1

PARRICIDE That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 9,

1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
PEOPLE v. JUMAWAN jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully,
Republic of the Philippines unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the
SUPREME COURT private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter[']s will.
Baguio City
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of
FIRST DIVISION 1997.

G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014 Meanwhile the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-669 reads:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October
vs. 10, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within
EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant. the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused by means of force upon person did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
DECISION
the private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter's will.

"Among the duties assumed by the husband are his duties to

Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of
love, cherish and protect his wife, to give her a home, to provide
1997.
her with the comforts and the necessities of life within his means,
to treat her kindly and not cruelly or inhumanely. He is bound to
honor her x x x; it is his duty not only to maintain and support The accused-appellant was arrested upon a warrant issued on
her, but also to protect her from oppression and wrong."1 July 21, 1999.11 On August 18, 1999, the accused-appellant filed
a Motion for Reinvestigation,12 which was denied by the trial
court in an Order13 dated August 19, 1999. On even date, the
REYES, J.:
accused-appellant was arraigned and he entered a plea of not
guilty to both charges.14
Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies.
Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not
On January 10, 2000, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit
consensual, is rape. This is the clear State policy expressly
Amended Information15 averring that the name of the private
legislated in Section 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
complainant was omitted in the original informations for rape.
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law
The motion also stated that KKK, thru a Supplemental Affidavit
of 1997.
dated November 15, 1999,16 attested that the true dates of
commission of the crime are October 16, 1998 and October 1 7,
The Case
1998 thereby modifying the dates stated in her previous
complaint-affidavit. The motion was granted on January 18,
This is an automatic review 2 of the Decision3 dated July 9, 2008 2000.17 Accordingly, the criminal informations were amended as
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353, follows:
which affirmed the Judgment4 dated April 1, 2002 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, in Criminal
Criminal Case No. 99-668:
Case Nos. 99-668 and 99-669 convicting him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.
That on or about October 16, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
The Facts
Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon
person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK,5 were married on October have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, his wife,
18, 1975. They Ii ved together since then and raised their four (4) [KKK], against the latter's will.
children6 as they put up several businesses over the years.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of
On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint- 1997.18
Affidavit,7 alleging that her husband, the accused-appellant,
raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in
Criminal Case No. 99-669:
Phase 2, Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, and that on
December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder
That on or about October 17, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro
for refusing to have sex with him.
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon
On June 11, 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan
person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
de Oro City issued a Joint Resolution, 8 finding probable cause
have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, his wife,
for grave threats, less serious physical injuries and rape and
[KKK], against the latter's will.
recommending that the appropriate criminal information be filed
against the accused-appellant.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of
1997.19
On July 16, 1999, two Informations for rape were filed before the
RTC respectively docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-6689 and
The accused-appellant was thereafter re-arraigned. He
Criminal Case No. 99-669.10 The Information in Criminal Case
maintained his not guilty plea to both indictments and a joint trial
No. 99-668 charged the accused-appellant as follows:
of the two cases forthwith ensued.

Version of the prosecution
The prosecution's theory was anchored on the testimonies of
KKK, and her daughters MMM and 000, which, together with
pertinent physical evidence, depicted the following events:
KKK met the accused-appellant at the farm of her parents where
his father was one of the laborers. They got married after a year
of courtship.20 When their first child, MMM, was born, KKK and
the accused-appellant put up a sari-sari store.21 Later on, they
engaged in several other businesses -trucking, rice mill and
hardware. KKK managed the businesses except for the rice mill,
which, ideally, was under the accused-appellant's supervision
with the help of a trusted employee. In reality, however, he
merely assisted in the rice mill business by occasionally driving
one of the trucks to haul goods.22
Accused-appellant's keenness to make the businesses flourish
was not as fervent as KKK's dedication. Even the daughters
observed the disproportionate labors of their parents.23 He would
drive the trucks sometimes but KKK was the one who actively
managed the businesses.24
She wanted to provide a comfortable life for their children; he, on
the other hand, did not acquiesce with that objective.25
In 1994, KKK and the accused-appellant bought a lot and built a
house in Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City.26 Three of
the children transferred residence therein while KKK, the
accused-appellant and one of their sons stayed in Dangcagan,
Bukidnon. She shuttled between the two places regularly and
sometimes he accompanied her.27 In 1998, KKK stayed in Gusa,
Cagayan De Oro City most of the days of the week. 28 On
Wednesdays, she went to Dangcagan, Bukidnon to procure
supplies for the family store and then returned to Cagayan de
Oro City on the same day.29
Conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between
KKK and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent
and fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course, responded
with equal degree of enthusiasm.30However, in 1997, he started
to be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her panties
and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His
abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so
she would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her
into submission.31
In 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant started quarrelling
usually upon his complaint that she failed to attend to him. She
was preoccupied with financial problems in their businesses and
a bank loan. He wanted KKK to stay at home because "a woman
must stay in the house and only good in bed (sic) x x x." She
disobeyed his wishes and focused on her goal of providing a
good future for the children.32
Four days before the subject rape incidents or on October 12,
1998, KKK and the accused-appellant slept together in Cebu
City where the graduation rites of their eldest daughter were
held. By October 14, 1998, the three of them were already back
in Cagayan de Oro City.33
On October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant, his wife KKK and
their children went about their nightly routine. The family store in
their residence was closed at about 9:00 p.m. before supper was
taken. Afterwards, KKK and the children went to the girls'
bedroom at the mezzanine of the house to pray the rosary while
the accused-appellant watched television in the living
room.34 OOO and MMM then prepared their beds. Soon after, the
2
accused-appellant fetched KKK and bid her to come with him to
their conjugal bedroom in the third floor of the house. KKK
complied.35
Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the
matrimonial bed but she did not lie thereon with the accused-
appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed.
Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: "[W]hy are
you lying on the c{o]t[?]", and to instantaneously order: "You
transfer here [to] our bed."36
KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had
headache and abdominal pain due to her forthcoming
menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got
angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against
the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up
from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed.37
The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long,
expressed his desire to copulate with her by tapping his fingers
on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and
reiterating that she was not feeling well.38
The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and
when KKK tried to resist by holding on to her panties, he pulled
them down so forcefully they tore on the sides. 39 KKK stayed
defiant by refusing to bend her legs.40
The accused-appellant then raised KKK's daster,41 stretched her
legs apart and rested his own legs on them. She tried to wrestle
him away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating
her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to
protest by desperately shouting: "[D]on 't do that to me because
I'm not feeling well."42
With a concrete wall on one side and a mere wooden partition on
the other enclosing the spouses' bedroom,43KKK's pleas were
audible in the children's bedroom where MMM lay awake.
Upon hearing her mother crying and hysterically shouting:
"Eddie, don't do that to me, have pity on me,"44 MMM woke up
000 who prodded her to go to their parents' room. 45 MMM
hurriedly climbed upstairs, vigorously knocked on the door of her
parents' bedroom and inquired: "Pa, why is it that Mama is
crying?"46 The accused-appellant then quickly put on his briefs
and shirt, partly opened the door and said: "[D]on 't interfere
because this is a family trouble," before closing it again. 47 Since
she heard her mother continue to cry, MMM ignored his father's
admonition, knocked at the bedroom door again, and then kicked
it.48 A furious accused-appellant opened the door wider and
rebuked MMM once more: "Don't interfere us. Go downstairs
because this is family trouble!" Upon seeing KKK crouching and
crying on top of the bed, MMM boldly entered the room,
approached her mother and asked: "Ma, why are you crying?"
before asking her father: "Pa, what happened to Mama why is it
that her underwear is torn[?]"49
When MMM received no definite answers to her questions, she
helped her mother get up in order to bring her to the girls'
bedroom. KKK then picked up her tom underwear and covered
herself with a blanket.50 However, their breakout from the room
was not easy. To prevent KKK from leaving, the accused-
appellant blocked the doorway by extending his arm towards the
knob. He commanded KKK to "[S]tay here, you sleep in our
room," when the trembling KKK pleaded: "Eddie, allow me to go
out." He then held KKK's hands but she pulled them back.
Determined to get away, MMM leaned against door and
embraced her mother tightly as they pushed their way out.51

In their bedroom, the girls gave their mother some water and
queried her as to what happened.52 KKK relayed: "[Y]our father
is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex with him when
I'm not feeling well." The girls then locked the door and let her
rest."53
The accused-appellant's aggression recurred the following night.
After closing the family store on October 17, 1998, KKK and the
children took their supper. The accused-appellant did not join
them since, according to him, he already ate dinner elsewhere.
After resting for a short while, KKK and the children proceeded
to the girls' bedroom and prayed the rosary. KKK decided to
spend the night in the room's small bed and the girls were
already fixing the beddings when the accused-appellant entered.
"Why are you sleeping in the room of our children", he asked
KKK, who responded that she preferred to sleep with the
children.54 He then scoffed: "Its alright if you will not go with me,
anyway, there are women that could be paid [P] 1,000.00." She
dismissed his comment by turning her head away after retorting:
"So be it." After that, he left the room.55
He returned 15 minutes later56 and when KKK still refused to go
with him, he became infuriated. He lifted her from the bed and
attempted to carry her out of the room as he exclaimed: "Why
will you sleep here[?] Lets go to our bedroom." When she defied
him, he grabbed her short pants causing them to tear apart. 57 At
this point, MMM interfered, "Pa, don't do that to Mama because
we are in front of you."58
The presence of his children apparently did not pacify the
accused-appellant who yelled, "[E]ven in front of you, I can have
sex of your mother [sic J because I'm the head of the family." He
then ordered his daughters to leave the room. Frightened, the
girls obliged and went to the staircase where they subsequently
heard the pleas of their helpless mother resonate with the
creaking bed.59
The episodes in the bedroom were no less disturbing. The
accused-appellant forcibly pulled KKK's short pants and panties.
He paid no heed as she begged, "[D]on 't do that to me, my body
is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you
wanted me to do [sic]. I cannot withstand sex."60
After removing his own short pants and briefs, he flexed her
legs, held her hands, mounted her and forced himself inside her.
Once gratified, the accused-appellant put on his short pants and
briefs, stood up, and went out of the room laughing as he
conceitedly uttered: "[I]t s nice, that is what you deserve because
you are [a] flirt or fond of sex." He then retreated to the masters'
bedroom.61
Sensing that the commotion in their bedroom has ceased, MMM
and OOO scurried upstairs but found the door locked. MMM
pulled out a jalousie window, inserted her arm, reached for the
doorknob inside and disengaged its lock. Upon entering the
room, MMM and OOO found their mother crouched on the bed
with her hair disheveled. The girls asked: "Ma, what happened to
you, why are you crying?" KKK replied: "[Y}our father is a beast
and animal, he again forced me to have sex with him even if I
don't feel well. "62
Version of the defense
The defense spun a different tale. The accused-appellant's father
owned a land adjacent to that of KKK's father. He came to know
KKK because she brought food for her father's laborers. When
3
they got married on October 18, 1975, he was a high school
graduate while she was an elementary graduate.
Their humble educational background did not deter them from
pursuing a comfortable life. Through their joint hard work and
efforts, the couple gradually acquired personal properties and
established their own businesses that included a rice mill
managed by the accused-appellant. He also drove their trucks
that hauled coffee, copra, or com.63
The accused-appellant denied raping his wife on October 16 and
17, 1998. He claimed that on those dates he was in Dangcagan,
Bukidnon, peeling com. On October 7, his truck met an accident
somewhere in Angeles Ranch, Maluko, Manolo Fortich,
Bukidnon. He left the truck by the roadside because he had to
attend MMM's graduation in Cebu on October 12 with KKK.
When they returned to Bukidnon on October 14, he asked KKK
and MMM to proceed to Cagayan de Oro City and just leave him
behind so he can take care of the truck and buy some com.64
Ryle Equia (Equia), the spouses' driver from January 1996 until
June 1999 corroborated the above claims. According to him, on
October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant was within the vicinity
of the rice mill's loading area in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, cleaning
a pick-up truck. On October 17, 1998, he and the accused-
appellant were in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, loading sacks of com
into the truck. They finished loading at 3 :00 p.m. The accused-
appellant then instructed Equia to proceed to Maluko, Manolo
Fortich, Bukidnon while the former attended a fiesta in New
Cebu, Kianggat, Dangcagan, Bukidnon. At around 4:00 p.m.,
Equia, together with a helper and a mechanic, left for Maluko in
order to tow the stalled truck left there by the accused-appellant
in October 7 and thereafter, bring it to Cagayan de Oro City
together with the separate truck loaded with com.
They arrived in Maluko at 7:00 p.m. and it took them three hours
to turn the truck around and hoist it to the towing bar of the other
truck. At around 10:00 p.m., the accused-appellant arrived in
Maluko. The four of them then proceeded to Cagayan de Oro
City where they arrived at 3 :00 a.m. of October 18, 1998. The
accused-appellant went to Gusa while the other three men
brought the damaged truck to Cugman.65
The accused-appellant asserted that KKK merely fabricated the
rape charges as her revenge because he took over the control
and management of their businesses as well as the possession
of their pick-up truck in January 1999. The accused-appellant
was provoked to do so when she failed to account for their bank
deposits and business earnings. The entries in their bank
account showed the balance of P3,190,539.83 on October 31,
1996 but after only a month or on November 30, 1996, the
amount dwindled to a measly P9,894.88.66 Her failure to
immediately report to the police also belies her rape
allegations.67
KKK wanted to cover-up her extra-marital affairs, which the
accused-appellant gradually detected from her odd behavior.
While in Cebu on October 12, 1998 for MMM's graduation rites,
the accused-appellant and KKK had sexual intercourse. He was
surprised when his wife asked him to get a napkin to wipe her
after having sex. He tagged her request as "high-tech," because
they did not do the same when they had sex in the past. KKK
had also become increasingly indifferent to him. When he arrives
home, it was an employee, not her, who opened the door and
welcomed him. She prettied herself and would no longer ask for
his permission whenever she went out.68

Bebs,69 KKK's cousin and a cashier in their Bukidnon store, gave
the accused-appellant several love letters purportedly addressed
to Bebs but were actually intended for KKK.70
KKK had more than ten paramours some of whom the accused-
appellant came to know as: Arsenio, Jong-Jong, Joy or Joey,
somebody from the military or the Philippine National Police,
another one is a government employee, a certain Fernandez and
three other priests.71 Several persons told him about the
paramours of his wife but he never confronted her or them about
it because he trusted her.72
What further confirmed his suspicions was the statement made
by OOO on November 2, 1998. At that time, OOO was listening
loudly to a cassette player. Since he wanted to watch a television
program, he asked OOO to tum down the volume of the cassette
player. She got annoyed, unplugged the player, spinned around
and hit the accused-appellant's head with the socket. His head
bled. An altercation between the accused-appellant and KKK
thereafter followed because the latter took OOO's side. During
the argument, OOO blurted out that KKK was better off without
the accused-appellant because she had somebody young,
handsome, and a businessman unlike the accused-appellant
who smelled bad, and was old, and ugly.73
KKK also wanted their property divided between them with three-
fourths thereof going to her and one-fourth to the accused-
appellant. However, the separation did not push through
because the accused-appellant's parents
intervened.74 Thereafter, KKK pursued legal separation from the
accused-appellant by initiating Barangay Case No. 00588-99
before the Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa of Gusa, Cagayan
de Oro City and thereafter obtaining a Certificate to File Action
dated February 18, 1999.75
Ruling of the RTC
In its Judgment76 dated April 1, 2002, the RTC sustained the
version proffered by the prosecution by giving greater weight and
credence to the spontaneous and straightforward testimonies of
the prosecution's witnesses. The trial court also upheld as
sincere and genuine the two daughters' testimonies, as it is not
natural in our culture for daughters to testify against their own
father for a crime such as rape if the same was not truly
committed.
The trial court rejected the version of the defense and found
unbelievable the accused-appellant's accusations of extra-
marital affairs and money squandering against KKK. The trial
court shelved the accused-appellant's alibi for being premised on
inconsistent testimonies and the contradicting declarations of the
other defense witness, Equia, as to the accused-appellant's
actual whereabouts on October 16, 1998. Accordingly, the RTC
ruling disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Edgar Jumawan
"GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of the two (2) separate
charges of rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each, to pay complainant [P]50,000.00
in each case as moral damages, indemnify complainant the sum
of (P]75,000.00 in each case, [P]50,000.00 as exemplary
damages and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.77
Ruling of the CA
4
In its Decision78 dated July 9, 2008, the CA affirmed in toto the
RTC ruling. The CA held that Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure, sanctioned the amendment of the original
informations. Further, the accused-appellant was not prejudiced
by the amendment because he was re-arraigned with respect to
the amended informations.
The CA found that the prosecution, through the straightforward
testimony of the victim herself and the corroborative declarations
of MMM and OOO, was able to establish, beyond reasonable
doubt, all the elements of rape under R.A. No. 8353. The
accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of KKK by using force
and intimidation.
The CA also ruled that KKK's failure to submit herself to medical
examination did not negate the commission of the crime
because a medical certificate is not necessary to prove rape.
The CA rejected the accused-appellant's argument that since he
and KKK are husband and wife with mutual obligations of and
right to sexual intercourse, there must be convincing physical
evidence or manifestations of the alleged force and intimidation
used upon KKK such as bruises. The CA explained that physical
showing of external injures is not indispensable to prosecute and
convict a person for rape; what is necessary is that the victim
was forced to have sexual intercourse with the accused.
In addition, the CA noted that the fact that KKK and the accused-
appellant are spouses only reinforces the truthfulness of KKK's
accusations because no wife in her right mind would accuse her
husband of having raped her if it were not true.
The delay in the filing of the rape complaint was sufficiently
explained by KKK when she stated that she only found out that a
wife may charge his husband with rape when the fiscal
investigating her separate complaint for grave threats and
physical injuries told her about it.
Finally, the CA dismissed the accused-appellant's alibi for lack of
convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to
be at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the
commission of the crimes, considering that Dangcagan,
Bukidnon, the place where he allegedly was, is only about four
or five hours away. Accordingly, the decretal portion of the
decision read:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed
Judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.79
Hence, the present review. In the Court Resolution 80 dated July
6, 2009, the Court notified the parties that, if they so desire, they
may file their respective supplemental briefs. In a Manifestation
and Motion81 dated September 4, 2009, the appellee, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, expressed that it intends to adopt
its Brief before the CA. On April 16, 2012, the accused-appellant,
through counsel, filed his Supplemental Brief, arguing that he
was not in Cagayan de Oro City when the alleged rape incidents
took place, and the presence of force, threat or intimidation is
negated by: (a) KKK's voluntary act of going with him to the
conjugal bedroom on October 16, 1998; (b) KKK's failure to put
up resistance or seek help from police authorities; and ( c) the
absence of a medical certificate and of blood traces in KKK's
panties.82
Our Ruling

I. Rape and marriage: the historical connection
The evolution of rape laws is actually traced to two ancient
English practices of 'bride capture' whereby a man conquered a
woman through rape and 'stealing an heiress' whereby a man
abducted a woman and married her.83
The rape laws then were intended not to redress the violation of
the woman's chastity but rather to punish the act of obtaining the
heiress' property by forcible marriage84 or to protect a man's
valuable interest in his wife's chastity or her daughter's virginity.85
If a man raped an unmarried virgin, he was guilty of stealing her
father's property and if a man raped his wife, he was merely
using his property.86
Women were subjugated in laws and society as objects or goods
and such treatment was justified under three ideologies.
Under the chattel theory prevalent during the 6th century, a
woman was the property of her father until she marries to
become the property of her husband.87 If a man abducted an
unmarried woman, he had to pay the owner, and later buy her
from the owner; buying and marrying a wife were synonymous.88
From the 11th century to the 16th century, a woman lost her
identity upon marriage and the law denied her political power
and status under the feudal doctrine of coverture.89
A husband had the right to chastise his wife and beat her if she
misbehaved, allowing him to bring order within the family.90
This was supplanted by the marital unity theory, which espoused
a similar concept. Upon marrying, the woman becomes one with
her husband. She had no right to make a contract, sue another,
own personal property or write a will.91
II. The marital exemption rule
In the 17th century, Sir Matthew Hale (Hale), a Chief Justice in
England, conceived the irrevocable implied consent theory that
would later on emerge as the marital exemption rule in rape. He
stated that:
[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself
upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and
contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her
husband, which she cannot retract.92
The rule was observed in common law countries such as the
United States of America (USA) and England. It gives legal
immunity to a man who forcibly sexually assaults his wife, an act
which would be rape if committed against a woman not his
wife.93 In those jurisdictions, rape is traditionally defined as "the
forcible penetration of the body of a woman who is not the wife
of the perpetrator."94
The first case in the USA that applied the marital exemption rule
was Commonwealth v. Fogerty95 promulgated in 1857. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts pronounced that it
would always be a defense in rape to show marriage to the
victim. Several other courts adhered to a similar rationale with all
of them citing Hale's theory as basis.96
The rule was formally codified in the Penal Code of New York in
1909. A husband was endowed with absolute immunity from
prosecution for the rape of his wife.97 The privilege was personal
and pertained to him alone. He had the marital right to rape his
5
wife but he will be liable when he aids or abets another person in
raping her.98
In the 1970s, the rule was challenged by women's movements in
the USA demanding for its abolition for being violative of married
women's right to be equally protected under rape laws.99
In 1978, the rule was qualified by the Legislature in New York by
proscribing the application of the rule in cases where the
husband and wife are living apart pursuant to a court order
"which by its terms or in its effects requires such living apart," or
a decree, judgment or written agreement of separation.100
In 1983, the marital exemption rule was abandoned in New York
when the Court of Appeals of New York declared the same
unconstitutional in People v. Liberta101 for lack of rational basis in
distinguishing between marital rape and non-marital rape. The
decision, which also renounced Hale's irrevocable implied
consent theory, ratiocinated as follows:
We find that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between
marital rape and nonmarital rape. The various rationales which
have been asserted in defense of the exemption are either
based upon archaic notions about the consent and property
rights incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand
even the slightest scrutiny. We therefore declare the marital
exemption for rape in the New York statute to be
unconstitutional.
Lord Hale's notion of an irrevocable implied consent by a married
woman to sexual intercourse has been cited most frequently in
support of the marital exemption. x x x Any argument based on a
supposed consent, however, is untenable. Rape is not simply a
sexual act to which one party does not consent. Rather, it is a
degrading, violent act which violates the bodily integrity of the
victim and frequently causes severe, long-lasting physical and
psychic harm x x x. To ever imply consent to such an act is
irrational and absurd. Other than in the context of rape statutes,
marriage has never been viewed as giving a husband the right to
coerced intercourse on demand x x x. Certainly, then, a marriage
license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to
forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married woman has the
same right to control her own body as does an unmarried
woman x x x. If a husband feels "aggrieved" by his wife's refusal
to engage in sexual intercourse, he should seek relief in the
courts governing domestic relations, not in "violent or forceful
self-help x x x."
The other traditional justifications for the marital exemption were
the common-law doctrines that a woman was the property of her
husband and that the legal existence of the woman was
"incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband x x x."
Both these doctrines, of course, have long been rejected in this
State. Indeed, "[nowhere] in the common-law world - [or] in any
modem society - is a woman regarded as chattel or demeaned
by denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity associated
with recognition as a whole human being x x x." 102 (Citations
omitted)
By 1993, marital rape was a crime in all 50 states, with 17 of
them, as well as the District of Columbia, outlawing the act
without exemptions. Meanwhile, the 33 other states granted
some exemptions to a husband from prosecution such as when
the wife is mentally or physically impaired, unconscious, asleep,
or legally unable to consent.103
III. Marital Rape in the Philippines

Interestingly, no documented case on marital rape has ever
reached this Court until now. It appears, however, that the old
provisions of rape under Article 335 of the RPC adhered to
Hale's irrevocable implied consent theory, albeit in a limited form.
According to Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino,104 a husband may
not be guilty of rape under Article 335 of Act No. 3815 but, in
case there is legal separation, the husband should be held guilty
of rape if he forces his wife to submit to sexual intercourse.105
In 1981, the Philippines joined 180 countries in ratifying the
United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (UN-CEDAW).106 Hailed as the
first international women's bill of rights, the CEDAW is the first
major instrument that contains a ban on all forms of
discrimination against women. The Philippines assumed the role
of promoting gender equality and women's empowerment as a
vital element in addressing global concerns.107 The country also
committed, among others, to condemn discrimination against
women in all its forms, and agreed to pursue, by all appropriate
means and without delay, a policy of eliminating discrimination
against women and, to this end, undertook:
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in
their national constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not
yet incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other
appropriate means, the practical realization of this principle;
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures,
including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all
discrimination against women;
xxxx
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to
modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and
practices which constitute discrimination against women;
(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute
discrimination against women.108
In compliance with the foregoing international commitments, the
Philippines enshrined the principle of gender equality in the 1987
Constitution specifically in Sections 11 and 14 of Article II
thereof, thus:
Sec. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights.
xxxx
Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-
building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the
law of women and men. The Philippines also acceded to adopt
and implement the generally accepted principles of international
law such as the CEDA W and its allied issuances, viz:
Article II, Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation, and amity with all nations. (Emphasis ours)
The Legislature then pursued the enactment of laws to
propagate gender equality. In 1997, R.A. No. 8353 eradicated
the stereotype concept of rape in Article 335 of the RPC. 109 The
law reclassified rape as a crime against person and removed it
from the ambit of crimes against chastity. More particular to the
present case, and perhaps the law's most progressive proviso is
6
the 2nd paragraph of Section 2 thereof recognizing the reality of
marital rape and criminalizing its perpetration, viz:
Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage
between the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or
the penalty imposed.
In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the
subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall
extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the
crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be
abated if the marriage is void ab initio.
Read together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses
the term "man" in defining rape, it is unmistakable that R.A. No.
8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist's legal
relationship with his victim, thus:
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is
committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse
of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years
of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
The explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible from the
records of the deliberations of the 10th Congress on the law's
progenitor's, House Bill No. 6265 and Senate Bill No. 650. In
spite of qualms on tagging the crime as 'marital rape' due to
conservative Filipino impressions on marriage, the consensus of
our lawmakers was clearly to include and penalize marital rape
under the general definition of 'rape,' viz:
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, one more point
of clarification in the House version on Anti-Rape Bill, House Bill
No. 6265, we never agreed to marital rape. But under Article
266-C, it says here: "In case it is the legal husband who is the
offender... " Does this presuppose that there is now marital rape?
x x x.
MR. LARA: x x x [I]n this jurisdiction, well, I only have a limited,
very limited 17 years of private practice in the legal profession,
Madam Speaker, and I believe that I can put at stake my license
as a lawyer in this jurisdiction there is no law that prohibits a
husband from being sued by the wife for rape. Even
jurisprudence, we don't have any jurisprudence that prohibits a
wife from suing a husband. That is why even if we don't provide
in this bill expanding the definition of crime that is now being
presented for approval, Madam Speaker, even if we don't
provide here for marital rape, even if we don't provide for sexual
rape, there is the right of the wife to go against the husband. The
wife can sue the husband for marital rape and she cannot be
prevented from doing so because in this jurisdiction there is no
law that prohibits her from doing so. This is why we had to put
second paragraph of 266-C because it is the belief of many of
us. x x x, that if it is true that in this jurisdiction there is marital

rape even if we don't provide it here, then we must provide for
something that will unify and keep the cohesion of the family
together that is why we have the second paragraph.
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, under the House
version specifically House Bill No. 6265 our provision on a
husband forcing the wife is not marital rape, it is marital sexual
assault.
MR. LARA: That is correct, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING: But here it is marital rape because there is no
crime of sexual assault. So, Your Honor, direct to the point,
under Article 266-C, is it our understanding that in the second
paragraph, quote: "In case it is the legal husband who is the
offender, this refers to marital rape filed against the husband? Is
that correct?
MR. LARA: No, Madam Speaker, not entirely, no. The answer is
no.
MR. DAMASING: So if the husband is guilty of sexual assault,
what do you call- it?
MR. LARA: Sexual assault, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING: There is no crime of sexual assault, Your
Honor, we have already stated that. Because under 1 and 2 it is
all denominated as rape, there is no crime of sexual assault.
That is why I am sorry that our House version which provided for
sexual assault was not carried by the Senate version because all
sexual crimes under this bicameral conference committee report
are all now denominated as rape whether the penalty is from
reclusion perpetua to death or whether the penalty is only prision
mayor. So there is marital rape, Your Honor, is that correct?
xxxx
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, I am in favor of
this. I am in favor of punishing the husband who forces the wife
even to 30 years imprisonment. But please do not call it marital
rape, call it marital sexual assault because of the sanctity of
marriage. x x x.110 (Emphasis ours)
HON. APOSTOL: In our version, we did not mention marital rape
but marital rape is not excluded.
HON. ROCO: Yeah. No. But I think there is also no specific
mention.
HON. APOSTOL: No. No. No. Silent lang 'yung marital rape.
xxxx
HON. ROCO: xx x [I]f we can retain the effect of pardon, then
this marital rape can be implicitly contained in the second
paragraph. x x x So marital rape actually was in the House
version x x x. But it was not another definition of rape. You will
notice, it only says, that because you are the lawful husband
does not mean that you cannot commit rape. Theoretically, I
mean, you can beat up your wife until she's blue. And if the wife
complains she was raped, I guess that, I mean, you just cannot
raise the defense x x x[:] I am the husband. But where in the
marriage contract does it say that I can beat you up? That's all it
means. That is why if we stop referring to it as marital rape,
acceptance is easy. Because parang ang marital rape, married
na nga kami. I cannot have sex. No, what it is saying is you're
[the] husband but you cannot beat me up. x x x. That's why to
7
me it's not alarming. It was just a way of saying you're [the]
husband, you cannot say when I am charged with rape x x x.
PRESIDING OFFICER SHAHAN!: All right, so how do you
propose it if we put it in[?]
HON. ROCO: x x x [A]ll we are saying [is] that if you are the
lawful husband does not mean you can have carnal knowledge
by force[,] threat or intimidation or by depriving your wife reason,
a grave abuse of authority, I don't know how that cannot apply. Di
ba yung, or putting an instrument into the, yun ang sinasabi ko
lang, it is not meant to have another classification of rape. It is all
the same definition x x x.
xxxx
HON.ROCO: What is 266-F? x x x. Now if we can retain 266-F x
x x, we can say that this rule is implicit already in the first
proviso. It implies na there is an instance when a husband can
be charged [with] rape x x x.
HON. ROXAS: Otherwise, silent na.
HON. ROCO: Otherwise, we are silent na. So parang i-delete
natin ito. But it is understood that this rule of evidence is now
transport[ed], put into 266-F, the effect of pardon.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: We will retain this effect of
pardon. We will remove marital rape.
HON. ROCO: No, yun ang, oo we will remove this one on page 3
but we will retain the one on page 8, the effect of pardon. x x x
[I]t is inferred but we leave it because after all it is just a rule of
evidence. But I think we should understand that a husband
cannot beat at his wife to have sex. Di ha? I think that should be
made clear. x x x.
xxxx
HON. ROCO: x x x [W]e are not defining a crime of marital rape.
All we are saying is that if you're [the] legal husband, Jesus
Christ, don't beat up to have sex. I almost want, you are my wife,
why do you have to beat me up.
So, ganoon. So, if we both justify it that way in the Report as
inferred in proviso, I mean, we can face up, I hope, to the women
and they would understand that it is half achieved.
HON. ZAMORA: I think, Raul, as long as we understand that we
are not defining or creating a new crime but instead, we are just
defining a rule of evidence. x x x.
HON. ROCO: Then, in which case we may just want to clarify as
a rule of evidence the fact that he is husband is not, does not
negate.111
CHAIRMAN LARA: x x x We all agree on the substance of the
point in discussion. The only disagreement now is where to place
it. Let us clear this matter. There are two suggestions now on
marital rape. One is that it is rape if it is done with force or
intimidation or any of the circumstances that would define rape x
x x immaterial. The fact that the husband and wife are separated
does not come into the picture. So even if they are living under
one roof x x x for as long as the attendant circumstances of the
traditional rape is present, then that is rape.112

PRESIDING OFFICER ANGARA-CASTILLO: Mr. Chairman, x x
x [t]his provision on marital rape, it does not actually change the
meaning of rape. It merely erases the doubt in anybody's mind,
whether or not rape can indeed be committed by the husband
against the wife. So the bill really says, you having been married
to one another is not a legal impediment. So I don't really think
there is any need to change the concept of rape as defined
presently under the revised penal code. This do[es] not actually
add anything to the definition of rape. It merely says, it is merely
clarificatory. That if indeed the wife has evidence to show that
she was really brow beaten, or whatever or forced or intimidated
into having sexual intercourse against her will, then the crime of
rape has been committed against her by the husband,
notwithstanding the fact that they have been legally married. It
does not change anything at all, Mr. Chairman.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: Yes, I think, there is no
change on this x x x.113
The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine jurisdiction is
further affirmed by R.A. No. 9262, 114 which regards rape within
marriage as a form of sexual violence that may be committed by
a man against his wife within or outside the family abode, viz:
Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a
series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is
his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person
has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has
a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or
is likely to result in. physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or
physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature,
committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not
limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a
woman or her child as a sex object, making demeaning and
sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual
parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene
publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her
child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the
wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep
together in the same room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in
any sexual activity by force, threat of force, physical or other
harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
Statistical figures confirm the above characterization. Emotional
and other forms of non-personal violence are the most common
type of spousal violence accounting for 23% incidence among
ever-married women. One in seven ever-married women
experienced physical violence by their husbands while eight
percent (8%) experienced sexual violence.115
IV. Refutation of the accused-appellant's arguments
The crux of the accused-appellant's plea for acquittal mirrors the
irrevocable implied consent theory. In his appeal brief before the
8
CA, he posits that the two incidents of sexual intercourse, which
gave rise to the criminal charges for rape, were theoretically
consensual, obligatory even, because he and the victim, KKK,
were a legally married and cohabiting couple. He argues that
consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting husband
and wife unless the contrary is proved.
The accused-appellant further claims that this case should be
viewed and treated differently from ordinary rape cases and that
the standards for determining the presence of consent or lack
thereof must be adjusted on the ground that sexual community is
a mutual right and obligation between husband and wife.116
The contentions failed to muster legal and rational merit.
The ancient customs and ideologies from which the irrevocable
implied consent theory evolved have already been superseded
by modem global principles on the equality of rights between
men and women and respect for human dignity established in
various international conventions, such as the CEDAW. The
Philippines, as State Party to the CEDAW, recognized that a
change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of
women in society and in the family is needed to achieve full
equality between them. Accordingly, the country vowed to take
all appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural
patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving
the elimination of prejudices, customs and all other practices
which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of
either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and
women.117 One of such measures is R.A. No 8353 insofar as it
eradicated the archaic notion that marital rape cannot exist
because a husband has absolute proprietary rights over his
wife's body and thus her consent to every act of sexual intimacy
with him is always obligatory or at least, presumed.
Another important international instrument on gender equality is
the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women, which was Promulgated118 by the UN General Assembly
subsequent to the CEDA W. The Declaration, in enumerating the
forms of gender-based violence that constitute acts of
discrimination against women, identified 'marital rape' as a
species of sexual violence, viz:
Article 1
For the purposes of this Declaration, the term "violence against
women" means any act of gender-based violence that results in,
or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or
suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in
private life.
Article 2
Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but
not be limited to, the following:
(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the
family, including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the
household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital
mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-
spousal violence and violence related to
exploitation;119 (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual
violence, exists within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife
without her consent or against her will commits sexual violence
upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDA W

and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act
as rape under R.A. No. 8353.
A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled
her to be. A husband who has sexual intercourse with his wife is
not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a marital consortium
with a fellow human being with dignity equal 120 to that he accords
himself. He cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by
coercing her to engage in a sexual act without her full and free
consent. Surely, the Philippines cannot renege on its
international commitments and accommodate conservative yet
irrational notions on marital activities121 that have lost their
relevance in a progressive society.
It is true that the Family Code, 122 obligates the spouses to love
one another but this rule sanctions affection and sexual intimacy,
as expressions of love, that are both spontaneous and
mutual123 and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force
or coercion.
Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy
between a husband and wife excludes cruelty and coercion.
Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and oneness. It is a
gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a deep
sense of spiritual communion. It is a function which enlivens the
hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family
relations. It is an expressive interest in each other's feelings at a
time it is needed by the other and it can go a long way in
deepening marital relationship.124 When it is egoistically utilized
to despoil marital union in order to advance a felonious urge for
coitus by force, violence or intimidation, the Court will step in to
protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and protect our laws
and State policies. Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved by
his indifferent or uninterested wife's absolute refusal to engage in
sexual intimacy may legally seek the court's intervention to
declare her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill an essential
marital obligation.125 But he cannot and should not demand
sexual intimacy from her coercively or violently.
Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital
rape cases in terms of the elements that constitute the crime and
in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal protection
clause. The Constitutional right to equal protection of the
laws126 ordains that similar subjects should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminate against others; no person or class of persons shall
be denied the same protection of laws, which is enjoyed, by
other persons or other classes in like circumstances.127
As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A.
No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as traditionally known; (b) sexual
assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the victim is the
perpetrator's own spouse. The single definition for all three forms
of the crime shows that the law does not distinguish between
rape committed in wedlock and those committed without a
marriage. Hence, the law affords protection to women raped by
their husband and those raped by any other man alike.
The posture advanced by the accused-appellant arbitrarily
discriminates against married rape victims over unmarried rape
victims because it withholds from married women raped by their
husbands the penal redress equally granted by law to all rape
victims.
Further, the Court adheres to and hereby adopts the rationale in
Liberta in rejecting the argument akin to those raised by herein
accused-appellant. A marriage license should not be viewed as a
license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A
married woman has the same right to control her own body, as
9
does an unmarried woman.128 She can give or withhold her
consent to a sexual intercourse with her husband and he cannot
unlawfully wrestle such consent from her in case she refuses.
Lastly, the human rights of women include their right to have
control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters related
to their sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health, free
of coercion, discrimination and violence.129 Women do not divest
themselves of such right by contracting marriage for the simple
reason that human rights are inalienable.130
In fine, since the law does not separately categorize marital rape
and non-marital rape nor provide for different definition or
elements for either, the Court, tasked to interpret and apply what
the law dictates, cannot trudge the forbidden sphere of judicial
legislation and unlawfully divert from what the law sets forth.
Neither can the Court frame distinct or stricter evidentiary rules
for marital rape cases as it would inequitably burden its victims
and unreasonably and irrationally classify them differently from
the victims of non-marital rape.
Indeed, there exists no legal or rational reason for the Court to
apply the law and the evidentiary rules on rape any differently if
the aggressor is the woman's own legal husband. The elements
and quantum of proof that support a moral certainty of guilt in
rape cases should apply uniformly regardless of the legal
relationship between the accused and his accuser.
Thus, the Court meticulously reviewed the present case in
accordance with the established legal principles and evidentiary
policies in the prosecution and resolution of rape cases and
found that no reversible error can be imputed to the conviction
meted the accused-appellant.
The evidence for the prosecution was
based on credible witnesses who gave
equally credible testimonies
In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the
credibility of the victim. Hence, the strict mandate that all courts
must examine thoroughly the testimony of the offended party.
While the accused in a rape case may be convicted solely on the
testimony of the complaining witness, courts are, nonetheless,
duty-bound to establish that their reliance on the victim's
testimony is justified. Courts must ensure that the testimony is
credible, convincing, and otherwise consistent with human
nature. If the testimony of the complainant meets the test of
credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.131
It is settled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility
of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to the highest
respect. This is in view of its inimitable opportunity to directly
observe the witnesses and their deportment, conduct and
attitude, especially during cross-examination. Thus, unless it is
shown that its evaluation was tainted with arbitrariness or certain
facts of substance and value have been plainly overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied, the same will not be disturbed on
appeal.132
After approximating the perspective of the trial court thru a
meticulous scrutiny of the entire records of the trial proceedings
and the transcript of each witnesses' testimony, the Court found
no justification to disturb its findings.
Rather, the Court observed that KKK and her testimony were
both credible and spontaneous. Hailed to the witness stand on
six separate occasions, KKK never wavered neither did her
statements vacillate between uncertainty and certitude. She
 10

remained consistent, categorical, straightforward, and candid A He lie down beside me and asked me to have sex with him.
during the rigorous cross-examination and on rebuttal
examination, she was able to convincingly explain and debunk Q How did he manifest that he wanted to have sex with you?
the allegations of the defense.
A He put his hand on my lap and asked me to have sex with him
She vividly recounted how the accused-appellant forced her to but I warded off his hand.
have sex with him despite her refusal on October 16, 1998. He
initially ordered her to sleep beside him in their conjugal bed by Q Can you demonstrate to this Court how did he use his hand?
violently throwing the cot where she was resting. In order not to
aggravate his temper, KKK obeyed. On the bed, he insinuated
A Yes. "witness demonstrating on how the accused used his
for them to have sex. When she rejected his advances due to
finger by touching or knocking her lap which means that he
abdominal pain and headache, his request for intimacy
wanted to have sex."
transformed into a stubborn demand. Unyielding, KKK held her
panties but the accused-appellant forcibly pulled them down. The
tug caused the small clothing to tear apart. She reiterated that Q So, what did you do after that?
she was not feeling well and begged him to stop. But no amount
of resistance or begging subdued him. He flexed her two legs A I warded off his hand and refused because I was not feeling
apart, gripped her hands, mounted her, rested his own legs on well. (at this juncture the witness is sobbing)
hers and inserted his penis into her vagina. She continued
pleading but he never desisted.133 Q So, what did your husband do when you refused him to have
sex with you?
Her accurate recollection of the second rape incident on October
1 7, 1998 is likewise unmistakable. After the appalling episode in A He insisted and he pulled my pantie forcibly, that is why my
the conjugal bedroom the previous night, KKK decided to sleep pantie [sic] was tom.
in the children's bedroom. While her daughters were fixing the
beddings, the accused-appellant barged into the room and Q Why, what did you do when he started to pull your pantie [sic]?
berated her for refusing to go with him to their conjugal bedroom.
When KKK insisted to stay in the children's bedroom, the
A I resisted and tried to hold my pantie [sic] but I failed, because
accused-appellant got angry and pulled her up. MMM's attempt
he is so strong.
to pacify the accused-appellant further enraged him. He
reminded them that as the head of the family he could do
xx xx
whatever he wants with his wife. To demonstrate his role as
patriarch, he ordered the children to go out of the room and
thereafter proceeded to force KKK into sexual intercourse. He Q So, when your pantie [sic] was tom by your husband, what
forcibly pulled down her short pants and panties as KKK begged else did he do?
"Dont do that to me, my body is still aching and also my
abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do. I cannot A He flexed my two legs and rested his two legs on my legs.
withstand sex."134 But her pleas fell on deaf ears. The accused-
appellant removed his shorts and briefs, spread KKK's legs Q So after that what else did he do?
apart, held her hands, mounted her and inserted his penis into
her vagina. After gratifying himself, he got dressed, left the room A He succeeded in having sex with me because he held my two
as he chuckled: "Its nice, that is what you deserve because you hands no matter how I wrestled but I failed because he is
are [a] flirt or fond of sex."135 stronger than me.

Entrenched is the rule that in the prosecution of rape cases, the COURT: Make it of record that the witness is sobbing while she
essential element that must be proved is the absence of the is giving her testimony.
victim's consent to the sexual congress.136
ATTY. LARGO: (To the witness cont'ng.)
Under the law, consent is absent when: (a) it was wrestled from
the victim by force, threat or intimidation, fraudulent
Q So, what did you do when your husband already stretched
machinations or grave abuse of authority; or (b) the victim is
your two legs and rode on you and held your two hands?
incapable of giving free and voluntary consent because he/she is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious or that the offended
party is under 12 years of age or is demented. A I told him, "don't do that because I'm not feeling well and my
whole body is aching."

Contrary to the accused-appellant's asseverations, KKK's

consent was wrestled from her through force and intimidation Q How did you say that to your husband?
both of which were established beyond moral certainty by the
prosecution through the pertinent testimony of KKK, viz: A I told him, "don't do that to me because I'm not feeling well."

On the October 16, 1998 rape incident: Q Did you say that in the manner you are saying now?

(Direct Examination) xxxx

ATTY. LARGO: A I shouted when I uttered that words.

Q So, while you were already lying on the bed together with your xxxx
husband, do you remember what happened?

Q Was your husband able to consummate his desire?
xxxx
A Yes, sir, because I cannot do anything.137
(Cross-Examination)
ATTY. AMARGA;
Q Every time you have sex with your husband it was your
husband normally remove your panty?
A Yes, Sir.
Q It was not unusual for your husband then to remove your
panty because according to you he normally do that if he have
sex with you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And finally according to you your husband have sex with you?
A Yes, Sir because he forcibly used me in spite of holding my
panty because I don't want to have sex with him at that time.
Q You did not spread your legs at that time when he removed
your panty?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Meaning, your position of your legs was normal during that
time?
A I tried to resist by not flexing my legs.
xxxx
Q At that time when your husband allegedly removed your panty
he also remove your nightgown?
A No, Sir.
Q And he did pull out your duster [sic] towards your face?
A He raised my duster [sic] up.
Q In other words your face was covered when he raised your
duster [sic]?
A No, only on the breast level.138
On the October 17, 1998 rape incident:
(Direct Examination)
ATTY. LARGO
Q So, after your children went out of the room, what transpired?
A He successfully having sex with me because he pulled my
short pant and pantie forcible.
Q So, what did you say when he forcibly pulled your short and
pantie?
11
A I told him, "don't do that to me, my body is still aching and also
my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do. I
cannot withstand sex."
Q So, what happened to your short when he forcibly pulled it
down?
A It was tom.
Q And after your short and pantie was pulled down by your
husband, what did he do?
A He also removed his short and brief and flexed my two legs
and mounted on me and succeeded in having sex with me.139
The accused-appellant forced his wife when he knowingly
overpowered her by gripping her hands, flexing her legs and
then resting his own legs thereon in order to facilitate the
consummation of his much-desired non-consensual sexual
intercourse.
Records also show that the accused-appellant employed
sufficient intimidation upon KKK. His actuations prior to the
actual moment of the felonious coitus revealed that he imposed
his distorted sense of moral authority on his wife. He furiously
demanded for her to lay with him on the bed and thereafter
coerced her to indulge his sexual craving.
The fury the accused-appellant exhibited when KKK refused to
sleep with him on their bed, when she insisted to sleep in the
children's bedroom and the fact that he exercises dominance
over her as husband all cowed KKK into submission.
The fact that KKK voluntarily went with the accused-appellant to
their conjugal bedroom on October 16, 1998 cannot be stretched
to mean that she consented to the forced sexual intercourse that
ensued. The accused-appellant was KKK's husband and hence
it was customary for her to sleep in the conjugal bedroom. No
consent can be deduced from such act of KKK because at that
juncture there were no indications that sexual intercourse was
about to take place. The issue of consent was still irrelevant
since the act for which the same is legally required did not exist
yet or at least unclear to the person from whom the consent was
desired. The significant point when consent must be given is at
that time when it is clear to the victim that her aggressor is
soliciting sexual congress. In this case, that point is when the
accused-appellant tapped his fingers on her lap, a gesture KKK
comprehended to be an invitation for a sexual intercourse, which
she refused.
Resistance, medical certificate and blood traces.
We cannot give credence to the accused-appellant's argument
that KKK should have hit him to convey that she was resisting
his sexual onslaught. Resistance is not an element of rape and
the law does not impose upon the victim the burden to prove
resistance140 much more requires her to raise a specific kind
thereof.
At any rate, KKK put up persistent, audible and intelligible
resistance for the accused-appellant to recognize that she
seriously did not assent to a sexual congress. She held on to her
panties to prevent him from undressing her, she refused to bend
her legs and she repeatedly shouted and begged for him to stop.
Moreover, as an element of rape, force or intimidation need not
be irresistible; it may be just enough to bring about the desired
result. What is necessary is that the force or intimidation be

sufficient to consummate the purpose that the accused had in
mind141 or is of such a degree as to impel the defenseless and
hapless victim to bow into submission.142
Contrary to the accused-appellant's allusions, the absence of
blood traces in KKK's panties or the lack of a medical certificate
do not negate rape. It is not the presence or absence of blood on
the victim's underwear that determines the fact of
rape143 inasmuch as a medical certificate is dispensable
evidence that is not necessary to prove rape.144 These details do
not pertain to the elements that produce the gravamen of the
offense that is -sexual intercourse with a woman against her will
or without her consent.145
The accused-appellant harps on the acquittal ruling in People v.
Godoy,146 the evidentiary circumstances of which are, however,
disparate from those in the present case. In Godoy, the
testimony of the complainant was inherently weak, inconsistent,
and was controverted by the prosecution's medico-legal expert
witness who stated that force was not applied based on the
position of her hymenal laceration. This led the Court to conclude
that the absence of any sign of physical violence on the victim's
body is an indication of consent.147 Here, however, KKK's
testimony is, as discussed earlier, credible, spontaneous and
forthright.
The corroborative testimonies of
MMM and OOO are worthy of credence.
The accused-appellant's assertion that MMM and OOO's
testimonies lacked probative value as they did not witness the
actual rape is bereft of merit. It must be stressed that rape is
essentially committed in relative isolation, thus, it is usually only
the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced
sexual intercourse.148 Hence, the probative value of MMM and
OOO's testimonies rest not on whether they actually witnessed
the rape but on whether their declarations were in harmony with
KKK's narration of the circumstances, preceding, subsequent to
and concurrent with, the rape incidents.
MMM and OOO's testimonies substantiated significant points in
KKK's narration. MMM heard KKK shouting and crying: "Eddie,
don’t do that to me, have pity on me" 149 on the night of October
16, 1998 shortly after KKK and the accused-appellant went to
their conjugal bedroom. When MMM went upstairs to check on
her mother, the accused-appellant admonished her for meddling.
Frustrated to aid her mother who persistently cried, MMM kicked
the door so hard the accused-appellant was prompted to open it
and rebuke MMM once more. OOO heard all these commotion
from the room downstairs.
MMM then saw her mother crouched on the bed, crying, with her
hair disheveled while her tom panty lay on the floor. After a brief
struggle with the accused-appellant, MMM and KKK were finally
able to escape and retreat to the children's bedroom where KKK
narrated to her daughters: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast;
he forced me to have sex with him when I'm not feeling well. "
KKK gave a similar narration to MMM and OOO the following
night after the accused-appellant barged inside the children's
bedroom. The couple had an argument and when MMM tried to
interfere, the accused-appellant ordered her and OOO to get out
after bragging that he can have sex with his wife even in front of
the children because he is the head of the family. The girls then
12
stayed by the staircase where they afterwards heard their
mother helplessly crying and shouting for the accused-appellant
to stop.
Indeed, the testimonies of KKK, MMM and OOO coherently
depicted that the accused-appellant, through the use of force
and intimidation, had non-consensual and forced carnal
knowledge of his wife, KKK on the nights of October 16 and 17,
1998.
KKK's helpless screams and pleas from inside the bedroom
coupled with her verbal and physical resistance were clear
manifestations of coercion. Her appearance when MMM saw her
on the bed after the accused appellant opened the door on
October 16, 1998, her conduct towards the accused-appellant on
her way out of the room, and her categorical outcry to her
children after the two bedroom episodes - all generate the
conclusion that the sexual acts that occurred were against her
will.
Failure to immediately report to the
police authorities, if satisfactorily
explained, is not fatal to the
credibility of a witness.
The testimonies of KKK and her daughters cannot be discredited
merely because they failed to report the rape incidents to the
police authorities or that KKK belatedly filed the rape charges.
Delay or vacillation by the victims in reporting sexual assaults
does not necessarily impair their credibility if such delay is
satisfactorily explained.150
At that time, KKK and her daughters were not aware that a
husband forcing his wife to submit to sexual intercourse is
considered rape. In fact, KKK only found out that she could sue
his husband for rape when Prosecutor Benjamin Tabique, Jr.
(Prosecutor Tabique) told her about it when she filed the
separate charges for grave threats and physical injuries against
the accused-appellant.151
It must be noted that the incidents occurred a year into the
effectivity of R.A. No. 8353 abolishing marital exemption in rape
cases hence it is understandable that it was not yet known to a
layman as opposed to legal professionals like Prosecutor
Tabique. In addition, fear of reprisal thru social humiliation which
is the common factor that deter rape victims from reporting the
crime to the authorities is more cumbersome in marital rape
cases. This is in view of the popular yet outdated belief that it is
the wife's absolute obligation to submit to her husband's carnal
desires. A husband raping his own wife is often dismissed as a
peculiar occurrence or trivialized as simple domestic trouble.
Unfamiliarity with or lack of knowledge of the law criminalizing
marital rape, the stigma and public scrutiny that could have
befallen KKK and her family had the intervention of police
authorities or even the neighbors been sought, are acceptable
explanations for the failure or delay in reporting the subject rape
incidents.
The victim’s testimony on the
witness stand rendered
unnecessary the presentation of her
complaint-affidavit as evidence.
The failure of the prosecution to present KKK's complaint-
affidavit for rape is not fatal in view of the credible, candid and
positive testimony of KKK on the witness stand. Testimonial
evidence carries more weight than the affidavit since it

underwent the rudiments of a direct, cross, re-direct and re-cross
examinations. Affidavits or statements taken ex parte are
generally considered incomplete and inaccurate. Thus, by
nature, they are inferior to testimony given in court.152
Ill motive imputed to the victim
The ill motive, which the accused-appellant imputed to KKK,
does not inspire belief as it is riddled with loopholes generated
by incongruent and flimsy evidence. The prosecution was able to
establish that the P3 Million deposit in the spouses' bank
account was the proceeds of their loan from the Bank of
Philippine Islands (BPI). Exhibit J, which is a BPI ML instruction
sheet dated October 31, 1996 in the amount of P3,149,840.63 is
the same amount the accused-appellant claimed to have
entrusted to her wife. Although the accused-appellant denied
being aware of such loan, he admitted that approximately P3
Million was spent for the construction of their house. These
pieces of evidence effectively belie the accused appellant's
allegation that KKK could not account for the money deposited in
the bank.153
Anent, KKK's alleged extra-marital affairs, the accused-appellant
failed to explain how Bebs could be his wife KKK when the letter-
sender greeted Bebs a "happy birthday" on October 28 while
KKK's birthday is June 23. The accused-appellant also did not
present Bebs herself, being a more competent witness to the
existence of the alleged love letters for KKK. He likewise failed,
despite promise to do so, to present the original copies of such
love letters neither did he substantiate KKK's supposed extra-
marital affairs by presenting witnesses who could corroborate his
claims. Further, the Court finds it unbelievable that an able man
would not have the temerity to confront his wife who has fooled
around with 10 men - some of whom he has even met. The
accused-appellant's erratic statements on the witness stand are
inconsistent with the theory of extra-marital romance making it
reasonable to infer that he merely made up those malicious
stories as a desperate ploy to extricate himself out of this legal
quandary.
At best, the basis of the alleged illicit affairs of KKK were the
accused-appellant's unfounded suspicions that hold no
evidentiary weight in law and thus incompetent to destroy KKK's
credibility and that of her testimony. In sum, the defense failed to
present sufficiently convincing evidence that KKK is a mere
vindictive wife who is harassing the accused-appellant with
fabricated rape charges.
Alibi
It must be stressed that in raising the irrevocable implied consent
theory as defense, the accused-appellant has essentially
admitted the facts of sexual intercourse embodied in the two
criminal informations for rape. This admission is inconsistent with
the defense of alibi and any discussion thereon will thus be
irrelevant.
At any rate, the courts a quo correctly rejected his alibi.
Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is
inherently frail and unreliable, but also because it is easy to
fabricate and difficult to check or rebut. It cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the accused by eyewitnesses who had
no improper motive to testify falsely.154
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not
only that he was at some other place at the time of the
commission of the crime, but also that it was physically
13
impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its
immediate vicinity. Physical impossibility refers not only to the
geographical distance between the place where the accused
was and the place where the crime was committed when the
crime transpired, but more importantly, the facility of access
between the two places.155
Even granting in arguendo that the accused-appellant had
indeed attended a fiesta in Dangcagan, Bukidnon or was hauling
com with Equia on the dates of commission of the crime, the
same will not easily exonerate him. The accused-appellant failed
to adduce clear and convincing evidence that it was physically
impossible for him to be at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City
at the time of the commission of the crime. Dangcagan,
Bukidnon can be traversed by about four or five hours from
Cagayan de Oro City, and even less by private vehicle which
was available to the accused appellant at any time.156 Thus, it
was not physically impossible for him to be at the situs criminis at
the dates and times when the two rape incidents were
committed.
Between the accused-appellant's alibi and denial, and the
positive identification and credible testimony of the victim, and
her two daughters, the Court must give weight to the latter,
especially in the absence of ill motive on their part to falsely
testify against the accused-appellant.
Conclusion
All told, the presumption of innocence endowed an accused-
appellant was sufficiently overcome by KKK's clear,
straightforward, credible, and truthful declaration that on two
separate occasions, he succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with her, without her consent and against her will. Evidence of
overwhelming force and intimidation to consummate rape is
extant from KKK's narration as believably corroborated by the
testimonies of MMM and OOO and the physical evidence of
KKK's tom panties and short pants. Based thereon, the reason
and conscience of the Court is morally certain that the accused-
appellant is guilty of raping his wife on the nights of October 16
and 17, 1998.
Penalties
The Court affirms the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for each
count of rape, meted upon the accused-appellant for being in
accord with Article 266-A in relation to 266-B of the RPC. Further,
he shall not be eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of R.A.
No. 9346, which states that "persons convicted of offenses
punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be
reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be
eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."157
The Court sustains the moral damages awarded in the amount
of P50,000.00. Moral damages are granted to rape victims
without need of proof other than the fact of rape under the
assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from the
experience she underwent.158
The award of civil indemnity is proper; it is mandatory upon the
finding that rape took place.1âwphi1 Considering that the crime
committed is simple rape, there being no qualifying
circumstances attendant in its commission, the appropriate
amount is P50,000.00159 and not P75,000.00 as awarded by the
RTC.

To serve as an example for public good and in order to deter a
similar form of domestic violence, an award ofP30,000.00 as
exemplary damages is imperative.160
The damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum to be reckoned from the date of finality
of this judgment until fully paid.161
A Final Note
Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation because it is
an abhorrence to a woman's value and dignity as a human
being. It respects no time, place, age, physical condition or
social status. It can happen anywhere and it can happen to
anyone. Even, as shown in the present case, to a wife, inside
her time-honored fortress, the family home, committed against
her by her husband who vowed to be her refuge from cruelty.
The herein pronouncement is an affirmation to wives that our
rape laws provide the atonement they seek from their sexually
coercive husbands.
Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a
license to forcibly rape their wives. A husband does not own his
wife's body by reason of marriage. By marrying, she does not
divest herself of the human right to an exclusive autonomy over
her own body and thus, she can lawfully opt to give or withhold
her consent to marital coitus. A husband aggrieved by his wife's
unremitting refusal to engage in sexual intercourse cannot resort
to felonious force or coercion to make her yield. He can seek
succor before the Family Courts that can determine whether her
refusal constitutes psychological incapacity justifying an
annulment of the marriage.
Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the
spiritual and biological communion that achieves the marital
purpose of procreation. It entails mutual love and self-giving and
as such it contemplates only mutual sexual cooperation and
never sexual coercion or imposition.
The Court is aware that despite the noble intentions of the herein
pronouncement, menacing personalities may use this as a tool
to harass innocent husbands. In this regard, let it be stressed
that safeguards in the criminal justice system are in place to spot
and scrutinize fabricated or false marital rape complaints and
any person who institutes untrue and malicious charges will be
made answerable under the pertinent provisions of the RPC
and/or other laws.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Decision dated
July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00353 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-
appellant Edgar Jumawan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of two (2) counts of RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, without eligibility for
parole. He is further ordered to pay the victim, KKK, the amounts
of PS0,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of rape.
The award of damages shall earn legal interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE v. GENOSA
EN BANC
14
[G.R. No. 135981. January 15, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARIVIC
GENOSA, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her
prayer for acquittal on a novel theory -- the “battered woman
syndrome” (BWS), which allegedly constitutes self-defense.
Under the proven facts, however, she is not entitled to complete
exoneration because there was no unlawful aggression -- no
immediate and unexpected attack on her by her batterer-
husband at the time she shot him.
Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense,
complete or incomplete.
But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted
on appellant constituted a form of cumulative provocation that
broke down her psychological resistance and self-control. This
“psychological paralysis” she suffered diminished her will power,
thereby entitling her to the mitigating factor under paragraphs 9
and 10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellant should also be credited with the
extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so
powerful as to have naturally produced passion and
obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in
the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she
was eight months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her
and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which
overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and
her unborn child’s.
Considering the presence of these two mitigating
circumstances arising from BWS, as well as the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, she may now apply for and be
released from custody on parole, because she has already
served the minimum period of her penalty while under detention
during the pendency of this case.
The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the September
25, 1998 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc
City (Branch 35) in Criminal Case No. 5016-0, finding Marivic
Genosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide. The
decretal portion of the Decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the
Court finds the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide as provided
under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code as restored by Sec.
5, RA No. 7659, and after finding treachery as a generic
aggravating circumstance and none of mitigating circumstance,
hereby sentences the accused with the penalty of DEATH.
“The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the
deceased the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00),
Philippine currency as indemnity and another sum of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral
damages.”[2]

The Information[3] charged appellant with parricide as
follows:
“That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay
Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel, Province of Leyte, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound one BEN GENOSA,
her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon,
which the accused had provided herself for the purpose,
[causing] the following wounds, to wit:
‘Cadaveric spasm.
‘Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
‘Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident post-mortem lividity.
Eyes protruding from its sockets and tongue slightly protrudes
out of the mouth.
‘Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone
of the head, resulting [in] laceration of the brain, spontaneous
rupture of the blood vessels on the posterior surface of the brain,
laceration of the dura and meningeal vessels producing severe
intracranial hemorrhage.
‘Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest,
trunk w/ shedding of the epidermis.
‘Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.’
which caused his death.”[4]
With the assistance of her counsel,[5] appellant pleaded not
guilty during her arraignment on March 3, 1997. [6] In due course,
she was tried for and convicted of parricide.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the
prosecution’s version of the facts in this wise:
“Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on
November 19, 1983 in Ormoc City. Thereafter, they lived with
the parents of Ben in their house at Isabel, Leyte. For a time,
Ben’s younger brother, Alex, and his wife lived with them too.
Sometime in 1995, however, appellant and Ben rented from
Steban Matiga a house at Barangay Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte
where they lived with their two children, namely: John Marben
and Earl Pierre.
“On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a
cockfight after receiving their salary. They each had two (2)
bottles of beer before heading home. Arturo would pass Ben’s
house before reaching his. When they arrived at the house of
Ben, he found out that appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to
look for him. Ben went inside his house, while Arturo went to a
store across it, waiting until 9:00 in the evening for
the masiao runner to place a bet. Arturo did not see appellant
arrive but on his way home passing the side of the Genosas’
rented house, he heard her say ‘I won’t hesitate to kill you’ to
which Ben replied ‘Why kill me when I am innocent?’ That was
15
the last time Arturo saw Ben alive. Arturo also noticed that since
then, the Genosas’ rented house appeared uninhabited and was
always closed.
“On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her
close friend and neighbor living about fifty (50) meters from her
house, to look after her pig because she was going to Cebu for a
pregnancy check-up. Appellant likewise asked Erlinda to sell her
motorcycle to their neighbor Ronnie Dayandayan who
unfortunately had no money to buy it.
“That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was
waiting for a bus going to Ormoc when he saw appellant going
out of their house with her two kids in tow, each one carrying a
bag, locking the gate and taking her children to the waiting area
where he was. Joseph lived about fifty (50) meters behind the
Genosas’ rented house. Joseph, appellant and her children rode
the same bus to Ormoc. They had no conversation as Joseph
noticed that appellant did not want to talk to him.
“On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told
him about the foul odor emanating from his house being rented
by Ben and appellant. Steban went there to find out the cause of
the stench but the house was locked from the inside. Since he
did not have a duplicate key with him, Steban destroyed the gate
padlock with a borrowed steel saw. He was able to get inside
through the kitchen door but only after destroying a window to
reach a hook that locked it. Alone, Steban went inside the
unlocked bedroom where the offensive smell was coming from.
There, he saw the lifeless body of Ben lying on his side on the
bed covered with a blanket. He was only in his briefs with
injuries at the back of his head. Seeing this, Steban went out of
the house and sent word to the mother of Ben about his son’s
misfortune. Later that day, Iluminada Genosa, the mother of
Ben, identified the dead body as that of [her] son.
“Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo
Acodesin, then assigned at the police station at Isabel, Leyte,
received a report regarding the foul smell at the Genosas’ rented
house. Together with SPO1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and Dr.
Refelina Cerillo, SPO3 Acodesin proceeded to the house and
went inside the bedroom where they found the dead body of Ben
lying on his side wrapped with a bedsheet. There was blood at
the nape of Ben who only had his briefs on. SPO3 Acodesin
found in one corner at the side of an aparador a metal pipe
about two (2) meters from where Ben was, leaning against a
wall. The metal pipe measured three (3) feet and six (6) inches
long with a diameter of one and half (1 1/2) inches. It had an
open end without a stop valve with a red stain at one end. The
bedroom was not in disarray.
“About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of
its stench, had to be taken outside at the back of the house
before the postmortem examination was conducted by Dr. Cerillo
in the presence of the police. A municipal health officer at Isabel,
Leyte responsible for medico-legal cases, Dr. Cerillo found that
Ben had been dead for two to three days and his body was
already decomposing. The postmortem examination of Dr.
Cerillo yielded the findings quoted in the Information for parricide
later filed against appellant. She concluded that the cause of
Ben’s death was ‘cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe
intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the
occipital [bone].’
“Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home
after work on November 15, 1995, she got worried that her
husband who was not home yet might have gone gambling since
it was a payday. With her cousin Ecel Araño, appellant went to
look for Ben at the marketplace and taverns at Isabel, Leyte but

did not find him there. They found Ben drunk upon their return at
the Genosas’ house. Ecel went home despite appellant’s
request for her to sleep in their house.
“Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even
challenging her to a fight. She allegedly ignored him and instead
attended to their children who were doing their homework.
Apparently disappointed with her reaction, Ben switched off the
light and, with the use of a chopping knife, cut the television
antenna or wire to keep her from watching television. According
to appellant, Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the
bedroom, but he got hold of her hands and whirled her around.
She fell on the side of the bed and screamed for help. Ben left.
At this point, appellant packed his clothes because she wanted
him to leave. Seeing his packed clothes upon his return home,
Ben allegedly flew into a rage, dragged appellant outside of the
bedroom towards a drawer holding her by the neck, and told her
‘You might as well be killed so nobody would nag me.’ Appellant
testified that she was aware that there was a gun inside the
drawer but since Ben did not have the key to it, he got a three-
inch long blade cutter from his wallet. She however, ‘smashed’
the arm of Ben with a pipe, causing him to drop the blade and
his wallet. Appellant then ‘smashed’ Ben at his nape with the
pipe as he was about to pick up the blade and his wallet. She
thereafter ran inside the bedroom.
“Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her
husband by shooting him. She supposedly ‘distorted’ the drawer
where the gun was and shot Ben. He did not die on the spot,
though, but in the bedroom.”[7] (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:
“1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on
November 19, 1983. Prior to her marriage, Marivic had
graduated from San Carlos, Cebu City, obtaining a degree of
Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, and was
working, at the time of her husband’s death, as a Secretary to
the Port Managers in Ormoc City. The couple had three (3)
children: John Marben, Earl Pierre and Marie Bianca.
“2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since
elementary school; they were neighbors in Bilwang; they were
classmates; and they were third degree cousins. Both sets of
parents were against their relationship, but Ben was persistent
and tried to stop other suitors from courting her. Their closeness
developed as he was her constant partner at fiestas.
“3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of
Ben’s parents, together with Ben’s brother, Alex, in Isabel,
Leyte. In the first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben ‘lived
happily’. But apparently, soon thereafter, the couple would
quarrel often and their fights would become violent.
“4. Ben’s brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that
he could not remember when Ben and Marivic married. He said
that when Ben and Marivic quarreled, generally when Ben would
come home drunk, Marivic would inflict injuries on him. He said
that in one incident in 1993 he saw Marivic holding a kitchen
knife after Ben had shouted for help as his left hand was covered
with blood. Marivic left the house but after a week, she returned
apparently having asked for Ben’s forgiveness. In another
incident in May 22, 1994, early morning, Alex and his father
apparently rushed to Ben’s aid again and saw blood from Ben’s
forehead and Marivic holding an empty bottle. Ben and Marivic
16
reconciled after Marivic had apparently again asked for Ben’s
forgiveness.
“Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivic’s mother-in-law, testified too,
saying that Ben and Marivic married in ‘1986 or 1985 more or
less here in Fatima, Ormoc City.’ She said as the marriage went
along, Marivic became ‘already very demanding. Mrs. Iluminada
Genosa said that after the birth of Marivic’s two sons, there were
‘three (3) misunderstandings.’ The first was when Marivic
stabbed Ben with a table knife through his left arm; the second
incident was on November 15, 1994, when Marivic struck Ben on
the forehead ‘using a sharp instrument until the eye was also
affected. It was wounded and also the ear’ and her husband
went to Ben to help; and the third incident was in 1995 when the
couple had already transferred to the house in Bilwang and she
saw that Ben’s hand was plastered as ‘the bone cracked.’
“Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic
for medical intervention.
“5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on
November 15, 1995 ‘After we collected our salary, we went to the
cock-fighting place of ISCO.’ They stayed there for three (3)
hours, after which they went to ‘Uniloks’ and drank beer –
allegedly only two (2) bottles each. After drinking they bought
barbeque and went to the Genosa residence. Marivic was not
there. He stayed a while talking with Ben, after which he went
across the road to wait ‘for the runner and the usher of the
masiao game because during that time, the hearing on masiao
numbers was rampant. I was waiting for the ushers and runners
so that I can place my bet.’ On his way home at about 9:00 in
the evening, he heard the Genosas arguing. They were
quarreling loudly. Outside their house was one ‘Fredo’ who is
used by Ben to feed his fighting cocks. Basobas’ testimony on
the root of the quarrel, conveniently overheard by him was
Marivic saying ‘I will never hesitate to kill you’, whilst Ben replied
‘Why kill me when I am innocent.’ Basobas thought they were
joking.
“He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road
from the Genosa residence. Basobas admitted that he and Ben
were always at the cockpits every Saturday and Sunday. He
claims that he once told Ben ‘before when he was stricken with a
bottle by Marivic Genosa’ that he should leave her and that Ben
would always take her back after she would leave him ‘so many
times’.
“Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it
was a long time that they had been quarreling. He said Ben
‘even had a wound’ on the right forehead. He had known the
couple for only one (1) year.
“6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage,
Ben became cruel to her and was a habitual drinker. She said
he provoked her, he would slap her, sometimes he would pin her
down on the bed, and sometimes beat her.
“These incidents happened several times and she would often
run home to her parents, but Ben would follow her and seek her
out, promising to change and would ask for her forgiveness.
She said after she would be beaten, she would seek medical
help from Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. These
doctors would enter the injuries inflicted upon her by Ben into
their reports. Marivic said Ben would beat her or quarrel with her
every time he was drunk, at least three times a week.
“7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely
related to Marivic, testified as to the abuse and violence she
received at the hands of Ben.

