SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (Atty.
Geraldine Quimosing-Tiu) 1
INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS
WHO MAY FILE PETITION
ACAIN v. IAC
XXX
MALOLES v. PHILLIPS
XXX
LEVISTE v. CA
XXX
SAN LUIS v. SAN LUIS
XXX
WHO MAY BE APPOINTED
RAMOS v. JUDGE BAROT
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1338 January 21, 2004
ROGELIO R. RAMOS, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE EUSEBIO M. BAROT, Presiding Judge, 8th Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Branch 2, Aparri-Calayan,
Cagayan, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For resolution is the complaint1 dated March 26, 1999, filed before
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), charging respondent
Judge Eusebio M. Barot, Presiding Judge, 8th Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Aparri-Calayan, Cagayan, Branch 2, of (a) violations of the
Code of Judicial Conduct and (b) Grave Misconduct.
Attached to the complaint was a supporting joint affidavit, 2 executed
by complainant Rogelio R. Ramos together with one Dominador C.
Ramos, alleging that they are the owners, possessors and
cultivators of two parcels of land located in Gabun, Lasam,
Cagayan. These parcels are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 17902-03. Affiants further claim that they likewise cultivated
another parcel of land registered in the name of one Romeo Ramos
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17904. These three
parcels of land, according to complainant, formerly formed part of
the Estate of Florencio Barut3 but were later covered by
Emancipation Patents issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR).
According to the complaint, on February 26, 1997, certain individuals
entered their rice fields and, without authority, harvested the
standing rice crops, upon the unlawful orders of one Atty. Nuelino B.
Ranchez and respondent judge. Complainant further averred that
respondent judge acted as attorney-in-fact for Florencio Barot (now
deceased), who was also a claimant to the aforesaid lots, as per
COMPILATION OF CASES
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Case
No. II-464-CAG.97.4
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) required the respondent
to comment on the complaint as per 1st Endorsement 5 dated August
9, 1999.
In his Comment,6 respondent admitted that he did act as attorney-in-
fact for his uncle Florencio A. Barot7 and represented the latter in
DARAB Cases Nos. 464, 524 to 542-Cag-1997 for Annulment of
Emancipation Patents Nos. A-2000750 to A-2000769, filed by
Florencio Barot against Dominador Ramos, among others. In a
decision8dated December 8, 1997, the Regional Adjudicator
rendered judgment in favor of Florencio Barot and ordered the
cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer and the
Emancipation Patents issued in favor of Dominador Ramos and his
co-defendants therein.
Respondent, however, denied any participation in the alleged
unauthorized harvesting of the rice crops claimed by herein
complainant. According to respondent, the administrative complaint
filed against him was nothing more than a cheap stunt and a
fabrication instigated by one Atty. Edgar Orro, who had a grudge
against the Barot family. Respondent claimed that the complainant
was merely being utilized as a willing tool of Atty. Orro to ruin
respondent's reputation.9
In a resolution10 dated March 5, 2001, we referred the matter to
Executive Judge Antonio Laggui of the Regional Trial Court of
Aparri, Cagayan for investigation, report and recommendation. The
investigating judge required the parties to submit their respective
position papers but only the respondent complied.
In his position paper,11 respondent contended that he did not violate
Rules 2.0112 and 2.03,13 Canon 214 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
and was not guilty of grave misconduct as the acts imputed to him
were not related to or connected with the performance of his official
functions and duties as a member of the judiciary. Instead, he said
those acts had to do with the proper execution of his responsibilities
and obligations as a private individual, i.e., as attorney-in-fact of his
late uncle, Florencio Barot. Furthermore, he stated that two cases
for theft filed by complainant against him were dismissed by the
Regional State Prosecutor of Region 2, and they only served to
show his innocence of the acts imputed against him. 15
On September 28, 2001, the investigating judge rendered his report
and recommendation,16 which was received by the Office of the
Court Administrator on October 10, 2001. Judge Laggui found that
respondent had violated Rule 5.06,17 Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.18 Judge Laggui held that while it is true that the acts
complained of were not related to respondent's judicial functions, it
does not follow that a judge cannot be administratively charged for
acts of a private character. He recommended that respondent be
ordered to pay a fine of ₱2,000.00, with a warning that a repetition of
the same shall be dealt with more severely. However, he exonerated
respondent judge of the charge of Grave Misconduct for lack of
merit.
On August 8, 2000, the OCA affirmed the findings of Judge Laggui,
but recommended that the fine be increased to ₱3,000.00.19
The findings and recommendations of the OCA, based on the report
of Executive Judge Laggui, are well taken.1âwphi1That respondent
violated Rule 5.06, Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct is
patent. Respondent himself admitted that he acted as one of the
attorneys-in-fact for his paternal uncle, Florencio Barot, whom he
also represented in DARAB Case No. II-464-Cag. 97. In his position

paper, respondent likewise admitted that he continues to act as
attorney-in-fact for the children of his deceased uncle. 20 Pursuant to
his authority as such attorney-in-fact, he entered into two
compromise agreements relating to the aforesaid DARAB case.
Being and serving as an attorney-in-fact is within the purview of
"other fiduciary" as used in Rule 5.06. As a noun, "fiduciary" means
"a person holding the character of a trustee, or a character
analogous to that of a trustee, in respect to the trust and confidence
involved in it and the scrupulous good faith and candor which it
requires."21 A fiduciary primarily acts for another's benefit, pursuant
to his undertaking as such fiduciary, in matters connected with said
undertaking. When respondent acted as attorney-in-fact for his
uncle, Florencio Barot, he likewise undertook to perform all acts
necessary to protect the latter's interests. These would include
attending scheduled hearings in the DARAB case, among others, as
pointed out by OCA. The possibility of a scheduled hearing for the
DARAB case conflicting with his own calendared hearings in his sala
is not altogether far-fetched. But far worse is the possibility that
respondent's official position and stature might have affected the
outcome of the DARAB case.
Respondent gives as an excuse the fact that since he attended only
one hearing in the DARAB case, particularly the pre-trial conference,
he could not have peddled any influence, either as a member of the
Bar or of the Judiciary. However, it goes without saying that a judge
holds a position in the community that is looked up to with honor and
privilege. For this vantaged position, an exacting price is imposed,
for judges to comport themselves in a manner beyond suspicion or
reproach. A judge's private actuations come under scrutiny as much
as his public functions, for the citizenry hardly makes a distinction
between them.
The Code of Judicial Conduct lays down the guidelines with respect
to fiduciary activities that judges may engage in. The thin line
between what is allowed and what is not allowed is set forth in Rule
5.06, and therein made very specific. As a general rule, judges
cannot serve as executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or other
fiduciary, except if he acts in a fiduciary capacity for the estate, trust
or person of a member of his immediate family. The Code defines
"immediate family" as being limited to the spouse and relatives
within the second degree of consanguinity. Clearly, respondent's
paternal uncle does not fall under "immediate family" as herein
defined. Hence, his appointment as attorney-in-fact for his uncle is
not a valid exception to the rule. As we have held in Carual vs.
Brusola:22
The Code does not qualify the prohibition. The intent of the rule is to
limit a judge's involvement in the affairs and interests of private
individuals to minimize the risk of conflict with his judicial duties and
to allow him to devote his undivided attention to the performance of
his official functions.
Needless to say, the Code of Judicial Conduct has the force and
effect of law. The Code itself provides that judges are enjoined to
strictly comply with its provisions.23 Otherwise, a judge may arrogate
upon himself the discretion of determining when he may or may not
act in a fiduciary capacity.
In this case, respondent should have been more circumspect in
accepting the appointment as an attorney-in-fact for his paternal
uncle. A judge is expected to be knowledgeable about current laws
and jurisprudence. But more than that, he is also expected to know,
in significant detail, the ethical rules that govern judicial conduct,
both in public and private affairs. He should know, or should have
known, the prohibition embodied in the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Respondent's failure to do so shows a lack of diligence to keep
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (Atty. Geraldine Quimosing-Tiu) 2
COMPILATION OF CASES
himself abreast of the responsibilities of a judge. For this alone, he
deserves to be sanctioned.
WHEREFORE, respondent Hon. EUSEBIO M. BAROT, Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Branch 2, Aparri-Calayan,
Cagayan is found LIABLE for violation of Rule 5.06, Canon 5 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct. He is hereby ORDERED to pay, as
recommended by OCA, a FINE of ₱3,000.00, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be
dealt with more severely. The charge for GRAVE MISCONDUCT is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
ORDER OF PREFERENCE
BALUYUT v. CRUZ-PANO
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-42088 May 7, 1976
ALFREDO G. BALUYUT, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, ENCARNACION LOPEZ VDA. DE
BALUYUT, JOSE ESPINO and CORAZON ESPINO, respondents.
Mary Concepcion-Bautista for petitioner.
Santiago, Salunat and Agbayani for respondent Encarnacion Lopez
Vda. de Baluyut.
AQUINO, J.:
Sotero Baluyut died in Manila on January 6, 1975 at the age of
eighty-six, leaving an estate allegedly valued at not less than two
million pesos.
A few weeks later, or on February 20, his nephew, Alfredo G.
Baluyut, filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City a verified
petition for letters of administration. He alleged that the deceased
was survived by his widow, Encarnacion Lopez, who was mentally
incapable of acting as administratrix of the decedent's estate.
Alfredo surmised that the decedent had executed a will. He prayed
that he be appointed regular administrator and in the meantime as
special administrator.
The lower court in its order of February 24, 1975 appointed Alfredo
G. Baluyut as special administrator with a bond of P100,000.
Mrs. Baluyut in her verified opposition of March 8, 1975 alleged that
she was unaware that her deceased husband executed a will. She
characterized as libelous the allegation as to her mental incapacity.
She prayed that she be named administratrix and that the
appointment of Alfredo G. Baluyut as special administrator be set
aside.

