, making nega tivity a historkal rather than a metaphysical condition, Uniortnately, Mars never completly excaped « Hegelian vocabulary. In addition, he spoke of his diaeee asthe“ ‘ersion” of Hegel, implying that he was simply changing the nature ofthe objets to which the method was api. Marx's dialectic, however, was not merely an arial Hegelian mete phor used to describe empirical change. Taking Hegel off hit head aio enaled an entre overhaul of the structure of the dialectic. Ie was Feuerbach who inverted Hegel by changing the elements ofthe dialectic. As Althusser (197048) hos argued “Marx set himvel apart rom Feuerbach when be relied that the Feverbachian crique of Hegel was a ridque from within Hegelian philosophy ise.” ‘According to the Hegelian dialect, all dhe various contradictions which determine a particular historical situation can be reduced to a single underlying prineple. The dialectic i thor a semancic opposition, what Althuser has labeled “general contradiction.” For Marx, on the other hand, says ‘Athuser (> 100, the “contradiction” i imepaable from the total sructre ofthe ‘cial boy in which ii found separable om formal cond tons of exstenee, nd even rom he tances gover trae Esl affected hy. themdctermining, st ls determined fn one Shite same movements ad determined by the various ives and Stance of the socal formation animate i ight be called ‘werden’ i principle The Marxian dialectic cannot be reduced to @ single metaphorical opposition. Ie is areal part ofthe evelbing socal for- Ination. The “contradiction” must be considered within the Context of reciprocally related structures, Ie determines and is Aetermined. For example, according to Mars, the lass conta: in capitalist relations of production does not contain within isl ll the conditions for ts own rsoation. Rather the evolving “contradiction” between the relations and the Vol. 17 + No.2 + Jane 1976 forces of production creates the material conditions which al- Jow for the elimination of the enire sytem (Marx 1970 (1859) 21). This second contradiction is not reducible to the fist. ““Overdetermination” ofa contradiction i the reflection within it ofits conditions of existence within the complex whole. Extending Althuser’s argument (perhaps farther than he would himsel), one may argue that what Marx is describing is a primitive model of systems theory. Marx's remarkable cone tribution was to turn the dialectic from a Hegelian metaphor ta framework forthe synchronic and diachronic analysis of the veal constraints and functional interrelations tha explain ‘social formation. Bt must we stick to his inexact vocabulary? Te would be ironic if after century of painstaking data collee- tion and theoretical refinement we sill had to return to Marx's Hegelian concept of “contradictions.” The problem with the structural Marxist is that they are mired in Man's terminol- ogy. As Harris has writen (CA 16:454, italics added) “everything that i worthwhile in Marx’ insistence upon the preva lence of change and evolution and upon the comple inlrctie dynamism of Dave and superstructure (and of emies and etc) is totaly subsumed by neo-Darwinian and modern cybernetic concepts of systems.” Instead of bandying about the label "cone teadietions,"it time Marast anthropologists began studying the actual Functioning of negative and positive feedback process between diferent pars and levels of the socal formation. Finally, Friedman has failed to appreciate the importance of the emic/etie distinction. In his emphasis on contradictions and social appearances as “negations” of structure, he is all too ready to accept the emic aspects of the relations of production as determinant in the historical process. This is particularly ‘evident in a recent article of his on fetishism (Friedman 1974). Social relations are fetishes because “they do not adequately. represent their material effects—not bucause they are ilusons en gendered by the materialeve, but because they are opaque With respect to that level” (1974b:56, italies added). In discussing twibal and Asiatic economies, Friedman writes (p. 59, italics added) {might be suggested tha itis the particular structure of the “re igion” which through its link to production permits the transition om egalitarian t ranked to cla society without a change in the property stricture... Monopoly over the “wealth-gving” spirits [sof the same onder at monopoly over money-capital. The control ‘ofboth Bettis items ensures the domination over material repro- ‘duction and the exploitation ofthe labor of society. Socal repro- ‘duction only takes place through social forms and society lives its reproduction in these forms. Tt lives it own alienation, not at lenated consciousness but ax social fetish which both determines the Ltrctre of material raprodction and misrepresent it de tit opacity. ‘What Friedman has failed to provide is any theory accounting for the specific form ofthe fetishization and for its necessity ‘The fetish is simply accepted as a given, In fact, Friedman is totally unconcerned with explaining the fetish; he would prefer that “we drop the corresponding verbform notion a9 its neces sary precondition” (1974H:56). He never investigates the histori ‘al connection between the fetish (which is derived by the observer through the elicitation from individuals of their ideas) land the material conditions and etic activities which comprise the mode of production, We thus seem to have gone full circle from a Marxist materialism back to @ Lévi-Straussian lack of concern with the functions and historical development of ideo!