‘7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of
the Genosas, testified that on November 15, 1995, he overheard
a quarrel between Ben and Marivic. Marivic was shouting for
help and through the open jalousies, he saw the spouses
‘grappling with each other’. Ben had Marivic in a choke hold. He
did not do anything, but had come voluntarily to testify. (Please
note this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo
Busabos.[8])
‘7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of
Mr. Joe Barrientos, testified that he heard his neighbor Marivic
shouting on the night of November 15, 1995. He peeped
through the window of his hut which is located beside the
Genosa house and saw ‘the spouses grappling with each other
then Ben Genosa was holding with his both hands the neck of
the accused, Marivic Genosa’. He said after a while, Marivic was
able to extricate he[r]self and enter the room of the children.
After that, he went back to work as he was to go fishing that
evening. He returned at 8:00 the next morning. (Again, please
note that this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo
Basobas).
‘7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the
Genosas while they were living in Isabel, Leyte. His house was
located about fifty (50) meters from theirs. Marivic is his niece
and he knew them to be living together for 13 or 14 years. He
said the couple was always quarreling. Marivic confided in him
that Ben would pawn items and then would use the money to
gamble. One time, he went to their house and they were
quarreling. Ben was so angry, but would be pacified ‘if
somebody would come.’ He testified that while Ben was alive
‘he used to gamble and when he became drunk, he would go to
our house and he will say, ‘Teody’ because that was what he
used to call me, ‘mokimas ta,’ which means ‘let’s go and look for
a whore.’ Mr. Sarabia further testified that Ben ‘would box his
wife and I would see bruises and one time she ran to me, I
noticed a wound (the witness pointed to his right breast) as
according to her a knife was stricken to her.’ Mr. Sarabia also
said that once he saw Ben had been injured too. He said he
voluntarily testified only that morning.
‘7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin
of Marivic, testified that in the afternoon of November 15, 1995,
Marivic went to her house and asked her help to look for Ben.
They searched in the market place, several taverns and some
other places, but could not find him. She accompanied Marivic
home. Marivic wanted her to sleep with her in the Genosa
house ‘because she might be battered by her husband.’ When
they got to the Genosa house at about 7:00 in the evening, Miss
Arano said that ‘her husband was already there and was drunk.’
Miss Arano knew he was drunk ‘because of his staggering
walking and I can also detect his face.’ Marivic entered the
house and she heard them quarrel noisily. (Again, please note
that this is the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas)
Miss Arano testified that this was not the first time Marivic had
asked her to sleep in the house as Marivic would be afraid every
time her husband would come home drunk. At one time when
she did sleep over, she was awakened at 10:00 in the evening
when Ben arrived because the couple ‘were very noisy in the
sala and I had heard something was broken like a vase.’ She
said Marivic ran into her room and they locked the door. When
Ben couldn’t get in he got a chair and a knife and ‘showed us the
knife through the window grill and he scared us.’ She said that
Marivic shouted for help, but no one came. On cross-
examination, she said that when she left Marivic’s house on
November 15, 1995, the couple were still quarreling.
‘7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic
were co-employees at PHILPHOS, Isabel, Leyte. Marivic was
17
his patient ‘many times’ and had also received treatment from
other doctors. Dr. Caing testified that from July 6, 1989 until
November 9, 1995, there were six (6) episodes of physical
injuries inflicted upon Marivic. These injuries were reported in
his Out-Patient Chart at the PHILPHOS Hospital. The
prosecution admitted the qualifications of Dr. Caing and
considered him an expert witness.’
xxx xxx xxx
‘Dr. Caing’s clinical history of the tension headache and
hypertention of Marivic on twenty-three (23) separate
occasions was marked at Exhibits ‘2’ and ‘2-B.’ The OPD Chart
of Marivic at the Philphos Clinic which reflected all the
consultations made by Marivic and the six (6) incidents of
physical injuries reported was marked as Exhibit ‘3.’
“On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a
psychiatrist, he could not say whether the injuries were directly
related to the crime committed. He said it is only a psychiatrist
who is qualified to examine the psychological make-up of the
patient, ‘whether she is capable of committing a crime or not.’
‘7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where
the Genosas resided, testified that about two (2) months before
Ben died, Marivic went to his office past 8:00 in the evening.
She sought his help to settle or confront the Genosa couple who
were experiencing ‘family troubles’. He told Marivic to return in
the morning, but he did not hear from her again and assumed
‘that they might have settled with each other or they might have
forgiven with each other.’
xxx xxx xxx
“Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got
home that night it was her husband who began the provocation.
Marivic said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her
and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely.
In fact, Marivic had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical
Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension,
and the baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.
“Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave
her husband at least five (5) times, but that Ben would always
follow her and they would reconcile. Marivic said that the reason
why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was
because ‘he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu x x x
Rubillos.’
“On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun;
she said that he died in the bedroom; that their quarrels could be
heard by anyone passing their house; that Basobas lied in his
testimony; that she left for Manila the next day, November 16,
1995; that she did not bother anyone in Manila, rented herself a
room, and got herself a job as a field researcher under the alias
‘Marvelous Isidro’; she did not tell anyone that she was leaving
Leyte, she just wanted to have a safe delivery of her baby; and
that she was arrested in San Pablo, Laguna.
‘Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw
the gun away; that she did not know what happened to the pipe
she used to ‘smash him once’; that she was wounded by Ben on
her wrist with the bolo; and that two (2) hours after she was
‘whirled’ by Ben, he kicked her ‘ass’ and dragged her towards the
drawer when he saw that she had packed his things.’
“9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18,
1995 after an investigation was made of the foul odor emitting

from the Genosa residence. This fact was testified to by all the
prosecution witnesses and some defense witnesses during the
trial.
“10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the
Municipal Health Officer of Isabel, Leyte at the time of the
incident, and among her responsibilities as such was to take
charge of all medico-legal cases, such as the examination of
cadavers and the autopsy of cadavers. Dra. Cerillo is not a
forensic pathologist. She merely took the medical board exams
and passed in 1986. She was called by the police to go to the
Genosa residence and when she got there, she saw ‘some
police officer and neighbor around.’ She saw Ben Genosa,
covered by a blanket, lying in a semi-prone position with his back
to the door. He was wearing only a brief.
xxx xxx xxx
“Dra. Cerillo said that ‘there is only one injury and that is the
injury involving the skeletal area of the head’ which she
described as a ‘fracture’. And that based on her examination,
Ben had been dead 2 or 3 days. Dra. Cerillo did not testify as
to what caused his death.
“Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.
“11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed
against Marivic Genosa charged her with the crime of
PARRICIDE committed ‘with intent to kill, with treachery and
evidence premeditation, x x x wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, hit and wound x x x her legitimate husband, with
the use of a hard deadly weapon x x x which caused his death.’
“12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997,
21 July 1997, 17, 22 and 23 September 1997, 12 November
1997, 15 and 16 December 1997, 22 May 1998, and 5 and 6
August 1998.
“13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from
the day of the last trial date, the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona,
Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City, rendered a
JUDGMENT finding Marivic guilty ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ of
the crime of parricide, and further found treachery as an
aggravating circumstance, thus sentencing her to the ultimate
penalty of DEATH.
“14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon
automatic review and, under date of 24 January 2000, Marivic’s
trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P. Tabucanon, filed a Motion to
Withdraw as counsel, attaching thereto, as a precautionary
measure, two (2) drafts of Appellant’s Briefs he had prepared for
Marivic which, for reasons of her own, were not conformed to by
her.
“The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. Tabucanon
and permitted the entry of appearance of undersigned counsel.
“15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa
wrote a letter dated 20 January 2000, to the Chief Justice,
coursing the same through Atty. Teresita G. Dimaisip, Deputy
Clerk of Court of Chief Judicial Records Office, wherein she
submitted her ‘Brief without counsels’ to the Court.
“This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4
February 2000.
“16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and
stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 19 February 2000,
18
undersigned counsel filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION
praying that the Honorable Court allow the exhumation of Ben
Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death; allow
the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists
and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she
killed her husband; and finally, to allow a partial re-opening of the
case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and
psychiatrists.
“Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of
Dr. Raquel Fortun, then the only qualified forensic pathologist in
the country, who opined that the description of the death wound
(as culled from the post-mortem findings, Exhibit ‘A’) is more akin
to a gunshot wound than a beating with a lead pipe.
“17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the
Honorable Court partly granted Marivic’s URGENT OMNIBUS
MOTION and remanded the case ‘to the trial court for the
reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on
the ‘battered woman syndrome’ plea, within ninety (90) days
from notice, and, thereafter to forthwith report to this Court the
proceedings taken, together with the copies of the TSN and
relevant documentary evidence, if any, submitted.’
“18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan
appeared and testified before the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona,
RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
“Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a
quo asked if she had interviewed Marivic Genosa. Dra. Dayan
informed the Court that interviews were done at the Penal
Institution in 1999, but that the clinical interviews and
psychological assessment were done at her clinic.
“Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist for
twenty (20) years with her own private clinic and connected
presently to the De La Salle University as a professor. Before
this, she was the Head of the Psychology Department of the
Assumption College; a member of the faculty of Psychology at
the Ateneo de Manila University and St. Joseph’s College; and
was the counseling psychologist of the National Defense
College. She has an AB in Psychology from the University of the
Philippines, a Master of Arts in Clinical [Counseling], Psychology
from the Ateneo, and a PhD from the U.P. She was the past
president of the Psychological Association of the Philippines and
is a member of the American Psychological Association. She is
the secretary of the International Council of Psychologists from
about 68 countries; a member of the Forensic Psychology
Association; and a member of the ASEAN [Counseling]
Association. She is actively involved with the Philippine Judicial
Academy, recently lecturing on the socio-demographic and
psychological profile of families involved in domestic violence
and nullity cases. She was with the Davide Commission doing
research about Military Psychology. She has written a book
entitled ‘Energy Global Psychology’ (together with Drs. Allan Tan
and Allan Bernardo). The Genosa case is the first time she has
testified as an expert on battered women as this is the first case
of that nature.
“Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on the
socio-demographic and psychological profile of families involved
in domestic violence, and nullity cases, she looked at about 500
cases over a period of ten (10) years and discovered that ‘there
are lots of variables that cause all of this marital conflicts, from
domestic violence to infidelity, to psychiatric disorder.’
“Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of ‘a lot of
incidents of psychological abuse, verbal abuse, and emotional
abuse to physical abuse and also sexual abuse.’

xxx xxx xxx
“Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, ‘the battered woman
usually has a very low opinion of herself. She has a self-
defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x they usually
think very lowly of themselves and so when the violence would
happen, they usually think that they provoke it, that they were
the one who precipitated the violence, they provoke their spouse
to be physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to them.’
Dra. Dayan said that usually a battered x x x comes from a
dysfunctional family or from ‘broken homes.’
“Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered woman,
‘also has a very low opinion of himself. But then emerges to
have superiority complex and it comes out as being very
arrogant, very hostile, very aggressive and very angry. They
also had (sic) a very low tolerance for frustrations. A lot of times
they are involved in vices like gambling, drinking and drugs. And
they become violent.’ The batterer also usually comes from a
dysfunctional family which over-pampers them and makes them
feel entitled to do anything. Also, they see often how their
parents abused each other so ‘there is a lot of modeling of
aggression in the family.’
“Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a
battered woman does not leave her husband: poverty, self-blame
and guilt that she provoked the violence, the cycle itself which
makes her hope her husband will change, the belief in her
obligations to keep the family intact at all costs for the sake of
the children.
xxx xxx xxx
“Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the
violence: some leave the house, or lock themselves in another
room, or sometimes try to fight back triggering ‘physical violence
on both of them.’ She said that in a ‘normal marital relationship,’
abuses also happen, but these are ‘not consistent, not chronic,
are not happening day in [and] day out.’ In an ‘abnormal marital
relationship,’ the abuse occurs day in and day out, is long lasting
and ‘even would cause hospitalization on the victim and even
death on the victim.’
xxx xxx xxx
“Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological
tests she administered, it was her opinion that Marivic fits the
profile of a battered woman because ‘inspite of her feeling of
self-confidence which we can see at times there are really
feeling (sic) of loss, such feelings of humiliation which she sees
herself as damaged and as a broken person. And at the same
time she still has the imprint of all the abuses that she had
experienced in the past.’
xxx xxx xxx
“Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and
did not even consider filing for nullity or legal separation inspite
of the abuses. It was at the time of the tragedy that Marivic then
thought of herself as a victim.
xxx xxx xxx
“19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician,
who has since passed away, appeared and testified before RTC-
Branch 35, Ormoc City.
19
“Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of
Psychiatry; a Fellow of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry and a
Fellow of the Philippine Psychiatry Association. He was in the
practice of psychiatry for thirty-eight (38) years. Prior to being in
private practice, he was connected with the Veterans Memorial
Medical Centre where he gained his training on psychiatry and
neurology. After that, he was called to active duty in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, assigned to the V. Luna Medical
Center for twenty six (26) years. Prior to his retirement from
government service, he obtained the rank of Brigadier General.
He obtained his medical degree from the University of Santo
Tomas. He was also a member of the World Association of
Military Surgeons; the Quezon City Medical Society; the
Cagayan Medical Society; and the Philippine Association of
Military Surgeons.
“He authored ‘The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown
in the Philippine Military Academy from the Period 1954 – 1978’
which was presented twice in international congresses. He also
authored ‘The Mental Health of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines 2000’, which was likewise published internationally
and locally. He had a medical textbook published on the use of
Prasepam on a Parke-Davis grant; was the first to use
Enanthate (siquiline), on an E.R. Squibb grant; and he published
the use of the drug Zopiclom in 1985-86.
“Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional
disorder of the mind and neurology deals with the ailment of the
brain and spinal cord enlarged. Psychology, on the other hand,
is a bachelor degree and a doctorate degree; while one has to
finish medicine to become a specialist in psychiatry.
“Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical
Centre, Dr. Pajarillo had already encountered a suit involving
violent family relations, and testified in a case in 1964. In the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, violent family disputes abound,
and he has seen probably ten to twenty thousand cases. In
those days, the primordial intention of therapy was
reconciliation. As a result of his experience with domestic
violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman
Office in Quezon City under Atty. Nenita Deproza.
“As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of
severe domestic violence, where there is physical abuse: such
as slapping, pushing, verbal abuse, battering and boxing a
woman even to an unconscious state such that the woman is
sometimes confined. The affliction of Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder ‘depends on the vulnerability of the victim.’ Dr. Pajarillo
said that if the victim is not very healthy, perhaps one episode of
violence may induce the disorder; if the psychological stamina
and physiologic constitutional stamina of the victim is stronger, ‘it
will take more repetitive trauma to precipitate the post-traumatic
stress disorder and this x x x is very dangerous.’
“In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is incorporated
under the ‘anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxcietism.’ It is
produced by ‘overwhelming brutality, trauma.’
xxx xxx xxx
“Dr. Pajarillo explained that with ‘neurotic anxiety’, the victim
relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is
not actually being beaten at that time. She thinks ‘of nothing but
the suffering.’
xxx xxx xxx

“A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become
neurotic, her emotional tone is unstable, and she is irritable and
restless. She tends to become hard-headed and persistent.
She has higher sensitivity and her ‘self-world’ is damaged.
“Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to
an individual’s illness, such as the deprivation of the continuous
care and love of the parents. As to the batterer, he normally
‘internalizes what is around him within the environment.’ And it
becomes his own personality. He is very competitive; he is
aiming high all the time; he is so macho; he shows his strong
façade ‘but in it there are doubts in himself and prone to act
without thinking.’
xxx xxx xxx
“Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that ‘even though without the presence
of the precipator (sic) or the one who administered the battering,
that re-experiencing of the trauma occurred (sic) because the
individual cannot control it. It will just come up in her mind or in
his mind.’
xxx xxx xxx
“Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress
disorder try to defend themselves, and ‘primarily with knives.
Usually pointed weapons or any weapon that is available in the
immediate surrounding or in a hospital x x x because that
abound in the household.’ He said a victim resorts to weapons
when she has ‘reached the lowest rock bottom of her life and
there is no other recourse left on her but to act decisively.’
xxx xxx xxx
“Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in
an interview he conducted for two (2) hours and seventeen (17)
minutes. He used the psychological evaluation and social case
studies as a help in forming his diagnosis. He came out with a
Psychiatric Report, dated 22 January 2001.
xxx xxx xxx
“On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo
said that at the time she killed her husband Marivic’c mental
condition was that she was ‘re-experiencing the trauma.’ He
said ‘that we are trying to explain scientifically that the re-
experiencing of the trauma is not controlled by Marivic. It will
just come in flashes and probably at that point in time that things
happened when the re-experiencing of the trauma flashed in her
mind.’ At the time he interviewed Marivic ‘she was more
subdued, she was not super alert anymore x x x she is mentally
stress (sic) because of the predicament she is involved.’
xxx xxx xxx
“20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by
either the private or the public prosecutor. Thus, in accord with
the Resolution of this Honorable Court, the records of the
partially re-opened trial a quo were elevated.”[9]
Ruling of the Trial Court
Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the
RTC gave credence to the prosecution evidence that appellant
had killed the deceased while he was in bed sleeping. Further,
the trial court appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance
20
of treachery, because Ben Genosa was supposedly defenseless
when he was killed -- lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed
him with a pipe at the back of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was
elevated to this Court for automatic review.
Supervening Circumstances
On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus
Motion praying that this Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben
Genosa and the reexamination of the cause of his death; (2) the
examination of appellant by qualified psychologists and
psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she had
killed her spouse; and (3) the inclusion of the said experts’
reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic
review or, in the alternative, a partial reopening of the case for
the lower court to admit the experts’ testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution
granting in part appellant’s Motion, remanding the case to the
trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or
psychiatric opinion on the “battered woman syndrome” plea; and
requiring the lower court to report thereafter to this Court the
proceedings taken as well as to submit copies of the TSN and
additional evidence, if any.
Acting on the Court’s Resolution, the trial judge authorized
the examination of Marivic by two clinical psychologists, Drs.
Natividad Dayan[10] and Alfredo Pajarillo,[11] supposedly experts
on domestic violence. Their testimonies, along with their
documentary evidence, were then presented to and admitted by
the lower court before finally being submitted to this Court to
form part of the records of the case.[12]
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial
court for this Court’s consideration:
“1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an
obviously hasty decision without reflecting on the evidence
adduced as to self-defense.
“2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that
Ben and Marivic Genosa were legally married and that she was
therefore liable for parricide.
“3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death
to be by beating with a pipe.
“4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and
disregarding evidence adduced from impartial and unbiased
witnesses that Ben Genosa was a drunk, a gambler, a
womanizer and wife-beater; and further gravely erred in
concluding that Ben Genosa was a battered husband.
“5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony
from the children of Marivic Genosa.
“6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that
Marivic’s flight to Manila and her subsequent apologies were

indicia of guilt, instead of a clear attempt to save the life of her
unborn child.
“7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there
was an aggravating circumstance of treachery.
“8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate
the traditional elements in determining the existence of self-
defense and defense of foetus in this case, thereby erroneously
convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of parricide and
condemning her to the ultimate penalty of death.”[13]
In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1)
whether appellant acted in self-defense and in defense of her
fetus; and (2) whether treachery attended the killing of Ben
Genosa.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Collateral Factual Issues
The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual
in nature, if not collateral to the resolution of the principal issues.
As consistently held by this Court, the findings of the trial court
on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled
to a high degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in
the absence of any showing that the trial judge gravely abused
his discretion or overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
material facts or circumstances of weight and substance that
could affect the outcome of the case.[14]
In appellant’s first six assigned items, we find no grave
abuse of discretion, reversible error or misappreciation of
material facts that would reverse or modify the trial court’s
disposition of the case. In any event, we will now briefly dispose
of these alleged errors of the trial court.
First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated “an
obviously hasty decision without reflecting on the evidence
adduced as to self-defense.” We note that in his 17-page
Decision, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona summarized the
testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense witnesses
and -- on the basis of those and of the documentary evidence on
record -- made his evaluation, findings and conclusions. He
wrote a 3-page discourse assessing the testimony and the self-
defense theory of the accused. While she, or even this Court,
may not agree with the trial judge’s conclusions, we cannot
peremptorily conclude, absent substantial evidence, that he
failed to reflect on the evidence presented.
Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been
made in an “obviously hasty” manner. The Information had been
filed with the lower court on November 14, 1996. Thereafter, trial
began and at least 13 hearings were held for over a year. It took
the trial judge about two months from the conclusion of trial to
promulgate his judgment. That he conducted the trial and
resolved the case with dispatch should not be taken against him,
much less used to condemn him for being unduly hasty. If at all,
the dispatch with which he handled the case should be lauded.
In any case, we find his actions in substantial compliance with
his constitutional obligation.[15]
Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that
Ben Genosa and appellant had been legally married, despite the
21
non-presentation of their marriage contract. In People v.
Malabago,[16] this Court held:
“The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender
with the victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best
proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased
is the marriage certificate. In the absence of a marriage
certificate, however, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may be
considered by the trial court if such proof is not objected to.”
Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and
the brother of appellant’s deceased spouse -- attested in court
that Ben had been married to Marivic.[17] The defense raised no
objection to these testimonies. Moreover, during her direct
examination, appellant herself made a judicial admission of her
marriage to Ben.[18] Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission
is conclusive upon the party making it, except only when there is
a showing that (1) the admission was made through a palpable
mistake, or (2) no admission was in fact made.[19] Other than
merely attacking the non-presentation of the marriage contract,
the defense offered no proof that the admission made by
appellant in court as to the fact of her marriage to the deceased
was made through a palpable mistake.
Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or
direct cause of Ben’s death -- whether by a gunshot or by
beating with a pipe -- has no legal consequence. As the Court
elucidated in its September 29, 2000 Resolution, “[c]onsidering
that the appellant has admitted the fact of killing her husband
and the acts of hitting his nape with a metal pipe and of shooting
him at the back of his head, the Court believes that exhumation
is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which of said acts
actually caused the victim’s death.” Determining which of these
admitted acts caused the death is not dispositive of the guilt or
defense of appellant.
Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating
evidence that Ben was a drunk, gambler, womanizer and wife-
beater. Until this case came to us for automatic review, appellant
had not raised the novel defense of “battered woman syndrome,” for
which such evidence may have been relevant. Her theory of self-
defense was then the crucial issue before the trial court. As will be
discussed shortly, the legal requisites of self-defense under
prevailing jurisprudence ostensibly appear inconsistent with the
surrounding facts that led to the death of the victim. Hence, his
personal character, especially his past behavior, did not constitute
vital evidence at the time.
Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not
requiring testimony from appellant’s children. As correctly
elucidated by the solicitor general, all criminal actions are
prosecuted under the direction and control of the public
prosecutor, in whom lies the discretion to determine which
witnesses and evidence are necessary to present.[20] As the
former further points out, neither the trial court nor the
prosecution prevented appellant from presenting her children as
witnesses. Thus, she cannot now fault the lower court for not
requiring them to testify.
Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of
whether the flight of Marivic to Manila and her subsequent
apologies to her brother-in-law are indicia of her guilt or are
attempts to save the life of her unborn child. Any reversible error
as to the trial court’s appreciation of these circumstances has
little bearing on the final resolution of the case.
First Legal Issue:
Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus
Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal
liability, invokes self-defense and/or defense of her unborn child.

When the accused admits killing the victim, it is incumbent upon
her to prove any claimed justifying circumstance by clear and
convincing evidence.[21] Well-settled is the rule that in criminal
cases, self-defense (and similarly, defense of a stranger or third
person) shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the
defense.[22]
The Battered Woman Syndrome
In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory
of the battered woman syndrome. While new in Philippine
jurisprudence, the concept has been recognized in foreign
jurisdictions as a form of self-defense or, at the least, incomplete
self-defense.[23] By appreciating evidence that a victim or
defendant is afflicted with the syndrome, foreign courts convey
their “understanding of the justifiably fearful state of mind of a
person who has been cyclically abused and controlled over a
period of time.”[24]
A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is
repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological
behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he
wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women
include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with
men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered
woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least
twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship
with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in
the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.”[25]
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as
low self-esteem, traditional beliefs about the home, the family
and the female sex role; emotional dependence upon the
dominant male; the tendency to accept responsibility for the
batterer’s actions; and false hopes that the relationship will
improve.[26]
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is
characterized by the so-called “cycle of violence,”[27] which has
three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute
battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least,
nonviolent) phase.[28]
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs
-- it could be verbal or slight physical abuse or another form of
hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the batterer
through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying
out of his way. What actually happens is that she allows herself
to be abused in ways that, to her, are comparatively minor. All
she wants is to prevent the escalation of the violence exhibited
by the batterer. This wish, however, proves to be double-edged,
because her “placatory” and passive behavior legitimizes his
belief that he has the right to abuse her in the first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her
effort to placate him are not usually successful, and the verbal
and/or physical abuse worsens. Each partner senses the
imminent loss of control and the growing tension and despair.
Exhausted from the persistent stress, the battered woman soon
withdraws emotionally. But the more she becomes emotionally
unavailable, the more the batterer becomes angry, oppressive
and abusive. Often, at some unpredictable point, the violence
“spirals out of control” and leads to an acute battering incident.[29]
The acute battering incident is said to be characterized
by brutality, destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The
battered woman deems this incident as unpredictable, yet also
inevitable. During this phase, she has no control; only the
batterer may put an end to the violence. Its nature can be as
unpredictable as the time of its explosion, and so are his reasons
22
for ending it. The battered woman usually realizes that she
cannot reason with him, and that resistance would only
exacerbate her condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the
attack and the terrible pain, although she may later clearly
remember every detail. Her apparent passivity in the face of
acute violence may be rationalized thus: the batterer is almost
always much stronger physically, and she knows from her past
painful experience that it is futile to fight back. Acute battering
incidents are often very savage and out of control, such that
innocent bystanders or intervenors are likely to get hurt.[30]
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the
acute battering incident ends. During this tranquil period, the
couple experience profound relief. On the one hand, the batterer
may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner.
He knows that he has been viciously cruel and tries to make up
for it, begging for her forgiveness and promising never to beat
her again. On the other hand, the battered woman also tries to
convince herself that the battery will never happen again; that
her partner will change for the better; and that this “good, gentle
and caring man” is the real person whom she loves.
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole
anchor of the emotional stability of the batterer. Sensing his
isolation and despair, she feels responsible for his well-being.
The truth, though, is that the chances of his reforming, or
seeking or receiving professional help, are very slim, especially if
she remains with him. Generally, only after she leaves him does
he seek professional help as a way of getting her back. Yet, it is
in this phase of remorseful reconciliation that she is most
thoroughly tormented psychologically.
The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched
in a battered woman’s psyche. In this phase, she and her
batterer are indeed emotionally dependent on each other -- she
for his nurturant behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath
this miserable cycle of “tension, violence and forgiveness,” each
partner may believe that it is better to die than to be separated.
Neither one may really feel independent, capable of functioning
without the other.[31]
History of Abuse
in the Present Case
To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the
defense presented several witnesses. She herself described her
heart-rending experience as follows:
“ATTY. TABUCANON
Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben
Genosa?
A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the
subsequent year he was cruel to me and a
behavior of habitual drinker.
Q You said that in the subsequent year of your
marriage, your husband was abusive to you and
cruel. In what way was this abusive and cruelty
manifested to you?
A He always provoke me in everything, he always
slap me and sometimes he pinned me down on
the bed and sometimes beat me.
Q How many times did this happen?
A Several times already.
Q What did you do when these things happen to
you?
 23

A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father Q Will you please read the physical findings
and we separate each other. together with the dates for the record.

Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you
leaving home?
A He is following me, after that he sought after me.
Q What will happen when he follow you?
A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness
and I was convinced and after that I go to him
and he said ‘sorry’.
Q During those times that you were the recipient of
such cruelty and abusive behavior by your
husband, were you able to see a doctor?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who are these doctors?
A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr.
Lucero and Dra. Cerillo.
A 1. May 12, 1990 - physical findings are as
follows: Hematoma (R) lower eyelid and redness
of eye. Attending physician: Dr. Lucero;
2. March 10, 1992 - Contusion-Hematoma
(L) lower arbital area, pain and contusion (R)
breast. Attending physician: Dr. Canora;
3. March 26, 1993 - Abrasion, Furuncle (L)
Axilla;
4. August 1, 1994 - Pain, mastitis (L) breast,
2 to trauma. Attending physician: Dr. Caing;
5. April 17, 1995 - Trauma, tenderness (R)
Shoulder. Attending physician: Dr. Canora; and
6. June 5, 1995 - Swelling Abrasion (L) leg,
multiple contusion Pregnancy. Attending
physician: Dr. Canora.

Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents

xxx xxx xxx wherein you were the attending physician, is that
correct?
Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your
injuries? A Yes, sir.

A Yes, sir. Q Did you actually physical examine the accused?

Q Who inflicted these injuries? A Yes, sir.

A Of course my husband. Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were
the one who attended the patient. What do you
Q You mean Ben Genosa? mean by abrasion furuncle left axilla?

A Yes, sir. A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes

in contact with something rough substance if
xxx xxx xxx force is applied.

Q What is meant by furuncle axilla?

[Court] /to the witness
A It is secondary of the light infection over the
Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you abrasion.
said?
Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to
A Everytime he got drunk. trauma?
Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is
infliction of injury inflicted on your occurred, after an inflammation of left breast. So, [pain]
your marriage, from that time on, how frequent meaning there is tenderness. When your breast
was the occurrence? is traumatized, there is tenderness pain.
A Everytime he got drunk. Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor?
Q Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in a
month or in a week? xxx xxx xxx

A Three times a week.

Q Were you able to talk with the patient?
Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat
A Yes, sir.
you?
Q What did she tell you?
A Not necessarily that he would beat me but
sometimes he will just quarrel me.” [32] A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know
the cause of these injuries. And she told me that
Referring to his “Out-Patient Chart”[33] on Marivic Genosa at
it was done to her by her husband.
the Philphos Hospital, Dr. Dino D. Caing bolstered her foregoing
testimony on chronic battery in this manner: Q You mean, Ben Genosa?

“Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) A Yes, sir.

incidents which are found in the chart of your
clinic? xxx xxx xxx
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor?

A I did.

Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical
examine the accused sometime in the month of
November, 1995 when this incident happened?
A As per record, yes.
Q What was the date?
A It was on November 6, 1995.
Q So, did you actually see the accused physically?
A Yes, sir.
Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this
Honorable Court, was the patient pregnant?
A Yes, sir.
Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what
stage of pregnancy was she?
A Eight (8) months pregnant.
Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of
pregnancy?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination,
was it an examination about her pregnancy or
for some other findings?
A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache
which complicates her pregnancy.
Q When you said admitted, meaning she was
confined?
A Yes, sir.
Q For how many days?
A One day.
Q Where?
A At PHILPHOS Hospital.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic
Genosa. You said that you were able to
examine her personally on November 6, 1995
and she was 8 months pregnant.
What is this all about?
A Because she has this problem of tension
headache secondary to hypertension and I think
I have a record here, also the same period from
1989 to 1995, she had a consultation for twenty-
three (23) times.
Q For what?
A Tension headache.
Q Can we say that specially during the latter
consultation, that the patient had hypertension?
A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was
refractory to our treatment. She does not
response when the medication was given to her,
because tension headache is more or less
stress related and emotional in nature.
Q What did you deduce of tension headache when
you said is emotional in nature?
24
A From what I deduced as part of our physical
examination of the patient is the family history in
line of giving the root cause of what is causing
this disease. So, from the moment you ask to
the patient all comes from the domestic problem.
Q You mean problem in her household?
A Probably.
Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood
pressure, Doctor?
A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can
cause increases in hypertension which is
unfortunately does not response to the
medication.
Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did
you take the blood pressure of the accused?
A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood
pressure was 180/120.
Q Is this considered hypertension?
A Yes, sir, severe.
Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you
mean this is dangerous level of blood pressure?
A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus.” [34]
Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former
neighbor of the Genosas in Isabel, Leyte, testified that he had
seen the couple quarreling several times; and that on some
occasions Marivic would run to him with bruises, confiding that
the injuries were inflicted upon her by Ben.[35]
Ecel Arano also testified[36] that for a number of times she
had been asked by Marivic to sleep at the Genosa house,
because the latter feared that Ben would come home drunk and
hurt her. On one occasion that Ecel did sleep over, she was
awakened about ten o’clock at night, because the couple “were
very noisy … and I heard something was broken like a vase.”
Then Marivic came running into Ecel’s room and locked the
door. Ben showed up by the window grill atop a chair, scaring
them with a knife.
On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again
asked her help -- this time to find Ben -- but they were unable to.
They returned to the Genosa home, where they found him
already drunk. Again afraid that he might hurt her, Marivic
asked her to sleep at their house. Seeing his state of
drunkenness, Ecel hesitated; and when she heard the couple
start arguing, she decided to leave.
On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben
Genosa, at least three other witnesses saw or heard the couple
quarreling.[37] Marivic relates in detail the following backdrop of
the fateful night when life was snuffed out of him, showing in the
process a vivid picture of his cruelty towards her:
“ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident
in November 15, 1995 in the evening?
A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the
office working then after office hours, I boarded
the service bus and went to Bilwang. When I
reached Bilwang, I immediately asked my son,
where was his father, then my second child said,
‘he was not home yet’. I was worried because
that was payday, I was anticipating that he was
gambling. So while waiting for him, my eldest

son arrived from school, I prepared dinner for
my children.
Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?
A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel
looking for him.
Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for
him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you come back to your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence
situated this time?
A Bilwang.
Q Is this your house or you are renting?
A Renting.
Q What time were you able to come back in your
residence at Bilwang?
A I went back around almost 8:00 o’clock.
Q What happened when you arrived in your
residence?
A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I
requested to sleep with me at that time because
I had fears that he was again drunk and I was
worried that he would again beat me so I
requested my cousin to sleep with me, but she
resisted because she had fears that the same
thing will happen again last year.
Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested
to sleep with you?
A Ecel Araño, the one who testified.
Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that
evening?
A No, because she expressed fears, she said her
father would not allow her because of Ben.
Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you
pregnant?
A Yes, 8 months.
Q How advance was your pregnancy?
A Eight (8) months.
Q Was the baby subsequently born?
A Yes, sir.
Q What’s the name of the baby you were carrying at
that time?
A Marie Bianca.
Q What time were you able to meet personally your
husband?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time?
25
A When I arrived home, he was there already in his
usual behavior.
Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition?
A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual
unruly behavior.
Q What was he yelling all about?
A His usual attitude when he got drunk.
Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and
yelling at you? What else did he do if any?
A He is nagging at me for following him and he
dared me to quarrel him.
Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling
at you if you know?
A He was angry at me because I was following x x
x him, looking for him. I was just worried he
might be overly drunk and he would beat me
again.
Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did
he do to you if any?
A He was nagging at me at that time and I just
ignore him because I want to avoid trouble for
fear that he will beat me again. Perhaps he was
disappointed because I just ignore him of his
provocation and he switch off the light and I said
to him, ‘why did you switch off the light when the
children were there.’ At that time I was also
attending to my children who were doing their
assignments. He was angry with me for not
answering his challenge, so he went to the
kitchen and [got] a bolo and cut the antenna wire
to stop me from watching television.
Q What did he do with the bolo?
A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from
watching T.V.
Q What else happened after he cut the wire?
A He switch off the light and the children were
shouting because they were scared and he was
already holding the bolo.
Q How do you described this bolo?
A 1 1/2 feet.
Q What was the bolo used for usually?
A For chopping meat.
Q You said the children were scared, what else
happened as Ben was carrying that bolo?
A He was about to attack me so I run to the room.
Q What do you mean that he was about to attack
you?
A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he
whirled me and I fell to the bedside.
Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you?
A I screamed for help and then he left.
Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell
on the bedside?
A Yes, sir.

Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know
where he was going?
A Outside perhaps to drink more.
Q When he left what did you do in that particular
time?
A I packed all his clothes.
Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?
A I wanted him to leave us.
Q During this time, where were your children, what
were their reactions?
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and
he got angry with me for packing his clothes,
then he dragged me again of the bedroom
holding my neck.
Q You said that when Ben came back to your
house, he dragged you? How did he drag you?
COURT INTERPRETER:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her
right hand flexed forcibly in her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get
something and then he kept on shouting at me
that ‘you might as well be killed so there will be
nobody to nag me.’
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the
drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(At this juncture the witness started crying).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that
drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was
about to open the drawer but he could not open
it because he did not have the key then he
pulled his wallet which contained a blade about
3 inches long and I was aware that he was going
to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the
wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to
open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that
long, and when he was about to pick-up the
wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to
the other room, and on that very moment
everything on my mind was to pity on myself,
then the feeling I had on that very moment was
the same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS
Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER:
26
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your
room?
A Outside.
Q In what part of the house?
A Dining.
Q Where were the children during that time?
A My children were already asleep.
Q You mean they were inside the room?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record
will you please describe this blade about 3
inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.
Q Is it a flexible blade?
A It’s a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both
edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he
intimidate me.” [38]
In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to
testify as an expert witness to assist it in understanding the
psyche of a battered person. She had met with Marivic Genosa
for five sessions totaling about seventeen hours. Based on their
talks, the former briefly related the latter’s ordeal to the court a
quo as follows:
“Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a
battered wife? Could you in layman’s term
describe to this Court what her life was like as
said to you?
A: What I remember happened then was it was
more than ten years, that she was suffering
emotional anguish. There were a lot of
instances of abuses, to emotional abuse, to
verbal abuse and to physical abuse. The
husband had a very meager income, she was
the one who was practically the bread earner of
the family. The husband was involved in a lot of
vices, going out with barkadas, drinking, even
womanizing being involved in cockfight and
going home very angry and which will trigger a
lot of physical abuse. She also had the
experience a lot of taunting from the husband for
the reason that the husband even accused her
of infidelity, the husband was saying that the
child she was carrying was not his own. So she
was very angry, she was at the same time very
depressed because she was also aware, almost

like living in purgatory or even hell when it was
happening day in and day out.” [39]
In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not
merely elicited, but wittingly or unwittingly put forward, additional
supporting evidence as shown below:
“Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this
case in 1999, where you talked to her about
three hours, what was the most relevant
information did you gather?
A The most relevant information was the tragedy
that happened. The most important information
were escalating abuses that she had
experienced during her marital life.
Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we
presume that you already knew of the facts of
the case or at least you have substantial
knowledge of the facts of the case?
A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not
know whether I can consider them as
substantial.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that
on the side of her husband they were fond of
battering their wives?
A I also heard that from her?
Q You heard that from her?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the
relatives of her husband that were fond of
battering their wives?
A What I remember that there were brothers of her
husband who are also battering their wives.
Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance
that she stayed in a hotel in Ormoc where her
husband followed her and battered [her] several
times in that room?
A She told me about that.
Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?
A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she
was battered in that room.
Q Several times in that room?
A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no
problem about being battered, it really
happened.
Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not
complete on saying this matter. I think that is
the first time that we have this in the Philippines,
what is your opinion?
A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife
and in this kind happened, it was really a self-
defense. I also believe that there had been
provocation and I also believe that she became
a disordered person. She had to suffer anxiety
reaction because of all the battering that
happened and so she became an abnormal
person who had lost she’s not during the time
and that is why it happened because of all the
27
physical battering, emotional battering, all the
psychological abuses that she had experienced
from her husband.
Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she
extremely battered?
A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes.[40]
Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was
demonstrated as follows:
“Q And you also said that you administered [the]
objective personality test, what x x x [is this] all
about?
A The objective personality test is the Millon
Clinical Multiaxial Inventory. The purpose of that
test is to find out about the lying prone[ne]ss of
the person.
Q What do you mean by that?
A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling
me the truth, or is she someone who can
exaggerate or x x x [will] tell a lie[?]
Q And what did you discover on the basis of this
objective personality test?
A She was a person who passed the honesty test.
Meaning she is a person that I can trust. That
the data that I’m gathering from her are the
truth.”[41]
The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr.
Alfredo Pajarillo, testified on his Psychiatric Report,[42] which was
based on his interview and examination of Marivic Genosa. The
Report said that during the first three years of her marriage to
Ben, everything looked good -- the atmosphere was fine, normal
and happy -- until “Ben started to be attracted to other girls and
was also enticed in[to] gambling[,] especially cockfighting. x x x.
At the same time Ben was often joining his barkada in drinking
sprees.”
The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he
showed toward his family, particularly to his wife. The Report
continued: “At first, it was verbal and emotional abuses but as
time passed, he became physically abusive. Marivic claimed
that the viciousness of her husband was progressive every time
he got drunk. It was a painful ordeal Marivic had to anticipate
whenever she suspected that her husband went for a drinking
[spree]. They had been married for twelve years[;] and
practically more than eight years, she was battered and
maltreated relentlessly and mercilessly by her husband
whenever he was drunk.”
Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts
were in vain. Further quoting from the Report, “[s]he also sought
the advice and help of close relatives and well-meaning friends
in spite of her feeling ashamed of what was happening to her.
But incessant battering became more and more frequent and
more severe. x x x.”[43]
From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no
doubt in the Court’s mind that Appellant Marivic Genosa was a
severely abused person.
Effect of Battery on Appellant
Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by
the abused woman, her state of mind metamorphoses. In
determining her state of mind, we cannot rely merely on the
 28

judgment of an ordinary, reasonable person who is evaluating to believe that anything she can do will have a predictable
the events immediately surrounding the incident. A Canadian positive effect.”[52]
court has aptly pointed out that expert evidence on the
A study[53] conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at
psychological effect of battering on wives and common law
the University of Pennsylvania, found that “even if a person has
partners are both relevant and necessary. “How can the mental
control over a situation, but believes that she does not, she will
state of the appellant be appreciated without it? The average
be more likely to respond to that situation with coping responses
member of the public may ask: Why would a woman put up with
rather than trying to escape.” He said that it was the cognitive
this kind of treatment? Why should she continue to live with
aspect -- the individual’s thoughts -- that proved all-important.
such a man? How could she love a partner who beat her to the
He referred to this phenomenon as “learned helplessness.”
point of requiring hospitalization? We would expect the woman
“[T]he truth or facts of a situation turn out to be less important
to pack her bags and go. Where is her self-respect? Why does
than the individual’s set of beliefs or perceptions concerning the
she not cut loose and make a new life for herself? Such is the
situation. Battered women don’t attempt to leave the battering
reaction of the average person confronted with the so-called
situation, even when it may seem to outsiders that escape is
‘battered wife syndrome.’”[44]
possible, because they cannot predict their own safety; they
To understand the syndrome properly, however, one’s believe that nothing they or anyone else does will alter their
viewpoint should not be drawn from that of an ordinary, terrible circumstances.”[54]
reasonable person. What goes on in the mind of a person who
Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is
has been subjected to repeated, severe beatings may not be
somehow responsible for the violent behavior of her partner, she
consistent with -- nay, comprehensible to -- those who have not
also believes that he is capable of killing her, and that there is no
been through a similar experience. Expert opinion is essential to
escape.[55] Battered women feel unsafe, suffer from pervasive
clarify and refute common myths and misconceptions about
anxiety, and usually fail to leave the relationship. [56] Unless a
battered women.[45]
shelter is available, she stays with her husband, not only
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well because she typically lacks a means of self-support, but also
as her research on domestic violence, has had a significant because she fears that if she leaves she would be found and
impact in the United States and the United Kingdom on the hurt even more.[57]
treatment and prosecution of cases, in which a battered woman
In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for
is charged with the killing of her violent partner. The
specific evidence establishing that appellant, due to the repeated
psychologist explains that the cyclical nature of the violence
abuse she had suffered from her spouse over a long period of
inflicted upon the battered woman immobilizes the latter’s “ability
time, became afflicted with the battered woman syndrome. We,
to act decisively in her own interests, making her feel trapped in
however, failed to find sufficient evidence that would support
the relationship with no means of escape.”[46] In her years of
such a conclusion. More specifically, we failed to find ample
research, Dr. Walker found that “the abuse often escalates at the
evidence that would confirm the presence of the essential
point of separation and battered women are in greater danger of
characteristics of BWS.
dying then.”[47]
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the
Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said
“cycle of violence” supposedly characterizing the relationship of
that “the battered woman usually has a very low opinion of
Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering
herself. She has x x x self-defeating and self-sacrificing
incidents. In relating to the court a quo how the fatal incident
characteristics. x x x [W]hen the violence would happen, they
that led to the death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described
usually think that they provoke[d] it, that they were the one[s]
the tension-building phase of the cycle. She was able to explain
who precipitated the violence[; that] they provoke[d] their spouse
in adequate detail the typical characteristics of this stage.
to be physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to them.”[48]
However, that single incident does not prove the existence of the
According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a syndrome. In other words, she failed to prove that in at least
battered woman does not readily leave an abusive partner -- another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a
poverty, self-blame and guilt arising from the latter’s belief that similar pattern.
she provoked the violence, that she has an obligation to keep
How did the tension between the partners usually arise or
the family intact at all cost for the sake of their children, and that
build up prior to acute battering? How did Marivic normally
she is the only hope for her spouse to change.[49]
respond to Ben’s relatively minor abuses? What means did she
The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is employ to try to prevent the situation from developing into the
also helpful. He had previously testified in suits involving violent next (more violent) stage?
family relations, having evaluated “probably ten to twenty
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to
thousand” violent family disputes within the Armed Forces of the
the third phase of the cycle. She simply mentioned that she
Philippines, wherein such cases abounded. As a result of his
would usually run away to her mother’s or father’s house; [58]that
experience with domestic violence cases, he became a
Ben would seek her out, ask for her forgiveness and promise to
consultant of the Battered Woman Office in Quezon City. As
change; and that believing his words, she would return to their
such, he got involved in about forty (40) cases of severe
common abode.
domestic violence, in which the physical abuse on the woman
would sometimes even lead to her loss of consciousness.[50] Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents
between her and her spouse? Did she believe that she was the
Dr. Pajarillo explained that “overwhelming brutality, trauma”
only hope for Ben to reform? And that she was the sole support
could result in posttraumatic stress disorder, a form of “anxiety
of his emotional stability and well-being? Conversely, how
neurosis or neurologic anxietism.”[51] After being repeatedly and
dependent was she on him? Did she feel helpless and trapped in
severely abused, battered persons “may believe that they are
their relationship? Did both of them regard death as preferable
essentially helpless, lacking power to change their situation. x x
to separation?
x [A]cute battering incidents can have the effect of stimulating
the development of coping responses to the trauma at the In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself
expense of the victim’s ability to muster an active response to try her factual experiences and thoughts that would clearly and fully
to escape further trauma. Furthermore, x x x the victim ceases demonstrate the essential characteristics of the syndrome.

The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the
expert witnesses for the defense. Indeed, they were able to
explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and scientifically, how the
personality of the battered woman usually evolved or
deteriorated as a result of repeated and severe beatings inflicted
upon her by her partner or spouse. They corroborated each
other’s testimonies, which were culled from their numerous
studies of hundreds of actual cases. However, they failed to
present in court the factual experiences and thoughts that
appellant had related to them -- if at all -- based on which they
concluded that she had BWS.
We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a
modifying circumstance must be proven in order to be
appreciated. To repeat, the records lack supporting evidence
that would establish all the essentials of the battered woman
syndrome as manifested specifically in the case of the Genosas.
BWS as Self-Defense
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a
relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the
woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be
considered in the context of self-defense.[59]
From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court
reckons further that crucial to the BWS defense is the state of
mind of the battered woman at the time of the offense [60] -- she
must have actually feared imminent harm from her batterer and
honestly believed in the need to kill him in order to save her life.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the
one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on one’s
life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and
actual, not merely imaginary.[61] Thus, the Revised Penal Code
provides the following requisites and effect of self-defense:[62]
“Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur
any criminal liability:
“1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights,
provided that the following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.”
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-
defense.[63] It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack
-- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a
person.[64] In the present case, however, according to the
testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval
between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack
upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his
violent behavior and escape to their children’s bedroom. During
that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The
reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended
altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an
actual threat on her life or safety.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of
their children’s bedroom -- and based on past violent incidents,
there was a great probability that he would still have pursued her
and inflicted graver harm -- then, the imminence of the real
threat upon her life would not have ceased yet. Where the
brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further
evidence of actual physical assault at the time of the killing is not
29
required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a
predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an
obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life “would
amount to sentencing her to ‘murder by installment.’”[65] Still,
impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in
previous battering episodes) prior to the defendant’s use of
deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or
communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger.
[66]
Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS,
self-defense may be appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous,
does not warrant self-defense.[67] In the absence of such
aggression, there can be no self-defense -- complete or
incomplete -- on the part of the victim.[68] Thus, Marivic’s killing of
Ben was not completely justified under the circumstances.
Mitigating Circumstances Present
In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not
raise any other modifying circumstances that would alter her
penalty, we deem it proper to evaluate and appreciate in her
favor circumstances that mitigate her criminal liability. It is a
hornbook doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens it
wholly for review on any issue, including that which has not been
raised by the parties.[69]
From several psychological tests she had administered to
Marivic, Dra. Dayan, in her Psychological Evaluation Report
dated November 29, 2000, opined as follows:
“This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The
repeated battering Marivic experienced with her husband
constitutes a form of [cumulative] provocation which broke down
her psychological resistance and natural self-control. It is very
clear that she developed heightened sensitivity to sight of
impending danger her husband posed continuously. Marivic truly
experienced at the hands of her abuser husband a state of
psychological paralysis which can only be ended by an act of
violence on her part.” [70]
Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He
explained that the effect of “repetitious pain taking, repetitious
battering, [and] repetitious maltreatment” as well as the severity
and the prolonged administration of the battering is
posttraumatic stress disorder.[71] Expounding thereon, he said:
“Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?
A What causes the trauma is probably the
repetitious battering. Second, the severity of the
battering. Third, the prolonged administration of
battering or the prolonged commission of the
battering and the psychological and
constitutional stamina of the victim and another
one is the public and social support available to
the victim. If nobody is interceding, the more
she will go to that disorder....
xxx xxx xxx
Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the
qualifications in terms of severity of the
postraumatic stress disorder, Dr. Pajarillo?
A The severity is the most severe continuously to
trig[g]er this post[t]raumatic stress disorder is
injury to the head, banging of the head like that.
It is usually the very very severe stimulus that

precipitate this post[t]raumatic stress disorder.
Others are suffocating the victim like holding a
pillow on the face, strangulating the individual,
suffocating the individual, and boxing the
individual. In this situation therefore, the victim
is heightened to painful stimulus, like for
example she is pregnant, she is very susceptible
because the woman will not only protect herself,
she is also to protect the fetus. So the anxiety is
heightened to the end [sic] degree.
Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr.
Witness, how do you classify?
A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or
delayed or [a]typical.
Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification
you called delayed or [atypical]?
A The acute is the one that usually require only one
battering and the individual will manifest now a
severe emotional instability, higher irritability
remorse, restlessness, and fear and probably in
most [acute] cases the first thing will be
happened to the individual will be thinking of
suicide.
Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?
A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering,
repetitious maltreatment, any prolonged, it is
longer than six (6) months. The [acute] is only
the first day to six (6) months. After this six (6)
months you become chronic. It is stated in the
book specifically that after six (6) months is
chronic. The [a]typical one is the repetitious
battering but the individual who is abnormal and
then become normal. This is how you get
neurosis from neurotic personality of these
cases of post[t]raumatic stress disorder.” [72]
Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the
expert witness clarified further:
“Q But just the same[,] neurosis especially on
battered woman syndrome x x x affects x x x
his or her mental capacity?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her
rationality?
A Of course obfuscated.”[73]
In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence
inflicted upon appellant resulted in “cumulative provocation
which broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-
control,” “psychological paralysis,” and “difficulty in concentrating
or impairment of memory.”
Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such
manifestations were analogous to an illness that diminished the
exercise by appellant of her will power without, however,
depriving her of consciousness of her acts. There was, thus, a
resulting diminution of her freedom of action, intelligence or
intent. Pursuant to paragraphs 9[74] and 10[75] of Article 13 of the
Revised Penal Code, this circumstance should be taken in her
favor and considered as a mitigating factor. [76]
In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the
extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so
powerful as to have naturally produced passion and
obfuscation. It has been held that this state of mind is present
when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst
30
of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a
legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. [77] To
appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should
concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to
produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far
removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable
length of time, during which the accused might recover her
normal equanimity.[78]
Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa
was the unlawful aggressor, preceded his being killed by
Marivic. He had further threatened to kill her while dragging her
by the neck towards a cabinet in which he had kept a gun. It
should also be recalled that she was eight months pregnant at
the time. The attempt on her life was likewise on that of her
fetus.[79]His abusive and violent acts, an aggression which was
directed at the lives of both Marivic and her unborn child,
naturally produced passion and obfuscation overcoming her
reason. Even though she was able to retreat to a separate
room, her emotional and mental state continued. According to
her, she felt her blood pressure rise; she was filled with feelings
of self-pity and of fear that she and her baby were about to die.
In a fit of indignation, she pried open the cabinet drawer where
Ben kept a gun, then she took the weapon and used it to shoot
him.
The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion
that there was no considerable period of time within which
Marivic could have recovered her normal equanimity. Helpful is
Dr. Pajarillo’s testimony[80] that with “neurotic anxiety” -- a
psychological effect on a victim of “overwhelming brutality [or]
trauma” -- the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were
real, although she is not actually being beaten at the time. She
cannot control “re-experiencing the whole thing, the most vicious
and the trauma that she suffered.” She thinks “of nothing but the
suffering.” Such reliving which is beyond the control of a person
under similar circumstances, must have been what Marivic
experienced during the brief time interval and prevented her from
recovering her normal equanimity. Accordingly, she should
further be credited with the mitigating circumstance of passion
and obfuscation.
It should be clarified that these two circumstances --
psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did
not arise from the same set of facts.
On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the
cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the
batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings
over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis,
which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of
her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her
acts.
The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from
the violent aggression he had inflicted on her prior to the killing.
That the incident occurred when she was eight months pregnant
with their child was deemed by her as an attempt not only on her
life, but likewise on that of their unborn child. Such perception
naturally produced passion and obfuscation on her part.
Second Legal Issue:
Treachery
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes
against persons by employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense
that the offended party might make.[81] In order to qualify an act
as treacherous, the circumstances invoked must be proven as
indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from
mere inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the

appreciation of evidence.[82] Because of the gravity of the
resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as
the killing itself.[83]
Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the
trial court imposed the penalty of death upon appellant. It
inferred this qualifying circumstances merely from the fact that
the lifeless body of Ben had been found lying in bed with an
“open, depressed, circular” fracture located at the back of his
head. As to exactly how and when he had been fatally attacked,
however, the prosecution failed to establish indubitably. Only the
following testimony of appellant leads us to the events
surrounding his death:
“Q You said that when Ben came back to your
house, he dragged you? How did he drag you?
COURT:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her
right hand flexed forcibly in her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get
something and then he kept on shouting at me
that ‘you might as well be killed so there will be
nobody to nag me’
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the
drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER
(At this juncture the witness started crying)
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that
drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was
about to open the drawer but he could not open
it because he did not have the key then he
pulled his wallet which contained a blade about
3 inches long and I was aware that he was going
to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the
wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to
open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that
long, and when he was about to pick-up the
wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to
the other room, and on that very moment
everything on my mind was to pity on myself,
then the feeling I had on that very moment was
the same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS
Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxx xxx xxx
31
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record
will you please describe this blade about 3
inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and ½ inch wide.
Q It is a flexible blade?
A It’s a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both
edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he
intimidate me.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it
correct?
A Yes, because I smashed him.
Q What happened?
A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I
pick-up the pipe and I smashed him and I ran to
the other room.
Q What else happened?
A When I was in the other room, I felt the same
thing like what happened before when I was
admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to
vomit. I know my blood pressure was raised. I
was frightened I was about to die because of my
blood pressure.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and
smashed him, the witness at the same time
pointed at the back of her neck or the nape).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said you went to the room, what else
happened?
A Considering all the physical sufferings that I’ve
been through with him, I took pity on myself and
I felt I was about to die also because of my
blood pressure and the baby, so I got that gun
and I shot him.
COURT
/to Atty. Tabucanon
Q You shot him?
A Yes, I distorted the drawer.”[84]
The above testimony is insufficient to establish the
presence of treachery. There is no showing of the victim’s
position relative to appellant’s at the time of the shooting.
Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is
preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased

may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated
aggression from the assailant.[85]
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of
assault adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously
and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of
accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense
that might be put up by the party attacked. [86] There is no
showing, though, that the present appellant intentionally chose a
specific means of successfully attacking her husband without
any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make.
To the contrary, it appears that the thought of using the gun
occurred to her only at about the same moment when she
decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In the absence of any
convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately employed
the method by which she committed the crime in order to ensure
its execution, this Court resolves the doubt in her favor.[87]
Proper Penalty
The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Since two
mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance have
been found to have attended the commission of the offense, the
penalty shall be lowered by one (1) degree, pursuant to Article
64 of paragraph 5[88] of the same Code.[89] The penalty
ofreclusion temporal in its medium period is imposable,
considering that two mitigating circumstances are to be taken
into account in reducing the penalty by one degree, and no other
modifying circumstances were shown to have attended the
commission of the offense.[90] Under the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the minimum of the penalty shall be within the range of that
which is next lower in degree -- prision mayor -- and the
maximum shall be within the range of the medium period
of reclusion temporal.
Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we
deem it just and proper to impose the penalty of prision mayor in
its minimum period, or six (6) years and one (1) day in prison as
minimum; to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years
8 months and 1 day as maximum. Noting that appellant has
already served the minimum period, she may now apply for and
be released from detention on parole.[91]
Epilogue
Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered
woman syndrome was neither easy nor simple to analyze and
recognize vis-à-vis the given set of facts in the present case.
The Court agonized on how to apply the theory as a modern-day
reality. It took great effort beyond the normal manner in which
decisions are made -- on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence applicable to the proven facts. To give a just and
proper resolution of the case, it endeavored to take a good look
at studies conducted here and abroad in order to understand the
intricacies of the syndrome and the distinct personality of the
chronically abused person. Certainly, the Court has learned
much. And definitely, the solicitor general and appellant’s
counsel, Atty. Katrina Legarda, have helped it in such learning
process.
While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered
persons, we can only work within the limits of law, jurisprudence
and given facts. We cannot make or invent them. Neither can
we amend the Revised Penal Code. Only Congress, in its
wisdom, may do so.
32
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of
self-defense arising from the battered woman syndrome. We
now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the
cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least
two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate
partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the
killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered
person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her
batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in
order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer
must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and
actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of
violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken
altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of
self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case,
however, not all of these elements were duly established.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa
for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2)
mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance
attending her commission of the offense, her penalty
is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the
minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau
of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody
upon due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she
is being held for some other lawful cause. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
January 13, 2016
G.R. No. 211062
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MANUEL MACAL y BOLASCO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Violence between husband and wife is nothing new. Marital
violence that leads to spousal killing is parricide. Perceived as a
horrific kind of killing, penal laws impose a harsher penalty on
persons found guilty of parricide compared to those who commit
the felony of homicide.
For review is the June 28, 2013 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR H.C. No. 01209 which
affirmed with modification the August 18, 2009 Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, Branch 6, convicting
Manuel Macal y Bolasco (accused-appellant) of the crime of
parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
The Facts
For allegedly killing his spouse, Auria Ytac Macal (Auria), the
accused-appellant was charged with the crime of parricide in a
February 13, 2003 Information3 that reads:
"That on or about the 12th day of February, 2003, in the City of
Tacloban, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, MANUEL MACAL y BOLASO,
did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with
evident premeditation, that is, having conceived and deliberated
to kill his wife, AURIA MACAL y YTAC, with whom he was united
in lawful wedlock, armed with an improvised bladed weapon (belt
buckle) and a kitchen knife, stab said Auria Macal on the front

portion of her body inflicting a fatal wound which caused her
death, which incident happened inside the bedroom of the house
they are residing.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
On July 7, 2003, upon arraignment, the accused-appellant, duly
assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge of
parricide.4 During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to
stipulate that Auria was the wife of the accused-
appellant.5 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
To prove the accusation, the prosecution presented Angeles Ytac
(Angeles) and Erwin Silvano (Erwin) as witnesses.
Angeles, the mother of Auria, narrated that Auria and the
accused-appellant got married in March 2000 and that out of
their union, they begot two (2) children. Angeles claimed that, at
the time of the incident, they were all living together in a house
located in V & G Subdivision, Tacloban City. The said house was
entrusted to Angeles by her brother, Quirino Ragub, who was
then residing in Canada.
Angeles testified that at around 1:20 in the morning of February
12, 2003, she, her children Catherine, Jessica, Auria and Arvin
were walking home after playing bingo at a (EVRMC) for medical treatment.
local peryahan. Some friends tagged along with them so that
they could all feast on the leftover food prepared for the fiesta
that was celebrated the previous day. Along the way, Angeles
and her group met Auria's husband, the accused appellant. The
latter joined them in walking back to their house.
When they arrived at the house, the group proceeded to the
living room except for Auria and the accused-appellant who went
straight to their bedroom, about four (4) meters away from the
living room. Shortly thereafter, Angeles heard her daughter Auria
shouting, "mother help me I am going to be killed."6 Upon
hearing Auria's plea for help, Angeles and the rest of her
companions raced towards the bedroom but they found the door
of the room locked. Arvin kicked open the door of the bedroom
and there they all saw a bloodied Auria on one side of the room.
Next to Auria was the accused-appellant who was then trying to
stab himself with the use of an improvised bladed weapon (belt
buckle). Auria was immediately taken to a hospital, on board a
vehicle owned by a neighbor, but was pronounced dead on
arrival. Angeles declared that the accused-appellant jumped over
the fence and managed to escape before the policemen could
reach the crime scene.
Erwin corroborated Angeles' testimony that Auria was killed by
the accused-appellant. Erwin claimed that he was part of the
group that went to Angeles' residence on that fateful morning.
From where he was seated in the living room, Erwin recounted
that he heard Auria's screaming for her mother's help. The cry for
help prompted him to ran towards the bedroom. Once the door
was forcibly opened, Erwin became aware that the accused-
appellant stabbed Auria on the upper left portion of her chest
with a stainless knife. Erwin testified that the accused-appellant
stabbed himself on the chest with a knife-like belt buckle and
that soon after, the accused-appellant hurriedly left the house.
The prosecution formally offered in evidence the Certificate of
Death wherein it is indicated that Auria died of hemorrhagic
shock secondary to stab wound.7
Version of the Defense
To substantiate its version of the fact, the defense called to the
witness stand the accused-appellant, Benito Billota (Benito) and
Nerissa Alcantara (Nerissa).1âwphi1
The accused-appellant did not refute the factual allegations of
the prosecution that he stabbed his wife, resulting in the latter's
33
death, but seeks exoneration from criminal liability by interposing
the defense that the stabbing was accidental and not intentional.
The accused-appellant admitted that he was married to Auria in
March 2000 and the wedding was held in Manila. The couple
had two children but one of them died. According to the accused-
appellant, he was employed as a security guard by Fighter Wing
Security Agency which was based in Manila. While the accused-
appellant was working in Manila, his family lived with Angeles in
Tacloban City. The accused-appellant came home only once a
year to his family in Tacloban City.
On February 12, 2003, the accused-appellant arrived home in V
& G Subdivision, Tacloban City from Manila. Before the accused-
appellant could reach the bedroom, he was warned by Arvin, his
brother-in-law, not to go inside the bedroom where his wife was
with a man for he might be killed. Ignoring Arvin's admonition,
the accused-appellant kicked the door but it was opened from
the inside. After the bedroom door was opened, the accused-
appellant saw his wife and a man seated beside each other
conversing. Furious by what he had seen, the accused-appellant
went out of the room, got a knife and delivered a stab blow
towards the man but the latter was shielded by Auria. In the
process, the stab blow landed on Auria. After Auria was
accidentally stabbed, the man ran outside and fled. The
accused-appellant testified that out of frustration for not killing
the man, he wounded himself on the chest. He then left the
house and went to Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center
Benito attested that he came to know the accused-appellant
while they were seated next to each other on board a
Christopher Bus bound for Tacloban City. The bus they were
riding reached Tacloban City past midnight of February 12, 2003.
Considering the lateness of the hour and there was no bus
available that would take Benito to his final destination, the
accused-appellant convinced Benito to simply go home with him.
Once they got home, the accused-appellant went inside the
house while Benito opted to stay by the main door. The accused-
appellant asked someone from the living room the whereabouts
of his wife, Auria. Benito testified that a female informed the
accused-appellant that Auria was inside the bedroom but
advised him not to go in as Auria was not alone in the room.
Undettered, the accused-appellant proceeded to the bedroom
and was able to get inside the room. Moments later, Benito
heard a thudding sound coming from the bedroom. Then, Benito
saw a man running out of the house. Sensing trouble, Benito
immediately proceeded to the bus terminal.
To support the accused-appellant's claim that he brought himself
to a hospital on February 12, 2003, Nerissa, the Administrative
Officer/OIC Records Officer of EVRMC, was presented as
witness for the defense. Her testimony focused on the existence
of the medical record concerning the examination conducted on
the accused-appellant by a physician at EVRMC. Per hospital
record, Nerissa confirmed that the accused-appellant sustained
a three-centimeter wound located at the left parastemal, level of
the 5th ICS non-penetrating and another lacerated wound in the
left anterior chest.8
The RTC's Ruling
The RTC convicted the accused-appellant of the crime of
parricide and the dispositive portion of its judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this
Court finds accused MANUEL MACAL y BOLASCOguilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide, and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of RECLUSION PERPETUA; to pay the heirs of the victim,
Aurea Ytac Macal, P.50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and
P.50,000.00 for moral damages. And, to pay the Costs.
SO ORDERED.9
The RTC gave full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. In contrast, the RTC found accused-appellant's

declarations doubtful and contrary to human experience and
reason. The RTC was not persuaded by the accused-appellant's
argument that the stabbing incident was purely accidental after it
took into account Auria's terrifying wail that she was going to be
killed. The RTC also refused to believe accused-appellant's
claim that there was a man with Auria inside the bedroom. Logic
dictates that a man in that situation would normally run away the
first opportunity he had specifically when the accused-appellant
stepped out of the bedroom to obtain a knife. The RTC even
went further by saying that the accused-appellant injured himself
so that he can later on invoke self-defense which he failed to do
as there are witnesses who can easily disprove his theory of
self-defense.
The CA 's Ruling
On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC decision.
The fallo of the CA decision states:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby
AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the assailed Decision dated
August 18, 2009, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Tacloban
City in Criminal Case No. 2003-02-92. Accused-Appellant
MANUEL MACAL y BOLASCO is found GUILTY of parricide
committed against his legal wife, Auria Ytac Macal, on February
12, 2003 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of Auria Ytac
Macal the amounts of Php 50,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php
50,000.00 as moral damages, Php 25,000.00 as temperate
damages and Php 30,000.00 as exemplary damages. All
monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal
rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.10
The appellate court ruled that all the elements of parricide are
present in this case. Moreover, the CA reasoned out that while
Angeles did not actually see the accused-appellant stab Auria,
the prosecution adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to
sustain his conviction. From the viewpoint of the CA, the
prosecution's case against the accused-appellant was
strengthened by the latter's own testimony and admission that he
stabbed his wife. The CA further held that neither can the act of
the accused-appellant be covered under the exempting
circumstance of accident under Article 12(4)11 of the Revised
Penal Code nor under absolutory cause found in Article 24 12 of
the same Code.
Hence, this appeal.
The Issue
The principal issue before the Court is whether the court a
quo erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide.
In the resolution of March 10, 2014, the Court required the
parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs within thirty
(30) days from notice. However, both parties manifested that
they will no longer file the required briefs as they had already
exhaustively and extensively discussed all the matters and
issues of this case in the briefs earlier submitted with the CA.
The Court's Ruling
The Court affirms the conviction of the accused-appellant with
modifications.
All the Essential Elements of Parricide Duly Established and
Proven by the Prosecution
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the
deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father,
mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate
34
other ascendants or other descendants, or the legitimate spouse
of the accused.13
Among the three requisites, the relationship between the
offender and the victim is the most crucial. 14 This relationship is
what actually distinguishes the crime of parricide from
homicide.15 In parricide involving spouses, the best proof of the
relationship between the offender and victim is their marriage
certificate.16 Oral evidence may also be considered in proving the
relationship between the two as long as such proof is not
contested.17
In this case, the spousal relationship between Auria and the
accused-appellant is beyond dispute. As previously stated, the
defense already admitted that Auria was the legitimate wife of
the accused-appellant during the pre-trial conference. Such
admission was even reiterated by the accused-appellant in the
course of trial of the case. Nevertheless, the prosecution
produced a copy of the couple's marriage certificate which the
defense admitted to be a genuine and faithful reproduction of the
original.18 Hence, the key element that qualifies the killing to
parricide was satisfactorily demonstrated in this case.
Just like the marital relationship between Auria and the accused-
appellant, the fact of Auria's death is incontestable. Witnesses,
from both the prosecution and defense, were in agreement that
Auria expired on February 12, 2003. As additional proof of her
demise, the prosecution presented Auria's Certificate of Death
which was admitted by the RTC and the defense did not object
to its admissibility.
Anent the remaining element, there is no doubt that Auria was
killed by the accused-appellant. The stabbing incident was
acknowledged by the accused-appellant himself during his direct
examination by defense counsel Emelinda Maquilan, to wit:
xxxx
Q: What is the name of your wife?
A: Aurea Ytac.
Q: You said you saw your wife in your room with a man. Now,
what was the man doing when you saw this man together with
your wife?
A: They were conversing.
Q: They were conversing in what part of your room?
A: At one side of the room.
Q: So, what did you do upon seeing the man, if there was any?
A: Because of my anger, I stabbed the man.
Q: Were you able to hit the man?
A: No, because my wife shielded him.
Q: Since your wife shielded the man, what happened to your
wife?
A: My wife got hit.
Q: Now, in what of the body of his wife was hit?
A: I cannot exactly tell where she was hit but he delivered a
stabbing blow at the man.
Q: So, after your wife was hit by the stabbing blow to be directed
to the man, what happened next?

A: Out of desperation because I was not able to kill the man, I
wounded myself.
Q: How about the man whom you wanted to stab, what
happened to him?
A: He ran.
Q: Since you said your wife was hit by that stabbing blow, what
happen to your wife then?
A: She died.
Q: How about you, what happened to you after you yourself?
A: I left the place.19
The outright admission of the accused-appellant in open court
that he delivered the fatal stabbing blow that ended Auria's life
established his culpability.
Clearly, all the elements of the crime of parricide as defined in
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code are present in this case.
Affirmative Defense of Accident as an Exempting
Circumstance Must Fail
The defense invoked Article 12 paragraph 4 of the Revised
Penal Code to release the accused-appellant from criminal
liability. Pursuant to said provision, the essential requisites of
accident as an exempting circumstance are: (1) a person is
performing a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3) he causes an injury
to another by mere accident; and (4) without fault or intention of
causing it.20
A close scrutiny of the transcripts of stenographic notes would
reveal that the accused-appellant was not performing a lawful
act at the time Auria was stabbed. This can be gathered from the
narration of the accused-appellant during cross-examination
conducted by Prosecutor Percival Dolina:
xxxx
Q: Now, of course, when you saw the man and your wife,
according to you, they were just conversing with each other,
correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How far where they to each other?
A: They were beside each other.
Q: They were sitting?
A: Yes, sir, both were sitting.
Q: Of course, when you saw them, you got angry?
A: I became angry.
Q: That is why you got a knife and stabbed the man?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when you stabbed the man, you had the intention to kill
him?
A: Yes, my intention was to kill him.
Q: But it was your wife who was hit?
35
A: My wife was the one hit.21
The defense of accident presupposes lack of intention to
kill.22 This certainly does not hold true in the instant case based
on the aforequoted testimony of the accused-appellant.
Moreover, the prosecution witnesses, who were then within
hearing distance from the bedroom, testified that they distinctly
heard Auria screaming that she was going to be killed by the
accused-appellant.
Given these testimonies, the accused-appellant's defense of
accident is negated as he was carrying out an unlawful act at the
time of the incident.
It also bears stressing that in raising the defense of accident, the
accused-appellant had the inescapable burden of proving, by
clear and convincing evidence, of accidental infliction of injuries
on the victim.23 In so doing, the accused-appellant had to rely on
the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution's evidence.24 As aptly pointed out by the CA, the
defense failed to discharge the burden of proving the elements
of the exempting circumstance of accident that would otherwise
free the accused-appellant from culpability. Aside from the
accused-appellant's self-serving statement, no other proof was
adduced that will substantiate his defense of accidental stabbing.
Further, contrary to what the accused-appellant wants the Court
to believe, his actuations closely after Auria was stabbed tell a
different story.1avvphi1 If Auria was really accidentally stabbed
by him, the accused-appellant's natural reaction would have
been to take the lead in bringing his wife to a hospital. Instead,
his priority was to come up with an improvised bladed weapon
that he could use to hurt himself. Additionally, the fact that the
accused-appellant ran away from the crime scene leaving Auria's
relatives and neighbors to tend to his dying wife is indicative of
his guilt.
The CA took one step further when it examined the applicability
of Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code in this case. For this
purpose, the CA assumed arguendo that there is another man
inside the bedroom with Auria.
Article 247 is an absolutory cause that recognizes the
commission of a crime but for reasons of public policy and
sentiment there is no penalty imposed.25 The defense must
prove the concurrence of the following elements: (1) that a
legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person; (2) that he
kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately
thereafter; and (3) that he has not promoted or facilitated the
prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not
consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.26 Among the three
elements, the most vital is that the accused-appellant must prove
to the court that he killed his wife and her paramour in the act of
sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.27
Having admitted the stabbing, the burden of proof is shifted to
the defense to show the applicability of Article 247. 28As disclosed
by the accused-appellant, when he saw Auria with a man, the
two were just seated beside each other and were simply talking.
Evidently, the absolutory cause embodied in Article 247 is not
applicable in the present case.
In sum, the Court agrees with the trial and appellate courts that
the evidence of the prosecution has established the guilt of the
accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
Penalty and Pecuniary Liability
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the
imposable penalty for parricide is reclusion perpetua to
death.1âwphi1 With the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 (RA
9346), the imposition of the penalty of death is prohibited.
Likewise significant is the provision found in Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code stating that in the absence of mitigating and
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime, the
lesser penalty shall be imposed. Applying these to the case at

bar and considering that there are no mitigating and aggravating
circumstances present, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was
correctly imposed by the RTC and CA.
Civil indemnity is automatically awarded upon proof of the fact of
death of the victim and the commission by the accused-appellant
of the crime of parricide.29 Current jurisprudence sets civil
indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00. As such, the Court finds
it necessary to increase the civil indemnity awarded by the trial
and appellate courts from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.
There is no question that Auria's heirs suffered mental anguish
by reason of her violent death. Consequently, the award of moral
damages is in order. Similar to civil indemnity, prevailing
jurisprudence pegs moral damages in the amount of P75,000.00.
On that account, the Court must also adjust the moral damages
from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.
Given that this is a case of a husband killing his wife where
relationship a qualifying circumstance, the award of exemplary
damages is justified. The exemplary damages of P30,000.00
awarded by the CA is maintained as it is consistent with the
latest rulings of the Court.
Temperate damages may be recovered when some pecuniary
loss has been suffered but definite proof of its amount was not
presented in court.30 In People v. De Leon,31 the Court awarded
P25,000.00 as temperate damages where the expenses for the
funeral cannot be determined with certainty because of the
absence of receipts to prove them. In keeping with the said
ruling, the Court affirms the CA's award of P25,000.00 as
temperate damages.
On a final note, the Court upholds the imposition of interest at
the legal rate of 6% per annum on all the monetary awards for
damages reckoned from the date of finality of this Decision until
fully paid.32 This is in accordance with the Court's discretionary
authority to levy interest as part of the damages and in
conformity with the latest Court policy on the matter.
WHEREFORE, the CA's decision dated June 28, 2013 in CA-
G.R. CEB-CR H.C. No. 01209, finding accused-appellant,
Manuel Macal y Bolasco, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Parricide, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
the heirs of the victim, Auria Ytac Macal, the amounts of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages,
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P25,000.00 as
temperate damages. In addition, all the monetary awards shall
earn an interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date
of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
DEATH OR PHYSICAL INJURIES INFLICTED UNDER
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
PEOPLE v. ABARCA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO ABARCA, accused-appellant.
36
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Palo, Leyte, sentencing the accused-appellant Francisco Abarca
to death for the complex crime of murder with double frustrated
murder.
The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death
sentence imposed. With the approval of the new Constitution,
abolishing the penalty of death and commuting all existing death
sentences to life imprisonment, we required the accused-
appellant to inform us whether or not he wished to pursue the
case as an appealed case. In compliance therewith, he filed a
statement informing us that he wished to continue with the case
by way of an appeal.
The information (amended) in this case reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Tacloban accuses
Francisco Abarca of the crime of Murder with Double Frustrated
Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of July, 1984, in the City of
Tacloban, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill
and with evident premeditation, and with treachery, armed with
an unlicensed firearm (armalite), M-16 rifle, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and shot several times
KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH on the different parts of his body,
thereby inflicting upon said KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH gunshot
wounds which caused his instantaneous death and as a
consequence of which also caused gunshot wounds to LINA
AMPARADO and ARNOLD AMPARADO on the different parts of
their bodies thereby inflicting gunshot wounds which otherwise
would have caused the death of said Lina Amparado and Arnold
Amparado, thus performing all the acts of execution which
should have produced the crimes of murders as a consequence,
but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of his will, that is by the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado
which prevented their death. 1
xxx xxx xxx
On arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. The
Solicitor General states accurately the facts as follows:
Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco Abarca,
Jenny, had illicit relationship. The illicit relationship apparently
began while the accused was in Manila reviewing for the 1983
Bar examinations. His wife was left behind in their residence in
Tacloban, Leyte (pp. 45-47, 65, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984).
On July 15, 1984, the accused was in his residence in Tacloban,
Leyte. On the morning of that date he went to the bus station to
go to Dolores, Eastern Samar, to fetch his daughter. However,
he was not able to catch the first trip (in the morning). He went
back to the station in the afternoon to take the 2:00 o'clock trip
but the bus had engine trouble and could not leave (pp. 5-8, tsn,
Nov. 28, 1985). The accused, then proceeded to the residence of
his father after which he went home. He arrived at his residence
at the V & G Subdivision in Tacloban City at around 6:00 o'clock
in the afternoon (pp. 8-9, tsn, Id.).

Upon reaching home, the accused found his wife, Jenny, and
Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife
and Koh noticed the accused, the wife pushed her paramour
who got his revolver. The accused who was then peeping above
the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ran away (pp. 9-13,
tsn, Id.).
The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. He went
to the house of a PC soldier, C2C Arturo Talbo, arriving there at
around 6:30 p.m. He got Talbo's firearm, an M-16 rifle, and went
back to his house at V & G Subdivision. He was not able to find
his wife and Koh there. He proceeded to the "mahjong session"
as it was the "hangout" of Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh
playing mahjong. He fired at Kingsley Koh three times with his
rifle (pp. 13-19, tsn, Id.). Koh was hit. Arnold and Lina Amparado
who were occupying a room adjacent to the room where Koh
was playing mahjong were also hit by the shots fired by the
accused (pp. 34-49, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984). Kingsley Koh died
instantaneously of cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock and
hemorrhage as a result of multiple gunshot wounds on the head,
trunk and abdomen (pp. 28-29, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984; see also
exh. A): Arnold Amparado was hospitalized and operated on in
the kidney to remove a bullet (pp. 17-23, tsn, Oct. 17, 1984; see
also exh. C). His wife, Lina Amparado, was also treated in the
hospital as she was hit by bullet fragments (p. 23, tsn, Id.).
Arnold Amparado who received a salary of nearly P1,000.00 a
month was not able to work for 1-1/2 months because of his
wounds. He spent P15,000.00 for medical expenses while his
wife spent Pl,000.00 for the same purpose (pp. 24-25, tsn, Id. ). 2
On March 17, 1986, the trial court rendered the appealed
judgment, the dispositive portion whereof reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Francisco Abarca guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of murder with
double frustrated murder as charged in the amended
information, and pursuant to Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code
which does not consider the effect of mitigating or aggravating
circumstances when the law prescribes a single indivisible
penalty in relation to Art. 48, he is hereby sentenced to death, to
indemnify the heirs of Khingsley Paul Koh in the sum of P30,000,
complainant spouses Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
It appears from the evidence that the deceased Khingsley Paul
Koh and defendant's wife had illicit relationship while he was
away in Manila; that the accused had been deceived, betrayed,
disgraced and ruined by his wife's infidelity which disturbed his
reasoning faculties and deprived him of the capacity to reflect
upon his acts. Considering all these circumstances this court
believes the accused Francisco Abarca is deserving of executive
clemency, not of full pardon but of a substantial if not a radical
reduction or commutation of his death sentence.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished her Excellency, the
President of the Philippines, thru the Ministry of Justice, Manila.
SO ORDERED. 3
xxx xxx xxx
The accused-appellant assigns the following errors committed by
the court a quo:
I.
37
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIME AS
CHARGED INSTEAD OF ENTERING A JUDGMENT OF
CONVICTION UNDER ARTICLE 247 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE;
II.
IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING WAS AMENDED BY THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY. 4
The Solicitor General recommends that we apply Article 247 of
the Revised Penal Code defining death inflicted under
exceptional circumstances, complexed with double frustrated
murder. Article 247 reads in full:
ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional
circumstances. — Any legally married person who, having
surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse
with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the
act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any
serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he
shall be exempt from punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances,
to parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years
of age, and their seducers, while the daughters are living with
their parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate prostitution of his wife
or daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of
the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this
article.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the aforequoted
provision applies in the instant case. There is no question that
the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in
this case, in the act of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he
went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate outburst.
Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally
married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any
of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter.
These elements are present in this case. The trial court, in
convicting the accused-appellant of murder, therefore erred.
Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed
between the time the accused-appellant discovered his wife
having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter
was actually shot, the shooting must be understood to be the
continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused-appellant.
The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the accused "shall kill
any of them or both of them . . . immediately" after surprising his
spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say that he should
commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the
death caused be the proximate result of the outrage
overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the
basest act of infidelity. But the killing should have been actually
motivated by the same blind impulse, and must not have been
influenced by external factors. The killing must be the direct by-
product of the accused's rage.
It must be stressed furthermore that Article 247, supra, does not
define an offense. 5 In People v. Araque, 6 we said:
xxx xxx xxx