The lower court in its order of March 24, 1975 cancelled Baluyut's
appointment as special administrator. In that same order the lower
court noted that after asking Mrs. Baluyut a series of questions while
on the witness stand, it found that she "is healthy and mentally
qualified".
Alfredo G. Baluyut moved for the reconsideration of that order.
Acting on that motion, the lower court in its order of March 31, 1975
appointed Baluyut and Jose Espino as special administrators.
Mrs. Baluyut in her verified amended opposition of September 2,
1975 asked that Espino, former governor of Nueva Vizcaya and an
alleged acknowledged natural child of Sotero Baluyut, be appointed
administrator should she not be named administratrix.
On November 12, 1975 Mrs. Baluyut filed an urgent motion praying
that she be appointed administratrix. She reasoned out that Alfredo
G. Baluyut had no more interest in the decedent's estate because as
a collateral relative he was excluded by Espino and other supposed
descendants of the deceased who had intervened in the proceeding,
and, therefore, it was not necessary to continue with the reception of
his evidence.
Alfredo G. Baluyut opposed the urgent motion. He alleged that
Espino was not a natural child of Sotero Baluyut because Espino's
parents were the spouses Elino Espino and Josefa de Guzman.
Alfredo further alleged that Mrs. Baluyut was declared an
incompetent by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Quezon City in its order of September 25, 1975 in Special
Proceeding No. QC-00939 for the guardianship of Mrs. Baluyut. That
proceeding was instituted by her sisters, Cristeta Lopez Vda. de
Cuesta and Guadalupe Lopez-Viray.
At the hearing of Mrs. Baluyut's urgent motion on November 17,
1975 no oral and documentary evidence was presented. The lower
court merely examined Mrs. Baluyut as follows:
Court: We want also to hear her testimony.
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Salunat: We are now therefore presenting the widow, your
Honor, to take the witness stand for examination by the court.
xxx xxx xxx
Court to witness: Can you testify in English?-No, your Honor,
Pampango.
Q. Ilocano? — A. No, your Honor.
Atty. Salunat: She can testify in Tagalog your Honor, which
comprehensible.
Court: Your remember when you were born, Mrs. Baluyut? — A.
March 25, 1901.
Q. Where did you graduate? — Madres Dominicas.
Q. When did you get married to Sec. Baluyut? — A. I cannot
remember the date but this was in Lingayen.
Q. What church? — A. A Catholic.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (Atty. Geraldine Quimosing-Tiu) 3
COMPILATION OF CASES
Court: You want to ask more questions Attorney?
Atty. Salunat: Just a few clarificatory questions, your Honor.
Q. Do you know Gov. Espino? — A. Yes.
Q. Why do you know him? — A. Because he is like a son to me.
Q. Do you know whether Gov. Espino has any relationship with the
late Don Sotero Baluyut? — A. Yes, why not.
Q. Will you please tell us what is the relationship if there is any? —
A. He is his son, sir.
Atty. Salunat: I think that would be all, your Honor.
Court: Submitted?
Atty. Salunat: We will ask the Court to (be allowed to) submit a
rejoinder, your Honor.
The probate court in its order of November 27, 1975 terminated the
appointments of Espino and Alfredo G. Baluyut as special
administrators and appointed Mrs. Baluyut as regular administratrix
with a bond of P20,000. The order was based on the fact that as
surviving spouse she has a preferential right to be appointed as
administratrix of her deceased husband's estate and that she is
entitled to three-fourths of the conjugal estate: one-half in her own
right and one-fourth as heir of the deceased. The lower court said it
was convinced of the widow's capacity and that her "sufficient
understanding" justified her appointment.
Letters of administration were issued to Mrs. Baluyut after she
posted her bond. She took her oath of office on November 29, 1975.
On December 13, 1975 Alfredo G. Baluyut filed against respondent
Judge, Mrs. Baluyut and the Espino spouses this special civil action
of certiorari in order to set aside the order of November 27
appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix.
This court issued a restraining order enjoining the respondents from
enforcing the order of November 27 and from disposing of the funds
or assets of the estate in their possession or deposited in certain
banks.
The Espino's in their comment alleged that Alfredo G. Baluyut is
aware that Jose Espino was acknowledged in a notarial instrument
by Sotero Baluyut as his natural child.
Mrs. Baluyut in her comment alleged that Alfredo G. Baluyut
instituted the administration proceeding after he had failed to get
from her a cheek for P500,000 belonging to the decedent's estate
and that he grossly misrepresented that she was mentally
incompetent. She further alleged that the order of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court declaring her an incompetent was issued
in a blitzkrieg manner because it was based on the report of Doctor
Lourdes V. Lapuz which was filed in court just one day before the
order was issued.
Mrs. Baluyut's main contention is that it is the probate court and not
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court that should decide the
issue as to her competency to act as administratrix.
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (Atty. Geraldine Quimosing-Tiu) 4
COMPILATION OF CASES

Alfredo G. Baluyut in his manifestation of February 2, 1976 disclosed
that Sotero Baluyut executed a notarial will on April 14, 1973. In that
will he bequeathed to Mrs. Baluyut his one-half share in certain
conjugal assets and one-fourth of the residue of his estate. The
remaining three-fourths were bequeated to his collateral relatives
named Irene, Erlinda, Estrellita, Eliseo and Alfredo, all surnamed
Baluyut, and Emerita, Emilio and Benjamin, all surnamed Miranda.
The testator designated Mrs. Baluyut as executrix. Espino is not
mentioned in that will.
In this Court's resolution of May 7, 1976 respondents' comments
were treated as their answers. The case was deemed submitted for
decision.
The issue is whether the lower court acted with grave abuse of
discretion in appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix.
The lower court departed from the usual course of probate
procedure in summarily appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix on
the assumption that Alfredo G. Baluyut was not an interested party.
That irregularity became more pronounced after Alfredo G. Baluyut's
revelation that the decedent had executed a will. He anticipated that
development when he articulated in his petition his belief that Sotero
Baluyut executed wills which should be delivered to the court for
probate.
Certiorari lies when a grave abuse of discretion was patently
committed by the lower court or if the petitioner's contention is
clearly tenable or when the broader interests of justice or public
policy justify the nullification of the questioned order (Manila Electric
Company and Sheriff of Quezon City vs. Hon. Enriquez and
Espinosa, 110 Phil. 499, 503; Pacheco vs. Tumangday and
Fernando, 108 Phil. 238; Raneses vs. Teves, L-26854, March 4,
1976).