- ‘ogy. Perhaps Friedman needs to be reminded of Marx's (1967 [1867]:372-73) description of the materialist strategy: [Every history of religion even, that fails wo take account of this ma- ‘basis is uncritical I iin reality, much easier to discover by isthe earthy core ofthe misty creations of religion than, con- ‘versely, i sto develop from the actual relations of life the corre= ‘ponding celestalized forms of those relations. The later method isthe only materialistic, and therefore the only scente one. ‘The structural Marxists maintain that despite material de+ 298terminiem, kinship and politico-eligious relations dominate ‘economic process in. precapitaist societies (eg., Godelier 1972:ix; Sablins 1972:101-2). They are troubled by the fact, that in primitive societies there is a lack ofthe institutional differentiation between base and superstructure that Marx found in capitalist society. But ths is a fase issue that arses through, the failure to distinguish between emic and etic operational procedures. The lack of institutional differentiation is a matter that pertains to natives’ categories. For the anthropologist, ‘who utilizes etic procedures, there is no problem in distinguish ing economic activities. Without the emiejetic distinction, the researcher i bound to confuse base and superstructure land therefore be unable to study the complex interrelation be- ‘oween them. Thus, without a commitment to etic, the materi- alse strategy is meaningless. Friedman, because he works with natives categories and is unwilling to probe the rationality of the fetish itself, ends up emphasizing emic aspects of relations of production, ie, ideology, as determinant ‘Thus Marxism’is transformed by the structuralists into a nascent idealism. In turn, Friedman has accused Harris of the opposite extreme, interpreting Marx in a ‘‘mechanistie” or “vulgar” fashion. Supposedly Harris's goal is to demonstrate how ideology is specifaly determined by the material condi= tions of social life. Similar mechanistic interpretations of Marx were quite common among early politicized Marxists. Most cited the “Preface”to Mare’s Critique of Political Economy as their authority. Here Marx wrote: The mode of production ‘of material lie conditions the general proces of social, political land intellectual life. Iti not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness” (1970 [1859]:20-21). Interpreting this statement in terms of direct cause and effect inevitably implies the notion of precedence: the material conditions pre= ‘ede consciousness. Logically it entails the assumption of a frst ‘eae, But one must understand that Marx's writings were par- tially 4 response to the needs of the time; within the vogue of religious transcendentalism of the middle and late 15th cen~ tury, his occasional hints at crude determinism had themselves fan almost religious appeal (Gramsci 1971). His system was in actuality far more complex and sophisticated. Engels elabo rated upon this problem in a letter to,J. Bloch (quoted in Alt- Inusser 1970105) Mare and I are ourselves partly to blame for the fat that the younger people sometimes lay more ste on the economic side {han is det it We had to emphasize the main principle vis--vis four adversaries who denied it, andl we had not aways the time, the place or the opportunity to allow the other elements involved in {he interaction to come into thei right Significantly, Harris also quotes Engels to this effect in The Rise of Anthropological Theory. Harris, himself, emphasizes “the reed for considering the interaction between base and superstructure in accounting for any particular historical situation”; he argues that Marx and Engels “made it perfectly clear that the determinism which they saw extending from base to super= structure was not an absolute one-to-one effect” (1968:244), ‘That Friedman can label Harris's materialism mechanical is therefore the utmost in distortion, Social systems exist within the constraints established by the environment; they are not, however, directly determined by the environment, It is on this basis that Friedman considers Harris's (1966) analysis of the “sacred cow" in India. He ac~ couses Harri of ignoring the larger economic system within, Which the cattle taboo operates—of making it look as fit were solely an ecological problem, Friedman argues that the beef ‘taboo may maximize total calorie and protein output, but only within the constrains of a system that holds output far below capacity. Friedman's point is well taken, but it does not follow. that Harris's analysis is Panglosian (cf. Harris 1967:253). Harris's goal was to demonstrate operationally why the taboo 294 isnot irrational, not the result ofan impractical ideology; no- where does he argue that itis the best of all possible work ‘Asimilar reply may be made to Friedman's critique of Rap- paport’s (1968) Pigs or the Anctrs. Rappaport hypothesizes {hat Tsembaga pig feast operate aba negative feedback mechae ism to keep the pig population below levels which would Cause environmental degradation. He admits, however, that the reference range for pgs (defined by natives’ complains) is likely to be below the goal range defined by local earying Capacity Iti this fact which Friedman seizes upon in his crit cism (19744:460, italics added) fi to se thatthe ensironmena iii inled ot al since among the “Maring the cycle is tigered way below carcying espacity, and other group probably come closer to that it» socal relations determine the composition and quantity of labour with the conse= quent exploitation of the pig population somewhere within the tits of environmental adaptabty, But these limits do notin any seme regulate the manner or degree of explotaton Ta thermostat act for 75 degrees, but the furnace which it regulates breaks down at 65 depres every ime, then cata peak {facts fdback we ean approach the 75 degre limit with other {enact shoul be clear that the temperature mit determined by the propertis ofthe furnace and not by the thermertat. Several remarks are in order. Fist, Rappaport emphasizes foom the beginning the synchronic and provisional nature of| his study. He does not presume to give a historical explanation of the Tsembaga system, but he does demonstrate the reality of a negative feedback process operating within the constraints imposed by noneultural variables. The Maringstual cycle stil operates as a regulating mechaniam, but at limits defined both bythe social structure and by the environment, Secon, the fact thatthe pig Population fs always maintained below the theoretical maximum carrying capacity is no reason to reject negative feedback models or the cultural materialist strategy. For any population to hover about maximum carrying eapacty ‘would be dangerous and maladaptive ‘On s more general level, itis often alleged that cultural ma- teriliim is merely a cheonological approach that by hindsight always seems to work, rather than a processual accounting of| transformations, The charge is tht the demonstration of adaptive advantage is an empty explanation: changes in material Conditions preceding social transformations can inevitably be located. For example, Sains (1969:29-30) has