As may readily be seen from its provisions and its place in the
Code, the above-quoted article, far from defining a felony, merely
provides or grants a privilege or benefit — amounting practically
to an exemption from an adequate punishment — to a legally
married person or parent who shall surprise his spouse or
daughter in the act of committing sexual intercourse with
another, and shall kill any or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious
physical injury. Thus, in case of death or serious physical
injuries, considering the enormous provocation and his righteous
indignation, the accused — who would otherwise be criminally
liable for the crime of homicide, parricide, murder, or serious
physical injury, as the case may be — is punished only
withdestierro. This penalty is mere banishment and, as held in a
case, is intended more for the protection of the accused than a
punishment. (People vs. Coricor, 79 Phil., 672.) And where
physical injuries other than serious are inflicted, the offender is
exempted from punishment. In effect, therefore, Article 247, or
the exceptional circumstances mentioned therein, amount to an
exempting circumstance, for even where death or serious
physical injuries is inflicted, the penalty is so greatly lowered as
to result to no punishment at all. A different interpretation, i.e.,
that it defines and penalizes a distinct crime, would make the
exceptional circumstances which practically exempt the accused
from criminal liability integral elements of the offense, and
thereby compel the prosecuting officer to plead, and, incidentally,
admit them, in the information. Such an interpretation would be
illogical if not absurd, since a mitigating and much less an
exempting circumstance cannot be an integral element of the
crime charged. Only "acts or omissons . . . constituting the
offense" should be pleaded in a complaint or information, and a
circumstance which mitigates criminal liability or exempts the
accused therefrom, not being an essential element of the offense
charged-but a matter of defense that must be proved to the
satisfaction of the court-need not be pleaded. (Sec. 5, Rule 106,
Rules of Court; U.S. vs. Campo, 23 Phil., 368.)
That the article in question defines no crime is made more
manifest when we consider that its counterpart in the old Penal
Code (Article 423) was found under the General Provisions
(Chapter VIII) of Title VIII covering crimes against persons. There
can, we think, hardly be any dispute that as part of the general
provisions, it could not have possibly provided for a distinct and
separate crime.
xxx xxx xxx
We, therefore, conclude that Article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code does not define and provide for a specific crime, but grants
a privilege or benefit to the accused for the killing of another or
the infliction of serious physical injuries under the circumstances
therein mentioned. ... 7
xxx xxx xxx
Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted upon the accused. He
is banished, but that is intended for his protection. 8
It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death under exceptional
circumstances, not being a punishable act, cannot be qualified
by either aggravating or mitigating or other qualifying
circumstances, We cannot accordingly appreciate treachery in
this case.
The next question refers to the liability of the accused-appellant
for the physical injuries suffered by Lina Amparado and Arnold
Amparado who were caught in the crossfire as the accused-
appellant shot the victim. The Solicitor General recommends a
finding of double frustrated murder against the accused-
38
appellant, and being the more severe offense, proposes the
imposition of reclusion temporal in its maximum period pursuant
to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. This is where we
disagree. The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill
the Amparado couple. Although as a rule, one committing an
offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, that rule
presupposes that the act done amounts to a felony. 9
But the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-
appellant was not committing murder when he discharged his
rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional
circumstances is not murder. We cannot therefore hold the
appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by
the Amparados.
This does not mean, however, that the accused-appellant is
totally free from any responsibility. Granting the fact that he was
not performing an illegal act when he fired shots at the victim, he
cannot be said to be entirely without fault. While it appears that
before firing at the deceased, he uttered warning words ("an
waray labot kagawas,") 10that is not enough a precaution to
absolve him for the injuries sustained by the Amparados. We
nonetheless find negligence on his part. Accordingly, we hold
him liable under the first part, second paragraph, of Article 365,
that is, less serious physical injuries through simple imprudence
or negligence. (The records show that Arnold Amparado was
incapacitated for one and one-half months; 11 there is no
showing, with respect to Lina Amparado, as to the extent of her
injuries. We presume that she was placed in confinement for
only ten to fourteen days based on the medical certificate
estimating her recovery period.) 12
For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we
therefore impose upon the accused-appellantarresto mayor (in
its medium and maximum periods) in its maximum
period, arresto to being the graver penalty (than destierro). 13
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
MODIFIED. The accused-appellant is sentenced to four months
and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor. The period within
which he has been in confinement shall be credited in the
service of these penalties. He is furthermore ordered to
indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00
as and for hospitalization expense and the sum of P1,500.00 as
and for Arnold Amparado's loss of earning capacity. No special
pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE v. OYANIB
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 130634-35. March 12, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
MANOLITO OYANIB y MENDOZA, accused-
appellant.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza appeals from the joint
decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 02, Iligan City

finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and
parricide and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty[2] of six
(6) months one day (1) to six (6) years of prision correccional as
minimum to six (6) years one (1) day to eight (8) years of prision
mayor as maximum,[3]and to pay P50,000.00 civil indemnity and
the costs for the death of Jesus Esquierdo, and to reclusion
perpetua, to pay P50,000.00 and the costs for the death of his
wife, Tita T. Oyanib.[4]
On September 11, 1995, Iligan City Prosecutor Ulysses V.
Lagcao filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iligan City two (2)
separate informations charging accused Manolito Oyanib y
Mendoza with murder and parricide, as follows:
Criminal Case No. 6012
“That on or about September 4, 1995, in the City of Iligan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, armed with a deadly weapon to wit: a hunting
knife about six inches long and with intent to kill and evident
premeditation and by means of treachery, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab and
wound one Jesus Esquierdo, thereby inflicting upon him the
following physical injuries, to wit:
Cardiorespiratory arrest
Hypovolemic shock irreversible
Multiple organ injury
Multiple stab wound chest & abdomen
and as a result thereof the said Jesus Esquierdo died.
“Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code with the aggravating circumstances (sic) of evident
premeditation.”[5]
Criminal Case No. 6018
“That on or about September 4, 1995, in the City of Iligan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, having conceived and (sic) deliberate intent to
kill his wife Tita Oyanib, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously and with evident premeditation, attack, assault,
stab and wound his wife, as a result of said attack, the said Tita
Oyanib died.
“Contrary to and in violation of Article 246 of the Revised Penal
Code.”[6]
The prosecutor recommended no bail for the temporary
liberty of accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza in both cases.
On September 11, 1995, accused voluntarily surrendered
to the police authorities[7] and was immediately detained at the
Iligan City Jail.[8]
On January 17, 1996, the trial court arraigned accused
Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza by reading the informations against
him and translating them into the Visayan dialect.[9] He pleaded
not guilty to both charges.
As the two (2) cases arose from the same set of facts, the
trial court conducted a joint trial.
Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza (hereafter Manolito)
and Tita T. Oyanib (hereafter Tita) were married on February 3,
39
1979[10] and had two (2) children, Desilor and Julius. They lived
in Purok 1, Tambacan, Iligan City.
In 1994, due to marital differences, Manolito and
Tita separated, with Manolito keeping custody of their two (2)
children. Tita rented a room at the second floor of the house of
Edgardo Lladas (hereafter Edgardo), not far from the place
where her family lived.
At about 9:30 in the evening of September 4, 1995, while
Edgardo and his family were watching TV at the sala located at
the ground floor of their house at Purok 3-A, Tambacan, Iligan
City, they heard a commotion coming from the second floor
rented by Tita. The commotion and the noise lasted for quite
some time. When it died down, Edgardo went upstairs to check.
[11]
Upstairs, Edgardo saw Tita wearing a duster, bloodied and
sprawled on the floor. He saw Manolito stabbing Jesus
Esquierdo (hereafter Jesus) while sitting on the latter’s stomach.
Jesus was wearing a pair of long black pants. When Edgardo
asked Manolito what he was doing, accused told Edgardo not to
interfere.
Thereafter, Edgardo left the house and called the
police. Meanwhile, the neighbors brought Tita to the hospital.
She died on the way to the hospital.[12]
SPO3 Eduard Tubil, police investigator, General
Investigation Office, Iligan City Police Command, Precinct I,
Poblacion, Iligan City said that at about 9:00 in the evening of
September 4, 1995, while he was on duty, he received an
information regarding a stabbing incident at the Llagas residence
at Purok 3-A, Tambacan, Iligan City.[13]
At the crime scene, SPO3 Tubil saw the lifeless body of
Jesus lying face up with several stab wounds in different parts of
the body. Jesus was clad in t-shirt and long pants. From the
crime scene, he recovered a knife. Afterwards, he went to Dr. Uy
Hospital to check on Tita; he was informed that she was dead.
Manolito was the suspect in the killing of Jesus and Tita.[14] The
incident was recorded in the police blotter as Entry No. 137138.
[15]
On September 5, 1995, Dr. Leonardo A. Labanon, Medico-
Legal Officer, Iligan City examined the bodies of Jesus and Tita.
[16]
Jesus sustained multiple stab wounds, and those inflicted in
the right and left chests and stomach were fatal. [17] The cause of
death was “cardiorespiratory arrest, hypovolemic shock
irreversible, multiple organ injury and multiple stab wound chest
and abdomen.”[18]
Likewise, Tita sustained several stab wounds, with the fatal
wounds inflicted in the left chest and right side of the abdomen.
The cause of death was “cardiorespiratory arrest, hypovolemic
shock and multiple stab wound.”[19]
As heretofore stated, in 1994, following a series of
arguments, Manolito and Tita decided to live
separately. Manolito retained custody of their two (2)
children. Immediately after the separation, Tita stayed at her
friend Merlyn’s house for two (2) months. Afterwards, she
transferred to the Lladas residence, located at Purok 3, G.
Tambacan, Iligan City, and rented the second floor.[20] The rented
space consisted mainly of a sala with one adjoining room. It was
arranged in a manner that if one enters the main entrance door,
one is immediately led to the sala and from the sala, directly to
the door of the adjoining room.
Despite their separation, Manolito tried to win Tita back and
exerted all efforts towards reconciliation for the sake of the
children. However, Tita was very reluctant to reconcile with
Manolito.[21] In fact, she was very open about her relationship
with other men and would flaunt it in front of Manolito. One time,

he chanced upon his wife and her paramour, Jesus, in a very
intimate situation by the hanging bridge at Brgy. Tambacan,
Iligan City.[22] Manolito confronted Tita and Jesus about this. He
censured his wife and reminded her that she was still his wife.
They just ignored him; they even threatened to kill him.[23]
In the evening of September 4, 1995, after supper, his
daughter Desilor handed Manolito a letter from the Iligan City
National High School. The letter mentioned that his son Julius
failed in two (2) subjects and invited his parents to a meeting at
the school. Because he had work from 8:00 in the morning until
5:00 in the afternoon the next day, Manolito went to Tita’s house
to ask her to attend the school meeting in his behalf.[24]
Upon reaching Tita’s rented place, he heard “sounds of
romance” (kissing) coming from the inside. He pried open the
door lock using a hunting knife. He caught his wife Tita and
Jesus having sexual intercourse. Jesus was on top of Tita and
his pants were down to his knees.
Upon seeing him, Jesus kicked Manolito in the
cheek. Manolito immediately stabbed Jesus. Though Jesus
was 5’9” in height and weighed about 70 kg., the suddenness of
the assault caused him to lose his balance and fall
down. Manolito took advantage of this opportunity and stabbed
Jesus in the stomach. Tita left the room upon seeing Manolito,
only to come back armed with a Tanduay bottle. She hit
Manolito in the head, while at the same time shouting “kill him
Jake, kill him Jake.”[25]
In the commotion, Manolito stabbed Jesus, hitting him in
the abdomen. Jesus fell down and Manolito stabbed him
again. Meanwhile, Tita stabbed Manolito in the arm with the
broken Tanduay bottle. This angered Manolito and he stabbed
Tita in the left breast. He stabbed her three (3) more times in
different parts of her body. Tita fell near the lifeless body of her
paramour. It was at this point that Edgardo, the owner of the
house Tita was renting, appeared from the ground floor and
inquired about what had happened. Manolito told Edgardo not to
interfere because he had nothing to do with it.
Thereafter, Manolito left the house of Edgardo and went to
Kilumco, Camague, Iligan City and stayed at the wake of his
friend’s neighbor. He threw away the knife he used in stabbing
his wife and her paramour. At around 4:00 in the morning of the
following day, he went to Camague Highway to catch a bus for
Lentogan, Aurora, Zamboanga. While in Lentogan, he heard
over radio DXIC that there was a call for him to surrender. He
heeded the call and gave himself up to the police authorities in
Precinct 2, Nonocan, Iligan City.[26]
When asked why he was carrying a knife when he went to
his wife’s place, Manolito said that he brought it for self-defense.
Prior to the incident, he received threats from his wife and her
paramour, Jesus, that they would kill him so they could live
together.[27]
After trial, on May 26, 1997, the trial court promulgated
a joint decision finding accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes charged. The dispositive portion reads:
“WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing findings and
pronouncements and having carefully observed the demeanor of
witnesses, this Court hereby declares accused MANOLITO
OYANIB y Mendoza GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Homicide (Crim. Case No. II-6012) and Parricide (Crim.
Case No. II-6018) and appreciating the two (2) mitigating
circumstances of passion or obfuscation and voluntary surrender
without any aggravating circumstances to consider, this Court
sentences accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza to suffer an
imprisonment as follows:
40
“1) In Criminal Case No. II-6012:
To an Indeterminate Penalty ranging from SIX (6) MONTHS
ONE (1) DAY to SIX (6) YEARS as Minimum to Six (6) YEARS
ONE (1) DAY to EIGHT (8) YEARS as Maximum; to indemnify
heirs of Jesus Esquierdo the sum of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, and to pay the costs.
“2) In Criminal Case No. II-6018:
To RECLUSION PERPETUA pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659;
to indemnify heirs of his wife P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
to pay the costs.
“It is likewise ordered that the aforesaid imprisonment is subject
to the forty (40) years limitation prescribed in Article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code.
“Accused is likewise entitled to full credit of his preventive
imprisonment.
“SO ORDERED.
“Iligan City, Philippines, May 26, 1997.
“MAXIMO B. RATUNIL
“Presiding Judge”[28]
On June 17, 1997, accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza
interposed an appeal from the joint decision of the trial court to
the Supreme Court.[29]
Accused admitted the killings. He argued that he killed
them both under the exceptional circumstances provided in
Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. He raised several errors
allegedly committed by the trial court, which boiled down to the
basic issue of whether accused is entitled to the exceptional
privilege under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.[30] He
questioned the trial court’s appreciation of the facts and the
evidence, contending that it ignored and overlooked vital pieces
of physical evidence material to the defense of the accused, like
the photograph of the lifeless body of Jesus. Accused contends
that the photograph graphically showed that Jesus’ pants were
wide open, unzipped and unbuttoned, revealing that he was not
wearing any underwear, lending credence to his defense that he
caught his wife and her paramour in the act of sexual
intercourse. On the other hand, the Solicitor General submitted
that accused-appellant failed to discharge the burden of proving,
by clear and convincing evidence, that he killed the victims under
the exceptional circumstances contemplated in Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code. Hence, the trial court did not err in
denying him the exempting privilege under the Article.[31]
We find the appeal meritorious.
At the outset, accused admitted killing his wife and her
paramour. He invoked Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code as
an absolutory and an exempting cause. “An absolutory cause is
present ‘where the act committed is a crime but for reasons of
public policy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed.’”[32]
Having admitted the killing, it is incumbent upon accused to
prove the exempting circumstances to the satisfaction of the
court in order to be relieved of any criminal liability. Article 247 of
the Revised Penal Code prescribes the following essential
elements for such a defense: (1) that a legally married person
surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse
with another person; (2) that he kills any of them or both of them

in the act or immediately thereafter; and (3) that he has not
promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or
that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other
spouse.[33] Accused must prove these elements by clear and
convincing evidence, otherwise his defense would be untenable.
“The death caused must be the proximate result of the outrage
overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the
act of infidelity. Simply put, the killing by the husband of his wife
must concur with her flagrant adultery.”[34]
There is no question that the first element is present in the
case at bar. The crucial fact that accused must convincingly
prove to the court is that he killed his wife and her paramour in
the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.
After an assiduous analysis of the evidence presented and
the testimonies of the witnesses, we find accused to have acted
within the circumstances contemplated in Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code. Admittedly, accused-appellant surprised
his wife and her lover in the act of sexual intercourse.
To the mind of the court, what actually happened was that
accused chanced upon Jesus at the place of his wife. He saw
his wife and Jesus in the act of having sexual
intercourse. Blinded by jealousy and outrage, accused stabbed
Jesus who fought off and kicked the accused. He vented his
anger on his wife when she reacted, not in defense of him, but in
support of Jesus. Hence, he stabbed his wife as well several
times. Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza surrendered to the
police when a call for him to surrender was made.
The law imposes very stringent requirements before
affording the offended spouse the opportunity to avail himself of
Article 247, Revised Penal Code. As the Court put it in People v.
Wagas:[35]
“The vindication of a Man’s honor is justified because of the
scandal an unfaithful wife creates; the law is strict on this,
authorizing as it does, a man to chastise her, even with
death. But killing the errant spouse as a purification is so severe
as that it can only be justified when the unfaithful spouse is
caught in flagrante delicto; and it must be resorted to only with
great caution so much so that the law requires that it be inflicted
only during the sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.”
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 02, Iligan City in
Criminal Cases Nos. II-6012 and II-6018. The Court sentences
accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza to two (2) years and four
(4) months of destierro.[36] He shall not be permitted to enter
Iligan City, nor within a radius of one hundred (100) kilometers
from Iligan City.[37]
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION
PEOPLE v. SALUFRANIA
G.R. No. L-50884 March 30, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FILOMENO SALUFRANIA, defendant-appellant.
PADILLA, J.:
41
In an information, dated 7 May 1976, Filomeno Salufrania y
Aleman was charged before the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Norte, Branch I, with the complex crime of parricide
with intentional abortion, committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of December,
1974, in Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court the accused Filomeno
Salufrania y Aleman did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack,
assault and use personal violence on
MARCIANA ABUYO-SALUFRANIA, the
lawfully wedded wife of the accused, by then
and there boxing and stranging her, causing
upon her injuries which resulted in her
instantaneous death; and by the same criminal
act committed on the person of the wife of the
accused, who was at the time 8 months on the
family way, the accused likewise did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously cause
the death of the child while still in its maternal
womb, thereby committing both crimes of
PARRICIDE and INTENTIONAL ABORTION
as defined and punished under Art. 246 and
Art. 256, paragraph I, of the Revised Penal
Code, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of said woman and child in the amount
as the Honorable Court shall assess.
CONTRARY TO LAW
Upon arraignment, the accused, assisted by counsel de officio,
pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged.
After trial the lower court rendered a decision ** dated 9 August
1978, the dispositive part of which states:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Filomeno
Salufrania y Aleman guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, of the complex crime of Parricide with
Intentional Abortion, he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of DEATH, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Marciano Abuyo in the
sum of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs. "For
unselfish, valuable and exemplary service
rendered by counsel de oficio, Atty. Marciano
C. Dating, Jr., a compensation of P500.00 is
hereby recommended for him subject to the
availability of funds
SO ORDERED.
The accused having been sentenced to suffer the penalty of
death, this case is on automatic review before this Court.
At the trial in the court a quo, the prosecution presented the
following witnesses: Dr. Juan L. Dyquiangco Jr., Pedro
Salufrania and Narciso Abuyo.
Dr. Juan L. Dyquiangco Jr., who was then Rural Health Officer of
Talisay, Camarines Norte, testified that, after passing the Board
Examination, he was employed as a Resident Physician of La
Union Provincial Hospital, then as Junior Resident Physician of
Bethane Hospital in San Fernando, La Union and that later, he
joined the government service, starting from 1968 up to the time
of the trial; that as a Doctor of Medicine, he had performed about
ten (10) post mortem examinations; that he was called upon by
the Municipal Judge of Talisay to examine the corpse of
Marciana Abuyo-Salufrania that was exhumed from its grave in
the Municipal Cemetery of Talisay at around 11:00 o'clock in the
morning of 11 December 1974; that his post
mortem examination lasted from 12:30 o'clock to 2:00
o'clock in the afternoon of the same day. He reduced his
findings of injuries into writing. (Exhibit "A"), which,
 42

together with their probable cause, as testified to by him, The other witness for the prosecution was Pedro Salufrania, son
of herein appellant and of the deceased. The lower court's
are as follows: decision states that, by reason of interest and relationship,
before Pedro Salufrania was allowed to testify against his father-
accused Filomeno Salufrania, he was carefully examined by the
Injury Cause
prosecuting officer and the defense counsel under the careful
supervision of the court a quo, to determine whether, at his age
1) Multiple abrasions with "Blunt object or friction by
of 13 years old, he was already capable of receiving correct
impressions of facts and of relating them truly and, also, whether
contusion, left leg, middle hard object" (tsn., Aug. 20,
he was compelled and/or threatened by anybody to testify
part, posterior
against his father-accused. 1
covering an area of 1976, p. 7)
The lower court found Pedro Salufrania to be determined and
about 2 & 1/2 by 5 intelligent. He convincingly declared that he was not threatened
inches. by any of his uncles on his mother's side to testify against his
father, because it was true that the latter killed his mother. Then,
2) Abrasions, 1/2 by 2 formally testifying as the prosecution's lone eyewitness, he
Friction on a hard object"
stated that his father Filomeno Salufrania and his mother
inches, medial side of the (tsn., Aug. 20, 1976,Marciana
p. 7) Abuyo quarrelled at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening
cubi of 3 December 1974, in their small house at a far away sitio in
barrio Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte; that during said quarrel,
tal fossa (back left leg) he saw his father box his pregnant mother on the stomach and,
once fallen on the floor, his father strangled her to death; that he
3) Multiple pinhead sized Hard pinhead sized saw blood ooze from the eyes and nose of his mother and that
material
she died right on the spot where she fell.
wounds, right face, (tsn., Aug. 20, 1976, p. 7)
starting Pedro Salufrania further testified that after killing his mother, the
accused- appellant went out of the house to get a hammock; that
from the side of the right his brother Alex and he were the only ones who witnessed how
eye the accused killed their mother because his sister and other
brothers were already asleep when the horrible incident
down to mandibular bone happened; that his brothers Celedonio, Danilo and sister Merly
woke up after the death of their mother and kept watch at their
(right check) mothers body while their father was away; that their father
arrived early the next morning with the hammock and after
4) Upper right eyelid No cause given placing their dead mother on the hammock, the accused carried
her on his shoulder and brought the cadaver to the house of his
more prominent than the sister Conching, located at a populated section of Tigbinan that
left from Tigbinan the corpse was transferred to Gabon, Talisay,
Camarines Norte for burial.
eyelid ("the right upper
eyelid a Continuing his testimony, Pedro Salufrania stated that he is now
living with his uncle Eduardo Abuyo and had refused and still
little bit bulging than the refused to live with his father-accused, because the latter has
left threatened to kill him and his other brothers and sister should he
reveal the true cause of his mother's death.
eye "and" sort of
"swollen") (tsn.,
The third witness for the prosecution was Narciso Abuyo, a
Aug. 20, 1976, pp. 7-8) resident of Gabon, Talisay, Camarines Norte. He testified that the
accused Filomeno Salufrania and his sister, the deceased
5) Tongue protruding bet Marciana
Usually, the main cause of Abuyo, were lawfully wedded husband and wife as
evidenced by a marriage contract (Exhibit "C"). He declared that
ween the lips, about 1 his sister was more or less seven (7) months pregnant when she
protruding tongue during
inch teeth died; that he first came to know about his sister's death on 4
December 1974 thru his nephews Pedro and Alex Salufrania
line. who first informed him that their mother died of stomach ailment
death is (by) strangulation.
and headache; that he went to Tigbinan to request for the body
(tsn., Aug. 20, 1976,ofp.his
8) sister so that it may be buried in Talisay, Camarines Norte
and, as intended, Marciana Abuyo was buried in the Talisay
6) Deceased is pregnant Cemetery on 6 December 1974.

with a baby boy about 7-8
months old (tsn., Aug. 20,
1976, p. 8).
Dr. Dyquiangco testified that after conducting the post
mortem examination, he issued a certification thereof (Exhibit
"A"); that he issued a death certificate (Exhibit "B") for the
deceased Marciano Abuyo-Salufrania, bearing the date of 5
December 1974, made on the basis of the information relayed by
a certain Leonila Loma to his nurse before the burial, without
mentioning the cause of death; that the cause of death, as
cardiac arrest, was indicated on said death certificate only after
the post mortem examination on 11 December 1974.
Narciso Abuyo also declared that after the burial of Marciana
Abuyo, the three (3) children of his deceased sister went to his
house and refused to go home with their father Filomeno
Salufrania; that when asked for the reason why, his nephew Alex
Salufraña told him that the real cause of death of their mother
was not stomach ailment and headache, rather, she was boxed
on the stomach and strangled to death by their father; that
immediately after learning of the true cause of death of his sister,
he brought the matter to the attention of the police authorities of
Talisay, Camarines Norte, who investigated Alex and Pedro
Salufirania and later, to that of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal
of Camarines Norte.
The defense had for witnesses Geronimo Villan, Juanito Bragais,
Angeles Liling Balce and the accused Filomeno Salufrania.

Geronimo Villan testified that he was a neighbor of Filomeno
Sulfrania. He declared that Marciana Abuyo died at around 6:00
o'clock in the morning of 4 December 1974 in her house at Sitio
Kapagisahan Tigbinan Labo, Camarines Norte; that he
happened to pass by said house because his attention was
attracted by the bright light in the fireplace and he saw Filomeno
Salufrania boiling "ikmo" and garlic as medicine for his wife who
was about to deliver a child; that he helped the accused by
applying "ikmo" to the different parts of the body of Marciana
Abuyo and by administering the native treatment known as
"bantil", that is, by pinching and pulling the skin with two fingers
of his closed fist; that when the condition of Marciana Abuyo
worsened, he told Filomeno Salufrania to go and get Juanita
Bragais who is known as a healer but the latter arrived at about
7:00 o'clock in the morning of 4 December 1974 and that at that
time Marciana Abuyo was already dead.
Witness Juanita Bragais testified that he was fetched by Felipe
Salufrania, another son of Filomeno Salufrania at about 6:00
o'clock in the morning of 4 December 1974. He further testified
that when he reached the house of the Salufranias, Marciana
Abuyo was already dead so he just helped Filomeno Salufrania
in transferring the body of his wife to the house of the latter's
brother-in-law at Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte.
Angeles Liling Balce, who claimed to be a former resident of
Kapagisahan Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte testified that she
arrived in the house of Filomeno Salufrania at about 6:00 o'clock
in the morning of 4 December 1974 after being called by one of
the latter's sons; that she saw Marciana still in a coma lying on
the lap of her husband who informed her that Marciana was
suffering from an old stomach ailment.
The accused Filomeno Salufrania admitted that he was that
lawful husband of the deceased Marciana Abuyo; that at around
9:00 o'clock in the morning of 3 December 1974, Marciana
arrived home from Talisay where she had earlier stayed for about
a week; that she was hungry upon her arrival, so he allegedly
cooked their food and after eating their lunch, he proceeded to
his work while his wife rested in their house; that when he
returned home at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day,
his wife complained to him of stomach pain and he was told to
prepare the beddings because she was already sleepy; that at
about 4:00 o'clock in the morning of 4 December 1974, he was
awakened by his wife who was still complaining of stomach pain,
and that she asked for a drink of hot water; that while he was
boiling water, Geronimo Villan arrived and assisted him in
administering to his wife the native treatments known as "hilot" or
massaging and "banti" that Geronimo Villan and Francisco
Repuya alternately applied "bantil" to his wife but when her
condition worsened, he woke up his children, Pedro and Alex to
fetch Rico Villanueva who might be able to ,save the life of their
mother; that his children left and returned without Rico
Villanueva but the latter arrived a little later.
Accused-appellant then went on to say that he sent for Juanito
Bragais but the latter was not able to cure his wife, since the
latter was already dead when he arrived; that after the death of
his wife, he ordered his children to get the hammock of Kaloy
Belardo whose house was about two (2) kilometers away from
their house, and upon the arrival of the hammock, he placed the
body of his wife thereon and brought it to the house of his sister
Consolacion Salufrania in Tigbinan; that while the corpse of
Marciana Abuyo was at Tigbinan he sent Chiding and his elder
son to inform the brothers and sisters of his wife at Talisay about
her death and that Leonila Abuyo and Salvador Abuyo came;
that he informed the Barangay Captain of Tigbinan of the cause
of death of his wife; that upon the suggestion of the brothers and
sisters of Marciana Abuyo, especially Salvador Abuyo, the body
of their sister was brought home to Talisay and thereafter buried
at the Talisay Cemetery; that there was no quarrel between him
and his wife that preceded the latter's death, and that during the
lifetime of the deceased, they loved each other; that after her
burial, his son Pedro Salufrania was taken by his brother-in-law
Narciso Abuyo and since then, he was not able to talk to his son
until during the trial; and that at the time of death of his wife,
aside from the members of his family, Geronimo Villan Francisco
Repuya and Liling Angeles Balce were also present.
43
The case was considered submitted for decision by the trial court
on 18 July 1978. As aforestated, the trial court found the
appellant guilty of the crimes charged and sentenced him to the
penalty of death.
The appellant assigns the following errors allegedly committed
by the trial court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED
ON THE BASIS OF THE TESTIMONY OF AN INCOMPETENT
WITNESS, AND ON INCONSISTENT AND INSUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION, THEREBY VIOLATING
THE RULE THAT THE ACCUSED IS ENTITLED TO AN
ACQUITTAL UNLESS HIS GUILT IS SHOWN BEYOND ANY
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE EVIDENCE FOR THE
PROSECUTION IS CREDIBLE AND SUFFICIENT, THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE
COMPLEX CRIME OF PARRICIDE WITH INTENTIONAL
ABORTION.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISCREDITING THE
EVIDENCE FOR THE ACCUSED.
Appellant alleges that the trial court failed to determine the
competence of Pedro Salufrania before he was allowed to testify.
Since Pedro was allegedly a child of tender age, being only
thirteen (13) years old when he testified, and only eleven (11)
years old when the offense charged occurred, he is presumed
incompetent under Rule 130 Sec. 19 (b) of the Revised Rules of
Court, which includes among those who cannot be witnesses:
Children who appear to the court to be of such
tender age and inferior capacity as to be
incapable of receiving correct impressions of
the facts respecting which they are examined,
or of relating them truly.
Therefore, according to appellant, for failure of the trial court to
determine Pedro's competence, the presumption of
incompetency was not rebutted and Pedro's testimony should
not have been admitted. Moreover, appellant stresses that there
is no basis for the trial court's finding that Pedro is intelligent.
Appellant's contention is without merit. The record shows that
the trial court determined Pedro Salufrania's competency before
he was allowed to testify under oath. 2 The trial court's
conclusion that Pedro was intelligent and competent is fully
supported by Pedro's responsiveness to the questions
propounded to him when he was already under oath:
A. Did you go here in court
to testify voluntarily?
Q. Yes, Your Honor.
A. Were you not forced by
your uncle to testify in his
case?
Q. No, I was not forced by
my uncle.
xxx xxx xxx
A. The accused is your
father?

Q. Yes, sir.
A. Do you love him?
Q. No, sir.
A. Your father is accused
now of crime which carries
the penalty of death, are you
still willing to testify against
him?
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Why did you say that you
don't love your father
A. Because he killed my
mother.
Q. And that is the reason
why you hate your father
now?
A. Yes, sir. (tsn., pp. 3, 7,17,
Nov. 12, 1976).
Pedro's strong sense of moral duty to tell the truth, even though
it should lead to his father's conviction, shows that he fully
appreciated the meaning of an oath, which likewise proves that
he was no longer a child of tender years at the time of his
testimony.
Appellant also alleges that, since Pedro changed his answer
from no to yes when he was asked whether he was threatened
by his uncle to testify against his father, shows that Pedro was
lying and proves that he did not appreciate the meaning of an
oath at all. 3
Again, this contention is without merit, Pedro became confused
when the trial court ordered that the original question be
reformed. Pedro's confusion is apparent from the fact that when
asked the third time, he affirmed his first answer,
Q. Isn't it that your uncle
threatened you with bodily
harm if you will not give
statement before the police?
A. No, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. But later you actually
went with your uncle to the
police because you were
threatened by him with
bodily harm if you will not
follow him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is it true that your uncle
threatened you with bodily
harm if you will not give
statement to the police?
A. No, sir. (tsn., pp. 6, 7,
Nov. 12, 1976)
Appellant next lists the following alleged inconsistencies to
discredit the testimony of Pedro. First, Pedro testified on direct
examination that his mother died in the evening of December 3.
while on cross-examination he said that she died in the morning
44
of December 4. It must be noted that he affirmed twice during
cross-examination that his mother died on December 3, just as
he had testified during direct examination. Significantly, he did
not mention December 4 as the date when she died, as
appellant would make it appear. Pedro merely answered 'yes' to
the question "And isn't it that your mother died in the early
morning on that day (December 4) and not on the evening of
December 3?" 4 Thus, Pedro's answer could have resulted only
from a misapprehension of the a question, and for no other
reason.
Second, appellant alleges that Pedro testified on direct
examination that he saw appellant leave the house to get a
hammock after strangling the victim and then came back the
following morning. However, upon cross-examination, Pedro
testified that appellant left at noon or in the afternoon of
December 4. Moreover, Pedro allegedly testified on re-direct that
he saw appellant sleep beside the dead body of his mother.
Again Pedro misapprehended the question propounded to him.
Ajudicious reading of the transcript will bear this out:
Q. When did your father
leave to get the hammock?
A. In the afternoon.
Q. That may be when the
body was brought to Talisay.
When your father, rather,
when you said that your
father left to get a hammock
so that your mother may be
brought to Tigbinan what
time was that?
A. About 12:00 o'clock noon.
(Tsn, p. 16, Nov. 12, 1976)
One may discern that the court itself noticed that there was a
missapprehension when it commented "that maybe when the
body was brought to Talisay" after Pedro answered "In the
afternoon". When Pedro answered "about 12:00 noon' he must
have been referring to the time when appellant carried his dead
wife to Tigbinan. It must be noted that the question was so
worded that it could have misled Pedro to think that what was
being asked was the time when appellant brought his dead wife
to Tigbinan. In fact, there is nothing inconsistent with Pedro's
testimony that he saw his father leave in the evening of
December 3 and again saw him asleep and thus not noticed
appellant's coming back after securing a hammock and sleeping
beside the deceased. Pedro was therefore telling the truth when
he said that, upon waking up, he saw his father sleeping beside
his dead mother. By then, appellant had already returned with
the hammock.
Third, Pedro allegedly testified on direct examination that the
corpse was carried to Tigbinan in the morning of December 4,
while on cross-examination, he said it was in the evening. 5 It
must be pointed out that Pedro merely answered "yes" to a
question purportedly mentioning the time when the victim's body
was transferred to Tigbinan. The question is as follows: "The
corpse of your mother was brought to the Tigbinan proper when
the vigil was had in the evening of December 4, is that right?" It
is to be noted that the question's thrust is whether or not the
victim's body was brought to Tigbinan. The time it was brought
was merely incidental. Thus, Pedro may not have paid attention
to the part of the question involving time. Moreover, the phrase
"in the evening" may have referred either to the time of transport
of the body or to the vigil, which could have definitely confused
Pedro.
Fourth, Pedro allegedly testified on direct examination that he,
together with his brothers and sister, kept vigil beside their
mother's dead body that night, while on cross-examination, he
testified that they just kept lying down and pretended to
sleep. 6 There is nothing inconsistent here. The children could
have kept vigil while lying down with their deceased mother.

Appellant further cites other alleged improbabilities to discredit
Pedro's testimony. Appellant contends that it was improbable for
Pedro to have seen the attack on his mother since he testified
that the room was dimly lighted, and that, while the attach was
going on, he closed his eyes pretending to sleep. 7 This
contention is without merit. Even though the room was dimly
lighted, Pedro was only two (2) meters away from his parents;
thus, he could easily see, as he saw, the attack on his
mother. 8 Also, although he pretended to be asleep, it was
unlikely that he kept his eyes closed all the while, as he was
aware that a fight was going on. Rather, it was to be expected
that he had his eyes open and, thus, he saw the heinous crime
unfold and ultimately consumated.
Appellant alleges that he does not believe that it was fear of him
that caused the delay in Pedro's divulging the real cause of his
mother's death until 10 December 1974. According to appellant,
such fear could no longer have influenced Pedro from December
6, the date he started to live separately from him. This contention
is untenable. Even though Pedro started to live separately from
his father from December 6, it cannot be said that the influence
of appellant's threat suddenly ceased from that time. It must be
noted that Pedro was young and was still very much under
appellant's influence and control. The thought and memory of his
father's viciousness were still too fresh even after three days
from his mother's death. The fear that he too could be killed by
appellant in like manner must have deterred him from divulging
the truth earlier.
Appellant also alleges that it was improbable for Pedro to have
just watched the killing of his mother. This contention is
untenable. At that moment, when his mother was being
assaulted and strangled, Pedro must have been so shocked as
to be rendered immobile and powerless to do anything. This is a
normal reaction in such a situation. Besides, it is a fact of life that
different people react differently to the same types of
situations. 9 One cannot overlook that there is no standard form
of behaviour when one is confronted by a shocking occurrence.10
Appellant next alleges that since the prosecution has failed
without satisfactory explanation to present Pedro's brother Alex
who is alleged to be also an eyewitness to the killing of the
victim, it is presumed that Alex's testimony would be adverse to
the prosecution if presented. This contention is without merit.
First, Alex, who is younger than Pedro by 3 years, may not have
been competent to testify due to his tender age. Second, even
assuming that he was competent to testify, his testimony could
be merely corroborative. Corroboration is not necessary in this
case because the details of the crime have already been testified
to by Pedro with sufficient clarity. The failure to present all the
eyewitnesses to an act does not necessarily give rise to an
unfavorable presumption, especially when the testimony of the
witness sought to be presented is merely
corroborative. 11 Witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered,
and it is a well established rule that the testimony of a single
witness, even if uncorroborated, but positive and credible, is
sufficient to support a conviction. 12 In any event, it is not for the
appellant to say how many witnesses the prosecution should
have presented. 13
The inconsistencies magnified by appellant in the testimony of
Pedro Salufrania have been satisfactorily explained. In fact,
some of them are not material since they neither touch upon the
manner of death of the victim nor question the identity of the
killer, both of which were unwaveringly testified upon by Pedro.
Thus, with the alleged inconsistencies and improbabilities
explained away, Pedro's testimony remains unperturbed. Even if
there were discrepancies, such discrepancies were minor and
may be considered as earmarks of verisimilitude.14
The trial court's assessment of Pedro's testimony, as quoted
hereunder, deserves more than passing consideration:
... The testimony of eye-witness Pedro
Salufrania, 13-year old son of the victim
Marciana Abuyo and her killer-spouse
Filomeno Salufrania, appears to be very clear,
convincing and truthful. It is vivid as to the
45
details of the horrible occurence that took
place at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of
December 3, 1974 in their small house at a far
away sitio of Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte,
resulting in the untimely and cruel death of her
(sic) mother. He and his brother Alex were the
only eyewitnesses to the gory crime committed
by their father. The credibility of this witness
(Pedro Salufrania) and his testimony was
invested when, despite rigid cross-
examination, the veracity of his testimony in
chief was not impeached. He remained firm
and on the verge of crying, when he pointed
an accusing finger at his father during the trial.
He was unshaken notwithstanding a long and
detailed cross-examination. And, there is
reason to bestow complete credence to his
testimony because he had the opportunity to
closely observe how his father had deliberately
and cruelly ended the life of his mother.
Despite his tender age and apparent childish
innocence, this Court believes that he can
clearly perceive and perceiving, make known
his perception, precluding the possibility of
coaching or tutoring by someone. His
declaration as to when, where and how the
horrible incident complained of happened is
the believable version.15
Appellant questions the competence of Dr. Dyquiangco as an
expert witness, since this is the first time that the doctor
conducted an autopsy on a cadaver which had been buried for
about a week. It must be noted, however, that although this was
the doctor's first autopsy under circumstances present in this
case, he had, however, conducted similar post-
mortem examinations on ten (10) other occasions. This would
constitute sufficient experience. Significantly, appellant did not
object to the doctor's expression of medical opinions during the
trial. Being an expert in his field, the doctor is presumed to have
taken all pertinent factors into consideration with regard to the
autopsy, including embalming and the state of the cadaver's
decomposition. Dr. Juan Dyquiangco Jr., was a disinterested
witness in the case, and a reputable public official in whose favor
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties
must be applied.
Appellant further alleges that the findings of Dr. Dyquiangco and
the testimony of Pedro Salufrania do not tally. Suffice it to say
that the Court finds no inconsistencies between the findings of
Dr. Dyquiangco and Pedro Salufrania's testimony. Both are
consistent on material points. Thus, the Court sees no reason to
disturb the conclusions reached by the trial court insofar as their
credibility and the appellant's guilt are concerned.
Appellant's third assignment of error alleges that the trial court
erred in discrediting his evidence simply because the testimonies
of the defense witnesses were consistent on material points.
Moreover, there is no showing, according to the appellant, that
said testimonies were rehearsed so as to dovetail with each
other.
This contention is without merit. The Court notes, first of all, that
appellant did not even bother to discuss his defense in order to
refute the massive evidence against him. This is tantamount to
an admission that he could not adequately support his version of
Marciana Abuyo's death. The trial court's reasons for rejecting
the defense version, as hereunder quoted, are tenable and
sound. Thus —
On the contrary, the testimonies of defense
witnesses Geronimo Villan, Angeles Liling
Balce and the accused Filomeno Salufrania
suspiciously dove-tailed in every detail as to
when, where and how .Marciana Abuyo died at
6:00 o'clock in the morning of 4 December
1974, in their house at sitio Kapagisahan
Tigbinan Labo, Carnarines Norte, of stomach
pain. On these points, these witnesses and the
accused made statements which seemed to
 46

be very fresh and clear in their minds, despite
the lapse of four long years. Their exact and
uniform declarations on these points, their
phenomenal recollections, without sufficient
special or uncommon reason to recall,
rendered their testimonies unconvincing. If at
all, their testimonies appeared to this Court to
be an eleventh hour concoction. And, as
defense witnesses, after observing them and
their declarations on the witness stand, they
appeared to the Court to be untruthful and
unreliable. For, despite the synchronization of
time when, the place where and how the
incidence happened, their testimonies on other
material points revealed their tendency to
exaggerate and their propensity to falsehood,
thus-Aside from the accused Filomeno
Salufrania, there are three other witnesses for
the defense Geronimo Villan Angeles Liling
Balce and Juanita Bragais. There is nothing in
the testimony of Juanito Bragais because he
did not witness how and when Marciana Abuyo
died. Francisco Repuya, who was also alleged
by Filomeno Salufrania to be present when
Marciana Abuyo died, did not testify. Accused
Filomeno Salufrania never claimed that he
summoned for Angeles Liling Balce. According
to him Angeles Liling Balce was not present
during the moment of death of Marciana
Abuyo, for she was fetched by him only after
the death of his wife. Logically, therefore, there
is no basis for the presentation of Angeles
Liling Balce that she was present during the
moment of death of Marciana Abuyo. She was
merely play-acting. Geronimo Villan who
claimed he passed-by the house of Filomeno
Salufrania and saw the latter boiling water with
"ikmo" and garlic, as medicine for his wife
Marciana Abuyo, who was about to give birth
was discredited by accused himself who
declared he was merely boiling water for the
hot drink of his wife, who was suferring from
her old stomach ailment. In like manner,
witness Geronimo Villan discredited the
accused Filomeno Salufrania, about the
presence of Francisco Repuya, who allegedly
alternated with Geronimo Villan in applying the
native treatments of 'hilot' and 'bantil' to
Marciana Abuyo, when throughout his
testimony he (Geronimo Villan) never
mentioned the presence of Francisco Repuya.
After closely observing defense witnesses
Geronimo Villan and Angeles Liling Balce, this
Court is convinced that their testimonies and
accounts of the incident are fabricated,
untruthful and not worth of credence. Certainly,
they were not present immediately before and
during the moment of death of Marciana
Abuyo. ...
with Intentional Abortion but of the complex crime of Parricide
with Unintentional Abortion. The elements of Unintentional
Abortion are as follows:
1. That there is a pregnant woman.
2. That violence is used upon such pregnant
woman without intending an abortion.
3. That the violence is intentionally exerted.
4. That as a result of the violence the foetus
dies, either in the womb or after having been
expelled therefrom. 17
The Solicitor General's brief makes it appear that
appellant intended to cause an abortion because he boxed his
pregnant wife on the stomach which caused her to fall and then
strangled her. We find that appellant's intent to cause an abortion
has not been sufficiently established. Mere boxing on the
stomach, taken together with the immediate strangling of the
victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show an intent to cause
an abortion. In fact, appellant must have merely intended to kill
the victim but not necessarily to cause an abortion.
The evidence on record, therefore, establishes beyond
reasonable doubt that accused Filomeno Salufrania committed
and should be held liable for the complex crime of parricide with
unintentional abortion. The abortion, in this case, was caused by
the same violence that caused the death of Marciana Abuyo,
such violence being voluntarily exerted by the herein accused
upon his victim.
It has also been clearly established (a) that Marciana Abuyo was
seven (7) to eight (8) months pregnant when she was killed; (b)
that violence was voluntarily exerted upon her by her husband
accused; and (c) that, as a result of said violence, Marciana
Abuyo died together with the foetus in her womb. In this
afternoon, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code states that the
accused should be punished with the penalty corresponding to
the more serious came of parricide, to be imposed in its
maximum period which is death. However, by reason of the 1987
Constitution which has abolished the death penalty, appellant
should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, as modified, the judgment appealed from is
AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The indemnity of P12,000. 00
awarded to the heirs of the deceased Marciana Abuyo is
increased to P30,000.00 in line with the recent decisions of the
Court. With costs against the appellant,
SO ORDERED.

Added to these, there is one scandalous ABORTION

circumstance, which to the mind of this Court,
betrays the guilty conscience of the accused. If RA 4729
there was nothing revealing in the face of the
deceased Marciana Abuyo, why was her face
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4729
covered by a piece of cloth by the accused. ...

Trial judges are in the best position to ascertain the truth and
AN ACT TO REGULATE THE SALE, DISPENSATION, AND/OR
detect falsehoods in the testimony of witnesses. This Court will
normally not disturb the findings of the trial court on the DISTRIBUTION OF CONTRACEPTIVE DRUGS AND DEVICES
credibility of witnesses, in view of its advantage in observing first
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or
hand their demeanor in giving their testimony.16 Such rule applies
in the present case. corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distribute whether for
or without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device,
unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is by a duly
Lastly, appellant alleges that, assuming he indeed killed his wife,
there is no evidence to show that he had the intention to cause licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the
an abortion. In this contention, appellant is correct. He should prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
not be held guilty of the complex crime of Parricide

Section 2. For the purpose of this Act:
(a) “Contraceptive drug” is any medicine, drug, chemical, or
portion which is used exclusively for the purpose of preventing
fertilization of the female ovum: and
(b) “Contraceptive device” is any instrument, device, material, or
agent introduced into the female reproductive system for the
primary purpose of preventing conception.
Section 3. Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the
provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of not more
than five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six
months or more than one year or both in the discretion of the
Court.
This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, June 18, 1966.
MUTILATION
AGUIRRE v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 170723 March 3, 2008
GLORIA PILAR S. AGUIRRE, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
MICHELINA S. AGUIRRE-OLONDRIZ, PEDRO B. AGUIRRE,
DR. JUVIDO AGATEP and DR. MARISSA B.
PASCUAL, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, petitioner Gloria Pilar S. Aguirre
(Gloria Aguirre) seeks the reversal of the 21 July 2005
Decision2 and 5 December 2005 Resolution,3 both of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88370, entitled "Gloria Pilar S.
Aguirre v. Secretary of the Department of Justice, Michelina S.
Aguirre-Olondriz, Dr. Juvido Agatep, Dra. Marissa B. Pascual,
Pedro B. Aguirre and John and Jane Does."
The Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) when
the latter issued the twin resolutions dated 11 February
20044 and 12 November 2004,5 respectively, which in turn
affirmed the 8 January 2003 Resolution6 of the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City.
The Assistant City Prosecutor for the OCP of Quezon City
recommended the dismissal of the criminal complaint, docketed
as I.S. No. 02-12466, for violation of Articles 172 (Falsification by
Private Individuals and Use of Falsified Documents) and 262
(Mutilation), both of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as "Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act," for insufficiency of
evidence.
The case stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioner Gloria
Aguirre against respondents Pedro B. Aguirre (Pedro Aguirre),
47
Michelina S. Aguirre-Olondriz (Olondriz), Dr. Juvido Agatep (Dr.
Agatep), Dr. Marissa B. Pascual (Dr. Pascual) and several
John/Jane Does for falsification, mutilation and child abuse.
The antecedents of the present petition are:
Laureano "Larry" Aguirre7 used to be a charge of the Heart of
Mary Villa, a child caring agency run by the Good Shepherd
Sisters and licensed by the Department of Social Work and
Development (DSWD). Sometime in 1978, respondent Pedro
Aguirre; the latter's spouse, Lourdes S. Aguirre (Lourdes
Aguirre); and their four daughters, who included petitioner Gloria
Aguirre and respondent Olondriz, came to know Larry, who was
then just over a year old. The Aguirres would have Larry spend a
few days at their home and then return him to the orphanage
thereafter. In June 1980, Larry, then two years and nine months
of age, formally became the ward of respondent Pedro Aguirre
and his spouse Lourdes Aguirre by virtue of an Affidavit of
Consent to Legal Guardianshipexecuted in their favor by Sister
Mary Concepta Bellosillo, Superior of the Heart of Mary Villa. On
19 June 1986, the Aguirre spouses' guardianship of Larry was
legalized when the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of
Balanga, Bataan, duly appointed them as joint co-guardians over
the person and property of Larry.
As Larry was growing up, the Aguirre spouses and their children
noticed that his developmental milestones were remarkably
delayed. His cognitive and physical growth did not appear
normal in that "at age 3 to 4 years, Larry could only crawl on his
tummy like a frog x x x;" 8 he did not utter his first word until he
was three years of age; did not speak in sentences until his sixth
year; and only learned to stand up and walk after he turned five
years old. At age six, the Aguirre spouses first enrolled Larry at
the Colegio de San Agustin, Dasmariñas Village, but the child
experienced significant learning difficulties there. In 1989, at age
eleven, Larry was taken to specialists for neurological and
psychological evaluations. The psychological evaluation9 done
on Larry revealed the latter to be suffering from a mild mental
deficiency.10 Consequent thereto, the Aguirre spouses
transferred Larry to St. John Ma. Vianney, an educational
institution for special children.
In November of 2001, respondent Dr. Agatep, a
urologist/surgeon, was approached concerning the intention to
have Larry, then 24 years of age, vasectomized. Prior to
performing the procedure on the intended patient, respondent
Dr. Agatep required that Larry be evaluated by a psychiatrist in
order to confirm and validate whether or not the former could
validly give his consent to the medical procedure on account of
his mental deficiency.
In view of the required psychiatric clearance, Larry was brought
to respondent Dr. Pascual, a psychiatrist, for evaluation. In a
psychiatric report dated 21 January 2002, respondent Dr.
Pascual made the following recommendation:
[T]he responsibility of decision making may be given to his
parent or guardian.11
the full text of which reads –
PSYCHIATRY REPORT
21 January 2002
GENERAL DATA
 48

LAUREANO AGUIRRE, 24 years old, male, high school comparable to a 7-8 year old. He demonstrated fair judgment
graduate of St. John [Marie Vianney], was referred for psychiatric and poor insight. He had fair impulse control.
evaluation to determine competency to give consent for
vasectomy. PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS

CLINICAL SUMMARY Psychological tests done on March 6, 1990 (Dr. Lourdes

Ledesma) and on August 4, 2000 (Dr. Ma. Teresa Gustilo-
Larry was adopted at age 3 from an orphanage and prenatal Villaosor) consistently revealed mild to moderate mental
history is not known to the adoptive family except that abortion deficiency.
was attempted. Developmental milestones were noted to be
delayed. He started to walk and speak in single word at around SIGNIFICANT LABORATORY EXAMS RESULTS
age 5. He was enrolled in Colegio de San Agustin at age 6
where he showed significant learning difficulties that he had to CT scan done 09 January 2001 showed nonspecific right deep
repeat 1st and 4th grades. A consult was done in 1989 when he parietal subcortical malacia. No localized mass lesion in the
was 11 years old. Neurological findings and EEG results were brain.
not normal and he was given Tecretol and Encephabol by his
neurologist. Psychological evaluation revealed mild to moderate
MRI done on 10 January 2001 showed bilateral parietal x x x
mental retardation, special education training was advised and
volume loss, encephalomalacia, gliosis and ulegyria consistent
thus, he was transferred to St. John Marie Vianney. He finished
with sequela of postnatal or neonatal infarcts. Ex-vacuo
his elementary and secondary education in the said school. He
dilatation of the atria of lateral ventricles associated thinned
was later enrolled in a vocational course at Don Bosco which he
posterior half of the corpus callosum.
was unable to continue. There has been no reported behavioral
problems in school and he gets along relatively well with his
teachers and some of his classmates. ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION

Larry grew up with a very supportive adoptive family. He is the Axis I None
youngest in the family of four sisters. Currently, his adoptive
parents are already old and have medical problem and thus, Axis II Mental Retardation, mild to moderate type
they could no longer monitor and take care of him like before.
His adoptive mother has Bipolar Mood Disorder and used to Axis III None
physically maltreat him. A year ago, he had an episode of
dizziness, vomiting and headaches after he was hit by his Axis IV None at present
adoptive mother. Consult was done in Makati Medical Center
and several tests were done, results of which were consistent
Axis V Current GAF = 50-60
with his developmental problem. There was no evidence of acute
insults. The family subsequently decided that he should stay with
Larry's mental deficiency could be associated with possible
one of his sisters to avoid similar incident and the possibility that
perinatal insults, which is consistent with the neuroimaging
he would retaliate although he has never hurt anybody. There
findings. Mental retardation associated with neurological
has been no episode of violent outburst or aggressive behavior.
problems usually has poorer prognosis. Larry is very much
He would often keep to himself when sad, angry or frustrated.
dependent on his family for his needs, adaptive functioning,
direction and in making major life decisions. At his capacity, he
He is currently employed in the company of his sister and given
may never understand the nature, the foreseeable risks and
assignment to do some photocopying, usually in the mornings.
benefits, and consequences of the procedure (vasectomy) that
He enjoys playing billiards and basketball with his nephews and,
his family wants for his protection. Thus, the responsibility of
he spends most of his leisure time watching TV and listening to
decision making may be given to his parent or guardian.
music. He could perform activities of daily living without
assistance except that he still needs supervision in taking a bath.
He cannot prepare his own meal and never allowed to go out Marissa B. Pascual, M.D.
and run errands alone. He does not have friends and it is only Psychiatrist12
his adoptive family whom he has significant relationships. He
claims that he once had a girlfriend when he was in high school
Considering the above recommendation, respondent Pedro
who was more like a best friend to him. He never had sexual
Aguirre's written consent was deemed sufficient in order to
relations. He has learned to smoke and drink alcohol few years
proceed with the conduct of the vasectomy. Hence, on 31
ago through his cousins and the drivers. There is no history of
January 2002, respondent Dr. Agatep performed a bilateral
abuse of alcohol or any prohibited substances.
vasectomy on Larry.

MEDICAL STATUS EXAMINATION

The applicant was appropriately dressed. He was cooperative
and he had intermittent eye contact. Speech was spontaneous,
soft, and relevant. He responded to questions in single words or
simple sentences. He was anxious specially at the start of the
interview, with full affect appropriate to mood and thought
content. There was no apparent thought or perceptual
disturbance. No suicidal/homicidal thoughts elicited. He was
oriented to time, place and person. He has intact remote and
recent memory. He could do simple calculation. He could write
his name and read simple words. His human figure was
On 11 June 2002, petitioner Gloria Aguirre, respondent Pedro
Aguirre's eldest child, instituted a criminal complaint for the
violation of the Revised Penal Code, particularly Articles 172 and
262, both in relation to Republic Act No. 7610 against
respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep, Dr. Pascual
and several John/Jane Does before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City.
The Complaint Affidavit,13 docketed as I.S. No. 02-12466,
contained the following allegations:

2. x x x Dr. Agatep and Dra. Pascual were (sic) medical
practitioners specializing in urology and psychiatry respectively;
while respondent Pedro B. Aguirre is my father; Michelina S.
Aguirre-Olondriz is my sister, and the victim Laureano "Larry"
Aguirre xxx is my common law brother. JOHN and JANE DOES
were the persons who, acting upon the apparent instructions of
respondents Michelina Aguirre-Olondriz and/or Pedro B. Aguirre,
actually scouted, prospected, facilitated, solicited and/or
procured the medical services of respondents Dra. Pascual and
Dr. Agatep vis-à-vis the intended mutilation via bilateral
vasectomy of my common law brother Larry Aguirre subject
hereof.
xxxx
4. Sometime in March 2002, however, the Heart of Mary Villa of
the Good Shepherd Sisters was furnished a copy of respondent
Dra. Pascual's Psychiatry Report dated 21 January 2004 by the
"DSWD," in which my common law brother "Larry" was falsely
and maliciously declared incompetent and incapable of
purportedly giving his own consent to the MUTILATION VIA
BILATERAL VASECTOMY intended to be performed on him by
all the respondents.
xxxx
6. Based on the foregoing charade and false pretenses
invariably committed by all of the respondents in conspiracy with
each other, on 31 January 2002, my common law brother Larry
Aguirre, although of legal age but conspiratorially caused to be
declared by respondents to be "mentally deficient" and
incompetent to give consent to his BILATERAL VASECTOMY,
was then intentionally, unlawfully, maliciously, feloniously and/or
criminally placed thereafter under surgery for MUTILATION VIA
"BILATERAL VASECTOMY" x x x, EVEN WITHOUT ANY
AUTHORIZATION ORDER from the GUARDIANSHIP COURT,
nor personal consent of Larry Aguirre himself.
In addition to the above, the complaint included therein an
allegation that –
v. x x x without a PRIOR medical examination, professional
interview of nor verification and consultation with my mother,
Lourdes Sabino-Aguirre, respondent Dra. Pascual baselessly,
fraudulently and with obvious intent to defame and malign her
reputation and honor, and worse, that of our Sabido family,
falsely concluded and diagnosed, via her falsified Psychiatry
Report, that my mother Lourdes Sabido-Aguirre purportedly
suffers from "BIPOLAR MOOD DISORDER" x x x.
To answer petitioner Gloria Aguirre's accusations against them,
respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual
submitted their respective Counter-Affidavits.
In her defense,14 respondent Olondriz denied that she
"prospected, scouted, facilitated, solicited and/or procured any
false statement, mutilated or abused" her common-law brother,
Larry Aguirre. Further, she countered that:
3. x x x While I am aware and admit that Larry went through a
vasectomy procedure, there is nothing in the Complaint which
explains how the vasectomy amounts to a mutilation.
xxxx
5. In any case, as I did not perform the vasectomy, I can state
with complete confidence that I did not participate in any way in
the alleged mutilation.
49
6. Neither did I procure or solicit the services of the physician
who performed the vasectomy, Dr. Juvido Agatep x x x. It was
my father, Pedro Aguirre, Larry's guardian, who obtained his
services. I merely acted upon his instructions and accompanied
my brother to the physician, respondents Dra. Marissa B.
Pascual x x x.
xxxx
10. Neither does the Complaint explain in whatmanner the
Complainant is authorized or has any standing to declare that
Larry's consent was not obtained. Complainant is not the
guardian or relative of Larry. While she argues that Larry's
consent should have been obtained the Complaint does not
dispute the psychiatrist's findings about Larry's inability to give
consent.
xxxx
13. x x x the Complaint does not even state what alleged
participation was falsified or the portion of the psychiatric report
that allegedly states that someone participated when in fact that
person did not so participate.
xxxx
15. Again, I had no participation in the preparation of the report
of Dr. Pascual x x x.
xxxx
17. x x x the Complaint does not dispute that he (Larry) is
mentally deficient or incompetent to give consent.
xxxx
19. x x x I verified that the effect of a vasectomy operation was
explained to him (Larry) by both respondent doctors.
20. x x x I accompanied Larry and obeyed my father on the belief
that my father continues to be the legal guardian of Larry. I know
of no one else who asserts to be his legal guardian x x x.15
Alleging the same statement of facts and defenses, respondent
Pedro Aguirre argues against his complicity in the crime of
mutilation as charged and asserts that:
5. In any case, as I did not perform the vasectomy, I can state
with complete confidence that I did not participate in any way in
the alleged mutilation.16
Nevertheless, he maintains that the vasectomy performed on
Larry does not in any way amount to mutilation, as the latter's
reproductive organ is still completely intact. 17 In any case,
respondent Pedro Aguirre explains that the procedure performed
is reversible through another procedure called Vasovasostomy,
to wit:
8. I understand that vasectomy is reversible through a procedure
called Vasovasostomy. I can also state with confidence that the
procedure enables men who have undergone a vasectomy to
sire a child. Hence, no permanent damage was caused by the
procedure.
Respondent Pedro Aguirre challenges the charge of falsification
in the complaint, to wit:

14. x x x I did not make it appear that any person participated in
any act or proceeding when that person did not in fact participate
x x x.
xxxx
16. x x x I had no participation in the preparation of the report of
Dra. Pascual. She arrived at her report independently, using her
own professional judgment x x x.
xxxx
31. What I cannot understand about Petita's Complaint is how
Larry is argued to be legally a child under the definition of one
law but nonetheless and simultaneously argued to be
capacitated to give his consent as fully as an adult.18
Respondent Pedro Aguirre further clarifies that co-guardianship
over Larry had been granted to himself and his wife, Lourdes
Aguirre, way back on 19 June 1986 by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 3 of Balanga, Bataan. Respondent Pedro Aguirre
contends that being one of the legal guardians, consequently,
parental authority over Larry is vested in him. But assuming for
the sake of argument that Larry does have the capacity to make
the decision concerning his vasectomy, respondent Pedro
Aguirre argues that petitioner Gloria Aguirre has no legal
personality to institute the subject criminal complaint, for only
Larry would have the right to do so.
Just as the two preceding respondents did, respondent Dr.
Agatep also disputed the allegations of facts stated in the
Complaint. Adopting the allegations of his co-respondents
insofar as they were material to the charges against him, he
vehemently denied failing to inform Larry of the intended
procedure. In his counter-statement of facts he averred that:
(b) x x x I scheduled Larry for consultative interview x x x
wherein I painstakingly explained what vasectomy is and the
consequences thereof; but finding signs of mental deficiency, x x
x I advised his relatives and his nurse who accompanied him to
have Larry examined by a psychiatrist who could properly
determine whether or not Larry x x x can really give his consent,
thus I required them to secure first a psychiatric evaluation and
clearance prior to the contemplated procedure.
(c) On January 21, 2002, I was furnished a copy of a psychiatric
report prepared by Dr. Marissa Pascual x x x. In her said report,
Dr. Pascual found Larry to suffer from "mental retardation, mild
to moderate type" and further stated that "at his capacity, he may
never understand the nature, the foreseeable risks and benefits
and consequences of the procedure (vasectomy) x x x, thus the
responsibility of decision making may be given to his parent or
guardian x x x."
(d) x x x I was likewise furnished a copy of an affidavit executed
by Pedro Aguirre stating that he was the legal guardian of Larry x
x x Pedro Aguirre gave his consent to vasectomize Larry x x x.
(e) Only then, specifically January 31, 2002, vasectomy was
performed with utmost care and diligence.19
In defense against the charge of falsification and mutilation,
respondent Dr. Agatep argued that subject complaint should be
dismissed for the following reasons:
1. The complainant has no legal personality to file this case. As
mentioned above, she is only a common law sister of Larry who
50
has a legal guardian in the person of Pedro Aguirre, one of the
herein respondents x x x.
2. x x x [t]he allegations in the complaint clearly centers on the
condition of complainant's mother, Lourdes Aguirre, her
reputation, and miserably fails to implicate the degree of
participation of herein respondent. x x x
xxxx
(b) Falsification. x x x I strongly aver that this felony does not
apply to me since it clearly gives reference to co-respondent, Dr.
Marissa Pascual's Psychiatry Report, dated January 21, 2002, in
relation with her field of profession, an expert opinion. I do not
have any participation in the preparation of said report, x x x
neither did I utilized (sic) the same in any proceedings to the
damage to another. x x x I also deny using a falsified document x
x x.
(c) Mutilation. x x x Vasectomy does not in anyway equate to
castration and what is touched in vasectomy is not considered
an organ in the context of law and medicine, it is quite remote
from the penis x x x.
(d) Child Abuse. x x x the complaint-affidavit is very vague in
specifying the applicability of said law. It merely avers that
Laureano "Larry" Aguirre is a child, and alleges his father, Pedro
Aguirre, has parental authority over him x x x.20
Similarly, respondent Dr. Pascual denied the criminal charges of
falsification and mutilation imputed to her. She stands by the
contents of the assailed Psychiatric Report, justifying it thus:
x x x My opinion of Larry Aguirre's mental status was based on
my own personal observations, his responses during my
interview of him, the results of the two (2) psychological tests
conducted by clinical psychologists, the results of laboratory
tests, including a CT Scan and MRI, and his personal and family
history which I obtained from his sister, Michelina Aguirre-
Olondriz x x x.
5. x x x the reference in my report concerning Mrs. Lourdes
Aguirre is not a statement of my opinion of Mrs. Aguirre's mental
status, x x x. Rather, it is part of the patient's personal and family
history as conveyed to me by Mrs. Aguirre-Olondriz.
6. x x x An expression of my opinion, especially of an expert
opinion, cannot give rise to a charge for falsification. A contrary
opinion by another expert only means that the experts differ, and
does not necessarily reflect on the truth or falsity of either
opinion x x x.
7. x x x I never stated that I examined Mrs. Aguirre, because I
never did x x x.
8. I had no participation in the surgery performed on Larry
Aguirre except to render an opinion on his capacity to give
informed consent to the vasectomy x x x.
9. Without admitting the merits of the complaint, I submit that
complainants are not the proper persons to subscribe to the
same as they are not the offended party, peace officer or other
public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated x
x x.21
The Assistant City Prosecutor held that the circumstances
attendant to the case did not amount to the crime of falsification.
He held that –

[T]he claim of the complainant that the Psychiatric Report was
falsified, because consent was not given by Larry Aguirre to the
vasectomy and/or he was not consulted on said operation does
not constitute falsification. It would have been different if it was
stated in the report that consent was obtained from Larry Aguirre
or that it was written therein that he was consulted on the
vasectomy, because that would mean that it was made to appear
in the report that Larry Aguirre participated in the act or
proceeding by giving his consent or was consulted on the matter
when in truth and in fact, he did not participate. Or if not, the
entry would have been an untruthful statement. But that is not
the case. Precisely (sic) the report was made to determine
whether Larry Aguirre could give his consent to his intended
vasectomy. Be that as it may, the matter of Larry's consent
having obtained or not may nor be an issue after all, because
complainant's (sic) herself alleged that Larry's mental condition is
that of a child, who can not give consent. Based on the foregoing
consideration, no falsification can be established under the
circumstances.22
Even the statement in the Psychiatric Report of respondent Dr.
Pascual that Lourdes Aguirre had Bipolar Mood Disorder cannot
be considered falsification since –
The report did not state that Lourdes Aguirre was in fact
personally interviewed by respondent Dr. Pascual and that the
latter concluded that Lourdes Aguirre has Bipolar Mood Disorder.
The report merely quoted other sources of information with
respect to the condition of Lourdes Aguirre, in the same manner
that the fact that Lourdes Aguirre was physically abusing Larry
Aguirre was also not of Dra. Pascual personal knowledge. But
the fact that Dra. Pascual cited finding, which is not of her own
personal knowledge in her report does not mean that she
committed falsification in the process. Her sources may be
wrong and may affect the veracity of her report, but for as long
as she has not alleged therein that she personally diagnosed
Lourdes Aguirre, which allegation would not then be true, she
cannot be charged of falsification. Therefore, it goes without
saying that if the author of the report is not guilty, then with more
reason the other respondents are not liable.23
Respecting the charge of mutilation, the Assistant City
Prosecutor also held that the facts alleged did not amount to the
crime of mutilation as defined and penalized under Article 262 of
the Revised Penal Code, i.e., "[t]he vasectomy operation did not
in any way deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive organ, which
is still very much part of his physical self." He ratiocinated that:
While the operation renders him the inability (sic) to procreate,
the operation is reversible and therefore, cannot be the
permanent damage contemplated under Article 262 of the
Revised Penal Code.24
The Assistant City Prosecutor,25 in a Resolution26 dated 8
January 2003, found no probable cause to hold respondents
Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual liable for the
complaint of falsification and mutilation, more specifically, the
violation of Articles 172 and 262 of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to Republic Act No. 7610. Accordingly, the Assistant City
Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of petitioner Gloria
Aguirre's complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive
portion of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, it is recommended that the above-entitled case
be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.27
On 18 February 2003, petitioner Gloria Aguirre appealed the
foregoing resolution to the Secretary of the DOJ by means of a
Petition for Review.28
51
In a Resolution dated 11 February 2004, Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito R. Zuño, for the Secretary of the DOJ, dismissed the
petition. In resolving said appeal, the Chief State Prosecutor held
that:
Under Section 12, in relation to Section 7, of Department
Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, the Secretary of Justice
may, motu proprio, dismiss outright the petition if there is no
showing of any reversible error in the questioned resolution or
finds the same to be patently without merit.
We carefully examined the petition and its attachments and
found no error that would justify a reversal of the assailed
resolution which is in accord with the law and evidenced (sic) on
the matter.29
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre's Motion for Reconsideration was
likewise denied with finality by the DOJ in another Resolution
dated 12 November 2004.
Resolute in her belief, petitioner Gloria Aguirre went to the Court
of Appeals by means of a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as
amended.
On 21 July 2005, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision
dismissing petitioner Gloria Aguirre's recourse for lack of merit.
The fallo of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is
hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED for
lack of merit. Consequently, the assailed Resolutions dated
February 11, 2004 and November 12, 2004 of the Secretary of
Justice in I.S. No. 02-12466 are hereby AFFIRMED.30
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre's motion for reconsideration proved
futile as it was denied by the appellate court in a Resolution
dated 5 December 2005.
Hence, the present petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, premised on the following arguments:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS, GRAVE
AND REVERSIBLE ERRORS OF LAW WHEN IT CONCLUDED,
BASED PURPORTEDLY ON THE INTERNET WHICH RUNS
AMUCK WITH OUR SYSTEM OF THE RULE OF LAW AND
THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, THAT BILATERAL
VASECTOMY IS PURPORTEDLY 100% REVERSIBLE BY A
FUTURE MEDICAL PROCEDURE HENCE NOT AMOUNTING
TO MUTILATION, X X X; AND
xxxx
II.
WORSE, THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE,
SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERRORS OF LAW WHEN IT
REFUSED TO DIRECT THE INDICTMENT OF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS FOR MUTILATION AND FALSIFICATION
DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF SUFFICIENT PROBABLE
CAUSE THEREFOR X X X.31
The foregoing issues notwithstanding, the more proper issue for
this Court's consideration is, given the facts of the case, whether

or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the DOJ did not
commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when the latter affirmed the public prosecutor's
finding of lack of probable cause for respondents Pedro Aguirre,
Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual to stand trial for the
criminal complaints of falsification and mutilation in relation to
Republic Act No. 7610.
In ruling that the DOJ did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals
explained that:
Evidently, the controversy lies in the permanency of sterilization
as a result of a vasectomy operation, and the chances of
restoring fertility with a reversal surgery x x x.
We sustain the DOJ in ruling that the bilateral vasectomy
performed on Larry does not constitute mutilation even if
intentionally and purposely done to prevent him from siring a
child.
xxxx
Sterilization is to be distinguished from castration: in the latter
act the reproductive capacity is permanently removed or
damaged.32
It then concluded that:
The matter of legal liability, other than criminal,which private
respondents may have incurred for the alleged absence of a
valid consent to the vasectomy performed on Larry, is certainly
beyond the province of this certiorari petition. Out task is
confined to the issue of whether or not the Secretary of Justice
and the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City committed
grave abuse of discretion in their determining the existence or
absence of probable cause for filing criminal cases
for falsification and mutilation under Articles 172 (2) and 262 of
the Revised Penal Code.33
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre, however, contends that the Court of
Appeals and the DOJ failed to appreciate several important
facts: 1) that bilateral vasectomy conducted on petitioner's
brother, Larry Aguirre, was admitted34; 2) that the procedure
caused the perpetual destruction of Larry's reproductive organs
of generation or conception;353) that the bilateral vasectomy was
intentional and deliberate to deprive Larry forever of his
reproductive organ and his capacity to procreate; and 4) that
respondents, "in conspiracy with one another, made not only one
but two (2) untruthful statements, and not mere inaccuracies
when they made it appear in the psychiatry report"36that a)
Larry's consent was obtained or at the very least that the latter
was informed of the intended vasectomy; and b) that Lourdes
Aguirre was likewise interviewed and evaluated. Paradoxically,
however, petitioner Gloria Aguirre does not in any way state that
she, instead of respondent Pedro Aguirre, has guardianship over
the person of Larry. She only insists that respondents should
have obtained Larry's consent prior to the conduct of the bilateral
vasectomy.
In contrast, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for public
respondent DOJ, argues that "the conduct of preliminary
investigation to determine the existence of probable cause for
the purpose of filing (an) information is the function of the public
prosecutor."37 More importantly, "the element[s] of castration or
mutilation of an organ necessary for generation is completely
absent as he was not deprived of any organ necessary for
reproduction, much less the destruction of such organ."38
52
Likewise, in support of the decision of the Court of Appeals,
respondents Pedro Aguirre and Olondriz assert that,
fundamentally, petitioner Gloria Aguirre has no standing to file
the complaint, as she has not shown any injury to her person or
asserted any relationship with Larry other than being his
"common law sister"; further, that she cannot prosecute the
present case, as she has not been authorized by law to file said
complaint, not being the offended party, a peace officer or a
public officer charged with the enforcement of the law.
Accordingly, respondents Pedro Aguirre and Olondriz posit that
they, together with the other respondents Dr. Agatep and Dr.
Pascual, may not be charged with, prosecuted for and ultimately
convicted of: 1) "mutilation x x x since the bilateral vasectomy
conducted on Larry does not involve castration or amputation of
an organ necessary for reproduction as the twin elements of the
crime of mutilation x x x are absent" 39; and 2) "falsification x x x
since the acts allegedly constituting falsification involve matters
of medical opinion and not matters of fact," 40 and that petitioner
Gloria Aguirre failed to prove damage to herself or to any other
person.
Respondent Dr. Agatep, in the same vein, stresses that
vasectomy is not mutilation. He elucidates that vasectomy is
merely the "excision of the vas deferens, the duct in testis which
transport semen"41; that it is the penis and the testis that make
up the male reproductive organ and not the vas deferens; and
additionally argues that for the crime of mutilation to be
accomplished, Article 262 of the Revised Penal Code
necessitates that there be intentional total or partial deprivation
of some essential organ for reproduction. Tubes, seminal ducts,
vas deferens or prostatic urethra not being organs, respondent
Dr. Agatep concludes, therefore, that vasectomy does not
correspond to mutilation.
Anent the charge of falsification of a private document,
respondent Dr. Agatep asseverates that he never took part in
disclosing any information, data or facts as contained in the
contentious Psychiatric Report.
For her part, respondent Dr. Pascual insists that the assailed
Psychiatry Report was the result of her independent exercise of
professional judgment. "Rightly or wrongly, (she) diagnosed
Larry Aguirre to be incapable of giving consent, based on
interviews made by the psychiatrist on Larry Aguirre and persons
who interacted with him."42And supposing that said report is
flawed, it is, at most, an erroneous medical diagnosis.
The petition has no merit.
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts
and circumstances as would excite belief in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that
the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted.43 The term does not mean "actual and positive
cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. 44 It is merely based
on opinion and reasonable belief;45 that is, the belief that the act
or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. A
finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand
trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.46
The executive department of the government is accountable for
the prosecution of crimes, its principal obligation being the
faithful execution of the laws of the land. A necessary component
of the power to execute the laws is the right to prosecute their
violators,47 the responsibility of which is thrust upon the DOJ.
Hence, the determination of whether or not probable cause
exists to warrant the prosecution in court of an accused is
consigned and entrusted to the DOJ. And by the nature of his
office, a public prosecutor is under no compulsion to file a

particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he
has evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the
evidence at hand points to a different conclusion.
Put simply, public prosecutors under the DOJ have a wide range
of discretion, the discretion of whether, what and whom to
charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of
factors which are best appreciated by (public) prosecutors.48 And
this Court has consistently adhered to the policy of non-
interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to
leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of
discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient
evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of an
information against the supposed offender.49
But this is not to discount the possibility of the commission of
abuses on the part of the prosecutor. It is entirely possible that
the investigating prosecutor may erroneously exercise the
discretion lodged in him by law. This, however, does not render
his act amenable to correction and annulment by the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, absent any showing of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.50
Prescinding from the above, the court's duty in an appropriate
case, therefore, is confined to a determination of whether the
assailed executive determination of probable cause was done
without or in excess of jurisdiction resulting from a grave abuse
of discretion. For courts of law to grant the extraordinary writ
of certiorari, so as to justify the reversal of the finding of whether
or not there exists probable cause to file an information, the one
seeking the writ must be able to establish that the investigating
prosecutor exercised his power in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be
patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a
unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law. Grave abuse of discretion is not
enough.51 Excess of jurisdiction signifies that he had jurisdiction
over the case but has transcended the same or acted without
authority.52
Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present petition, the
reasons of the Assistant City Prosecutor in dismissing the
criminal complaints for falsification and mutilation, as affirmed by
the DOJ, is determinative of whether or not he committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In ruling the way he did – that no probable cause for falsification
and mutilation exists - the Assistant City Prosecutor deliberated
on the factual and legal milieu of the case. He found that there
was no sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for the
crimes complained of as defined and punished under Articles
172, paragraph 2, and 262 of the Revised Penal Code in relation
to Republic Act No. 7610, respectively. Concerning the crime of
falsification of a private document, the Assistant City Prosecutor
reasoned that the circumstances attendant to the case did not
amount to the crime complained of, that is, the lack of consent
by Larry Aguirre before he was vasectomized; or the fact that the
latter was not consulted. The lack of the two preceding attendant
facts do not in any way amount to falsification, absent the
contention that it was made to appear in the assailed report that
said consent was obtained. That would have been an untruthful
statement. Neither does the fact that the Psychiatric Report state
that Lourdes Aguirre has Bipolar Mood Disorder by the same
token amount to falsification because said report does not put
forward that such finding arose after an examination of the
concerned patient. Apropos the charge of mutilation, he
reasoned that though the vasectomy rendered Larry unable to
procreate, it was not the permanent damage contemplated under
the pertinent provision of the penal code.
53
We agree. Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the DOJ and the Assistant
City Prosecutor was not shown in the present case.
In the present petition, respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr.
Agatep and Dr. Pascual are charged with violating Articles 172
and 262 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Republic Act
No. 7610. Article 172, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code,
defines the crime of falsification of a private document, viz –
Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of
falsified documents. – The penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000
pesos shall be imposed upon:
xxxx
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the
intent to cause such damage, shall in any private document
commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next
preceding article.
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre charges respondents with falsification of
a private document for conspiring with one another in keeping
Larry "in the dark about the foregoing (vasectomy) as the same
was concealed from him by the respondents x x x," 53 as well as
for falsely concluding and diagnosing Lourdes Aguirre to be
suffering from Bipolar Mood Disorder.
A scrutiny, however, of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code
which defines the acts constitutive of falsification, that is –
Art. 171. x x x shall falsify a document by committing any of the
following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or
rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act
or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or
proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document
which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be
a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or
including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from,
that of the genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance
thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.
vis-à-vis the much criticized Psychiatric Report, shows that the
acts complained of do not in any manner, by whatever stretch of
the imagination, fall under any of the eight (8) enumerated acts
constituting the offense of falsification.
In order to properly address the issue presented by petitioner
Gloria Aguirre, it is necessary that we discuss the elements of
the crime of falsification of private document under the Revised

Penal Code, a crime which all the respondents have been
accused of perpetrating. The elements of said crime under
paragraph 2 of Article 172 of our penal code are as follows: 1)
that the offender committed any acts of falsification, except those
in par. 7, enumerated in Article 171; 2) that the falsification was
committed in any private document; and 3) that the falsification
caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was
committed with intent to cause such damage. Under Article 171,
paragraph 2, a person may commit falsification of a private
document by causing it to appear in a document that a person or
persons participated in an act or proceeding, when such person
or persons did not in fact so participate in the act or proceeding.
On the other hand, falsification under par. 3 of the same article is
perpetrated by a person or persons who, participating in an act
or proceeding, made statements in that act or proceeding and
the offender, in making a document, attributed to such person or
persons statements other than those in fact made by such
person or persons. And the crime defined under paragraph 4
thereof is committed when 1) the offender makes in a document
statements in a narration of facts; 2) he has a legal obligation to
disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; 3) the facts
narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and 4) the
perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the
wrongful intent of injuring a third person.
Applying the above-stated elements of the crime to the case at
bar, in order that respondent Dr. Pascual, and the rest acting in
conspiracy with her, to have committed the crime of falsification
under par. 3 and 4 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, it is
essential that that there be prima facie evidence to show that
she had caused it to appear that Larry gave his consent to be
vasectomized or at the very least, that the proposed medical
procedure was explained to Larry. But in the assailed report, no
such thing was done. Lest it be forgotten, the reason for having
Larry psychiatrically evaluated was precisely to ascertain
whether or not he can validly consent with impunity to the
proposed vasectomy, and not to obtain his consent to it or to
oblige respondent Dr. Pascual to explain to him what the import
of the medical procedure was. Further, that Larry's consent to be
vasectomized was not obtained by the psychiatrist was of no
moment, because nowhere is it stated in said report that such
assent was obtained. At any rate, petitioner Gloria Aguirre
contradicts her very own allegations when she persists in the
contention that Larry has the mental age of a child; hence, he
was legally incapable of validly consenting to the procedure.
In the matter of the supposed incorrect diagnosis of Lourdes
Aguirre, with regard to paragraph 2 of Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code, we quote with approval the succinct statements of
the Assistant City Prosecutor:
[T]he fact that Dra. Pascual cited finding, which is not of her own
personal knowledge in her report does not mean that she
committed falsification in the process. Her sources may be
wrong and may affect the veracity of her report, but for as long
as she has not alleged therein that she personally diagnosed
Lourdes Aguirre, which allegation would not then be true, she
cannot be charged of falsification. Therefore, it goes without
saying that if the author of the report is not guilty, then with more
reason the other respondents are not liable.54
As to the charge of mutilation, Art. 262 of the Revised Penal
Code defines the crime as –
Art. 262. Mutilation. – The penalty of reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall
intentionally mutilate another by depriving him, either totally or
partially, of some essential organ for reproduction.
54
Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished by prision
mayor in its medium and maximum periods.
A straightforward scrutiny of the above provision shows that the
elements55 of mutilation under the first paragraph of Art. 262 of
the Revised Penal Code to be 1) that there be a castration, that
is, mutilation of organs necessary for generation; and 2) that the
mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to
deprive the offended party of some essential organ for
reproduction. According to the public prosecutor, the facts
alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation as defined and
penalized above, i.e., "[t]he vasectomy operation did not in any
way deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still
very much part of his physical self." Petitioner Gloria Aguirre,
however, would want this Court to make a ruling that bilateral
vasectomy constitutes the crime of mutilation.
This we cannot do, for such an interpretation would be contrary
to the intentions of the framers of our penal code.
A fitting riposte to the issue at hand lies in United States v.
Esparcia,56 in which this Court had the occasion to shed light on
the implication of the term mutilation. Therein we said that:
The sole point which it is desirable to discuss is whether or not
the crime committed is that defined and penalized by article 414
of the Penal Code. The English translation of this article reads:
"Any person who shall intentionally castrate another shall suffer
a penalty ranging from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua."
The Spanish text, which should govern, uses the word
"castrare," inadequately translated into English as "castrate."
The word "capar," which is synonymous of "castrar," is defined in
the Royal Academic Dictionary as the destruction of the organs
of generation or conception. Clearly it is the intention of the law
to punish any person who shall intentionally deprived another of
any organ necessary for reproduction. An applicable construction
is that of Viada in the following language:
"At the head of these crimes, according to their order of gravity,
is the mutilation known by the name of 'castration' which consists
of the amputation of whatever organ is necessary for generation.
The law could not fail to punish with the utmost severity such a
crime, which, although not destroying life, deprives a person of
the means to transmit it. But bear in mind that according to this
article in order for 'castration' to exist, it is indispensable that the
'castration' be made purposely. The law does not look only to the
result but also to the intention of the act. Consequently, if by
reason of an injury or attack, a person is deprived of the organs
of generation, the act, although voluntary, not being intentional to
that end, it would not come under the provisions of this article,
but under No. 2 of article 431." (Viada, Codigo Penal, vol. 3, p.
70. See to same effect, 4 Groizard, Codigo Penal, p. 525.)
Thus, the question is, does vasectomy deprive a man, totally or
partially, of some essential organ of reproduction? We answer in
the negative.
In the male sterilization procedure of vasectomy, the tubular
passage, called the vas deferens, through which the sperm
(cells) are transported from the testicle to the urethra where they
combine with the seminal fluid to form the ejaculant, is divided
and the cut ends merely tied.57 That part, which is cut, that is, the
vas deferens, is merely a passageway that is part of the duct
system of the male reproductive organs. The vas deferens is not
an organ,i.e., a highly organized unit of structure, having a
defined function in a multicellular organism and consisting of a
range of tissues.58 Be that as it may, even
assuming arguendo that the tubular passage can be considered
an organ, the cutting of the vas deferens does not divest or deny

a man of any essential organ of reproduction for the simple
reason that it does not entail the taking away of a part or portion
of the male reproductive system. The cut ends, after they have
been tied, are then dropped back into the incision.59
Though undeniably, vasectomy denies a man his power of
reproduction, such procedure does not deprive him, "either
totally or partially, of some essential organ for reproduction."
Notably, the ordinary usage of the term "mutilation" is the
deprivation of a limb or essential part (of the body), 60 with the
operative expression being "deprivation." In the same manner,
the word "castration" is defined as the removal of the testies or
ovaries.61Such being the case in this present petition, the
bilateral vasectomy done on Larry could not have amounted to
the crime of mutilation as defined and punished under Article
262, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. And no criminal
culpability could be foisted on to respondent Dr. Agatep, the
urologist who performed the procedure, much less the other
respondents. Thus, we find sufficient evidence to explain why the
Assistant City Prosecutor and the DOJ ruled the way they did.
Verily, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the writ
of certiorari is unavailing; hence, should not be issued.
It is once more apropos to pointedly apply the Court's general
policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary
investigations. As it has been oft said, the Supreme Court cannot
order the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor
does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima
facie case.62 The courts try and absolve or convict the accused
but, as a rule, have no part in the initial decision to prosecute
him.63 The possible exception to this rule is where there is an
unmistakable showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction that will justify judicial intrusion
into the precincts of the executive. But that is not the case
herein.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed 21 July
2005Decision and 5 December 2005 Resolution, both of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88370 are
herebyAFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner Gloria Aguirre.
SO ORDERED.
HAZING
RA 8049
REPUBLIC ACT No. 8049
AN ACT REGULATING HAZING AND OTHER FORMS OF
INITIATION RITES IN FRATERNITIES, SORORITIES, AND
OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES
THEREFOR
Section 1. Hazing, as used in this Act, is an initiation rite or
practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a
fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit, neophyte
or applicant in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such
as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks
or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or
psychological suffering or injury.
The term "organization" shall include any club or the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, Philippine National Police, Philippine
Military Academy, or officer and cadet corp of the Citizen's
Military Training and Citizen's Army Training. The physical,
mental and psychological testing and training procedure and
55
practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental and
psychological fitness of prospective regular members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police as approved ny the Secretary of National Defense and the
National Police Commission duly recommended by the Chief of
Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Director General
of the Philippine National Police shall not be considered as
hazing for the purposes of this Act.
Section 2. No hazing or initiation rites in any form or manner by
a fraternity, sorority or organization shall be allowed without prior
written notice to the school authorities or head of organization
seven (7) days before the conduct of such initiation. The written
notice shall indicate the period of the initiation activities which
shall not exceed three (3) days, shall include the names of those
to be subjected to such activities, and shall further contain an
undertaking that no physical violence be employed by anybody
during such initiation rites.
Section 3. The head of the school or organization or their
representatives must assign at least two (2) representatives of
the school or organization, as the case may be, to be present
during the initiation. It is the duty of such representative to see to
it that no physical harm of any kind shall be inflicted upon a
recruit, neophyte or applicant.
Section 4. If the person subjected to hazing or other forms of
initiation rites suffers any physical injury or dies as a result
thereof, the officers and members of the fraternity, sorority or
organization who actually participated in the infliction of physical
harm shall be liable as principals. The person or persons who
participated in the hazing shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) if death,
rape, sodomy or mutilation results there from.
2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period (17
years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years) if in consequence of the
hazing the victim shall become insane, imbecile, impotent or
blind.
3. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period (14
years, 8 months and one day to 17 years and 4 months) if in
consequence of the hazing the victim shall have lost the use of
speech or the power to hear or to smell, or shall have lost an
eye, a hand, a foot, an arm or a leg or shall have lost the use of
any such member shall have become incapacitated for the
activity or work in which he was habitually engaged.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its minimum period (12
years and one day to 14 years and 8 months) if in consequence
of the hazing the victim shall become deformed or shall have lost
any other part of his body, or shall have lost the use thereof, or
shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance on the
activity or work in which he was habitually engaged for a period
of more than ninety (90) days.
5. The penalty of prison mayor in its maximum period (10 years
and one day to 12 years) if in consequence of the hazing the
victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance on
the activity or work in which he was habitually engaged for a
period of more than thirty (30) days.
6. The penalty of prison mayor in its medium period (8 years and
one day to 10 years) if in consequence of the hazing the victim
shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance on the
activity or work in which he was habitually engaged for a period

of ten (10) days or more, or that the injury sustained shall require
medical assistance for the same period.
7. The penalty of prison mayor in its minimum period (6 years
and one day to 8 years) if in consequence of the hazing the
victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance on
the activity or work in which he was habitually engaged from one
(1) to nine (9) days, or that the injury sustained shall require
medical assistance for the same period.
8. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period (4
years, 2 months and one day to 6 years) if in consequence of the
hazing the victim sustained physical injuries which do not
prevent him from engaging in his habitual activity or work nor
require medical attendance.
The responsible officials of the school or of the police, military or
citizen's army training organization, may impose the appropriate
administrative sanctions on the person or the persons charged
under this provision even before their conviction. The maximum
penalty herein provided shall be imposed in any of the following
instances:
(a) when the recruitment is accompanied by force, violence,
threat, intimidation or deceit on the person of the recruit who
refuses to join;
(b) when the recruit, neophyte or applicant initially consents to
join but upon learning that hazing will be committed on his
person, is prevented from quitting;
(c) when the recruit, neophyte or applicant having undergone
hazing is prevented from reporting the unlawful act to his parents
or guardians, to the proper school authorities, or to the police
authorities, through force, violence, threat or intimidation;
(d) when the hazing is committed outside of the school or
institution; or
(e) when the victim is below twelve (12) years of age at the time
of the hazing.
The owner of the place where hazing is conducted shall be liable
as an accomplice, when he has actual knowledge of the hazing
conducted therein but failed to take any action to prevent the
same from occurring. If the hazing is held in the home of one of
the officers or members of the fraternity, group, or organization,
the parents shall be held liable as principals when they have
actual knowledge of the hazing conducted therein but failed to
take any action to prevent the same from occurring.
The school authorities including faculty members who consent to
the hazing or who have actual knowledge thereof, but failed to
take any action to prevent the same from occurring shall be
punished as accomplices for the acts of hazing committed by the
perpetrators.
The officers, former officers, or alumni of the organization, group,
fraternity or sorority who actually planned the hazing although
not present when the acts constituting the hazing were
committed shall be liable as principals. A fraternity or sorority's
adviser who is present when the acts constituting the hazing
were committed and failed to take action to prevent the same
from occurring shall be liable as principal.
The presence of any person during the hazing is prima facie
evidence of participation therein as principal unless he prevented
the commission of the acts punishable herein.
56
Any person charged under this provision shall not be entitled to
the mitigating circumstance that there was no intention to commit
so grave a wrong.
This section shall apply to the president, manager, director or
other responsible officer of a corporation engaged in hazing as a
requirement for employment in the manner provided herein.
Section 5. If any provision or part of this Act is declared invalid
or unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions thereof shall
remain valid and effective.
Section 6. All laws, orders, rules or regulations which are
inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of this Act are
hereby amended or repealed accordingly.
Section 7. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) calendar days
after its publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of
general circulation.
RAPE
RA 8353
Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Tenth Congress
Republic Act No. 8353 September 30, 1997
AN ACT EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF THE CRIME OF
RAPE, RECLASSIFYING THE SAME AS A CRIME AGAINST
PERSONS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ACT NO. 3815,
AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED
PENAL CODE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as "The Anti-
Rape Law of 1997."
Section 2. Rape as a Crime Against Persons. - The crime of
rape shall hereafter be classified as a Crime Against Persons
under Title Eight of Act No. 3815, as amended, otherwise known
as the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, there shall be
incorporated into Title Eight of the same Code a new chapter to
be known as Chapter Three on Rape, to read as follows:
"Chapter Three
"Rape
"Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. -
Rape is committed:
"1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
"a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
"b) When the offended party is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious;

"c) By means of fraudulent machination or
grave abuse of authority; and
"d) When the offended party is under twelve
(12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above
be present.
"2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances
mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of
sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
"Article 266-B. Penalty. - Rape under paragraph 1 of
the next preceding article shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua.
"Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a
deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the
victim has become insane, the penalty shall become
reclusion perpetua to death.
"When the rape is attempted and a homicide is
committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
"When by reason or on the occasion ofthe rape,
homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
"The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of
rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
"l) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim;
"2) When the victim is under the custody of the police or
military authorities or any law enforcement or penal
institution;
"3) When the rape is committed in full view of the
spouse, parent, any of the children or other relatives
within the third civil degree of consanguinity;
"4) When the victim is a religious engaged in legitimate
religious vocation or calling and is personally known to
be such by the offender before or at the time of the
commission of the crime;
"5) When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old;
"6) When the offender knows that he is afflicted with the
Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus (HIV)/Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or any other
sexually transmissible disease and the virus or disease
is transmitted to the victim;
"7) When committed by any member of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or para-military units thereof
or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement
57
agency or penal institution, when the offender took
advantage of his position to facilitate the commission of
the crime;
"8) When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the
victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation or
disability;
"9) When the offender knew of the pregnancy of the
offended party at the time of the commission of the
crime; and
"10) When the offender knew of the mental disability,
emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the
offended party at the time of the commission of the
crime.
"Rape under paragraph 2 of the next preceding article
shall be punished by prision mayor.
"Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a
deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty
shall be prision mayor to reclusion temporal.
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the
victim has become insane, the penalty shall be
reclusion temporal.
"When the rape is attempted and a homicide is
committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the
penalty shall be reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua.
"When by reason or on the occasion ofthe rape,
homicide is committed, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua.
"Reclusion temporal shall be imposed if the rape is
committed with any of the ten aggravating/ qualifying
circumstances mentioned in this article.
"Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid
marriage between the offended party shall extinguish
the criminal action or the penalty imposed.
"In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the
subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended
party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty:
Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or
the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is
void ab initio.
"Article 266-D. Presumptions. - Any physical overt act
manifesting resistance against the act of rape in any
degree from the offended party, or where the offended
party is so situated as to render her/him incapable of
giving valid consent, may be accepted as evidence in
the prosecution of the acts punished under Article 266-
A."
Section 3. Separability Clause. - If any part, Sec., or provision
of this Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts
thereof not affected thereby shall remain valid.
Section 4. Repealing Clause. - Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, and all laws, acts, presidential decrees, executive
orders, administrative orders, rules and regulations inconsistent

with or contrary to the provisions of this Act are deemed
amended, modified or repealed accordingly.
Section 5. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15)
days after completion of its publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation.
Approved: September 30, 1997.
PEOPLE v. ORITA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 88724 April 3, 1990
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CEILITO ORITA alias "Lito," defendant-appellant.
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
C. Manalo for defendant-appellant.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
The accused, Ceilito Orita alias Lito, was charged with the crime
of rape in Criminal Case No. 83-031-B before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch II, Borongan, Eastern Samar. The information filed
in the said case reads as follows (p. 47, Rollo):
The undersigned Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal upon prior
complaint under oath by the offended party, accuses CEILITO
ORITA alias LITO of the crime of Rape committed as follows:
That on March 20, 1983, at about 1:30 o'clock in the morning
inside a boarding house at Victoria St., Poblacion, Borongan,
Eastern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above named accused with lewd designs and
by the use of a Batangas knife he conveniently provided himself
for the purpose and with threats and intimidation, did, then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lay with and succeeded
in having sexual intercourse with Cristina S. Abayan against her
will and without her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon being arraigned, the accused entered the plea of not guilty
to the offense charged. After the witnesses for the People
testified and the exhibits were formally offered and admitted, the
prosecution rested its case. Thereafter, the defense opted not to
present any exculpatory evidence and instead filed a Motion to
58
Dismiss. On August 5, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads (pp. 59-60, Rollo):
WHEREFORE. the Court being morally certain of the guilt of
accused CEILITO ORITA @ LITO, of the crime of Frustrated
Rape (Art. 335, RPC), beyond reasonable doubt, with the
aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nightime (sic) with no
mitigating circumstance to offset the same, and considering the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, imposes on
accused an imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY, PRISION MAYOR, as minimum to TWELVE (12)
YEARSPRISION MAYOR, maximum; to indemnify CRISTINA S.
ABAYAN, the amount of Four Thousand (P4,000.00) Pesos,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay costs.
SO ORDERED.
Not satisfied with the decision, the accused appealed to the
Court of Appeals. On December 29, 1988, the Court of Appeals
rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads (p.
102, Rollo):
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is hereby MODIFIED,
and the appellant found guilty of the crime of rape, and
consequently, sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the victim in the amount of
P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
On January 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution
setting aside its December 29, 1988 decision and forwarded the
case to this Court, considering the provision of Section 9,
paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in conjunction with
Section 17, paragraph 3, subparagraph 1 of the Judiciary Act of
1948.
The antecedent facts as summarized in the People's brief are as
follows (pp. 71-75, Rollo):
Complainant Cristina S. Abayan was a 19-year old freshman
student at the St. Joseph's College at Borongan, Eastern Samar.
Appellant was a Philippine Constabulary (PC) soldier.
In the early morning of March 20, 1983, complainant arrived at
her boarding house. Her classmates had just brought her home
from a party (p. 44, tsn, May 23, 1984). Shortly after her
classmates had left, she knocked at the door of her boarding
house (p. 5, ibid). All of a sudden, somebody held her and poked
a knife to her neck. She then recognized appellant who was a
frequent visitor of another boarder (pp. 8-9, ibid).
She pleaded with him to release her, but he ordered her to go
upstairs with him. Since the door which led to the first floor was
locked from the inside, appellant forced complainant to use the
back door leading to the second floor (p. 77, ibid). With his left
arm wrapped around her neck and his right hand poking a
"balisong" to her neck, appellant dragged complainant up the
stairs (p. 14, ibid). When they reached the second floor, he
commanded her to look for a room. With the Batangas knife still
poked to her neck, they entered complainant's room.
Upon entering the room, appellant pushed complainant who hit
her head on the wall. With one hand holding the knife, appellant
undressed himself. He then ordered complainant to take off her
clothes. Scared, she took off her T-shirt. Then he pulled off her
bra, pants and panty (p. 20, ibid).