We hold that while the probate court correctly assumed that Mrs.
Baluyut as surviving spouse enjoys preference in the granting of
letters of administration (Sec. 6[a), Rule 78, Rules of Court), it does
not follow that she should be named administratrix without
conducting a full-dress hearing on her competency to discharge that
trust.
Before closing, a pending incident herein should be resolved.
Alfredo G. Baluyut in his motion of January 15, 1976 prayed that
respondent Judge be enjoined from acting on Mrs. Baluyut's motion
for the appointment of Espino as special administrator. In view of
Alfredo G. Baluyut's manifestation of

Even the directive of the testator in his will designating that a certain
person should act as executor is not binding on the probate court
and does not automatically entitle him to the issuance of letters
testamentary. A hearing has to be held in order to ascertain his
fitness to act as executor. He might have been fit to act as executor
when the will was executed but supervening circumstances might
have rendered him unfit for that position.
Thus, it was held that a hearing is necessary in order to determine
the suitability of the person to be appointed administrator by giving
him the opportunity to prove his qualifications and affording
oppositors a chance to contest the petition (Matute vs. Court of
Appeals, L-26106, January 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 768, 791).
April 2, 1976 that his motion had become moot, the same is hereby
denied.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of November 27, 1975
appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix is set aside. The letters of
administration granted to her are cancelled. The probate court is
directed to conduct further proceedings in consonance with the
guidelines delineated in this decision. Costs against respondent Mrs.
Baluyut.
SO ORDERED.

In this case the probate court briefly and perfunctorily interrogated

Mrs. Baluyut in order to satisfy itself on her mental capacity. The
court did not give Alfredo G. Baluyut a chance to contest her
qualifications. He had squarely raised the issue as to her
competency. The probate court assumed that

Alfredo G. Baluyut had no interest in the decedent's estate. As it now

turned out, he is one of the legatees named in the decedent's
alleged will.

Moreover, it is necessary to convert the proceeding in the lower

court into a testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will cannot
be dispensed with and is a matter of public policy (Art. 838, Civil
Code; See. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74
Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249).

After the will is probated, the prior letters of administration should be

revoked and proceedings for the issuance of letters testamentary or
of administration under the will should be conducted (Sec. 1, Rule
82, Rules of Court; Cartajena vs. Lijauco and Zaballa, 38 Phil. 620;
Rodriguez vs. De Borja, L-21993, 64 O.G. 754, 17 SCRA 418).

Whether Sotero Baluyut died testate or intestate, it is imperative in

the interest of the orderly administration of justice that a hearing be
held to determine Mrs. Baluyut's fitness to act as executrix or
administratrix. Persons questioning her capacity should be given an
adequate opportunity to be heard and to present evidence.

DE ROXAS v. PECSON
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2211 December 20, 1948
NATIVIDAD I. VDA. DE ROXAS, petitioner,
vs.
POTENCIANO PECSON, Judge of First Instance of Bulacan,
MARIA ROXAS and PEDRO ROXAS,respondents.
Claro M. Recto and Francisco A. Rodrigo for petitioner.
Estanislao A. Fernandez, Jr., and Gerardo M. Alfonso for
respondents.
FERIA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari filed against the respondent judge of
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.
The facts in this case may be summarily stated as follows: Pablo M.
Roxas died leaving properties in Bulacan. The other respondents
Maria and Pedro Roxas, sister and brother respectively of the
deceased, filed on August 3, 1946, a petition for the administration
of the latter's estate, in special intestate proceeding No. 1707 of the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, and Maria Roxas was appointed
special administratrix upon an ex-parte petition. On August 10, 1946,
the petitioner Natividad Vda. de Roxas, widow of Pablo M. Roxas,
filed a petition for the probate of an alleged will of her deceased
husband, and for her appointment as executrix of his estate
designated is said will, and the petition was docketed as special
proceeding No. 172 of the same court. In said will the deceased
bequeathed one-half of his estate to his widow, the herein petitioner,
and the other half to Reynaldo Roxas, an adulterous child 9 years
old of the decedent. Upon agreement of both parties, the intestate
proceeding No. 170 was dismissed and ordered closed by the court.
In view of the opposition to the probate of the will by the respondents
Maria and Pedro Roxas, the petitioner was appointed on September
10, 1946, special administratrix and qualified as such over the
objection of the respondents Maria and Pedro Roxas, who sought
the appointment of Maria as such. The said respondents filed on
October 21, 1946, a motion for reconsideration of the order of the
court appointing the petitioner as special administratrix, with an
alternative prayer that Maria Roxas be appointed as special co-
administratrix, which motion was not acted upon.
After hearing on December 15, 1947, the respondent judge rendered
a decision denying the probate of the will presented by the petitioner
on the ground that the attesting witnesses did not sign their
respective names in the presence of the testator, from which the
petitioner has appealed, and the appeal is now pending.
On December 29, 1947, the respondents Maria and Pedro Roxas
renewed their petition for the appointment of Maria Roxas as special
administratrix or special co-administratrix, and on May 5, 1948, the
respondent judge rendered his resolution appointing the petitioner
Natividad I. Vda. de Roxas as special administratrix only of all the
conjugal properties of the deceased, and Maria Roxas as special
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (Atty. Geraldine Quimosing-Tiu) 5
COMPILATION OF CASES
administratrix of all capital or properties belonging exclusively to the
deceased Pablo M. Roxas.
The present petition for certiorari has been filed with this Court
against the last order or resolution of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan based on the ground that the respondent judge acted in
excess of the court's jurisdiction in appointing two special co-
administratices of the estate of the deceased Pablo Roxas, one of
the capital or properties belonging exclusively to the deceased, and
another of his conjugal properties with his wife (now widow), the
petitioner.
It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or
preferred right of certain persons to the appointment of administrator
under section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory provisions as to
causes for removal of an executor or administrator under section
653 of Act No. 190, now section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the
selection or removal of special administrator. (21 Am. Jur., 833; De
Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 104, 106.) As the law does not
say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the
qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has
discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion
which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason,
justice or equity.
There is nothing wrong in that the respondent judge, in exercising
his discretion and appointing the petitioner as special administratrix,
had taken into consideration the beneficial interest of the petitioner
in the estate of the decedent and her being designated in the will as
executrix thereof. But the respondent's subsequent act of appointing
her as special administratrix only of the conjugal or community
property, and Maria Roxas as special administratrix of the capital or
exclusive property of the decedent, does not seem to be in
conformity with logic or reason. The petitioner has or claims to have
the same beneficial interest after the decision of the court
disapproving the will, which is now pending on appeal, as she had
prior to it, because the decision is not yet final and may be reversed
by the appellate court.
Besides, even if the will is not probated, the widow in the present
case would have, under the law, the right of usufruct over one-half of
the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the
conjugal partnership. The beneficial interest required as a
qualification for appointment as administrator of the estate of a
decedent is the interest in the whole estate and not only in some
part thereof. The petitioner being entitled to one-half in usufruct of all
the exclusive properties of the decedent, she would have as much if
not more interest in administering the entire estate correctly, in order
to reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical administration of
the state, and not suffer the consequences of the waste,
improvidence or mismanagement thereof. The good or bad
administration of the property may affect rather the fruits than the
naked ownership of a property.
However, for the decision of the question involved in this proceeding
it is not necessary for us to determine whether or not the respondent
judge has acted with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the
resolution complained of for the reasons just stated, in view of our
conclusion that the respondent judge acted in excess of the court's
jurisdiction in appointing two separate special administratices of the
estate of the decedent: one of the conjugal or community property
and another of the capital or exclusive property of the deceased
Pablo M. Roxas.
According to section 2, Rule 75, taken from section 685 of the
former Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, as amended, "when
the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the
community property shall be inventoried, administered, and

liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse." That is the reason why,
according to section 4, Rule 78, the "letters testamentary, or letters
of administration with the will annexed, shall extend to all the estate
of the testator in the Philippines," and section 6, Rule 79, provides
for appointment of one administrator in case of intestacy, except in
certain cases in which two or more joint, but not separate and
independent, administrators may be appointed under section 3, Rule
82. Therefore the administrator appointed to administer and liquidate
the exclusive property of a deceased spouse shall also administer,
liquidate and distribute the community property, because the estate
of a deceased spouse which is to be settled, that is, administered,
liquidated and distributed, consists not only of the exclusive
properties of the decedent, but also of one-half of the assets of the
conjugal partnership, if any, which may pertain to the deceased, as
determined after the liquidation thereof in accordance with the
provisions of articles 1421 to 1424 of the Civil Code.
There is absolutely no reason for appointing two separate
administrators, specially if the estate to be settled is that of a
deceased husband as in the present case, for according to articles
1422 and 1423 of the Civil Code, only after the dowry and
parapherna of the wife and the debts, charges, and obligations of
the conjugal partnership have been paid, the capital or exclusive
property of the husband may be liquidated and paid in so far as the
inventoried estate may reach; and if the estate inventoried should
not be sufficient to pay the dowry and the parapherna of the wife and
the debts, charges and obligations of the partnership, the provision
of Title XVII of the Civil Code relating to concurrence and preference
of credits shall be observed. If two separate administrators are
appointed as done in the present case, in every action which one of
them may institute to recover properties or credit of the deceased,
the defendant may raise the question or set up the defense that the
plaintiff has no cause of action, because the property or credit in
issue belongs to the class which is being administered by the other
administrator, which can not be done if the administrator of the entire
estate is only one.
As under the law only one general administrator may be appointed
to administer, liquidate and distribute the estate of a deceased
spouse, it clearly follows that only one special administrator may be
appointed to administer temporarily said estate, because a special
administrator is but a temporary administrator who is appointed to
act in lieu of the general administrator. "When there is delay in
granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by an
appeal from the allowance or disallowance of will, or from any other
cause, the court may appoint a special administrator to collect and
take charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions
causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators
thereupon appointed," (sec. 1, Rule 81). Although his powers and
duties are limited to "collect and take charge of the goods, chattels,
rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the same
for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that
purpose may commence and maintain suits as administrator, and
may sell such perishable and other property as the court orders sold.
A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the
deceased." (Section 2, Rule 81.)lawphil.net
In view of all the foregoing, we hold that the court below has no
power to appoint two special administratices of the estate of a
deceased husband or wife, one of the community property and
another of the exclusive property of the decedent, and therefore the
respondent judge acted in excess of the court's jurisdiction in
rendering or issuing the order complained of, and therefore said
order is hereby set aside, with costs against the respondents. So
ordered.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (Atty. Geraldine Quimosing-Tiu) 6
COMPILATION OF CASES
UY v. CA
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 167979 March 15, 2006
WILSON S. UY, as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate
of the Deceased JOSE K. C. UY, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANASTACIO C. RUFON,
As Presiding Judge of Branch 52, of the Regional Trial Court,
Sixth Judicial Region, sitting at Bacolod City, and JOHNNY K.
H. UY, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner assails the August 20, 2004 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72678,1 affirming the January 22, 2002
Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52 of Bacolod City in
Special Proceedings No. 97-241,2as well as the April 29, 2005
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.3
The facts of the case show that Jose K.C. Uy (Deceased) died
intestate on August 20, 1996 and is survived by his spouse, Sy Iok
Ing Uy, and his five children, namely, Lilian S. Uy, Lilly S. Uy, Livian
S. Uy-Garcia , Lilen S. Uy and Wilson S. Uy (Petitioner).
On February 18, 1997, Special Proceedings No. 97-241 was
instituted and Lilia Hofileña was appointed as special administrator
of the estate of the deceased. Petitioner moved to reconsider the
order appointing Lilia Hofileña as special administrator with prayer
that letters of administration be issued to him instead. 4
On June 9, 1998, Judge Ramon B. Posadas revoked Lilia Hofileña’s
appointment as special administrator and denied her petition to be
appointed as regular administrator. Meanwhile, letters of
administration were granted to petitioner, who took his oath of office
as administrator on June 23, 1998.
On February 17, 1999, Johnny K. H. Uy (Private Respondent) filed a
motion to intervene, praying that he be appointed as administrator of
the estate in lieu of petitioner. He alleged that he is the brother and a
creditor of the deceased, and has knowledge of the properties that
should be included in the estate.
The trial court initially denied private respondent’s motion to
intervene,5 but on March 16, 2000,6 it reconsidered its earlier order
and appointed private respondent as co-administrator of the estate.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Petitioner then moved that private respondent bring into the estate
properties belonging to the deceased, which motion was granted by
the trial court. Not satisfied with the compliance of private
respondent, petitioner reiterated his motion for removal of the former
as co-administrator, but the same was denied.
The trial court found that private respondent substantially complied
with the order directing him to bring into the estate properties owned
by or registered in the name of the deceased not subject of any
adverse claim or controversy when he listed the alleged properties
suspected to be concealed, embezzled or conveyed away by the

persons named therein. Thus, it found no cogent reason to remove
private respondent as co-administrator.7
Thereafter, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals by way of a
petition for certiorari which however, dismissed the petition.
The Court of Appeals held that the refusal of the trial court to remove
private respondent as co-administrator of the estate is neither an
error of jurisdiction nor a grave abuse of discretion; that the
appointment of private respondent was justified; that the order of
preference under Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court does
not rule out the appointment of co-administrators; that the institution
of a case for annulment of title and reconveyance against
respondent does not justify private respondent’s removal as co-
administrator.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, this
petition on the following grounds:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE
RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAVE ACTED
WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR IN GRAVE ABUSE OF THEIR
DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION (sic),
IN VIOLATION [OF] THE ESTABLISHED AND ACCEPTED RULE
OF LAW AND IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF SUBSTANTIAL
JUSTICE AND EQUITY IN APPOINTING A CO-ADMINISTRATOR
OF AN ESTATE (IN THE PROCESS OF SETTLEMENT) WHERE
THERE IS AN INCUMBENT ADMINISTRATOR WHOSE
APPOINTMENT IS FIRM, FINAL, IMPLEMENTED AND
INAPPEALABLE, AND WHICH (sic) APPOINTMENT HAS NOT
BEEN CANCELLED, RECALLED, REVOKED OR RESCINDED BY
APPOINTING, AT THAT, A PERSON
(a)
ALIEN TO THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, WITH VARIOUS
SERIOUS INTERESTS (ACTUAL JUDICIAL CONTROVERSIES) IN
CONFLICT WITH THOSE OF THE ESTATE, AND
(B)
WITH NO PROPER INTEREST IN THE ESTATE AND WHO IS
PERSONALLY UNFIT, UNSUITABLE, UNWORTHY,
UNDESERVING OF THE TRUST INHERENT IN THE POSITION
OF CO-ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE, AND
UNACCEPTABLE AND REPULSIVE TO THE FAMILY OF THE
LEGAL HEIRS OF THE DECEASED; AND THEN REFUSING TO
REMOVE HIM AS CO-ADMINISTRATOR AFTER IT WAS SHOWN
THAT HIS REPRESENTATIONS ON WHICH HE WAS APPOINTED
CO-ADMINISTRATOR WERE EMPTY AND FALSE; AND
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
DENIED PETITIONER HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO DUE
PROCESS OF LAW AND HIS RIGHT TO PETITION THE
GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES BY NOT
ADDRESSING AND RESOLVING THE ISSUES BROUGHT TO IT
BY THE PETITIONER, MORE ESPECIFICALLY THE ISSUES OF
(1)
RES JUDICATA AND STABILITY OF THE JUDGMENT
APPOINTING THE PETITIONER HEREIN AS JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE IN QUESTION, AND
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (Atty. Geraldine Quimosing-Tiu) 7
COMPILATION OF CASES
(2)
DECIDING THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN A MANNER CONTRARY
TO THE RULES SET DOWN BY THE SUPREME COURT ON THE
MATTER.8
The main issues for resolution are: (1) whether the trial court acted
with grave abuse of discretion in appointing private respondent as
co-administrator to the estate of the deceased; and (2) whether the
Court of Appeals deprived petitioner of his constitutional right to due
process and his right to petition the government for redress of
grievances by not addressing the issues raised before it.
The petition is without merit.
Petitioner asserts that his appointment as a regular administrator is
already final, unassailable or res judicata; that the inferior court has
no authority to re-open the issue of the appointment of an
administrator without removing the incumbent administrator; that
private respondent is not only alien to the estate, but has a conflict of
interest with it; that the trial court’s appointment of private
respondent as co-administrator constitutes grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
There is no question that petitioner was appointed as regular
administrator of the estate of the deceased Jose K. C. Uy on June 9,
1998. However, private respondent in his motion to intervene sought
to be appointed as administrator as he is not only the brother of the
decedent but also a creditor who knows the extent of the latter’s
properties. Thus, the trial court, while retaining petitioner as
administrator, appointed private respondent as co-administrator of
the estate.
The main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the
estates of deceased persons either summarily or through the
process of administration.9 In the case at bar, the trial court granted
letters of administration to petitioner and thereafter to private
respondent as co-administrator. Under Section 6, Rule 78 of the
Rules of Court, the preference to whom letters of administration may
be granted are as follows:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such
surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or
if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days
after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request
that administration be granted to some other person, it may be
granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and
willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may
be granted to such other person as the court may select.
The order of preference in the appointment of an administrator
depends on the attendant facts and circumstances. 10In Sioca v.
Garcia,11 this Court set aside the order of preference, to wit:

It is well settled that a probate court cannot arbitrarily and without
sufficient reason disregard the preferential rights of the surviving
spouse to the administration of the estate of the deceased
spouse. But, if the person enjoying such preferential rights is
unsuitable, the court may appoint another person. The
determination of a person’s suitability for the office of administrator
rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising
the power of appointment and such judgment will not be interfered
with on appeal unless it appears affirmatively that the court below
was in error.
x x x Unsuitableness may consist in adverse interest of some
kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate. x
x x.12 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In the instant case, the order of preference was not disregarded by
the trial court. Instead of removing petitioner, it appointed private
respondent, a creditor, as co-administrator since the estate was
sizeable and petitioner was having a difficult time attending to it
alone. In fact, petitioner did not submit any report regarding the
estate under his administration. In its March 16, 2000 Order, 13 the
trial court found thus:
Going over all the arguments of the parties, after hearing has been
set relative thereto, this Court has observed that indeed the judicial
administrator had not submitted to the Court any report about the
Estate under his administration except those involving the cases he
filed and/or intervened in other branches. This may be due to his
being inexperienced, but this fact will not be reason enough to
remove him from the administration of the Estate as Judicial
Administrator thereof. However, considering that the Intervenor is
claiming to be the patriarch of the Uy family and who claims to have
enormous knowledge of the businesses and properties of the
decedent Jose K.C. Uy, it is the feeling of this Court that it will be
very beneficial to the Estate if he be appointed co-administrator
(without removing the already appointed Judicial Administrator) of
the Estate of Jose K.C. Uy, if only to shed more light to the alleged
enormous properties/businesses and to bring them all to the
decedent’s Estate pending before this Court.14
A co-administrator performs all the functions and duties and
exercises all the powers of a regular administrator, only that he is
not alone in the administration.15 The practice of appointing co-
administrators in estate proceedings is not prohibited. In Gabriel v.
Court of Appeals,16 this Court reaffirmed that jurisprudence allows
the appointment of co-administrators under certain circumstances, to
wit:
Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment
of co-administrators has been upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to
have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have
different interests represented; (2) where justice and equity demand
that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management
of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or,
from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle; (4) to
have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work
in harmony for the best interests of the estate; and (5) when a
person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have
another competent person associated with him in the
office.17 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, petitioner’s argument that the trial court cannot re-open the
issue of the appointment of an administrator without removing the
incumbent administrator is erroneous. In probate proceedings,
considerable latitude is allowed a probate court in modifying or
revoking its own orders as long as the proceedings are pending in
the same court and timely applications or motions for such
modifications or revocations are made by the interested parties. 18 In
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (Atty. Geraldine Quimosing-Tiu) 8
COMPILATION OF CASES
the instant case, the estate of the deceased has not yet been settled
and the case is still within the jurisdiction of the court.
The foregoing discussion renders moot the second issue raised by
petitioner. We see no cogent reason to set aside the findings of the
Court of Appeals, because its findings of fact is conclusive and
binding on the parties and not subject to review by this Court, unless
the case falls under any of the exceptions to the rule.19
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 20, 2004
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72678 affirming
the January 22, 2002 Order of the Regional Trial Court in Special
Proceedings No. 97-241, as well as the April 29, 2005 Resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration are AFFIRMED.1avvphil.net
SO ORDERED.
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR
NATURE OF APPOINTMENT
HEIRS OF CASTILLO v. GABRIEL
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 162934 November 11, 2005
HEIRS OF BELINDA DAHLIA A. CASTILLO, namely, BENA
JEAN, DANIEL, MELCHOR, MICHAEL and DANIBEL, all
surnamed CASTILLO, Petitioners,
vs.
DOLORES LACUATA-GABRIEL, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 70645, as well as its
Resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
On January 25, 1989, Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel, wife of Lorenzo B.
Almoradie, died in Malabon City, Metro Manila, leaving behind a
sizable inheritance consisting mostly of real estate and shares of
stock.3
A little over a month after Crisanta’s death, her mother, Crisanta
Santiago Vda. de Yanga, commenced an intestate proceeding
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon City, Branch 72,
docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 192-MN. She alleged, among others,
that to her knowledge, her daughter died intestate leaving an estate
with an estimated net value of ₱1,500,000.00 and that such estate
was being managed by her wastrel and incompetent son-in-law,
Lorenzo, and by two other equally incompetent persons. She prayed
that letters of administration be issued to her son, Mariano Yanga,
Jr., also the brother of the deceased, and that she be awarded her
share of the estate of her daughter after due hearing. 4 However, the
RTC appointed Lorenzo as administrator.