argued: “The promatiue of adaptive advantage doesnot specify a uniquely Correct answer. As principle of etsality in general and econom fe performance in particular, adaptive advantage is indeterm nate: stipulating grossly what is posible but rendering suitable Anything that is posible.” ‘Sahlin’s statement is perceptive and accurate. More important, however tthe problem of how to proceed from a recog- nition of adaptive advantage toa specific historical explanation ‘of cultural form. Must we give up the materialist strategy and concede the inadequacy of material activity to constitute the historco-particular forms of human culture? Tt appears that “Heinen would answer in the affirmative (CA 16:450): ‘The economy ofa society, however, dacs not correspond t “game i prtct information,” and there are seal pal states You fave to know more than the environment and the technology 9 snake predictions. about behavior. As Hare (1967:129) has put ye "we must know about internal memory atucture be: fore we make preditions conceening higher-order systems." > Te ‘would low from the oegolng, then, that es ute to discus the Primacy of environmental over intttional constraints or rules SF behavior the actual situation results from he interaction between the fo Heinen argues the inadequacy of cultural materialism by mistepresenting it ar a monistc techno-enviconmental deter- rminism. He would prefer we follow instead an eclectic reeareh Strategy that gives equal weight in historical explanation to temic rues of behavior. But by focusing on emi rules, Heinen {otally abandons and obscures the determinant role of relationsof production, In addition, he ignores the problem of intracultural cognitive diversity and the fact that ideotogical-moral consensus is always an illusion fostered by those who are authorities or who work for them” (Harris 19742). “People obey. rules endorsed by authorities, not because they are obedient to rules, but because they are obedient to authorities” (Harris 19742). In a simplistic but revealing example, Heinen suggests that one can predict street-crossing behavior by knowing the appropriate behavioral code: eross on the green, stop on the red, It is obvious that he has never been to New York City, ‘where laws about running lights and jaywalking are rarely enforced, ‘The structural Marxists have also tended to abandon a ma- terialit reearch strategy somewhere between the demonstration of adaptive advantage and the explanation of specific cul tural form. Whereas Heinen has relied upon empirical emic rules, however, they have turned to LéviStraussian “inner” structures and the organization of practical action by cultural symbol. They appear to follow the antipositivst structuralist, position of Sebag (1967:193): “economic, social, and political relations, a8 the thearies that account for them in a given 20- ety, are just so many products of the mind.” ‘As explained previously, the Marxists who have turned toward symboli structures appear to have reservations about the applicability of historical materialism to preeapitalist social for mations. The apparent lack of institutional differentiation in these societies troubles them, Rather than risk a separation be= ‘ween Marxism and anthropology, however, they are prepared, to emphasize the symbolic determination’ of even capitalist society. For example, Friedman writes: “Money-capital is not an illusion based on real production, itis the social precondition for it” (19740:86). Perhaps, then, the critical “structural transformation” that students of anthropology should concer themselves with is the conversion of a materialist strategy via ‘Lévi-Strauss to structuralst and mentalist explanation, ‘The willingness of both Heinen and the structural Marxists to abandon etics in their explanations of historical particularity is what links them in opposition to Hares, Cultural material- jam, as developed by Harris, is not limited to the indeterminate demonstration of adaptive advantage. It is also a specific dia chronic strategy, focusing on changes in the mode of produc tion, including forces ond relations of production, and the mode of reproduction as the crucial causal parameters in social change. The strategy is neither “vulgar” nor “mechanical, but instead utilizes cybernetic models of negative and postive feedback to explain the relat nd superstructure Whereas the antiposiivst strate tion of a thewaicnobstrct objet and its axiomatce” (Llobera 1974: 20, italics added), the cultural materialist strategy is directed to the discovery of interrelations between empirical events and entities specified through etic operational procedures. "Though perhaps never the avowed intention of its practic toners, the ideological function of the antipostvis strueturalist school (as of British structural funetionalism before it) isto sever the study of history and material behavioral reality from the tubject matter of anthropology. As Asad (1974:217-18) has recently written, “neither funetionalism nor structaralism is capable of directly confronting the complex problem of the rationality of domination, exploitation and ideology in relation to historical formations.” By focusing on the complex interze- lation of base and superstructure, rather than the symbolic context of behavior and the metaphorical contradictions of abstract models, cultural materialism ean perhaps make a contri= bution to the study of these and other critical issues ABSTRACT. ‘Many anthropologists are no longer hesitant to identify themselves as Marsists, but along with this common identification Vol. 17 + No.2» June 1976 there has developed a raging diapute as to what a Marxist an- theopology is all about. Recent ertiques of cultural materialism, the avowedly Marxist strategy developed by Marvin Har- is, have attacked it for being a “vulgar” or “mechanical” interpretation of Marx. Two ofthese critiques, those of Jonathan, Friedman anc! H. Dieter Heinen, are examined in this paper. ‘The cultural materialist perspective and Harris's associated ‘epistemological distinction between emic and etic operational procedures are briefly explained. They are then used as an, botientation fora critical review of Friedman's structaralist and Heinen’s eclectic perspective. FFriedman’s work is examined in conjunction with that of ‘other anthtopologiss, principally Maurice Godelier and Mar- shall Sahlins. These