He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her.
He made her hold his penis and insert it in her vagina. She
followed his order as he continued to poke the knife to her. At
said position, however, appellant could not fully penetrate her.
Only a portion of his penis entered her as she kept on moving (p.
23, ibid).
Appellant then lay down on his back and commanded her to
mount him. In this position, only a small part again of his penis
was inserted into her vagina. At this stage, appellant had both
his hands flat on the floor. Complainant thought of escaping (p.
20, ibid).
She dashed out to the next room and locked herself in. Appellant
pursued her and climbed the partition. When she saw him inside
the room, she ran to another room. Appellant again chased her.
She fled to another room and jumped out through a window (p.
27, ibid).
Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, which was
about eighteen meters in front of the boarding house, and
knocked on the door. When there was no answer, she ran
around the building and knocked on the back door. When the
policemen who were inside the building opened the door, they
found complainant naked sitting on the stairs crying. Pat.
Donceras, the first policeman to see her, took off his jacket and
wrapped it around her. When they discovered what happened,
Pat. Donceras and two other policemen rushed to the boarding
house. They heard a sound at the second floor and saw
somebody running away. Due to darkness, they failed to
apprehend appellant.
Meanwhile, the policemen brought complainant to the Eastern
Samar Provincial Hospital where she was physically examined.
Dr. Ma. Luisa Abude, the resident physician who examined
complainant, issued a Medical Certificate (Exhibit "A") which
states:
Physical Examination — Patient is fairly built, came in with loose
clothing with no under-clothes; appears in state of shock, per
unambulatory.
PE Findings — Pertinent Findings only.
Neck- — Circumscribed hematoma at Ant. neck.
Breast — Well developed, conical in shape with prominent
nipples; linear abrasions below (L) breast.
Back — Multiple pinpoint marks.
Extremities — Abrasions at (R) and (L) knees.
Vulva — No visible abrasions or marks at the perineal area or
over the vulva,errythematous (sic) areas noted surrounding
vaginal orifice, tender, hymen intact; no laceration fresh and old
noted; examining finger can barely enter and with difficulty;
vaginal canal tight; no discharges noted.
As aforementioned, the trial court convicted the accused of
frustrated rape.
In this appeal, the accused assigns the following errors:
1) The trial court erred in disregarding the substantial
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses; and
59
2) The trial court erred in declaring that the crime of frustrated
rape was committed by the accused.
The accused assails the testimonies of the victim and Pat.
Donceras because they "show remarkable and vital
inconsistencies and its incredibility amounting to fabrication and
therefore casted doubt to its candor, truth and validity." (p.
33, Rollo)
A close scrutiny of the alleged inconsistencies revealed that they
refer to trivial inconsistencies which are not sufficient to blur or
cast doubt on the witnesses' straightforward attestations. Far
from being badges of fabrication, the inconsistencies in their
testimonies may in fact be justifiably considered as
manifestations of truthfulness on material points. These little
deviations also confirm that the witnesses had not been
rehearsed. The most candid witnesses may make mistakes
sometimes but such honest lapses do not necessarily impair
their intrinsic credibility (People v. Cabato, G.R. No. L-37400,
April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 98). Rather than discredit the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, discrepancies on
minor details must be viewed as adding credence and veracity to
such spontaneous testimonies (Aportadera et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-41358, March 16, 1988, 158 SCRA
695). As a matter of fact, complete uniformity in details would be
a strong indication of untruthfulness and lack of spontaneity
(People v. Bazar, G.R. No. L-41829, June 27, 1988, 162 SCRA
609). However, one of the alleged inconsistencies deserves a
little discussion which is, the testimony of the victim that the
accused asked her to hold and guide his penis in order to have
carnal knowledge of her. According to the accused, this is
strange because "this is the only case where an aggressor's
advances is being helped-out by the victim in order that there will
be a consumation of the act." (p. 34, Rollo). The allegation would
have been meritorious had the testimony of the victim ended
there. The victim testified further that the accused was holding a
Batangas knife during the aggression. This is a material part of
the victim's testimony which the accused conveniently deleted.
We find no cogent reason to depart from the well-settled rule that
the findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses
should be accorded the highest respect because it has the
advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses and can
discern if a witness is telling the truth (People v. Samson, G.R.
No. 55520, August 25, 1989). We quote with favor the trial
court's finding regarding the testimony of the victim (p 56, Rollo):
As correctly pointed out in the memorandum for the People,
there is not much to be desired as to the sincerity of the offended
party in her testimony before the court. Her answer to every
question profounded (sic), under all circumstances, are plain and
straightforward. To the Court she was a picture of supplication
hungry and thirsty for the immediate vindication of the affront to
her honor. It is inculcated into the mind of the Court that the
accused had wronged her; had traversed illegally her honor.
When a woman testifies that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed
provided her testimony is clear and free from contradiction and
her sincerity and candor, free from suspicion (People v Alfonso,
G.R. No. 72573, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 487; People v.
Alcid, G.R. Nos. 66387-88, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 280;
People v. Soterol G.R. No. 53498, December 16, 1985, 140
SCRA 400). The victim in this case did not only state that she
was raped but she testified convincingly on how the rape was
committed. The victim's testimony from the time she knocked on
the door of the municipal building up to the time she was brought
to the hospital was corroborated by Pat. Donceras. Interpreting
the findings as indicated in the medical certificate, Dr. Reinerio

Zamora (who was presented in view of the unavailability of Dr.
Abude) declared that the abrasions in the left and right knees,
linear abrasions below the left breast, multiple pinpoint marks,
circumscribed hematoma at the anterior neck, erythematous
area surrounding the vaginal orifice and tender vulva, are
conclusive proof of struggle against force and violence exerted
on the victim (pp. 52-53, Rollo). The trial court even inspected
the boarding house and was fully satisfied that the narration of
the scene of the incident and the conditions therein is true (p.
54, Rollo):
. . . The staircase leading to the first floor is in such a condition
safe enough to carry the weight of both accused and offended
party without the slightest difficulty, even in the manner as
narrated. The partitions of every room were of strong materials,
securedly nailed, and would not give way even by hastily scaling
the same.
A little insight into human nature is of utmost value in judging
rape complaints (People v. Torio, et al., G.R. No. L-48731,
December 21, 1983, 126 SCRA 265). Thus, the trial court added
(p. 55, Rollo):
. . . And the jump executed by the offended party from that
balcony (opening) to the ground which was correctly estimated
to be less than eight (8) meters, will perhaps occasion no injury
to a frightened individual being pursued. Common experience
will tell us that in occasion of conflagration especially occuring
(sic) in high buildings, many have been saved by jumping from
some considerable heights without being injured. How much
more for a frightened barrio girl, like the offended party to whom
honor appears to be more valuable than her life or limbs?
Besides, the exposure of her private parts when she sought
assistance from authorities, as corroborated, is enough
indication that something not ordinary happened to her unless
she is mentally deranged. Sadly, nothing was adduced to show
that she was out of her mind.
In a similar case (People v. Sambili G.R. No. L-44408,
September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 312), We ruled that:
What particularly imprints the badge of truth on her story is her
having been rendered entirely naked by appellant and that even
in her nudity, she had to run away from the latter and managed
to gain sanctuary in a house owned by spouses hardly known to
her. All these acts she would not have done nor would these
facts have occurred unless she was sexually assaulted in the
manner she narrated.
The accused questions also the failure of the prosecution to
present other witnesses to corroborate the allegations in the
complaint and the non-presentation of the medico-legal officer
who actually examined the victim. Suffice it to say that it is up to
the prosecution to determine who should be presented as
witnesses on the basis of its own assessment of their necessity
(Tugbang v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 56679, June 29,
1989; People v. Somera, G.R. No. 65589, May 31, 1989). As for
the non-presentation of the medico-legal officer who actually
examined the victim, the trial court stated that it was by
agreement of the parties that another physician testified
inasmuch as the medico-legal officer was no longer available.
The accused did not bother to contradict this statement.
Summing up, the arguments raised by the accused as regards
the first assignment of error fall flat on its face. Some were not
even substantiated and do not, therefore, merit consideration.
We are convinced that the accused is guilty of rape. However,
We believe the subject matter that really calls for discussion, is
whether or not the accused's conviction for frustrated rape is
60
proper. The trial court was of the belief that there is no
conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the
victim and thus convicted the accused of frustrated rape only.
The accused contends that there is no crime of frustrated rape.
The Solicitor General shares the same view.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code defines and enumerates
the elements of the crime of rape:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of
the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though
neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next
preceding paragraphs shall be present.
xxx xxx xxx
Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man in having
sexual bodily connections with a woman (Black's Law Dictionary.
Fifth Edition, p. 193).
On the other hand, Article 6 of the same Code provides:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. —
Consummated felonies as well as those which are frustrated and
attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its
execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated
when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless,
do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of
the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.
Correlating these two provisions, there is no debate that the
attempted and consummated stages apply to the crime of rape.
Our concern now is whether or not the frustrated stage applies to
the crime of rape.
The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the offender has
performed all the acts of execution which would produce the
felony and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes
independent of the perpetrator's will. In the leading case
of United States v. Eduave, 36 Phil. 209, 212, Justice Moreland
set a distinction between attempted and frustrated felonies which
is readily understood even by law students:
. . . A crime cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender,
after beginning the commission of the crime by overt acts, is
prevented, against his will, by some outside cause from
performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. In
other words, to be an attempted crime the purpose of the
offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which

intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he
has performed all of the acts which should produce the crime as
a consequence, which acts it is his intention to perform. If he has
performed all of the acts which should result in the
consummation of the crime and voluntarily desists from
proceeding further, it can not be an attempt. The essential
element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony is
that, in the latter, there is no intervention of a foreign or
extraneous cause or agency between the beginning of the
commission of the crime and the moment when all of the acts
have been performed which should result in the consummated
crime; while in the former there is such intervention and the
offender does not arrive at the point of performing all of the acts
which should produce the crime. He is stopped short of that point
by some cause apart from his voluntary desistance.
Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has
carnal knowledge of his victim he actually attains his purpose
and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the
offense have been accomplished.Nothing more is left to be done
by the offender, because he has performed the last act
necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is
consummated. In a long line of cases (People v. Oscar, 48 Phil.
527; People v. Hernandez, 49 Phil. 980; People v. Royeras, G.R.
No. L-31886, April 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 666; People v. Amores,
G.R. No. L-32996, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 505), We have set
the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect
penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ
by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the
female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the
vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is
attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ (People
v. Tayaba, 62 Phil. 559 People v. Rabadan et al., 53 Phil. 694;
United States v. Garcia: 9 Phil. 434) because not all acts of
execution was performed. The offender merely commenced the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into account
the nature, elements and manner of execution of the crime of
rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable
how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed.
Of course, We are aware of our earlier pronouncement in the
case of People v. Eriña 50 Phil. 998 [1927] where We found the
offender guilty of frustrated rape there being no conclusive
evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended
party. However, it appears that this is a "stray" decision
inasmuch as it has not been reiterated in Our subsequent
decisions. Likewise, We are aware of Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 2632 (dated
September 12, 1960) and Republic Act No. 4111 (dated March
29, 1965) which provides, in its penultimate paragraph, for the
penalty of death when the rape is attempted orfrustrated and a
homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof. We
are of the opinion that this particular provision on frustrated rape
is a dead provision. The Eriña case, supra, might have prompted
the law-making body to include the crime of frustrated rape in the
amendments introduced by said laws.
In concluding that there is no conclusive evidence of penetration
of the genital organ of the victim, the trial court relied on the
testimony of Dr. Zamora when he "categorically declared that the
findings in the vulva does not give a concrete disclosure of
penetration. As a matter of fact, he tossed back to the offended
party the answer as to whether or not there actually was
penetration." (p. 53, Rollo) Furthermore, the trial court stated (p.
57, Rollo):
. . . It cannot be insensible to the findings in the medical
certificate (Exhibit "A") as interpreted by Dr. Reinerio Zamora
and the equivocal declaration of the latter of uncertainty whether
61
there was penetration or not. It is true, and the Court is not
oblivious, that conviction for rape could proceed from the
uncorroborated testimony of the offended party and that a
medical certificate is not necessary (People v. Royeras People v.
Orteza, 6 SCRA 109, 113). But the citations the people relied
upon cannot be applicable to the instant case. The testimony of
the offended party is at variance with the medical certificate. As
such, a very disturbing doubt has surfaced in the mind of the
court. It should be stressed that in cases of rape where there is a
positive testimony and a medical certificate, both should in all
respect, compliment each other, for otherwise to rely on the
testimony alone in utter disregard of the manifest variance in the
medical certificate, would be productive of mischievous results.
The alleged variance between the testimony of the victim and
the medical certificate does not exist. On the contrary, it is stated
in the medical certificate that the vulva was erythematous (which
means marked by abnormal redness of the skin due to capillary
congestion, as in inflammation) and tender. It bears emphasis
that Dr. Zamoradid not rule out penetration of the genital organ
of the victim. He merely testified that there was uncertainty
whether or not there was penetration. Anent this testimony, the
victim positively testified that there was penetration, even if only
partially (pp. 302, 304, t.s.n., May 23, 1984):
Q Was the penis inserted on your vagina?
A It entered but only a portion of it.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What do you mean when you said comply, or what act do you
referred (sic) to, when you said comply?
A I inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q And was it inserted?
A Yes only a little.
The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be
convicted even on the sole basis of the victim's testimony if
credible (People v. Tabago, G.R. No. 69778, November 8, 1988,
167 SCRA 65; People v. Aragona, G.R. No. L-43752, September
19, 1985, 138 SCRA 569; People v. Taduyo, G.R. Nos. L-37928-
29, September 29, 1987, 154 SCRA 349). Moreover, Dr.
Zamora's testimony is merely corroborative and is not an
indispensable element in the prosecution of this case (People v.
Alfonso, supra).
Although the second assignment of error is meritorious, it will not
tilt the scale in favor of the accused because after a thorough
review of the records, We find the evidence sufficient to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of consummated
rape.
Article 335, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code provides
that whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a
deadly weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of
dwelling and nighttime. Thus, the proper imposable penalty is
death. In view, however, of Article 111, Section 19(1) of the 1987
Constitution and Our ruling in People v. Millora, et al., G.R. Nos.
L-38968-70, February 9, 1989, that the cited Constitutional
provision did not declare the abolition of the death penalty but
merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the Court
has since February 2, 1987 not imposed the death penalty
whenever it was called for under the Revised Penal Code but

instead reduced the same to reclusion perpetua (People v. Solis,
et al., G.R. Nos. 78732-33, February 14, 1990). Reclusion
perpetua, being a single indivisible penalty under Article 335,
paragraph 3, is imposed regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances (in relation to Article 63, paragraph 1,
Revised Penal Code; see People v. Arizala, G.R. No. 59713,
March 15, 1982, 112 SCRA 615; People v. Manzano, G.R. No.
L38449, November 25, 1982, 118 SCRA 705; People v. Ramirez,
G.R. No. 70744, May 31, 1985, 136 SCRA 702).
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is
hereby MODIFIED. The accused Ceilito Orita is hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the
victim in the amount of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE v. MANGALINO
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 79011 February 15, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SEMION MANGALINO y LUMANOG, accused-appellant.
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Adriatico T. Bruno for accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, 1 in which the accused was convicted of statutory rape
under Article 335, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, 2 and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
the offended parties the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
The complaint signed by the father of the victim, Tomas Carlos y
Valente states:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about March 7, 1984, in the city of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have carnal knowledge of
the undersigned complainant's daughter Marichelle, a minor, 6
years of age, against her will and consent.
Contrary to Law.
The following facts are fully supported by the evidence on
record, mainly the testimonies of the victim herself and her
mother, Bernardine, Dr. Roberto V. Garcia, and Staff Sergeant
Mario Oser, as well as the testimonies of the witnesses for the
62
defense — Ramil las Dulce, Linda Ayroso, and the accused
himself.
At about 10 or 11 o'clock in the morning of March 7, 1984,
Marichelle Carlos, 6 years old and a Grade I pupil at the Moises
Salvador Elementary School, Manila, was playing "takbuhan"
alone at the first level (ground floor) of the two-story apartment of
the accused, Semion Mangalino, 53, married to 55-year old
Laura Gasmin, childless, a security guard by occupation, and
residing at 1597-D Honradez Street, Sampaloc, Manila. 3 At the
time of the incident, Laura was in Balayan, Batangas, having left
the day before the incident. The accused and Marichelle's
parents (Tomas and Bernardine Carlos) are neighbors, their
respective rented apartments being almost opposite each other.
During the morning of March 7, 1984, Ramil las Dulce, a 16-year
old high school student occupying the second floor of the
apartment, for free and free board, too, a grandson of the
accused (his mother, Edita Onadia who lived with him upstairs,
being an adopted daughter of the accused), and Laura's
nephew, Armando Ayroso, were allegedly playing chess 4 in the
sala of the apartment. Ramil, a witness for the defense, testified
that he did not hear or see the accused calling out to Marichelle
and motioning her to go inside his bedroom or "sleeping
quarters" at one end of the sala of the ground floor, opposite the
kitchen.
Once inside the bedroom, the accused handed the girl a two
peso bill (P2.00) 5 and told her not to tell anybody about his
calling her to his bedroom. The girl assented. 6
The accused then laid Marichelle down, removed her jogging
pants, and placed them beside her feet. 7 He kissed her and
fondled her infantile breasts. 8 He inserted his finger into the
private part of the victim, 9 and then forcibly and repeatedly
introduced his sexual organ into her undeveloped genitalia, but
in vain. 10
Meanwhile, the victim's mother, Bernardine Carlos, 27, and a
plain housewife, was looking for her daughter, who should be
leaving for school by that time. She was informed by her sister
Agnes, who was living next door, that the adopted daughter of
the accused, Cielito, had told her that Marichelle was in their
apartment. 11 Immediately, Michael, Agnes' four-year old son,
was dispatched to fetch Marichelle.
Hearing the call of Michael, the victim put on her garments, and
on the way home noticed that her jogging pants were wet. Upon
reaching her house, Marichelle narrated to her mother what had
happened, saying, "Si Mang Semion nilagay ang daliri niya sa
pikpik ko," and "yong titi ni Mang Semion nilagay sa pikpik ko." 12
At about 2:30 that same day, an enraged Bernardine submitted
her daughter to a physical and genital examination, 13 the results
of which National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Medico Legal
Officer Roberto V. Garcia certified as follows:
No evidence (or) sign of any extragenital physical injury noted on
the body of the subject at the time of examination.
Hymen, intact and its orifice, narrow.
Sign of recent genital trauma, present.
Dr. Garcia opined that the vestibular mucosa contusion could
have been caused by a hard object like an erected penis and
such bruises at such part of the girl's vagina if caused by an
erected penis would be an indication of an unsuccessful

penetration. He discounted the probability of an accident, like
bumping at an edge of a chair, or any blunt object, since there
was no contusion of the labia. 14
The confrontation between the victim and the accused took
place when Staff Sergeant Mario Oser of the Waterfront Unit,
Reaction Strike Force, Philippine Constabulary Metropolitan
Command (P.C. Metrocom), who conducted the initial
investigation, invited the accused to the P.C. Headquarters.
There, Marichelle Identified Semion Mangalino as the man who
had abused her.
The accused vehemently denied having ever abused Marichelle.
He argued that the bruises in the complainant's vestibular
mucosa may have been self-inflicted. Marichelle, who was
constantly running about, might have bumped her pelvis against
a chair, which explained the absence of signs of contusions in
the labia.
Curiously, the young victim candidly testified that she felt no pain
when the accused was allegedly trying to insert his penis into her
vagina. She did not cry in pain nor shout for help when she was
being abused. 15
Before the Court, the appellant assigned four errors in his brief
which he claims the trial court committed, to wit:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT,
CONSIDERING THE PLACE, THE TIME, AND THE PRESENCE
OF SO MANY PEOPLE WITHIN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY
WHERE THE ALLEGED CRIME WAS COMMITTED, THE
ACCUSED COULD NOT HAVE SEXUALLY ABUSED
MARICHELLE G. CARLOS, THE COMPLAINING WITNESS
HEREIN;
ERROR II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
BRUISES THROUGH THE VESTIBULAR MUCOSA OF THE
PRIVATE PART OF MARICHELLE G. CARLOS IS THE RESULT
OF AN ACCIDENT, CONSIDERING THAT ON MARCH 7,1984,
SHE WAS IN THE GROUND FLOOR OF THE APARTMENT OF
HEREIN ACCUSED PLAYING — RUNNING AROUND
"TAKBUHAN";
ERROR III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE ACCUSED TO
PAY THE OFFENDED PARTIES, MARICHELLE G. CARLOS
AND HER PARENTS, TOMAS CARLOS AND BERNARDINE
GANLAC CARLOS, THE SUM OF P50,000.00 AS AND FOR
DAMAGES;
ERROR IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED
IS GUILTY OF THE CHARGE ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION, INSTEAD OF ACQUITTING HIM WITH COSTS
DE OFFICIO. 16
The defense vigorously argues against the probability of the rape
having been committed on two points: 1) The commission of the
crime was impossible, taking place as claimed, in broad daylight,
and 2) there were at least eight persons — including the
63
accused and the complainant — on the ground floor where the
rape was supposedly consummated.
The commission of the crime, submits the defense, was
impossible, considering that it was allegedly committed at
noontime, which would have readily exposed the act of rape to
anyone glancing in the direction of the place where the suspect
was abusing the victim.
On the second point, it is contended that the rape could not have
been accomplished with so many persons present in the
apartment. As it was, Ramil and Armando were playing chess
near the front door of the apartment. Also, Linda Ayroso, 29,
married to Armando, and a housewife, was washing laundry in
the kitchen. Furthermore, the accused was cooking lunch also in
the kitchen, and so could not have flitted from the kitchen to his
room to execute his evil design without anyone noticing his
absence.
The defense brings to our attention the physical layout of the
apartment of the accused. The place where the alleged sexual
abuse took place was not even a room, he asserts. The
apartment had neither a door nor walls, and what divided the so-
called room from the living room was a wooden folding divider
which was full of holes, "butas-butas." 17
Finally, the accused assails the lower court's slapping of
damages based on the claims of prosecution witnesses of
suffering mental anguish, moral shock, and a "besmirched
reputation." Since he did not commit the offense attributed to
him, the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages is unwarranted.
Consequently, he prays he must be exculpated.
We deny the appeal except the amount of the award of damages
which we reduce to P20,000.00 conformably to prevailing
jurisprudence.
We rule that statutory rape had been committed beyond the
shadow of a doubt.
The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape as provided in
Article 335, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code is the carnal
knowledge of a woman below 12 years of age. 18 Marichelle, a
little over 6 years of age at the time, was raped. Beyond that,
proof of intimidation or force used on her, or lack of it, is
immaterial.
The findings of Dr. Roberto V. Garcia, the NBI Medico Legal
officer, who testified for the People, conclude that rape could
have been perpetrated. To reiterate, he certified the existence of
indications of recent genital trauma.Under normal condition, the
color of the vestibular mucosa is pinkish. The doctor found the
vestibular mucosa of the victim to be dark red. 19 The forcible
attempt of an erected penis to have complete penetration
caused the 3 1/2-centimeter contusion prior to the hymen. The
government doctor further discounted the probability of an
accident, such as bumping the edge of a chair, or violent contact
with a blunt object, as there was no contusion of the labia.
The penile-vaginal contact without penetration was due to the
one- centimeter diameter opening of Marichelle's hymen.
Usually, the average adult's hymen measures 2.8 to 3
centimeters in diameter, making it compatible to, or easily
penetrable by, an average-size penis. The victim being of a
tender age, the penetration could go only as deep as the
labia. 20 In any case, the Court has consistently held that for rape
to be committed, full penetration is not required. It is enough that
there is proof of entrance of the male organ within the labia or
 64

pudendum of the female organ. 21Indeed, even the slightest q While you were playing inside the house of Semion Mangalino
penetration is sufficient to consummate the crime of rape. he called for you?

The relationship between the offender and the victim as Witness

neighbors remains unrebutted. This relationship has an
important bearing on the medico-legal finding, because it a Yes, madam.
explains the absence of visible signs of physical injuries.22 The
close relationship of Semion Mangalino to Marichelle — as a q Why did he called (sic) for you?
nearby neighbor of the Carlos family — and the degree of
respect that Semion may have had in Marichelle's life, helps
Witness
explain why physical force was not employed. The mere size of
the accused, a robust security guard, and 163 centimeters (five
feet and four inches) in height, could have easily immobilized the a He called me and told me to go to his bedroom madam.
victim who was at that time only one hundred eight centimeters
tall and weighing 31.818 kilos (70 lbs.) Fiscal Salvania

The attempt to discredit the prosecution's version as shown by q When you were asked to go to his bedroom, did he give you
the fact that Marichelle did not cry out or struggle against her anything?
attacker deserves scant consideration. The absence of hymenal
laceration adequately explains why Marichelle did not feel any Witness
pain during the attempted sexual intercourse. Why would she
struggle, when she did not even know that her chastity was a Yes madam.
being violated? As her mother testified, it was only upon realizing
that she had been defiled did her daughter cry. From then on,
q What did he give to you?
she became "matatakutin' and "hindi na kumakain", she became
nervous and had no appetite for food — symptoms of a state of
a He gave me P2.00, madam.
anguish.

Court
The simplicity of the testimony of Marichelle convinces us that
she was telling the truth about her having been sexually abused.
q Did you accept that P2.00?
xxx xxx xxx
Witness
q (Asst. Fiscal Mercedes C. Salvania) Now, while you were
playing will you tell this Honorable court where did you go after a Yes, your Honor.
that?
Fiscal Salvania
Witness (Marichelle)
q When you were asked to go inside the higaan of Semion
a While I was playing Mang Simeon called me madam. Mangalino, did you go?

Court Witness

q Why, were you playing alone? a Yes, madam.

Witness q Now, when you went inside the higaan, what did he do to you?

a Yes, your Honor. a He inserted one of his fingers in my private part madam.

Fiscal Salvania Fiscal Salvania

q What were you playing? q You stated that you were wearing jogging pant?

Witness Witness

a I was running around "takbuhan" madam. a Yes, madam.

Court q What happened to your jogging pant?

q Were you running outside or inside the house of the accused a He first removed my jogging pant, madam.

Witness q After removing your jogging pant, did he removed (sic)anything

in his clothes?
a Inside the house of Semion Mangalino, your Honor.
a He did not removed (sic) anything in his clothes madam.
Fiscal Salvania
Court
 65

q Beside the jogging pant you are (sic) wearing, were you also a He put-out his penis while he was kissing and his one fingers
wearing a panty? (sic) inserted in my private part, your Honor.

Witness q What did he do with his penis?

a Yes, your Honor. a He is inserting his penis in my private part, your Honor.

Fiscal Salvania Court

q What happen(ed) to your panty, did he remove? q Was the accused able to insert his penis into your private part?

Witness Witness

a He also removed my panty madam. a He was not able, your Honor.

Fiscal Salvania xxx xxx xxx

q What did he do with his finger? q How do you feel or did you feel pain while the accused was
trying to insert his penis into your private part?
Court
Witness
She said he inserted.
a I did not feel anything, your Honor.
q Was one of the fingers of the accused inserted in your private
part? q Did you feel pain?

Witness a I did not feel anything painful, your Honor.

a Yes, your Honor. q Did you saw (sic) the penis of Semion Mangalino?

q What did he do? a Yes, your Honor.

a He kissed me your Honor. q What was your position when Semion Mangalino was trying to
insert his penis into your private part?
q Where did he kissed (sic) you?
Witness
a In my breast your Honor.
a I was lying down, your Honor.
Fiscal Salvania
Court
q Did he remove your T-shirt?
q Who put you lay (sic) down, was it yourself or what?
Witness
Witness
a No madam.
a Semion Mangalino, your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
q Did you not cry?
Court
a I did not cry, your Honor.
q Did Semion Mangalino removed (sic) his pant?
q Did you shout?
Witness
a I did not shout, your Honor.
a He did not removed (sic) his pant your Honor.
q Why, were there persons inside the house while Semion
xxx xxx xxx Mangalino was doing all these things to you?

q Do you know what is penis?
a Yes, your Honor.
q Did the accused put-out his penis while he was inserting his
finger in your private part and kissing you in the breast?
a There were no other persons except myself and Semion
Mangalino your Honor. 23
Marichelle was a Grade I pupil when she was violated. She was
in Grade II when she took the witness stand. In view of her very
tender age and her little formal schooling, it is inconceivable for
Marichelle to concoct a serious charge of rape, and to narrate, in

unhesitating and simple terms, that she had been asked by the
offender to go inside the room; that she was laid down after the
accused had given her P2.00; that he removed her jogging pants
and panty; that the accused kissed her and caressed her
breasts, that "Mang Semion" inserted a finger into her genital,
and later his sexual organ. At age 6, Marichelle would have been
one of those "babes and sucklings" from whose mouths words of
praise should have been perfected, but alas, she was instead
compelled to relate in the presence of people, some of them
complete strangers, in the police precinct and in court, her tragic
story.
The heart of the matter is the violation of a child's incapacity to
discern evil from good. As the behavior of the victim towards the
accused during the commission of the crime and her testimony
before police officers and in the court indicate, she had no
awareness of the wrongfulness of the action of the accused who
was old enough to be her grandfather. Her willingness to lie
down on and accept the P2.00 given her by the accused, whom
she looked up to as an elder person, a neighbor, and a friend of
her family, indicate not naivete, but the absolute trust and
confidence of the very young in an older person. She was
incapable of reading malice or evil in his intentions. It is likely
that it was only when she saw how distraught her mother was at
her telling of her story and the flurry of police and judicial activity
stirred up by her narration that her young and innocent mind was
violently exposed to the reality of the existence of evil in the
hearts of men. The moment of truth, dawning so violently upon
young and innocent minds is contemptible. The older persons in
the community should set themselves up as models of proper
decorum and high moral purpose for young children; it is they
who should guide the young, teach them, and nurture them in
the way of the righteous. A 53-year-old man who instead
corrupts and violates the purity and dignity of a minor is morally
depraved and should be punished to the limits of the law.
It is even more difficult to conceive of Mrs. Bernardine Carlos
trumping up a charge of the rape of her daughter and subject
herself and her daughter to humiliation, to fear, and anxiety, and
community censure that she and her daughter will have to bear
for the rest of their lives, 24 simply in consideration of P50,000.00,
the amount asked for in moral damages.
The trial court's findings of facts which rely on the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to respect, if not finality. A painstaking
examination and review of the records of the case yield no fact
or circumstance that would have contradicted the findings of the
trial court.
The alleged inconsistencies refer to minor details and do not at
all touch upon the basic aspects of the who, the how, and the
when of the crime committed. Minor discrepancies in the
testimonies of Marichelle and her mother are but natural, and
even enhance their credibility as witnesses because these
discrepancies indicate that the responses given were honest and
unrehearsed. 25 In appreciation of the testimony of the victim,
due regard must be accorded to her tender age.
The contention of the accused that he never left the kitchen is
flawed. The facility of a quick tap to his room can not be
discounted considering that kitchen where he was supposed to
have been cooking was only a few meters away. That the
presence of Ramil and Armando who were allegedly playing
chess in the kitchen made the commission of the crime
impossible, even if were true, falls flat in the face of the game of
chess being one that requires utmost concentration; that being
so, it is logical for both players to be concentrating on the game
when the accused lured Marichelle into the room. We hold that
when Ramil, Armando, and Linda were engrossed in what they
66
were doing, that the accused surreptitiously enticed Marichelle
into his higaan, and that the short distance between the kitchen
and the "room" — a mere distance of 5 to 6 meters — is no
obstacle to the satiation of his carnal lusting after the child.
The accused claims it was impossible for him to have raped the
victim in the presence of other people, more so, in a place
without privacy. We do not agree. Rape was in fact committed. It
is quite possible for an experienced man, like the accused, to
consummate rape in just one minute, without attracting the
attention of the people inside the apartment. 26 Marichelle's
complete innocence may have facilitated the perpetration of the
clime, and the divider, although "butas-butas," was sufficient to
conceal the commission of the bestial act.
In several instances, this Court held that rape can be committed
even in places where people congregate: in parks, along the
road side, within school premises, and even inside a house
where there are other occupants. 27The apartment of the
accused was no exception. Lust is no respecter of time or place.
In fine, we hold that the trial court did not commit any reversible
error in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of statutory rape.
No amount of money can soothe the pain and anguish suffered
by a victim of rape and her family. Still, we cannot impose the
damages of P50,000.00 on the accused. As stated earlier, we
reduce the amount to P20,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the appealled decision is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION above indicated.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE v. ERINIA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26298 January 20, 1927
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
JULIAN ERINIA Y VINOLLA, defendant-appellant.
Hermogenes Caluag for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
OSTRAND, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Manila finding the defendant guilty of the crime of
consummated rape and sentencing him to suffer seventeen
years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal, with the
accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs.
The victim of the crime was a child of 3 years and 11 months old
and the evidence is conclusive that the defendant endeavored to
have carnal intercourse with her, but there may be some doubt
whether he succeeded in penetrating the vagina before being

disturbed by the timely intervention of the mother and the sister
of the child. The physician who examined the genital organ of the
child a few hours after the commission of the crime found a slight
inflammation of the exterior parts of the organ, indicating that an
effort had been made to enter the vagina, but in testifying before
the court he expressed doubts as to whether the entry had been
effected. The mother of the child testified that she found its
genital organ covered with a sticky substance, but that cannot be
considered conclusive evidence of penetration.
It has been suggested that the child was of such tender age that
penetration was impossible; that the crime of rape consequently
was impossible of consummation; and that, therefore, the
offense committed should be treated only as abusos
deshonestos. We do not think so. It is probably true that a
complete penetration was impossible, but such penetration is not
essential to the commission of the crime; it is sufficient if there is
a penetration of the labia. In the case of Kenny vs. State ([Tex.
Crim. App.], 79 S. W., 817; 65 L. R. A., 316) where the offended
party was a child of the age of 3 years and 8 months the
testimony of several physicians was to the effect that her labia of
the privates of a child of that age can be entered by a man's
male organ to the hymen and the defendant was found guilty of
the consummated crime rape.
There being no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital
organ of the offended party, the defendant is entitled to the
benefit of the doubt and can only be found guilty of frustrated
rape, but in view of the fact that he was living in the house of the
parents of the child as their guest, the aggravating circumstance
of abuse of confidence existed and the penalty must therefore be
imposed in its maximum degree.
The judgment appealed from is modified and the defendant-
appellant is hereby found guilty of the crime of frustrated rape
and is sentenced to suffer twelve years of prision mayor, with the
accessory penalties prescribed by law, and with the costs in both
instances. So ordered.
PEOPLE v. CASTRO
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 91490 May 6, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DELFIN CASTRO y LOZADA, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Eduardo I. Advincula for defendant-appellant.
PADILLA, J.:p
This is an appeal interposed by the accused, Delfin Castro y
Lozada, from the decision* of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, Branch 110, imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for statutory rape defined under Art. 335, paragraph 3
of the Revised Penal Code.
67
On the witness stand, six (6) year old Diana Rose Castro
narrated how, while playing with a neighbor sometime on 4
October 1986, she was pulled by the accused inside a bathroom,
prevented from going out, and made to stand on the toilet bowl.
Accused is a first cousin of Diana Rose's mother. Kuya Delfin, as
Diana Rose referred to the accused, then put up her clothes,
took off her panty, made her lean on the wall and, despite her
efforts to pull away he inserted his private part into her causing
pain. Then she was told by the accused to go home. At home,
she refused to have her private part washed by her Auntie Alice
because it was hurting and painful. 1
Mrs. Jacinta Castro, Diana's grandmother, testified that on 6
October 1986, in her house at No. 1692, F. Muñoz, Tramo,
Pasay City, she was asked by her husband to find out why Diana
was crying. Her testimony follows. 2
COURT:
Q Was there anything unusual that happened on Oct. 6
particularly in your house?
A On Oct. 6 I was downstairs and there was a call by my
husband.
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, what was the reason why your husband called you?
A He asked me to fine out why my granddaughter does not want
to eat and just keeps on crying.
Q And what did you do wen (sic) your husband told you to see
your granddaughter?
A I went upstairs and found out what was wring (sic) with her
whether she has fever.
Q And what did you find out
A At first she said she was complaining that her private property
was painful and when I investigated I discovered that it swollen
(sic).
Q Then what happened after you found out that the private
property of your granddaughter was swollen?
A I asked her why.
Q (sic). And what did your granddaughter tell you?
A At first she told me that "nasabit sa hiyero."
Q And what did you do after that?
xxx xxx xxx
A What I did was to examine her carefully her private part; I lifted
her two (2) legs and I discovered that her private property was
reddened as swollen.
Q Did you ask her again what happened to her private property?

A Yes, sir, she told me that she was invited by her Kuya Delfin to
the bathroom.
Q And what else did she tell you?
A She told me that she was asked by her Kuya to stand on top of
the toilet bowl and he removed her panty and his (sic) Kuya
Delfin also removed his pants.
Q What else did she tell you?
A She told me that his (sic) Kuya Delfin had sexual intercourse
with her.
COURT:
Q Did you ask Diane Castro how Delfin allegedly had sexual
intercourse with her?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What did she answer?
A She was standing and she was made to lean on the wall, Your
Honor. . .
Because of Diana's revelation, the grandmother brought her to
the National Bureau of Investigation for examination on 8
October 1986. 3
Dr. Roberto Garcia, the NBI medico-legal, had this explanation:
xxx xxx xxx
A Under the single heading of "genital examination" the more
insignificant findings will be the contused or bruised vetibular
(sic) meaning the area inside the genital organ of the subject
person; the hymen of the subject person was noted to be bruised
or contused . . .
Q Now what do you mean when you say that the genital parts
you mentioned were contused or bruised?
A The area was noted to be purplish or red darker than the
normal appearance of the said portion being bruised or contused
it would mean that this particular portion was subject to some
amount of force or it could have come in contact with a hard
object, the contract must have been done with a certain amount
of force.
Q Under No. 2 of the conclusion of this report it reads—"signs of
recent genital trauma, present, consistent with the alleged date
of infliction."
Would you explain this?
This witness meant that the appearance of the genital or prior of
those mentioned was seen by this witness which brought about
the trauma and that it has to be recent, meaning it could have
been sustained by the subject person in a matter of days prior to
the date of the examination.
A Now, was the hymen of the subject lacerated?
A No, sir.
68
Q Now this genital trauma which you said to have been suffered
by the subject from what could this injury or trauman (sic), what
was the cause?
A Any hard object would have produced this bruise or contusion.
Q Now, this is a case of rape, Doctor, would you venture to state
from what object this could have been inflicted?
A Under the normal course of events injuries of this nature
involving this particular portion of the body of a female or woman
is produced by the insertion of a male organ. 4
xxx xxx xxx
A sworn complaint for rape was filed against Delfin Castro y
Lozada. It charged as follows:
That on or about the 4th day of October, 1986 in Pasay City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of tills Honorable Court, the
above named accused, Delfin Castro y Lozada, with lewd
designs and taking advantage of his moral ascendancy over the
undersigned complainant who is his niece, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with
or carnal knowledge of the undersigned. 5
Accused pleaded not guilty and posted bail for his provisional
liberty.
Delfin's alibi begins on 3 October 1986 in 1692 Muñoz, Pasay
City, where he lives two (2) houses away from complainant's. At
about 12:00 P.M., Diana went to his house while he was taking a
bath. She was crying and went inside the bathroom. When
asked by the accused why, she replied that while going down the
stairs, a dog whose two (2) hind legs were limping, chased her
and so she tripped. The accused told Diana to go out because
their dog might bite her. He proceeded to dress up and saw the
victim playing outside.
In the morning of 4 October 1986, he woke up at about quarter
to seven, 6 left the house at 7:30 7 took a jeep plying the Pasay-
Taft- Luneta route, arrived in school (Adamson University) at
8:15 in the morning. He proceeded to see Dolores Rivera, a
godsister who worked in the treasurer's office of the university to
ask the latter to type a term paper which was due that day. After
submitting the term paper, he treated his godsister to lunch.
Around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon, he went home.
Mrs. Teresita Castro's testimony dovetails with her son Delfin's
saying that at around 12:30 P.M. on 4 October 1986, he arrived
and ate lunch at
home. 8 Mother and son talked of enmity between Mrs. Jacinta
Castro, Diana's grandmother and their family. This rape case
against Delfin is a result allegedly of the envy of Diana's said
grandmother over his (Delfin's) fine scholastic performance. 9
Delfin further narrated that on or about 8 October 1986, he was
invited to the Pasay Police Headquarters for questioning. While
there, he was asked to undress, was blindfolded and beaten by
around 7 to 10 policemen for about half an hour and made to
admit that he raped Diana. Since he could no longer stand the
torture, he told them that he used his small finger to touch her
private part. 10 After the incident, Delfin left their house in order to
avoid trouble; occasionally he would visit his parents. 11
Finding the testimony of Diana positive, clear and credible, the
Regional Trial Court disregarded the alibi of the accused and
convicted him. The trial court, inter alia, stated:

. . . The accused's claim that he was, in the morning of October
4, 1986, at Adamson University waiting for his term paper
engenders disbelief. By his evidence, he was enrolled at the
Adamson University for the second semester of school 1986-
1987 classes for which usually start in October. Term papers are
usually submitted at the end of the semester, not at the
beginning of the semester. In any event, Delfin was not shown
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the place of the
incident on October 4, 1986 as, by his evidence, he returned to
his house after noontime, rested for a while, then left and
returned again in the afternoon. His suggestion that Diana's
genital bruises could have resulted from trippling down the stairs
when she was chased by a limping dog is ridiculous. A dog
whose two hind legs are limping chasing her (where did the dog
come from?) while she was going down the stairs? Granted that
were possible or that actually happened, the fall would cause
abrasions, not hymenal contusions. Finally the defense's
insinuation that Diana's grandmother Jacinta who was pictured
to be supercilious and envious was behind the filing of this case
is difficult to believe, there being no concrete proof thereof.
Besides, it would be unthinkable for Jacinta to alienate her
relations with all her in-laws, the Castros, who are staying in
different houses of the same compound, by fabricating a charge
against the accused.
Finally, the accused's flight from his house after the filing of the
present case is not consistent with his professed innocence. He
did not, according to him, have any good relationship with
Diana's grandmother even before October 4, 1986. So what was
he fleeing from? His answer, that he wanted to avoid trouble,
tells it all . . .
xxx xxx xxx
From the said decision sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and indemnify the victim in the amount of
P20,000.00 by way of damages, the accused appealed to this
Court pointing out the following alleged errors:
1. there is no rape because —
a. the hymen of the victim was not lacerated.
b. the victim was allegedly standing while the
crime was being committed.
c. the victim is still a virgin.
2. reliance on the conflicting testimony of the victim and not that
of the accused.
A recent decision of this Court in a case of statutory rape
observed that, usually, the average adult's hymen measures 2.8
to 3 centimeters in diameter, making it compatible with, or easily
penetrable by an average size penis. The victim being of tender
age, the penetration of the male organ could go only as deep as
the labia. In any case, for rape to be committed, full penetration
is not required. It is enough that there is proof of entrance of the
male organ within the labia or pudendum of the female organ.
Even the slightest penetration is sufficient to consummate the
crime of rape. 12
Perfect penetration, rupture of the hymen or laceration of the
vagina are not essential for the offense of consummated rape.
Entry, to the least extent, of the labia or lips of the female organ
is sufficient. 13 Diana's remaining a virgin does not negate rape.
69
Sexual intercourse in a standing position, while perhaps
uncomfortable, is not improbable. The RTC decision explained:
. . . For her account that she was made to stand on the toilet
bowl made it easy for the accused to do the act as she was too
small and their private parts would not align unless she was
elevated to a higher position. The suggestion of the defense
counsel that a finger could have been used is absurd. For if it
were only a finger there would have been no need to let Diana
stand on the toilet bowl.. . . 14
The Solicitor General's brief, in turn, asserts that the position
Diana was forced to take, made it easier for appellant to
accomplish insertion of his organ than if Diana had been made
to lie down. 15
Experience has shown that unfounded charges of rape have
frequently been proffered by women actuated by some sinister,
ulterior or undisclosed motive. Convictions in such cases should
not be sustained without clear and convincing proof of
guilt, 16 considering the gravity of the offense and the penalty it
carries.
On the alleged sinister motive of Diana's grandmother
engendered by envy, we find this incredulous. For, what
grandmother would exact vengeance on her enemies at the
perpetual humiliation and disrepute of her six (6) year old
granddaughter?
Finally, the issue of credibility. Who among the contending
parties is telling the truth? The prosecution's evidence is simple
and straightforward. Appellant's alibi must fall. Claims of his
scholastic achievements, assuming they are relevant, were
unsubstantiated. His counsel did not even formally offer the
exhibits attesting to his enrollment at Adamson University where
he was supposed to have submitted in the morning of 4 October
1986 a term paper. His credibility is dubious; he was not able to
even identify the topic of his alleged term paper. To discredit the
victim he testified on her alleged propensity to tell lies. 17 The trial
court, however, categorically held:
While Diana's testimony was in some instances flawed, the flaw
was minor and only with respect to dates. She is a young girl.
She sat at the witness stand four times, yet she survived the
rigors of testifying, unwavering in her claim that she was
raped. 18
Accused-appellant claims he was coerced and tortured by Pasay
policemen to admit the rape, showing to the trial court bodily
signs of said abuse. 19 Aside from his self-serving assertion, the
truth of such allegation was not proven. Besides, this allegedly
coerced admission of guilt cannot affect the prosecution's case
which has been established by other positive evidence pointing
to his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Finding no reversible error in the decision subject of this appeal,
we affirm the same in its entirety.
WHEREFORE, the decision is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the victim, Diana Rose Castro in the amount of
P30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence. Costs against
the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE v. ATENTO

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 84728 April 26, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CESAR ATENTO accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:p
Asked how she felt while she was being raped, the complainant
replied: "Masarap." The trial judge believed her but just the same
convicted the accused-appellant. The case is now before us.
The complainant is Glenda Aringo, who was sixteen years old at
the time of the alleged offense. She is the neighbor of Cesar
Atento, the herein accused-appellant, a 39-year old store-keeper
with a wife and eight children. Her claim is that Atento raped her
five separate times, the first sometime in April 1986.
She says that on that first occasion she went to Atento's store in
Barangay 18, Minoro, Cabagñan, in Legazpi City to buy bread.
Her parents were at work and Atento was alone in his house
except for his three-year old daughter. Glenda claims Atento
cajoled her into coming inside the house and then took her
downstairs, where he succeeded in deflowering her. She says
her maiden head ached and bled. Afterwards, he gave her
P5.00.
Glenda speaks of four other times when he raped her. It was
later (presumably because her hymen had healed) that she felt
tickled by his manhood and described the act of coitus as
"masarap." 1
The girl says she never told anybody about Atento's attacks on
her because he had threatened her life. But she could not
conceal her condition for long and after five months had to admit
she was pregnant. She revealed the accused-appellant as the
father of the foetus in her womb. The child was delivered on
December 27, 1987, and christened Hubert Buendia Aringo.
Atento denies the charge against him, saying it was pure
harassment concocted by a relative of the girl who wanted to
eject him from the land where his house was erected. Insisting
that Glenda was a girl of loose morals, he says he had twice
seen her in sexual congress with a man and that she had once
offered her body to his thirteen year old son for a fee of P5.00.
Glenda's description of the act of coitus as pleasurable would
have destroyed the whole case against Atento but for one
singular significant fact. The girl is a mental retardate.
Ascendo Belmonte, a clinical psychologist at Don Susano
Rodriguez Memorial Mental Hospital, subjected the girl to a
series of intelligence tests, to wit, the Wecslar adult intelligence
scale, revised beta exam, standard progressive matrices, and
the Bender visual motor gestalt test, with the following findings:
70
Glenda B. Aringo, who was born on June 18, 1970, is INTER
ALIA with an intellectual capacity between the ages of nine (9)
and twelve (12) years. As such, her intellectual functioning is
within the mentally defective level. Her fund of information is
inadequate, her judgment is unsound, her thinking and working
capacity is poor. She is unable to distinguish essential from non-
essential details. Her vocabulary is limited. Her capacity for her
perceptual processes is unsatisfactory. She lacks the capacity
for abstracting and synthesizing concepts. However, in the midst
of all these, Glenda was found capable of telling the truth. 2
Benita Aringo, Glenda's mother, testified that her daughter
reached only third grade and did not like to continue studying,
preferring to play with children younger than she, even when she
was already pregnant. After delivering her child, she would often
leave its care to Benita, and play marbles with the children rather
than feed her baby. Another relative, Caridad Aringo, testified
that Glenda had the mentality of a 12-year old and was fond of
rubber bands and playing cards.
The Court finds this to be the reason why, while a rape victim
with normal intelligence, would have said that the attack on her
caused her much physical pain and mental agony, Glenda
naively declared that Atento's sexual organ in hers gave her
much pleasure.
It is worth observing that Glenda's child was born on December,
nine months after her rape in April, and that, according to the trial
judge, there was a remarkable resemblance between Atento and
the boy.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 335. When and how rape committed. –– Rape is committed
by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though
neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next
preceding paragraphs shall be present.
xxx xxx xxx
It has not been clearly established that Atento employed force or
threat against Glenda to make her submit to his lust.
Nevertheless, there is no question that Atento is guilty of rape
upon Glenda under paragraph 2, because the girl was deprived
of reason. Alternatively, he is liable under paragraph 3, because
his victim had the mentality of a girl less than twelve years old at
the time she was raped.
In People v. Atutubo, 3 this Court held:
It is not necessary under Article 335 for the culprit to actually
deprive the victim of reason prior to the rape, as by the
administration of drugs or by some other illicit method. Ms
provision also applies to cases where the woman has been
earlier deprived of reason by other causes, as when she is
congenitally retarded or has previously suffered some traumatic
experience that has lowered her mental capacity. In such
situations, the victim is in the same category as a child below 12
years of age for lacking the necessary will to object to the
attacker's lewd intentions.

In People v. Palma, 4 where a 14-year old mental retardate was
another rape victim, we held that:
The crime committed by Palma is rape under Article 335(2) of
the Revised Penal Code. Copulation with a woman known to be
mentally incapable of giving even an imperfect consent is rape.
Physical intimidation need not precede sexual intercourse
considering the age, mental abnormality and deficiency of the
complainant.
So also in People v. Sunga, 5 where the offended party was 23
years old with the mentality of a child about 8 to 9 years of age:
Because of her mental condition, complainant is incapable of
giving consent to the sexual intercourse. She is in the same
class as a woman deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious.
Appellant therefore committed rape in having sexual intercourse
with her.
In his authoritative work on Criminal Law, Chief Justice Aquino
explains Paragraph 2 as follows. 6
. . . in the rape of a woman deprived of reason or unconscious,
the victim has no will. The absence of will determines the
existence of the rape. Such lack of will may exist not only when
the victim is unconscious or totally deprived of reason, but also
when she is suffering some mental deficiency impairing her
reason or free will. In that case, it is not necessary that she
should offer real opposition or constant resistance to the sexual
intercourse. Carnal knowledge of a woman so weak in intellect
as to be incapable of legal consent constitutes rape. Where the
offended woman was feeble-minded, sickly and almost an idiot,
sexual intercourse with her is rape. Her failure to offer resistance
to the act did not mean consent for she was incapable of giving
any rational consent.
The deprivation of reason need not be complete. Mental
abnormality or deficiency is enough. Cohabitation with a feeble-
minded, idiotic woman is rape.
The trial court, however, held Atento guilty of rape under
Paragraph 3, citing People v. Asturias, 7 where it was held:
Assuming that complainant Vilma Ortega voluntarily submitted
herself to the bestial desire of appellant still the crime committed
is rape under paragraph 3 of Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code. This is so even if the circumstances of force and
intimidation, or of the victim being deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious are absent. The victim has the mentality
of a child below seven years old. If sexual intercourse with a
victim under twelve years of age is rape, then it should follow
that carnal knowledge with a seventeen-year old girl whose
mental capacity is that of a seven year old child would constitute
rape.
In coming to his conclusion, Judge Gregorio A. Consulta
declared:
. . . Given the low I.Q. of Glenda, it is impossible to believe that
she could have fabricated her charges against the accused. She
lacks the gift of articulation and inventiveness. She could not
even explain with ease the meaning of rape, a term which she
learned in the community. Even with intensive coaching,
assuming that happened, on the witness stand where she was
alone, it would show with her testimony falling into irretrievable
pieces. But that did not happen. She proceeded, though with
much difficulty, with childlike innocence. A smart and
perspicacious person would hesitate to describe to the Court her
71
sexual experiences as "tickling" and "masarap" for that would
only elicit disdain and laughter. Only a simple-minded artless
child would do it. And Glenda falls within the level of a 9-12 year
old child. And Glenda was telling the truth!
There is no doubt that when she submitted herself to the
accused later for subsequent intercourses, she was dominated
more by fear and ignorance than by reason.
In any event, whether under paragraph 2 or under paragraph 3
of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused-appellant
deserves to be punished for the rape of Glenda Azingo.
The trial court found the accused-appellant guilty of rape as
charged, meaning that he raped the victim five times, but we do
not agree that the other four rapes have been conclusively
proven. Otherwise, he would have to be punished for five
separate rapes. Except for this and the civil indemnity, which is
increased from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00, we agree with the
sentence imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the
obligation to acknowledge and support Hubert Buendia Aringo as
his own spurious child, and to pay the costs.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED as above
modified. It is so ordered.
PEOPLE v. CAMPUHAN
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 129433 March 30, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,
vs.
PRIMO CAMPUHAN Y BELLO accused.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 3 April 1990 this Court in People v. Orita 1 finally did away
with frustrated rape 2 and allowed only attempted rape and
consummated rape to remain in our statute books. The instant
case lurks at the threshold of another emasculation of the stages
of execution of rape by considering almost every attempt at
sexual violation of a woman as consummated rape, that is, if the
contrary view were to be adopted. The danger there is that that
concept may send the wrong signal to every roaming lothario,
whenever the opportunity bares itself, to better intrude with
climactic gusto, sans any restraint, since after all any attempted
fornication would be considered consummated rape and
punished as such. A mere strafing of the citadel of passion would
then be considered a deadly fait accompli, which is absurd.
In Orita we held that rape was consummated from the moment
the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim since by it he
attained his objective. All the elements of the offense were
already present and nothing more was left for the offender to do,
having performed all the acts necessary to produce the crime
and accomplish it. We ruled then that perfect penetration was not
essential; any penetration of the female organ by the male
organ, however slight, was sufficient. The Court further held that
entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, even without
rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, was sufficient to
warrant conviction for consummated rape. We distinguished
consummated rape from attempted rape where there was no

penetration of the female organ because not all acts of execution
were performed as the offender merely commenced the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts. 3 The inference that
may be derived therefrom is that complete or full penetration of
the vagina is not required for rape to be consummated. Any
penetration, in whatever degree, is enough to raise the crime to
its consummated stage.
But the Court in Orita clarified the concept of penetration in rape
by requiring entry into the labia or lips of the female organ, even
if there be no rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, to
warrant a conviction for consummated rape. While the entry of
the penis into the lips of the female organ was considered
synonymous with mere touching of the external genitalia, e.g.,
labia majora, labia minora, etc.,4 the crucial doctrinal bottom line
is that touching must be inextricably viewed in light of, in relation
to, or as an essential part of, the process of penile penetration,
and not just mere touching in the ordinary sense. In other words,
the touching must be tacked to the penetration itself. The
importance of the requirement of penetration, however slight,
cannot be gainsaid because where entry into the labia or the lips
of the female genitalia has not been established, the crime
committed amounts merely to attempted rape.
Verily, this should be the indicium of the Court in determining
whether rape has been committed either in its attempted or in its
consummated stage; otherwise, no substantial distinction would
exist between the two, despite the fact that penalty-wise, this
distinction, threadbare as it may seem, irrevocably spells the
difference between life and death for the accused — a reclusive
life that is not even perpetua but only temporal on one hand, and
the ultimate extermination of life on the other. And, arguing on
another level, if the case at bar cannot be deemed attempted but
consummated rape, what then would constitute attempted rape?
Must our field of choice be thus limited only to consummated
rape and acts of lasciviousness since attempted rape would no
longer be possible in light of the view of those who disagree with
this ponencia?
On 27 May 1997 Primo Campuhan y Bello was found guilty of
statutory rape and sentenced by the court a quo to the extreme
penalty of death, 5 hence this case before us on automatic
review under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
RA 7659. 6
As may be culled from the evidence on record, on 25 April 1996,
at around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan,
mother of four (4)-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went down from
the second floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks
for her two (2) children. At the ground floor she met Primo
Campuhan who was then busy filling small plastic bags with
water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at the second
floor. Primo was a helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of
Corazon. As Corazon was busy preparing the drinks, she heard
one of her daughters cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" 7 prompting Corazon
to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw Primo Campuhan inside
her children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or
"jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while his short
pants were down to his knees.
According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into
Crysthel's vagina. Horrified, she cursed the accused, "P - t - ng
ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several times. He evaded
her blows and pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside
when she tried to block his path. Corazon then ran out and
shouted for help thus prompting her brother, a cousin and an
uncle who were living within their compound, to chase the
accused. 8Seconds later, Primo was apprehended by those who
answered Corazon's call for help. They held the accused at the
72
back of their compound until they were advised by their
neighbors to call the barangay officials instead of detaining him
for his misdeed. Physical examination of the victim yielded
negative results. No evident sign of extra-genital physical injury
was noted by the medico-legal officer on Crysthel's body as her
hymen was intact and its orifice was only 0.5 cm. in diameter.
Primo Campuhan had only himself for a witness in his defense.
He maintained his innocence and assailed the charge as a mere
scheme of Crysthel's mother who allegedly harbored ill will
against him for his refusal to run an errand for her. 9 He asserted
that in truth Crysthel was in a playing mood and wanted to ride
on his back when she suddenly pulled him down causing both of
them to fall down on the floor. It was in this fallen position that
Corazon chanced upon them and became hysterical. Corazon
slapped him and accused him of raping her child. He got mad
but restrained himself from hitting back when he realized she
was a woman. Corazon called for help from her brothers to stop
him as he ran down from the second floor.
Vicente, Corazon's brother, timely responded to her call for help
and accosted Primo. Vicente punched him and threatened to kill
him. Upon hearing the threat, Primo immediately ran towards the
house of Conrado Plata but Vicente followed him there. Primo
pleaded for a chance to explain as he reasoned out that the
accusation was not true. But Vicente kicked him instead. When
Primo saw Vicente holding a piece of lead pipe, Primo raised his
hands and turned his back to avoid the blow. At this moment, the
relatives and neighbors of Vicente prevailed upon him to take
Primo to the barangay hall instead, and not to maul or possibly
kill him.
Although Primo Campuhan insisted on his innocence, the trial
court on 27 May 1997 found him guilty of statutory rape,
sentenced him to the extreme penalty of death, and ordered him
to pay his victim P50,000.00 for moral damages, P25,000.00 for
exemplary damages, and the costs.
The accused Primo Campuhan seriously assails the credibility of
Ma. Corazon Pamintuan. He argues that her narration should not
be given any weight or credence since it was punctured with
implausible statements and improbabilities so inconsistent with
human nature and experience. He claims that it was truly
inconceivable for him to commit the rape considering that
Crysthel's younger sister was also in the room playing while
Corazon was just downstairs preparing Milo drinks for her
daughters. Their presence alone as possible eyewitnesses and
the fact that the episode happened within the family compound
where a call for assistance could easily be heard and responded
to, would have been enough to deter him from committing the
crime. Besides, the door of the room was wide open for anybody
to see what could be taking place inside. Primo insists that it was
almost inconceivable that Corazon could give such a vivid
description of the alleged sexual contact when from where she
stood she could not have possibly seen the alleged touching of
the sexual organs of the accused and his victim. He asserts that
the absence of any external signs of physical injuries or of
penetration of Crysthel's private parts more than bolsters his
innocence.
In convicting the accused, the trial court relied quite heavily on
the testimony of Corazon that she saw Primo with his short pants
down to his knees kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas and
panty were supposedly "already removed" and that Primo was
"forcing his penis into Crysthel's vagina." The gravamen of the
offense of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below
twelve (12), as provided in Art. 335, par. (3), of the Revised
Penal Code. Crysthel was only four (4) years old when sexually
molested, thus raising the penalty, from reclusion perpetua to

death, to the single indivisible penalty of death under RA 7659,
Sec. 11, the offended party being below seven (7) years old. We
have said often enough that in concluding that carnal knowledge
took place, full penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an
essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of the hymen necessary;
the mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable
of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal
knowledge. 10 But the act of touching should be understood here
as inherently part of the entry of the penis into the labias of the
female organ and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or
the pudendum.
In People v. De la Peña 11 we clarified that the decisions finding a
case for rape even if the attacker's penis merely touched the
external portions of the female genitalia were made in the
context of the presence or existence of an erect penis capable of
full penetration. Where the accused failed to achieve an erection,
had a limp or flaccid penis, or an oversized penis which could
not fit into the victim's vagina, the Court nonetheless held that
rape was consummated on the basis of the victim's testimony
that the accused repeatedly tried, but in vain, to insert his penis
into her vagina and in all likelihood reached the labia of her
pudendum as the victim felt his organ on the lips of her
vulva, 12 or that the penis of the accused touched the middle part
of her vagina. 13 Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does
not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of
organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external
layer of the victim's vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case.
There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis
indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not
merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be
convicted of consummated rape. 14 As the labias, which are
required to be "touched" by the penis, are by their natural situs or
location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch
them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration
beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion that touching the
labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes
consummated rape.
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female
genital organs that are visible in the perineal area,e.g., mons
pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the
vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the rounded eminence
that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within
the surface. The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of
the female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the
inner surface. The skin of the outer convex surface is covered
with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a
thin skin which does not have any hair but has many sebaceous
glands. Directly beneath the labia majora is the labia
minora. 15 Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be
entered for rape to be consummated, 16 and not merely for the
penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing
of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of
the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape.
Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female
organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the
penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only
be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.
Judicial depiction of consummated rape has not been confined
to the oft-quoted "touching of the female organ,"17 but has also
progressed into being described as "the introduction of the male
organ into the labia of the pudendum," 18 or "the bombardment of
the drawbridge." 19 But, to our mild, the case at bar merely
constitutes a "shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency," or as
earlier stated, a "strafing of the citadel of passion.
73
A review of the records clearly discloses that the prosecution
utterly failed to discharge its onus of proving that Primo's penis
was able to penetrate Crysthel's vagina however slight. Even if
we grant arguendo that Corazon witnessed Primo in the act of
sexually molesting her daughter, we seriously doubt the veracity
of her claim that she saw the inter-genital contact between Primo
and Crysthel. When asked what she saw upon entering her
children's room Corazon plunged into saying that she saw Primo
poking his penis on the vagina of Crysthel without explaining her
relative position to them as to enable her to see clearly and
sufficiently, in automotive lingo, the contact point. It should be
recalled that when Corazon chanced upon Primo and Crysthel,
the former was allegedly in a kneeling position, which Corazon
described thus:
Q: How was Primo holding your daughter?
A: (The witness is demonstrating in such a way that the
chest of the accused is pinning down the victim, while
his right hand is holding his penis and his left hand is
spreading the legs of the victim).
It can reasonably be drawn from the foregoing narration that
Primo's kneeling position rendered an unbridled observation
impossible. Not even a vantage point from the side of the
accused and the victim would have provided Corazon an
unobstructed view of Primo's penis supposedly reaching
Crysthel's external genitalia, i.e., labia majora, labia minora,
hymen, clitoris, etc., since the legs and arms of Primo would
have hidden his movements from Corazon's sight, not to
discount the fact that Primo's right hand was allegedly holding
his penis thereby blocking it from Corazon's view. It is the burden
of the prosecution to establish how Corazon could have seen the
sexual contact and to shove her account into the permissive
sphere of credibility. It is not enough that she claims that she saw
what was done to her daughter. It is required that her claim be
properly demonstrated to inspire belief. The prosecution failed in
this respect, thus we cannot conclude without any taint of
serious doubt that inter-genital contact was at all achieved. To
hold otherwise would be to resolve the doubt in favor of the
prosecution but to run roughshod over the constitutional right of
the accused to be presumed innocent.
Corazon insists that Primo did not restrain himself from pursuing
his wicked intention despite her timely appearance, thus giving
her the opportunity to fully witness his beastly act.
We are not persuaded. It is inconsistent with man's instinct of
self-preservation to remain where he is and persist in satisfying
his lust even when he knows fully well that his dastardly acts
have already been discovered or witnessed by no less than the
mother of his victim. For, the normal behavior or reaction of
Primo upon learning of Corazon's presence would have been to
pull his pants up to avoid being caught literally with his pants
down. The interval, although relatively short, provided more than
enough opportunity for Primo not only to desist from but even to
conceal his evil design.
What appears to be the basis of the conviction of the accused
was Crysthel's answer to the question of the court —
Q: Did the penis of Primo touch your organ?
A: Yes, sir.
But when asked further whether his penis penetrated her organ,
she readily said, "No." Thus —

Q: But did his penis penetrate your organ?
A: No, sir. 20
This testimony alone should dissipate the mist of confusion that
enshrouds the question of whether rape in this case was
consummated. It has foreclosed the possibility of Primo's penis
penetrating her vagina, however slight. Crysthel made a
categorical statement denying penetration, 27 obviously induced
by a question propounded to her who could not have been
aware of the finer distinctions between touching and penetration.
Consequently, it is improper and unfair to attach to this reply of a
four (4)-year old child, whose vocabulary is yet as
underdeveloped as her sex and whose language is bereft of
worldly sophistication, an adult interpretation that because the
penis of the accused touched her organ there was sexual entry.
Nor can it be deduced that in trying to penetrate the victim's
organ the penis of the accused touched the middle portion of her
vagina and entered the labia of her pudendum as the
prosecution failed to establish sufficiently that Primo made efforts
to penetrate Crysthel. 22Corazon did not say, nay, not even hint
that Primo's penis was erect or that he responded with an
erection. 23 On the contrary, Corazon even narrated that Primo
had to hold his penis with his right hand, thus showing that he
had yet to attain an erection to be able to penetrate his victim.
Antithetically, the possibility of Primo's penis having breached
Crysthel's vagina is belied by the child's own assertion that she
resisted Primo's advances by putting her legs close
together; 24 consequently, she did not feel any intense pain but
just felt "not happy" about what Primo did to her. 25 Thus, she
only shouted "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko, aray ko!" In cases
where penetration was not fully established, the Court had
anchored its conclusion that rape nevertheless was
consummated on the victim's testimony that she felt pain, or the
medico-legal finding of discoloration in the inner lips of the
vagina, or the labia minora was already gaping with redness, or
the hymenal tags were no longer visible. 26 None was shown in
this case. Although a child's testimony must be received with due
consideration on account of her tender age, the Court endeavors
at the same time to harness only what in her story appears to be
true, acutely aware of the equally guaranteed rights of the
accused. Thus, we have to conclude that even on the basis of
the testimony of Crysthel alone the accused cannot be held
liable for consummated rape; worse, be sentenced to
death.1âwphi1
Lastly, it is pertinent to mention the medico legal officer's finding
in this case that there were no external signs of physical injuries
on complaining witness' body to conclude from a medical
perspective that penetration had taken place. As Dr. Aurea P.
Villena explained, although the absence of complete penetration
of the hymen does not negate the possibility of contact, she
clarified that there was no medical basis to hold that there was
sexual contact between the accused and the victim. 27
In cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a
medical certificate, both should in all respects complement each
other; otherwise, to rely on the testimonial evidence alone, in
utter disregard of the manifest variance in the medical certificate,
would be productive of unwarranted or even mischievous results.
It is necessary to carefully ascertain whether the penis of the
accused in reality entered the labial threshold of the female
organ to accurately conclude that rape was consummated.
Failing in this, the thin line that separates attempted rape from
consummated rape will significantly disappear.
Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code,
rape is attempted when the offender commences the
74
commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform
all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape
by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted rape —
and only of attempted rape — are present in the instant case,
hence, the accused should be punished only for it.
The penalty for attempted rape is two (2) degrees lower than the
imposable penalty of death for the offense charged, which is
statutory rape of a minor below seven (7) years. Two (2) degrees
lower is reclusion temporal, the range of which is twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in the absence of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the maximum of the
penalty to be imposed upon the accused shall be taken from the
medium period of reclusion temporal, the range of which is
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and (1) day to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months, while the minimum shall be
taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision
mayor, the range of which is from six (6) years and one (1) day
to twelve (12) years, in any of its periods.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding accused
PRIMO "SONNY" CAMPUHAN Y BELLO guilty of statutory rape
and sentencing him to death and to pay damages is MODIFIED.
He is instead found guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced
to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years four (4) months
and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years ten (10) months and twenty (20) days
ofreclusion temporal medium as maximum. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt
[G.R. Nos. 136300-02. September 24, 2002.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
EMMANUEL AARON, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us on appeal is the Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court
of Balanga, Bataan, Branch 3, in Criminal Cases Nos. 6730,
6731 and 6732 convicting herein appellant, Emmanuel Aaron, of
one count of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim P50,000 as civil
indemnity.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The appellant, Emmanuel Aaron y Dizon, was charged with three
counts of rape defined and penalized under Articles 266-A and
266-B of the Revised Penal Code, 2 respectively, in three
separate criminal complaints filed and signed by the private
complainant, Jona G. Grajo, and subscribed and sworn to on
January 17, 1998 before 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Oscar M. Lasam. Save for their docket numbers, the said
criminal complaints are identically worded thus:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
That on or about 16 January 1998 at Brgy. San Jose, Balanga,
Bataan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, armed with a knife and by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously succeed in having sexual intercourse with the
offended party JONA G. GRAJO, against the will and consent of
the latter, to her damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment on January 30, 1998, the accused, Emmanuel
Aaron, assisted by counsel of his choice, entered the plea of "not
guilty" to each of the three complaints in Criminal Cases Nos.
6730, 6731 and 6732. Thereafter, joint trial on the merits ensued.