Meantime, the marriage between Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel and
Lorenzo Almoradie was declared void for being bigamous. The RTC
then removed Lorenzo as administrator and appointed Mariano, Jr.
in his stead.5
On October 16, 1989, one Belinda Dahlia Y. Almoradie Castillo,
claiming to be the only legitimate child of Lorenzo and Crisanta, filed
a motion for intervention.6 Resolution on this motion was, however,
held in abeyance pending some incidents in the CA.
On November 3, 1989, Roberto Y. Gabriel, the legally adopted son
of Crisanta Y. Gabriel, filed before the RTC of Malabon City a
petition for probate of an alleged will and for the issuance of letters
testamentary in his favor. The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc.
No. 211-MN. 7 He alleged that he discovered his mother’s will on
October 25, 1989 in which he was instituted as the sole heir of the
testatrix, and designated as alternate executor for the named
executor therein, Francisco S. Yanga, a brother of Crisanta, who
had predeceased the latter sometime in 1985 or 1986.
On June 2, 1990, Belinda Castillo died.
The two (2) special proceedings were consolidated. On May 15,
1991, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the intestate
proceedings, Spec. Proc. No. 192-MN.8 Mariano Yanga, Jr.
questioned the dismissal of the intestate proceedings before the
appellate court via a petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 25897).
On July 8, 1991, the probate court appointed Roberto Y. Gabriel as
special administrator of his mother’s estate.9
On May 23, 2001, the heirs of Belinda, namely, Bena Jean, Daniel,
Melchor, Michael, and Danibel, all surnamed Castillo, filed a
Motion10 praying that they be substituted as party-litigants in lieu of
their late mother Belinda, who died in 1990.
On April 16, 2001, Roberto Gabriel died. His widow, Dolores L.
Gabriel, filed a "Manifestation and Motion"11 where she informed the
probate court of her husband’s death and prayed that she be
admitted as substitute in place of her late husband, and be
appointed as administratrix of the estate of Crisanta Gabriel as well.
She alleged that she had a bachelor’s degree in law and had worked
for several years in a law office.12
On August 14, 2001, the heirs of Belinda opposed Dolores’
manifestation and motion. They averred that Dolores was not
Crisanta Gabriel’s next of kin, let alone the lawful wife of the late
Roberto.13 This elicited a Reply14 from Dolores where she refuted
these allegations.
On August 24, 2001, Bena Jean filed a "Motion for Appointment as
Administrator of the Estate of Crisanta Y. Gabriel" 15 praying that she
be appointed administratrix of the estate of her grandmother
Crisanta.
On October 11, 2001, Dolores opposed the motion of Bena Jean,
claiming that the latter has neither proven her kinship with Crisanta
Gabriel nor shown any particular qualification to act as administratrix
of the estate.16
On November 28, 1991, the CA dismissed the petition
for certiorari of Mariano Yanga, Jr. in CA-G.R. SP No. 25897.
In a Resolution17 dated December 5, 2001, the lower court appointed
Dolores as special administratrix upon a bond of ₱200,000.00. The
probate court merely noted the motion for substitution filed by the
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (Atty. Geraldine Quimosing-Tiu) 9
COMPILATION OF CASES
heirs of Belinda, stating that they were "mere strangers to the case"
and that their cause could better be ventilated in a separate
proceeding. According to the trial court –
Contrary to the assertions of Oppositors Heirs of Belinda A. Castillo,
movant Dolores L. Gabriel has amply proven her kinship with
petitioner Roberto Y. Gabriel, and therefore her kinship, by operation
of law, with decedent Crisanta Y. Gabriel. In the probate
proceedings, this Court has the power to determine questions as to
who are the heirs of the decedent …, the recognition of a natural
child …, the validity of disinheritance effected by the testator … and
the status of a woman who claims to be the lawful wife of the
decedent. ...
Guided by the foregoing precepts, this Court is of the opinion, and
so holds, that movant Dolores L. Gabriel has established her claim
that she is the lawfully wedded wife of petitioner Roberto Y. Gabriel
and that the previous marriage between petitioner and one Lucita V.
Cruz was already long dissolved prior to the celebration of marriage
between petitioner and movant Dolores L. Gabriel’s marriage in July
4, 1997.
And even assuming that movant Dolores L. Gabriel’s lawful
relationship with petitioner, and corollarily with the decedent, was not
proven, the stringent rules regarding the order of preference in the
appointment of an Administrator does not find application in the
instant case … for what is at stake here is the appointment of a
Special Administrator as such position was vacated by the death of
the previously appointed Special Administrator in the person of
petitioner herein. The reason for the relaxation of the rules regarding
the appointment of a Special Administrator is the nature of its
position, being merely temporary and will subsist only until a regular
administrator or executor is appointed.
…
In view thereof, movant Dolores L. Gabriel is hereby appointed as
Special Administrator of the estate of decedent Crisanta Y. Gabriel,
and upon posting of a bond in the amount of ₱200,000.00 pursuant
to the mandate of Section 4, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court, may
assume the functions and duties of such Special Administrator.
SO ORDERED.18
The heirs of Belinda moved to reconsider.19 In the meantime,
Dolores took her oath of office on January 11, 2002.20
The probate court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
Belinda’s heirs in its Order21 dated March 19, 2002. The said heirs
then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for a
temporary restraining order or/and preliminary injunction against
Dolores and the probate court. The case was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 70645. They prayed, among others, that Bena Jean be
appointed as the regular administratrix of Crisanta Gabriel’s estate,
thus –
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioners most respectfully
pray that:
1. Upon filing of this petition and in order not to prejudice the rights
of petitioners, a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction be issued against respondent Dolores L. Gabriel enjoining
her to cease and desist from acting as special administratrix of the
estate of Crisanta Y. Gabriel;

2. After hearing and consideration, a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued against respondent Dolores L. Gabriel to cease and desist
from acting as special administratrix of Crisanta Y. Gabriel until
further order from this Honorable Court;
3. An Order be issued nullifying and setting aside the assailed
Orders dated December 5, 2001 and March 19, 2002 both issued by
the respondent Judge for having been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and for this Honorable
Court to issue a new one by appointing petitioner Bena Jean A.
Castillo as regular administratrix of the estate of Crisanta Y. Gabriel.
Petitioner likewise prays for such other just, fair and equitable relief
under the premises.22
On October 30, 2003, the appellate court dismissed the petition in
CA-G.R. SP No. 70645. It ruled that the probate court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in appointing Dolores as special
administratrix.23
The heirs of Belinda Dahlia Castillo, now the petitioners, filed the
instant petition for review on certiorari against Dolores Lacuata-
Gabriel, assigning the following errors –
A determines who is entitled to the administration of the estate of the
With due respect, the decision dated October 30, 2003 rendered by
the honorable court of appeals is based on a misapprehension of
facts.
B When Crisanta died on January 25, 1989, her estate passed on to
With due respect, the honorable court of appeals erred in ruling that
private respondent Dolores lacuata-gabriel is entitled to the
administration of the estate of Crisanta y. Gabriel, she being the heir
of her deceased husband whose estate is the former estate Of his
adopting mother Crisanta as the sAme is contrary to the law on
succession.
C private respondent is undeniably entitled to the administration of the
The appointment of private respondent Dolores lacuata-gabriel is
contrary to the ruling laid down by this honorable court in the case of
Gonzalez vs. guido, 190 SCRA 112.
D
The honorable court of appeals erred in ruling that IT is section 1,
rule 80 and not section 6, rule 78 of the rules of court which is
applicable in this case.24
The assigned errors in this case boil down to the propriety of the
appointment of respondent as special administratrix of the estate left
by Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel.
The petitioners argue that since the respondent does not have any
right to inherit from their grandmother, either by her own right or by
the right of representation, she is not qualified to be appointed as
administratrix of the estate; in contrast, they are Crisanta Gabriel’s
only compulsory heirs. They insist that the respondent’s late
husband, Roberto, was just a nephew of the decedent and not a
legally adopted son as he claimed to be. Even assuming
this claim was true, the fact that the respondent is not naturally
related to the decedent by blood in the direct descending line makes
it unfair to appoint her as the special administratrix. Citing
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (Atty. Geraldine Quimosing-Tiu) 10
COMPILATION OF CASES
jurisprudence, the petitioners explain that the principal consideration
in the appointment of administrator of a deceased person’s estate is
the applicant’s interest therein. This is the same consideration which
Section 6,25 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court takes into account in
establishing the order of preference in the appointment of such
administrators. The underlying assumption behind this rule, the
petitioners insist, is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise,
speedy, economical administration of the estate, or suffer the
consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the
highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate
correctly. Lastly, the petitioners posit that since CA-G.R. SP No.
25897 had long been dismissed by the CA, a regular administrator
of the said estate should now be appointed.
The petition is without merit.
In ruling against the petitioners and dismissing their petition, the CA
ratiocinated as follows:
The appointment of a special administrator lies entirely in the
discretion of the court. The order of preference in the appointment of
a regular administrator under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court does not apply to the selection of a special administrator. In
the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary and
subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed, the court
decedent. On this point, We hold that the preference of private
respondent Dolores Gabriel is with sufficient reason.
The facts of this case show that Roberto Gabriel – the legally
adopted son of Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel – survived Crisanta’s death.
her surviving adopted son Roberto. When Roberto himself later died
on April 16, 2001, pursuant to the law on succession, his own estate
which he inherited from Crisanta passed on to his surviving widow,
private respondent.
While it is true, as petitioners submit, that private respondent is
neither a compulsory nor a legal heir of Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel and
is considered a third person to the estate of Crisanta, nonetheless,
said estate because she is an heir of her husband Roberto, whose
estate is the former estate of his adopting mother Crisanta. 26
The ruling of the CA is correct. The Court has repeatedly held that
the appointment of a special administrator lies in the sound
discretion of the probate court.27 A special administrator is a
representative of a decedent appointed by the probate court to care
for and preserve his estate until an executor or general administrator
is appointed.28 When appointed, a special administrator is regarded
not as a representative of the agent of the parties suggesting the
appointment, but as the administrator in charge of the estate, and, in
fact, as an officer of the court.29 As such officer, he is subject to the
supervision and control of the probate court and is expected to work
for the best interests of the entire estate, especially its smooth
administration and earliest settlement.30 The principal object of
appointment of temporary administrator is to preserve the estate
until it can pass into hands of person fully authorized to administer it
for the benefit of creditors and heirs.31 In many instances, the
appointment of administrators for the estates of decedents
frequently become involved in protracted litigations, thereby
exposing such estates to great waste and losses unless an
authorized agent to collect the debts and preserve the assets in the
interim is appointed. The occasion for such an appointment,
likewise, arises where, for some cause, such as a pendency of a suit
concerning the proof of the will, regular administration is delayed.32