three theorists have attempted to develop a dialectical, antipositivst research strategy based upon a syn~ thesis of Lévi-Strauss structuralism and Marn’s historical materials. The nature of this synthesis and is effect on what is, considered to be proper sociocultural explanation are critically fexamined here, The author's conclusion is that the materialist orientation of Marxist strategy is destroyed by the attempt to incorporate LéviStraussian structuralism into its fabric. ‘This conclusion is reached following discussion of two critical propo- jons: (I) that LéviStraussian structuralist hypotheses are by their nature unfalsifiable and (2) that Friedman and Co. have failed to make the critical distinction between emic and etic ‘operational procedures, Heinen's critique of Harris's position is shown to be based ‘upon a misrepresentation of cultural materialism, Finally, ‘8 argued that Heinen’s own eclectic revision of Marnist strategy (he argues that we must give equal weight in historical explana tion to emic rules of behavior) ignores the determinant role of relations of production and the problem of intracultural Cogn tive diversity RESUME De nombreux anthropologues n’hésitent plus ase nommer eux- rmémes marxistes, mais, en méme temps que cette identification ‘commune, seat développée une dispute acharnée autour de ce {quest une anthropologie marxiste. De récentes critiques du ‘matérialisme culturel, la stratégie d’allégence marxiste déve- loppée par Marvin Harris, Pont accusée 'étre une interpréta- tion evulgairey ou emécaniquey de Marx. Deux de ces er tigues, celles de Jonathan Friedman et de H. Dieter Heinen, sont examinges dans cet article. La perspective matérialiste calturelle et la distinction épistémologique associée entre les pprocédés dopération emie et etie sont britvement expliquées. Eilles sont ensuite utilises comme orientation pour une révision, critique de la perspective structuraliste de Friedman et la perspective éclectique de Heinen, Le travail de Friedman est examiné en conjonction avec celui autres anthropologues, principalement Maurice Godelier et ‘Marshall Sahlins. Les wois théoriciens ont tenté de développer tune stratégie de recherche dialectque, anti-postiviste, sur la base d'une synthése du structuralisme de Lévi-Strauss et du matérialieme historique de Mars. La nature de eette synthése cet ses effets aur ce qui est considéré étre une explication socio- coulturelle correcte sont examinge ici d'une manitre critique La conclusion de V'auteur est que orientation matéialiste de la stratégie marxiate ext détruite par la tentative d'incorporer le structuralisme lévistraussien dans son tissu. Cette conclusion fest atteinte & la suite dune discussion de deux propositions critiques: (1) que les hypotheses structuralistes lévi-straussiennes font par nature infalsifiable et (2) que Friedman and Co. n'ont pas réussi A faire la distinction critique entre les procédés opérationnels noémique et noétique. Test démontré que la critique de Heinen de la position de Harris est basée sur une représentation erronée du matérialisme caulturel. Finalement, il est avanoé que la révision éclectique 295propre A Heinen de la stratégie marxiste (il argumente quan, poids égal doit tre donné aux régles emic de conduite dans une explication historique) ignore le rle déterminant des relations de production et le probléme de la diversité cognitive intra-culturlle. RESUME! Muchos antropélogos ya no dudan en identificarse como Marx- istas, pero junto con esta identificacién comin se ha desa- rrollado una violenta disputa acerca de qué es lo que es una antropologia Marxista. Recienteserticas de materialism cultural, a abierta profesin ce Ja estrategia Marxista desarrollada por Marvin Harris, lohan atacado por ser una interpretaci6n fivulgarn 0 emecinicay de Marx. Dos de estas erfticas, la de Jonathan Friedman y la de H. Dieter Heinen, son examinadas ‘en esta disertacién. La perspectiva materialista cultural y la distineién epistemoldgica de Harris entre los procedimientos ‘operacionales emic y etic se explican brevemente, Estas son uusadas como una orientacién para una revisién extica del es ‘ructuralismo de Friedman y la perspectiva ecéctica de Heinen El trabajo de Friedman se examina en conjunto con los de otros antropélogos, principalmente Maurice Godelier y Mar- shall Sablins. Estos tres teoristas han tratado de desarrollar una cstrategia de Investigacion dialéctica y anti-positivista basada ‘en una sintess del estructuralismo de LévieStraussy el materia lismo histérico de Marx. La naturaleza de esta sintesis y #9 ‘efecto en lo que se considera ser Ia correcta explicaciGn sociocultural son rigurosamente examinada aqui. La conclusin del Autor es que Ia orientacin materaliata de la estrategia Marxis- ta es destruida por el intento de incorporar el estructuralismo de Lévi-Strauss a su fabrica, Se llega a esta conclusion siguiendo Ia discusi6n de dos proposiciones exticas: (1) que las hipStesis ‘structuralistas de Lévi-Strauss son por su naturaleza infalsi cables y 2) Friedman y Compaaia han omitido hacer la dis- Lincién exacta entre los procesos de operacién emie y etc. a extica que Heinen hace de Ia posicién de Harris se mucs- ‘tra basada en una inexacta interpretacién del materialismo cultural. Finalmente se arguye que la propia revisién liberal hhecha por Heinen de la estrategia Marxista (El arguye que de- Demos dar igual peso en la explicacién histérica a las regias fémicas de condueta) pasa por alto el papel determinante de las relaciones de produecién y el problema de la diversidad cognoscitiva inter-cultaral PESIOME, Muorwe epe aurponooron we saxyussmace mpiemnaion eit apscuerasus, no auceve¢ 9718 miKpoRse piri RORMIRC Gypman nomena noRpyr sonpeca, KaKol uNeHHO airponaor Dower ewurars ce6a aapueuetos. Kystbrypnitt warepitcaas ‘To orxpusTo sapreeneTeras exparerus, Koropy%0 paar Map Tappue, 2 nexanmx peuesaninx Gir xpiminonsit 88. e201 YYALrapayON we owaIERNIOD suErEpnpEraRND Maples. Hse pene, Spxonaran puzpen x T. Tusep Terme, pac- ‘ouurpuuores:” 9 aroit crarte. Tlepenekrina xyaerypuoro MaTEpHANONA HC ewmaMHe smuCTENOROMHUEEKOR PARI UNE Tappwew sexy onepermua poneypatt sxe. a HK acres 9 xpavkow ofhsinetinr, Sure oft HeRoAyOTeH PAM ‘pmenraxunt sun Kpuruueezoro aKaziio® erpy'eryparnersEeKOR nepencrenins puna nsreEKOR nepenetasee Teme, PaGorst Opicwana couarpurnaoren nenasire paSorasm pyr