The evidence of the prosecution shows that, on January 16,
1998, at around 7:00 o’clock in the morning, the private
complainant, Jona Grajo, was asleep in bed ("papag") inside her
room on the second floor of the apartment unit which she shared
with her sister and her brother-in-law, herein appellant
Emmanuel Aaron. Jona was wearing only a panty and was
covered with a blanket. Sensing that someone was inside her
room, Jona opened her eyes and was surprised to find
Emmanuel sitting beside her in bed totally naked. Emmanuel
immediately went on top of Jona and poked a knife on her neck.
Jona’s attempt to cry for help proved futile as Emmanuel quickly
covered her mouth with his left hand. 3 Jona’s room was partly open so he peeped through the narrow
Emmanuel removed her panty and succeeded in having carnal
intercourse with Jona who could only manage to cry.
Subsequently, Emmanuel withdrew his penis and ordered Jona
to lie down on the floor. He inserted his penis into her vagina for
the second time with the knife still poked on Jona’s neck.
Thereafter, Emmanuel stood up and commanded Jona to lie
down near the headboard of the "papag" bed where he inserted
his penis into her vagina for the third time, still armed with a
knife, and continued making pumping motions ("umiindayog"). 4
After the incident, Jona pleaded to be released but Emmanuel
initially refused. He budged only after Jona told him that she
urgently needed to relieve herself ("Ihing-ihi na ako, puputok na
ang pantog ko.") but not before warning her not to tell anyone
about the incident. Jona quickly put on her panty and hurried
down the street in front of the apartment with only a blanket
covering herself. Her cries drew the attention of a neighbor,
Lilibeth Isidro, who tried to persuade Jona to go back inside the
apartment, to no avail, for fear of Emmanuel. Upon the prodding
of another neighbor, a certain Agnes, Jona revealed that she
was raped by her brother-in-law, 5 the appellant herein.
Jona proceeded to the nearby store of their landlady upon the
latter’s arrival from the market and she related the misfortune
that had befallen her. At that instance, Emmanuel approached
and warned her to be careful with her words. Then he left for the
house of Bong Talastas. 6 interposed the instant appeal. In his Brief, 17 appellant raised a
After Emmanuel left, Jona went back to their house and dressed
up. Thereafter, she went to the police station in Balanga, Bataan
to report the incident. 7 Police Officers Rommel Morales and
Edgardo Flores proceeded to the residence of the private
complainant who appeared very tense but the neighbors
informed them that Emmanuel had left. The police officers then
proceeded to the house of Bong Talastas in San Jose, Balanga,
Bataan, where the victim told them Emmanuel could have
possibly gone. On arrival there, they found Emmanuel
conversing with Bong Talastas and they immediately arrested the
appellant herein upon ascertaining his identity. 8
After bringing Emmanuel to the police station, Police Officers
Morales and Flores accompanied Jona to the provincial hospital
in Bataan for physical examination. Thereupon, the attending
physician at the Bataan Provincial Hospital, Dra. Emelita
Firmacion, M.D., found "multiple healed laceration(s) at 1, 3, 5,
6, 9 o’clock position(s), incomplete type" in Jona Grajo’s private
part.
At the trial, Dra. Firmacion identified her signature 9 appearing
on the lower right portion of the medical certificate 10 and
affirmed the medical findings contained therein. The multiple
hymenal lacerations sustained by Jona which were respectively
indicated in the medical certificate as 1 o’clock, 3 o’clock, 5
o’clock, 6 o’clock and 9 o’clock could have been caused by
sexual intercourse, masturbation, strenuous exercises or
penetration of any hard object. The appearance of a lacerated
hymen could indicate the approximate time when the laceration
was sustained. In the case of Jona Grajo, her hymenal
lacerations were completely healed, indicating that the same
were sustained at least one month before she was examined on
January 16, 1998. However, it was possible that she had sexual
intercourse immediately before the said examination. 11
The defense denied any liability for the three counts of rape
charged. Appellant Emmanuel Aaron testified that he and his
wife were residing in an apartment unit together with his sister-
75
in-law, herein private complainant, Jona Grajo. 12 Jona occupied
a room on the second floor while the couple stayed at the ground
floor. 13
On the date of the incident, Emmanuel admitted that he and
Jona were the only persons inside the apartment. He had just
arrived from work as a night-shift waiter at Base One restaurant
in Balanga, Bataan. He had earlier met Bong Talastas at 7:00
o’clock in the morning as Bong was preparing to leave his house
while his wife had gone to the market. Emmanuel changed his
clothes upstairs where the cabinet was located opposite the
room occupied by Jona. Emmanuel noticed that the door of
opening and saw her wearing only a panty. He was about to
close the door when Jona woke up and began shouting. 14
Emmanuel did not know why Jona kept on shouting. She even
followed as Emmanuel descended the stairs and she proceeded
to the nearby store of their landlady. Emmanuel went her to the
store to caution Jona about her words ("Ayusin mo ang sinasabi
mo") because she was telling their landlady that he raped her.
However, Jona ignored him so he left and decided to see Bong
Talastas in San Jose, Balanga, Bataan to inquire from the latter
why Jona was accusing him of having raped her. Emmanuel
denied that he was armed with a knife during the incident, much
less threatened Jona with it. 15
On October 14, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision, 16 the
dispositive portion of which read:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused for the single act of rape
having been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalty provided by law. The accused is further
required to indemnify the complainant the sum of P50,000.00
and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Dissatisfied with the decision of the trial court, Emmanuel Aaron
single assignment of error:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
Appellant argues that the account of the private complainant,
Jona Grajo, of the alleged incidents of rape appears incredible
and contrary to common human experience. Based on her
testimony, the appellant suddenly placed himself on top of her
with his right hand poking a knife on her neck and with his left
hand covering her mouth. Subsequently, the appellant removed
her panty and succeeded in inserting his penis into her private
part even without previously opening his zipper or removing his
pants. Likewise, the private complainant did not offer any
resistance although she could have done so. After the alleged
acts of rape, the victim did not even complain to her sister who,
by then, had already arrived from the market. The
uncharacteristic behavior of the private complainant could only
be explained by the fact that she admittedly had several sexual
experiences in the past with her boyfriend and live-in partner
Bong Talastas. The appellant theorizes that private complainant
wanted to get back at him for the embarrassment of being seen
by him in her panty after her boyfriend, Bong Talastas, left the
apartment. Appellant downplays the testimony of PO1 Rommel
Morales as not worthy of credence for lack of corroborative
evidence. 18
On the other hand, the prosecution showed that the appellant
was already naked even before the private complainant was
awakened by his presence; that the private complainant could
not effectively offer any resistance as the appellant was armed
with a knife which he used to intimidate her; and that the private
complainant’s being a non-virgin did not discount rape on
January 16, 1998. 19
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code provides:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. — Rape is

committed — with only a blanket to cover her naked body. Her neighbors took
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of
authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or
is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned
above are present.
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances
mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual
assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal
orifice or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice
of another person.
Article 266-B of the same Code provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
Article 266-B. Penalties. — Rape under paragraph 1 of the next
preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua to death.
x x x intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed by strong
It should be stressed that in the review of rape cases, this Court
is almost invariably guided by three principles: (1) an accusation
of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more
difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2)
in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two
persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant is
scrutinized with extreme caution and (3) the evidence of the
prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. 20
In other words, the credibility of the private complainant is
determinative of the outcome of these cases for rape. Her
consistency on material points, or lack of it, that can sustain or
negate conviction, becomes the single most important matter in
inquiry. 21
After a thorough review, we find that the testimony of private
complainant, Jona Grajo, sufficiently established all the elements
of rape committed under Article 266-A, paragraph (1) (a) of the
Revised Penal Code, namely: a) that the offender, who must be
a man, had carnal knowledge of a woman and (b) that such act
is accomplished by using force or intimidation. 22 The gist of
private complainant’s testimony clearly shows that the appellant,
Emmanuel Aaron, forced himself on her at around 7:00 o’clock in
the morning on January 16, 1998. The sexual assault started on
the "papag" bed inside her room on the second floor of their
apartment unit. After going on top of the private complainant, the
appellant succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina after
which he made pumping motions while poking a knife on her
neck. He then succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina
two more times on the same occasion after transferring locations
inside the room, with the knife continuously poked on her neck.
We also find no reason to disturb the assessment of the trial
court of private complainant’s credibility. Her testimony during
the trial was completely credible as it was given in an honest and
straightforward manner. As noted above, she gave a lucid and
consistent account of the commission of the crime and did not
waver in pinpointing her brother-in-law, herein appellant, as the
perpetrator thereof. Likewise, her actuation after the incident
vividly portrayed a confused and traumatized woman typical of
victims of rape. Thus, after she broke free of the appellant on the
pretense that she urgently needed to relieve herself, the private
complainant quickly put on her panty and rushed to the street
76
note of her obviously troubled condition and admonished her to
go back inside the apartment but she refused, claiming that she
had been raped. She sought refuge at the nearby store of their
landlady to whom she confided that she was raped by her
brother-in-law. Private complainant hurried back to their
apartment to get dressed only upon making sure that the
appellant had already left the place. Without losing time, she
proceeded directly to the police station and lodged a complaint
for rape against the Appellant.
Prosecution witness PO1 Rommel Morales of Balanga, Bataan,
who was the police officer on duty at the time Jona Grajo came
to the police station, recounted during the trial that the private
complainant was crying and trembling on arrival at the Balanga,
Bataan police station on January 16, 1998. Private complainant
took time to answer the queries of the police officer since she
was crying uncontrollably. When she finally got hold of herself,
the private complainant reported that she had been raped by the
appellant who was subsequently arrested by the police. The
actuations of the private complainant immediately after the
incident may be considered as part of the res gestae that
substantially strengthens her claim of sexual assault by the
appellant. 23
On the other hand, all the appellant can offer in his defense is
bare denial. He claims that he had just changed his clothes on
the second floor of their apartment where his cabinet was
located when he chanced upon the private complainant naked
inside her room as the door was then slightly ajar. He did not do
anything further as the private complainant was awakened and
she already started shouting. In view of the positive and
convincing testimony of the private complainant, however, the
defense of denial must fail. It is well-settled that denial is an
evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. 24
The appellant argues that it was impossible for him to have
inserted his penis into the private part of the complainant without
first opening his zipper or removing his pants. This argument of
the appellant is misleading for the reason that, per the testimony
of the private complainant, the appellant was already naked
when his presence roused her from her sleep:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
PROS. LASAM:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q: While you were in your room on that time and date, do you
remember of any incident that happened?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that incident?
A: While I was inside my room, I sensed that there was a person
inside my room and when I opened my eyes, I saw that he is my
brother-in-law.
Q: And that brother-in-law of yours is the person whom you
pointed a while ago. Is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How does he look when you saw him inside your room?
A: He was naked sitting beside me.25cralaw:red
That the private complainant did not offer sustained resistance
despite having been ordered twice by the appellant to change
location inside the room can easily be explained by the fact that
the appellant was threatening to stab her if she resisted. The
private complainant was obviously overwhelmed by intense fear
when she woke up with a knife pointed at her neck. The
continuing intimidation of private complainant cowed her into
helpless submission to appellant’s lechery. She could only
express her disgust over the sexual attack of her brother-in-law
silently in tears. In this connection, it has been ruled that physical
resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is
used on the victim and the latter submits herself, against her will,
to the rapist’s embrace because of fear for her life and personal

safety. 26
The failure of the private complainant to confide the sexual
assault to her sister who, appellant claimed, had arrived from the
market before she (private complainant) went to report the
matter to the police is quite understandable and far from being
uncharacteristic of a rape victim, as what appellant would like to
make it appear. The workings of the human mind which is under
a great deal of emotional and psychological stress are
unpredictable and different people will react differently to a given
situation. 27 Besides, the private complainant did not want to
drag her sister into the controversy and hurt her in the process.
During the trial, the private complainant revealed that she kept
from her sister the previous sexual advances of the appellant in
order not to destroy their good relationship. Private complainant
explained that she did not leave the apartment despite the said
harassments of the appellant inasmuch as she had no other
place to go. However, she confided her ordeal to their landlady, a
certain Elsa Navarro. At any rate, what is important is that the
private complainant reported the rape immediately to the police.
Admittedly, private complainant was having an affair with a
certain Bong Talastas 28 and that she was not innocent to the
ways of the world. However, such fact alone does not negate the
commission of rape by the appellant against her. Dra. Firmacion
testified that although the lacerations found in the private part of
Jona Grajo were completely healed, such fact did not discount
the possibility that she was sexually molested immediately
before she was examined on January 16, 1998. We emphasize
that moral character is immaterial in the prosecution and
conviction of the offender in the crime of rape. The Court has
ruled time and again that even a prostitute can be a victim of
rape 29 as the essence is the victim’s lack of consent to the
sexual act.
Significantly, the appellant failed to advance any credible motive
that could have impelled the private complainant to testify falsely
against him. 30 In a desperate attempt to avoid any
responsibility for his crime, however, the appellant theorizes that
the private complainant merely wanted to exact revenge from
him for the embarrassment she experienced when he chanced
upon her clad merely in a panty inside her room. This alleged
motive on the part of the private complainant is too shallow to
merit even scant consideration from this Court. If appellant were
to be believed, would not private complainant have instead opted
to keep quiet about the incident to spare herself from further
embarrassment? Common experience dictates that no woman,
especially one of tender age, will concoct a rape complaint, allow
a gynecological examination and permit herself to be subjected
to public trial if she is not motivated solely by the desire to have
the culprit apprehended and punished. 31 Indeed, coming out in
the open with the accusation of sexual assault on her by her
brother-in-law inevitably entailed risking her relationship with her
boyfriend, Bong Talastas, and with her sister. However, the rape
simply proved too much for her to bear.
We agree with the trial court that the appellant should be
convicted of only one count of rape. It may appear from the facts
that the appellant thrice succeeded in inserting his penis into the
private part of Jona Grajo. However, the three penetrations
occurred during one continuing act of rape in which the appellant
was obviously motivated by a single criminal intent. There is no
indication in the records, as the trial court correctly observed,
from which it can be inferred that the appellant decided to
commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault other
than his lustful desire to change positions inside the room where
the crime was committed.
Considering that the crime of rape was committed by the
appellant with the use of a deadly weapon, the imposable
penalty under Article 266-B is reclusion perpetua to death. In the
absence of any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the trial
court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on the
appellant. She is also entitled to a civil indemnity of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000). And due to the emotional distress
suffered by the private complainant who was only nineteen years
old at the time of the rape, she is also entitled to an award of
moral damages in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000).
32
77
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo convicting the
appellant Emmanuel Aaron of one count of rape and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the
private complainant the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000) as civil indemnity is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that said appellant shall pay an additional fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000) by way of moral
damages.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 190632, February 26, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff–
Appellee, v. MANOLITO LUCENA Y VELASQUEZ, ALIAS
“MACHETE,” Accused–Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The subject of this appeal is the Decision1 dated 24 August 2009
of the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. CR–H.C. No. 03371 affirming
the Decision2 dated 30 April 2008 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 260, in Criminal Cases Nos.
03–0763 to 03–0765, finding herein appellant Manolito Lucena y
Velasquez alias “Machete” guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
three counts of rape, thereby sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count and ordering him to
pay AAA3 the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity also for each count.
Three (3) similarly worded Informations,4 all dated 24 June 2003
allege:
That on or about the 28th day of April 2003, in the City of
Parañaque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above–named [appellant], a Barangay
Tanod Volunteer, who took advantage of his position to facilitate
the commission of the crime, by means of force, threat or
intimidation and with the use of a gun did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
the complainant AAA, a minor, 17 years of age, against her
will and consent. (Emphasis and italics supplied).
The appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded NOT
GUILTY to all the charges against him. 5Thereafter, the cases
were jointly tried.
The prosecution presented AAA, the victim herself; and Dr. Merle
Tan (Dr. Tan) of the Child Protection Unit, University of the
Philippines – Philippine General Hospital (UP–PGH), who
examined the victim.
The testimonies of the above–named prosecution witnesses
established that on 28 April 2003, at around 11:30 p.m., while
AAA, who was then 17 years old, having been born on 10 July
1986, was walking and chatting with her friends along one of the
streets of San Dionisio, Parañaque City, two (2) barangay
tanods, one of whom is the appellant, approached and informed
them that they were being arrested for violating a city ordinance
imposing curfew against minors. AAA’s companions, however,
managed to escape, thus, she alone was apprehended.6 AAA
was then ordered by the barangay tanods to board the tricycle.
Afraid that she might spend the night in jail, AAA pleaded with
them and protested that she did not commit any offense as she
was just chatting with her friends. AAA’s plea, however, remained
unheeded.7
AAA was then brought by the two (2) barangay tanods within the
vicinity of the San Dionisio BarangayHall. Afterwards, one of
them alighted from the tricycle and went inside
the barangay hall. The appellant, on the other hand, stayed in
the tricycle to guard AAA. After a while, the barangay tanod, the
one who went inside the barangay hall, returned. But, the

appellant told the former that he will just be the one to bring AAA
back to her house.8
But, instead of escorting AAA back to her house, the appellant
brought her to Kabuboy Bridge in San Dionisio, Parañaque City.
While on their way, the appellant threatened AAA that he would
kill her once she resists or jumps off the tricycle. Upon arrival,
the appellant ordered AAA to alight from the tricycle. AAA asked
the appellant what he would do with her but the former did not
respond. The appellant then took out the backseat of the tricycle
and positioned it in a grassy area. He subsequently pointed a
gun at AAA and commanded her to lie down and to take off her
clothes. The appellant later put the gun down on the ground and
inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina despite the latter’s plea not
to rape her. Satisfied, the appellant stopped. But, after a short
while, or after about five (5) minutes, the appellant, once again,
inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina. Thereafter, he stopped. On
the third time, the appellant inserted again his penis into AAA’s
vagina. Fulfilling his bestial desire, the appellant stopped and
finally ordered AAA to dress up. The appellant even threatened
AAA that he would kill her should she tell anyone about what
happened between them.9
The appellant, thereafter, directed AAA to board the tricycle. He
then brought AAA in front of a school in Parañaque City. But,
before allowing AAA to get off, the appellant repeated his threat
to kill her should she tell anyone about the incident.10
The following day, AAA took the courage to seek the assistance
of their barangay kagawad, who simply advised her to just
proceed to the barangay hall to lodge her complaint against the
appellant. AAA and her mother subsequently went to PGH,
where she was subjected to physical examination by Dr.
Tan,11which resulted in the following findings:
Tanner Stage 3, healing laceration[s] 3 and 5 o’clock
area with petechiae, fresh laceration at 9 o’clock area
HYMEN
with eccymosi at 8–10 o’clock area, Type of Hymen:
Crescentic
xxx
Perianal Skin: fresh laceration[s] at 12
ANAL EXAMINATION and 1 o’clock area. No evident injury at
the time of examination.
xxx
IMPRESSIONS
Disclosure of sexual abuse.
Genital findings show clear Evidence Of Blunt Force Or
Penetrating Trauma.12 (Emphasis supplied).
AAA also went to the Coastal Road Police Headquarters, where
she executed her sworn statement accusing the appellant of
rape. AAA was able to identify the appellant as her assailant
because the former was wearing a jacket emblazoned with
“Barangay Police,” as well as a Barangay Identification Card, at
the time of the incident.13
The appellant and Rodel Corpuz (Corpuz) took the witness stand
for the defense.
In the course of Corpuz’s direct examination, however, the
parties made the following stipulations: (1) that the [herein
appellant] was the assigned barangay radio operator on that
date, [28 April 2003], and he stayed at the barangay hall from
12:00 midnight to 5:00 a.m.; (2) that the witness was there up to
12:00 midnight, but at about past 12:00, he left and returned
after two (2) hours, at 2:00 o’clock a.m.; and (3) that when he
woke up at 5:00 o’clock in the morning, the [appellant] was still
there. With these stipulations, Corpuz’s testimony was dispensed
with.14
The appellant, for his part, could only muster the defenses of
denial and alibi. He, thus, offered a different version of the story.
78
On 28 April 2003, the appellant claimed that he was on duty as a
radio operator at the barangay hall. His task as such was to
receive complaints from the residents of the barangay, as well as
to receive calls from fellow barangay officials who are in need of
assistance. On the same day, he received a call from his
companion, who is also a barangay tanod. He cannot, however,
recall any unusual incident that transpired on that day.15
The appellant admitted that he knew AAA as the one who lodged
a complaint against him but he denied that he knew her
personally. He also vehemently denied the following: (1) that he
raped AAA; (2) that he was one of those barangay tanods who
apprehended AAA for violating the curfew ordinance of
their barangay; and (3) that he was the one driving the tricycle in
going to the barangay hall. Instead, the appellant claimed that
after 12:00 midnight of 28 April 2003, he went home already. In
fact, he was shocked when he was arrested on 25 September
2003 as he did not commit any crime.16
In its Decision dated 30 April 2008, the trial court, giving
credence to the categorical, straightforward and positive
testimony of AAA, coupled with the medical findings of sexual
abuse, convicted the appellant of three (3) counts of rape as
defined and penalized under paragraph 1(a) of Article 266–A, in
relation to Article 266–B, of the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines, as amended. The trial court, thus, decreed:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the [herein appellant] MANOLITO
LUCENA y VELASQUEZ alias MACHETE, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of Rape (under Art. 266–a
par. 1(a) in relation to Art. 266–B of the RPC as amended by
RA 8353)and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count of Rape. In addition, the
[appellant] is ordered to pay [AAA] the amount of P50,000.00 as
moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each
count.17 (Emphasis and italics theirs).
The appellant appealed18 the trial court’s Decision to the Court of
Appeals with the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
[HEREIN APPELLANT] OF RAPE DESPITE THE
PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE THE ELEMENT OF
FORCE AND INTIMIDATION.
II.
GRANTING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE [APPELLANT]
COMMITTED THE CRIME CHARGED, THE TRIAL COURT
GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM OF THREE (3)
COUNTS OF RAPE.19
After a thorough study of the records, the Court of Appeals
rendered its now assailed Decision dated 24 August 2009
sustaining appellant’s conviction for three (3) counts of rape, as
well as the damages awarded to AAA. In doing so, the Court of
Appeals explained that the facts revealed that the appellant
succeeded thrice in inserting his penis into AAA’s vagina. The
said three (3) penetrations happened one after another at an
interval of five (5) minutes, wherein the appellant would take a
rest after satiating his lust and after regaining his strength would
again rape AAA. Undoubtedly, the appellant decided to commit
those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault on AAA. Thus,
his conviction for three (3) counts of rape is irrefutable.20
Hence, this appeal.21
Both parties in their manifestations22 before this Court adopted
their respective appeal briefs23 filed with the Court of Appeals in
lieu of Supplemental Briefs.
In his Brief, the appellant contends that the prosecution failed to
prove that force or intimidation attended the commission of rape.
Records revealed that AAA did not even attempt to resist his

alleged sexual advances over her person. Instead, AAA opted to
remain passive throughout her ordeal despite the fact that during
the three (3) episodes of their sexual intercourse he was
unarmed and she, thus, had all the opportunity to escape, which
she never did. These reactions of AAA were contrary to human
experience, thus, cast serious doubts on the veracity of her
testimony and on her credibility as a witness.
The appellant similarly argues that the result of AAA’s medical
examination is quite disturbing as it appears that her anal orifice
was also penetrated by a hard object though nothing was said to
this effect in her testimony.
The appellant likewise avers that he cannot be convicted of three
counts of rape. The intervening period of five (5) minutes
between each penetration does not necessarily prove that he
decided to commit three separate acts of rape. He maintains that
what is of prime importance is that he was motivated by a single
criminal intent.
With the foregoing, the appellant believes that his guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt; hence, his acquittal is
inevitable.
This Court holds otherwise. The conviction of the appellant, thus,
stands but the damages awarded in favor AAA must be modified.
Primarily, in reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided with three
settled principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with
facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even
more difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to
disprove; (2) considering the intrinsic nature of the crime, only
two persons being usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit,
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the defense.24
Rape is a serious transgression with grave consequences both
for the accused and the complainant. Following the above
principles, this Court is duty–bound to conduct a thorough and
exhaustive evaluation of a judgment of conviction for rape.25
After a careful scrutiny of the entire records, however, this Court
finds no justifiable reason to reverse the rulings of the lower
courts.
All the Informations in this case charged the appellant with rape
under paragraph 1(a), Article 266–A, in relation to paragraph 2,
Article 266–B, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. These
provisions specifically state:
ART. 266–A. Rape; When and How Committed. – Rape is
committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; and d) When the offended party is under twelve (12)
years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
xxxx
ART. 266–B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next
preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
79
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death. (Emphasis supplied).
Certainly, carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following instances constitutes rape: (1) when force or
intimidation is used; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason
or is otherwise unconscious; and (3) when she is under twelve
(12) years of age.26
The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and
need not be overpowering or irresistible when applied. For rape
to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation be so
great or be of such character as could not be resisted – it is
only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to
consummate the purpose which the accused had in
mind.27 Further, it should be viewed from the perception and
judgment of the victim at the time of the commission of the
crime. What is vital is that the force or intimidation be of
such degree as to cow the unprotected and vulnerable
victim into submission. Force is sufficient if it produces fear
in the victim, such as when the latter is threatened with
death.28
In the case at bench, as can be gleaned from the transcript of
stenographic notes and as observed by the trial court, which the
Court of Appeals sustained, AAA’s categorical, straightforward
and positive testimony revealed that the appellant was armed
with a gun and the same was pointed at her while she was
ordered to lie down and to take off her clothes, to which she
acceded because of fear for her life and personal safety. The
appellant then put the gun down on the ground and successfully
inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina, not only once but thrice.
This happened despite AAA’s plea not to rape her. And, after
satisfying his lust, the appellant threatened AAA that he would kill
her should she tell anyone about the incident. This same threat
of killing AAA was first made by the appellant while the former
was still inside the tricycle on their way to Kabuboy Bridge.29 It
cannot be denied, therefore, that force and intimidation were
employed by the appellant upon AAA in order to achieve his
depraved desires.
While it is true that the appellant had already put the gun down
on the ground the moment he inserted his penis into AAA’s
vagina and was actually unarmed on those three (3) episodes of
sexual intercourse, the same does not necessarily take away the
fear of being killed that had already been instilled in the mind of
AAA. Emphasis must be given to the fact that the gun was still
within appellant’s reach, therefore, he could still make good of
his threat on AAA at anytime the latter would show any
resistance to his evil desires. AAA’s lack of physical resistance,
therefore, is understandable and would not in any way discredit
her testimony.
It must be borne in mind that when a rape victim becomes
paralyzed with fear, she cannot be expected to think and act
coherently. Further, as has been consistently held by this
Court, physical resistance is not an essential element of
rape and need not be established when intimidation is exercised
upon the victim, and, the latter submits herself, against her will,
to the rapist’s embrace because of fear for her life and personal
safety. The victim’s failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance
did not make voluntary her submission to the criminal acts of her
aggressor. It bears stressing that not every rape victim can be
expected to act with reason or in conformity with the usual
expectations of everyone. The workings of a human mind placed
under emotional stress are unpredictable; people react
differently. Some may shout, some may faint, while others may
be shocked into insensibility.30
In his attempt to ruin AAA’s credibility in order to exculpate
himself from all the charges, the appellant puts stress on the
portion of the result of AAA’s medical examination disclosing that
even her anal orifice was also penetrated by a hard object, which
she never mentioned in her testimony.
To the mind of this Court, such argument is flimsy and totally
misplaced. It would not even work to appellant’s advantage and

would not in any way cast doubt on the veracity of AAA’s
testimony. As this Court has previously stated, a medical
examination and a medical certificate, albeit corroborative of the
commission of rape, are not indispensable to a successful
prosecution for rape.31 Moreover, even though AAA made no
mention of any anal penetration, such omission would not
change the fact that she was, indeed, raped by the appellant. As
succinctly found by both lower courts, AAA categorically,
straightforwardly, clearly and positively narrated her harrowing
experience in the hands of the appellant. She recounted in detail
how the appellant took advantage of her by bringing her
to Kabuboy Bridge, where nobody was present; commanding her
to lie down and undress herself at a point of a gun; and
successfully inserting his penis into her vagina, not only once but
thrice. AAA stated that after the first penetration the appellant
stopped. After about five minutes, however, the appellant, once
again, inserted his penis into her vagina. Thereafter, the
appellant stopped. For the third and last time, the appellant
again inserted his penis into her vagina. This narration was
consistent with the rest of the medical findings showing fresh
hymenal lacerations on AAA’s vagina, which according to Dr. Tan
is a clear evidence of “blunt force or penetrating trauma” – a
disclosure of sexual abuse.
For his ultimate defense, the appellant puts forward denial
and alibi. Notably, these defenses are totally inconsistent with his
line of argument that the rape was committed without force or
intimidation thereby implying that the sexual intercourse between
him and AAA was consensual.
Time and again, this Court has viewed denial and alibi as
inherently weak defenses, unless supported by clear and
convincing evidence, the same cannot prevail over the positive
declarations of the victim who, in a simple and straightforward
manner, convincingly identified the appellant as the defiler of her
chastity.32 Simply put, the positive assertions of AAA that he
raped her are entitled to greater weight. While denial
and alibi are legitimate defenses in rape cases, bare assertions
to this effect cannot overcome the categorical testimony of the
victim,33 as in this case.
Also, appellant’s alibi that on the night the rape incident
happened, he was at the barangay hall doing his job as radio
operator and at 12:00 midnight he already went home, failed to
sufficiently establish that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the scene of the crime when it was committed. Moreover,
the corroborating testimony of defense witness Corpuz that the
appellant left at about past 12:00 midnight, almost the same time
the rape incident happened, and then returned after two (2)
hours, even bolster the possibility of the appellant’s presence at
the scene of the crime.
This Court also notes that the appellant failed to show any ill–
motive on the part of AAA to testify falsely against him. This
bolsters the veracity of AAA’s accusation since no woman would
concoct a tale that would tarnish her reputation, bring humiliation
and disgrace to herself and her family, and submit herself to the
rigors, shame, and stigma attendant to the prosecution of rape,
unless she is motivated by her quest to seek justice for the crime
committed against her.34
In light of the foregoing, it is beyond any cavil of doubt that the
appellant’s guilt for the crime of rape has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
As to the number of rapes committed. The appellant,
citing People v. Aaron (Aaron Case),35 insists that he cannot be
convicted of three (3) counts of rape despite the three (3)
penetrations because he was motivated by a single criminal
intent. This Court finds this contention fallacious.
In the Aaron Case, the accused inserted his penis into the
victim’s vagina; he then withdrew it and ordered the latter to lie
down on the floor and, for the second time, he inserted again his
penis into the victim’s vagina; the accused, thereafter, stood up
and commanded the victim to lie near the headboard of the
makeshift bed and, for the third time, he inserted again his penis
into the victim’s vagina and continued making pumping motions.
80
From these sets of facts, this Court convicted the accused
therein for only one count of rape despite the three successful
penetrations because there is no indication in the records from
which it can be inferred that the accused decided to commit
those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault other than his
lustful desire to change positions inside the room where the
crime was committed. This Court, thus, viewed that the three
penetrations occurred during one continuing act of rape in which
the accused was obviously motivated by a single criminal intent.
The circumstances in the present case, however, are far different
from the Aaron Case. Here, we quote with approval the
observations of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed that of the
trial court, to wit:
We agree with the trial court that the [herein appellant] should be
convicted of three (3) counts of rape. It appears from the facts
that the [appellant] thrice succeeded in inserting his penis into
the private part of [AAA]. The three (3) penetrations occurred
one after the other at an interval of five (5) minutes wherein
the [appellant] would rest after satiating his lust upon his
victim and, after he has regained his strength, he would
again rape [AAA]. Hence, it can be clearly inferred from the
foregoing that when the [appellant] decided to commit those
separate and distinct acts of sexual assault upon [AAA], he
was not motivated by a single impulse[,] but rather by
several criminal intent. Hence, his conviction for three (3)
counts of rape is indubitable.36 (Emphasis supplied).
This Court sustains the findings of both lower courts that, indeed,
the three insertions into AAA were in satiation of successive but
distinct criminal carnality. Therefore, the appellant’s conviction for
three counts of rape is proper.
As to penalty. The second paragraph of Art. 266–B of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that “[w]henever the
rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon x x x the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.” As it was properly
alleged and proved that the appellant used a gun in order to
consummate his evil desires, thus, both lower courts correctly
imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count of rape.
As to damages. Civil indemnity, which is mandatory in a finding
of rape is distinct from and should not be denominated as moral
damages which are based on different jural foundations and
assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion.37 The
award of moral damages, on the other hand, is automatically
granted in rape cases without need of further proof other than
the commission of the crime because it is assumed that a rape
victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such
award.38 Hence, this Court upholds the P50,000.00 civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 moral damages, for each count of
rape, that were awarded by both lower courts in favor of AAA.
In addition, this Court deems it proper to award exemplary
damages in favor of AAA. The award of exemplary damages is
justified under Article 2230 of the Civil Code if there is an
aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying.39 In
this case, since the qualifying circumstance of the use of a
deadly weapon was present in the commission of the crime,
exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00, for each count
of rape, is awarded in favor of AAA. Moreover, in line with recent
jurisprudence, the interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be
imposed on all damages awarded from the date of the finality of
this judgment until fully paid.40
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA–G.R. CR–H.C. No. 03371 dated 24 August
2009 finding herein appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
three counts of rape is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATIONS that: (1) the exemplary damages in the
amount of P30,000.00, for each count of rape, is awarded in
favor of AAA; and (2) the appellant is ordered to pay AAA the
interest on all damages at the legal rate of 6% per annum from
the date of finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 196315, October 22, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. LEONARDO CATAYTAY Y SILVANO, Accused-
Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an Appeal1 from the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 32275 dated August 11, 2010 affirming the
conviction of accused-appellant Leonardo Cataytay y Silvano for
the crime of rape.
Accused-appellant Cataytay was charged of said crime in an
Information dated September 9, 2003:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That on or about the 07 th day of September 2003, in the City of
Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
designs[,] and by means of force and intimidation, did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge
[of AAA],3 19 years of age but with a mental age of a 5 year old,
hence, a retardate, or demented, which is known to accused at
the time of the commission of the offense, against her will and
consent and to her damage and prejudice.4
Accused-appellant Cataytay entered a plea of not guilty at his
arraignment on October 3, 2003. Trial thereafter ensued.
BBB (AAA’s mother) testified that she knew accused-appellant
Cataytay as her neighbor in their compound in Mandaluyong
City. Accused-appellant was a shoe repairman who had a shop
six houses away from BBB’s house.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On September 7, 2003, at around 6:30 p.m., BBB left AAA in
their house to look for BBB’s youngest daughter. Thirty minutes
later, when she reached the bridge near Block 37, her neighbor,
Lito, told her that there was a problem, and brought her to
the barangay outpost. AAA and the accused-appellant were
already at the outpost. Lito told the persons at the outpost that
she was the mother of the victim. When BBB saw AAA, the latter
told her, “Mommy, ni-rape po ako.” BBB asked her who raped
her. AAA responded by pointing to accused-appellant. During
the interviews made by the barangay officials, AAA narrated how
she was raped by accused-appellant, which ended when a
certain “Mimi” knocked at the door. When accused-appellant
answered the knock, Mimi told the former that she will shout if he
does not leave the house. AAA went out of the house and
sought help from their neighbors. One of their neighbors,
Amelita Morante, called the barangay officials at the
outpost.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
BBB identified a Psychological Evaluation Report from the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) dated
May 25, 1999, which was conducted in connection with another
rape case. The report stated that AAA had the mental capacity
of an eight-year-old child.7 BBB also identified AAA’s birth
certificate which showed that she was biologically 19 years old at
the time of the incident. 8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On cross-examination, BBB confirmed that AAA was the victim in
a rape case in 1999 against a certain Norberto Lerit. BBB
admitted that she did not personally witness the alleged rape
committed by the accused-appellant.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
When AAA appeared as the second witness for the prosecution,
the prosecution manifested that by merely looking at her, it was
apparent that she was mentally retardate.10 AAA, who was
crying while being asked questions, testified that she was raped
by accused-appellant by inserting his penis into her, despite her
protestations. After the deed, she was given money by accused-
appellant. She knew the accused-appellant before the incident
as a shoe repairman.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
DSWD Social Worker Arlene Gampal testified that she referred
AAA to the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) for
psychological examination. She also conducted a Social Case
81
Study upon AAA in relation to the incident of sexual abuse at the
hands of the accused.12 NCMH Psychologist Susan
Sabado was presented as a prosecution witness, but her
testimony was dispensed with when the defense agreed to a
stipulation regarding her expertise and that the tests conducted
on AAA affirmed that the latter had a mental capacity of a seven-
year-old child.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Police Chief Inspector (PC/Insp.) Bonnie Chua, the medico-
legal officer who examined AAA on September 8, 2003 was
likewise presented as a prosecution witness. The defense
agreed to a stipulation that the findings of the examination were
consistent with recent sexual
intercourse.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For the defense, accused-appellant testified that on September
7, 2003, at around 7:00 p.m., he was in his house together with
his brother, feeding his four-year-old daughter. He then went out
and proceeded to a videoke bar, which was around 20 meters
from his house.15 He stayed at the videoke bar for less than 15
minutes, as barangay officers suddenly arrived and arrested
him. Upon asking why he was being arrested, the officers told
him that he was the suspect in the rape of AAA. He was brought
to the Barangay Hall, where he denied the accusations against
him. He estimated that the house of BBB was more or less 50
meters away from his house,16 and that it would take more or
less a one minute walk from the videoke bar to the house of
AAA.17 Accused-appellant admitted that by merely looking at
AAA, he could tell that she has a mental
disability.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Accused-appellant’s brother, Jose Fresco Cataytay (Jose),
testified that at 6:30 p.m. of September 7, 2003, accused-
appellant was inside their house feeding his daughter. At around
7:00 p.m., accused-appellant told Jose that he will go to
the videoke bar, which was around 30 meters away from their
house. Accused-appellant stayed in the videoke bar for 5 to 10
minutes, then went back to their house and watched television.
Accused-appellant was arrested that night within the vicinity of
their house by the barangay tanods. He estimated that AAA’s
house is 20 to 30 meters away from the videoke bar, and that it
would take less than five minutes to reach the house of AAA
from the videoke bar.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Alicia Panaguitol (Alicia), a neighbor of AAA and accused-
appellant, testified that she lives two meters away from AAA’s
house and 60 meters away from that of accused-appellant. She
was inside her house at around 7:00 p.m. of September 7, 2003,
during which time she heard AAA shouting that she was raped.
She asked AAA who raped her. AAA replied “Pilay,” apparently
referring to their neighbor who was called Jun Pilay. Alicia saw
Jun Pilay run from AAA’s house towards a dark
area.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On February 5, 2009, the RTC rendered its Judgment finding
accused-appellant guilty as charged, and disposing of the case
as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, accused
LEONARDO CATAYTAY y SILVANO is hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape against one
[AAA] defined and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 266-B paragraph 10
of the same Code.
As a consequence thereof, accused LEONARDO CATAYTAY y
SILVANO is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of from TWENTY YEARS (20) and ONE (1) DAY
to FORTY (40) YEARS of reclusion perpetua.
Further, accused LEONARDO CATAYTAY y SILVANO is hereby
ordered to indemnify the victim [AAA], the amount of SEVENTY
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00) as and by way of moral
damages and SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P75,000.00) by way of exemplary damages.
Finally, the period of detention of accused LEONARDO
CATAYTAY y SILVANO at the Mandaluyong City Jail is hereby
fully credited to his account.21ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, where it was
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32275. On August 11, 2010, the
Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the instant appeal
is DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS that an additional award of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity is granted to the victim and the award of exemplary
damages of P75,000.00 is reduced to P30,000.00. The penalty
of imprisonment to be served is simply reclusion
perpetua.22ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Hence, this appeal, where accused-appellant Cataytay adopted
his Appellant’s Brief with the Court of Appeals, which contained
the following assignment of errors:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
I Q-
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S
FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE WAS
ILLEGALLY ARRESTED.23ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In his appellant’s brief, accused-appellant claims that BBB’s
testimony concerning the details of the commission of the rape
as narrated by AAA is hearsay and therefore has no probative
value. Accused-appellant also points out that the Psychological
Evaluation Report dated May 25, 1999 and Psychological Report
dated June 29, 2009 illustrate that AAA can be easily influenced.
At the outset, we agree with accused-appellant that the details
concerning the manner of the commission of the rape, which
was merely narrated by AAA at the barangay outpost, is hearsay
and cannot be considered by this Court. A witness can testify
only on the facts that she knows of his own personal knowledge,
or more precisely, those which are derived from her own
perception.24 A witness may not testify on what she merely
learned, read or heard from others because such testimony is
considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the
truth of what she has learned, read or
heard.25cralawredchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the details of the rape
which BBB merely heard from AAA’s narration, we nevertheless
find no reason to disturb the findings of fact of the trial court.
Despite lacking certain details concerning the manner in which
AAA was allegedly raped, the trial court, taking into consideration
the mental incapacity of AAA and qualifying her to be a child
witness,26 found her testimony to be credible and
convincing:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Q- Uulitin ko sa iyo ‘yung unang tinanong ko sa’yo ha, bakit
ka nandito sa office ni Judge, para ano?
A- Para magsumbong.
Q- Sinong isusumbong mo?
A- Leonardo Cataytay.
INTERPRETER:
Witness at this moment is now crying.
Q- Nandito ba si Leonardo Cataytay, [AAA], nandito ba siya
ngayon sa office ni Judge? Tingin ka sa office ni Judge
kung nandito ngayon si Leonardo, sabi mo isusumbong
mo siya kay Judge, diba?
COURT:
Ituro mo nga kung nandiyan siya, sige.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointed to the male person seated in the first
row of the gallery, wearing white t-shirt, who when
asked to identify himself, answered to the name of
LEONARDO CATAYTAY Y SILVANO.
PROS. LAZARO:
Q- [AAA], itinuro mo si Leonardo, sabi mo kanina
isusumbong mo siya, bakit mo siya isusumbong, anong
82
ginawa niya sa’yo?
A- Ni-rape po ako.
Q- Ilang beses ka niya ni-rape?
A- Isa lang po.
Q- Papaano ka niya ni-rape?
A- Pinasok niya ‘yung ari niya sa akin.
Q- Anong sinabi mo sa kanya ‘nung ni-rape ka niya, anong
sinabi mo kay Leonardo?
A- Ayaw ko na po.
Q- Anong sinabi naman ni Leonardo habang nire-rape ka
niya?
A- Wag daw po ako maingay.
Q- Kasi pag maingay ka, ano daw ang gagawin sa’yo?
A- Uulitin daw niya po.
Q- Anong sinabi ni Leonardo sa’yo pagkatapos ka niyang
ni-rape, [AAA]? May sinabi sa’yo pagkatapos ka niya ni-
rape? Meron o wala?
A- Wala po.
May binigay sya sa’yo?
A- Opo.
Q- Anong binigay niya? Punasan mo ang luha mo.
A- Pera po.
Q- Alam mo kung magkano?
A- Hindi po.27
AAA’s mental condition may have prevented her from delving
into the specifics of the assault in her testimony almost three
years later, unlike the way she narrated the same when she was
asked at the barangay outpost merely minutes after the incident.
However, as we have ruled in a litany of cases, when a woman,
more so if she is a minor, says she has been raped, she says, in
effect, all that is necessary to prove that rape was committed.
Youth and, as is more applicable in the case at bar, immaturity
are generally badges of truth.28 Furthermore, the report of
PC/Insp. Chua that the findings of the physical examination were
consistent with recent sexual intercourse, provide additional
corroboration to the testimonies of AAA and BBB. It should be
noted that this report was stipulated upon by the prosecution and
the defense.
We have pronounced time and again that both denial and alibi
are inherently weak defenses which cannot prevail over the
positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that
the accused committed the crime. Thus, as between a
categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand, and
a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held
to prevail.29 For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be
sufficiently convincing as to preclude any doubt on the physical
impossibility of the presence of the accused at the locus
criminis or its immediate vicinity at the time of the incident. 30 In
the case at bar, accused-appellant and his brother, second
defense witness Jose, claim that the former was taking care of
his daughter in his house at around 7:00 p.m. of September 7,
2003. He then went out and proceeded to a videoke bar, which
was merely 20 meters away from his house. Accused-appellant
and his brother admitted that their house was merely 50 meters
away, or around a one-minute walk, from the house of AAA,
where the alleged incident occurred. Accused-appellant was
therefore clearly in the immediate vicinity of the locus criminis at
the time of the commission of the crime, and thus accused-
appellant’s defense of alibi must fail.
Other than alibi and denial, accused-appellant presented the
testimony of Alicia, a neighbor of AAA and accused-appellant, to
prove that another person raped AAA. However, the record is
clear that AAA positively identified accused-appellant as the
culprit both at the barangay outpost minutes after the incident,
and in open court. It is furthermore axiomatic that when it comes
to evaluating the credibility of the testimonies of the witnesses,
great respect is accorded to the findings of the trial judge who is
in a better position to observe the demeanor, facial expression,
and manner of testifying of witnesses, and to decide who among
them is telling the truth.31 The trial court, which was able to
carefully observe the testimony of Alicia, was not adequately
convinced by her allegations.
To recall, the Information charged accused-appellant of
committing the following act: “by means of force and intimidation,
did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have
carnal knowledge [of AAA], 19 years of age but with a mental

age of a 5 year old, hence, a retardate, or demented, which is
known to accused at the time of the commission of the offense,
against her will and consent and to her damage and
prejudice.”32 The Information, as worded, can conceivably
comprehend rape under either paragraph 1(b) or 1(d) of Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. — Rape is
committed —
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:cralawlawlibrary
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;chanrobleslaw
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious;chanrobleslaw
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority;chanrobleslaw
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age
or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present. (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Caoile,33 we differentiated the terms “deprived of
reason” and “demented,” as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The term demented refers to a person who has dementia, which
is a condition of deteriorated mentality, characterized by marked
decline from the individual's former intellectual level and often by
emotional apathy, madness, or insanity. On the other hand, the
phrase deprived of reason under paragraph 1 (b) has been
interpreted to include those suffering from mental abnormality,
deficiency, or retardation. Thus, AAA, who was clinically
diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be properly classified as
a person who is “deprived of reason,” and not one who is
“demented.”
In the case at bar, AAA was clinically diagnosed to have mental
retardation with the mental capacity of a seven-year old child.34
The prosecution and the defense agreed to stipulate on the
conclusion of the psychologist that the “mental age of the victim
whose chronological age at the time of the commission of the
offense is nineteen (19) years old x x x is that of a seven (7)
year old child.”35 Accused-appellant is therefore criminally liable
for rape under paragraph 1(b) of Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code. The appropriate penalty is provided for by Article
266-B, which relevantly provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances:cralawlawlibrary
x x x x
10. When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional
disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the
time of the commission of the crime.
Since the accused-appellant’s knowledge of AAA’s mental
retardation was alleged in the Information and admitted by the
former during the trial, the above special qualifying circumstance
is applicable, and the penalty of death should have been
imposed. With the passage, however, of Republic Act No.
934636prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua shall instead be imposed.
The RTC sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of twenty years and one day to forty years
of reclusion perpetua. The Court of Appeals correctly modified
the penalty to be simply reclusion perpetua. Since reclusion
perpetua is an indivisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence
Law cannot be applied.37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As regards accused-appellant’s civil liability, the RTC ordered
him to pay AAA in the amount of P75,000.00 as moral damages
and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. The Court of Appeals
modified the trial court’s decision by granting the additional
83
award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and reducing the award
of exemplary damages to P30,000.00. In accordance, however,
to People v. Lumaho,38 where the penalty for the crime
committed is death which cannot be imposed because of
Republic Act No. 9346, we increase the amounts of indemnity
and damages to be imposed as follows: P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral damages; and P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages. In addition, we impose 6% interest per
annum from finality of judgment until fully
paid.39chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the present appeal is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32275 dated August 11,
2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION increasing the
amounts of indemnity and damages to be imposed as follows:
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral damages;
and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. All amounts are
furthermore subject to interest at the rate of 6% per annum from
the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
MARITAL RAPE
G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
"Among the duties assumed by the husband are his duties to
love, cherish and protect his wife, to give her a home, to provide
her with the comforts and the necessities of life within his means,
to treat her kindly and not cruelly or inhumanely. He is bound to
honor her x x x; it is his duty not only to maintain and support
her, but also to protect her from oppression and wrong."1
REYES, J.:
Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies.
Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not
consensual, is rape. This is the clear State policy expressly
legislated in Section 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law
of 1997.
The Case
This is an automatic review 2 of the Decision3 dated July 9, 2008
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353,
which affirmed the Judgment4 dated April 1, 2002 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, in Criminal
Case Nos. 99-668 and 99-669 convicting him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.
The Facts
Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK,5 were married on October
18, 1975. They Ii ved together since then and raised their four (4)
children6 as they put up several businesses over the years.
On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-
Affidavit,7 alleging that her husband, the accused-appellant,
raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in
Phase 2, Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, and that on
December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder
for refusing to have sex with him.
On June 11, 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan
de Oro City issued a Joint Resolution, 8 finding probable cause
for grave threats, less serious physical injuries and rape and
recommending that the appropriate criminal information be filed
against the accused-appellant.

On July 16, 1999, two Informations for rape were filed before the
RTC respectively docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-6689 and
Criminal Case No. 99-669.10 The Information in Criminal Case
No. 99-668 charged the accused-appellant as follows:
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 9,
1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the
private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter[']s will.
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of
1997.
Meanwhile the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-669 reads:
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October
10, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused by means of force upon person did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
the private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of
1997.
The accused-appellant was arrested upon a warrant issued on
July 21, 1999.11 On August 18, 1999, the accused-appellant filed
a Motion for Reinvestigation,12 which was denied by the trial
court in an Order13 dated August 19, 1999. On even date, the
accused-appellant was arraigned and he entered a plea of not
guilty to both charges.14
On January 10, 2000, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit
Amended Information15 averring that the name of the private
complainant was omitted in the original informations for rape.
The motion also stated that KKK, thru a Supplemental Affidavit
dated November 15, 1999,16 attested that the true dates of
commission of the crime are October 16, 1998 and October 1 7,
1998 thereby modifying the dates stated in her previous
complaint-affidavit. The motion was granted on January 18,
2000.17 Accordingly, the criminal informations were amended as
follows:
Criminal Case No. 99-668:
That on or about October 16, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon
person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, his wife,
[KKK], against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of
1997.18
Criminal Case No. 99-669:
That on or about October 17, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon
person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, his wife,
[KKK], against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of
1997.19
The accused-appellant was thereafter re-arraigned. He
maintained his not guilty plea to both indictments and a joint trial
of the two cases forthwith ensued.
Version of the prosecution
84
The prosecution's theory was anchored on the testimonies of
KKK, and her daughters MMM and 000, which, together with
pertinent physical evidence, depicted the following events:
KKK met the accused-appellant at the farm of her parents where
his father was one of the laborers. They got married after a year
of courtship.20 When their first child, MMM, was born, KKK and
the accused-appellant put up a sari-sari store.21 Later on, they
engaged in several other businesses -trucking, rice mill and
hardware. KKK managed the businesses except for the rice mill,
which, ideally, was under the accused-appellant's supervision
with the help of a trusted employee. In reality, however, he
merely assisted in the rice mill business by occasionally driving
one of the trucks to haul goods.22
Accused-appellant's keenness to make the businesses flourish
was not as fervent as KKK's dedication. Even the daughters
observed the disproportionate labors of their parents.23 He would
drive the trucks sometimes but KKK was the one who actively
managed the businesses.24
She wanted to provide a comfortable life for their children; he, on
the other hand, did not acquiesce with that objective.25
In 1994, KKK and the accused-appellant bought a lot and built a
house in Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City.26 Three of
the children transferred residence therein while KKK, the
accused-appellant and one of their sons stayed in Dangcagan,
Bukidnon. She shuttled between the two places regularly and
sometimes he accompanied her.27 In 1998, KKK stayed in Gusa,
Cagayan De Oro City most of the days of the week. 28 On
Wednesdays, she went to Dangcagan, Bukidnon to procure
supplies for the family store and then returned to Cagayan de
Oro City on the same day.29
Conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between
KKK and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent
and fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course, responded
with equal degree of enthusiasm.30However, in 1997, he started
to be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her panties
and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His
abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so
she would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her
into submission.31
In 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant started quarrelling
usually upon his complaint that she failed to attend to him. She
was preoccupied with financial problems in their businesses and
a bank loan. He wanted KKK to stay at home because "a woman
must stay in the house and only good in bed (sic) x x x." She
disobeyed his wishes and focused on her goal of providing a
good future for the children.32
Four days before the subject rape incidents or on October 12,
1998, KKK and the accused-appellant slept together in Cebu
City where the graduation rites of their eldest daughter were
held. By October 14, 1998, the three of them were already back
in Cagayan de Oro City.33
On October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant, his wife KKK and
their children went about their nightly routine. The family store in
their residence was closed at about 9:00 p.m. before supper was
taken. Afterwards, KKK and the children went to the girls'
bedroom at the mezzanine of the house to pray the rosary while
the accused-appellant watched television in the living
room.34 OOO and MMM then prepared their beds. Soon after, the
accused-appellant fetched KKK and bid her to come with him to
their conjugal bedroom in the third floor of the house. KKK
complied.35
Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the
matrimonial bed but she did not lie thereon with the accused-
appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed.
Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: "[W]hy are
you lying on the c{o]t[?]", and to instantaneously order: "You
transfer here [to] our bed."36

KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had
headache and abdominal pain due to her forthcoming
menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got
angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against
the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up
from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed.37
The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long,
expressed his desire to copulate with her by tapping his fingers
on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and
reiterating that she was not feeling well.38
The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and
when KKK tried to resist by holding on to her panties, he pulled
them down so forcefully they tore on the sides. 39 KKK stayed
defiant by refusing to bend her legs.40
The accused-appellant then raised KKK's daster,41 stretched her
legs apart and rested his own legs on them. She tried to wrestle
him away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating
her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to
protest by desperately shouting: "[D]on 't do that to me because
I'm not feeling well."42
With a concrete wall on one side and a mere wooden partition on
the other enclosing the spouses' bedroom,43KKK's pleas were
audible in the children's bedroom where MMM lay awake.
Upon hearing her mother crying and hysterically shouting:
"Eddie, don't do that to me, have pity on me,"44 MMM woke up
000 who prodded her to go to their parents' room. 45 MMM
hurriedly climbed upstairs, vigorously knocked on the door of her
parents' bedroom and inquired: "Pa, why is it that Mama is
crying?"46 The accused-appellant then quickly put on his briefs
and shirt, partly opened the door and said: "[D]on 't interfere
because this is a family trouble," before closing it again. 47 Since
she heard her mother continue to cry, MMM ignored his father's
admonition, knocked at the bedroom door again, and then kicked
it.48 A furious accused-appellant opened the door wider and
rebuked MMM once more: "Don't interfere us. Go downstairs
because this is family trouble!" Upon seeing KKK crouching and
crying on top of the bed, MMM boldly entered the room,
approached her mother and asked: "Ma, why are you crying?"
before asking her father: "Pa, what happened to Mama why is it
that her underwear is torn[?]"49
When MMM received no definite answers to her questions, she
helped her mother get up in order to bring her to the girls'
bedroom. KKK then picked up her tom underwear and covered
herself with a blanket.50 However, their breakout from the room
was not easy. To prevent KKK from leaving, the accused-
appellant blocked the doorway by extending his arm towards the
knob. He commanded KKK to "[S]tay here, you sleep in our
room," when the trembling KKK pleaded: "Eddie, allow me to go
out." He then held KKK's hands but she pulled them back.
Determined to get away, MMM leaned against door and
embraced her mother tightly as they pushed their way out.51
In their bedroom, the girls gave their mother some water and
queried her as to what happened.52 KKK relayed: "[Y]our father
is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex with him when
I'm not feeling well." The girls then locked the door and let her
rest."53
The accused-appellant's aggression recurred the following night.
After closing the family store on October 17, 1998, KKK and the
children took their supper. The accused-appellant did not join
them since, according to him, he already ate dinner elsewhere.
After resting for a short while, KKK and the children proceeded
to the girls' bedroom and prayed the rosary. KKK decided to
spend the night in the room's small bed and the girls were
already fixing the beddings when the accused-appellant entered.
"Why are you sleeping in the room of our children", he asked
KKK, who responded that she preferred to sleep with the
children.54 He then scoffed: "Its alright if you will not go with me,
anyway, there are women that could be paid [P] 1,000.00." She
85
dismissed his comment by turning her head away after retorting:
"So be it." After that, he left the room.55
He returned 15 minutes later56 and when KKK still refused to go
with him, he became infuriated. He lifted her from the bed and
attempted to carry her out of the room as he exclaimed: "Why
will you sleep here[?] Lets go to our bedroom." When she defied
him, he grabbed her short pants causing them to tear apart. 57 At
this point, MMM interfered, "Pa, don't do that to Mama because
we are in front of you."58
The presence of his children apparently did not pacify the
accused-appellant who yelled, "[E]ven in front of you, I can have
sex of your mother [sic J because I'm the head of the family." He
then ordered his daughters to leave the room. Frightened, the
girls obliged and went to the staircase where they subsequently
heard the pleas of their helpless mother resonate with the
creaking bed.59
The episodes in the bedroom were no less disturbing. The
accused-appellant forcibly pulled KKK's short pants and panties.
He paid no heed as she begged, "[D]on 't do that to me, my body
is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you
wanted me to do [sic]. I cannot withstand sex."60
After removing his own short pants and briefs, he flexed her
legs, held her hands, mounted her and forced himself inside her.
Once gratified, the accused-appellant put on his short pants and
briefs, stood up, and went out of the room laughing as he
conceitedly uttered: "[I]t s nice, that is what you deserve because
you are [a] flirt or fond of sex." He then retreated to the masters'
bedroom.61
Sensing that the commotion in their bedroom has ceased, MMM
and OOO scurried upstairs but found the door locked. MMM
pulled out a jalousie window, inserted her arm, reached for the
doorknob inside and disengaged its lock. Upon entering the
room, MMM and OOO found their mother crouched on the bed
with her hair disheveled. The girls asked: "Ma, what happened to
you, why are you crying?" KKK replied: "[Y}our father is a beast
and animal, he again forced me to have sex with him even if I
don't feel well. "62
Version of the defense
The defense spun a different tale. The accused-appellant's father
owned a land adjacent to that of KKK's father. He came to know
KKK because she brought food for her father's laborers. When
they got married on October 18, 1975, he was a high school
graduate while she was an elementary graduate.
Their humble educational background did not deter them from
pursuing a comfortable life. Through their joint hard work and
efforts, the couple gradually acquired personal properties and
established their own businesses that included a rice mill
managed by the accused-appellant. He also drove their trucks
that hauled coffee, copra, or com.63
The accused-appellant denied raping his wife on October 16 and
17, 1998. He claimed that on those dates he was in Dangcagan,
Bukidnon, peeling com. On October 7, his truck met an accident
somewhere in Angeles Ranch, Maluko, Manolo Fortich,
Bukidnon. He left the truck by the roadside because he had to
attend MMM's graduation in Cebu on October 12 with KKK.
When they returned to Bukidnon on October 14, he asked KKK
and MMM to proceed to Cagayan de Oro City and just leave him
behind so he can take care of the truck and buy some com.64
Ryle Equia (Equia), the spouses' driver from January 1996 until
June 1999 corroborated the above claims. According to him, on
October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant was within the vicinity
of the rice mill's loading area in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, cleaning
a pick-up truck. On October 17, 1998, he and the accused-
appellant were in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, loading sacks of com
into the truck. They finished loading at 3 :00 p.m. The accused-
appellant then instructed Equia to proceed to Maluko, Manolo
Fortich, Bukidnon while the former attended a fiesta in New

Cebu, Kianggat, Dangcagan, Bukidnon. At around 4:00 p.m.,
Equia, together with a helper and a mechanic, left for Maluko in
order to tow the stalled truck left there by the accused-appellant
in October 7 and thereafter, bring it to Cagayan de Oro City
together with the separate truck loaded with com.
They arrived in Maluko at 7:00 p.m. and it took them three hours
to turn the truck around and hoist it to the towing bar of the other
truck. At around 10:00 p.m., the accused-appellant arrived in
Maluko. The four of them then proceeded to Cagayan de Oro
City where they arrived at 3 :00 a.m. of October 18, 1998. The
accused-appellant went to Gusa while the other three men
brought the damaged truck to Cugman.65
The accused-appellant asserted that KKK merely fabricated the
rape charges as her revenge because he took over the control
and management of their businesses as well as the possession
of their pick-up truck in January 1999. The accused-appellant
was provoked to do so when she failed to account for their bank
deposits and business earnings. The entries in their bank
account showed the balance of ₱3,190,539.83 on October 31,
1996 but after only a month or on November 30, 1996, the
amount dwindled to a measly ₱9,894.88.66 Her failure to
immediately report to the police also belies her rape
allegations.67
KKK wanted to cover-up her extra-marital affairs, which the
accused-appellant gradually detected from her odd behavior.
While in Cebu on October 12, 1998 for MMM's graduation rites,
the accused-appellant and KKK had sexual intercourse. He was
surprised when his wife asked him to get a napkin to wipe her
after having sex. He tagged her request as "high-tech," because
they did not do the same when they had sex in the past. KKK
had also become increasingly indifferent to him. When he arrives
home, it was an employee, not her, who opened the door and
welcomed him. She prettied herself and would no longer ask for
his permission whenever she went out.68
Bebs,69 KKK's cousin and a cashier in their Bukidnon store, gave
the accused-appellant several love letters purportedly addressed
to Bebs but were actually intended for KKK.70
KKK had more than ten paramours some of whom the accused-
appellant came to know as: Arsenio, Jong-Jong, Joy or Joey,
somebody from the military or the Philippine National Police,
another one is a government employee, a certain Fernandez and
three other priests.71 Several persons told him about the
paramours of his wife but he never confronted her or them about
it because he trusted her.72
What further confirmed his suspicions was the statement made
by OOO on November 2, 1998. At that time, OOO was listening
loudly to a cassette player. Since he wanted to watch a television
program, he asked OOO to tum down the volume of the cassette
player. She got annoyed, unplugged the player, spinned around
and hit the accused-appellant's head with the socket. His head
bled. An altercation between the accused-appellant and KKK
thereafter followed because the latter took OOO's side. During
the argument, OOO blurted out that KKK was better off without
the accused-appellant because she had somebody young,
handsome, and a businessman unlike the accused-appellant
who smelled bad, and was old, and ugly.73
KKK also wanted their property divided between them with three-
fourths thereof going to her and one-fourth to the accused-
appellant. However, the separation did not push through
because the accused-appellant's parents
intervened.74 Thereafter, KKK pursued legal separation from the
accused-appellant by initiating Barangay Case No. 00588-99
before the Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa of Gusa, Cagayan
de Oro City and thereafter obtaining a Certificate to File Action
dated February 18, 1999.75
Ruling of the RTC
In its Judgment76 dated April 1, 2002, the RTC sustained the
version proffered by the prosecution by giving greater weight and
86
credence to the spontaneous and straightforward testimonies of
the prosecution's witnesses. The trial court also upheld as
sincere and genuine the two daughters' testimonies, as it is not
natural in our culture for daughters to testify against their own
father for a crime such as rape if the same was not truly
committed.
The trial court rejected the version of the defense and found
unbelievable the accused-appellant's accusations of extra-
marital affairs and money squandering against KKK. The trial
court shelved the accused-appellant's alibi for being premised on
inconsistent testimonies and the contradicting declarations of the
other defense witness, Equia, as to the accused-appellant's
actual whereabouts on October 16, 1998. Accordingly, the RTC
ruling disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Edgar Jumawan
"GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of the two (2) separate
charges of rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each, to pay complainant [P]50,000.00
in each case as moral damages, indemnify complainant the sum
of (P]75,000.00 in each case, [P]50,000.00 as exemplary
damages and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.77
Ruling of the CA
In its Decision78 dated July 9, 2008, the CA affirmed in toto the
RTC ruling. The CA held that Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure, sanctioned the amendment of the original
informations. Further, the accused-appellant was not prejudiced
by the amendment because he was re-arraigned with respect to
the amended informations.
The CA found that the prosecution, through the straightforward
testimony of the victim herself and the corroborative declarations
of MMM and OOO, was able to establish, beyond reasonable
doubt, all the elements of rape under R.A. No. 8353. The
accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of KKK by using force
and intimidation.
The CA also ruled that KKK's failure to submit herself to medical
examination did not negate the commission of the crime
because a medical certificate is not necessary to prove rape.
The CA rejected the accused-appellant's argument that since he
and KKK are husband and wife with mutual obligations of and
right to sexual intercourse, there must be convincing physical
evidence or manifestations of the alleged force and intimidation
used upon KKK such as bruises. The CA explained that physical
showing of external injures is not indispensable to prosecute and
convict a person for rape; what is necessary is that the victim
was forced to have sexual intercourse with the accused.
In addition, the CA noted that the fact that KKK and the accused-
appellant are spouses only reinforces the truthfulness of KKK's
accusations because no wife in her right mind would accuse her
husband of having raped her if it were not true.
The delay in the filing of the rape complaint was sufficiently
explained by KKK when she stated that she only found out that a
wife may charge his husband with rape when the fiscal
investigating her separate complaint for grave threats and
physical injuries told her about it.
Finally, the CA dismissed the accused-appellant's alibi for lack of
convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to
be at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the
commission of the crimes, considering that Dangcagan,
Bukidnon, the place where he allegedly was, is only about four
or five hours away. Accordingly, the decretal portion of the
decision read:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed
Judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.79
Hence, the present review. In the Court Resolution 80 dated July
6, 2009, the Court notified the parties that, if they so desire, they
may file their respective supplemental briefs. In a Manifestation
and Motion81 dated September 4, 2009, the appellee, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, expressed that it intends to adopt
its Brief before the CA. On April 16, 2012, the accused-appellant,
through counsel, filed his Supplemental Brief, arguing that he
was not in Cagayan de Oro City when the alleged rape incidents
took place, and the presence of force, threat or intimidation is
negated by: (a) KKK's voluntary act of going with him to the
conjugal bedroom on October 16, 1998; (b) KKK's failure to put
up resistance or seek help from police authorities; and ( c) the
absence of a medical certificate and of blood traces in KKK's
panties.82
Our Ruling
I. Rape and marriage: the historical connection
The evolution of rape laws is actually traced to two ancient
English practices of 'bride capture' whereby a man conquered a
woman through rape and 'stealing an heiress' whereby a man
abducted a woman and married her.83
The rape laws then were intended not to redress the violation of
the woman's chastity but rather to punish the act of obtaining the
heiress' property by forcible marriage84 or to protect a man's
valuable interest in his wife's chastity or her daughter's virginity.85
If a man raped an unmarried virgin, he was guilty of stealing her
father's property and if a man raped his wife, he was merely
using his property.86
Women were subjugated in laws and society as objects or goods
and such treatment was justified under three ideologies.
Under the chattel theory prevalent during the 6th century, a
woman was the property of her father until she marries to
become the property of her husband.87 If a man abducted an
unmarried woman, he had to pay the owner, and later buy her
from the owner; buying and marrying a wife were synonymous.88
From the 11th century to the 16th century, a woman lost her
identity upon marriage and the law denied her political power
and status under the feudal doctrine of coverture.89
A husband had the right to chastise his wife and beat her if she
misbehaved, allowing him to bring order within the family.90
This was supplanted by the marital unity theory, which espoused
a similar concept. Upon marrying, the woman becomes one with
her husband. She had no right to make a contract, sue another,
own personal property or write a will.91
II. The marital exemption rule
In the 17th century, Sir Matthew Hale (Hale), a Chief Justice in
England, conceived the irrevocable implied consent theory that
would later on emerge as the marital exemption rule in rape. He
stated that:
[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself
upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and
contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her
husband, which she cannot retract.92
The rule was observed in common law countries such as the
United States of America (USA) and England. It gives legal
immunity to a man who forcibly sexually assaults his wife, an act
which would be rape if committed against a woman not his
wife.93 In those jurisdictions, rape is traditionally defined as "the
forcible penetration of the body of a woman who is not the wife
of the perpetrator."94
87
The first case in the USA that applied the marital exemption rule
was Commonwealth v. Fogerty95 promulgated in 1857. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts pronounced that it
would always be a defense in rape to show marriage to the
victim. Several other courts adhered to a similar rationale with all
of them citing Hale's theory as basis.96
The rule was formally codified in the Penal Code of New York in
1909. A husband was endowed with absolute immunity from
prosecution for the rape of his wife.97 The privilege was personal
and pertained to him alone. He had the marital right to rape his
wife but he will be liable when he aids or abets another person in
raping her.98
In the 1970s, the rule was challenged by women's movements in
the USA demanding for its abolition for being violative of married
women's right to be equally protected under rape laws.99
In 1978, the rule was qualified by the Legislature in New York by
proscribing the application of the rule in cases where the
husband and wife are living apart pursuant to a court order
"which by its terms or in its effects requires such living apart," or
a decree, judgment or written agreement of separation.100
In 1983, the marital exemption rule was abandoned in New York
when the Court of Appeals of New York declared the same
unconstitutional in People v. Liberta101 for lack of rational basis in
distinguishing between marital rape and non-marital rape. The
decision, which also renounced Hale's irrevocable implied
consent theory, ratiocinated as follows:
We find that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between
marital rape and nonmarital rape. The various rationales which
have been asserted in defense of the exemption are either
based upon archaic notions about the consent and property
rights incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand
even the slightest scrutiny. We therefore declare the marital
exemption for rape in the New York statute to be
unconstitutional.
Lord Hale's notion of an irrevocable implied consent by a married
woman to sexual intercourse has been cited most frequently in
support of the marital exemption. x x x Any argument based on a
supposed consent, however, is untenable. Rape is not simply a
sexual act to which one party does not consent. Rather, it is a
degrading, violent act which violates the bodily integrity of the
victim and frequently causes severe, long-lasting physical and
psychic harm x x x. To ever imply consent to such an act is
irrational and absurd. Other than in the context of rape statutes,
marriage has never been viewed as giving a husband the right to
coerced intercourse on demand x x x. Certainly, then, a marriage
license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to
forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married woman has the
same right to control her own body as does an unmarried
woman x x x. If a husband feels "aggrieved" by his wife's refusal
to engage in sexual intercourse, he should seek relief in the
courts governing domestic relations, not in "violent or forceful
self-help x x x."
The other traditional justifications for the marital exemption were
the common-law doctrines that a woman was the property of her
husband and that the legal existence of the woman was
"incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband x x x."
Both these doctrines, of course, have long been rejected in this
State. Indeed, "[nowhere] in the common-law world - [or] in any
modem society - is a woman regarded as chattel or demeaned
by denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity associated
with recognition as a whole human being x x x." 102 (Citations
omitted)
By 1993, marital rape was a crime in all 50 states, with 17 of
them, as well as the District of Columbia, outlawing the act
without exemptions. Meanwhile, the 33 other states granted
some exemptions to a husband from prosecution such as when
the wife is mentally or physically impaired, unconscious, asleep,
or legally unable to consent.103

III. Marital Rape in the Philippines
Interestingly, no documented case on marital rape has ever
reached this Court until now. It appears, however, that the old
provisions of rape under Article 335 of the RPC adhered to
Hale's irrevocable implied consent theory, albeit in a limited form.
According to Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino,104 a husband may
not be guilty of rape under Article 335 of Act No. 3815 but, in
case there is legal separation, the husband should be held guilty
of rape if he forces his wife to submit to sexual intercourse.105
In 1981, the Philippines joined 180 countries in ratifying the
United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (UN-CEDAW).106 Hailed as the
first international women's bill of rights, the CEDAW is the first
major instrument that contains a ban on all forms of
discrimination against women. The Philippines assumed the role
of promoting gender equality and women's empowerment as a
vital element in addressing global concerns.107 The country also
committed, among others, to condemn discrimination against
women in all its forms, and agreed to pursue, by all appropriate
means and without delay, a policy of eliminating discrimination
against women and, to this end, undertook:
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and
women in their national constitutions or other
appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein
and to ensure, through law and other appropriate
means, the practical realization of this principle;
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures,
including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all
discrimination against women;
xxxx
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including
legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws,
regulations, customs and practices which constitute
discrimination against women;
(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which
constitute discrimination against women.108
In compliance with the foregoing international commitments, the
Philippines enshrined the principle of gender equality in the 1987
Constitution specifically in Sections 11 and 14 of Article II
thereof, thus:
Sec. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights.
xxxx
Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-
building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the
law of women and men. The Philippines also acceded to adopt
and implement the generally accepted principles of international
law such as the CEDA W and its allied issuances, viz:
Article II, Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation, and amity with all nations. (Emphasis ours)
The Legislature then pursued the enactment of laws to
propagate gender equality. In 1997, R.A. No. 8353 eradicated
the stereotype concept of rape in Article 335 of the RPC. 109 The
law reclassified rape as a crime against person and removed it
from the ambit of crimes against chastity. More particular to the
present case, and perhaps the law's most progressive proviso is
the 2nd paragraph of Section 2 thereof recognizing the reality of
marital rape and criminalizing its perpetration, viz:
88
Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage
between the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or
the penalty imposed.
In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the
subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall
extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the
crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be
abated if the marriage is void ab initio.
Read together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses
the term "man" in defining rape, it is unmistakable that R.A. No.
8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist's legal
relationship with his victim, thus:
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is
committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse
of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years
of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
The explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible from the
records of the deliberations of the 10th Congress on the law's
progenitor's, House Bill No. 6265 and Senate Bill No. 650. In
spite of qualms on tagging the crime as 'marital rape' due to
conservative Filipino impressions on marriage, the consensus of
our lawmakers was clearly to include and penalize marital rape
under the general definition of 'rape,' viz:
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, one more point
of clarification in the House version on Anti-Rape Bill, House Bill
No. 6265, we never agreed to marital rape. But under Article
266-C, it says here: "In case it is the legal husband who is the
offender... " Does this presuppose that there is now marital rape?
x x x.
MR. LARA: x x x [I]n this jurisdiction, well, I only have a limited,
very limited 17 years of private practice in the legal profession,
Madam Speaker, and I believe that I can put at stake my license
as a lawyer in this jurisdiction there is no law that prohibits a
husband from being sued by the wife for rape. Even
jurisprudence, we don't have any jurisprudence that prohibits a
wife from suing a husband. That is why even if we don't provide
in this bill expanding the definition of crime that is now being
presented for approval, Madam Speaker, even if we don't
provide here for marital rape, even if we don't provide for sexual
rape, there is the right of the wife to go against the husband. The
wife can sue the husband for marital rape and she cannot be
prevented from doing so because in this jurisdiction there is no
law that prohibits her from doing so. This is why we had to put
second paragraph of 266-C because it is the belief of many of
us. x x x, that if it is true that in this jurisdiction there is marital
rape even if we don't provide it here, then we must provide for
something that will unify and keep the cohesion of the family
together that is why we have the second paragraph.
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, under the House
version specifically House Bill No. 6265 our provision on a
husband forcing the wife is not marital rape, it is marital sexual
assault.
MR. LARA: That is correct, Madam Speaker.

MR. DAMASING: But here it is marital rape because there is no
crime of sexual assault. So, Your Honor, direct to the point,
under Article 266-C, is it our understanding that in the second
paragraph, quote: "In case it is the legal husband who is the
offender, this refers to marital rape filed against the husband? Is
that correct?
MR. LARA: No, Madam Speaker, not entirely, no. The answer is
no.
MR. DAMASING: So if the husband is guilty of sexual assault,
what do you call- it?
MR. LARA: Sexual assault, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING: There is no crime of sexual assault, Your
Honor, we have already stated that. Because under 1 and 2 it is
all denominated as rape, there is no crime of sexual assault.
That is why I am sorry that our House version which provided for
sexual assault was not carried by the Senate version because all
sexual crimes under this bicameral conference committee report
are all now denominated as rape whether the penalty is from
reclusion perpetua to death or whether the penalty is only prision
mayor. So there is marital rape, Your Honor, is that correct?
xxxx
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, I am in favor of
this. I am in favor of punishing the husband who forces the wife
even to 30 years imprisonment. But please do not call it marital
rape, call it marital sexual assault because of the sanctity of
marriage. x x x.110 (Emphasis ours)
HON. APOSTOL: In our version, we did not mention marital rape
but marital rape is not excluded.
HON. ROCO: Yeah. No. But I think there is also no specific
mention.
HON. APOSTOL: No. No. No. Silent lang 'yung marital rape.
xxxx
HON. ROCO: xx x [I]f we can retain the effect of pardon, then
this marital rape can be implicitly contained in the second
paragraph. x x x So marital rape actually was in the House
version x x x. But it was not another definition of rape. You will
notice, it only says, that because you are the lawful husband
does not mean that you cannot commit rape. Theoretically, I
mean, you can beat up your wife until she's blue. And if the wife
complains she was raped, I guess that, I mean, you just cannot
raise the defense x x x[:] I am the husband. But where in the
marriage contract does it say that I can beat you up? That's all it
means. That is why if we stop referring to it as marital rape,
acceptance is easy. Because parang ang marital rape, married
na nga kami. I cannot have sex. No, what it is saying is you're
[the] husband but you cannot beat me up. x x x. That's why to
me it's not alarming. It was just a way of saying you're [the]
husband, you cannot say when I am charged with rape x x x.
PRESIDING OFFICER SHAHAN!: All right, so how do you
propose it if we put it in[?]
HON. ROCO: x x x [A]ll we are saying [is] that if you are the
lawful husband does not mean you can have carnal knowledge
by force[,] threat or intimidation or by depriving your wife reason,
a grave abuse of authority, I don't know how that cannot apply. Di
ba yung, or putting an instrument into the, yun ang sinasabi ko
lang, it is not meant to have another classification of rape. It is all
the same definition x x x.
xxxx
HON.ROCO: What is 266-F? x x x. Now if we can retain 266-F x
x x, we can say that this rule is implicit already in the first
89
proviso. It implies na there is an instance when a husband can
be charged [with] rape x x x.
HON. ROXAS: Otherwise, silent na.
HON. ROCO: Otherwise, we are silent na. So parang i-delete
natin ito. But it is understood that this rule of evidence is now
transport[ed], put into 266-F, the effect of pardon.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: We will retain this effect of
pardon. We will remove marital rape.
HON. ROCO: No, yun ang, oo we will remove this one on page 3
but we will retain the one on page 8, the effect of pardon. x x x
[I]t is inferred but we leave it because after all it is just a rule of
evidence. But I think we should understand that a husband
cannot beat at his wife to have sex. Di ha? I think that should be
made clear. x x x.
xxxx
HON. ROCO: x x x [W]e are not defining a crime of marital rape.
All we are saying is that if you're [the] legal husband, Jesus
Christ, don't beat up to have sex. I almost want, you are my wife,
why do you have to beat me up.
So, ganoon. So, if we both justify it that way in the Report as
inferred in proviso, I mean, we can face up, I hope, to the women
and they would understand that it is half achieved.
HON. ZAMORA: I think, Raul, as long as we understand that we
are not defining or creating a new crime but instead, we are just
defining a rule of evidence. x x x.
HON. ROCO: Then, in which case we may just want to clarify as
a rule of evidence the fact that he is husband is not, does not
negate.111
CHAIRMAN LARA: x x x We all agree on the substance of the
point in discussion. The only disagreement now is where to place
it. Let us clear this matter. There are two suggestions now on
marital rape. One is that it is rape if it is done with force or
intimidation or any of the circumstances that would define rape x
x x immaterial. The fact that the husband and wife are separated
does not come into the picture. So even if they are living under
one roof x x x for as long as the attendant circumstances of the
traditional rape is present, then that is rape.112
PRESIDING OFFICER ANGARA-CASTILLO: Mr. Chairman, x x
x [t]his provision on marital rape, it does not actually change the
meaning of rape. It merely erases the doubt in anybody's mind,
whether or not rape can indeed be committed by the husband
against the wife. So the bill really says, you having been married
to one another is not a legal impediment. So I don't really think
there is any need to change the concept of rape as defined
presently under the revised penal code. This do[es] not actually
add anything to the definition of rape. It merely says, it is merely
clarificatory. That if indeed the wife has evidence to show that
she was really brow beaten, or whatever or forced or intimidated
into having sexual intercourse against her will, then the crime of
rape has been committed against her by the husband,
notwithstanding the fact that they have been legally married. It
does not change anything at all, Mr. Chairman.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: Yes, I think, there is no
change on this x x x.113
The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine jurisdiction is
further affirmed by R.A. No. 9262, 114 which regards rape within
marriage as a form of sexual violence that may be committed by
a man against his wife within or outside the family abode, viz:
Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a
series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is
his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person

has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has
a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or
is likely to result in. physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily
or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in
nature, committed against a woman or her child. It
includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of
lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child
as a sex object, making demeaning and
sexually suggestive remarks, physically
attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body,
forcing her/him to watch obscene publications
and indecent shows or forcing the woman or
her child to do indecent acts and/or make films
thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to
live in the conjugal home or sleep together in
the same room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the
victim to engage in any sexual activity by
force, threat of force, physical or other harm or
threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
Statistical figures confirm the above characterization. Emotional
and other forms of non-personal violence are the most common
type of spousal violence accounting for 23% incidence among
ever-married women. One in seven ever-married women
experienced physical violence by their husbands while eight
percent (8%) experienced sexual violence.115
IV. Refutation of the accused-appellant's arguments
The crux of the accused-appellant's plea for acquittal mirrors the
irrevocable implied consent theory. In his appeal brief before the
CA, he posits that the two incidents of sexual intercourse, which
gave rise to the criminal charges for rape, were theoretically
consensual, obligatory even, because he and the victim, KKK,
were a legally married and cohabiting couple. He argues that
consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting husband
and wife unless the contrary is proved.
The accused-appellant further claims that this case should be
viewed and treated differently from ordinary rape cases and that
the standards for determining the presence of consent or lack
thereof must be adjusted on the ground that sexual community is
a mutual right and obligation between husband and wife.116
The contentions failed to muster legal and rational merit.
The ancient customs and ideologies from which the irrevocable
implied consent theory evolved have already been superseded
by modem global principles on the equality of rights between
men and women and respect for human dignity established in
various international conventions, such as the CEDAW. The
Philippines, as State Party to the CEDAW, recognized that a
change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of
women in society and in the family is needed to achieve full
equality between them. Accordingly, the country vowed to take
all appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural
patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving
the elimination of prejudices, customs and all other practices
which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of
either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and
women.117 One of such measures is R.A. No 8353 insofar as it
eradicated the archaic notion that marital rape cannot exist
because a husband has absolute proprietary rights over his
90
wife's body and thus her consent to every act of sexual intimacy
with him is always obligatory or at least, presumed.
Another important international instrument on gender equality is
the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women, which was Promulgated118 by the UN General Assembly
subsequent to the CEDA W. The Declaration, in enumerating the
forms of gender-based violence that constitute acts of
discrimination against women, identified 'marital rape' as a
species of sexual violence, viz:
Article 1
For the purposes of this Declaration, the term "violence against
women" means any act of gender-based violence that results in,
or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or
suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in
private life.
Article 2
Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but
not be limited to, the following:
(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the
family, including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the
household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital
mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-
spousal violence and violence related to
exploitation;119 (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual
violence, exists within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife
without her consent or against her will commits sexual violence
upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDA W
and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act
as rape under R.A. No. 8353.
A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled
her to be. A husband who has sexual intercourse with his wife is
not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a marital consortium
with a fellow human being with dignity equal 120 to that he accords
himself. He cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by
coercing her to engage in a sexual act without her full and free
consent. Surely, the Philippines cannot renege on its
international commitments and accommodate conservative yet
irrational notions on marital activities121 that have lost their
relevance in a progressive society.
It is true that the Family Code, 122 obligates the spouses to love
one another but this rule sanctions affection and sexual intimacy,
as expressions of love, that are both spontaneous and
mutual123 and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force
or coercion.
Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy
between a husband and wife excludes cruelty and coercion.
Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and oneness. It is a
gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a deep
sense of spiritual communion. It is a function which enlivens the
hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family
relations. It is an expressive interest in each other's feelings at a
time it is needed by the other and it can go a long way in
deepening marital relationship.124 When it is egoistically utilized
to despoil marital union in order to advance a felonious urge for
coitus by force, violence or intimidation, the Court will step in to
protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and protect our laws
and State policies. Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved by
his indifferent or uninterested wife's absolute refusal to engage in
sexual intimacy may legally seek the court's intervention to
declare her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill an essential
marital obligation.125 But he cannot and should not demand
sexual intimacy from her coercively or violently.
Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital
rape cases in terms of the elements that constitute the crime and

in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal protection
clause. The Constitutional right to equal protection of the
laws126 ordains that similar subjects should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminate against others; no person or class of persons shall
be denied the same protection of laws, which is enjoyed, by
other persons or other classes in like circumstances.127
As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A.
No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as traditionally known; (b) sexual
assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the victim is the
perpetrator's own spouse. The single definition for all three forms
of the crime shows that the law does not distinguish between
rape committed in wedlock and those committed without a
marriage. Hence, the law affords protection to women raped by
their husband and those raped by any other man alike.
The posture advanced by the accused-appellant arbitrarily
discriminates against married rape victims over unmarried rape
victims because it withholds from married women raped by their
husbands the penal redress equally granted by law to all rape
victims.
Further, the Court adheres to and hereby adopts the rationale in
Liberta in rejecting the argument akin to those raised by herein
accused-appellant. A marriage license should not be viewed as a
license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A
married woman has the same right to control her own body, as
does an unmarried woman.128 She can give or withhold her
consent to a sexual intercourse with her husband and he cannot
unlawfully wrestle such consent from her in case she refuses.
Lastly, the human rights of women include their right to have
control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters related
to their sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health, free
of coercion, discrimination and violence.129 Women do not divest
themselves of such right by contracting marriage for the simple
reason that human rights are inalienable.130
In fine, since the law does not separately categorize marital rape
and non-marital rape nor provide for different definition or
elements for either, the Court, tasked to interpret and apply what
the law dictates, cannot trudge the forbidden sphere of judicial
legislation and unlawfully divert from what the law sets forth.
Neither can the Court frame distinct or stricter evidentiary rules
for marital rape cases as it would inequitably burden its victims
and unreasonably and irrationally classify them differently from
the victims of non-marital rape.
Indeed, there exists no legal or rational reason for the Court to
apply the law and the evidentiary rules on rape any differently if
the aggressor is the woman's own legal husband. The elements
and quantum of proof that support a moral certainty of guilt in
rape cases should apply uniformly regardless of the legal
relationship between the accused and his accuser.
Thus, the Court meticulously reviewed the present case in
accordance with the established legal principles and evidentiary
policies in the prosecution and resolution of rape cases and
found that no reversible error can be imputed to the conviction
meted the accused-appellant.
The evidence for the prosecution was
based on credible witnesses who gave
equally credible testimonies
In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the
credibility of the victim. Hence, the strict mandate that all courts
must examine thoroughly the testimony of the offended party.
While the accused in a rape case may be convicted solely on the
testimony of the complaining witness, courts are, nonetheless,
duty-bound to establish that their reliance on the victim's
testimony is justified. Courts must ensure that the testimony is
credible, convincing, and otherwise consistent with human
nature. If the testimony of the complainant meets the test of
credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.131
91
It is settled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility
of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to the highest
respect. This is in view of its inimitable opportunity to directly
observe the witnesses and their deportment, conduct and
attitude, especially during cross-examination. Thus, unless it is
shown that its evaluation was tainted with arbitrariness or certain
facts of substance and value have been plainly overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied, the same will not be disturbed on
appeal.132
After approximating the perspective of the trial court thru a
meticulous scrutiny of the entire records of the trial proceedings
and the transcript of each witnesses' testimony, the Court found
no justification to disturb its findings.
Rather, the Court observed that KKK and her testimony were
both credible and spontaneous. Hailed to the witness stand on
six separate occasions, KKK never wavered neither did her
statements vacillate between uncertainty and certitude. She
remained consistent, categorical, straightforward, and candid
during the rigorous cross-examination and on rebuttal
examination, she was able to convincingly explain and debunk
the allegations of the defense.
She vividly recounted how the accused-appellant forced her to
have sex with him despite her refusal on October 16, 1998. He
initially ordered her to sleep beside him in their conjugal bed by
violently throwing the cot where she was resting. In order not to
aggravate his temper, KKK obeyed. On the bed, he insinuated
for them to have sex. When she rejected his advances due to
abdominal pain and headache, his request for intimacy
transformed into a stubborn demand. Unyielding, KKK held her
panties but the accused-appellant forcibly pulled them down. The
tug caused the small clothing to tear apart. She reiterated that
she was not feeling well and begged him to stop. But no amount
of resistance or begging subdued him. He flexed her two legs
apart, gripped her hands, mounted her, rested his own legs on
hers and inserted his penis into her vagina. She continued
pleading but he never desisted.133
Her accurate recollection of the second rape incident on October
1 7, 1998 is likewise unmistakable. After the appalling episode in
the conjugal bedroom the previous night, KKK decided to sleep
in the children's bedroom. While her daughters were fixing the
beddings, the accused-appellant barged into the room and
berated her for refusing to go with him to their conjugal bedroom.
When KKK insisted to stay in the children's bedroom, the
accused-appellant got angry and pulled her up. MMM's attempt
to pacify the accused-appellant further enraged him. He
reminded them that as the head of the family he could do
whatever he wants with his wife. To demonstrate his role as
patriarch, he ordered the children to go out of the room and
thereafter proceeded to force KKK into sexual intercourse. He
forcibly pulled down her short pants and panties as KKK begged
"Dont do that to me, my body is still aching and also my
abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do. I cannot
withstand sex."134 But her pleas fell on deaf ears. The accused-
appellant removed his shorts and briefs, spread KKK's legs
apart, held her hands, mounted her and inserted his penis into
her vagina. After gratifying himself, he got dressed, left the room
as he chuckled: "Its nice, that is what you deserve because you
are [a] flirt or fond of sex."135
Entrenched is the rule that in the prosecution of rape cases, the
essential element that must be proved is the absence of the
victim's consent to the sexual congress.136
Under the law, consent is absent when: (a) it was wrestled from
the victim by force, threat or intimidation, fraudulent
machinations or grave abuse of authority; or (b) the victim is
incapable of giving free and voluntary consent because he/she is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious or that the offended
party is under 12 years of age or is demented.
Contrary to the accused-appellant's asseverations, KKK's
consent was wrestled from her through force and intimidation
both of which were established beyond moral certainty by the
prosecution through the pertinent testimony of KKK, viz:
 92

On the October 16, 1998 rape incident: xxxx

(Direct Examination) Q Was your husband able to consummate his desire?