Section 1, Rule 80 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Appointment of Special Administrator. – When there is
delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any
cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a
will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession
and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing
the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed.
The new Rules have broadened the basis for the appointment of an
administrator, and such appointment is allowed when there is delay
in granting letters testamentary or administration by any cause, e.g.,
parties cannot agree among themselves. Nevertheless, the
discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the probate
court.33In De Guzman v. Guadiz, Jr.,34 the Court further elucidated –
Under the above rule, the probate court may appoint a special
administrator should there be a delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration occasioned by any cause including
an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will. Subject to
this qualification, the appointment of a special administrator lies in
the discretion of the Court. This discretion, however, must be sound,
that is, not whimsical, or contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal
principle.
The basis for appointing a special administrator under the Rules is
broad enough to include any cause or reason for the delay in
granting letters testamentary or of administration as where a contest
as to the will is being carried on in the same or in another court, or
where there is an appeal pending as to the proceeding on the
removal of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the
parties cannot agree among themselves. Likewise, when from any
cause general administration cannot be immediately granted, a
special administrator may be appointed to collect and preserve the
property of the deceased.
It is obvious that the phrase "by any cause" includes those incidents
which transpired in the instant case clearly showing that there is a
delay in the probate of the will and that the granting of letters
testamentary will consequently be prolonged necessitating the
immediate appointment of a special administrator.35
As enunciated above, the probate court has ample jurisdiction to
appoint respondent as special administratrix. The deceased Crisanta
Yanga-Gabriel left a document purporting to be her will where her
adopted son, Roberto, was named as the sole heir of all her
properties. However, pending probate of the will, Roberto died
leaving his widow, the respondent herein, as his sole heir. Thus, the
respondent has much stake in Crisanta’s estate in case the latter’s
will is allowed probate. It needs to be emphasized that in the
appointment of a special administrator (which is but temporary and
subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed), the probate
court does not determine the shares in the decedent’s estate, but
merely appoints who is entitled to administer the estate. The issue of
heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the
findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the
administration as to be the basis of distribution.36 Thus, the
preference of respondent is sound, that is, not whimsical, or contrary
to reason, justice, equity or legal principle.
The petitioners’ strenuous invocation of Section 6, Rule 78 of the
Rules of Court is misplaced. The rule refers to the appointment of
regular administrators of estates; Section 1, Rule 80, on the other
hand, applies to the appointment of a special administrator. It has
long been settled that the appointment of special administrators is
not governed by the rules regarding the appointment of regular
administrators.37 Thus, in Roxas v. Pecson,38 this Court ruled:
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (Atty. Geraldine Quimosing-Tiu) 11
COMPILATION OF CASES
It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or
preferred right of certain persons to the appointment of administrator
under Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory provisions as to
causes for removal of an executor or administrator under section
653 of Act No. 190, now Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the
selection or removal of special administrator. ... As the law does not
say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the
qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has
discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion
which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason,
justice or equity.
On the plea of the petitioners for this Court to appoint their co-
petitioner, Bena Jean Castillo, as the regular administratrix of the
estate of Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel, the matter should be addressed to
the probate court for its consideration. It is not for this Court to
preempt the discretion of the probate court and appoint a regular
administrator in the present action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 70645, dated October 30, 2003,
and its Resolution of March 26, 2004 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
TAN v. GEDORIO
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 166520 March 14, 2008
VILMA C. TAN, GERARDO "JAKE" TAN and GERALDINE TAN,
REPRESENTED BY EDUARDO NIERRAS,Petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 12, ORMOC CITY, ROGELIO LIM SUGA and HELEN
TAN RACOMA, REPRESENTED BY ROMUALDO
LIM, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision1dated 29 July 2004 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79335. The assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed the Order2 dated 17 July
2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City in SP. PROC.
No. 4014-0 denying reconsideration of its Order dated 12 June 2003
whereby it appointed Romualdo D. Lim as special administrator to
the estate of the late Gerardo Tan.
The factual and procedural antecedents of this case are as follows:
Gerardo Tan (Gerardo) died on 14 October 2000, leaving no will. On
31 October 2001, private respondents, who are claiming to be the
children of Gerardo Tan, filed with the RTC a Petition for the

issuance of letters of administration. The Petition was docketed as
Special Proceeding No. 4014-0 and was raffled to Branch 12.
Petitioners, claiming to be legitimate heirs of Gerardo Tan, filed an
Opposition to the Petition.
Private respondents then moved for the appointment of a special
administrator, asserting the need for a special administrator to take
possession and charge of Gerardo’s estate until the Petition can be
resolved by the RTC or until the appointment of a regular
administrator. They prayed that their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo D.
Lim (Romualdo), be appointed as the special administrator.
Petitioners filed an Opposition to private respondents’ Motion for
Appointment, arguing that none of the private respondents can be
appointed as the special administrator since they are not residing in
the country. Petitioners contend further that Romualdo does not
have the same familiarity, experience or competence as that of their
co-petitioner Vilma C. Tan (Vilma) who was already acting as de
facto administratrix of his estate since his death.
On 18 March 2002, Atty. Clinton Nuevo (Nuevo), as court-appointed
commissioner, issued directives to Vilma, in her capacity as de facto
administratrix, to wit:
b.1.) requiring the de facto administratrix Ms. Vilma Tan to deposit in
the fiduciary account of the Court all money and or cash at hand or
deposited in the bank(s) which rightfully belong to the estate of the
decedent within five (5) days from receipt hereof;
b.2.) requiring the same administratrix to deposit in the same
account the proceeds of all sugarcane harvest or any crop harvest, if
any, done in the past or is presently harvesting or about to
undertake, which belong to the estate of the decedent;
b.3.) relative to the foregoing, the same de facto administratrix is
also required to submit a financial report to the Commission as
regards the background of the cash at hand or deposited in bank(s),
if any, the expenses incurred in course of her administration and
other relevant facts including that of the proceeds of the
sugarcane/crop harvest, which submission will be done upon deposit
of the foregoing with the court as above-required.3
More than a year later or on 23 May 2003, the RTC, acting on the
private respondents’ Urgent Ex-parte Motion to resolve pending
incident, gave Vilma another 10 days to comply with the directive of
Atty. Nuevo. Again, no compliance has been made.
Consequently, on 12 June 2003, RTC Judge Eric F. Menchavez
issued an Order4 appointing Romualdo as special administrator of
Gerardo’s Estate, the fallo of which states:
Foregoing considered, the motion for the appointment of a special
administrator is hereby GRANTED. Mr. Romualdo D. Lim is hereby
appointed as Special Administrator and shall immediately take
possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits and
estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executor or
administrator afterwards appointed, upon his filing of a bond in the
amount of ₱50,000.00 and upon approval of the same by this Court.5
Petitioners filed on 19 June 2003 a Motion for Reconsideration of the
foregoing Order, claiming that petitioner Vilma should be the one
appointed as special administratix as she was allegedly next of kin
of the deceased.
On 17 July 2003, respondent Judge Francisco Gedorio (Gedorio), in
his capacity as RTC Executive Judge, issued an Order6 denying
petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.1avvphi1
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (Atty. Geraldine Quimosing-Tiu) 12
COMPILATION OF CASES
Petitioners instituted with the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition assailing the 17 July 2003 Order, again
insisting on petitioner Vilma’s right to be appointed as special
administratix. Petitioners likewise prayed for the issuance of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) to
enjoin Romualdo from entering the estate and acting as special
administrator thereof.
On 29 July 2004, the Court of Appeals issued a Decision denying
petitioners’ Petition. On 6 December 2004, the Court of Appeals
similarly denied the ensuing Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioners, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is
hereby rendered by us DENYING and DISMISSING the petition filed
in this case and AFFIRMING the assailed order in Special
Proceeding No. 4014-0.7
On 22 January 2005, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari assigning the following errors:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE COURT A QUO BOTH
GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS’ PLEA TO BE
GIVEN PRIMACY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THEIR FATHER’S
ESTATE.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN DENYING
PETITIONERS’ PLEA FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND
THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT.8
On 14 February 2005, this Court issued a Resolution9 denying the
Petition on the ground of late filing, failure to submit an affidavit of
service of a copy of the Petition on the Court of Appeals and proof of
such service, failure to properly verify the Petition, and failure to pay
the deposit for the Salary Adjustment for the Judiciary (SAJ) fund
and sheriff’s fee. Upon Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioners, however, this Court issued on 18 July 2005 a
Resolution10 reinstating the Petition.
Petitioners contend11 that they should be given priority in the
administration of the estate since they are allegedly the legitimate
heirs of the late Gerardo, as opposed to private respondents, who
are purportedly Gerardo’s illegitimate children. Petitioners rely on the
doctrine that generally, it is the nearest of kin, whose interest is more
preponderant, who is preferred in the choice of administrator of the
decedent’s estate.
Petitioners also claim that they are more competent than private
respondents or their attorney-in-fact to administer Gerardo’s estate.
Petitioners Vilma and Gerardo "Jake" Tan (Jake) claim to have lived
for a long time and continue to reside on Gerardo’s estate, while
respondents are not even in the Philippines, having long established
residence abroad.
Petitioners additionally claim that petitioner Vilma has been acting as
the administratrix of the estate since Gerardo’s death on 14 October
2000 and is thus "well steeped in the actual management and
operation of the estate (which essentially consists of agricultural
landholdings)."12