rpono.toros, & raanwnps oGpazox © pasorast Mopue Toxeste 4 Mapunsir Coane. Sew xpic wopenine tomeraziee paamire DusaekrIWeRyIO ATH TOSITUBNETERYTO —woLTeAONATE TAK expareri, oropas ceionaia na coeruemat eTpyieTypa.THaNs HlemieCrpayeen w ueropuveckoro searepnamiaa Mapes. Cy Uioers 2roro coemincinaN Mero aXibeeTa 1 TO, TO. MoMKO (cuTaTk mpaneranne comescisHo-kY.nbrypHN ofa, 296 noxpepractes purwieckony’ ananitey. Awrop erariat mpuxoster ‘aksho weno, sro saTepEasINeTHeeraH OpHOUTALULE MEDIC exOR erpazervin _yausrosaeren pit Nomar wacera e expyrrypasitow JTemi-Cxpayeea. Taxoe aus eHHe 1OeTHTHYO oe oro KAR je RAK npeonINReNM Gan Oey (1) ao expyxrypauerneraie rimorennt Jeam-Orpayec, 0 noel eymnoers, neonpoveparanns x (2) sro pcwan e ow ‘mye Ho exesRstN puree paazeneNe B oneparinMEN mponeaypax wexcty annkom aro, ‘Awrop noxsauisacr, uro Teftueua xpurua noowut Pappa ‘coviomaia ia nenpaniinano Toston Ky¥TypHOnO ate swe. Haxowen, muwer antop, cana SHIRT Peme Daprscaercron erpererss Totiveta (ow yrpepactaer, 0 HaRO pigiare vance ke anavene —m weropitieoM Obnenemn auvcexint aaKONaMt noREAeHuLA) THOpupyer omparecINTET. ots omowsenu mpoxsnonerua 1 poOeMy ay pH-KY 14ry PHS ‘oatiosarecbaax paasio6pasut Comments by M.E. F, Brocu Landon Scbol of Ecomsmics, Houghton St, London WC2, England. 26175 Its difficult to comment concisely on a paper which makes such a variety of points. I is a pity that the debate between Godelier and Friedman, on the one hand, and Harris and Rap- paport, on the other, has been obscured by such things as Gode~ Tiers idiosyneratic use of the word empiricism, a strange desice on the part ofall concerned to rehearse the long-dead debates, of 18th- and 19th-century philosophy, and a destructive ten- Geney on ether sie to ignore the valuable contributions made by the other. This has transformed what isthe healthiest trend in recent anthropology to an obscurantist academic polemic In an attempt to clear the ground, I woul like to dwell on one point of conderable importance in the work of Godelier whose full significance seems to have escaped Berger. I shall purposely ‘avoid the terms which have caused such difficaly i this debate, If, with Marx, Harris, and Godelier, we believe that the material conditions of human existence, that is, both the biological nature of man and his material environment, determine rociety, the only way we can demonstrate this s by showing the necessary connections between base and superstructure. The first sMrategy which springs to mind for doing this is the Malinow- ‘skian one of showing the ft beoween the material and the ideal aspects of society. This faces two difficulties. The first ie that ft ‘dots not prove cause, Indeed, to say that all aspects of society it, together is nothing more than a tautology, though an illuminat- ing one. Of course the sacredness of the cow in India is linked with the type of agriculture practised, but this does not prove or disprove a selective advantage for the sacredness of the Cow as against its non-sacrecness. Its true that ifthe cow were not sacred Indian agriculture would be diferent, but this does not get us anywhere, In England, guardsmen’s helmets are made ‘of bearskins imported from the U.SS.R., and s0 the uniforms fof guardsmen are linked vith the whole pattern of East/West trade, but this in no sense proves that itis in order to maintain East/West trade that English guarcamen are dressed in this ridiculous way. The second difficulty, and this is Godelir’s point is that even if a culture iva perfectly adaptive mechanism, i remains a specific system of “livedsin-meanings.” It is ‘operated by people who are acting on nature from within its confines. This system of meaning isthe bass of social reproduction, but in an exploitative situation this reproduction is most, ikely 19 be achieved by concepts which obscure the material situation. This means that in such circumstances the system of “ived-in-meanings" culture isa different system to that of the material base, In any ease, the cultural system and the material system are subject to different types of constraints. The cul- ‘tural system is constrained by the requirement that it be apprehensible by human minds (though, pace Lévi-Strauss, we have very litle idea what this constraint consists of), while the mate Fal system is constrained by the processes of nature. This dis. tinction becomes all the more important if we put it in the eon- text of change. Since the material adaptation and the conceptual aystem are of different natures, the ways they change are different also, and they cannot therefore change in parallel. It is alto true that they cannot change independently, since that ‘would be as much as to say that there is no connection between base and superstructure, a view not held by any serious anthro~ pologists. What this means is thatthe problem of determination ‘must be a double one, where culeure ata given time isthe product both of preexisting cultural system(s) and of the material impetus to change. The mistake which Godelier is trying to guard against and which Berger falls into isnot realizing that Since individuals only see the world through their “cultural slases,” they must create and interpret change in the only system of meaning (however complex) they know. This means that the aim of Harris's programme, to predict the eulture from the nature of the material base, must inevitably be unattain- able, since culture cannot be directly determined by the base This point seems to me inescapable. Once accepted as @ modifi- cation to their programme by the cultural materialists it will enable them to build more effectively the anthropology they eck to achieve, by A. oe Reayren Institut soorCaltrele Antroploge van de Rjkeunvestit, Transi- tori I, Heidalbrglan 2, Urrecht, the Netherlands. 