ATTY. LARGO: xxxx

Q So, while you were already lying on the bed together with your
husband, do you remember what happened?
A He lie down beside me and asked me to have sex with him.
Q How did he manifest that he wanted to have sex with you?
A He put his hand on my lap and asked me to have sex with him
but I warded off his hand.
Q Can you demonstrate to this Court how did he use his hand?
A Yes. "witness demonstrating on how the accused used his
finger by touching or knocking her lap which means that he
wanted to have sex."
Q So, what did you do after that?
A I warded off his hand and refused because I was not feeling
well. (at this juncture the witness is sobbing)
Q So, what did your husband do when you refused him to have
sex with you?
A He insisted and he pulled my pantie forcibly, that is why my
pantie [sic] was tom.
A Yes, sir, because I cannot do anything.137
(Cross-Examination)
ATTY. AMARGA;
Q Every time you have sex with your husband it was your
husband normally remove your panty?
A Yes, Sir.
Q It was not unusual for your husband then to remove your
panty because according to you he normally do that if he have
sex with you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And finally according to you your husband have sex with you?
A Yes, Sir because he forcibly used me in spite of holding my
panty because I don't want to have sex with him at that time.
Q You did not spread your legs at that time when he removed
your panty?
A Yes, Sir.

Q Why, what did you do when he started to pull your pantie [sic]? Q Meaning, your position of your legs was normal during that
time?
A I resisted and tried to hold my pantie [sic] but I failed, because
he is so strong. A I tried to resist by not flexing my legs.

xx xx xxxx

Q So, when your pantie [sic] was tom by your husband, what Q At that time when your husband allegedly removed your panty
else did he do? he also remove your nightgown?

A He flexed my two legs and rested his two legs on my legs. A No, Sir.

Q So after that what else did he do? Q And he did pull out your duster [sic] towards your face?

A He succeeded in having sex with me because he held my two A He raised my duster [sic] up.
hands no matter how I wrestled but I failed because he is
stronger than me.
Q In other words your face was covered when he raised your
duster [sic]?
COURT: Make it of record that the witness is sobbing while she
is giving her testimony.
A No, only on the breast level.138
ATTY. LARGO: (To the witness cont'ng.)
On the October 17, 1998 rape incident:
Q So, what did you do when your husband already stretched
your two legs and rode on you and held your two hands? (Direct Examination)

A I told him, "don't do that because I'm not feeling well and my
whole body is aching."
Q How did you say that to your husband?
A I told him, "don't do that to me because I'm not feeling well."
ATTY. LARGO
Q So, after your children went out of the room, what transpired?
A He successfully having sex with me because he pulled my
short pant and pantie forcible.

Q Did you say that in the manner you are saying now? Q So, what did you say when he forcibly pulled your short and
pantie?
xxxx

A I shouted when I uttered that words.


A I told him, "don't do that to me, my body is still aching and also
my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do. I
cannot withstand sex."
Q So, what happened to your short when he forcibly pulled it
down?
A It was tom.
Q And after your short and pantie was pulled down by your
husband, what did he do?
A He also removed his short and brief and flexed my two legs
and mounted on me and succeeded in having sex with me.139
The accused-appellant forced his wife when he knowingly
overpowered her by gripping her hands, flexing her legs and
then resting his own legs thereon in order to facilitate the
consummation of his much-desired non-consensual sexual
intercourse.
Records also show that the accused-appellant employed
sufficient intimidation upon KKK. His actuations prior to the
actual moment of the felonious coitus revealed that he imposed
his distorted sense of moral authority on his wife. He furiously
demanded for her to lay with him on the bed and thereafter
coerced her to indulge his sexual craving.
The fury the accused-appellant exhibited when KKK refused to
sleep with him on their bed, when she insisted to sleep in the
children's bedroom and the fact that he exercises dominance
over her as husband all cowed KKK into submission.
The fact that KKK voluntarily went with the accused-appellant to
their conjugal bedroom on October 16, 1998 cannot be stretched
to mean that she consented to the forced sexual intercourse that
ensued. The accused-appellant was KKK's husband and hence
it was customary for her to sleep in the conjugal bedroom. No
consent can be deduced from such act of KKK because at that
juncture there were no indications that sexual intercourse was
about to take place. The issue of consent was still irrelevant
since the act for which the same is legally required did not exist
yet or at least unclear to the person from whom the consent was
desired. The significant point when consent must be given is at
that time when it is clear to the victim that her aggressor is
soliciting sexual congress. In this case, that point is when the
accused-appellant tapped his fingers on her lap, a gesture KKK
comprehended to be an invitation for a sexual intercourse, which
she refused.
Resistance, medical certificate and blood traces.
We cannot give credence to the accused-appellant's argument
that KKK should have hit him to convey that she was resisting
his sexual onslaught. Resistance is not an element of rape and
the law does not impose upon the victim the burden to prove
resistance140 much more requires her to raise a specific kind
thereof.
At any rate, KKK put up persistent, audible and intelligible
resistance for the accused-appellant to recognize that she
seriously did not assent to a sexual congress. She held on to her
panties to prevent him from undressing her, she refused to bend
her legs and she repeatedly shouted and begged for him to stop.
Moreover, as an element of rape, force or intimidation need not
be irresistible; it may be just enough to bring about the desired
result. What is necessary is that the force or intimidation be
sufficient to consummate the purpose that the accused had in
mind141 or is of such a degree as to impel the defenseless and
hapless victim to bow into submission.142
Contrary to the accused-appellant's allusions, the absence of
blood traces in KKK's panties or the lack of a medical certificate
do not negate rape. It is not the presence or absence of blood on
the victim's underwear that determines the fact of
93
rape143 inasmuch as a medical certificate is dispensable
evidence that is not necessary to prove rape. 144These details do
not pertain to the elements that produce the gravamen of the
offense that is -sexual intercourse with a woman against her will
or without her consent.145
The accused-appellant harps on the acquittal ruling in People v.
Godoy,146 the evidentiary circumstances of which are, however,
disparate from those in the present case. In Godoy, the
testimony of the complainant was inherently weak, inconsistent,
and was controverted by the prosecution's medico-legal expert
witness who stated that force was not applied based on the
position of her hymenal laceration. This led the Court to conclude
that the absence of any sign of physical violence on the victim's
body is an indication of consent.147 Here, however, KKK's
testimony is, as discussed earlier, credible, spontaneous and
forthright.
The corroborative testimonies of
MMM and OOO are worthy of credence.
The accused-appellant's assertion that MMM and OOO's
testimonies lacked probative value as they did not witness the
actual rape is bereft of merit. It must be stressed that rape is
essentially committed in relative isolation, thus, it is usually only
the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced
sexual intercourse.148 Hence, the probative value of MMM and
OOO's testimonies rest not on whether they actually witnessed
the rape but on whether their declarations were in harmony with
KKK's narration of the circumstances, preceding, subsequent to
and concurrent with, the rape incidents.
MMM and OOO's testimonies substantiated significant points in
KKK's narration. MMM heard KKK shouting and crying: "Eddie,
don’t do that to me, have pity on me" 149 on the night of October
16, 1998 shortly after KKK and the accused-appellant went to
their conjugal bedroom. When MMM went upstairs to check on
her mother, the accused-appellant admonished her for meddling.
Frustrated to aid her mother who persistently cried, MMM kicked
the door so hard the accused-appellant was prompted to open it
and rebuke MMM once more. OOO heard all these commotion
from the room downstairs.
MMM then saw her mother crouched on the bed, crying, with her
hair disheveled while her tom panty lay on the floor. After a brief
struggle with the accused-appellant, MMM and KKK were finally
able to escape and retreat to the children's bedroom where KKK
narrated to her daughters: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast;
he forced me to have sex with him when I'm not feeling well. "
KKK gave a similar narration to MMM and OOO the following
night after the accused-appellant barged inside the children's
bedroom. The couple had an argument and when MMM tried to
interfere, the accused-appellant ordered her and OOO to get out
after bragging that he can have sex with his wife even in front of
the children because he is the head of the family. The girls then
stayed by the staircase where they afterwards heard their
mother helplessly crying and shouting for the accused-appellant
to stop.
Indeed, the testimonies of KKK, MMM and OOO coherently
depicted that the accused-appellant, through the use of force
and intimidation, had non-consensual and forced carnal
knowledge of his wife, KKK on the nights of October 16 and 17,
1998.
KKK's helpless screams and pleas from inside the bedroom
coupled with her verbal and physical resistance were clear
manifestations of coercion. Her appearance when MMM saw her
on the bed after the accused appellant opened the door on
October 16, 1998, her conduct towards the accused-appellant on
her way out of the room, and her categorical outcry to her
children after the two bedroom episodes - all generate the
conclusion that the sexual acts that occurred were against her
will.

Failure to immediately report to the
police authorities, if satisfactorily
explained, is not fatal to the
credibility of a witness.
The testimonies of KKK and her daughters cannot be discredited
merely because they failed to report the rape incidents to the
police authorities or that KKK belatedly filed the rape charges.
Delay or vacillation by the victims in reporting sexual assaults
does not necessarily impair their credibility if such delay is
satisfactorily explained.150
At that time, KKK and her daughters were not aware that a
husband forcing his wife to submit to sexual intercourse is
considered rape. In fact, KKK only found out that she could sue
his husband for rape when Prosecutor Benjamin Tabique, Jr.
(Prosecutor Tabique) told her about it when she filed the
separate charges for grave threats and physical injuries against
the accused-appellant.151
It must be noted that the incidents occurred a year into the
effectivity of R.A. No. 8353 abolishing marital exemption in rape
cases hence it is understandable that it was not yet known to a
layman as opposed to legal professionals like Prosecutor
Tabique. In addition, fear of reprisal thru social humiliation which
is the common factor that deter rape victims from reporting the
crime to the authorities is more cumbersome in marital rape
cases. This is in view of the popular yet outdated belief that it is
the wife's absolute obligation to submit to her husband's carnal
desires. A husband raping his own wife is often dismissed as a
peculiar occurrence or trivialized as simple domestic trouble.
Unfamiliarity with or lack of knowledge of the law criminalizing
marital rape, the stigma and public scrutiny that could have
befallen KKK and her family had the intervention of police
authorities or even the neighbors been sought, are acceptable
explanations for the failure or delay in reporting the subject rape
incidents.
The victim -S testimony on the
witness stand rendered
unnecessary the presentation of her
complaint-affidavit as evidence.
The failure of the prosecution to present KKK's complaint-
affidavit for rape is not fatal in view of the credible, candid and
positive testimony of KKK on the witness stand. Testimonial
evidence carries more weight than the affidavit since it
underwent the rudiments of a direct, cross, re-direct and re-cross
examinations. Affidavits or statements taken ex parte are
generally considered incomplete and inaccurate. Thus, by
nature, they are inferior to testimony given in court.152
Ill motive imputed to the victim
The ill motive, which the accused-appellant imputed to KKK,
does not inspire belief as it is riddled with loopholes generated
by incongruent and flimsy evidence. The prosecution was able to
establish that the ₱3 Million deposit in the spouses' bank
account was the proceeds of their loan from the Bank of
Philippine Islands (BPI). Exhibit J, which is a BPI ML instruction
sheet dated October 31, 1996 in the amount of ₱3,149,840.63 is
the same amount the accused-appellant claimed to have
entrusted to her wife. Although the accused-appellant denied
being aware of such loan, he admitted that approximately ₱3
Million was spent for the construction of their house. These
pieces of evidence effectively belie the accused appellant's
allegation that KKK could not account for the money deposited in
the bank.153
Anent, KKK's alleged extra-marital affairs, the accused-appellant
failed to explain how Bebs could be his wife KKK when the letter-
sender greeted Bebs a "happy birthday" on October 28 while
KKK's birthday is June 23. The accused-appellant also did not
present Bebs herself, being a more competent witness to the
existence of the alleged love letters for KKK. He likewise failed,
despite promise to do so, to present the original copies of such
94
love letters neither did he substantiate KKK's supposed extra-
marital affairs by presenting witnesses who could corroborate his
claims. Further, the Court finds it unbelievable that an able man
would not have the temerity to confront his wife who has fooled
around with 10 men - some of whom he has even met. The
accused-appellant's erratic statements on the witness stand are
inconsistent with the theory of extra-marital romance making it
reasonable to infer that he merely made up those malicious
stories as a desperate ploy to extricate himself out of this legal
quandary.
At best, the basis of the alleged illicit affairs of KKK were the
accused-appellant's unfounded suspicions that hold no
evidentiary weight in law and thus incompetent to destroy KKK's
credibility and that of her testimony. In sum, the defense failed to
present sufficiently convincing evidence that KKK is a mere
vindictive wife who is harassing the accused-appellant with
fabricated rape charges.
Alibi
It must be stressed that in raising the irrevocable implied consent
theory as defense, the accused-appellant has essentially
admitted the facts of sexual intercourse embodied in the two
criminal informations for rape. This admission is inconsistent with
the defense of alibi and any discussion thereon will thus be
irrelevant.
At any rate, the courts a quo correctly rejected his alibi.
Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is
inherently frail and unreliable, but also because it is easy to
fabricate and difficult to check or rebut. It cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the accused by eyewitnesses who had
no improper motive to testify falsely.154
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not
only that he was at some other place at the time of the
commission of the crime, but also that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its
immediate vicinity. Physical impossibility refers not only to the
geographical distance between the place where the accused
was and the place where the crime was committed when the
crime transpired, but more importantly, the facility of access
between the two places.155
Even granting in arguendo that the accused-appellant had
indeed attended a fiesta in Dangcagan, Bukidnon or was hauling
com with Equia on the dates of commission of the crime, the
same will not easily exonerate him. The accused-appellant failed
to adduce clear and convincing evidence that it was physically
impossible for him to be at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City
at the time of the commission of the crime. Dangcagan,
Bukidnon can be traversed by about four or five hours from
Cagayan de Oro City, and even less by private vehicle which
was available to the accused appellant at any time.156 Thus, it
was not physically impossible for him to be at the situs criminis at
the dates and times when the two rape incidents were
committed.
Between the accused-appellant's alibi and denial, and the
positive identification and credible testimony of the victim, and
her two daughters, the Court must give weight to the latter,
especially in the absence of ill motive on their part to falsely
testify against the accused-appellant.
Conclusion
All told, the presumption of innocence endowed an accused-
appellant was sufficiently overcome by KKK's clear,
straightforward, credible, and truthful declaration that on two
separate occasions, he succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with her, without her consent and against her will. Evidence of
overwhelming force and intimidation to consummate rape is
extant from KKK's narration as believably corroborated by the
testimonies of MMM and OOO and the physical evidence of
KKK's tom panties and short pants. Based thereon, the reason

and conscience of the Court is morally certain that the accused-
appellant is guilty of raping his wife on the nights of October 16
and 17, 1998.
Penalties
The Court affirms the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for each
count of rape, meted upon the accused-appellant for being in
accord with Article 266-A in relation to 266-B of the RPC. Further,
he shall not be eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of R.A.
No. 9346, which states that "persons convicted of offenses
punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be
reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be
eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."157
The Court sustains the moral damages awarded in the amount
of ₱50,000.00. Moral damages are granted to rape victims
without need of proof other than the fact of rape under the
assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from the
experience she underwent.158
The award of civil indemnity is proper; it is mandatory upon the
finding that rape took place.1âwphi1 Considering that the crime
committed is simple rape, there being no qualifying
circumstances attendant in its commission, the appropriate
amount is ₱50,000.00159 and not ₱75,000.00 as awarded by the
RTC.
To serve as an example for public good and in order to deter a
similar form of domestic violence, an award of ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages is imperative.160
The damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum to be reckoned from the date of finality
of this judgment until fully paid.161
A Final Note
Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation because it is
an abhorrence to a woman's value and dignity as a human
being. It respects no time, place, age, physical condition or
social status. It can happen anywhere and it can happen to
anyone. Even, as shown in the present case, to a wife, inside
her time-honored fortress, the family home, committed against
her by her husband who vowed to be her refuge from cruelty.
The herein pronouncement is an affirmation to wives that our
rape laws provide the atonement they seek from their sexually
coercive husbands.
Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a
license to forcibly rape their wives. A husband does not own his
wife's body by reason of marriage. By marrying, she does not
divest herself of the human right to an exclusive autonomy over
her own body and thus, she can lawfully opt to give or withhold
her consent to marital coitus. A husband aggrieved by his wife's
unremitting refusal to engage in sexual intercourse cannot resort
to felonious force or coercion to make her yield. He can seek
succor before the Family Courts that can determine whether her
refusal constitutes psychological incapacity justifying an
annulment of the marriage.
Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the
spiritual and biological communion that achieves the marital
purpose of procreation. It entails mutual love and self-giving and
as such it contemplates only mutual sexual cooperation and
never sexual coercion or imposition.
The Court is aware that despite the noble intentions of the herein
pronouncement, menacing personalities may use this as a tool
to harass innocent husbands. In this regard, let it be stressed
that safeguards in the criminal justice system are in place to spot
and scrutinize fabricated or false marital rape complaints and
any person who institutes untrue and malicious charges will be
made answerable under the pertinent provisions of the RPC
and/or other laws.
95
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Decision dated
July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00353 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-
appellant Edgar Jumawan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of two (2) counts of RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, without eligibility for
parole. He is further ordered to pay the victim, KKK, the amounts
of PS0,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages,
and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of rape.
The award of damages shall earn legal interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
STATUTORY RAPE
G.R. No. 203086 June 11, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
JOSE DALAN y PALDINGAN, Appellant.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review the appeal, filed by appellant Jose Dalan, assailing
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 31,
2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04279. The CA affirmed the
Judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 64, Abatan,
Buguias, Benguet, which found the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of statutory rape.
In its Judgment dated December 3, 2009, the RTC convicted the
appellant of two counts of statutory rape. It ruled that the
prosecution was able to prove that the appellant inserted his
penis in AAA' s vagina on two occasions, namely, in December
2006 and on March 3, 2007. It added that AAA' s testimony was
corroborated by the medical findings of Dr. Sabrina Florendo.
The RTC further explained that AAA's mental retardation cannot
disqualify her as a witness, since she capably narrated the
details of the sexual abuses committed against her by the
appellant in 2006 and 2007.
Accordingly, the RTC sentenced the appellant to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the victim the
amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages, both for each count of statutory rape.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The CA ruled that
AAA positively identified the appellant asthe person who raped
her on two occasions. According to the CA, AAA was consistent
in her recollection of the details of the crime. It alsoadded that
AAA’s moderate mental retardation was sufficiently established
by the prosecution’s evidence. Finally, the RTC found the
appellant’s uncorroborated denial and alibi to be unmeritorious.
Our Ruling
We deny the appeal, but modify the designation of the crime
committed and the awarded indemnities.
For the charge of rape to prosper,the prosecution must prove
that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2)
he accomplished such act through force or intimidation, or when
she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when
she was under 12 years of age or was demented. 3 Carnal
knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape under
Article 266-A, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, as a
mental retardate is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act.
What need to be proven are the facts of sexual congress
between the accused and the victim, and the mental retardation
of the latter.4

In the present case, the prosecution established the elements of
rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. First, AAA positively identified the appellant as the
person who inserted his penis in her vaginain December 2006
and in March 2007; she never wavered in this identification.
Significantly, AAA’s claim of sexual intercourse had been
corroborated by the medical findings and testimony of Dr.
Florendo who testified that the markedattenuated hymen at 6
o’clock position was most probably caused by an erect penis,
while the absent hymen at the 4, 5 and 7 o’clock positions could
be caused by repeated sexual experience.
Second, the prosecution satisfactorily established the mental
condition of the victim. Dr. Ekid conducted a battery of tests to
determine the mental age, social maturity and emotional
condition of AAA. During trial, Dr. Ekid explained each test, and
how she arrived at her conclusions. Accordingly, she found AAA
to be suffering from moderate retardation, with a mental age of a
person four (4) years and seven (7) months old.
As the lower courts did, we are unpersuaded by the appellant’s
alibi that he was at a farm in Ca-ew, Bulalacao, during the two
rapes. Aside from being uncorroborated, we point out thatCa-ew
was just five (5) minutes away from the scene of the rape. In
short, the appellant miserably failed to show that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the places where AAA had
been sexually abused.
The Crime Committed
Article 266-A paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, provides:
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is
committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reasonor is
otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse
of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years
of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present; x x x
In the present case, the Information alleged that the victim was
"xxx a minor, being seventeen (17) years of age,or below
eighteen (18) years old at the time of the commission of the
crime, but mentally retarded with a mental age that equates to a
child of four (4) years and seven (7) months," and this
circumstance had been proven during trial. The RTC, however,
equated AAA’s mental retardation with dementia. It is settled that
carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape
as she is in the same class as a woman deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious.5 Our ruling in People v. Monticalvo6 on
this point is instructive:
The term "deprived of reason" has been construed to
encompass those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency
or retardation. The term "demented," on the other hand, means
having dementia, which Webster defines as mental deterioration;
also madness, insanity. Dementiahas also been defined in
Black’sLaw Dictionary as a "form of mental disorder in which
cognitive and intellectual functions of the mind are prominently
affected; x x x total recovery not possible since cerebral disease
is involved."Thus, a mental retardate can be classified as a
person "deprived of reason," not one who is "demented" and
carnal knowledge of a mental retardate is considered rape under
subparagraph (b), not subparagraph (d) of Article 266-A(1)of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. [Emphasis in the original]
96
Aside from erroneously equating AAA’s mental retardation with
dementia, the RTC further justified its conviction of the appellant
of statutory rape on account of the victim’s mental age. The
gravamen of the offense of statutory rape, as provided for in
Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, is the carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years
old. To convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the
prosecution must prove: first, the age of the complainant;
second, the identity of the accused; and last but not the least,
the carnal knowledge between the accused and the
complainant.7
In the present case, it is not disputed that AAA was already 17
years old when she was raped.1âwphi1 In People v.
Butiong,8 we held that carnal knowledge of a female mental
retardate with the mental age below 12 years of ageis
considered as rape of a woman deprived of reason, thus:
It should no longer be debatable that rape of a mental retardate
falls under paragraph 1(b), of Article 266-A, x x x, because the
provision refers to a rape of a female "deprived of reason," a
phrase that refers to mental abnormality, deficiency or
retardation.
We are not unaware that there have been cases 9 where the
Court stated that sexual intercourse with a mental retardate
constitutes statutory rape. Nonetheless, the Court in these cases
affirmed the accused’s conviction for simple rape despite a
finding that the victim was a mental retardate with a mental age
of a person less than 12 years old.
Based on these discussions, we hold that the term statutory rape
should only be confined to situations where the victim of rape is
a person less than 12 years of age. If the victim of rape is a
person with mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation,the
crime committed is simple rape under Article 266-A, paragraph
(1)(b) asshe is considered "deprived of reason" notwithstanding
that her mental age isequivalent to that of a person under 12. In
short, carnal knowledge with a mental retardate whose mental
age is that of a person below 12 years, while akinto statutory
rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d), should still be
designated as simple rape under paragraph 1(b). At any rate,
proof of force, threat or intimidation is dispensed with in both
statutory rape and rape with a person who is deprived of reason.
With respect to the awarded indemnities, we further direct the
appellant to pay the victim ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages to
set a public example and to protect hapless individuals from
sexual molestation. We also impose a 6% interest on all the
monetary awards for damages to be reckoned from the date of
finality of this decision until fully paid.10
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the CA decision dated
January 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04279 is AFFIRMED
with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(a) the appellant is found guilty of simple rape under
Article 266-A(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended;
(b) he is further ordered to pay AAA ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and
(c) he is ordered to pay interest, at the rate of 6% per
annum on the award of civil indemnity, moral damages,
and exemplary damages from finality of judgment until
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
R.A. 9262
Republic Act No. 9262 March 08, 2004
AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND
THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE

MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES
THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Short Title.- This Act shall be known as the "Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004".
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.- It is hereby declared that the
State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees
full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need
to protect the family and its members particularly women and
children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and
security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address
violence committed against women and children in keeping with
the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution
and the Provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the convention on the Elimination of all forms of
discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the
Child and other international human rights instruments of which
the Philippines is a party.
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers
to any act or a series of acts committed by any person
against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against
a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or with whom he has a common
child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which
result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It
includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that
include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is
sexual in nature, committed against a woman
or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of
lasciviousness, treating a woman or
her child as a sex object, making
demeaning and sexually suggestive
remarks, physically attacking the
sexual parts of the victim's body,
forcing her/him to watch obscene
publications and indecent shows or
forcing the woman or her child to do
indecent acts and/or make films
thereof, forcing the wife and
mistress/lover to live in the conjugal
home or sleep together in the same
room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to
cause the victim to engage in any
sexual activity by force, threat of
force, physical or other harm or threat
of physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or
omissions causing or likely to cause mental or
emotional suffering of the victim such as but
not limited to intimidation, harassment,
stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or
humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental
97
infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the
victim to witness the physical, sexual or
psychological abuse of a member of the family
to which the victim belongs, or to witness
pornography in any form or to witness abusive
injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted
deprivation of the right to custody and/or
visitation of common children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make
or attempt to make a woman financially
dependent which includes, but is not limited to
the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or
preventing the victim from engaging
in any legitimate profession,
occupation, business or activity,
except in cases wherein the other
spouse/partner objects on valid,
serious and moral grounds as defined
in Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation
of financial resources and the right to
the use and enjoyment of the
conjugal, community or property
owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money
or properties or solely controlling the
conjugal money or properties.
(b) "Battery" refers to an act of inflicting physical harm
upon the woman or her child resulting to the physical
and psychological or emotional distress.
(c) "Battered Woman Syndrome" refers to a
scientifically defined pattern of psychological and
behavioral symptoms found in women living in battering
relationships as a result of cumulative abuse.
(d) "Stalking" refers to an intentional act committed by a
person who, knowingly and without lawful justification
follows the woman or her child or places the woman or
her child under surveillance directly or indirectly or a
combination thereof.
(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the
parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or are romantically involved over time and on
a continuing basis during the course of the relationship.
A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization
between two individuals in a business or social context
is not a dating relationship.
(f) "Sexual relations" refers to a single sexual act which
may or may not result in the bearing of a common child.
(g) "Safe place or shelter" refers to any home or
institution maintained or managed by the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) or by any
other agency or voluntary organization accredited by
the DSWD for the purposes of this Act or any other
suitable place the resident of which is willing temporarily
to receive the victim.
(h) "Children" refers to those below eighteen (18) years
of age or older but are incapable of taking care of
themselves as defined under Republic Act No. 7610. As
used in this Act, it includes the biological children of the
victim and other children under her care.

SECTION 4. Construction.- This Act shall be liberally construed
to promote the protection and safety of victims of violence
against women and their children.
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their
Children.- The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child
physical harm;
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical
harm;
(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent
physical harm;
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or
her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her
child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct
which the woman or her child has the right to engage
in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or
her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or
threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against
the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to,
the following acts committed with the purpose or effect
of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's
movement or conduct:
(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving
the woman or her child of custody to her/his
family;
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the
woman or her children of financial support
legally due her or her family, or deliberately
providing the woman's children insufficient
financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the
woman or her child of a legal right;
(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any
legitimate profession, occupation, business or
activity or controlling the victim's own mon4ey
or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal
or common money, or properties;
(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on
oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or
decisions;
(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her
child to engage in any sexual activity which does not
constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical
harm, or through intimidation directed against the
woman or her child or her/his immediate family;
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless
conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or
causes substantial emotional or psychological distress
to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be
limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child
in public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside
the residence of the woman or her child;
98
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on
the property of the woman or her child against
her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal
belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets
of the woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or
violence;
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule
or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but
not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse,
and denial of financial support or custody of minor
children of access to the woman's child/children.
SECTION 6. Penalties.- The crime of violence against women
and their children, under Section 5 hereof shall be punished
according to the following rules:
(a) Acts falling under Section 5(a) constituting
attempted, frustrated or consummated parricide or
murder or homicide shall be punished in accordance
with the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
If these acts resulted in mutilation, it shall be punishable
in accordance with the Revised Penal Code; those
constituting serious physical injuries shall have the
penalty of prison mayor; those constituting less serious
physical injuries shall be punished by prision
correccional; and those constituting slight physical
injuries shall be punished by arresto mayor.
Acts falling under Section 5(b) shall be punished by
imprisonment of two degrees lower than the prescribed
penalty for the consummated crime as specified in the
preceding paragraph but shall in no case be lower than
arresto mayor.
(b) Acts falling under Section 5(c) and 5(d) shall be
punished by arresto mayor;
(c) Acts falling under Section 5(e) shall be punished by
prision correccional;
(d) Acts falling under Section 5(f) shall be punished by
arresto mayor;
(e) Acts falling under Section 5(g) shall be punished by
prision mayor;
(f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall
be punished by prision mayor.
If the acts are committed while the woman or child is
pregnant or committed in the presence of her child, the
penalty to be applied shall be the maximum period of
penalty prescribed in the section.
In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a)
pay a fine in the amount of not less than One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than three
hundred thousand pesos (300,000.00); (b) undergo
mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric
treatment and shall report compliance to the court.
SECTION 7. Venue.- The Regional Trial Court designated as a
Family Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over
cases of violence against women and their children under this
law. In the absence of such court in the place where the offense
was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court
where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the
option of the compliant.
 99

SECTION 8. Protection Orders.- A protection order is an order
issued under this act for the purpose of preventing further acts of
violence against a woman or her child specified in Section 5 of
this Act and granting other necessary relief. The relief granted
under a protection order serve the purpose of safeguarding the
victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victim's
daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim
to independently regain control over her life. The provisions of
the protection order shall be enforced by law enforcement
agencies. The protection orders that may be issued under this
Act are the barangay protection order (BPO), temporary
protection order (TPO) and permanent protection order (PPO).
The protection orders that may be issued under this Act shall
include any, some or all of the following reliefs:
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to
commit or committing, personally or through another,
any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing,
annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly;
(c) Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the
residence of the petitioner, regardless of ownership of
the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of
protecting the petitioner, or permanently where no
property rights are violated, and if respondent must
remove personal effects from the residence, the court
shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the
respondent has gathered his things and escort
respondent from the residence;
(i) Restitution for actual damages caused by the
violence inflicted, including, but not limited to, property
damage, medical expenses, childcare expenses and
loss of income;
(j) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to
provide petitioner may need; and
(k) Provision of such other forms of relief as the court
deems necessary to protect and provide for the safety
of the petitioner and any designated family or
household member, provided petitioner and any
designated family or household member consents to
such relief.
Any of the reliefs provided under this section shall be
granted even in the absence of a decree of legal
separation or annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage.
The issuance of a BPO or the pendency of an
application for BPO shall not preclude a petitioner from
applying for, or the court from granting a TPO or PPO.
SECTION 9. Who may file Petition for Protection Orders. – A
petition for protection order may be filed by any of the following:
(a) the offended party;
(b) parents or guardians of the offended party;

(c) ascendants, descendants or collateral relatives

(d) Directing the respondent to stay away from within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity;
petitioner and designated family or household member
at a distance specified by the court, and to stay away
from the residence, school, place of employment, or (d) officers or social workers of the DSWD or social
any specified place frequented by the petitioner and workers of local government units (LGUs);
any designated family or household member;
(e) police officers, preferably those in charge of women
(e) Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of and children's desks;
an automobile and other essential personal effects,
regardless of ownership, and directing the appropriate (f) Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad;
law enforcement officer to accompany the petitioner to
the residence of the parties to ensure that the petitioner
(g) lawyer, counselor, therapist or healthcare provider of
is safely restored to the possession of the automobile
the petitioner;
and other essential personal effects, or to supervise the
petitioner's or respondent's removal of personal
belongings; (h) At least two (2) concerned responsible citizens of
the city or municipality where the violence against
women and their children occurred and who has
(f) Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a
personal knowledge of the offense committed.
child/children to the petitioner;

SECTION 10. Where to Apply for a Protection Order. –

(g) Directing the respondent to provide support to the
Applications for BPOs shall follow the rules on venue under
woman and/or her child if entitled to legal support.
Section 409 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its
Notwithstanding other laws to the contrary, the court
implementing rules and regulations. An application for a TPO or
shall order an appropriate percentage of the income or
PPO may be filed in the regional trial court, metropolitan trial
salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly by the
court, municipal trial court, municipal circuit trial court with
respondent's employer for the same to be automatically
territorial jurisdiction over the place of residence of the petitioner:
remitted directly to the woman. Failure to remit and/or
Provided, however, That if a family court exists in the place of
withhold or any delay in the remittance of support to the
residence of the petitioner, the application shall be filed with that
woman and/or her child without justifiable cause shall
court.
render the respondent or his employer liable for indirect
contempt of court;
SECTION 11. How to Apply for a Protection Order. – The
application for a protection order must be in writing, signed and
(h) Prohibition of the respondent from any use or
verified under oath by the applicant. It may be filed as an
possession of any firearm or deadly weapon and order
independent action or as incidental relief in any civil or criminal
him to surrender the same to the court for appropriate
case the subject matter or issues thereof partakes of a violence
disposition by the court, including revocation of license
as described in this Act. A standard protection order application
and disqualification to apply for any license to use or
form, written in English with translation to the major local
possess a firearm. If the offender is a law enforcement
languages, shall be made available to facilitate applications for
agent, the court shall order the offender to surrender his
protections order, and shall contain, among other, the following
firearm and shall direct the appropriate authority to
information:
investigate on the offender and take appropriate action
on matter;
(a) names and addresses of petitioner and respondent;

(b) description of relationships between petitioner and
respondent;
(c) a statement of the circumstances of the abuse;
(d) description of the reliefs requested by petitioner as
specified in Section 8 herein;
(e) request for counsel and reasons for such;
(f) request for waiver of application fees until hearing;
and
(g) an attestation that there is no pending application for
a protection order in another court.
If the applicants is not the victim, the application must be
accompanied by an affidavit of the applicant attesting to (a) the
circumstances of the abuse suffered by the victim and (b) the
circumstances of consent given by the victim for the filling of the
application. When disclosure of the address of the victim will
pose danger to her life, it shall be so stated in the application. In
such a case, the applicant shall attest that the victim is residing
in the municipality or city over which court has territorial
jurisdiction, and shall provide a mailing address for purpose of
service processing.
An application for protection order filed with a court shall be
considered an application for both a TPO and PPO.
Barangay officials and court personnel shall assist applicants in
the preparation of the application. Law enforcement agents shall
also extend assistance in the application for protection orders in
cases brought to their attention.
SECTION 12. Enforceability of Protection Orders. – All TPOs
and PPOs issued under this Act shall be enforceable anywhere
in the Philippines and a violation thereof shall be punishable with
a fine ranging from Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) to Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and/or imprisonment of six (6)
months.
SECTION 13. Legal Representation of Petitioners for Protection
Order. – If the woman or her child requests in the applications for
a protection order for the appointment of counsel because of
lack of economic means to hire a counsel de parte, the court
shall immediately direct the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) to
represent the petitioner in the hearing on the application. If the
PAO determines that the applicant can afford to hire the services
of a counsel de parte, it shall facilitate the legal representation of
the petitioner by a counsel de parte. The lack of access to family
or conjugal resources by the applicant, such as when the same
are controlled by the perpetrator, shall qualify the petitioner to
legal representation by the PAO.
However, a private counsel offering free legal service is not
barred from representing the petitioner.
SECTION 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May
Issue and How. - Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the
protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the
perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a)
and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives
applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the
applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the
basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to
act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted
upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued
by a Barangay Kagawad the order must be accompanied by an
attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong
Barangay was unavailable at the time for the issuance of the
BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately
after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or
Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on
the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect is
personal service.
100
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in
any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.
SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. – Temporary
Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to the protection order issued by
the court on the date of filing of the application after ex
parte determination that such order should be issued. A court
may grant in a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in
this Act and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall
schedule a hearing on the issuance of a PPO prior to or on the
date of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall order the
immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent by the
court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement
agents for the service. The TPO shall include notice of the date
of the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO.
SECTION 16. Permanent Protection Orders. – Permanent
Protection Order (PPO) refers to protection order issued by the
court after notice and hearing.
Respondents non-appearance despite proper notice, or his lack
of a lawyer, or the non-availability of his lawyer shall not be a
ground for rescheduling or postponing the hearing on the merits
of the issuance of a PPO. If the respondents appears without
counsel on the date of the hearing on the PPO, the court shall
appoint a lawyer for the respondent and immediately proceed
with the hearing. In case the respondent fails to appear despite
proper notice, the court shall allow ex parte presentation of the
evidence by the applicant and render judgment on the basis of
the evidence presented. The court shall allow the introduction of
any history of abusive conduct of a respondent even if the same
was not directed against the applicant or the person for whom
the applicant is made.
The court shall, to the extent possible, conduct the hearing on
the merits of the issuance of a PPO in one (1) day. Where the
court is unable to conduct the hearing within one (1) day and the
TPO issued is due to expire, the court shall continuously extend
or renew the TPO for a period of thirty (30) days at each
particular time until final judgment is issued. The extended or
renewed TPO may be modified by the court as may be
necessary or applicable to address the needs of the applicant.
The court may grant any, some or all of the reliefs specified in
Section 8 hereof in a PPO. A PPO shall be effective until revoked
by a court upon application of the person in whose favor the
order was issued. The court shall ensure immediate personal
service of the PPO on respondent.
The court shall not deny the issuance of protection order on the
basis of the lapse of time between the act of violence and the
filing of the application.
Regardless of the conviction or acquittal of the respondent, the
Court must determine whether or not the PPO shall become
final. Even in a dismissal, a PPO shall be granted as long as
there is no clear showing that the act from which the order might
arise did not exist.
SECTION 17. Notice of Sanction in Protection Orders. – The
following statement must be printed in bold-faced type or in
capital letters on the protection order issued by the Punong
Barangay or court:
"VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW."
SECTION 18. Mandatory Period For Acting on Applications For
Protection Orders – Failure to act on an application for a
protection order within the reglementary period specified in the
previous section without justifiable cause shall render the official
or judge administratively liable.
SECTION 19. Legal Separation Cases. – In cases of legal
separation, where violence as specified in this Act is alleged,
Article 58 of the Family Code shall not apply. The court shall
proceed on the main case and other incidents of the case as
soon as possible. The hearing on any application for a protection

order filed by the petitioner must be conducted within the
mandatory period specified in this Act.
SECTION 20. Priority of Application for a Protection Order. – Ex
parte and adversarial hearings to determine the basis of
applications for a protection order under this Act shall have
priority over all other proceedings. Barangay officials and the
courts shall schedule and conduct hearings on applications for a
protection order under this Act above all other business and, if
necessary, suspend other proceedings in order to hear
applications for a protection order.
SECTION 21. Violation of Protection Orders. – A complaint for a
violation of a BPO issued under this Act must be filed directly
with any municipal trial court, metropolitan trial court, or
municipal circuit trial court that has territorial jurisdiction over the
barangay that issued the BPO. Violation of a BPO shall be
punishable by imprisonment of thirty (30) days without prejudice
to any other criminal or civil action that the offended party may
file for any of the acts committed.
A judgement of violation of a BPO ma be appealed according to
the Rules of Court. During trial and upon judgment, the trial court
may motu proprio issue a protection order as it deems necessary
without need of an application.
Violation of any provision of a TPO or PPO issued under this Act
shall constitute contempt of court punishable under Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court, without prejudice to any other criminal or civil
action that the offended party may file for any of the acts
committed.
SECTION 22. Applicability of Protection Orders to Criminal
Cases. – The foregoing provisions on protection orders shall be
applicable in impliedly instituted with the criminal actions
involving violence against women and their children.
SECTION 23. Bond to Keep the Peace. – The Court may order
any person against whom a protection order is issued to give a
bond to keep the peace, to present two sufficient sureties who
shall undertake that such person will not commit the violence
sought to be prevented.
Should the respondent fail to give the bond as required, he shall
be detained for a period which shall in no case exceed six (6)
months, if he shall have been prosecuted for acts punishable
under Section 5(a) to 5(f) and not exceeding thirty (30) days, if
for acts punishable under Section 5(g) to 5(I).
The protection orders referred to in this section are the TPOs
and the PPOs issued only by the courts.
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections
5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts falling under
Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.
SECTION 25. Public Crime. – Violence against women and their
children shall be considered a public offense which may be
prosecuted upon the filing of a complaint by any citizen having
personal knowledge of the circumstances involving the
commission of the crime.
SECTION 26. Battered Woman Syndrome as a Defense. –
Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from
battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil
liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for
justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal
Code.
In the determination of the state of mind of the woman who was
suffering from battered woman syndrome at the time of the
commission of the crime, the courts shall be assisted by expert
psychiatrists/ psychologists.
101
SECTION 27. Prohibited Defense. – Being under the influence of
alcohol, any illicit drug, or any other mind-altering substance
shall not be a defense under this Act.
SECTION 28. Custody of children. – The woman victim of
violence shall be entitled to the custody and support of her
child/children. Children below seven (7) years old older but with
mental or physical disabilities shall automatically be given to the
mother, with right to support, unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise.
A victim who is suffering from battered woman syndrome shall
not be disqualified from having custody of her children. In no
case shall custody of minor children be given to the perpetrator
of a woman who is suffering from Battered woman syndrome.
SECTION 29. Duties of Prosecutors/Court Personnel. –
Prosecutors and court personnel should observe the following
duties when dealing with victims under this Act:
a) communicate with the victim in a language
understood by the woman or her child; and
b) inform the victim of her/his rights including legal
remedies available and procedure, and privileges for
indigent litigants.
SECTION 30. Duties of Barangay Officials and Law Enforcers. –
Barangay officials and law enforcers shall have the following
duties:
(a) respond immediately to a call for help or request for
assistance or protection of the victim by entering the
necessary whether or not a protection order has been
issued and ensure the safety of the victim/s;
(b) confiscate any deadly weapon in the possession of
the perpetrator or within plain view;
(c) transport or escort the victim/s to a safe place of
their choice or to a clinic or hospital;
(d) assist the victim in removing personal belongs from
the house;
(e) assist the barangay officials and other government
officers and employees who respond to a call for help;
(f) ensure the enforcement of the Protection Orders
issued by the Punong Barangy or the courts;
(g) arrest the suspected perpetrator wiithout a warrant
when any of the acts of violence defined by this Act is
occurring, or when he/she has personal knowledge that
any act of abuse has just been committed, and there is
imminent danger to the life or limb of the victim as
defined in this Act; and
(h) immediately report the call for assessment or
assistance of the DSWD, social Welfare Department of
LGUs or accredited non-government organizations
(NGOs).
Any barangay official or law enforcer who fails to report the
incident shall be liable for a fine not exceeding Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00) or whenever applicable criminal, civil or
administrative liability.
SECTION 31. Healthcare Provider Response to Abuse – Any
healthcare provider, including, but not limited to, an attending
physician, nurse, clinician, barangay health worker, therapist or
counselor who suspects abuse or has been informed by the
victim of violence shall:

(a) properly document any of the victim's physical,
emotional or psychological injuries;
(b) properly record any of victim's suspicions,
observations and circumstances of the examination or
visit;
(c) automatically provide the victim free of charge a
medical certificate concerning the examination or visit;
(d) safeguard the records and make them available to
the victim upon request at actual cost; and
(e) provide the victim immediate and adequate notice of
rights and remedies provided under this Act, and
services available to them.
SECTION 32. Duties of Other Government Agencies and
LGUs – Other government agencies and LGUs shall establish
programs such as, but not limited to, education and information
campaign and seminars or symposia on the nature, causes,
incidence and consequences of such violence particularly
towards educating the public on its social impacts.
It shall be the duty of the concerned government agencies and
LGU's to ensure the sustained education and training of their
officers and personnel on the prevention of violence against
women and their children under the Act.
SECTION 33. Prohibited Acts. – A Punong Barangay, Barangay
Kagawad or the court hearing an application for a protection
order shall not order, direct, force or in any way unduly influence
he applicant for a protection order to compromise or abandon
any of the reliefs sought in the application for protection under
this Act. Section 7 of the Family Courts Act of 1997 and Sections
410, 411, 412 and 413 of the Local Government Code of 1991
shall not apply in proceedings where relief is sought under this
Act.
Failure to comply with this Section shall render the official or
judge administratively liable.
SECTION 34. Persons Intervening Exempt from Liability. – In
every case of violence against women and their children as
herein defined, any person, private individual or police authority
or barangay official who, acting in accordance with law, responds
or intervenes without using violence or restraint greater than
necessary to ensure the safety of the victim, shall not be liable
for any criminal, civil or administrative liability resulting therefrom.
SECTION 35. Rights of Victims. – In addition to their rights under
existing laws, victims of violence against women and their
children shall have the following rights:
(a) to be treated with respect and dignity;
(b) to avail of legal assistance form the PAO of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) or any public legal
assistance office;
(c) To be entitled to support services form the DSWD
and LGUs'
(d) To be entitled to all legal remedies and support as
provided for under the Family Code; and
(e) To be informed of their rights and the services
available to them including their right to apply for a
protection order.
SECTION 36. Damages. – Any victim of violence under this Act
shall be entitled to actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary
damages.
102
SECTION 37. Hold Departure Order. – The court shall expedite
the process of issuance of a hold departure order in cases
prosecuted under this Act.
SECTION 38. Exemption from Payment of Docket Fee and
Other Expenses. – If the victim is an indigent or there is an
immediate necessity due to imminent danger or threat of danger
to act on an application for a protection order, the court shall
accept the application without payment of the filing fee and other
fees and of transcript of stenographic notes.
SECTION 39. Inter-Agency Council on Violence Against Women
and Their Children (IAC-VAWC). In pursuance of the
abovementioned policy, there is hereby established an Inter-
Agency Council on Violence Against Women and their children,
hereinafter known as the Council, which shall be composed of
the following agencies:
(a) Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD);
(b) National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women
(NCRFW);
(c) Civil Service Commission (CSC);
(d) Commission on Human rights (CHR)
(e) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC);
(f) Department of Justice (DOJ);
(g) Department of the Interior and Local Government
(DILG);
(h) Philippine National Police (PNP);
(i) Department of Health (DOH);
(j) Department of Education (DepEd);
(k) Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE); and
(l) National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
These agencies are tasked to formulate programs and projects
to eliminate VAW based on their mandates as well as develop
capability programs for their employees to become more
sensitive to the needs of their clients. The Council will also serve
as the monitoring body as regards to VAW initiatives.
The Council members may designate their duly authorized
representative who shall have a rank not lower than an assistant
secretary or its equivalent. These representatives shall attend
Council meetings in their behalf, and shall receive emoluments
as may be determined by the Council in accordance with existing
budget and accounting rules and regulations.
SECTION 40. Mandatory Programs and Services for Victims.
– The DSWD, and LGU's shall provide the victims temporary
shelters, provide counseling, psycho-social services and /or,
recovery, rehabilitation programs and livelihood assistance.
The DOH shall provide medical assistance to victims.
SECTION 41. Counseling and Treatment of Offenders. – The
DSWD shall provide rehabilitative counseling and treatment to
perpetrators towards learning constructive ways of coping with
anger and emotional outbursts and reforming their ways. When
necessary, the offender shall be ordered by the Court to submit
to psychiatric treatment or confinement.

SECTION 42. Training of Persons Involved in Responding to
Violence Against Women and their Children Cases. – All
agencies involved in responding to violence against women and
their children cases shall be required to undergo education and
training to acquaint them with:
a. the nature, extend and causes of violence against
women and their children;
b. the legal rights of, and remedies available to, victims
of violence against women and their children;
c. the services and facilities available to victims or
survivors;
d. the legal duties imposed on police officers to make
arrest and to offer protection and assistance; and
e. techniques for handling incidents of violence against
women and their children that minimize the likelihood of
injury to the officer and promote the safety of the victim
or survivor.
The PNP, in coordination with LGU's shall establish an education
and training program for police officers and barangay officials to
enable them to properly handle cases of violence against women
and their children.
SECTION 43. Entitled to Leave. – Victims under this Act shall be
entitled to take a paid leave of absence up to ten (10) days in
addition to other paid leaves under the Labor Code and Civil
Service Rules and Regulations, extendible when the necessity
arises as specified in the protection order.
Any employer who shall prejudice the right of the person under
this section shall be penalized in accordance with the provisions
of the Labor Code and Civil Service Rules and Regulations.
Likewise, an employer who shall prejudice any person for
assisting a co-employee who is a victim under this Act shall
likewise be liable for discrimination.
SECTION 44. Confidentiality. – All records pertaining to cases of
violence against women and their children including those in the
barangay shall be confidential and all public officers and
employees and public or private clinics to hospitals shall respect
the right to privacy of the victim. Whoever publishes or causes to
be published, in any format, the name, address, telephone
number, school, business address, employer, or other identifying
information of a victim or an immediate family member, without
the latter's consent, shall be liable to the contempt power of the
court.
Any person who violates this provision shall suffer the penalty of
one (1) year imprisonment and a fine of not more than Five
Hundred Thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
SECTION 45. Funding – The amount necessary to implement
the provisions of this Act shall be included in the annual General
Appropriations Act (GAA).
The Gender and Development (GAD) Budget of the mandated
agencies and LGU's shall be used to implement services for
victim of violence against women and their children.
SECTION 46. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – Within six
(6) months from the approval of this Act, the DOJ, the NCRFW,
the DSWD, the DILG, the DOH, and the PNP, and three (3)
representatives from NGOs to be identified by the NCRFW, shall
promulgate the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
this Act.
SECTION 47. Suppletory Application – For purposes of this Act,
the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws, shall have
suppletory application.
103
SECTION 48. Separability Clause. – If any section or provision
of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid, the other sections or
provisions shall not be affected.
SECTION 49. Repealing Clause – All laws, Presidential decrees,
executive orders and rules and regulations, or parts thereof,
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly.
SECTION 50. Effectivity – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15)
days from the date of its complete publication in at least two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.
G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013
JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE
JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children,
namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all
surnamed GARCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines
boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos- or 93 percent of a total
population of 93.3 million – adhering to the teachings of Jesus
Christ.1 Yet, the admonition for husbands to love their wives as
their own bodies just as Christ loved the church and gave
himself up for her2 failed to prevent, or even to curb, the
pervasiveness of violence against Filipino women. The National
Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) reported
that, for the years 2000-2003, "female violence comprised more
than 90o/o of all forms of abuse and violence and more than
90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's
intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners."3
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy
by women's groups, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and
Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It took
effect on March 27, 2004.4
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes
acts of violence against women and their children (VAWC)
perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e, husband; former
husband; or any person who has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom the woman has a common child. 5 The
law provides for protection orders from the barangay and the
courts to prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC; and
outlines the duties and responsibilities of barangay officials, law
enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social workers,
health care providers, and other local government officials in
responding to complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality
of R.A. 9262 as being violative of the equal protection and due
process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to
barangay officials.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent)
filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a verified
petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection
Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner),
pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical
abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a
result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of
deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support.7

Private respondent's claims
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34
years old and the former was eleven years her senior. They have
three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old, who is
the natural child of petitioner but whom private respondent
adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph
Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old.8
Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful
wife, whose life revolved around her husband. On the other
hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant,
controlling, and demands absolute obedience from his wife and
children. He forbade private respondent to pray, and deliberately
isolated her from her friends. When she took up law, and even
when she was already working part time at a law office,
petitioner trivialized her ambitions and prevailed upon her to just
stay at home. He was often jealous of the fact that his attractive
wife still catches the eye of some men, at one point threatening
that he would have any man eyeing her killed.9
Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with
a bank manager of Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City, who is the
godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner admitted to the affair
when private respondent confronted him about it in 2004. He
even boasted to the household help about his sexual relations
with said bank manager. Petitioner told private respondent,
though, that he was just using the woman because of their
accounts with the bank.10
Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private
respondent physically and emotionally wounded. In one of their
quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on both arms
and shook her with such force that caused bruises and
hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit private respondent
forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner
sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had
seen the text messages he sent to his paramour and whom he
blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and
slapped her many times. When private respondent decided to
leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay for fear that if
the latter leaves, petitioner would beat her up. Even the small
boys are aware of private respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-
old son said that when he grows up, he would beat up his father
because of his cruelty to private respondent.11
All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private
respondent to the brink of despair. On December 17, 2005, while
at home, she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. She was
found by her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the
house instead of taking her to the hospital. Private respondent
was hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time
petitioner never bothered to visit, nor apologized or showed pity
on her. Since then, private respondent has been undergoing
therapy almost every week and is taking anti-depressant
medications.12
When private respondent informed the management of
Robinson's Bank that she intends to file charges against the
bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing the
manager's job. He then packed his things and told private
respondent that he was leaving her for good. He even told
private respondent's mother, who lives with them in the family
home, that private respondent should just accept his extramarital
affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has not
sired a child with her.13
Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but
she is afraid that he would take her children from her and
deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had previously warned
her that if she goes on a legal battle with him, she would not get
a single centavo.14
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the
construction of deep wells. He is the President of three
corporations – 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill
Corporation, and J-Bros Trading Corporation – of which he and
private respondent are both stockholders. In contrast to the
104
absolute control of petitioner over said corporations, private
respondent merely draws a monthly salary of ₱20,000.00 from
one corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill Corporation.
Household expenses amounting to not less than ₱200,000.00 a
month are paid for by private respondent through the use of
credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same corporation
together with the bills for utilities.15
On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of
₱60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and enjoys
unlimited cash advances and other benefits in hundreds of
thousands of pesos from the corporations.16 After private
respondent confronted him about the affair, petitioner forbade
her to hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all the
businesses of the corporations are conducted, thereby depriving
her of access to full information about said businesses. Until the
filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not given private
respondent an accounting of the businesses the value of which
she had helped raise to millions of pesos.17
Action of the RTC of Bacolod City
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of
violence against the private respondent and her children exists
or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO18 on March 24, 2006
effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted hereunder:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from
the conjugal dwelling or family home within 24 hours
from receipt of the Temporary Restraining Order and if
he refuses, ordering that he be removed by police
officers from the conjugal dwelling; this order is
enforceable notwithstanding that the house is under the
name of 236 Realty Holdings Inc. (Republic Act No.
9262 states "regardless of ownership"), this is to allow
the Petitioner (private respondent herein) to enter the
conjugal dwelling without any danger from the
Respondent.
After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the
conjugal dwelling, or anytime the Petitioner decides to
return to the conjugal dwelling to remove things, the
Petitioner shall be assisted by police officers when re-
entering the family home.
The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police
assistance on Sunday, 26 March 2006 because of the
danger that the Respondent will attempt to take her
children from her when he arrives from Manila and finds
out about this suit.
b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children,
mother and all her household help and driver from a
distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of
the subdivision where the Petitioner may be temporarily
residing.
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise
communicate with the Petitioner, directly or indirectly, or
through other persons, or contact directly or indirectly
her children, mother and household help, nor send gifts,
cards, flowers, letters and the like. Visitation rights to
the children may be subject of a modified TPO in the
future.
d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber
firearm and a Walther PPK and ordering the Philippine
National Police Firearms and Explosives Unit and the
Provincial Director of the PNP to cancel all the
Respondent's firearm licenses. He should also be
ordered to surrender any unlicensed firearms in his
possession or control.

e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the
children, including rental of a house for them, and
educational and medical expenses.
f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.
g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits,
bonuses and other cash he received from all the
corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31 March 2006,
which himself and as President of the corporations and
his Comptroller, must submit to the Court not later than
2 April 2006. Thereafter, an accounting of all these
funds shall be reported to the court by the Comptroller,
copy furnished to the Petitioner, every 15 days of the
month, under pain of Indirect Contempt of Court.
h) To ensure compliance especially with the order
granting support pendente lite, and considering the
financial resources of the Respondent and his threat
that if the Petitioner sues she will not get a single
centavo, the Respondent is ordered to put up a BOND
TO KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE MILLION
PESOS, in two sufficient sureties.
On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of private respondent,
the trial court issued an amended TPO, 20 effective for
thirty (30) days, which included the following additional
provisions:
i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given
the continued use of the Nissan Patrol and the Starex
Van which they are using in Negros Occidental.
j) The petitioners are given the continued use and
occupation of the house in Parañaque, the continued
use of the Starex van in Metro Manila, whenever they
go to Manila.
k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to
keep the peace, in two sufficient sureties.
l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally
fixed in the sum of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(Php 150,000.00) per month plus rental expenses of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per month until
the matter of support could be finally resolved.
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an
Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the
TPO21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the
grounds that it did not (1) comply with the three-day notice rule,
and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further asked that the
TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by private
respondent and returning the same to its rightful owner, the J-
Bros Trading Corporation, and (2) cancelling or reducing the
amount of the bond from ₱5,000,000.00 to a more manageable
level at ₱100,000.00.
Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved22 for the
modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his
children.
On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet
again, but subject only to the following modifications prayed for
by private respondent:
a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes
and other personal belongings of Rosalie and her
children to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for
Petitioner, within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary
Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared
in Indirect Contempt of Court;
b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of
furniture and equipment in the conjugal house in
Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City within
105
24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection
Order by his counsel;
c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the
Bacolod City Police Headquarters to remove
Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within eight (8)
hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by
his counsel, and that he cannot return until 48 hours
after the petitioners have left, so that the petitioner
Rosalie and her representatives can remove things
from the conjugal home and make an inventory of the
household furniture, equipment and other things in the
conjugal home, which shall be submitted to the Court.
d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and
Php50,000.00 for rental and Php25,000.00 for clothes
of the three petitioners (sic) children within 24 hours
from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his
counsel, otherwise be declared in indirect contempt of
Court;
e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all
unlicensed firearms to the Clerk of Court within 24
hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by
his counsel;
f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational
expenses of the children upon presentation of proof of
payment of such expenses.23
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial
support; failed to faithfully comply with the TPO; and committed
new acts of harassment against her and their children, private
respondent filed another application24 for the issuance of a TPO
ex parte. She alleged inter
alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-
Bros Trading, Inc., of which the latter was purportedly no longer
president, with the end in view of recovering the Nissan Patrol
and Starex Van used by private respondent and the children. A
writ of replevin was served upon private respondent by a group
of six or seven policemen with long firearms that scared the two
small boys, Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard.25
While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to
school, two men allegedly attempted to kidnap him, which
incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to go back to
school. On another occasion, petitioner allegedly grabbed their
daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and threatened her.26 The incident
was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann subsequently filed a
criminal complaint against her father for violation of R.A. 7610,
also known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the
filing by the housemaids working at the conjugal home of a
complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against private
respondent. This came about after private respondent, armed
with a TPO, went to said home to get her and her children's
belongings. Finding some of her things inside a housemaid's
(Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids' room, private respondent filed
a case for qualified theft against Jamola.27
On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO, 28 effective for thirty
(30) days, which reads as follows:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing,
personally or through another, acts of violence against
the offended party;
2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning,
contacting or otherwise communicating in any form with
the offended party, either directly or indirectly;

3) Required to stay away, personally or through his
friends, relatives, employees or agents, from all the
Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her children, Rosalie
J. Garcia's three brothers, her mother Primitiva Jaype,
cook Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo Hontiveros,
laundrywoman Mercedita Bornales, security guard
Darwin Gayona and the petitioner's other household
helpers from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not
enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioners
are temporarily residing, as well as from the schools of
the three children; Furthermore, that respondent shall
not contact the schools of the children directly or
indirectly in any manner including, ostensibly to pay for
their tuition or other fees directly, otherwise he will have
access to the children through the schools and the TPO
will be rendered nugatory;
4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM
caliber firearm and a Walther PPK to the Court;
5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of
Php200,000.00 a month and Php50,000.00 for rental
for the period from August 6 to September 6, 2006; and
support in arrears from March 2006 to August 2006 the
total amount of Php1,312,000.00;
6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-
2007 the amount of Php75,000.00 and Php25,000.00;
7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan
Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508 and a Starex van with
Plate No. FFD 991 and should the respondent fail to
deliver said vehicles, respondent is ordered to provide
the petitioner another vehicle which is the one taken by
J Bros Tading;
8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell,
lease or otherwise dispose of the conjugal assets, or
those real properties in the name of Jesus Chua Garcia
only and those in which the conjugal partnership of
gains of the Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and
respondent have an interest in, especially the conjugal
home located in No. 14, Pitimini St., Capitolville
Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other properties which
are conjugal assets or those in which the conjugal
partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and
the respondent have an interest in and listed in
Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I-2," including properties
covered by TCT Nos. T-186325 and T-168814;
9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City
and E.B. Magalona shall be served a copy of this
TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered
not to allow the transfer, sale, encumbrance or
disposition of these above-cited properties to any
person, entity or corporation without the personal
presence of petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall affix
her signature in the presence of the Register of Deeds,
due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie that her signature
will be forged in order to effect the encumbrance or sale
of these properties to defraud her or the conjugal
partnership of gains.
In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended
the aforequoted TPO for another ten (10) days, and gave
petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to show cause
why the TPO should not be renewed, extended, or modified.
Upon petitioner's manifestation,30 however, that he has not
received a copy of private respondent's motion to modify/renew
the TPO, the trial court directed in its Order 31 dated October 6,
2006 that petitioner be furnished a copy of said motion.
Nonetheless, an Order32 dated a day earlier, October 5, had
already been issued renewing the TPO dated August 23, 2006.
The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder:
xxxx
106
x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally
terminated, the Temporary Protection Order issued on August
23, 2006 is hereby renewed and extended for thirty (30) days
and continuously extended and renewed for thirty (30) days,
after each expiration, until further orders, and subject to such
modifications as may be ordered by the court.
After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no
longer submitted the required comment to private respondent's
motion for renewal of the TPO arguing that it would only be an
"exercise in futility."33
Proceedings before the CA
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed
before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition 34 for prohibition (CA-
G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and
temporary restraining order, challenging (1) the constitutionality
of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process and the equal
protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO
issued in the civil case for being "an unwanted product of an
invalid law."
On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary
Restraining Order36 (TRO) against the enforcement of the TPO,
the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.
Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court
dismissed36 the petition for failure of petitioner to raise the
constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the
civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same.
Secondly, the challenge to the validity
of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul
the protection orders issued by the trial court constituted a
collateral attack on said law.
His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having
been denied in the Resolution37 dated August 14, 2007,
petitioner is now before us alleging that –
The Issues
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION ON THE THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE LAW.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN
FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS
DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN
NOT FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE
TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL
INSTITUTION.
V.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE
DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY
OFFICIALS.38
The Ruling of the Court
Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner
against the constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we shall first tackle the
propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court of the petition for
prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest opportunity so that if not raised in the pleadings,
ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if not raised in the
trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. 39 Courts will not
anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it.40
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262
before the RTC of Bacolod City, petitioner argues that the Family
Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is "inadequate to
tackle the complex issue of constitutionality."41
We disagree.
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special
courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A.
8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997,"
family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases of domestic violence against women and
children.42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court
designated from among the branches of the Regional Trial
Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key cities
identified.43 To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law,
Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts
designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:
SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a
Family Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over
cases of violence against women and their children under this
law. In the absence of such court in the place where the offense
was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court
where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the
option of the complainant. (Emphasis supplied)
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod
City remains possessed of authority as a court of general original
jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal,
special proceedings, land registration, guardianship,
naturalization, admiralty or insolvency.44 It is settled that RTCs
have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a
statute,45 "this authority being embraced in the general definition
of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding
laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental
law."46The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in
all RTCs.47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA48 that,
"plainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts
should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any
treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments
of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens
to be in issue." Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
reads in part as follows:
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
107
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
xxxx
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the
earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection
order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to
determine the same, subject to the review of this Court.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence
Against Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind of
procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the
petition and not an answer.49 Thus:
SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. – (a) The respondent may file an
opposition to the petition which he himself shall verify. It must be
accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause
why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be
issued.
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but any cause
of action which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a
separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that,
since a counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaint are
to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of constitutionality
cannot likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as
any claim for money or other relief which a defending party may
have against an opposing party.50 A cross-claim, on the other
hand, is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of
the original action or of a counterclaim therein.51Finally, a third-
party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave
of court, file against a person not a party to the action for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect
of his opponent's claim.52As pointed out by Justice Teresita J.
Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a
cause of action that could be the subject of a counterclaim,
cross-claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not
prohibited from being raised in the opposition in view of the
familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the
resolution of the case a quo because the right of private
respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the very
statute the validity of which is being attacked 53 by petitioner who
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for
all intents and purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a
protection order.
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in
nature should not have deterred petitioner from raising the same
in his Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of
a statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by
evidence.54 Be that as it may, Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-
SC nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to determine
legal issues, among others, viz:
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court
determines the need for further hearing, it may issue an order
containing the following:
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;
(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;

(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that
have been marked and will be presented;
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present
their direct testimonies in the form of affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both
parties which shall be done in one day, to the extent
possible, within the 30-day period of the effectivity of
the temporary protection order issued. (Emphasis
supplied)
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the
conduct of a hearing when necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No.
04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection order issued
is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said
order for a period of thirty (30) days each time until final
judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or
renewed temporary protection order as may be necessary to
meet the needs of the parties. With the private respondent given
ample protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the
constitutional issues, without necessarily running afoul of the
very purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary
procedure.
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly
dismissed the petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction
and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698).
Petitioner may have proceeded upon an honest belief that if he
finds succor in a superior court, he could be granted an
injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC
expressly disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari,
mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued
by the trial court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate
court in this case against the enforcement of the TPO, the
amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto was improper,
and it effectively hindered the case from taking its normal course
in an expeditious and summary manner.
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari
before judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a
judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its
enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only
for thirty (30) days at a time,56 should not be enjoined.
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or
invalid, does not of itself entitle a litigant to have the same
enjoined.57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of the
United States declared, thus:
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their
entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions,
are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes
are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is
immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal
acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged
to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for
relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to
prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid.
(Citations omitted)
The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo
until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. It bears
stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex parte
so as to protect women and their children from acts of violence.
To issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the very
purpose of the law against VAWC.
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk
from our obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first
impression, with far-reaching implications. We have, time and
again, discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of
constitutional issues, and with more reason now, in view of
private respondent's plea in her Comment 59 to the instant
Petition that we should put the challenge to the constitutionality
of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.
108
Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and
criminalize spousal and child abuse, which could very well be
committed by either the husband or the wife, gender alone is not
enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies
under the law.60
A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No.
2723,61 which became R.A. 9262, reveals that while the sponsor,
Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi
Estrada), had originally proposed what she called a "synthesized
measure"62 – an amalgamation of two measures, namely, the
"Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-Abuse of Women in
Intimate Relationships Act"63 – providing protection to "all family
members, leaving no one in isolation" but at the same time
giving special attention to women as the "usual victims" of
violence and abuse,64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that
men be denied protection under the same measure. We quote
pertinent portions of the deliberations:
Wednesday, December 10, 2003
Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr.
President. Some women's groups have expressed concerns and
relayed these concerns to me that if we are to include domestic
violence apart from against women as well as other members of
the household, including children or the husband, they fear that
this would weaken the efforts to address domestic violence of
which the main victims or the bulk of the victims really are the
wives, the spouses or the female partners in a relationship. We
would like to place that on record. How does the good Senator
respond to this kind of observation?
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of
women who call themselves "WIIR" Women in Intimate
Relationship. They do not want to include men in this domestic
violence. But plenty of men are also being abused by women. I
am playing safe so I placed here members of the family,
prescribing penalties therefor and providing protective measures
for victims. This includes the men, children, live-in, common-law
wives, and those related with the family.65
xxx
Wednesday, January 14, 2004
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. x x x
Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the
discussion whether to limit this to women and not to families
which was the issue of the AWIR group. The understanding that I
have is that we would be having a broader scope rather than just
women, if I remember correctly, Madam sponsor.
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.
As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan
during the interpellation period.
I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of
the measure. Do not get me wrong. However, I believe that there
is a need to protect women's rights especially in the domestic
environment.
As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless
women who have not had the opportunity to file a case against
their spouses, their live-in partners after years, if not decade, of
battery and abuse. If we broaden the scope to include even the
men, assuming they can at all be abused by the women or their

spouses, then it would not equalize the already difficult situation
for women, Mr. President.
I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations,
concurs with this position. I am sure that the men in this
Chamber who love their women in their lives so dearly will agree
with this representation. Whether we like it or not, it is an
unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no matter how
empowered the women are, we are not given equal opportunities
especially in the domestic environment where the macho Filipino
man would always feel that he is stronger, more superior to the
Filipino woman.
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?
Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the
committee came up with this bill because the family members
have been included in this proposed measure since the other
members of the family other than women are also possible
victims of violence. While women are most likely the intended
victims, one reason incidentally why the measure focuses on
women, the fact remains that in some relatively few cases, men
also stand to be victimized and that children are almost always
the helpless victims of violence. I am worried that there may not
be enough protection extended to other family members
particularly children who are excluded. Although Republic Act
No. 7610, for instance, more or less, addresses the special
needs of abused children. The same law is inadequate.
Protection orders for one are not available in said law.
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting
the same protection to men, fearing that they may use this law to
justify their abusive behavior against women. However, we
should also recognize that there are established procedures and
standards in our courts which give credence to evidentiary
support and cannot just arbitrarily and whimsically entertain
baseless complaints.
Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family
relations and to protect the family as the basic social institution.
Though I recognize the unequal power relations between men
and women in our society, I believe we have an obligation to
uphold inherent rights and dignity of both husband and wife and
their immediate family members, particularly children.
While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to
include other family members as a critical input arrived at after a
series of consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts,
sports groups and other affected sectors, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the
other senators.
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the
Floor.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is
recognized.
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed
amendment of Senator Legarda would be removing the "men
and children" in this particular bill and focus specifically on
women alone. That will be the net effect of that proposed
amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned by the
distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am not
sure now whether she is inclined to accept the proposed
amendment of Senator Legarda.
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because
if she is going to accept this, I will propose an amendment to the
amendment rather than object to the amendment, Mr. President.
109
xxxx
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
xxxx
Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the
amendment.
The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the
rationale used by the distinguished proponent of the
amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to agree. Kung may
maaabuso, mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At saka
iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi iyan. Okey lang
iyan. But I cannot agree that we remove the children from this
particular measure.
So, if I may propose an amendment –
The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.
Senator Sotto. – more than the women, the children are very
much abused. As a matter of fact, it is not limited to minors. The
abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I have
seen 14, 15-year-old children being abused by their fathers,
even by their mothers. And it breaks my heart to find out about
these things.
Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this
particular measure will update that. It will enhance and hopefully
prevent the abuse of children and not only women.
SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove
the aspect of the men in the bill but not the children.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority
Leader.
The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women
AND CHILDREN.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence]
There being none, the amendment, as amended, is approved.66
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom,
justice, policy, or expediency of a statute. 67 Hence, we dare not
venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members of
Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse
under R.A. 9262 to women and children only. No proper
challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this
proceeding. Congress has made its choice and it is not our
prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice may be
perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to
seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle
of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the
necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.68 We
only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution.
However, none was sufficiently shown in this case.

R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of
the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated
disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workers' Union69 is instructive:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of
equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the
state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man,
woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality
of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation
on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not
identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things
which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were
the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows
classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of
knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in certain
particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The
very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes
without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a
valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which
make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose
of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This
Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification
or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational
basis and is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find
that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as shall
hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal
protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of
violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection.
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the
fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of
violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against
women all make for real differences justifying the classification
under the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly states, "the
accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true
equality."70
A. Unequal power relationship between men and women
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National
Machinery for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment),
violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked
with the unequal power relationship between women and men
otherwise known as "gender-based violence". Societal norms
and traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders,
pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while
women are nurturers, men's companions and supporters, and
take on subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to
men gaining more power over women. With power comes the
need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of men's
expression of controlling women to retain power.71
The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a
human rights issue, passed its Resolution 48/104 on the
Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on
December 20, 1993 stating that "violence against women is a
manifestation of historically unequal power relations between
110
men and women, which have led to domination over and
discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of
the full advancement of women, and that violence against
women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women
are forced into subordinate positions, compared with men."72
Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and
social context of gender-based violence and developments in
advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered during the
Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules last
October 27, 2004, the pertinent portions of which are quoted
hereunder:
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of
violence against women. The patriarch of a family was accorded
the right to use force on members of the family under his control.
I quote the early studies:
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in
patriarchy – the institutional rule of men. Women were seen in
virtually all societies to be naturally inferior both physically and
intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women whether
slave, concubine or wife, were under the authority of men. In law,
they were treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to
beat, or even kill, his wife if she endangered his property right
over her. Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented
towards the patriarchal family strengthened the male dominated
structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over
women. Even the eminent Blackstone has been quoted in his
commentaries as saying husband and wife were one and that
one was the husband. However, in the late 1500s and through
the entire 1600s, English common law began to limit the right of
husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed
the rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to beat their wives
with a rod or stick no thicker than their thumb.
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these
rights to chastise wives or inflict corporeal punishment ceased.
Even then, the preservation of the family was given more
importance than preventing violence to women.
The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States
followed that of the English common law. In 1871, the Supreme
Court of Alabama became the first appellate court to strike down
the common law right of a husband to beat his wife:
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a
stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her face or kick her about
the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities, is not now
acknowledged by our law... In person, the wife is entitled to the
same protection of the law that the husband can invoke for
himself.
As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became
more organized. The temperance leagues initiated it. These
leagues had a simple focus. They considered the evils of
alcoholism as the root cause of wife abuse. Hence, they
demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and their husbands'
other watering holes. Soon, however, their crusade was joined
by suffragette movements, expanding the liberation movement's
agenda. They fought for women's right to vote, to own property,
and more. Since then, the feminist movement was on the roll.
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the
domestic violence to the public gaze. They succeeded in
transforming the issue into an important public concern. No less
than the United States Supreme Court, in 1992 case Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, noted:
In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two
million women are the victims of severe assaults by their male
partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported that nearly one of
every eight husbands had assaulted their wives during the past
 111

year. The [American Medical Association] views these figures as
"marked underestimates," because the nature of these incidents
discourages women from reporting them, and because surveys
typically exclude the very poor, those who do not speak English
well, and women who are homeless or in institutions or hospitals
when the survey is conducted. According to the AMA,
"researchers on family violence agree that the true incidence of
partner violence is probably double the above estimates; or four
million severely assaulted women per year."
all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these
reported cases were committed by the women's intimate
partners such as their husbands and live-in partners.73
Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented
comparative statistics on violence against women across an
eight-year period from 2004 to August of 2011 with violations
under R.A. 9262 ranking first among the different VAW
categories since its implementation in 2004,74 thus:

Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against
all women will be physically assaulted by a partner or ex-partner Women, 2004 - 2011*
during their lifetime... Thus on an average day in the United
States, nearly 11,000 women are severely assaulted by their
male partners. Many of these incidents involve sexual assault...
In families where wife beating takes place, moreover, child 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
abuse is often present as well.

Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical

violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological 997 927 659 837 811 770 1,042
abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of
women, is also common.
38 46 26 22 28 27 19
Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers,
perhaps because they perceive no superior alternative...Many
abused women who find temporary refuge in shelters return to
their husbands, in large part because they have no other source 194 148 185 147 204 167 268
of income... Returning to one's abuser can be dangerous.
Recent Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics disclose that
8.8 percent of all homicide victims in the United States are killed
by their spouses...Thirty percent of female homicide victims are 580 536 382 358 445 485 745
killed by their male partners.

Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the

Violence Against Women Act. 3,553 2,335 1,892 1,505 1,307 1,498 2,018

In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was

no less successful. The United States Charter and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the equality of all human 53 37 38 46 18 54 83
beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the
landmark Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993, the UN
General Assembly also adopted the Declaration on the 218 924 1,269 2,387 3,599 5,285 9,974
Elimination of Violence Against Women. World conferences on
the role and rights of women have been regularly held in Mexico
City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing. The UN itself established 319 223 199 182 220 208 374
a Commission on the Status of Women.

The Philippines has been in cadence with the half – and full – 62 19 29 30 19 19 25
steps of all these women's movements. No less than Section 14,
Article II of our 1987 Constitution mandates the State to
recognize the role of women in nation building and to ensure the 121 102 93 109 109 99 158
fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Our
Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention on the
Rights of the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all, Congress, 17 11 16 24 34 152 190
on March 8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act No. 9262, entitled "An Act
Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing
for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties
therefor and for other Purposes." (Citations omitted) 16 34 23 28 18 25 22

B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"

90 50 59 59 83 703 183
victims of violence.