As regards the denial of petitioners’ plea for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or TRO, petitioners argue that such denial
would leave Romualdo, private respondents’ attorney-in-fact, free to
enter Gerardo’s estate and proceed to act as administrator thereof to
the prejudice of petitioners.
The appeal is devoid of merit.
The order of preference petitioners speak of is found in Section 6,
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.—If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such
surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or
if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days
after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request
that administration be granted to some other person, it may be
granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and
willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may
be granted to such other person as the court may select.
However, this Court has consistently ruled that the order of
preference in the appointment of a regular administrator as provided
in the afore-quoted provision does not apply to the selection of a
special administrator.13 The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers to the appointment of a
regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as
the appointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the
court, and is not appealable.14
Not being appealable, the only remedy against the appointment of a
special administrator is Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, which was what petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals.
Certiorari, however, requires nothing less than grave abuse of
discretion, a term which implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law.15
We agree with the Court of Appeals that there was no grave abuse
of discretion on the part of respondent Judge Gedorio in affirming
Judge Menchavez’s appointment of Romualdo as special
administrator. Judge Menchavez clearly considered petitioner Vilma
for the position of special administratrix of Gerardo’s estate, but
decided against her appointment for the following reasons:
Atty. Clinton C. Nuevo, in his capacity as court appointed
commissioner, directed oppositor Vilma Tan in the latter’s capacity
as de fact[o] administratrix, to deposit in the fiduciary account of the
court all money and cash at hand or deposited in the banks which
rightfully belong to the estate within five days from receipt of the
directive. Oppositor Vilma Tan was likewise directed to deposit in the
same account the proceeds of all sugarcane harvest or any crop
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (Atty. Geraldine Quimosing-Tiu) 13
COMPILATION OF CASES
from the estate of the decedent. She was likewise directed to submit
a financial report as regards the background of the cash on hand, if
any, the expenses incurred in the course of her administration. The
directive was issued by Atty. Nuevo on March 18, 2002 or more than
a year ago. On May 23, 2003, this Court, acting on the urgent ex
parte motion to resolve pending incident, gave Vilma Tan another
ten days to comply with the directive of Atty. Nuevo. Again, no
compliance has been made.
This Court is called upon to preserve the estate of the late Gerardo
Tan for the benefit of all heirs be that heir is (sic) the nearest kin or
the farthest kin. The actuation of oppositor Vilma Tan does not
satisfy the requirement of a special administrator who can effectively
and impartially administer the estate of Gerardo Tan for the best
interest of all the heirs.16 (Emphases supplied.)
Assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner Vilma is indeed
better suited for the job as special administratrix, as opposed to
Romualdo, who was actually appointed by the court as special
administrator of Gerardo’s estate, the latter’s appointment, at best,
would constitute a mere error of judgment and would certainly not be
grave abuse of discretion. An error of judgment is one which the
court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is
reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of
jurisdiction is one in which the act complained of was issued by the
court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.17 The Court of Appeals could not have
reversed a mere error of judgment in a Certiorari petition.
Furthermore, petitioners were not able to sufficiently substantiate
their claim that their co-petitioner Vilma would have been the more
competent and capable choice to serve as the special administratrix
of Gerardo’s estate. Contrary to petitioners’ bare assertions, both the
RTC and the Court of Appeals found that the documented failure of
petitioner Vilma to comply with the reportorial requirements after the
lapse of a considerable length of time certainly militates against her
appointment.
We find immaterial the fact that private respondents reside abroad,
for the same cannot be said as regards their attorney-in-fact,
Romualdo, who is, after all, the person appointed by the RTC as
special administrator. It is undisputed that Romualdo resides in the
country and can, thus, personally administer Gerardo’s estate.
If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of
preference provided in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, so
that petitioner Vilma as the supposed next of kin of the late Gerardo
may take over administration of Gerardo’s estate, they should
already pursue the appointment of a regular administrator and put to
an end the delay which necessitated the appointment of a special
administrator. The appointment of a special administrator is justified
only when there is delay in granting letters, testamentary (in case
the decedent leaves behind a will) or administrative (in the event that
the decedent leaves behind no will, as in the Petition at bar)
occasioned by any cause.18 The principal object of the appointment
of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it can
pass into the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for
the benefit of creditors and heirs.19
In the case at bar, private respondents were constrained to move for
the appointment of a special administrator due to the delay caused
by the failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the directives of the
court-appointed commissioner. It would certainly be unjust if
petitioner Vilma were still appointed special administratix, when the
necessity of appointing one has been brought about by her defiance
of the lawful orders of the RTC or its appointed officials. Petitioners
submit the defense that petitioner Vilma was unable to comply with
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (Atty. Geraldine Quimosing-Tiu) 14
COMPILATION OF CASES

the directives of the RTC to deposit with the court the income of
Gerardo’s estate and to provide an accounting thereof because of
the fact that Gerardo’s estate had no income. This defense is clearly
specious and insufficient justification for petitioner Vilma’s non-
compliance. If the estate truly did not have any income, petitioners
should have simply filed a manifestation to that effect, instead of
continuing to disregard the court’s orders.

Finally, as we are now resolving the case in favor of private

respondents, there is no longer any need to discuss petitioners’
arguments regarding the denial by the appellate court of their prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is

DENIED. The Decision dated 29 July 2004 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 79335 affirming the Order dated 17 July 2003 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City, in SP. PROC. No.
4014-0 denying reconsideration of its Order dated 12 June 2003,
whereby it appointed Romualdo D. Lim as special administrator of
the estate of Gerardo Tan, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

DE ROXAS v. PECSON

XXX

CO-ADMINISTRATOR

UY v. CA

XXX

AUTHORITY ISSUED TO EXECUTORS/ADMINISTRATORS

LETTERS TESTAMENTARY

MALOLES v. PHILLIPS

XXX

NITTSCHER v. NITTSCHER

XXX