17 x1 75 Without paying attention to our minor disagreements, I want to discuss only some of the isues raised by Berger's stimulating arti, Berger defends cultural materialism against characterisations| as “monistic environmental determinism.” He refers to Harris's temphasis on “the need for considering the interaction between, bate and superstructure in accounting for any particular his- torial situation.” Yet he hime speaks of cultural materialism asa research strategy “which states that the anthropologist is most likely to find the causes of sociocultural phenomena in the techno-economic, techno-environmental conditions of social life” (italies mine). His reaction to Heinen, with whom I completely agree, is revealing: Heinen “totally abandons and obscures the détrminant role of relations of production” (italics mine), His reference to intracultural cognitive diversity is irrele- vant, because this cognitive diversity probably eorresponds with diversity in the economic sphere. Just like the superstructure, the infrastructure (modes and relations of production) has insti tutional intrasystem differences. Besides, the acceptance of Harris's statement that people obey rues just because they obey authorities is very contestable, His own treatment of Heinen’s texample shows that people do not obey the authorities that have legislated traffic regulations. Apart from that, I wonder if one cannot make better predictions with knowledge of the rule “cross on the green, stop on the red” than without it, and this is what Heinen meant. As for Berger’s reaction to Friedman's critique of Rappaport, what evidence is there that a negative feedback mechanism, determined by environmental factors, i, at work? Since it functions within—or, better, blaw—the limit, set by “noncultural” factors, itis a matte of faith, not of proof, that the Tsembaga pig feasts operate as a negative-feedback ‘mechanism. A feedback mechanism stats to operate when the critical point—here, the level which would cause environ- ‘mental degradation—has been reached. This extical point, however, is never reached in Rappaport’s case. Besides, Ber” gers second remark on Friedman is not wholly valid. Reeton of a cain (esearch) statgy always has to be sen in the Light of ‘ltrnativer. An alternative in which “ideological” factors as ‘auss (in conjunction with environmental factors) are beter taken into account gives a more satisfactory and complete ex- Vol, 7 + No.2 + Fane 1976 planation of Tsembaga pig feasts than Rappaport’s, because the feast as a regulating principle is determined not only by ‘environmental factors, but also by the social structure ‘Berger—rightly—states that cultural materialism is based on 1 commitment to eties. Thus it preruppoces that our classifica tions are cros-cultally valid and are conceptualisations which are more valuable or more in accordance with “reality” than those of the “natives.” However, who says that our social sei ‘ence concepts are not system-specific? It is with regard to this issue that Lévi-Strauss rejects falsification & la Popper in the social sciences, in which we are concerned with “symbols of symbole” (Lévi-Strauss 1971:574). Whatever one thinks of this statement, the emic-etc distinction has taught us that a certain, modesty and prudence is in order. Thete are, unfortunately, {00 often missing in the work of cultural materialist. by. C. Janvie Depariment of Philsophy, Tork Univesity, Downsview, Ont Canada. 8176 Popper says in The Poverty of Historic (1961) that unless the social sciences are disciplined by concrete practical concerns there is grave danger of their wandering into the deserts of speculative metaphysics. Anthropology provides abundant evidence of this, Funetionalism all too easily degenerates into everything functions for the best in the hest of all posible worlds.” Positvise slips imperceptibly into. phenomenalistic idealism (asin E. R. Leach’s Palitical Sptems of Highland Burma) ‘The doctrine of internal relations is rediscovered and used to repudiate the task of giving causal explanations. Problems of \waniation teeter on the edge ofthe swamps of conceptual relativism (B. L. Whorf, naturally; a recent example is R. Need hham’s Bali, Language and Experience). And, of course, Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Husserl, and so on, all have partisans of their differing views of something called social reality.” Berger's paper, which so earnestly defencs Harris's “cultural materialism,” should be seen in the light of the above observa tions. Cultural materialism, Marxism, and structuralism, like functionalism and structural-funetionalism before them, share a very similar appeal. They attract people because they seem, to answer a number of difficult questions. More than that, they ‘unify the questions by providing connected answers. They make coherent fense of things —bring unity out of diversity, order cout of muddle, connection out of disarray. Each is a unifying system that renders the world understandable, This is their characteristic appeal, the classic appeal of all metaphysics or sgeneral systems of the world, namely, a uniiying vision of that world Tn the revelatory appeal of its unifying vision there lies, ‘also, the weakness of metaphysics, a weakness that science strives to overcome. This weakness is that itis all t00 easy to ‘defend a unifying vision, to illustrat it, to find cases which fit ‘\ vision which unifies and explains many things will not be hard to confirm. The difference between a metaphysical sys tem that leads to progressive science and one which leads t0 self-verifying speculation is the translation of the system into explanations of concrete phenomena that are precise enough tw be falsified, Iti the placing of a system of ideas at rsk in a court of appeal outside the control ofits partisans that isa mark of intellectual seriousness. The original, scientific versions of Marxism, functionalign, structuralism, etc, were made concrete then tested, and refuted, long ago. What goes on now are scholastic disputes among the faithful as to how to patch up the systems in order to keep them going. Why bother? by Joux O'Nen Department of Sociology, York University, Downsview 463, Ont, (Canada. 