6,271 5,374 4,881 5,729 6,905 9,485 15,104

At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official
statistics on violence against women and children show that –

*2011 report covers only from January to August

x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058
in 2002 representing 55.63% of total cases reported (9,903). And
for the first semester of 2003, there were 2,381 reported cases
out of 4,354 cases which represent 54.31%. xxx (T)he total
number of women in especially difficult circumstances served by
the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) for
the year 2002, there are 1,417 physically abused/maltreated
cases out of the total of 5,608 cases. xxx (T)here are 1,091
DSWD cases out of a total number of 3,471 cases for the first
semester of 2003. Female violence comprised more than 90% of
Source: Philippine National Police – Women and Children
Protection Center (WCPC)
On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on
domestic abuse and violence against men in the Philippines
because incidents thereof are relatively low and, perhaps,
because many men will not even attempt to report the situation.
In the United Kingdom, 32% of women who had ever

experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or more)
times, compared with 11% of the smaller number of men who
had ever experienced domestic violence; and women constituted
89% of all those who had experienced 4 or more incidents of
domestic violence.75Statistics in Canada show that spousal
violence by a woman against a man is less likely to cause injury
than the other way around (18 percent versus 44 percent). Men,
who experience violence from their spouses are much less likely
to live in fear of violence at the hands of their spouses, and
much less likely to experience sexual assault. In fact, many
cases of physical violence by a woman against a spouse are in
self-defense or the result of many years of physical or emotional
abuse.76
While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and
abuse perpetrated against men in the Philippines, the same
cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.
In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance
requiring drivers of animal-drawn vehicles to pick up, gather and
deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or discharged by their
vehicle-drawing animals in any public highways, streets, plazas,
parks or alleys, said ordinance was challenged as violative of the
guaranty of equal protection of laws as its application is limited to
owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not to those
animals, although not utilized, but similarly pass through the
same streets.
The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason
that, while there may be non-vehicle-drawing animals that also
traverse the city roads, "but their number must be negligible and
their appearance therein merely occasional, compared to the rig-
drawing ones, as not to constitute a menace to the health of the
community."77 The mere fact that the legislative classification
may result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal
protection, for every classification of persons or things for
regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but the
law is not thereby rendered invalid.78
C. Gender bias and prejudices
From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and
sentencing, crimes against women are often treated differently
and less seriously than other crimes. This was argued by then
United States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., now Vice President,
chief sponsor of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), in
defending the civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of the U.S.
Congress' authority under the Commerce and Equal Protection
Clauses. He stressed that the widespread gender bias in the
U.S. has institutionalized historic prejudices against victims of
rape or domestic violence, subjecting them to "double
victimization" – first at the hands of the offender and then of the
legal system.79
Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship
Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723 that "(w)henever violence
occurs in the family, the police treat it as a private matter and
advise the parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once the
complainant brings the case to the prosecutor, the latter is
hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might later be
withdrawn. This lack of response or reluctance to be involved by
the police and prosecution reinforces the escalating, recurring
and often serious nature of domestic violence."80
Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and
biases against our women.
In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge
Venancio J. Amila for Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge. He used
derogatory and irreverent language in reference to the
complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A. 9262,
calling her as "only a live-in partner" and presenting her as an
"opportunist" and a "mistress" in an "illegitimate relationship."
Judge Amila even called her a "prostitute," and accused her of
being motivated by "insatiable greed" and of absconding with the
contested property.81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila's
prejudices and lack of gender sensitivity.
112
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination
brought about by biases and prejudices against women. As
emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting
discrimination through specific measures focused on women
does not discriminate against men.82Petitioner's
83
contention, therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that
it is an "anti-male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men" law
deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW,
the Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures "to
modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices
and customary and all other practices which are based on the
idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or
on stereotyped roles for men and women." 84 Justice Puno
correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift changing the
character of domestic violence from a private affair to a public
offense will require the development of a distinct mindset on the
part of the police, the prosecution and the judges."85
II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.
The distinction between men and women is germane to the
purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed
against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of
Policy, as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the
State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees
full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need
to protect the family and its members particularly women and
children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and
security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address
violence committed against women and children in keeping with
the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution
and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other
international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is
a party.
In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which
the Philippines ratified on August 5, 1981. Subsequently, the
Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified by the
Philippines on October 6, 2003.86 This Convention mandates that
State parties shall accord to women equality with men before the
law87 and shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage
and family relations on the basis of equality of men and
women.88 The Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on the
Rights of the Child and its two protocols. 89 It is, thus, bound by
said Conventions and their respective protocols.
III. The classification is not limited to existing
conditions only, and apply equally to all members
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the
existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future
conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of
women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer
violence and abuse. Section 3 thereof defines VAWC as:
x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against
a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or
with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode,
which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including
threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the
following acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or
physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature,
committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not
limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of
lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child
as a sex object, making demeaning and
sexually suggestive remarks, physically
attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body,
forcing her/him to watch obscene publications
and indecent shows or forcing the woman or
her child to do indecent acts and/or make films
thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to
live in the conjugal home or sleep together in
the same room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the
victim to engage in any sexual activity by
force, threat of force, physical or other harm or
threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing
or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such
as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage
to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse
and marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to
witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member
of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness
pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to
unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or
visitation of common children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make
a woman financially dependent which includes, but is not limited
to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing
the victim from engaging in any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity,
except in cases wherein the other
spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and
moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the
Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of
financial resources and the right to the use and
enjoyment of the conjugal, community or
property owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money or
properties or solely controlling the conjugal
money or properties.
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the
aforequoted provision are attributable to research that has
exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery. The acts
described here are also found in the U.N. Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence Against Women.90 Hence, the argument
advanced by petitioner that the definition of what constitutes
abuse removes the difference between violent action and simple
marital tiffs is tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and
ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense. The acts
enumerated above are easily understood and provide adequate
contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They are
worded with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and need
not guess at its meaning nor differ in its application. 91 Yet,
113
petitioner insists92that phrases like "depriving or threatening to
deprive the woman or her child of a legal right," "solely
controlling the conjugal or common money or properties,"
"marital infidelity," and "causing mental or emotional anguish" are
so vague that they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse.
However, we have stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine merely
requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be
upheld – not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as
petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous
specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the
statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid
merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings
or detailed in its provisions.93
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262
singles out the husband or father as the culprit. As defined
above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship."
Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word "person" who has or
had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman
encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the
law provides that the offender be related or connected to the
victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating
relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle
of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the
case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica
Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be proper respondents
in the case filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and
their son (Go-Tan's husband) had community of design and
purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial
support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the
family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally,
mentally and physically.
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the
due process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the
issuance of POs, of all protections afforded by the due process
clause of the Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no opportunity to
respond, the husband is stripped of family, property, guns,
money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a
matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened."95
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of
violence against women and their children, their family or
household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its
purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm,
minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the
opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.96
"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure
that the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies
necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This
serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to
accord the victim and any designated family or household
member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the
perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment
and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award
temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from
violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to
ensure their financial support."97
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing,
signed and verified by the petitioner98 thereby undertaking full
responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since
"time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to
be prevented,"99 the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO
after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or
property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable
ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim
from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent
such violence, which is about to recur.100
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational
basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not only

to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her
witnesses' affidavits to the petition.101
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as
violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary
attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because
the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable
the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property,102 in the
same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered
harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and
possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before
such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace
that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must
yield to the necessities of protecting vital public
interests,103among which is protection of women and children
from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte,
the court shall likewise order that notice be immediately given to
the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5)
days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice,
copies of the petition and TPO be served immediately on the
respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective
for thirty (30) days from service on the respondent.104
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless
order the immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the
respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition
within five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary
conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise be indicated
on the notice.105
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall
verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and
shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection
order should not be issued.106
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a
petition for protection order should be apprised of the charges
imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side.
Thus, the fear of petitioner of being "stripped of family, property,
guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all
in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened" is a
mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence of due
process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard
and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's
defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in
court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process.107
It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an
Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the
TPO that was granted only two days earlier on April 24, 2006.
Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for the
modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his
children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated September 26,
2006, gave him five days (5) within which to show cause why the
TPO should not be renewed or extended. Yet, he chose not to
file the required comment arguing that it would just be an
"exercise in futility," conveniently forgetting that the renewal of
the questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30 days) each
time, and that he could prevent the continued renewal of said
order if he can show sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to do
so, petitioner may not now be heard to complain that he was
denied due process of law.
Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the
respondent in the VAWC case from the residence of the victim,
regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a "blank
check" issued to the wife to claim any property as her conjugal
home.108
The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any
stretch of the imagination suggest that this is so. It states:
114
SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection
order shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs:
xxxx
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence
of the offended party, regardless of ownership of the residence,
either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the offended
party, or permanently where no property rights are violated. If the
respondent must remove personal effects from the residence,
the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the
respondent to the residence, remain there until the respondent
has gathered his things and escort him from the residence;
xxxx
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from
private respondent's residence, regardless of ownership, only
temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal
and exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights
are violated. How then can the private respondent just claim any
property and appropriate it for herself, as petitioner seems to
suggest?
The non-referral of a VAWC case
to a mediator is justified.
Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments,
instead of encouraging mediation and counseling, the law has
done violence to the avowed policy of the State to "protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution."109
Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not
refer the case or any issue thereof to a mediator. The reason
behind this provision is well-explained by the Commentary on
Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence
as follows:110
This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to
mediation in a proceeding for an order for protection. Mediation
is a process by which parties in equivalent bargaining positions
voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the issue at hand.
Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process
which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies
that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of
issues in a proceeding for an order of protection is problematic
because the petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally
with the person against whom the protection order has been
sought. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no undue delegation of
judicial power to barangay officials.
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of
judicial power which, under the Constitution, is placed upon the
"Supreme Court and such other lower courts as may be
established by law" and, thus, protests the delegation of power
to barangay officials to issue protection orders.111 The pertinent
provision reads, as follows:
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue
and How. – Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the
protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the
perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a)
and (b) of this Act.1âwphi1 A Punong Barangay who receives
applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the
applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the
basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to
act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted
upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued
by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an
attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay
was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs
shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the
issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay
Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the

respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect its personal
service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in
any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.112 On the other hand, executive power "is
generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the
laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation
and enforcing their due observance."113
As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO
issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any
available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to
desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical
harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely
executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local
Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to
"maintain public order in the barangay."114
We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by
law to inquire into the existence of certain facts and to apply the
law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall
be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not
constitute an exercise of judicial powers."115
In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through
a preliminary inquiry or proceeding "whether there is reasonable
ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the
accused is probably guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must
determine reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger
of violence against the woman and her children exists or is about
to recur that would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The
preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is,
concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function. The same
holds true with the issuance of a BPO.
We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that
since barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies are
required to extend assistance to victims of violence and abuse, it
would be very unlikely that they would remain objective and
impartial, and that the chances of acquittal are nil. As already
stated, assistance by barangay officials and other law
enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty to enforce the
law and to maintain peace and order.
Conclusion
Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an
unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with the Constitution,
not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be
demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind
of the Court. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be
beyond reasonable doubt.116 In the instant case, however, no
concrete evidence and convincing arguments were presented by
petitioner to warrant a declaration of the unconstitutionality of
R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into law by
the highest officer of the co-equal executive department. As we
said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must assume that
the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its
plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts
and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the
welfare of the majority.
We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of
the women's movement against domestic violence shows that
one of its most difficult struggles was the fight against the
violence of law itself. If we keep that in mind, law will not again
be a hindrance to the struggle of women for equality but will be
its fulfillment."118 Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is,
as it should be, sustained.
115
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168852 September 30, 2008
SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L.
TAN, Respondents.*
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution1 dated March 7,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94, Quezon City
in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 and the RTC Resolution 2 dated
July 11, 2005 which denied petitioner's Verified Motion for
Reconsideration.
The factual background of the case:
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and
Steven L. Tan (Steven) were married.3 Out of this union, two
female children were born, Kyra Danielle 4 and Kristen
Denise.5 On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the
marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance
of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) 6 against Steven and her
parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan
(respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in
conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological
and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5,
paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9262,8 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women
and Their Children Act of 2004."
On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice 9 granting
petitioner's prayer for a TPO.
On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with
Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent Protection Order Ad
Cautelam and Comment on the Petition,10 contending that the
RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-
law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.
On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on
Opposition11 to respondents' Motion to Dismiss arguing that
respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a liberal
interpretation thereof aimed at promoting the protection and
safety of victims of violence.
On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution12 dismissing the
case as to respondents on the ground that, being the parents-in-
law of the petitioner, they were not included/covered as
respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known rule of
law "expressio unius est exclusio alterius."13
On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for
Reconsideration14 contending that the doctrine of necessary
implication should be applied in the broader interests of
substantial justice and due process.
On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on the
Verified Motion for Reconsideration15arguing that petitioner's
liberal construction unduly broadened the provisions of R.A. No.
9262 since the relationship between the offender and the alleged
victim was an essential condition for the application of R.A. No.
9262.
On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution 16 denying
petitioner's

Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned that to
include respondents under the coverage of R.A. No. 9262 would
be a strained interpretation of the provisions of the law.
Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law, to wit:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO
& JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW OF SHARICA, MAY BE
INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A
PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 9262, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "ANTI-
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF
2004".17
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in
the light of the provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which
explicitly provides for the suppletory application of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the provision on
"conspiracy" under Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletorily
applied to R.A. No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had
community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her
insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be
ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her
verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically; that respondents
should be included as indispensable or necessary parties for
complete resolution of the case.
On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not covered
by R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that
the offender should be related to the victim only by marriage, a
former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; that
allegations on the conspiracy of respondents require a factual
determination which cannot be done by this Court in a petition
for review; that respondents cannot be characterized as
indispensable or necessary parties, since their presence in the
case is not only unnecessary but altogether illegal, considering
the non-inclusion of in-laws as offenders under Section 3 of R.A.
No. 9262.
The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women
and their children'' as "any act or a series of acts committed by
any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or
against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic
abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty."
While the said provision provides that the offender be related or
connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a
sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application
of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the
suppletory application of the RPC, thus:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act,
the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws, shall
have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)
Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. –
Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under
special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This
Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter
should specially provide the contrary.(Emphasis supplied)
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be
applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under
special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special law is
silent on a particular matter.
116
Thus, in People v. Moreno,18 the Court applied suppletorily the
provision on subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of the RPC to
cases of violations of Act No. 3992, otherwise known as the
"Revised Motor Vehicle Law," noting that the special law did not
contain any provision that the defendant could be sentenced with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
In People v. Li Wai Cheung,19 the Court applied suppletorily the
rules on the service of sentences provided in Article 70 of the
RPC in favor of the accused who was found guilty of multiple
violations of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the "Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972," considering the lack of similar rules under
the special law.
In People v. Chowdury,20 the Court applied suppletorily Articles
17, 18 and 19 of the RPC to define the words "principal,"
"accomplices" and "accessories" under R.A. No. 8042, otherwise
known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995," because said words were not defined therein, although
the special law referred to the same terms in enumerating the
persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment.
In Yu v. People,21 the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on
subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise known as the "Bouncing
Checks Law," noting the absence of an express provision on
subsidiary imprisonment in said special law.
Most recently, in Ladonga v. People,22 the Court applied
suppletorily the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC
to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary provision therein.
With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under
Article 8 of the RPC may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No.
9262 because of the express provision of Section 47 that the
RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general
provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily
applicable, may be applied suppletorily.
Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No.
9262. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a
criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation
of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators
are principals.23
It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262
expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against women
and their children may be committed by an offender through
another, thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. -
The crime of violence against women and their children is
committed through any of the following acts:
xxx
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless
conduct, personally or through another, thatalarms or
causes substantial emotional or psychological distress
to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be
limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child
in public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside
the residence of the woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on
the property of the woman or her child against
her/his will;

(4) Destroying the property and personal
belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets
of the woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or
violence; x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the
purpose of preventing further acts of violence against the woman
or her child may include
individuals other than the offending husband, thus:
SEC. 8. Protection Orders. – x x x The protection orders that
may be issued under this Act shall include any, some or all of the
following reliefs:
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to
commit or committing, personally or through another,
any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this
Act; 1avvphi1.net
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing,
annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly;
x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction
of the law, thus:
SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to
promote the protection and safety of victims of violence against
women and their children. (Emphasis supplied)
It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law 24 and that
this intent must be effectuated by the courts. In the present case,
the express language of R.A. No. 9262 reflects the intent of the
legislature for liberal construction as will best ensure the
attainment of the object of the law according to its true intent,
meaning and spirit - the protection and safety of victims of
violence against women and children.
Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the
maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius" finds no application
here. It must be remembered that this maxim is only an "ancillary
rule of statutory construction." It is not of universal application.
Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of
discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and
should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of
the legislature.25
The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great
length on the attendance of circumstances evidencing the
conspiracy or connivance of Steven and respondents to cause
verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her. However,
conspiracy is an evidentiary matter which should be threshed out
in a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in the
present petition since this Court is not a trier of facts.26 It is thus
premature for petitioner to argue evidentiary matters since this
controversy is centered only on the determination of whether
respondents may be included in a petition under R.A. No. 9262.
The presence or absence of conspiracy can be best passed
upon after a trial on the merits.
Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy
may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262, the Court will no
longer delve on whether respondents may be considered
indispensable or necessary parties. To do so would be an
exercise in superfluity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Resolutions dated March 7, 2005 and July 11, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No.
Q-05-54536 are hereby PARTLY REVERSED and SET
ASIDE insofar as the dismissal of the petition against
respondents is concerned.
117
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010
RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH
SAGUD, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of
violence against women when a former boyfriend sent to the girl
the picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her face on it.
The Indictment
The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang
(Rustan) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora,
of violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 in an information that
reads:
That on or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality of Maria
Aurora, Province of Aurora, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, in a purposeful and reckless conduct, sent through
the Short Messaging Service (SMS) using his mobile phone, a
pornographic picture to one Irish Sagud, who was his former
girlfriend, whereby the face of the latter was attached to a
completely naked body of another woman making it to appear
that it was said Irish Sagud who is depicted in the said obscene
and pornographic picture thereby causing substantial emotional
anguish, psychological distress and humiliation to the said Irish
Sagud.1
The Facts and the Case
The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish
Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan
University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they
became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards the end of 2004.
When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in
partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke
up with him.
Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish
and tried to convince her to elope with him, saying that he did
not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the
proposal and told Rustan to take on his responsibility to the other
woman and their child. Irish changed her cellphone number but
Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text
messages. Rustan used two cellphone numbers for sending his
messages, namely, 0920-4769301 and 0921-8084768. Irish
replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her
alone.
In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through
multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman
with spread legs and with Irish’s face superimposed on the figure
(Exhibit A).2 The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the
message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan
used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a
shot he took when they were in Baguio in 2003 (Exhibit B).3
After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages
from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him to create
similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread
the picture he sent through the internet. One of the messages he
sent to Irish, written in text messaging shorthand, read: "Madali
lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa
lahat ng chatter."4

Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who
referred her to the police. Under police supervision, Irish
contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in
sending the picture and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan to
meet her at the Lorentess Resort in Brgy. Ramada, Maria
Aurora, and he did. He came in a motorcycle. After parking it, he
walked towards Irish but the waiting police officers intercepted
and arrested him. They searched him and seized his Sony
Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards. While Rustan
was being questioned at the police station, he shouted at Irish:
"Malandi ka kasi!"
Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of
Technology, testified as an expert in information technology and
computer graphics. He said that it was very much possible for
one to lift the face of a woman from a picture and superimpose it
on the body of another woman in another picture. Pictures can
be manipulated and enhanced by computer to make it appear
that the face and the body belonged to just one person.
Gonzales testified that the picture in question (Exhibit A) had two
distinct irregularities: the face was not proportionate to the body
and the face had a lighter color. In his opinion, the picture was
fake and the face on it had been copied from the picture of Irish
in Exhibit B. Finally, Gonzales explained how this could be done,
transferring a picture from a computer to a cellphone like the
Sony Ericsson P900 seized from Rustan.
For his part, Rustan admitted having courted Irish. He began
visiting her in Tarlac in October 2003 and their relation lasted
until December of that year. He claimed that after their relation
ended, Irish wanted reconciliation. They met in December 2004
but, after he told her that his girlfriend at that time (later his wife)
was already pregnant, Irish walked out on him.
Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish, asking
him to meet her at Lorentess Resort as she needed his help in
selling her cellphone. When he arrived at the place, two police
officers approached him, seized his cellphone and the contents
of his pockets, and brought him to the police station.
Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because
Irish asked him to help her identify a prankster who was sending
her malicious text messages. Rustan got the sender’s number
and, pretending to be Irish, contacted the person. Rustan claims
that he got back obscene messages from the prankster, which
he forwarded to Irish from his cellphone. This explained, he said,
why the obscene messages appeared to have originated from
his cellphone number. Rustan claims that it was Irish herself who
sent the obscene picture (Exhibit A) to him. He presented six
pictures of a woman whom he identified as Irish (Exhibits 2 to
7).5
Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustan’s wife, testified that she was
sure Irish sent the six pictures. Michelle claims that she received
the pictures and hid the memory card (Exhibit 8) that contained
them because she was jealous and angry. She did not want to
see anything of Irish. But, while the woman in the pictures posed
in sexy clothing, in none did she appear naked as in Exhibit A.
Further, the face of the woman in Exhibits 2, 4, 5 and 6 could not
be seen. Irish denied that she was the woman in those four
pictures. As for Exhibits 3 and 7, the woman in the picture was
fully dressed.
After trial, the RTC found Irish’s testimony completely credible,
given in an honest and spontaneous manner. The RTC observed
that she wept while recounting her experience, prompting the
court to comment: "Her tears were tangible expression of pain
and anguish for the acts of violence she suffered in the hands of
her former sweetheart. The crying of the victim during her
testimony is evidence of the credibility of her charges with the
verity borne out of human nature and experience."6 Thus, in its
Decision dated August 1, 2001, the RTC found Rustan guilty of
the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
7
On Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter
rendered a decision dated January 31, 2008,8 affirming the RTC
decision. The CA denied Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a
118
resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present
for review on certiorari.
The Issues Presented
The principal issue in this case is whether or not accused Rustan
sent Irish by cellphone message the picture with her face pasted
on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish, psychological
distress, and humiliation on her in violation of Section 5(h) of
R.A. 9262.
The subordinate issues are:
1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed
between Rustan and Irish as this term is defined in R.A.
9262;
2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the
sending of the nude picture in this case, already
constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262;
3. Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan
was obtained from him in violation of his constitutional
rights; and
4. Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in
evidence the obscene picture presented in the case.
The Court’s Rulings
Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women
includes an act or acts of a person against a woman with whom
he has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Thus:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers
to any act or a series of acts committed by any person
against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against
a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or with whom he has a common
child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which
result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
xxxx
Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute
violence against women and these include any form of
harassment that causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to a woman. Thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their
Children. – The crime of violence against women and
their children is committed through any of the following
acts:
xxxx
h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless
conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or
causes substantial emotional or psychological distress
to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be
limited to, the following acts:
xxxx
5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements
of the crime of violence against women through harassment are:

1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits
an act or series of acts of harassment against the
woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial
emotional or psychological distress to her.
One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution needed
to prove that accused Rustan had a "dating relationship" with
Irish. Section 3(e) provides that a "dating relationship" includes a
situation where the parties are romantically involved over time
and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship.
Thus:
(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties
live as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or are
romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during
the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary
socialization between two individuals in a business or social
context is not a dating relationship. (Underscoring supplied.)
Here, Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved," implies
that the offender and the offended woman have or had sexual
relations. According to him, "romance" implies a sexual act. He
cites Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopedia Edition
which provides a colloquial or informal meaning to the word
"romance" used as a verb, i.e., "to make love; to make love to"
as in "He romanced her."
But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the
colloquial verb "romance" that implies a sexual act. It did not say
that the offender must have "romanced" the offended woman.
Rather, it used the noun "romance" to describe a couple’s
relationship, i.e., "a love affair."9
R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against women x
x x refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person
against a woman x x x with whom the person has or had a
sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the law itself distinguishes
a sexual relationship from a dating relationship. Indeed, Section
3(e) above defines "dating relationship" while Section 3(f)
defines "sexual relations." The latter "refers to a single sexual act
which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child."
The dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore,
exist even without a sexual intercourse taking place between
those involved.
Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish and
him was of the "on-and-off" variety (away-bati), their romance
cannot be regarded as having developed "over time and on a
continuing basis." But the two of them were romantically
involved, as Rustan himself admits, from October to December
of 2003. That would be time enough for nurturing a relationship
of mutual trust and love.
An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a
common occurrence. Their taking place does not mean that the
romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken up
during periods of misunderstanding. Explaining what "away-bati"
meant, Irish explained that at times, when she could not reply to
Rustan’s messages, he would get angry at her. That was all.
Indeed, she characterized their three-month romantic relation as
continuous.10
Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive
picture should not be considered a form of harassment. He
claims that such would unduly ruin him personally and set a very
dangerous precedent. But Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes
"any act or series of acts" that constitutes violence against
women. This means that a single act of harassment, which
translates into violence, would be enough. The object of the law
is to protect women and children. Punishing only violence that is
repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.
119
Rustan alleges that today’s women, like Irish, are so used to
obscene communications that her getting one could not possibly
have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial emotional
or psychological distress. He claims having previously
exchanged obscene pictures with Irish such that she was
already desensitized by them.
But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife
give their testimonies was not impressed with their claim that it
was Irish who sent the obscene pictures of herself (Exhibits 2-7).
It is doubtful if the woman in the picture was Irish since her face
did not clearly show on them.
Michelle, Rustan’s wife, claimed that she deleted several other
pictures that Irish sent, except Exhibits 2 to 7. But her testimony
did not make sense. She said that she did not know that Exhibits
2 to 7 had remained saved after she deleted the pictures. Later,
however, she said that she did not have time to delete
them.11 And, if she thought that she had deleted all the pictures
from the memory card, then she had no reason at all to keep and
hide such memory card. There would have been nothing to hide.
Finally, if she knew that some pictures remained in the card,
there was no reason for her to keep it for several years, given
that as she said she was too jealous to want to see anything
connected to Irish. Thus, the RTC was correct in not giving
credence to her testimony.1avvphi1
Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish
experienced based on Rustan’s low regard for the alleged moral
sensibilities of today’s youth. What is obscene and injurious to an
offended woman can of course only be determined based on the
circumstances of each case. Here, the naked woman on the
picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irish’s head and face,
was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and
offensive one. Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in the
pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if she sees
herself in such a picture. What makes it further terrifying is that,
as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it in
the internet for all to see. That must have given her a nightmare.
Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain
items were seized from him without any warrant, the evidence
presented against him should be deemed inadmissible. But the
fact is that the prosecution did not present in evidence either the
cellphone or the SIM cards that the police officers seized from
him at the time of his arrest. The prosecution did not need such
items to prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a
photograph depicting the Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone that
was used, which cellphone Rustan admitted owning during the
pre-trial conference.
Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted
in Irish’s testimony that she received the obscene picture and
malicious text messages that the sender’s cellphone numbers
belonged to Rustan with whom she had been previously in
communication. Indeed, to prove that the cellphone numbers
belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police used such numbers to
summon him to come to Lorentess Resort and he
did.12 Consequently, the prosecution did not have to present the
confiscated cellphone and SIM cards to prove that Rustan sent
those messages.
Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text
messages to Irish.13 His defense was that he himself received
those messages from an unidentified person who was harassing
Irish and he merely forwarded the same to her, using his
cellphone. But Rustan never presented the cellphone number of
the unidentified person who sent the messages to him to
authenticate the same. The RTC did not give credence to such
version and neither will this Court. Besides, it was most unlikely
for Irish to pin the things on Rustan if he had merely tried to help
her identify the sender.
Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish
through a text message constitutes an electronic document.
Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic
signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).

But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of
the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court.
The objection is too late since he should have objected to the
admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was
offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already
waived such ground for objection.14
Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal
action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil
actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative
proceedings.15
In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved
each and every element of the crime charged beyond
reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 30567 dated
January 31, 2008 and its resolution dated April 25, 2008.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor
child RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-
Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the
Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as
Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
The following facts are culled from the records:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan
Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on
September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were blessed
with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time
of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.3
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by
virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of
Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months
old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the
Philippines.6
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide
monthly support to their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty
(250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or
less).7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the
Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son,
Roderigo.8
Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and
remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been
residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife established a
business known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao,
Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To date, all the
parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in
Cebu City.11
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter
demanding for support from respondent. However, respondent
refused to receive the letter.12
120
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a
complaint affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City
against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of
R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor
child with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit
thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her reply-
affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City
issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information
for the crime charged against herein respondent.
The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled
to Branch 20 thereof, states that:
That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or
less, in the Municipality of Minglanilla, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue to deprive his
son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old
minor, of financial support legally due him, resulting in economic
abuse to the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.15
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued
a Hold Departure Order against respondent.16Consequently,
respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted
bail.17 Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent
Protection Order to which respondent filed his
Opposition.18 Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was
arraigned.19 Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having
resolved the application of the protection order, respondent filed
a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over
the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged.20
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed
Order,21 dismissing the instant criminal case against respondent
on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an
alien, the dispositive part of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense with respect to the
accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case
DISMISSED.
The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van
Wilsem for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled (sic) and
ordered released.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto
reiterating respondent’s obligation to support their child under
Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him
liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons
in the Philippines who are obliged to support their minor children
regardless of the obligor’s nationality."24
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an
Order25 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and
reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:
x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of
those advanced earlier in the memorandum of the prosecution.
Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused
is a foreign national he is not subject to our national law (The
Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to
givesupport to his child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of
violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his child.
Unless it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to a
foreigner who fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding
that he is not bound by our domestic law which mandates a
parent to give such support, it is the considered opinion of the
court that no prima faciecase exists against the accused herein,
hence, the case should be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010. 26
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the
following issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to
support his minor child under Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held
criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified
failure to support his minor child.27
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance
of the instant petition despite the fact that the same was directly
lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in
Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation, 28 which
lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial court may be
brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties
from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case only
questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was
one that petitioners found themselves in when they filed the
instant Petition to raise only questions of law. In Republic v.
Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from
decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by
writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a
civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby
judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari
before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of
appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is
brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law. The third mode of appealis elevated to
the Supreme Court only on questions of law." (Emphasis
supplied)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented or
of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the
doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence
on the matter. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on
what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.29
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve
questions of law – the response thereto concerns the correct
application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts,
i.e.,whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support
his minor child under Philippine law; and whether or not he can
be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified
failure to do so.
It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition
highlights a novel question of law concerning the liability of a
foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions
punishable under special criminal laws, specifically in relation to
family rights and duties. The inimitability of the factual milieu of
the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by this
Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for future
cases. Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and
remanding the same to the CA would only waste the time, effort
and resources of the courts. Thus, in the present case,
considerations of efficiency and economy in the administration of
justice should prevail over the observance of the hierarchy of
courts.
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition
meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with petitioner’s
contentions.
121
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under
R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal obligation to support
exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which
provides the parent’s obligation to support his child. Petitioner
contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree
issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code, 31 respondent
is not excused from complying with his obligation to support his
minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no
sufficient and clear basis presented by petitioner that she, as
well as her minor son, are entitled to financial
support.32 Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce
Decree, he is not obligated topetitioner for any financial
support.33
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot
rely on Article 19534 of the New Civil Code in demanding support
from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 35 of the
New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other
words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the
provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies
to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to
foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with
respect to family rights and duties.36
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls
under family rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen
of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that
he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to
whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the
consequences of his failure to do so.37
In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke
the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for that Code
cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are
governed by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to
which they belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf.
Civil Code, Article 15).39
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not
obliged to support petitioner’s son under Article195 of the Family
Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in
Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not
obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law
applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the
foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes
that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such
laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to
support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands
in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his
son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the
national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the
parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during
or after the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v.
Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction
and our courts are not authorized to takejudicial notice of them.
Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.43
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the
Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption
shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is
not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that
the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal
law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the
obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved
in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine

law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their
children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 45 the Court held that a
divorce obtained in a foreign land as well as its legal effects may
be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality
principle on the matter of status of persons, the Divorce
Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show
that he is notliable to give support to his son after the divorce
decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s allegation
that under the second page of the aforesaid covenant,
respondent’s obligation to support his child is specifically
stated,46 which was not disputed by respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the
national law of respondent states that parents have no obligation
to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable
by law, said law would still not find applicability,in light of the
ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty
Corporation,47 to wit:
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on
the matter were properly pleaded and proved in accordance with
Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence
laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law
would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a
sound and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign
law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object public order,
public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective
by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the
principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up
of a single cause of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is
pertinent
— In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause
of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any
one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application
would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the
forum. To give justice is the most important function of law;
hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust
negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands
neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor
penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still
duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great
injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the
latter is entitled thereto.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent
is no longer liable to support his former wife, in consonance with
the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled
that she should no longerbe considered marriedto the alien
spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her
marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent
and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq.
of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged
to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
122
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to
be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added)50
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent
may be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262
for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioner’s son,
to wit:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their
Children.- The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to
engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to
desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child
has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting
the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by
force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the
woman or child. This shall include, butnot limited to, the following
acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children
of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately
providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; x x
xx
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited
to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial
support or custody of minor childrenof access to the woman's
child/children.51
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of
financial support to the child is considered anact of violence
against women and children.
Philippines, we find strength in petitioner’s claim that the
Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of
the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides
that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall
be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory,
subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty
stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged
continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with
petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the
parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As
such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense
charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that
jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that
granting, but not admitting, that there is a legal basis for charging
violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability
has been extinguished on the ground of prescription of
crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections
5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts falling under
Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and
(i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense, 53 which started in
1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime
charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.
Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has
provided support to petitioner’s child calls for an examination of

the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and
falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby remand the
determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has
jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated
February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the
Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court to
conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199522 June 22, 2015
RICKY DINAMLING, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on certiorari, under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision 1dated
August 11, 2011 and Resolution2 dated November 25, 2011 of
the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 32912, which affirmed
with modification the conviction of petitioner for violation of
Section 5(i), in relation to Section 6(f) of Republic Act (RA) No.
9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and
their Children Act of 2004 .
The facts of the case follow.
On the night of March 14, 2007,petitioner Ricky Dinamling and a
friend came from a drinking session and went to the boarding
house of AAA.3 At that time, Dinamling and the woman AAA were
in an ongoing five-year relationship and they had two common
children (then aged four and two years old). Dinamling and his
friend arrived as AAA was putting the two children to bed.
Suddenly, Dinamling started to evict AAA and the children,
ordering AAA to pack her things in a trash bag and a carton box
for ducklings. His reason for the eviction was that she was
allegedly using the place as a "whore house" wherein she
"brought (her) partners." AAA initially did not want to leave as
she could not carry the children and their things, but she left
when Dinamling threw a baby's feeding bottle outside the house,
causing it to break. She then went to the house of BBB and
requested the latter to fetch her children. When BBB and another
friend went for the children, Dinamling already had left with the
older child and only the baby was left. The baby was brought by
the friends back to AAA. In the past, there were similar incidents
that happened between Dinamling and AAA. Dinamling would hit
AAA's head, pull her hair and kick her. When AAA went to the
police, she was merely told that it was a family problem that
could be talked over. Dinamling was, at that time, a policeman
himself.4
Six days later, or on March 20, 2007, at around 9:00 p.m.,
another incident occurred. AAA was at the house of CCC when
Dinamling arrived. He shouted and counted down for AAA to
come out. When she came out, Dinamling punched her at the
left ear, which subsequently bled. When AAA asked him why he
kept on following her when she already had left him, Dinamling
shouted her family name and told her she was "good-for-
nothing." AAA left for the barangay captain's house, but
Dinamling caught up with her and kicked her until she fell to the
ground. On the road, Dinamling pulled down AAA's pants and
panty and shouted at her while people looked on. Dinamling then
threw the pants and panty back at AAA and shouted her family
name. Dinamling, then intoxicated, left on a motorcycle. 5 AAA
stayed at her friend's home until she felt some back pain in the
next morning. She found out she was bleeding and about to
miscarry so she was immediately brought to the hospital. There,
she was told that she was 19 weeks pregnant and had an
incomplete abortion. She was hospitalized for four days.
Dinamling visited her but showed no remorse over his acts.6
123
As a result of the above incidents, petitioner Ricky Dinamling
was charged in two (2) criminal Informations in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) for violation of Section 5(i), in relation to Section
6(f)7 of RA No. 9262. The two Informations against him read:
Criminal Case No. 1701:
That on or about the evening of March 14, 2007, at XXX, Ifugao,
the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously inflict psychological violence upon AAA, a
woman with whom he has two common children, resulting to
mental and emotional anguish and public ridicule or humiliation
by repeated verbal and emotional abuse consisting of several
bad and insulting utterances directed against the victim and a
feeding bottle being thrown against the latter in anger.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the offense being attended by the
special qualifying aggravating circumstance of the victim being
pregnant at the time.
Criminal Case No. 1702:
That on or about the evening of March 20, 2007 at XXX, Ifugao,
the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously inflict psychological violence upon AAA, a
woman with whom he has two common children, resulting to
mental and emotional anguish and public ridicule or humiliation
by boxing the victim on the head, kicking her at the back and
removing her pant(sic) and panty (sic).
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the offense being attended by the
special qualifying aggravating circumstance of the victim being
pregnant at the time.
Upon arraignment, Dinamling pleaded Not Guilty to both
charges. Thereafter, the cases were tried jointly.8
For the prosecution, AAA, her mother DDD and Dr. Mae
Codamon Diaz testified. For the accused, only petitioner testified
for and in his own defense. His defense was denial and alibi,
claiming that he was on duty at the town's police station at the
time that the offenses were committed.9
After trial, the RTC rendered its decision on August 4, 2009
finding Dinamling guilty of both charges. For Criminal Case No.
1701, the court sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of from ten
(10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision
mayor.10 For Criminal Case No. 1702, the court ordered him to
suffer imprisonment of from ten (10) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision in Criminal Case
No. 1701 was affirmed and the one in Criminal Case No. 1702
was affirmed with the modification on the penalty, by applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, such that Dinamling was
sentenced to imprisonment of nine (9) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12)
years of prision mayor, as maximum.
Hence, the present petition.
The petition assails the findings of the Court of Appeals for
allegedly disregarding his defenses of denial and alibi as well as
in discounting the supposedly exculpatory nature of a part of a
prosecution witness' testimony. Allegedly, the witness, Dr. Diaz,
testified that she was unsure if the abortion was a result of the
mauling that AAA suffered or could have been caused by an
infection or other factors.11
This Court resolves to deny the petition for lack of merit, but will
modify some of the penalties imposed by the appellate court.
The petition raises issues that call for an examination of the
factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court. As a
general rule, under Rule 45, no questions of fact but only

questions of law may be raised in a petition for review brought
before this Court.12 Time and again, the Court has consistently
declared that questions of facts are beyond the pale of a petition
for review.13 Factual findings of the trial court, particularly when
affirmed by the appellate courts, are generally binding on this
Court.14
But there are recognized exceptions to the rule that questions of
fact may not be entertained by this Court in a petition for review,
to wit:
(1) When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals
and the trial court are contradictory;
(2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely
on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (3) When the
inference made by the Court of Appeals from its
findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;
(4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of facts;
(5) When the appellate court, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case, and such findings
are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee;
(6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
premised on a misapprehension of facts;
(7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain
relevant facts which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion;
(8) When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
(9) When the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of the specific evidence on which they are
based; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are premised on the absence of evidence but such
findings are contradicted by the evidence on record,15
None of the above-mentioned exceptions, however, are cited by
the petitioner as a ground to grant his petition. But even
assuming arguendo, and in the interest of substantial justice,
that any of the exceptions above were indeed invoked, as the
petition alleges that the appellate court failed to give weight to
petitioner's defenses of denial and alibi as well as to his stance
that the testimony of Dr. Diaz exculpates him from the crime, this
Court, upon a close examination of the case records, still found
no error in the appellate court's finding of guilt in petitioner.
On its face, there is no reason to doubt the veracity and
truthfulness of the victim AAA's evidence. In particular, AAA's
testimony narrating the specific incidents which gave rise to the
charges was clear, categorical and straightforward and,
therefore, worthy of credence. Herein below are excerpts of her
testimony:
Q. Specifically inviting your attention to that incident in the
evening of March 14, 2007, could you please tell the court what
transpired?
A. In the evening of March 14, 2007, somewhere around seven
or eight o'clock in the evening, I was letting my kids sleep (w)hen
(Dinamling) came with a friend. They had a drinking spree and x
x x he started to evict us from that boarding house because
according to him, I (was) using that boarding house as a whore
house (by) bringing in partners, et cetera to that boarding house.
That (was) why he was letting us out of it. And he even told me
that if I (had) no travelling bag, I (could) use the basura
(garbage) bag outside and I (could) use the carton where he
124
placed the ducklings to pack our things and leave the place. That
night, I (did) not know how to carry them out and I was waiting
for him to stop talking and leave but he never left us up to the
time he threw the feeding bottle of my baby outside that caused
it to break and that was also the time I decided to go to the
house of BBB because it is the place where my landlady (was)
staying.
xxxx
Q. You mentioned of a feeding bottle.
A. He threw it outside, Sir.
Q. How did you feel as regards these actuations of the accused
that evening?
A. That is worst. He was inflicting pain (on) me but that time it
was directed (at an) innocent individual and that is very painful.
Q. Personally, did you feel distressed or stressed or fearful at the
time the accused was acting that way?
A. When he started acting that way, I fear(ed) he would again
inflict those pain (on) us.
Q. So when you went to the house of BBB, what happened
next?
A. x x x He (BBB) went to fetch the kids and came home with
one of the kids but to my dismay, even the milk of my baby was
not there any more; that night because it was around 11:00
o'clock, we had to use the feeding bottle of BBB's son together
with the milk because when they went to fetch the kids, the milk
was gone.
Q. Was the incident on March 14, 2007 the first time or it
happened (sic) previously?
A. It happened previously. Those were the time(s) that (I was)
prompted to go back home and to my relatives for protection but
he (came, followed) us where we (went).
Q. In those previous incidents before March 14, 2007, what did
he do, if any?
A. There are times he did that in public. He usually starts hitting
my head, pulls my hair kicks me and there was a time I went to
the police station but they said that (it) is some kind of family
problem that we could talk xxx over and so it was left that way. I
thought leaving him would be the best thing to do but he kept on
following us.16
xxxx
Q. I am inviting your attention to that incident of March 20, 2007.
Will you please tell the court what happened that late afternoon
or early evening?
A. I was at the house of CCC waiting for a friend because of
what happened on March 14, 2007 when we left the boarding
house.
xxxx
Q. What transpired thereat, when you were at that place?
A. After sometime, around 9 o'clock, (Dinamling) came and
shouted words that (on) final count, (I) should be out of that
place.
Q. And what else happened?

A. After shouting, he boxed me at the left ear.
Q. What transpired next?
A. (T)hen I felt there was blood in my ear. I followed him outside
and I inquired (as to) why he (kept on) following us when we
(already) left the boarding house and then he started shouting at
me, shouting my family name, x x x x that I (was) good for
nothing and that I (could) sue him (in) court and he (would) pay
me. So I said "I thought when we already left, you were at peace
with yourself already." When I was going down, going to the
barangay captain's house, he followed me. When I tried to go
back, he kicked me. He pulled my pants down and pulled even
my panty and he said x x x he (did) that to me because I was
worthless.
Q. (At) what particular spot did the accused pull down your pants
and your panty?
A. Front of CCC.
Q. What was that spot, road or backyard?
A. Road.
Q. Could you describe the place? Were there houses nearby,
that road, that spot where he pulled down your pants and panty?
A. There is a small store and people were looking at us. There
are houses above and then one of them told me he saw but he is
afraid to come out.
Q. Was it already dark (at) that time?
A. Dark but then there was a street light near the residence.
Q. Was it still early evening?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. About what time?
A. Around 9 o'clock.
Q. After pulling down your pants and your panty along that road,
what else happened?
A. He threw my pants and panty back tome and he left shouting
at me, my family name. It is very hurting because my family
(had) nothing to do with this.
xxxx
Q. And what happened the following day?
A. I stayed at my friend's house then at 5:00 o'clock early
morning of March 21, there was pain at my back. That night
when he kicked me, there was pain at my back. I said I (would)
just go tomorrow for medication but I did not reach the day
because I was bleeding. When I went to the bathroom, there
(was) blood so I said I think I am going to abort. There (was)
blood already so I decided to go to bath before I (went) to the
hospital but when I went to take a bath, I already had profuse
bleeding so they (had) to carry me with the use of a blanket to
the hospital.17
AAA also stated that the baby that she claims was aborted would
have been her third child with Dinamling. She also testified about
always being afraid of Dinamling, even fearing the sound of his
motorcycle as that signalled that she or her children would be
abused. She previously filed with the police a complaint for
physical injuries but nothing came of it. Later, she learned from
Dinamling that he had been discharged as a policeman.18
125
The trial court specifically ascribed credibility on the said
testimony of AAA which the Court of Appeals has affirmed. Under
such circumstances, this Court has little option but to accord said
findings with great respect, if not finality. The findings off act of
the trial court, as regards the credibility of a witness, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals and supported by the evidence
on record are accorded finality.19
In addition to AAA's testimony, her mother DDD also testified that
her daughter was "like a corpse" because of Dinamling's
maltreatment. DDD narrated the history of maltreatment of her
daughter, including the times that she saw her with "bluish spots"
and when AAA had a miscarriage from all the boxing and kicking
that she had received from Dinamling. 20 She knew that
Dinamling was a married man when he had his relationship with
AAA21 and she knew for a fact that Dinamling did not live with
AAA and the children because he always went home to his own
wife.22
The above testimonies suffice to establish the elements of the
crime as defined in Section 5(i) of RA No. 9262 and as alleged in
the two Informations filed against petitioner. The provision of the
law states:
Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.-
The crime of violence against women and their children is
committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited
to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial
support or custody of minor children or access to the woman's
child/children.
From the aforequoted Section 5(i), in relation to other sections of
RA No. 9262, the elements of the crime are derived as follows:
(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or
children;23
(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the
offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or
had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with
whom such offender has a common child. As for the
woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or
illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;24
(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child
mental or emotional anguish; and
(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule
or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse,
denial of financial support or custody of minor children
or access to the children or similar such acts or
omissions.25
As for the first case, Criminal Case No. 1701, filed against
petitioner Dinamling, the elements have been proven and duly
established. It is undisputed that AAA, as the victim, is a woman
who was then in a five-year ongoing relationship with petitioner
Dinamling. At that time, AAA and Dinamling had two common
children. AAA was often in fear of petitioner due to the latter's
physical and verbal abuse. In the evening of March 14, 2007, an
incident occurred in which she and her children were actually
evicted by Dinamling from a boarding house. Dinamling, in the
presence of his own friend and the children, accused AAA of
using the boarding house as a "whore-house" and alleged that
AAA brought sexual partners in that place. Dinamling further
humiliated AAA by telling her to pack her clothes in a trash bag
and in a carton box used to pack ducklings. He then threw a
baby bottle outside and broke it. This forced AAA to hastily leave
even without her children. Dinamling also left and took with him
the elder child and left the baby behind. AAA had to ask for her
friends to fetch the children but the latter found only the baby.

According to AAA and her mother DDD, that incident was not an
isolated one, as similar incidents had happened previously.
As for the second case, Criminal Case No. 1702, the crime's
elements were likewise proven. In addition to the first two
elements of the victim being a woman and in a relationship with
the offender, the prosecution was able to prove another incident
of mental or emotional anguish through public ridicule or
humiliation when it showed Dinamling acting in the following
manner: a) by calling and counting down on AAA for the latter to
come out of the house where she was staying;
b) by punching AAA at the left ear upon seeing her;
c) by shouting AAA's family name and calling her "good-
for-nothing;"
d) by saying that AAA could sue him but he would just
pay her;
e) by kicking AAA to the ground and then pulling off her
pants and underwear (panty) and calling her worthless;
f) by throwing the pants and panty back at AAA while
shouting AAA's family name as he left.
All such acts were committed while in full view and hearing of the
public, highlighting the public ridicule and humiliation done on
AAA and causing her mental and emotional pain. AAA's suffering
is so much that even the sound of petitioner's motorcycle would
put fear in her.
All the above, as established during trial, lead to no other
conclusion than the commission of the crime as prescribed in the
law.
It matters not that no other eyewitness corroborated AAA's
testimony of the actual incidents. The testimony of the
complainant as a lone witness to the actual perpetration of the
act, as long as it is credible, suffices to establish the guilt of the
accused because evidence is weighed and not counted. 26 If, in
criminal cases of rape27 or homicide,28 the positive, categorical
and credible testimony of a lone witness is deemed enough to
support a conviction, then, in the case at bar, involving a case of
violation of Section 5(i) of RA No. 9262, this Court shall treat in
the same manner the testimony of a single but credible witness
for the prosecution. Especially if the testimony bears the
earmarks of truth and sincerity and was delivered spontaneously,
naturally and in a straightforward manner, corroborative
testimony is not needed to support a conviction.29
It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of
psychological violence that are inflicted on victims who are
women and children. Other forms of psychological violence, as
well as physical, sexual and economic violence, are addressed
and penalized in other sub-parts of Section 5.
The law defines psychological violence as follows:
Section 3(a)
xxxx
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing
or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such
as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage
to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse
and mental infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to
witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member
of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness
pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to
unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or
visitation of common children.
126
Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i)
just like the mental or emotional anguish caused on the victim.
Psychological violence is the means employed by the
perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect
caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. To
establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is
necessary to show proof of commission of any of the acts
enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And to establish
mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the
testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this
party.30 All of this was complied with in the case at bar. In the
face of the strong and credible testimony of AAA, petitioner
Dinamling relies on a defense of denial and alibi. On the nights
of March 14 and 20, 2007, he claimed that he was on duty at
XXX Police Station.31 He denied seeing AAA on those
dates.32 However, on cross examination, he admitted that it takes
only two to three minutes to go from the police station to AAA's
boarding house.33
Denial and alibi, as defenses of an accused in a criminal case,
have been consistently held as inherently weak34 and which,
unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, cannot
prevail over the positive declarations of the victim.35 In general, a
plea of denial and alibi is not given much weight relative to the
affirmative testimony of the offended party. 36 The only exception
to this rule is where there is no effective identification, or where
the identification of the accused has been fatally tainted by
irregularity and attendant inconsistencies.37
In the case at bar, nothing in Dinamling's defense overcomes the
clear, straightforward, unequivocal and positive declarations of
AAA. For one, the positive identification of Dinamling as the
perpetrator is not an issue. It is not disputed that he and AAA
knew each other very well as, in fact, they were at that time
carrying on a five-year relationship which had borne two
common children.
Then, as for alibi, such a defense would prosper only if the
accused was able to prove that not only was heat some other
place when the crime was committed, but also that he could not
have been physically present at the place of the crime, or in its
immediate vicinity, during its commission. 38 Using such
standards, Dinamling's alibi holds no water. Not only was his
alleged location at the time of commission, that is, the XXX
Police Station where he was on duty, in the same municipality as
the crimes' place of commission, Dinamling himself also admited
that this police station is just "two to three minutes" away from
AAA's boarding house. Where the accused admits that he was in
the same municipality as the place where the offense occurred, it
cannot be said that it was physically impossible for him to have
committed the crime, and his defense of alibi cannot prosper.39
Therefore, the trial and appellate courts correctly found petitioner
Dinamling guilty beyond reasonable doubt and such conviction
must be upheld. To reiterate, the denial of the accused is a
negative assertion that is weaker than the affirmative testimony
of the victim.40 It almost has no probative value and may be
further discarded in the absence of any evidence of ill motives on
the part of the witness to impute so grave a wrong against the
accused.41As for alibi, it is not given weight if the accused failed
to demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been
physically present at the scene of the crime and its immediate
vicinity when the crime was committed.42
But petitioner Dinamling also harps on the allegedly exculpatory
testimony of Dr. Diaz, the substance of which allegedly frees him
from responsibility for the incomplete abortion of AAA's unborn
child.
By way of background, a witness, who is an officer of the Ifugao
Provincial Hospital, brought a copy of a medical certificate
issued by a Dr. Johan Baguilat stating that:
a) AAA was hospitalized at the said hospital from March
21 to March 24, 2007;
b) AAA had an incomplete abortion secondary to the
mauling, and;

c) AAA had anemia, contusion, hematoma and abrasion
of the left elbow.43
The witness testified that she herself typed the medical
certificate and had it signed by Dr. Baguilat. 44 Dr. Baguilat,
however, was unable to testify, due to the alleged distance of the
court from his current place of work. 45 Instead of Dr. Baguilat, it
was Dr. Mae Codamon-Diaz, an obstetrician-gynecologist of the
Ifugao Provincial Hospital, who testified that the medical
certificate indicated that AAA was pregnant, but that her
incomplete abortion might or might not have been caused by her
"mauling."46 Dr. Diaz added that the anemia was caused by
profuse bleeding, while the contusion and hematoma were
caused by a fall, trauma, blow or impact to the patient's
body.47 When cross-examined, Dr. Diaz stated that other
possible causes of abortion include infection of the reproductive
organ or urinary tract infection and intake of strong medicines,
while another cause of anemia is malnutrition.48
Petitioner Dinamling's position is that such testimony of Dr. Diaz,
which expresses an uncertainty as to whether the mauling of
AAA caused her abortion, exculpates him from the crime.
The Court disagrees. Petitioner barks up the wrong tree because
the fact of AAA's physical injuries from the mauling, including her
abortion, do not constitute an element of the crime with which he
is charged. Such injuries are likewise not alleged in the two
informations against him. Therefore, the testimony of Dr. Diaz or
any physician as to the fact or existence of such physical injuries
is not indispensable to petitioner's conviction or acquittal. Simply
put, AAA's physical condition is not an element of the crime that
petitioner was charged with, hence, proof of the same is, strictly
speaking, unnecessary.
In fact, neither the physical injuries suffered by the victim nor the
actual physical violence done by the perpetrator are necessary
to prove the essential elements of the crime as defined in
Section 5(i) of RA 9262. The only exception is, as in the case at
bar, when the physical violence done by the accused is alleged
to have caused the mental and emotional suffering; in which
case, such acts of physical violence must be proven. In this
instance, the physical violence was a means of causing mental
or emotional suffering. As such, whether or not it led to actual
bodily injury, the physical violence translates to psychological
violence since its main effect was on the victim's mental or
emotional well-being. In the case at bar, petitioner Dinamling's
acts of publicly punching, kicking and stripping AAA of her pants
and underwear, although obvious acts of physical violence, are
also instances of psychological violence since it was alleged and
proven that they resulted in AAA's public ridicule and humiliation
and mental or emotional distress. The clear, unrebutted
testimony of the victim AAA, as to the physical violence done on
her as well as to the mental and emotional suffering she
experienced as a result thereof, suffices to prove such facts.
The victim's resulting actual bodily injuries are immaterial unless
such injuries are also alleged to have led to her mental or
emotional anguish. There was no such allegation in the
information in the case at bar. Thus, proof of physical injuries is
not needed for conviction. Likewise, proof of the absence thereof
or lack of proof of such injuries would not lead to an acquittal.
Physical violence or physical injuries, in isolation, are not
elements of this particular crime.
As earlier discussed, the focus of this particular criminal act is
the causation of non-physical suffering, that is, mental or
emotional distress, or even anxiety and social shame or dishonor
on the offended party, and not of direct bodily harm or property
damage which are covered by the other subsections of the law's
provision. The use of physical violence, whether or not it causes
physical or property harm to the victim, falls under Section 5(i)
only if it is alleged and proven to have caused mental or
emotional anguish. Likewise, the physical injuries suffered are
similarly covered only if they lead to such psychological harm.
Otherwise, physical violence or injuries, with no allegation of
mental or emotional harm, are punishable under the other
provisions of the law.
127
As to the alleged miscarriage or incomplete abortion, the
allegedly exculpatory testimony of Dr. Diaz, or even the complete
disregard of any evidence surrounding such fact does not lead to
petitioner Dinamling's acquittal. Like the physical injuries that
was discussed above, the fact of AAA's miscarriage or
incomplete abortion is not essential to proving the elements of
the crime, unless it is alleged to have caused mental or
emotional suffering. It is not among the crime's elements. In fact,
it is not abortion but the mere fact of pregnancy of the victim at
the time of commission which is an aggravating circumstance,
not an element, of the offense. Section 6 of RA 9262 reads:
SECTION 6. Penalties.- The crime of violence against women
and their children, under Section 5 hereof shall be punished
according to the following rules:
xxxx
(f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be
punished by prision mayor.
If the acts are committed while the woman or child is pregnant or
committed in the presence of her child, the penalty to be applied
shall be the maximum period of penalty prescribed in the
section.
In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in
the amount of not less than One hundred thousand pesos
(₱100,000.00) but not more than three hundred thousand pesos
(₱300,000.00); (b) undergo mandatory psychological counseling
or psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to the
court.49
For this crime, pregnancy or the presence of the woman's child
are aggravating circumstances which increase the imposable
penalty, thus, they must be alleged and proven with competent
evidence for the penalty to be properly imposed.50
It is true that the fact of AAA's incomplete abortion or miscarriage
does not establish any of the crime's elements, as indeed the
information itself did not allege the same. However, from the fact
of miscarriage one may logically derive the fact of AAA's
pregnancy, which is an aggravating circumstance for the crime
and which is alleged as such in the information. The pregnancy
is proven by AAA's unrebutted testimony as well as by the
medical certificate that she presented in the course of such
testimony to show that she was indeed hospitalized and suffered
an "incomplete abortion secondary to the mauling."
Although petitioner Dinamling, up to this stage of the case,
denies having caused the incomplete abortion or miscarriage, he
does not deny the fact of pregnancy itself. He did not present
contradictory evidence during trial to controvert the prosecution's
assertions and proof of pregnancy. The pregnancy was never put
in issue during trial and on appeal. Neither is the same in
question in this petition. Therefore, it may be safely concluded
that the fact of AAA's pregnancy has been established and it
may be taken account of and considered as a circumstance that
aggravates Dinamling's criminal liability.
Therefore, given such finding, this Court will now accordingly
modify the penalties imposed by the trial court and appellate
court.51
As for Criminal Case No. 1701, no mitigating and only one (1)
aggravating circumstance attends the crime.1âwphi1Although it
was stated during trial that the offense was committed in the
presence of AAA's children, such fact was not alleged in the
information and therefore will not be taken into
consideration.52 Nighttime, though alleged, is not considered
aggravating because it neither facilitated the commission of the
offense nor was it shown to have been purposely sought by the
offender.53 The fact of AAA's pregnancy during the crime's
commission, however, has been alleged and established. This
single circumstance aggravates the accused's liability and
automatically raises his penalty to the maximum period of the
penalty prescribed, per Section 6 of RA 9262 and also Article

64(3) of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, petitioner Dinamling
should be sentenced to a maximum penalty that is derived from
prision mayor in its maximum period, which is imprisonment of
ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law,54 the minimum penalty should
come from the penalty one degree lower than prision mayor
which is prision correccional, whose range is from six (6) months
and one (1) day to six (6) years. 55 Therefore, this Court modifies
the trial court's Order dated September 17, 2009,56 which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and imposes on petitioner
Dinamling an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum to eleven (11) years of prision mayor as maximum. The
trial court's order for petitioner to pay a fine of one hundred
thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) and to undergo psychological
counseling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is upheld.
As for Criminal Case No. 1702, there is likewise no mitigating
and only one (1) aggravating circumstance. Again, the single
circumstance of pregnancy aggravates the accused's liability and
automatically raises his penalty to the maximum period of the
penalty prescribed, per Section 6 of RA No. 9262 and Article
64(3) of the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, the penalty
imposed by the Court of Appeals are to be modified. The
maximum penalty should be derived from prision mayor in its
maximum period, which, again, is imprisonment of ten (10) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. And again, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum should be derived
from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision
correccional. Therefore, the new penalty to be imposed shall be
imprisonment of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum
to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum. The rest of
the penalties, like the imposition on the petitioner of a fine of one
hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) and the order for him to
undergo psychological counseling, as upheld by the appellate
court, are hereby affirmed.
Both Criminal Case Nos. 1701 and 1702 involve the same
offense as defined in RA 9262 and are punishable by the same
range of penalties as prescribed in the said law. However, due to
the greater ignominy of the acts done by the accused in Criminal
Case No. 1702, the minimum and maximum lengths of the
sentence imposed should therefore be greater than in Criminal
Case No. 1701.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for
failure of petitioner to show any reversible error in the assailed
CA decision. The assailed Decision dated August 11, 2011 and
Resolution dated November 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals, in
CA-G.R. CR No. 32912, are hereby AFFIRMED and MODIFIED
only as to the penalties imposed, to wit:
1) in Criminal Case No. 1701, petitioner Ricky
Dinamling is ORDERED to serve an indeterminate
sentence of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum to eleven (11) years of prision mayor as
maximum. He is, likewise, ORDERED to PAY a fine of
one hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) and to
undergo psychological counseling;
2) in Criminal Case No. 1702, petitioner Ricky
Dinamling is hereby ORDERED to serve an
indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of six ( 6)
years of prision correccional as minimum to twelve (12)
years of prision mayor as maximum. He is also
ORDERED to PAY a fine of one hundred thousand
pesos (₱100,000.00) and to undergo psychological
counseling.
SO ORDERED.
R.A. 7610
Republic Act No. 7610 June 17, 1992
128
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND
SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE,
EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the Philippines in Congress assembled::
ARTICLE I
Title, Policy, Principles and Definitions of Terms
Section 1. Title. – This Act shall be known as the "Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act."
Section 2. Declaration of State Policy and Principles. – It is
hereby declared to be the policy of the State to provide special
protection to children from all firms of abuse, neglect, cruelty
exploitation and discrimination and other conditions, prejudicial
their development; provide sanctions for their commission and
carry out a program for prevention and deterrence of and crisis
intervention in situations of child abuse, exploitation and
discrimination. The State shall intervene on behalf of the child
when the parent, guardian, teacher or person having care or
custody of the child fails or is unable to protect the child against
abuse, exploitation and discrimination or when such acts against
the child are committed by the said parent, guardian, teacher or
person having care and custody of the same.1awphi1@alf
It shall be the policy of the State to protect and rehabilitate
children gravely threatened or endangered by circumstances
which affect or will affect their survival and normal development
and over which they have no control.
The best interests of children shall be the paramount
consideration in all actions concerning them, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts
of law, administrative authorities, and legislative bodies,
consistent with the principle of First Call for Children as
enunciated in the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the
Child. Every effort shall be exerted to promote the welfare of
children and enhance their opportunities for a useful and happy
life.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. –
(a) "Children" refers to person below eighteen (18)
years of age or those over but are unable to fully take
care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because
of a physical or mental disability or condition;
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether
habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the
following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect,
cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases,
degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic
needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical
treatment to an injured child resulting in
serious impairment of his growth and
development or in his permanent incapacity or
death.

(c) "Circumstances which gravely threaten or endanger
the survival and normal development of children"
include, but are not limited to, the following;
(1) Being in a community where there is armed
conflict or being affected by armed conflict-
related activities;
(2) Working under conditions hazardous to life,
safety and normal which unduly interfere with
their normal development;
(3) Living in or fending for themselves in the
streets of urban or rural areas without the care
of parents or a guardian or basic services
needed for a good quality of life;
(4) Being a member of a indigenous cultural
community and/or living under conditions of
extreme poverty or in an area which is
underdeveloped and/or lacks or has
inadequate access to basic services needed
for a good quality of life;
(5) Being a victim of a man-made or natural
disaster or calamity; or
(6) Circumstances analogous to those
abovestated which endanger the life, safety or
normal development of children.
(d) "Comprehensive program against child abuse,
exploitation and discrimination" refers to the
coordinated program of services and facilities to
protected children against:
(1) Child Prostitution and other sexual abuse;
(2) Child trafficking;
(3) Obscene publications and indecent shows;
(4) Other acts of abuses; and
(5) Circumstances which threaten or endanger
the survival and normal development of
children.1awphi1Ÿ
ARTICLE
Program on Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Section 4. Formulation of the Program. – There shall be a
comprehensive program to be formulated, by the Department of
Justice and the Department of Social Welfare and Development
in coordination with other government agencies and private
sector concerned, within one (1) year from the effectivity of this
Act, to protect children against child prostitution and other sexual
abuse; child trafficking, obscene publications and indecent
shows; other acts of abuse; and circumstances which endanger
child survival and normal development.
ARTICLE III
Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. –
Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any
other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any
adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
129
(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce
child prostitution which include, but are not limited to,
the following:
(1) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
(2) Inducing a person to be a client of a child
prostitute by means of written or oral
advertisements or other similar means;
(3) Taking advantage of influence or
relationship to procure a child as prostitute;
(4) Threatening or using violence towards a
child to engage him as a prostitute; or
(5) Giving monetary consideration goods or
other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to
engage such child in prostitution.
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse of
lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution
or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when
the victims is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335,
paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815,
as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or
lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That
the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion
temporal in its medium period; and
(c) Those who derive profit or advantage therefrom,
whether as manager or owner of the establishment
where the prostitution takes place, or of the sauna,
disco, bar, resort, place of entertainment or
establishment serving as a cover or which engages in
prostitution in addition to the activity for which the
license has been issued to said establishment.
Section 6. Attempt To Commit Child Prostitution. – There is
an attempt to commit child prostitution under Section 5,
paragraph (a) hereof when any person who, not being a relative
of a child, is found alone with the said child inside the room or
cubicle of a house, an inn, hotel, motel, pension house, apartelle
or other similar establishments, vessel, vehicle or any other
hidden or secluded area under circumstances which would lead
a reasonable person to believe that the child is about to be
exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
II
There is also an attempt to commit child prostitution, under
paragraph (b) of Section 5 hereof when any person is receiving
services from a child in a sauna parlor or bath, massage clinic,
health club and other similar establishments. A penalty lower by
two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony
under Section 5 hereof shall be imposed upon the principals of
the attempt to commit the crime of child prostitution under this
Act, or, in the proper case, under the Revised Penal Code.
ARTICLE IV
Child Trafficking
Section 7. Child Trafficking. – Any person who shall engage in
trading and dealing with children including, but not limited to, the
act of buying and selling of a child for money, or for any other
consideration, or barter, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua. The penalty shall be imposed in
its maximum period when the victim is under twelve (12) years of
age.
Section 8. Attempt to Commit Child Trafficking. – There is an
attempt to commit child trafficking under Section 7 of this
Act:1awphi1@alf
(a) When a child travels alone to a foreign country
without valid reason therefor and without clearance

issued by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development or written permit or justification from the
child's parents or legal guardian;
(c) When a person, agency, establishment or child-
caring institution recruits women or couples to bear
children for the purpose of child trafficking; or
(d) When a doctor, hospital or clinic official or employee,
nurse, midwife, local civil registrar or any other person
simulates birth for the purpose of child trafficking; or
(e) When a person engages in the act of finding
children among low-income families, hospitals, clinics,
nurseries, day-care centers, or other child-during
institutions who can be offered for the purpose of child
trafficking.
A penalty lower two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the
consummated felony under Section 7 hereof shall be imposed
upon the principals of the attempt to commit child trafficking
under this Act.
ARTICLE V (2) Act as conduit or middlemen in drug
Obscene Publications and Indecent Shows
Section 9. Obscene Publications and Indecent Shows. – Any
person who shall hire, employ, use, persuade, induce or coerce
a child to perform in obscene exhibitions and indecent shows,
whether live or in video, or model in obscene publications or
pornographic materials or to sell or distribute the said materials
shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium period.
If the child used as a performer, subject or seller/distributor is
below twelve (12) years of age, the penalty shall be imposed in
its maximum period.
Any ascendant, guardian, or person entrusted in any capacity
with the care of a child who shall cause and/or allow such child
to be employed or to participate in an obscene play, scene, act,
movie or show or in any other acts covered by this section shall
suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium period.
ARTICLE VI
Other Acts of Abuse
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or
Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's
Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child
abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be responsible for
other conditions prejudicial to the child's development
including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential
Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
(b) Any person who shall keep or have in his company a
minor, twelve (12) years or under or who in ten (10)
years or more his junior in any public or private place,
hotel, motel, beer joint, discotheque, cabaret, pension
house, sauna or massage parlor, beach and/or other
tourist resort or similar places shall suffer the penalty of
prision mayor in its maximum period and a fine of not
less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000): Provided,
That this provision shall not apply to any person who is
related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity or any bond recognized by law, local custom and
tradition or acts in the performance of a social, moral or
legal duty.
(c) Any person who shall induce, deliver or offer a minor
to any one prohibited by this Act to keep or have in his
company a minor as provided in the preceding
paragraph shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its
130
medium period and a fine of not less than Forty
thousand pesos (P40,000); Provided, however, That
should the perpetrator be an ascendant, stepparent or
guardian of the minor, the penalty to be imposed shall
be prision mayor in its maximum period, a fine of not
less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000), and the loss
of parental authority over the minor.
(d) Any person, owner, manager or one entrusted with
the operation of any public or private place of
accommodation, whether for occupancy, food, drink or
otherwise, including residential places, who allows any
person to take along with him to such place or places
any minor herein described shall be imposed a penalty
of prision mayor in its medium period and a fine of not
less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000), and the loss
of the license to operate such a place or establishment.
(e) Any person who shall use, coerce, force or
intimidate a street child or any other child to;
(1) Beg or use begging as a means of living;
trafficking or pushing; or
(3) Conduct any illegal activities, shall suffer
the penalty of prision correccional in its
medium period to reclusion perpetua.
For purposes of this Act, the penalty for the commission of acts
punishable under Articles 248, 249, 262, paragraph 2, and 263,
paragraph 1 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for the crimes of murder, homicide, other intentional
mutilation, and serious physical injuries, respectively, shall be
reclusion perpetua when the victim is under twelve (12) years of
age. The penalty for the commission of acts punishable under
Article 337, 339, 340 and 341 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the
Revised Penal Code, for the crimes of qualified seduction, acts
of lasciviousness with the consent of the offended party,
corruption of minors, and white slave trade, respectively, shall be
one (1) degree higher than that imposed by law when the victim
is under twelve (12) years age.
The victim of the acts committed under this section shall be
entrusted to the care of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.
ARTICLE VII
Sanctions for Establishments or Enterprises
Section 11. Sanctions of Establishments or Enterprises
which Promote, Facilitate, or Conduct Activities
Constituting Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse,
Child Trafficking, Obscene Publications and Indecent
Shows, and Other Acts of Abuse. – All establishments and
enterprises which promote or facilitate child prostitution and
other sexual abuse, child trafficking, obscene publications and
indecent shows, and other acts of abuse shall be immediately
closed and their authority or license to operate cancelled, without
prejudice to the owner or manager thereof being prosecuted
under this Act and/or the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or
special laws. A sign with the words "off limits" shall be
conspicuously displayed outside the establishments or
enterprises by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development for such period which shall not be less than one (1)
year, as the Department may determine. The unauthorized
removal of such sign shall be punishable by prision correccional.
An establishment shall be deemed to promote or facilitate child
prostitution and other sexual abuse, child trafficking, obscene
publications and indecent shows, and other acts of abuse if the
acts constituting the same occur in the premises of said
establishment under this Act or in violation of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. An enterprise such as a sauna, travel
agency, or recruitment agency which: promotes the
aforementioned acts as part of a tour for foreign tourists; exhibits

children in a lewd or indecent show; provides child masseurs for
adults of the same or opposite sex and said services include any
lascivious conduct with the customers; or solicits children or
activities constituting the aforementioned acts shall be deemed
to have committed the acts penalized herein.
ARTICLE VIII
Working Children
Section 12. Employment of Children. – Children below fifteen
(15) years of age may be employed except:
(1) When a child works directly under the sole
responsibility of his parents or legal guardian and where
only members of the employer's family are employed:
Provided, however, That his employment neither
endangers his life, safety and health and morals, nor
impairs his normal development: Provided, further, That
the parent or legal guardian shall provide the said minor
child with the prescribed primary and/or secondary
education; or
(2) When a child's employment or participation in public
& entertainment or information through cinema, theater,
radio or television is essential: Provided, The
employment contract concluded by the child's parent or
guardian, with the express agreement of the child
concerned, if possible, and the approval of the
Department of Labor and Employment: Provided, That
the following requirements in all instances are strictly
complied with:
(a) The employer shall ensure the protection, health,
safety and morals of the child;
(b) the employer shall institute measures to prevent the
child's exploitation or discrimination taking into account
the system and level of remuneration, and the duration
and arrangement of working time; and;
(c) The employer shall formulate and implement,
subject to the approval and supervision of competent
authorities, a continuing program for training and skill
acquisition of the child.
In the above exceptional cases where any such child may be
employed, the employer shall first secure, before engaging such
child, a work permit from the Department of Labor and
Employment which shall ensure observance of the above
requirement.
The Department of Labor Employment shall promulgate rules
and regulations necessary for the effective implementation of this
Section.
Section 13. Non-formal Education for Working Children. –
The Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall
promulgate a course design under its non-formal education
program aimed at promoting the intellectual, moral and
vocational efficiency of working children who have not
undergone or finished elementary or secondary education. Such
course design shall integrate the learning process deemed most
effective under given circumstances.
Section 14. Prohibition on the Employment of Children in
Certain Advertisements. – No person shall employ child
models in all commercials or advertisements promoting alcoholic
beverages, intoxicating drinks, tobacco and its byproducts and
violence.
Section 15. Duty of Employer. – Every employer shall comply
with the duties provided for in Articles 108 and 109 of
Presidential Decree No. 603.
Section 16. Penalties. – Any person who shall violate any
provision of this Article shall suffer the penalty of a fine of not
131
less than One thousand pesos (P1,000) but not more than Ten
thousand pesos (P10,000) or imprisonment of not less than
three (3) months but not more than three (3) years, or both at the
discretion of the court; Provided, That, in case of repeated
violations of the provisions of this Article, the offender's license to
operate shall be revoked.
ARTICLE IX
Children of Indigenous Cultural Communities
Section 17. Survival, Protection and Development. – In
addition to the rights guaranteed to children under this Act and
other existing laws, children of indigenous cultural communities
shall be entitled to protection, survival and development
consistent with the customs and traditions of their respective
communities.
Section 18. System of and Access to Education. – The
Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall develop and
institute an alternative system of education for children of
indigenous cultural communities which culture-specific and
relevant to the needs of and the existing situation in their
communities. The Department of Education, Culture and Sports
shall also accredit and support non-formal but functional
indigenous educational programs conducted by non-government
organizations in said communities.
Section 19. Health and Nutrition. – The delivery of basic social
services in health and nutrition to children of indigenous cultural
communities shall be given priority by all government agencies
concerned. Hospitals and other health institution shall ensure
that children of indigenous cultural communities are given equal
attention. In the provision of health and nutrition services to
children of indigenous cultural communities, indigenous health
practices shall be respected and recognized.
Section 20. Discrimination. – Children of indigenous cultural
communities shall not be subjected to any and all forms of
discrimination.
Any person who discriminate against children of indigenous
cultural communities shall suffer a penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period and a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos
(P5,000) more than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000).
Section 21. Participation. – Indigenous cultural communities,
through their duly-designated or appointed representatives shall
be involved in planning, decision-making implementation, and
evaluation of all government programs affecting children of
indigenous cultural communities. Indigenous institution shall also
be recognized and respected.
ARTICLE X
Children in Situations of Armed Conflict
Section 22. Children as Zones of Peace. – Children are
hereby declared as Zones of Peace. It shall be the responsibility
of the State and all other sectors concerned to resolve armed
conflicts in order to promote the goal of children as zones of
peace. To attain this objective, the following policies shall be
observed.
(a) Children shall not be the object of attack and shall
be entitled to special respect. They shall be protected
from any form of threat, assault, torture or other cruel,
inhumane or degrading treatment;
(b) Children shall not be recruited to become members
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines of its civilian
units or other armed groups, nor be allowed to take part
in the fighting, or used as guides, couriers, or spies;
(c) Delivery of basic social services such as education,
primary health and emergency relief services shall be
kept unhampered;

(d) The safety and protection of those who provide
services including those involved in fact-finding
missions from both government and non-government
institutions shall be ensured. They shall not be
subjected to undue harassment in the performance of
their work;
(e) Public infrastructure such as schools, hospitals and
rural health units shall not be utilized for military
purposes such as command posts, barracks,
detachments, and supply depots; and
(f) All appropriate steps shall be taken to facilitate the
reunion of families temporarily separated due to armed
conflict.
Section 23. Evacuation of Children During Armed Conflict. –
Children shall be given priority during evacuation as a result of
armed conflict. Existing community organizations shall be tapped
to look after the safety and well-being of children during
evacuation operations. Measures shall be taken to ensure that
children evacuated are accompanied by persons responsible for
their safety and well-being.
Section 24. Family Life and Temporary Shelter. – Whenever
possible, members of the same family shall be housed in the
same premises and given separate accommodation from other
evacuees and provided with facilities to lead a normal family life.
In places of temporary shelter, expectant and nursing mothers
and children shall be given additional food in proportion to their
physiological needs. Whenever feasible, children shall be given
opportunities for physical exercise, sports and outdoor games.
Section 25. Rights of Children Arrested for Reasons Related
to Armed Conflict. – Any child who has been arrested for
reasons related to armed conflict, either as combatant, courier,
guide or spy is entitled to the following rights;
(a) Separate detention from adults except where
families are accommodated as family units;
(b) Immediate free legal assistance;
(c) Immediate notice of such arrest to the parents or
guardians of the child; and
(d) Release of the child on recognizance within twenty-
four (24) hours to the custody of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development or any responsible
member of the community as determined by the court.
If after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings the court
should find that the aforesaid child committed the acts charged
against him, the court shall determine the imposable penalty,
including any civil liability chargeable against him. However,
instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court shall
suspend all further proceedings and shall commit such child to
the custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development or to any training institution operated by the
Government, or duly-licensed agencies or any other responsible
person, until he has had reached eighteen (18) years of age or,
for a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after
considering the reports and recommendations of the Department
of Social Welfare and Development or the agency or responsible
individual under whose care he has been committed.
The aforesaid child shall subject to visitation and supervision by
a representative of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development or any duly-licensed agency or such other officer
as the court may designate subject to such conditions as it may
prescribe.
The aforesaid child whose sentence is suspended can appeal
from the order of the court in the same manner as appeals in
criminal cases.
132
Section 26. Monitoring and Reporting of Children in
Situations of Armed Conflict. – The chairman of the barangay
affected by the armed conflict shall submit the names of children
residing in said barangay to the municipal social welfare and
development officer within twenty-four (24) hours from the
occurrence of the armed conflict.
ARTICLE XI
Remedial Procedures
Section 27. Who May File a Complaint. – Complaints on cases
of unlawful acts committed against the children as enumerated
herein may be filed by the following:
(a) Offended party;
(b) Parents or guardians;
(c) Ascendant or collateral relative within the third
degree of consanguinity;1awphi1@ITC
(d) Officer, social worker or representative of a licensed
child-caring institution;
(e) Officer or social worker of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development;
(f) Barangay chairman; or
(g) At least three (3) concerned responsible citizens
where the violation occurred.
Section 28. Protective Custody of the Child. – The offended
party shall be immediately placed under the protective custody of
the Department of Social Welfare and Development pursuant to
Executive Order No. 56, series of 1986. In the regular
performance of this function, the officer of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development shall be free from any
administrative, civil or criminal liability. Custody proceedings shall
be in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
603.
Section 29. Confidentiality. – At the instance of the offended
party, his name may be withheld from the public until the court
acquires jurisdiction over the case.
It shall be unlawful for any editor, publisher, and reporter or
columnist in case of printed materials, announcer or producer in
case of television and radio broadcasting, producer and director
of the film in case of the movie industry, to cause undue and
sensationalized publicity of any case of violation of this Act which
results in the moral degradation and suffering of the offended
party.Lawphi1@alf
Section 30. Special Court Proceedings. – Cases involving
violations of this Act shall be heard in the chambers of the judge
of the Regional Trial Court duly designated as Juvenile and
Domestic Court.
Any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding and
with the exception of habeas corpus, election cases, and cases
involving detention prisoners and persons covered by Republic
Act No. 4908, all courts shall give preference to the hearing or
disposition of cases involving violations of this Act.
ARTICLE XII
Common Penal Provisions
Section 31. Common Penal Provisions. –
(a) The penalty provided under this Act shall be
imposed in its maximum period if the offender has been
previously convicted under this Act;

(b) When the offender is a corporation, partnership or
association, the officer or employee thereof who is
responsible for the violation of this Act shall suffer the
penalty imposed in its maximum period;
(c) The penalty provided herein shall be imposed in its
maximum period when the perpetrator is an ascendant,
parent guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within
the second degree of consanguinity or affinity, or a
manager or owner of an establishment which has no
license to operate or its license has expired or has been
revoked;
(d) When the offender is a foreigner, he shall be
deported immediately after service of sentence and
forever barred from entry to the country;
(e) The penalty provided for in this Act shall be imposed
in its maximum period if the offender is a public officer
or employee: Provided, however, That if the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal,
then the penalty of perpetual or temporary absolute
disqualification shall also be imposed: Provided, finally,
That if the penalty imposed is prision correccional or
arresto mayor, the penalty of suspension shall also be
imposed; and
(f) A fine to be determined by the court shall be imposed
and administered as a cash fund by the Department of
Social Welfare and Development and disbursed for the
rehabilitation of each child victim, or any immediate
member of his family if the latter is the perpetrator of the
offense.
ARTICLE XIII
Final Provisions
Section 32. Rules and Regulations. – Unless otherwise
provided in this Act, the Department of Justice, in coordination
with the Department of Social Welfare and Development, shall
promulgate rules and regulations of the effective implementation
of this Act.
Such rules and regulations shall take effect upon their
publication in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
Section 33. Appropriations. – The amount necessary to carry
out the provisions of this Act is hereby authorized to be
appropriated in the General Appropriations Act of the year
following its enactment into law and thereafter.
Section 34. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act is
declared invalid or unconstitutional, the remaining provisions not
affected thereby shall continue in full force and effect.
Section 35. Repealing Clause. – All laws, decrees, or rules
inconsistent with the provisions of this Acts are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly.
Section 36. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect upon
completion of its publication in at least two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: June 17, 1992.lawphi1Ÿ
G.R. No. 198732 June 10, 2013
CHRISTIAN CABALLO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
133
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing
the January 28, 2011 Decision2 and September 26, 2011
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
27399-MIN which affirmed with modification the April 1, 2003
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 30
(RTC), finding petitioner Christian Caballo (Caballo) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 10(a), Article VI of
Republic Act No. 76104(RA 7610), otherwise known as the
"Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination Act," in relation to Section 2 of the Rules and
Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse
Cases (Rules on Child Abuse Cases).
The Facts
On March 16, 1999, an Information 5 was filed charging Caballo
of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610 which was
later amended on May 28, 1999, to include statements
pertaining to the delivery of private complainant AAA’s 6 baby. The
Amended Information7 reads:
That undersigned Second Assistant City Prosecutor hereby
accuses Christian Caballo of the crime of Violation of Section 10
(a) of Republic Act No. 7610, committed as follows:
That in or about the last week of March 1998, and on different
dates subsequent thereto, until June 1998, in the City of Surigao,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, a 23 year old man, in utter disregard
of the prohibition of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7610 and
taking advantage of the innocence and lack of worldly
experience of AAA who was only 17 years old at that time,
having been born on November 3, 1980, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual abuse upon
said AAA, by persuading and inducing the latter to have sexual
intercourse with him, which ultimately resulted to her untimely
pregnancy and delivery of a baby on March 8, 1999, a condition
prejudicial to her development, to the damage and prejudice of
AAA in such amount as may be allowed by law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Surigao City, Philippines, May 28, 1999.
Upon arraignment, Caballo pleaded not guilty to the aforesaid
charges.8
Based on the records, the undisputed facts are as follows:
AAA, then 17 years old, met Caballo, then 23 years old, in her
uncle’s place in Surigao City. Her uncle was a choreographer
and Caballo was one of his dancers. During that time, AAA was
a sophomore college student at the University of San Carlos and
resided at a boarding house in Cebu City. On January 17, 1998,
Caballo went to Cebu City to attend the Sinulog Festival and
there, visited AAA. After spending time together, they eventually
became sweethearts.9 Sometime during the third week of March
1998, AAA went home to Surigao City and stayed with her uncle.
In the last week of March of the same year, Caballo persuaded
AAA to have sexual intercourse with him. This was followed by
several more of the same in April 1998, in the first and second
weeks of May 1998, on August 31, 1998 and in November 1998,
all of which happened in Surigao City, except the one in August
which occurred in Cebu.10 In June 1998, AAA becamepregnant
and later gave birth on March 8, 1999.11
During the trial, the prosecution asserted that Caballo was only
able to induce AAA to lose her virginity due to promises of
marriage and his assurance that he would not get her pregnant
due to the use of the "withdrawal method." Moreover, it claimed
that Caballo was shocked upon hearing the news of AAA’s
pregnancy and consequently, advised her to have an abortion.
She heeded Caballo’s advice; however, her efforts were
unsuccessful. Further, the prosecution averred that when AAA’s
mother confronted Caballo to find out what his plans were for
AAA, he assured her that he would marry her daughter.12