28 X01 75 I shall confine myself to a single observation on Berger's attempt to equate the distineion between emics and ties with 297the Marxist analytic distinction between the economic base and the ideological superstructure of a society. In the first place, i is not at all clear that the Marxist categories of base land superstructure in fact apply to all societies, rather than to the stage-specific analysis of the development of capitalism and, the transition to socialism. Secondly, with respect tothe crucial relations between the Party and the proletariat in the final transition to socialism there arises the very difficult problem, raised in Marx's “Third ‘Thesis on Feuerbach,” namely, how it is that the Party’s scientific knowledge (eties) should be {geared to proletarian understanding (emics) in such a way as to avoid the expansion of Communist ideology as the latest abuse of proletarian conseiousness. In short, there is an enor- ‘ously difficult problem in the relation between firstorder (emi) and second-order (etic) analyses of social life. Berger ‘does not pay sufcient attention to the political as well as meth= tdological aspects of these orders of speech and thought, The problem, as I se it, is to radicalize bvk emic and etic understandings (O'Neill 1974), remembering that in the social World members’ accounts are never just the dumb material of social scientific analysis and that the latter cannot be treated 18 privileged speech without this being a further feature of the very political order that is the subject of etie accounts. Fanon (1963) and Freire (1971) deserve the attention of anyone working in cultural anthropology to bring together emic and etic ‘understandings in an overall structre of communicative competence (O'Neill 1974). By the same token, the emancipatory goals of communicative competence must be understood, despite what we know of cultural relativism, to rest upon an evo= Iutionary ta—a questionable if not painful assumption, as T remarked at the beginning of my comment. by Iwo Rost Department of Sociology and Anthropology, St. Jobn's University, Jamaica, NY. 11438, USA. 30075 Berger's essay touches on so many isues in so casual a way that, i can hardly clarify or deepen any aspects of a controversy ‘which is in the forefront of the discipline. One would have 10 take exception to the selective coverage of aspects of the struc: turalist Marxist position, th lack of differentiation among vari- ‘ous structuralist Marxist approaches, the interpretation of Marxist dialectics and epistemology, and s0 on, Structuralist ‘Maraists will certainly comment on these and other shortcom= ings. Since one of the professed aims of the article is to discuss “the epistemological underpinnings” of the controversy, I shall call attention to some mistaken and stereotyped notions about the structuralist perspective which continue to fuel peetdocon- troverses. For structuralists, mental structures are not autonomous in the sense that mind produces cultural facts through mental projections, so to speak; rather, mind organizes and attaches meaning to external reality. Structuralists do not “re~ Jeet” sensory data, but explain them by showing that they are based on classificatory principles and connected by relational ‘constant properties (the famed “unconscious structures”). Ber- ager expresses his indignation at the reiied metaphors of struc turalist Marxists and then attacks the “deeper reality” of structuralists without realizing that this isa refied metaphor fof his own making, His complaint about the incapacity of structuralists to produce “causal” explanations ignores recent structuralist studies based on predictive hypotheses and succes- sive verification by ethnographic data, Berger does not discus in depth the epistemological principles ‘which in is opinion are at the foundation of cultural materialism. Certainly laudable is the emphasis on operational intersubjective procedures, but this principle does not imply that only what is directly observable (or “etially” famed) is the legitimate subject matter of “scientific anthropology.” (One is also bothered by the contention that the notions of symbolic structures and adaptive change represent alletative 298 approaches and the contention that the procedures for eliciting the native's ideas and the procedures for observing behavior rust also be considered a allerative approaches. Aren’t sto- dents introduced anymore to the basic idea of the interrela- tionship between ideational culture and social structure? Nor ‘can much convincing power be generated from such arbi- wary and questionable statements a8 that ideological and moral consensus is always an illusion fostered by those who are in au thority or from the empiricist (with “peace” to cultural materialists) notion that strueturalist explanations are not falsifiable and replicable. Serious epistemological questions are even less convincingly. resolved by a stated preference for the study of specific causal explanations rather than a search for a teleological inner dynamism, falgely assumed to be mutually exclusive. Much les can one hope to refute the label of “mechanism” by counter- labeling as “idealist” or rationalist those anthropologists who use ideology as an explanatory variable. Some of those mis- guided idealists go so far as to believe that a grain of truth is Contained in the position of cultural materialism, but the grain, ‘must be tended by more expert hands. No progress can be ex- pected in contemporary anthropological theory unless we stop. rejecting each other's position with ad hominem and prejudged. arguments without coming to grips with authentic epistemologi- fal issues—and there are plenty of them-which have real ‘methodological significance dy Manstats Saute Department of Anthropology, University of Chicago, Chicago, I 60637, US.A. 18 x75 ‘The problem does not truly lie in the opposition of native generated and observer-generated categories. Allegedly developed “independently” by the community of scientists, the ‘materialist paradigm is no less “emic” than the cultural data, it seks to encompass, being itself a sustained application of the self-conception of bourgeois society as the sedimented outcome fof practical interest. ‘The real issue is whether culture—as praxis or structure, conscious or unconscious, in verbal state- iment or social aetion—is to be understood at meaningfully constituted according to local logics which are not themselves sequitur to material advantage but, on the contrary, specify for any given society the nature of the utilitarian fact and its cultural effects. I's, then the material “causes” are in that capacity the product of a symbolic system whose character itis our task to investigate; for without the mediation of this cultural scheme, no adequate relation between a given material condi tion and a specific cultural form can ever be stipulated. By mystifying this issue as an epistemological choice between the peoples’ views and the anthropologists, materialism merely al- Tows itself to ignore the distintive quality of human action as meaningfully organized—that it may proceed to organize ‘meaning a8 an instrumental mystification of natural reason. Its, “empiricism” then consists in the radical practice of the idea that nothing is in fact what it appears, Le, culturally, but is, ttandated instead into natural coordinates or consequences The result is a kind of “ecology fetishism” whereby corn, beans, and squash become an “unbalanced diet,” eress-cousin marriage an “interchange of genetic materials,” ritual pig, slaughter and distribution to affines a mode of remaining ithe in “the limits of carrying capacity,” the social order ‘a population of organisms” which perhaps numbers cannibalism withe in its repertory of “subsistence activities.” Materialism thus presents us with operative descriptions whieh in appearance are basic and objective, but in point of cultural fact are abstract and indeterminate. It thereby loses all hope of theoretical ade~ ‘quacy, since in the tranaation everything that is distinctively caltural about the object has been allowed to escape. Incidentally, it was Marx himself who gave such fetishismits most general criticism and precise explanation (Mare and Engels 1965:460-61): ‘The apparent stupidity of merging all the manifold relationships of people in the ove relation of usefulness, this apparently met physical abstraction artes from the fact that, in movdern bourgeos {ociety, all relations are subordinated in practice to the one ab= Seaet monetary-commercal relation. This theory came to the fore ‘with Hobbes and Locke... In Holbach, all the activity of indi- duals in their mutual intercourse, eg, speech, love, ete is de- pleted as a relation of utility and tlisation. Hence the actual rela tons that are presuppoted here are speech, lve, the definite maa festations of definite qualities of individuals. Now these relations are supposed not to have the meaning peculiar to them but tobe the ‘expresion and manifestation of some third relation introduced In their place, the relation of uiity or wilson... All this ‘tually the ease with the bourgeois. For him only ene relation & valid on is own account ~the relation of exploitation al other relations have validity for him only insofar ab he can include them under this one relation, and even where he encounters relations ‘which cannot be directly subordinated to the relation of expoita- tion, he docs atleast subordinate them to it imagination What is the actual relation of the material logic to the cul tural, the role of material “cause” in meaningful scheme? Al- Tow me to suggest an answer by the use of an example that is fat once familiar, as it concerns the system of use-valucs in ‘American subsistence, and privileged, as this system is onten= sibly organized by the rational pursuit of practical interest (Le. through the market). The normative American concept of 2 “proper meal” consists of a central element of meat supported Dy potatoes and vegetables; among meats, beef is generally, valued over other kinds, and steak over other cuts of beef. It is evident that the entire productive relation (or adaptation”) ‘of American society to its landscape-as well as decisive for- ‘ign-commercial and foreign-politieal relations—has been pred icated on this culinary triangle. In the event, production is ‘organized by a cultural wisdom which, while surely “material” and “objective,” cannot claim either ecological advantage or ‘opportunity costs as its own raison d'éte. The virile powers of igrowth and strength we especially attribute to eating meat develop from the depths of Indo-Buropean institutions. Con- sider the Vedic category patu (cognate to the famous pect), ‘hich unites householders and their domestic animals (more explicitly in the Avestan formula pasu viu), and the medieval dlistinetion of “livestock” from “deadstock” precisely as the ‘wansactable and augmentable form of wealth—expressed again in the common derivation of “cattle,” “chattel,” and “capital” (ef. Benveniste 1969 and the relevant entries in the (Oxford English Dictionary, including the indication of livestock as the male good in marital exchange). Within the eur= rent set of subsistence values, beef enters into a contrast with pork as more to less prefered (as for special occasions), while both stand in opposition to dog and horse as more and less tabu. ‘The logic ofthis complex of ecbility works on a distinction between object (cate, pig) and subject (horse, dog) in human affairs a principle realized also in naming practices relative to human proper names and in the inverse relation between the ‘edible value of the domestic animal and the metonymical dis- tance ofits own life-space from the domestic sphere (ef. Leach 1964, Sablins n.d.). An analogous transformation appears in the Valuation of the “outer” seetion of meat animals over the innards,” the latter often distinctively known in terms of human organs (heart, tongue, intestines, kidneys, et.). Globally, the system of subsistence values amounts to a sustained logie fof the concrete operating on two planes and integrated in a ‘common metaphor of anticannibalism. While itis rue that beef muscle tissue is relatively high in certain nutrients, it can hardly be claimed that this pene bourgvice isa direct expression of a natural economic, ecological, or nutritive rationality. To allege some ancient considera tions of productive utility, eg., in the tabu on horse and dog, ‘would be a sheer materialist piety and a violation besides of the ‘good empiricist canon of uniformitarianism, i, in accounting Vol. 17 + No.2 + Jane 1976 for the origins by a characteratc that cannot be found in the phenomenon as we know it. Surely it would be advantageous to raise some horses and dogs for food. We even raise horses as food for dogs. But then, the respect we pay to dogs we refuse to cat might put a Hindu in mind of a sacred animal, or suggest to an East African some kind of “complex.” (And think of the difference in the material and politcal effects of recent large- scale exports of grain if only we consented to eat dogs) Again, the price of roast beef in America remains considerably higher than that of beef tongue, although, given the anatomy of the Deas, the former isin much greater supply. Nor could the nutritive difference between these cuts of meat account for the disproportion in their price. Since these prices have been set largely by the supply-
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