Opposed to the foregoing, Caballo claimed that during their first
sexual intercourse, AAA was no longer a virgin as he found it
easy to penetrate her and that there was no bleeding. He also
maintained that AAA had (3) three boyfriends prior to him.
Further, he posited that he and AAA were sweethearts who lived-
in together, for one (1) week in a certain Litang Hotel and
another week in the residence of AAA’s uncle. Eventually, they
broke up due to the intervention of AAA’s parents. At a certain
time, AAA’s mother even told Caballo that he was not deserving
of AAA because he was poor. Lastly, he alleged that he
repeatedly proposed marriage to AAA but was always rejected
because she was still studying.13
The RTC’s Ruling
In a Decision dated April 1, 2003, the RTC found Caballo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI
of RA 7610, in relation to Section 2 of the Rules on Child Abuse
Cases. Accordingly, it sentenced Caballo to suffer imprisonment
for an indeterminate period ranging from prision correccional, in
its maximum period of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day, as minimum, to prision mayor in its minimum period of six
(6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum. It also
ordered Caballo to pay AAA moral damages in the amount of
₱50,000.00.14
Aggrieved, Caballo elevated the case to the CA.
The CA’s Ruling
In a Decision dated January 28, 2011,15 the CA dismissed the
appeal and affirmed with modification the RTC’s ruling, finding
Caballo guilty of violating Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.
It ruled that while the Amended Information denominated the
crime charged as violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA
7610, the statements in its body actually support a charge of
violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.16
On the merits of the case, it found that the evidence adduced by
the prosecution clearly showed that Caballo persuaded, induced
and enticed AAA, then a minor, to have carnal knowledge with
him. Towards this end, Caballo repeatedly assured AAA of his
love and even went on to promise marriage to her. He also
assured AAA that she would not get pregnant because he would
be using the "withdrawal method." Thus, it was upon these
repeated coaxing and assuring words that AAA succumbed to
Caballo’s evil desires which deflowered and got her pregnant.
On this score, it observed that consent is immaterial in child
abuse cases involving sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct
and therefore, the sweetheart defense remains unacceptable.17 It
also found basis to sustain the award of moral damages.18
Caballo filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however,
denied on September 26, 2011.19
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue
The core of the present controversy revolves around the
interpretation of the phrase "due to the coercion or influence of
any adult" which would thereby classify the victim as a "child
exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse" as found in
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. Consequently, the interpretation
which the Court accords herein would determine whether or not
the CA erred in finding Caballo guilty of violating paragraph (b) of
the same proviso.
In his petition, Caballo essentially argues that his promise to
marry or his use of the "withdrawal method" should not be
considered as "persuasion" or "inducement" sufficient to convict
him for the aforementioned offense, asserting that these should
be coupled with some form of coercion or intimidation to
constitute child abuse. He further alleges that he and AAA were
134
sweethearts which thus, made the sexual intercourse
consensual.
In its Comment,20 respondent advances the argument that there
was "sexual abuse" within the purview of RA 7610 as well as the
Rules on Child Abuse Cases since it was only upon Caballo’s
repeated assurances and persuasion that AAA gave in to his
worldly desires. Likewise, it points out that the sweetheart theory,
as relied on by Caballo, deserves scant consideration in view of
the Court’s ruling in Malto v. People (Malto).21
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertinently reads:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children,
whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following: x x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other
sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under
Article 335, paragraph 3 for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815,
as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious
conduct, as the case may be; Provided, That the penalty for
lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of
age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period x x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As determined in the case of Olivarez v. CA (Olivarez), 22 the
elements of the foregoing offense are the following:
(a) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct;
(b) The said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and
(c) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years
of age.
In this case, the existence of the first and third elements remains
undisputed. Records disclose that Caballo had succeeded in
repeatedly having sexual intercourse with AAA who, during all
those instances, was still a minor. Thus, the only bone of
contention lies in the presence of the second element. On this
note, the defense submits that AAA could not be considered as a
"child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse" since the
incidents to do not point to any form of "coercion" or "influence"
on Caballo’s part.
The argument is untenable.
To put things in proper perspective, it must be pointed out that
RA 7610 was meant to advance the state policy of affording
"special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation and discrimination and other conditions
prejudicial to their development" and in such regard, "provide
sanctions for their commission."23 It also furthers the "best
interests of children" and as such, its provisions are guided by
this standard.24
Driven by the foregoing considerations, Congress crafted Article
III of the same law in order to penalize child prostitution and
other forms of sexual abuse. Section 5 thereof provides a
definition of who is considered a "child exploited in prostitution

and other sexual abuse." As illumined in Olivarez,25 citing People
v. Larin26 and Amployo v. People,27 the final version of the
aforesaid provision was a product of various deliberations to
expand its original coverage to cases where the minor may have
been coerced or intimidated into sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, not necessarily for money or profit, viz:
The second element, i.e., that the act is performed with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, is
likewise present. As succinctly explained in People v. Larin:
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse, when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other
consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group...
It must be noted that the law covers not only a situation in which
a child is abused for profit, but also one in which a child, through
coercion or intimidation, engages in lascivious conduct.
We reiterated this ruling in Amployo v. People:
... As we observed in People v. Larin, Section 5 of Rep. Act No.
7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being abused
for profit, but also one in which a child engages in any lascivious
conduct through coercion or intimidation...
Thus, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when
the child indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or
influence of any adult. In this case, Cristina was sexually abused
because she was coerced or intimidated by petitioner to indulge
in a lascivious conduct. Furthermore, it is inconsequential that
the sexual abuse occurred only once. As expressly provided in
Section 3(b) of R.A. 7610, the abuse may be habitual or not. It
must be observed that Article III of R.A. 7610 is captioned as
"Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse" because Congress
really intended to cover a situation where the minor may have
been coerced or intimidated into lascivious conduct, not
necessarily for money or profit. The law covers not only child
prostitution but also other forms of sexual abuse. This is clear
from the deliberations of the Senate:
Senator Angara. I refer to line 9, ‘who for money or profit.’ I
would like to amend this, Mr. President, to cover a situation
where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated into this
lascivious conduct, not necessarily for money or profit, so that
we can cover those situations and not leave loophole in this
section.
The proposal I have is something like this: WHO FOR MONEY,
PROFIT, OR ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION OR DUE TO THE
COERCION OR INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT, SYNDICATE OR
GROUP INDULGE, et cetera.
The President Pro Tempore. I see. That would mean also
changing the subtitle of Section 4. Will it no longer be child
prostitution?
Senator Angara. No, no. Not necessarily, Mr. President, because
we are still talking of the child who is being misused for sexual
purposes either for money or for consideration. What I am trying
to cover is the other consideration. Because, here, it is limited
only to the child being abused or misused for sexual purposes,
only for money or profit.
I am contending, Mr. President, that there may be situations
where the child may not have been used for profit or ...
The President Pro Tempore. So, it is no longer prostitution.
Because the essence of prostitution is profit.
Senator Angara. Well, the Gentleman is right. Maybe the
heading ought to be expanded. But, still, the President will agree
that that is a form or manner of child abuse.
135
The President Pro Tempore. What does the Sponsor say? Will
the Gentleman kindly restate the amendment?
ANGARA AMENDMENT
Senator Angara. The new section will read something like this,
Mr. President: MINORS, WHETHER MALE OR FEMALE, WHO
FOR MONEY, PROFIT, OR ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION OR
INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT, SYNDICATE OR GROUP
INDULGE IN SEXUAL INTERCOURSE, et cetera.
Senator Lina. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence]
Hearing none, the amendment is approved.
How about the title, ‘Child Prostitution,’ shall we change that too?
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, to cover the expanded
scope.
The President Pro Tempore. Is that not what we would call
probable ‘child abuse’?
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Subject to rewording. Is there any
objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the amendment is approved.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As it is presently worded, Section 5, Article III of RA 7610
provides that when a child indulges in sexual intercourse or any
lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
the child is deemed to be a "child exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse." In this manner, the law is able to act as an
effective deterrent to quell all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation and discrimination against children, prejudicial as
they are to their development.
In this relation, case law further clarifies that sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult
exists when there is some form of compulsion equivalent to
intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended
party’s free will.28 Corollary thereto, Section 2(g) of the Rules on
Child Abuse Cases conveys that sexual abuse involves the
element of influence which manifests in a variety of forms. It is
defined as:
The employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or
coercion of a child to engage in or assist another person to
engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the
molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.
To note, the term "influence" means the "improper use of power
or trust in any way that deprives a person of free will and
substitutes another’s objective."29 Meanwhile, "coercion" is the
"improper use of x x x power to compel another to submit to the
wishes of one who wields it."30
In view of the foregoing, the Court observes that Caballo’s
actuations may be classified as "coercion" and "influence" within
the purview of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610:
First, the most crucial element is AAA’s minority. It is undisputed
that AAA was only 17 years old at the time of the commission of
the crime and is hence, considered a child under the law.31 In this
respect, AAA was not capable of fully understanding or knowing
the import of her actions and in consequence, remained
vulnerable to the cajolery and deception of adults, as in this
case.
Based on this premise, jurisprudence settles that consent is
immaterial in cases involving a violation of Section 5, Article III of
RA 7610; as such, the argument that AAA and Caballo were

sweethearts remains irrelevant. The Malto ruling is largely
instructive on this point:
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in
child abuse cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is
unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual
intercourse with another person.
The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish "those who
commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse."
Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving
violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. The mere act of
having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with
a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual
abuse constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an evil
that is proscribed.
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws.
This is on the rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud
as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the
nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is
under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who,
because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of
themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection.
The harm which results from a child’s bad decision in a sexual
encounter may be infinitely more damaging to her than a bad
business deal. Thus, the law should protect her from the harmful
consequences of her attempts at adult sexual behavior. For this
reason, a child should not be deemed to have validly consented
to adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the act of
ultimate physical intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her
special protection against abuse, exploitation and discrimination.
(Otherwise, sexual predators like petitioner will be justified, or
even unwittingly tempted by the law, to view her as fair game
and vulnerable prey.) In other words, a child is presumed by law
to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or
sexual intercourse. x x x x 32 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied; citations omitted)
Second, coupled with AAA’s minority is Caballo’s seniority.
Records indicate that Caballo was 23 years old at the time of the
commission of the offense and therefore, 6 years older than
AAA, more or less. The age disparity between an adult and a
minor placed Caballo in a stronger position over AAA so as to
enable him to force his will upon the latter.
Third, Caballo's actions effectively constitute overt acts of
coercion and influence.1âwphi1 Records reveal that Caballo
repeatedly assured AAA of his love for her, and even, promised
to marry her. In addition, he also guaranteed that she would not
get pregnant since he would be using the "withdrawal method"
for safety. Irrefragably, these were meant to influence AAA to set
aside her reservations and eventually give into having sex with
him, with which he succeeded.
Fourth, at least, with respect to the parties' first sexual
encounter, it is observed that the brash and unexpected manner
in which Caballo pursued AAA to her room and pressed on her to
have sex with him, effectively placed her in, to a certain extent, a
position of duress .. An important factor is that AAA refused
Caballo's incipient advances and in fact, asked him to leave.
However, AAA eventually yielded. Thus, it stands to reason that
she was put in a situation deprived of the benefit of clear thought
and choice. In any case, the Court observes that any other
choice would, nonetheless, remain tarnished due to AAA's
minority as above-discussed.
Hence, considering that Caballo's acts constitute "coercion" and
"influence" within the context of the law, and that AAA indulged in
sexual intercourse and/or lascivious conduct with Caballo due to
the same, she is deemed as a "child exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse"; as such, the second element of the subject
offense exists.
136
In fine, finding all elements to be present, the Court hereby
sustains Caballo's conviction for violation of Section 5(b), Article
III of RA 7610.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The January 28, 2011
Decision and September 26, 2011 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 27399-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED .
G.R. No. 202838 September 17, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JULITO GERANDOY, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
"Childhood should be carefree, playing in the sun: not living a
nightmare in the darkness of the soul."
-Dave Pelzer, A Child Called "It"
PEREZ, J.:
This is an appeal filed by herein accused Julito Gerandoy
(Gerandoy) from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, modifying
the decision or conviction rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Surigao City and finding the accused guilty of two counts of Acts
of Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of Republic Act No.
7610 or "Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
The Facts
Before the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Gerandoy was
charged with two counts of the crime of rape under Article 266-A,
paragraph 1 in relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code.
Criminal Case No. 6624
That on or about the 16th day or December, 2001 in the City or
Surigao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above named-accused, by means of foreel,I threats,
violence, and intimidation and with the use of deadly weapon
and then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with AAA,2 a 13 year old girl, I his] own
daughter without the consent and against the will of the latter, to
her damage and prejudice of in such sum as may be allowed by
law.
Contrary to law Article 266-A paragraph 1 in relation to Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code, with the qualifying
circumstance of relationship, the victim being the daughter of the
accused and aggravating circumstance of use of deadly
weapon.3
Criminal Case No. 6625
That on or about the 7th day of December, 2001 in the City or
Surigao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, by means of force[,] threats,
violence, and intimidation and then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have sexual intercourse with AAA, a 13 year old
girl, !his] own daughter without the consent and against the will
of the latter, to her damage and prejudice of in such sum as may
be allowed by law.
Contrary to law Article 266-A paragraph 1 in relation to Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code, with the qualifying
circumstance of relationship, the victim being the daughter of the
accused.4

When arraigned on 17 February 2004, he pleaded not guilty to
the offenses charged.5
Version of the Prosecution
The victim, AAA, then 13-years-old at the time of the commission
of rape, narrated that her father, accused Gerandoy, raped her
on two (2) occasions on 7 and 16 December 2001 . She recalled
that the first rape was committed on or about 12:00 a.m. of 7
December 2001 at their house. She narrated that while she was
sleeping with her brothers and sisters in one of the two rooms
inside their house, she was awakened when Gerandoy entered
the room and hugged her. The accused then forced her to lie
down despite her resistance. She tried to stand up but the
accused held her waist. He then kissed her cheeks and tore her
dress with a knife. She kept on resisting the assault of the
accused but the latter told her that he would kill them all if she
would not consent to his advances. AAA told him that she was
her daughter and his acts were sinful. The accused stabbed and
boxed her stomach. She lost her consciousness. After she
became conscious, she was already undressed and noticed that
her vagina was bleeding while the accused was lying beside her.
She cried and went away to the farm and reported the incident to
the elder sister6 of her mother, CCC (Aunt CCC).7
The second incident of rape happened on 16 December 2001 at
around 11 :00 p.m. AAA recalled that she was sleeping in a room
she shared with her brothers and sisters when awakened by
Gerandoy. Gerandoy then touched her face and told her that he
will rape her again. She pleaded him to stop but her father
continued to touch her body. AAA resisted but her father held her
arms and forced her to lie down. She kept on resisting but
Gerandoy held a knife at her waist and warned that he could
easily stab her. He slapped her and warned further that he would
kill all members of their family including himself if she would keep
on resisting. Gerandoy told her not to resist anymore as her two
older sisters have already been molested by him. She was then
undressed and Gerandoy mounted her. He touched and sucked
her nipple and kissed her lips. After that, AAA went again to her
aunt and told her what happened. 8 During trial, AAA clarified that
she reported the first incident or rape to her aunt one month after
it happened. She reported the second incident three months
after. She explained that the delay was due to her fear that her
father would make real his warning and continuing threats that
he would kill them all. When asked why she rep01icd the
incidents to her aunt instead of her mother, she answered that
she did tel 1 her mother about what happened but the she was
told to keep quiet about them because it was embarrassing. She
reported the incident to the police on 2003 and was medically
examined9 on 3 September 2003.
The prosecution likewise presented Dr. Josephine Del Carmen
(Dr. Del Carmen), the medico-legal expert who examined AAA on
3 September 2003. In lieu of her testimony in open court, the
prosecution and defense stipulated on the genuineness and due
execution as well as the authenticity of her findings.
Aside from the testimony of AAA and stipulation of facts relating
to the medical examination on the victim, the prosecution
likewise offered as evidence the Certificate of Live Birth of the
victim to prove that she was a minor when the two incidents of
rape were committed and the medical certificate10 issued by Dr.
Del Carmen.
Version of the Defense
On 30 September 2004, AAA executed an Affidavit of
Desistance11 that she was no longer pursuing her case against
her father. However, the court issued an order on 30 August
2005 ordering the continuance of the case to determine the
voluntariness of the execution of the affidavit.12
Aside from the affidavit, the defense presented its first witness
BBB, the mother of the victim and wife of the accused. She
denied that her daughter AAA was raped on 7 December 2001
as the victim was not in their house when the alleged incident
happened. BBB, controverting the earlier statement of AAA, said
137
that she was in their house on 7 December 2001 and was
feeding her infant child during that time.13
Likewise, she denied that AAA was raped on 16 December 200 I.
BBB testified that AAA left their house at around 8:00 p.m. to
attend a Christmas party with her friends. AAA did not return and
stayed in her Aunt CCC's house. BBB further said that it was
unlikely that the accused would be able to rape AAA as he was
in the farm on that date and time and arrived home at 7:00 a.m.
the day after. Upon learning that AAA did not return home, the
accused scolded and beat her with a broom. As a result, AAA
went away and since then stayed in her aunt's house. She also
identified the affidavit of desistance of AAA. She said that her
daughter told her that the charges of rape against Gerandoy
were not true.14
On her cross-examination, BBB denied that she was working as
a house helper when the alleged incidents of rape happened.
She gave conflicting answers on how many children she has and
the year when AAA was born.15
On 26 September 2007, AAA was again called to the witness
stand to testify on the voluntariness of the affidavit of desistance
she executed on 30 September 2004.16
On her cross-examination, she testified that pity for her father
prompted her desistance. She expressed her apprehension that
nobody would take care of her other siblings if the case against
her father would push through. She confirmed that her Aunt CCC
convinced her to file a rape case against her father. When asked
by the court to confirm her reason why she was desisting, she
again answered that she pitied her father.17
Finally, the defense presented the accused as its last witness. In
his direct examination, he denied the charges of rape filed
against him as he was not present in their house at the time the
alleged incidents happened. He testified that from 15 December
2011, he was in the farm harvesting coconuts for copra and only
arrived at their house in the evening of 19 December 2001. He
learned that his daughter AAA was not there. He was told by
BBB that AAA did not return home since 15 December 2001 afler
attending a party with her boyfriend. He later confronted AAA
about this but AAA answered back. Mad about AAA's response,
he beat his daughter with a broom. After that, she ran away to
her Aunt CCC's house. He mentioned that CCC and her
husband held grudges against him as he did not allow them to
join in the harvesting of coconuts.18
In his cross-examination, only few questions were asked by the
prosecution. Gerandoy confirmed that he was in the farm from
15-19 December 2001 and did not go home to sleep in their
house. He also stated that he became angry with AAA about
what her daughter did on 15 December 2001.19
Upon resting their case, the defense offered the affidavit or
desistance of AAA as documentary evidence.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court on 13 February 2009 found Gerandoy guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for each count of rape and imposed
upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory
penalties and civil indemnities.20 The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, for Criminal Cases Nos. 6624 and 6625, the
Court hereby finds the accused JULITO GERANDOY, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt as principal for the two counts of rape
committed respectively on December 7, 2001 and December 16,
2001, as may be defined and penalized under Article 266-A and
266-B of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic Act No.
9346.
This Court hereby sentences accused. JULITO GERANDOY
FOR EACH COlJNT OF RAPE to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA together with all the accessory
penalties provided for by law; to indemnify the victim AAA the
amount of SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND (₱75,000.00) PESOS;
 138

another sum of SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND (₱75,000.00) 1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under
PESOS as moral damages; and to pay the costs. any of the following circumstances:

In the service or his sentence accused shall be credited with the a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
full period or his preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29
or the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. b) When the offended party is deprived of' reason or is
6127. otherwise unconscious;

Let commitment order [BE ISSUED] for the transfer of the
accused from the City Jail BJMP, Silop, Surigao City to the
Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa, pursuant to Circular 4-92 of
the Supreme Court of the Philippines dated April 20, 1992
regarding the transfer of National Prisoners to the Bureau of
Corrections in Muntinlupa City.21
In its ruling, the trial court found credible the first testimony given
by AAA being spontaneous and worthy of credibility. It did not
give weight to the affidavit of desistance as it was based on pity.
Similarly, the court set aside the argument of the accused that it
was impossible for the victim to be sexually abused inside a
small room. Jurisprudential rulings have been consistent that
rape need not be committed in isolated places.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse
of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years
of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present. (Emphasis
ours).
Rape is qualified if the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or
the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.23
Upon review, we find the positive and credible testimony of AAA
sufficient to convict the accused of the crime of rape.

On 29 November 2011, the appellate court modified the ruling of The pertinent portion of her testimony is quoted as follows:
the trial court. The dispositive portion reads:
Q: After that when he hugged you what happened next?
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby
MODIFIES the assailed Decision dated February 13, 2009 of the A: He forced me to lie down.
Regional Trial Comi, Branch 29, Surigao City in Criminal Case
Nols]. 6624 and 6625. The Accused-Appellant Julito Gerandoy is Q: Then did you lie down?
found GUILTY of two counts of Acts of Lasciviousness in relation
with Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 or Child Prostitution
and Other Sexual Abuse and is hereby sentenced to suffer the A: I resisted, sir.
penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is likewise ordered to pay a
fine of P 15,000.00 and to indemnify AAA ₱20,000.00 as civil Q: When you resisted what happened next?
indemnity, ₱15,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱15,000.00 as
exemplary damages for each count, plus legal interest on all
A: I tried to stand up but he held me.
damages awarded at the rate of six percent (6%) from the date
of finality of this decision until fully paid.22
Q: Then what did he do next after he held you?
It ruled that the two counts of rape have not been sufficiently
established by the prosecution with moral certainty but A: He was still holding me.
nevertheless still found the accused liable for acts of
lasciviousness in relation with Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. Q: In what part of your body was held by him'?
7610. It found credible the testimony of AAA that the accused
hugged, kissed her lips and nipples, caressed her body and
A: My waist, sir.
touched her breasts. The appellate court dismissed the
argument that it is highly unlikely that the victim would be
sexually abused in a small room surrounded by her own siblings. Q: Then after he held your waist what did he do next'?

Our Ruling A: He kissed me.

After a careful review of the evidence, we affirm with modification Q: What part of your body was kissed by him?
the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
A: At my [check].
Primarily, accused relies on arguments initially raised in his
Supplemental Brief filed before the Court of Appeals. The Q: Only at your [check]?
accused reiterates denial of the commission of the crime, relying
on the affidavit of dcsistance. The accused assigns as error that
the appellate court did not give credit to the affidavit since it A: Yes, sir.
truthfully narrated his non-liability, and pointed to revenge as the
reason for the filing of the charges. Further, it emphasizes the Q: After he kissed you in your [check], what happened next?
inconsistencies made by AAA during her testimony thus eroding
her credibility. Finally, in his last effort to discredit the victim, the A: He forced me to lie down, sir.
accused asserts that the filing of the case after the lapse of two
years from the commission of the alleged crime indicates ill-
motive on the part of the victim. Q: Then he was able to let you lie down?

We find no merit in the appeal. A: Yes, sir.

Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Q: After that what happened next?
Republic Act No. 8353 describes how rape is committed:
A: He tried to undress me but I resisted.

Q: What happened next after that?
A: He tore my dress.
Q: What did he use in tearing your dress?
A: Knife, sir.
Q: After tearing your dress what happened next?
A: He told me that if Twill not consent he will kill us all.
Q: In your understanding what was your consent – what was to
be your consent about?
A: That I cannot permit him to touch me.
xxxx
Q: Then what happened next after that?
A: I kept on resisting, sir.
Q: And after you have been resisting, what happened next?
A: Then he told me again if I will not consent.
Q: What was your reply?
A: I told him that "I will not consent because you arc my father
and I am your daughter and it is against the law of God.
Q: Then what did he do when you said those statements?
A: I kept on crying and told him that I will not consent.
Q: After that -after you were crying what happened next?
A: I kept on crying and the knife was kept on pointing at my waist
and kept on telling me to give in and if I will not give in he will kill
me.
Q: What happened next?
A: He stabbed because I keep on resisting.
Q: Were you wounded when he stabbed you?
A: Yes, sir, only a small wound.
Q: After stabbing you and inflicted you with a small wound, what
happened next?
A: I kept on crying and he kept on telling me that I will give in to
him and I kept on pleading to him that I am his daughter and
then he boxed my stomach.
Q: After boxing you, what happened next?
A: I lost my consciousness.
Q: And after you regain your consciousness what happened?
A: I was already undressed, I have no underwear. I have no
more short pants.
Q: But did you notice in yourself after you regain your
consciousness?
139
A: When I regained my consciousness he was at my side and I
noticed that there were blood on my vagina, sir. 24(Emphasis
ours).
It is evident from the testimony of AAA that all the clements of
rape were established. The prosecution was able to prove that
on 7 December 2001, the accused Gerandoy entered the room
where AAA was sleeping with her siblings and through the use of
force, threat, intimidation and deadly weapon, succeeded in
having carnal knowledge with the victim against her will.
The appellate court lowered the crime from rape to acts or
lasciviousness upon finding that the testimony of the victim was
incomplete to constitute all the elements of rape. It concluded
that:
AAA's testimony that her vagina was bloodied when she woke
up. absent even of a testimony that she felt pain in the said area
due to lacerations of her genitals, can be construed and
interpreted to mean various other things, some of which arc
inconsistent with rape. A bloodied vagina could not only mean
forceful penetration but it could also be a result of a menstrual
discharge, among others. Thus the stark absence in the
testimony of AAA that she felt pain in her genitalia or even d
octor or medical practitioner, who examined AAA immediately
after the incident, that there were fresh lacerations in her vagina,
which was caused by insertion of the penis in the vagina or even
a conclusion that a blunt object entered the same, is constitutive
of an obvious failure to positively establish that the crime of rape
was committed on December 7, 2001.25
We do not agree.
Despite the absence in AAA's testimony that there was actual
carnal knowledge considering that she Jost consciousness
before that, circumstances indicate that the bloodied vagina was
a result of insertion or the accused's penis to the vagina of the
victim.
Direct evidence is not the only means of proving rape beyond
reasonable doubt.26 Even without direct evidence, the accused
may be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence,
provided the proven circumstances constitute an unbroken chain
leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.27
To prove conviction based on circumstantial evidence, there was
more than one circumstance; the facts from which the inferences
were derived were proved; and the combination of all the
circumstances was such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. What was essential was that the unbroken
chain of the established circumstances led to no other logical
conclusion except the appellant's guilt.28
In People v. Lupac,29 the Court convicted the accused of the
crime or rape even in the absence of direct testimonial evidence
from the victim that the accused had an actual carnal knowledge
of her. It rejected the argument of the accused that the victim,
being then asleep and unconscious, could not reliably attest to
his supposed deed. The Court found the accused guilty or raping
the victim while the latter was sleeping and unconscious based
on the following circumstances:
x x x (a) when AAA went to take her afternoon nap, the only
person inside the house with her was Lupac; (h) about an hour
into her sleep, she woke up to find herself already stripped
naked as to expose her private parts; (c) she immediately felt her
body aching and her vaginal region hurting upon her regaining
consciousness; (d) all doors and windows were locked from
within the house, with only her and the brief.-clad Lupac inside
the house; (e) he exhibited a remorserul demeanor in unilaterally
seeking her forgiveness (Pasensiya ka na AAA), even
spontaneously explaining that he did not really intend to do "that"
to her, showing his realization or the gravity or the crime he had
just committed against her; (/) her spontaneous, unhesitating
and immediate denunciation or the rape to Tita Terry and her
mother (hindot being the term she used); and (g) the medico-

legal findings about her congested vestibule within the lahiu
minora, deep fresh bleeding laceration at 9 o'clock position in the
hymen, and abraded and U-shaped posterior fourchette proved
the recency or infliction of her vaginal injuries.30
Similarly, we find the accused guilty of the crime of rape based
on the following unbroken circumstances. First, the accused
entered the room where AAA was sleeping and forced her to lie
down. Second, AAA resisted but the accused continued to kiss
her. Third, the accused succeeded in undressing her by tearing
her clothes with a knife despite her resistance. Fourth, he
pointed his knife in her waist and threatened to kill her. Fifih, due
to AAA' s continued resistance, he stabbed and boxed her
stomach causing AAA to lose consciousness. Sixth, upon
regaining her consciousness, AAA was already undressed and
her vagina was already bleeding while the accused was lying at
her side.
Clearly, conviction is proper. Combining in an unbroken chain the
proven circumstances, there can be no other logical conclusion
than that AAA was raped by appellant.
On the other hand, we agree with the appellate court that there
was only an act of lasciviousness on 16 December 2001.
On that day, a similar fate befell AAA at around 11 :00 p.m. when
the accused sexually abused the victim. We find credible AAA 's
testimony that the accused entered the small room where the
victim was sleeping and pawed her body. The accused
threatened to kill all the members of their family in case of
resistance and even told the victim not to resist as he had
already molested her other siblings. Thereafter, the accused
undressed AAA a nd forced her to lie down. He then mounted
himself on top of AAA, touched and sucked her nipple and
kissed her on her lips.31
Lascivious conduct is defined as intentional touching, either
directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast,
inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the
genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or
opposite sex, with the intent to abuse, humiliate, harass,
degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or
pubic area of a person.32
The elements of sexual abuse33 are the following:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct;
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years
of age.34
It is deemed that a child is sexually abused under Section 5(b) of
Republic Act No. 7610, when he or she is subjected to other
lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult.
There must be some form of compulsion equivalent to
intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended
party's free will.35
In Roallos v. People,36 the Court found Roallos guilty of acts of
lasciviousness in relation to Sec. 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610,
when he placed his right hand on the victim's right shoulder, slid
his hand towards the victim's both breasts and mashed them and
kissed the victim's right cheek.
Likewise in Garingarao v. People, the Court found Garingarao
guilty of acts of lasciviousness when he, under the pretext of
examining the victim as a hospital's nurse, lifted the latter's bra
and touched her lell breast. He further pressed the stethoscope
to her stomach, touched her two nipples and slid his finger inside
the victim's private part.
140
In this case, the prosecution established that Gerandoy again
entered the room where AAA was sleeping and performed
lascivious acts against her. Despite AAA 's objection, Gerandoy
touched parts of her body. He continued his sexual advances by
undressing AAA and forced her to lie down. He kissed AAA's lips,
mounted himself on top of her and touched and sucked AAA's
nipple.
The accused also tried to raise doubt on the victim's credibility
due to the presence of other people inside the small room when
the lascivious acts were committed. He advances his theory that
there is no way that the victim's siblings, who were sleeping on
the same room, would fail to notice that the accused entered the
room, boxed, threatened and stabbed the victim and be
successful in raping and performing lascivious acts against her.
We arc unconvinced.
As repeatedly held by this Court, "Lust is no respecter of time
and place."37 Neither the crampness of the room, nor the
presence of other people therein, nor the high risk of being
caught, has been held sufficient and effective obstacle to deter
the commission of rape.38 In the case of People v. Alarcon, 39 the
accused argued that rape could not have committed when the
victim's siblings were by her side was dismissed by the court.
Isolation is not a determinative factor to rule on whether a rape
was committed or not and there is no rule that a woman can only
be raped in seclusion.40 It ca be committed, discreetly or
indiscreetly, even in a room full of family members sleeping side
by side. It has been ruled that rape is not rendered impossible
simply because the siblings of the victim who were with her in
that small room were not awakened during its commission.41
Also, if rape can be committed inside a small room with
occupants sleeping side by side, it is likewise not impossible for
the accused to commit acts of lasciviousness or other sexual
abuses against the victim in a similar setting even if her siblings
were sleeping with her.
The accused also attributes error on the part of the Court of
Appeals when it failed to consider the affidavit of desistance as
evidence of his non-liability. He finds fault in the appellate court's
failure to consider the contents of the affidavit of desistance his
theory being that the affidavit was executed not only out of pity
but for other reasons mentioned in the affidavit.
An affidavit of desistancc is generally looked upon with disfavor
by Courts. In so many cases, retractions arc generally unreliable
and considered as an afterthought.42 As held in People v. Junio:43
x x x The unreliable character of this document is shown by the
fact that it is quite incredible that after going through the process
or having the [appellant] arrested by the police, positively
identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring the
humiliation or a physical examination of her private parts, and
then repeating her accusations in open court by recounting her
anguish, [the rape victim] would suddenly turn around and
declare that [a]fter a careful deliberation over the case, (she)
find(s) that the same does not merit or warrant criminal
prosecution.44
Upon this principle, we find that the courts below correctly
favored AAA's testimony in open court over the affidavit of
desistance. The statement that it was executed out of pity for her
father is only an additional reason why the desistancc would not
suffice to acquit accused. It cannot affect the conclusion that he
raped and sexually abused his daughter.
We also dismiss the argument that the delay in filing the
complaint indicates the innocence of the accused. Likewise
without merit is the accused's contention that the victim was only
persuaded by her aunt to file a case as an act of revenge.
At the outset, we recognize that the filing of complaint for rape
and sexual abuse against one's own parent is a difficult act.
Indeed, it is not really the publicity of trial that traumatizes. The
nightmare that was the act is for life.

Delay of two years on the part of AAA in filing a case docs not
necessarily result to a doubt in her credibility. It must be
emphasized that victims of rape and sexual abuse, especially
minors, react differently to the same set of circumstances. The
workings of a human mind placed under emotional stress arc
unpredictable; people react differently. Some may have a
passive or reactive response or settle into inscnsibility.45
Further, the delay on the part of the victim in relating her ordeal
from her own father was understandable. He is her parent and
her confusion and fear are logical under the circumstances. It
was established during trial that aside from the use of a knife to
enfeeble her resistance, the accused likewise threatened to kill
her and all the members of their family including himself if she
would keep fighting off the horror. To make the matters worse,
her own mother even expressed sympathy for the husband over
the child. Her mother's expression that it was embarrassing to
relate her sad plight aggravated the fear already sowed inside
the minor victim. The delay in filing a case, clearly, was
expalined.46
Penalties and Civil Indemnities
Criminal Case No. 6624
The penalty prescribed under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No.
7610 is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua. However, the penalty provided under this Act shall be
imposed in its maximum period when the perpetrator is an
ascendant, parent guardian, stepparent or collateral relative
within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity, or a
manager or owner of an establishment which has no license to
operate or its license has expired or has been rcvoked.47
We likewise impose the payment of the following amounts or
₱20,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱15,000.00 as moral damages,
₱15,000.00 as exemplary damages and ₱15,000.00 as fine with
six percent (6%) interest from finality of judgment until fully
paid.48
Criminal Case No. 6625
The penalty prescribed for qualified rape is death. Under Article
266-B, death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed by a parent against his child under eighteen (18)
years of age. However, in view of Republic Act No. 9346, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without the eligibility of
parole49 shall be imposed in lieu of the imposition of death
penalty.50
Following the new jurisprudential ruling of People v.
Gambao51 on damages, we increase the amounts of indemnity
and damages to be imposed as follows: ₱100,000.00 as civil
indemnity; ₱100,000.00 as moral damages; and ₱100,000.00 as
exemplary damages.52 In addition, we impose six percent ( 6%)
interest from finality of judgment until fully paid.53
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The 29 November 2011
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00709
modifying the judgment of conviction dated 13 February 2009 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29 of Surigao City is hereby
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
I. In Criminal Case No. 6624:
(a) Finding the accused-appellant guilty of acts of
lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of
Republic Act No. 7610;
(b) Sentencing the accused-appellant to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua; and
(c) Ordering the accused-appellant to pay AAA the
following amounts of ₱20,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱15,000.00 as moral damages, ₱15,000.00 as
exemplary damages and ₱15,000.00 as fine with six
141
percent (6%) interest from finality ofjudgment until fully
paid.
II. In Criminal Case No. 6625:
(a) Finding the accused-appellant guilty of qualified
rape in violation of Art. 266-A paragraph l in relation to
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code;
(b) Sentencing the accused-appellant to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without the eligibility of
parole; and
(c) Ordering the accused-appellant to pay AAA the
following amounts of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱100,000.00 as moral damages, ₱100,000.00 as
exemplary damages with six percent (6%) interest from
finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 188897 : June 06, 2011]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. IRENO
BONAAGUA Y BERCE, APPELLANT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Ireno Bonaagua (Ireno) seeks the reversal of the Decision [1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03133
convicting him with three (3) counts of Statutory Rape under
Paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610 (R.A. No. 7610)
and Acts of Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
In four (4) separate Informations, Ireno was charged by the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City with four (4)
counts of Rape under Paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, as
amended, in relation to R.A. No. 7610, for inserting his tongue
and his finger into the genital of his minor daughter, AAA. [2]
The accusatory portion of the Information in Criminal Case No.
03-0254 against Ireno reads:
That on or about the month of December 1998 in the City of Las
Piñas and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with abuse of influence and moral
ascendancy, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously insert his tongue
and finger into the genital of his daughter, [AAA], a minor then
eight (8) years of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW and with the special aggravating/qualifying
circumstance of minority of the private offended party, [AAA],
being then only eight (8) years of age and relationship of the said
private offended party with the accused, Ireno Bonaagua y
Berce, the latter being the biological father of the former. [3]
The Information in Criminal Case No. 03-0255 [4] has the same
accusatory allegations while the Informations in Criminal Case
Nos. 03-0256 [5] and Criminal Case Nos. 03-0257 [6] are similarly
worded, except for the date of the commission of the crime and
the age of AAA, which are December 2000 and ten (10) years
old, respectively.
The cases were later consolidated [7] and upon his arraignment,
Ireno pleaded not guilty to the four (4) counts of rape with which
he was charged. Consequently, trial on the merits ensued.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the
victim, AAA; the victim's mother; and Dr. Melissa De Leon. The
defense, on the other hand, presented the lone testimony of the
accused as evidence.

Evidence for the Prosecution
The prosecution established that in 1998, AAA and her mother
left their house in Candelaria, Quezon to spend the Christmas
with accused-appellant in Las Piñas City. They stayed in the
house of a certain Lola Jean, the godmother in the wedding of
her parents, at Sta. Cecilia Subdivision, Las Piñas City.
AAA was inside a room lying in bed one afternoon while her
younger brothers were playing outside the house and her mother
was not home. Accused-appellant entered the room. He
approached her, rolled her shirt upward, and removed her shorts
and panty. She tried to resist by putting her clothes back on, but
her father's strength prevailed. Thereafter, accused-appellant
touched and caressed her breasts. He licked her vagina then
inserted his finger into it.
In the evening of the same day, the accused-appellant raped
AAA again in the same manner and under the same
circumstances. AAA did not tell her mother that she was raped
because accused-appellant threatened to kill her mother by
placing the latter's body in a drum and have it cemented if she
would report the incidents. She returned to Quezon with her
mother before the end of the Christmas season.
In December 1999, AAA was raped by accused-appellant for the
third time when he went to Candelaria, Quezon. In December
2000, AAA and her mother spent the Yuletide season with
accused-appellant in Pulanglupa, Las Piñas City. In a single
day, AAA was raped for the fourth and fifth time. While spending
the afternoon inside her father's room at the car-wash station, he
removed her shorts and panty then proceeded to touch and
insert his finger into her vagina. Accused-appellant repeated the
same sexual assault shortly thereafter. AAA again did not report
these incidents for fear that her mother would be killed and
cemented inside a drum.
On January 26, 2001, AAA complained of severe abdominal pain
which prompted her mother to take her to Gregg Hospital in
Sariaya, Quezon. AAA was transferred to the Quezon Memorial
Hospital in Lucena City where Dr. Melissa De Leon performed on
her a physical examination. The results revealed that there was
a healed superficial laceration at the 9 o'clock position on the
hymen of AAA. This medical finding forced AAA to reveal to her
mother all the incidents of rape committed by accused-appellant.
After being discharged from the hospital, AAA's mother took her
to the Police Headquarters of Sariaya, Quezon to file a complaint
for rape against accused-appellant. AAA's mother also took her
to the office of the National Bureau of Investigation in Legaspi
City where she executed a sworn statement against accused-
appellant. [8]
Evidence for the Defense
Accused-appellant denied committing the charges of rape hurled
against him. He claimed to be working in Las Piñas City while
AAA, her mother and siblings where (sic) in Sariaya, Quezon at
the time the alleged rapes occurred. While he admitted that there
were times when AAA and her mother would visit him in Las
Piñas City, he nonetheless averred that they would leave on
the same day they arrived after he gives them money.
Accused-appellant asserted further that the charges of rape
against him were fabricated by AAA's mother, who suspected
him of having an affair with another woman in Las Piñas City. [9]
On August 6, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), after finding
the evidence for the prosecution overwhelming against the
accused's defense of denial and alibi, rendered a
Decision [10] convicting Ireno with four (4) counts of Rape, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being proof beyond
reasonable doubt that accused IRENO BONAAGUA, has
committed four (4) counts of RAPE under par. 2 of Article 266-A
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in relation to R.A.
7610, as charged, the Court hereby pronounced him GUILTY
and sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
142
PERPETUA for each case and to pay private complainant [AAA],
the amount of Php50,000 for each case, or a total of
Php200,000, by way of civil indemnity plus Php50,000 for each
case or a total of Php200,000 as moral damages.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED. [11]
Aggrieved, Ireno appealed the Decision before the CA, which
appeal was later docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03133.
On March 31, 2009, the CA rendered a Decision [12] affirming the
decision of the RTC with modifications on the imposable penalty
in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-0257, and
finding Ireno guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b)
of R.A. No. 7610, instead of Rape, in Criminal Case Nos. 03-
0255, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Las
Piñas City, Branch 254, finding Ireno Bonaagua y Berce guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONS:
1. Ireno Bonaagua y Berce is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum,
to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each rape in
Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256 and 03-0257 and is
ordered to pay AAA the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages in each case, apart from the civil indemnity and moral
damages that have already been awarded by the trial court;
2. Ireno Bonaagua y Berce is hereby held guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness in
Criminal Case No. 03-0255, with relationship as an aggravating
circumstance. He is, accordingly, sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 day to 17 years and 4
months of reclusion temporal in its minimum and medium
periods and ordered to pay AAA the amount of PhP15,000 as
moral damages and a fine of PhP15,000.00.
SO ORDERED. [13]
In fine, the CA found Ireno's defense of denial and alibi
inherently weak against the positive identification of AAA that he
was the culprit of the horrid deed. Thus, aside from modifying the
imposable penalty in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256 and
03-0257, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC finding Ireno
guilty of the crime of Rape Through Sexual Assault.
In Criminal Case No. 03-0255, however, after a diligent review of
the evidence adduced by the prosecution, the CA only found
Ireno guilty of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under Section
5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. The CA opined that since the prosecution
failed to establish the act of insertion by Ireno of his finger into
the vagina of AAA, Ireno could only be found guilty of Acts of
Lasciviousness, a crime which is necessarily included in the
Information filed against him in Criminal Case No. 03-0255.
Ireno now comes before this Court for relief.
In a Resolution [14] dated December 16, 2009, the Court informed
the parties that they may file their respective supplemental briefs
if they so desire. In their respective Manifestations, [15] the parties
waived the filing of their supplemental briefs and, instead,
adopted their respective briefs filed before the CA.
Hence, Ireno raises the lone error:
I
The COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF RAPE
DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. [16]
Simply put, Ireno maintains that the testimony of AAA was
replete with inconsistencies and was extremely unbelievable.
Ireno insists that the allegation that he inserted his tongue and
finger into the genital of AAA was manifestly incredible as the
deed is physiologically impossible. Moreover, the medical
findings are grossly inconclusive to prove that AAA was raped,

since it only established that there was only one healed
superficial laceration.
This Court, however, finds the arguments raised by Ireno
untenable. To determine the innocence or guilt of the accused in
rape cases, the courts are guided by three well-entrenched
principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility
and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more
difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2)
considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are
usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the
complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the defense. [17]
After perusing the testimony of the victim, AAA, the prosecution
has indubitably established that Ireno was the one who sexually
assaulted her. AAA categorically narrated that Ireno sexually
abused her on several occasions and even threatened AAA that
he would kill her mother if she would report the incidents.
Time and again, this Court has consistently held that in rape
cases, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is best
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge whose
conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect because
the judge had the direct opportunity to observe them on the
stand and ascertain if they were telling the truth or not.
Generally, appellate courts will not interfere with the trial court's
assessment in this regard, absent any indication or showing that
the trial court has overlooked some material facts of substance
or value, or gravely abused its discretion. [18]
It is well entrenched in this jurisdiction that when the offended
parties are young and immature girls, as in this case, courts are
inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired,
considering not only their relative vulnerability, but also the
shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed if
the matter about which they testified were not true. [19] A young
girl would not usually concoct a tale of defloration; publicly admit
having been ravished and her honor tainted; allow the
examination of her private parts; and undergo all the trouble and
inconvenience, not to mention the trauma and scandal of a
public trial, had she not in fact been raped and been truly moved
to protect and preserve her honor, and motivated by the desire to
obtain justice for the wicked acts committed against
her. [20] Moreover, the Court has repeatedly held that the lone
testimony of the victim in a rape case, if credible, is enough to
sustain a conviction. [21]
Moreover, contrary to Ireno's contention, the medical findings of
Dr. Melissa De Leon did not refute AAA's testimony of
defilement, but instead bolstered her claim. The RTC correctly
concluded:
It is true that Dr. Melissa De Leon, when called to the witness
stand to substantiate the same medical certification, did not rule
out the possibility that the laceration might have been inflicted
through some other causes and that there could have been only
one instance of finger insertion into the vagina of private
complainant. However, it is equally true that Dr. De Leon also did
not rule out the possibility that finger insertion might have been
the cause of the laceration (pp. 7-12, TSN, January 31, 2006).
Dr. De Leon also clarified that only one laceration may be
inflicted although a finger is inserted into the vagina on separate
instances (pp. 19-26, supra). According to Dr. De Leon, this
instance depends on the force exerted into the vagina and on
whether or not the hymen is membranous or firm and thick. A
membranous hymen is easily lacerated and so when a force is
exerted into it on several occasions, several lacerations may
occur. A thick and firm hymen is not easily lacerated and so a
force exerted into it on several occasions may cause only one
laceration. Private complainant has thick and firm hymen and
this may explain why there is only (sic) laceration on her hymen
although she claimed her father inserted into her vagina his
finger several times (pp. 19-29, supra).
This non-categorical stance of Dr. De Leon is nonetheless
understandable because Dr. De Leon has no personal
knowledge of what actually happened to private complainant that
143
she (complainant) suffered hymenal laceration. However, there is
one thing very certain though in the testimony of Dr. De Leon -
that she medically examined [AAA], herein private complainant,
because of the information that [AAA] was sexually abused by
her [AAA's] own father (pp. 5-6, supra). And indeed, as already
discussed lengthily above, there is no reason to doubt the
veracity of AAA's allegation. [22]
The same conclusion was also arrived at by the CA, to wit:
While the medico-legal findings showed a single healed
superficial laceration on the hymen of AAA, Dr. De Leon clarified
that it is not impossible for a hymen to sustain only one
laceration despite the fact that a finger had been inserted into
the vagina on several accounts. This situation may arise
depending on the force extended into the vagina and on whether
or not the hymen of the victim is membranous or firm and thick. A
membranous hymen is easily lacerated; thus, when a force is
exerted into it on several occasions, several lacerations may
occur. On the other hand, a thick and firm hymen is not easily
lacerated; a force exerted into it on several occasions may cause
only one laceration. According to Dr. De Leon, AAA has thick and
firm hymen and this may explain why it has only one laceration
despite her claim that accused-appellant inserted his finger
inside her vagina several times. [23]
Even Ireno's contention that the charges against him were
merely fabricated by his wife because she suspects that he is
having an affair with another woman deserves scant
consideration. Aside from the fact that the said allegation was
not proved, it must be emphasized that no member of a rape
victim's family would dare encourage the victim to publicly
expose the dishonor to the family unless the crime was in fact
committed, especially in this case where the victim and the
offender are relatives. [24] It is unnatural for a mother to use her
daughter as an engine of malice, especially if it will subject her
child to embarrassment and lifelong stigma. [25]
Also, Ireno cannot likewise rely on the Affidavit of Desistance
stating that AAA and her mother are no longer interested in
pursuing the case filed against him.
Rape is no longer a crime against chastity for it is now classified
as a crime against persons. [26]Consequently, rape is no longer
considered a private crime or that
whichcannotbeprosecuted,exceptupona complaint filed by the
aggrieved party. Hence, pardon by the offended party of the
offender in the crime of rape will not extinguish the offender's
criminal liability. Moreover, an Affidavit of Desistance ? even
when construed as a pardon in the erstwhile "private crime" of
rape ? is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal cases,
since the actions have already been instituted. To justify the
dismissal of the complaints, the pardon should have been made
prior to the institution of the criminal actions. [27] As correctly
concluded by the CA, the said affidavit was executed in
connection with another accusation of rape which Ireno
committed against AAA in Candelaria, Quezon and not the four
cases of rape subject of this appeal. In addition, AAA's mother
testified that she executed the said affidavit to regain custody of
her children who were brought to Bicol by Ireno's siblings. [28]
It has been repeatedly held by this Court that it looks with
disfavor on affidavits of desistance. As cited in People v.
Alcazar, [29] the rationale for this was extensively discussed
in People v. Junio: [30]
x x x We have said in so many cases that retractions are
generally unreliable and are looked upon with considerable
disfavor by the courts. The unreliable character of this document
is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that after going
through the process of having the [appellant] arrested by the
police, positively identifying him as the person who raped her,
enduring the humiliation of a physical examination of her private
parts, and then repeating her accusations in open court by
recounting her anguish, [the rape victim] would suddenly turn
around and declare that [a]fter a careful deliberation over the
case, (she) find(s) that the same does not merit or warrant
criminal prosecution.
Thus, we have declared that at most the retraction is an

afterthought which should not be given probative value. It would
be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before the
court of justice simply because the witness who gave it later on
changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a rule [would]
make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the
mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Because affidavits of
retraction can easily be secured from poor and ignorant
witnesses, usually for monetary consideration, the Court has
invariably regarded such affidavits as exceedingly unreliable. [31]
Amidst the overwhelming evidence against him, Ireno offered
nothing but his bare denial of the accusations against him and
that he was someplace else when the dastardly acts were
committed. No jurisprudence in criminal law is more settled than
that alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive
and difficult to disprove, and for which reason it is generally
rejected. [32] It has been consistently held that denial and alibi are
the most common defenses in rape cases. Denial could not
prevail over complainant's direct, positive and categorical
assertion. As between a positive and categorical testimony which
has the ring of truth, on one hand, and a bare denial, on the
other, the former is generally held to prevail. [33] All said, as found
by the CA, the prosecution has convincingly proved and more
than sufficiently established that: (1) Ireno committed the
accusations of Rape Through Sexual Assault against AAA in
Criminal Cases Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-0257; (2) that
AAA was a minor when Ireno committed the sexual assault
against her; [34] and (3) that Ireno was the biological father of
AAA. [35]
Verily, in criminal cases, an examination of the entire records of a
case may be explored for the purpose of arriving at a correct
conclusion, as an appeal in criminal cases throws the whole
case open for review, it being the duty of the court to correct
such error as may be found in the judgment appealed
from. [36]Since the CA found Ireno guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness
under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 in Criminal Case No. 03-
0255 instead of rape, the Court should thus determine whether
the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to
establish that the intentional touching of the victim by Ireno
constitutes lascivious conduct and whether the CA imposed the
appropriate penalties.
As aptly found by the CA:
A diligent review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution,
however, shows that accused-appellant cannot be held guilty as
charged for the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 03-0255. The
prosecution failed to establish insertion by accused-appellant of
his finger into the vagina of AAA, who testified on direct
examination that accused-appellant "touched my private part and
licked it but he did not insert his finger inside my vagina." In
fact, even the trial court asked AAA if accused-appellant inserted
his finger inside her vagina. She answered in the negative and
averred that he licked her vagina and touched her breasts. In
reply to the prosecution's query if accused-appellant did anything
else aside from licking her organ, she said he also touched it.
During cross-examination, AAA testified that accused-appellant
"merely touched her vagina but did not insert his finger." [37]
Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, defines and penalizes
acts of lasciviousness committed against a child as follows:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. --
Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any
other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any
adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
x x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other
sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victims is under twelve
(12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under
Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No.
3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or
lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the
penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve
144
(12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium
period. [38]
Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
not only with a child exploited in prostitution, but also with a child
subjected to other sexual abuses. It covers not only a situation
where a child is abused for profit, but also where one ? through
coercion, intimidation or influence ? engages in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child. [39]
However, pursuant to the foregoing provision, before an accused
can be convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct
committed against a minor below 12 years of age, the requisites
for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC must be
met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5
of R.A. No. 7610. [40]
Acts of Lasciviousness, as defined in Article 336 of the RPC, has
the following elements:
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or
lewdness;
(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex. [41]
In addition, the following elements of sexual abuse under
Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610 must be established:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of
age. [42]
[43]
Corollarilly, Section 2 (h) of the rules and regulations of R.A.
No. 7610 defines "Lascivious conduct" as:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of
the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the
introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of
any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent
to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the
sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person. [44]
Undeniably, all the afore-stated elements are present in Criminal
Case No. 03-0255. Ireno committed lascivious acts against AAA
by touching her breasts and licking her vagina and the lascivious
or lewd acts were committed against AAA, who was 8 years old
at the time as established by her birth certificate. [45]Thus, the CA
correctly found Ireno guilty of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness
under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.
It must be emphasized, however, that like in the crime of rape
whereby the slightest penetration of the male organ or even its
slightest contact with the outer lip or the labia majora of the
vagina already consummates the crime, in like manner, if the
tongue, in an act of cunnilingus, touches the outer lip of the
vagina, the act should also be considered as already
consummating the crime of rape through sexual assault, not the
crime of acts of lasciviousness. Notwithstanding, in the present
case, such logical interpretation could not be applied. It must be
pointed out that the victim testified that Ireno only touched her
private part and licked it, but did not insert his finger in her
vagina. This testimony of the victim, however, is open to various
interpretation, since it cannot be identified what specific part of
the vagina was defiled by Ireno. Thus, in conformity with the
principle that the guilt of an accused must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt, the statement cannot be the basis for
convicting Ireno with the crime of rape through sexual assault.

Penalties and Award of Damages
Having found Ireno guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape
Through Sexual Assault in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-
0256, and 03-0257 and Acts of Lasciviousness in Criminal Case
No. 03-0255, We shall proceed to determine the appropriate
penalties imposable for each offense.
Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-0257
Under Article 266-B of the RPC, the penalty for rape by sexual
assault is reclusion temporal "if the rape is committed by any of
the 10 aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in this
article." [46] In Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-
0257, the aggravating/qualifying circumstance of minority and
relationship are present, considering that the rape was
committed by a parent against his minor child. Reclusion
temporal ranges from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of
the indeterminate penalty shall be that which could be properly
imposed under the RPC. Other than the aggravating/qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship which have been
taken into account to raise the penalty to reclusion
temporal, [47] no other aggravating circumstance was alleged and
proven. Hence, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium
period, [48] or fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.
On the other hand, the minimum term of the indeterminate
sentence should be within the range of the penalty next lower in
degree than that prescribed by the Code which is prision
mayor or six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years. [49] Thus, Ireno should be meted the indeterminate penalty
of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal,as
maximum.
It must be clarified, however, that the reasoning expounded by
the Court in the recent case of People v. Armando Chingh y
Parcia, [50] for imposing upon the accused the higher penalty
provided in Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, has no
application in the case at bar. In the said case, the Court,
acknowledging the fact that to impose the lesser penalty would
be unfair to the child victim, meted upon the accused the higher
penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period as provided in
Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, instead of the lesser
penalty of prision mayor prescribed by Article 266-B for rape by
sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC. The
Court elucidated:
In this case, the offended party was ten years old at the time of
the commission of the offense. Pursuant to the above-quoted
provision of law, Armando was aptly prosecuted under Art. 266-
A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
8353, for Rape Through Sexual Assault. However, instead of
applying the penalty prescribed therein, which is prision mayor,
considering that VVV was below 12 years of age, and
considering further that Armando's act of inserting his finger in
VVV's private part undeniably amounted to lascivious conduct,
the appropriate imposable penalty should be that provided in
Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which is reclusion
temporal in its medium period.
The Court is not unmindful to the fact that the accused who
commits acts of lasciviousness under Art. 366 in relation to
Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, suffers the more severe
penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period than the one
who commits Rape Through Sexual Assault, which is merely
punishable by prision mayor. This is undeniably unfair to the
child victim. To be sure, it was not the intention of the framers of
R.A. No. 8353 to have disallowed the applicability of R.A. No.
7610 to sexual abuses committed to children. Despite the
passage of RA No. 8353, R.A. No. 7610 is still good law, which
must be applied when the victims are children or those "persons
below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to
fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse,
145
neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a
physical or mental disability or condition."
In the present case, the factual milieu was different since the
offender, Ireno, is the father of the minor victim. Hence, the
offenses were committed with the aggravating/qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship, attendant
circumstances which were not present in the Chingh case, which
in turn, warrants the imposition of the higher penalty of reclusion
temporal prescribed by Article 266-B of the RPC. Considering
that the RPC already prescribes such penalty, the rationale of
unfairness to the child victim that Chingh wanted to correct is
absent. Hence, there is no more need to apply the penalty
prescribed by R.A. No. 7610.
As to civil liabilities, the damages awarded in the form of civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and moral damages, also
in the amount of P50,000.00, for each count of Rape must be
both reduced to P30,000.00, respectively, in line with current
jurisprudence. [51] Also, the amount of exemplary damages
awarded in the amount of P25,000.00 must be increased to
P30,000.00 for each count of Rape. [52]
Criminal Case No. 03-0255
It is beyond cavil that when the sexual abuse was committed by
Ireno, AAA was only eight (8) years old. Hence, the provisions of
R.A. No. 7610, or The Special Protection of Children Against
Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, should be
applied.
Thus, the appropriate imposable penalty should be that provided
in Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which is reclusion
temporal in its medium period which is fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months. As the crime was committed by the father of the
offended party, the alternative circumstance of relationship
should be appreciated. In crimes against chastity, such as Acts
of Lasciviousness, relationship is always
aggravating. [53] Therefore, Ireno should be meted the
indeterminate penalty of thirteen (13) years, nine (9) months and
eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to sixteen
(16) years, five (5) months and ten (10) days of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
Moreover, the award in the amount of P15,000.00 as moral
damages and a fine in the amount of P15,000.00, is proper in
line with current jurisprudence. [54] However, civil indemnity ex
delicto in the amount of P20,000.00 should also be
awarded. [55] In view of the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of relationship, the amount of P15,000.00 as
exemplary damages should likewise be awarded. [56]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court
of Appeals, dated March 31, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
03133, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-
0257, IRENO BONAAGUA y BERCE is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each count. He is
likewise ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages for each count of Qualified Rape Through
Sexual Assault or a total of P90,000.00 for each count.
2. In Criminal Case No. 03-0255, IRENO BONAAGUA y
BERCE is meted to suffer the indeterminate penalty of thirteen
(13) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, five (5) months and
ten (10) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In addition to
moral damages and fine, he is likewise ordered to pay
P20,000.00 as civil indemnity and P15,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 173988 October 8, 2014

FELINA ROSALDES, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The petitioner, a public schoolteacher, was charged with and
found guilty of child abuse, a violation of Republic Act No.
7610.1 The victim was her own Grade 1 pupil whom she
physically maltreated for having accidentally bumped her knee
while she was drowsing off on a bamboo sofa as he entered the
classroom. Her maltreatment left him with physical injuries, as
duly certified by a physician.
Whether or not the petitioner thereby committed child abuse is
the question that this appeal must determine, in light of the
Court's pronouncement in Bongalon v. People of the
Philippines2 that:
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes
the crime of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No.
7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond
reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as
a human being should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise,
it is punished under the Revised Penal Code.
Antecedents
The State, through the Office ofthe Solicitor General, summed up
the factual antecedents in its comment,3 as follows:
On February 13, 1996, seven yearold Michael Ryan Gonzales,
then a Grade 1 pupil at Pughanan Elementary School located in
the Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, was hurriedly entering his
classroom when he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher,
petitioner Felina Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo
sofa (TSN, March 14, 1997, pp. 5-6). Roused from sleep,
petitioner asked Michael Ryan to apologize to her. When Michael
did not obey but instead proceeded to his seat (TSN, March 14,
1997, p. 6), petitioner went to Michael and pinched him on his
thigh. Then, she held him up by his armpits and pushed him to
the floor. As he fell, Michael Ryan’s body hit a desk. As a result,
he lost consciousness. Petitioner proceeded topick Michael
Ryan up by his ears and repeatedly slammed him down on the
floor. Michael Ryan cried (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 6; TSN,
November 13, 1997, p. 7).
After the incident, petitioner proceeded to teach her class.
During lunch break, Michael Ryan, accompanied by two of his
classmates, Louella Loredo and Jonalyn Gonzales, went home
crying and told his mother about the incident (TSN, March 14,
1997, p. 7). His mother and his Aunt Evangeline Gonzales
reported the incident to their Barangay Captain, Gonzalo Larroza
(TSN, February 1, 1999, p. 4) who advised them to have Michael
Ryan examined by a doctor. Michael Ryan’s aunt and Barangay
Councilman Ernesto Ligante brought him to the Dr. Ricardo Y.
Ladrido Hospital where he was examined by Dr. Teresita
Castigador. They, likewise, reported the incident to the Police
Station (TSN, July 27, 1997, p. 6; TSN, February 1, 1999, p. 4).
The medical certificate issued by Dr. Teresita Castigador reads,
in part:
1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external ears 1x2
cm. and 1x1 cm.;
2. Lumbar pains and tenderness at area of L3-L4;
3. Contusions at left inner thigh 1x1 and 1x1 cm.;
4. Tenderness and painful on walking especially at the
area of femoral head.
146
The petitioner was criminally charged with child abusein the
Regional Trial Court in Iloilo City (RTC), and the case was
assigned to Branch 27 of that court. The information alleged as
follows: The Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo, upon approval and
Directive of the Deputy OMBUDSMAN for the Visayas accuses
FELINA ROSALDES of the crime of VIOLATION OF CHILD
ABUSE LAW
(Section 10 (a) of R.A. 7610), committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of February 1996, in the
Municipality of Lambunao, Province of Iloilo, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being a public school teacher in Grade 1 of Pughanan
Elementary School, with a Salary Grade below 26, under the
DECS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
maltreat her pupil Michael Ryan Gonzales, a seven year old
child, by pinching him on different parts of his body, and
thereafter slumping him to the ground, thereby causing Michael
Ryan Gonzales to lose his consciousness and has suffered
injuries on different parts of his body.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On June 26, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment convicting the
petitioner of child abuse,5 disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of R.A. 7610, the
Court sentences her to an indeterminate prison term ranging
from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the costs.
No pronouncement as to civil liability, the same not having been
proved.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of the petitioner
through its assailed decision promulgated on May 11, 2005,7 with
a modification of the penalty, viz: WHEREFORE, premises
considered, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the
appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision rendered
on June 26, 2003 by the court a quo in Criminal Case No. 46893
with the MODIFICATION that the accusedappellant is sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as the minimum
of it, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the
maximum thereof.
IT IS SO ORDERED.8
In her petition for review on certiorari,9 the petitioner submits
that:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner by holding
that the acts of the petitioner constitute child abuse penalized
under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610[,] and notunder
the Revised Penal Code.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner by holding
that petitioner’s constitutional right to due process and her right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
her was not violated when the essential elements of the crime
charged were not properly recited in the information.10
Countering, the State, through the OSG, insists that the issues
the petitioner is raising are mainly factual and, therefore, not
reviewable under the mode of appeal chosen; that the affirmance
of her conviction by the CA was in accord with the pertinent law

and jurisprudence, and supported by the overwhelming evidence
of the trial; and that the information charging her with child abuse
was sufficient in form and substance.11
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
First of all, the State correctly contends that the petitioner could
raise only questions of law in her present recourse. Under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, the appeal is limited to questionsof law.
The immediate implication of the limitation is to have the findings
of fact by the CA, which affirmed the findings of fact by the trial
court, conclude the Court by virtue of its not being a trier of fact.
As such, the Court cannot analyze or weigh the evidence all over
again.
It is true that the limitation of the review to errors of law admits of
exceptions. Under Section 4, Rule 3 of the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court, the following situations are the exceptions in
which the Court may review findings of fact by the lower courts,
to wit: (a) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmise and conjecture; (b) the inference made is
manifestly mistaken; (c) there is grave abuse of discretion; (d)
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) the
findings of fact are conflicting; (f) the collegial appellate courts
went beyond the issues of the case, and their findings are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g)
the findings of fact of the collegial appellate courts are contrary
to those of the trial court; (h) said findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i)
the facts set forth in the petition aswell as in the petitioner’s main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; (j) the
findings of fact of the collegial appellate courts are premised on
the supposed evidence, but are contradicted by the evidence on
record; and (k) all other similar and exceptional cases warranting
a review of the lower courts’ findings of fact. A further exception
is recognized when the CA manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed bythe parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.12 Yet, none of the
exceptions applies herein.
Secondly, the petitioner contends that she did not deliberately
inflict the physical injuries suffered by MichaelRyan to maltreat or
malign him in a manner that would debase, demean or degrade
his dignity. She characterizes her maltreatment as anact of
discipline that she as a school teacher could reasonably do
towards the development of the child. She insists that her act
further came under the doctrine of in loco parentis.
The contention of the petitioner is utterly bereft of merit.
Although the petitioner, as a school teacher, could duly discipline
Michael Ryan as her pupil, her infliction of the physical injuries
on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even
fainted from the violence suffered at her hands.13 She could not
justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake of disciplining
him. Her physical maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited
by no less than the Family Code, which has expressly banned
the infliction of corporal punishmentby a school administrator,
teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special
parental authority (i.e., in loco parentis), viz:
Article 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority
shall have the same authority over the person of the child as the
parents.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual
engaged in child care exercising special parental authority inflict
corporal punishment upon the child. (n)
Proof of the severe results of the petitioner’s physical
maltreatment of Michael Ryan was provided by Dr. Teresita
Castigador, the Medico-Legal Officer of the Dr. Ricardo Y.
Ladrido Memorial Hospital in Iloilo who examined the victim at
about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of February 13, 1996, barely
147
three hours from the timethe boy had sustained his injuries. Her
Medical Report stated as follows:
1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external ears 1x2
cm. and 1x1 cm.;
2. Lumbar pains and tenderness at area of L3-L4;
3. Contusions at left inner thigh 1x1 and 1x1 cm.;
4. Tenderness and painful on walking especially at the
area of femoral head.
Reflecting her impressions of the physical injuries based on the
testimonial explanations of Dr. Castigador, the trial judge
observed in the decision of June 26, 2003:
A petechiae (wound no. 1), according to Dr. Castigador is a
discoloration of the skin caused by the extravasation of blood
beneath it. She opined that the petechiae and tenderness of the
ears of the victim could have been caused by pinching. As to the
lumbar pain and tenderness at the third and fourth level of the
vertebrae (wound no. 2), the doctor testified that during her
examination of the victim the latter felt pain when she put
pressure on the said area. She stated that this could be caused
by pressure or contact with a hard object. Wound No. 3 is
located on the victim’sleft inner thigh. According to her this could
not have been caused by ordinary pinching with pressure.
Wound No. 4 is located on the upper part of the left thigh. Dr.
Castigador testified that she noticed that the boy was limping as
he walked.14
Section 3 of RepublicAct No. 7610 defines child abusethusly:
xxxx
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or
not, of the child which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty,
sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases,
degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of
a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for
survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an
injured child resulting in serious impairment of his
growth and development or in his permanent incapacity
or death.
xxxx
In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the
maltreatment may consist of an act by deedsor by wordsthat
debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of
a child as a human being. The act need not be habitual. The CA
concluded that the petitioner "went overboard in disciplining
Michael Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-year old boy, when she
pinched hard Michael Ryan on the left thigh and when she held
him in the armpits and threw him on the floor[; and as] the boy
fell down, his body hit the desk causing him to lose
consciousness [but instead] of feeling a sense of remorse, the
accused-appellant further held the boy up by his ears and
pushed him down on the floor."15 On her part, the trial judge said
that the physical pain experienced by the victim had been
aggravated by an emotional trauma that caused him to stop
going to school altogether out of fear of the petitioner, compelling
his parents to transfer him to another school where he had to
adjust again.16 Such established circumstances proved beyond
reasonable doubt thatthe petitioner was guilty of child abuse by

deeds that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and
dignity of Michael Ryan as a human being.
It was also shown that Michael Ryan’s physical maltreatment by
the petitioner was neither her first or only maltreatment of a child.
Prosecution witness Louella Loredo revealed on cross
examination that she had also experienced the petitioner’s
cruelty.17 The petitioner was also convicted by the RTC in Iloilo
City (Branch 39) in Criminal Case No. 348921 for maltreatment
of another childnamed Dariel Legayada. 18 Such previous
incidents manifested that the petitioner had "a propensity for
violence," as the trial judge stated in her decision of June 26,
2003.19
Thirdly, the petitioner submits that the information charging her
with child abuse was insufficient in form and substance, in that
the essential elements of the crime charged were not properly
alleged therein; and that her constitutional and statutory right to
due process of law was consequently violated.
The petitioner’s submission deserves scant consideration.
Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the information
is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation
of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the proximate date of the commission of the
offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
The information explicitly averred the offense of child
abusecharged against the petitioner in the context of the
statutory definition of child abuse found in Section 3 (b) of
Republic Act No. 7610, supra, and thus complied with the
requirements of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the Court should no longer entertain the petitioner’s
challenge against the sufficiency of the information in form and
substance. Her last chance to pose the challenge was prior to
the time she pleaded to the information through a motion to
quash on the ground that the information did not conform
substantially to the prescribed form, or did not charge an offense.
She did not do so, resulting in her waiver of the challenge.
Fourthly, the RTC did not grant civil damages as civil liability ex
delictobecause no evidence had been adduced thereon.20 The
CA saw nothing wrong with the omission by the trial court. The
explanation tendered by the trial judge for the omission was
misplaced, however, because even without proof of the actual
expenses, or testimony on the victim’s feelings, the lower courts
still had the authority to define and allow civil liability arising from
the offense and the means to fix their extent. The child abuse
surely inflicted on Michael Ryan physical and emotional trauma
as well as moral injury. It cannot also be denied that his parents
necessarily spent for his treatment. We hold that both lower
courts committed a plain error that demands correction by the
Court. Indeed, as the Court pointed out in Bacolod v. People, 21 it
was "imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties
when convicting the accused, and determine the civil liability to
be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a reservation
of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery,"
explaining the reason for doing so in the following manner:
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA
disregarded their express mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of
the Rules of Courtto have the judgment, if it was of conviction,
state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the
acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the
participation ofthe accused in the offense, whether as principal,
accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed
upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused
by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the
accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has
been reserved or waived." Their disregard compels us to actas
we now do lest the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of
their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves
seek the correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance
to this action because the Court, as the final reviewing tribunal,
148
has not only the authority but also the duty to correct at any time
a matter of law and justice.1âwphi1
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid
omitting reliefs that the parties are properly entitled to by law or
in equity under the established facts. Their judgments will not be
worthy of the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights
and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by
a full determination of such rights and obligations would they
betrue to the judicial office of administering justice and equity for
all. Courts should then be alert and cautious in their rendition of
judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe
the legal penalties, which is what the Constitution and the law
require and expect them to do. Their prescription of the wrong
penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done without
jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. They should also determine and set the civil
liability ex delictoof the accused, in order to do justice to the
complaining victims who are always entitled to them. The Rules
of Court mandates them to do so unless the enforcement of the
civil liability by separate actions has been reserved or waived.22
Moral damages should be awarded to assuage the moral and
emotional sufferings of the victim, and in that respect the Court
believes and holds that ₱20,000.00 is reasonable. The victim
was likewise entitled to exemplary damages, considering that
Article 2230 of the Civil Code authorizes such damages if at
least one aggravating circumstance attended the commission of
the crime. The child abuse committed by the petitioner was
aggravated her being a public school teacher, a factor in raising
the penalty to its maximum period pursuantto Section 31(e) of
Republic Act No. 7610. The amount of ₱20,000.00 as exemplary
damages is imposed on in order to set an example for the public
good and as a deterrent to other public school teachers who
violate the ban imposed by Article 233 of the Family Code,
supra, against the infliction of corporal punishment on children
under their substitute parental authority. The lack of proof of the
actual expenses for the victim’s treatmentshould not hinder the
granting of a measure of compensation in the formof temperate
damages, which, according to Article 2224 of the Civil Code,
may be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered
butits amount cannot be proved with certainty. There being no
question aboutthe injuries sustained requiring medical treatment,
temperate damages ofat least ₱20,000.00 are warranted, for it
would be inequitable not to recognize the need for the treatment.
Lastly, interest of 6% per annum shall be charged on all the
items of civil liability, to be reckoned from the finality of this
decision until full payment.
The penalty for the child abusecommitted by the petitioner is that
prescribed in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610, viz:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation
and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse,
cruelty or exploitation or to be responsible for other conditions
prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by
Atiicle 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not
covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer
the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
xxxx
The CA revised the penalty fixed by the R TC by imposing the
indeterminate penalty of four years, two months and one day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years and one day of
prision mayor, as the maximum, on the ground that the offense
was aggravated by the petitioner being a public
schoolteacher.23 It cited Section 3 l(e) of Republic Act No. 7610,
which commands that the penalty provided in the Act "shall be
imposed in its maximum period if the offender is a public officer
or employee." Her being a public schoolteacher was alleged in
the information and established by evidence as well as admitted
by her. The revised penalty was erroneous, however, because
Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610 punishes the crime
committed by the petitioner with prision mayor in its minimum
period, whose three periods are six years and one day to six

years and eight months, for the minimum period; six years, eight
months and one day to seven years and four months, for the
medium period; and seven years, four months and one day to
eight years, for the maximum period. The maximum of the
indeterminate sentence should come from the maximum period,
therefore, and the Court fixes it at seven years, four months and
one day of prision mayor. The minimum of the indeterminate
sentence should come from prision correccional in the maximum
period, the penalty next lower than prision mayor in its minimum
period, whose range is from four years, two months and one day
to six years.1âwphi1 Accordingly, the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence is four years, nine months and 11 days,
and the maximum is seven years, four months and one day of
prision mayor.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
May 11, 2005, subject to the MODIFICATIONS that: (a) the
petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years,
nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as
minimum, to seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
pr is ion mayor, as the maximum; (b) the petitioner shall pay to
Michael Ryan Gonzales ₱20,000.00 as moral damages,
₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱20,000.00 as
temperate damages, plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum
on each item of the civil liability reckoned from the finality of this
decision until full payment; and (c) the petitioner shall pay the
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169533 March 20, 2013
GEORGE BONGALON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes
the crime of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No.
7610.1 Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond
reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as
a human being should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise,
it is punished under the Revised Penal Code.
The Case
2
On June 22, 2005, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
conviction of the petitioner for the crime of child abuse under
Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610.
Antecedents
On June 26, 2000, the Prosecutor’s Office of Legazpi City
charged the petitioner in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Legazpi City with child abuse, an act in violation of Section 10(a)
of Republic Act No. 7610, alleging as follows:
That on or about the 11th day of May 2000, in the City of Legazpi
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously commit on the person of JAYSON DELA CRUZ,
a twelve year-old,
Grade VI pupil of MABA Institute, Legazpi City, acts of physical
abuse and/or maltreatment by striking said JAYSON DELA
CRUZ with his palm hitting the latter at his back and by slapping
said minor hitting his left cheek and uttering derogatory remarks
to the latter’s family to wit: "Mga hayop kamo, para dayo kamo
digdi, Iharap mo dito ama mo" (You all animals, you are all
strangers here. Bring your father here), which acts of the
accused are prejudicial to the child’s development and which
149
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the said child as a
human being.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The Prosecution showed that on May 11, 2002, Jayson Dela
Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his older brother, both minors, joined
the evening procession for the Santo Niño at Oro Site in Legazpi
City; that when the procession passed in front of the petitioner’s
house, the latter’s daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a minor, threw
stones at Jayson and called him "sissy"; that the petitioner
confronted Jayson and Roldan and called them names like
"strangers" and "animals"; that the petitioner struck Jayson at the
back with his hand, and slapped Jayson on the face;4 that the
petitioner then went to the brothers’ house and challenged
Rolando dela Cruz, their father, to a fight, but Rolando did not
come out of the house to take on the petitioner; that Rolando
later brought Jayson to the Legazpi City Police Station and
reported the incident; that Jayson also underwent medical
treatment at the Bicol Regional Training and Teaching
Hospital;5 that the doctors who examined Jayson issued two
medical certificates attesting that Jayson suffered the following
contusions, to wit: (1) contusion .5 x 2.5 scapular area, left; and
(2) +1x1 cm. contusion left zygomatic area and contusion .5 x
2.33 cm. scapular area, left.6
On his part, the petitioner denied having physically abused or
maltreated Jayson. He explained that he only talked with Jayson
and Roldan after Mary Ann Rose and Cherrylyn, his minor
daughters, had told him about Jayson and Roldan’s throwing
stones at them and about Jayson’s burning Cherrylyn’s hair. He
denied shouting invectives at and challenging Rolando to a fight,
insisting that he only told Rolando to restrain his sons from
harming his daughters.7
To corroborate the petitioner’s testimony, Mary Ann Rose
testified that her father did not hit or slap but only confronted
Jayson, asking why Jayson had called her daughters "Kimi" and
why he had burned Cherrlyn’s hair. Mary Ann Rose denied
throwing stones at Jayson and calling him a "sissy." She insisted
that it was instead Jayson who had pelted her with stones during
the procession. She described the petitioner as a loving and
protective father.8
Ruling of the RTC
After trial, the RTC found and declared the petitioner guilty of
child abuse as charged, to wit:9
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment
is hereby rendered finding the accused GEORGE BONGALON
@ "GI" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of
Republic Act No. 7610, and is hereby ordered to undergo
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years
of prision mayor in its minimum period.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the petitioner assailed the credibility of the
Prosecution witnesses by citing their inconsistencies. He
contended that the RTC overlooked or disregarded material facts
and circumstances in the records that would have led to a
favorable judgment for him. He attacked the lack of credibility of
the witnesses presented against him, citing the failure of the
complaining brothers to react to the incident, which was
unnatural and contrary to human experience.
The CA affirmed the conviction, but modified the penalty,10 viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated October
20, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9 of Legazpi City is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-
appellant George Bongalon is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)

day of prision correccional, as minimum term, to six (6) years,
eight (8) months and 1 day of prision mayor as the maximum
term.
Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim, Jayson
de la Cruz the additional amount of ₱5,000 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
The petitioner has come to the Court via a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.11
The petitioner asserts that he was not guilty of the crime
charged; and that even assuming that he was guilty, his liability
should be mitigated because he had merely acted to protect her
two minor daughters.
Ruling of the Court
At the outset, we should observe that the petitioner has adopted
the wrong remedy in assailing the CA’s affirmance of his
conviction. His proper recourse from the affirmance of his
conviction was an appeal taken in due course. Hence, he should
have filed a petition for review on certiorari. Instead, he wrongly
brought a petition for certiorari. We explained why in People v.
Court of Appeals:12
The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction
of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is
only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its
jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As
observed in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et
al. "the special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for
the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.
The raison d’etre for the rule is when a court exercises its
jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not
deprived it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is
committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would
deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would
be a void judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of
justice would not survive. Hence, where the issue or question
involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision–
not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision–the same
is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari. The
proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the
Court of Appeals is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
It is of no consequence that the petitioner alleges grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CA in his petition. The allegation of
grave abuse of discretion no more warrants the granting of due
course to the petition as one for certiorari if appeal was available
as a proper and adequate remedy. At any rate, a reading of his
presentation of the issues in his petition indicates that he thereby
imputes to the CA errors of judgment, not errors of jurisdiction.
He mentions instances attendant during the commission of the
crime that he claims were really constitutive of justifying and
mitigating circumstances; and specifies reasons why he believes
Republic Act No. 7610 favors his innocence rather than his guilt
for the crime charged.13 The errors he thereby underscores in the
petition concerned only the CA’s appreciation and assessment of
the evidence on record, which really are errors of judgment, not
of jurisdiction.
Even if we were to treat the petition as one brought under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, it would still be defective due to its
being filed beyond the period provided by law. Section 2 of Rule
45 requires the filing of the petition within 15 days from the
notice of judgment to be appealed. However, the petitioner
received a copy of the CA’s decision on July 15, 2005, 14 but filed
the petition only on September 12, 2005,15 or well beyond the
period prescribed by the Rules of Court.
150
The procedural transgressions of the petitioner notwithstanding,
we opt to forego quickly dismissing the petition, and instead set
ourselves upon the task of resolving the issues posed by the
petition on their merits. We cannot fairly and justly ignore his
plea about the sentence imposed on him not being
commensurate to the wrong he committed. His plea is worthy of
another long and hard look. If, on the other hand, we were to
outrightly dismiss his plea because of the procedural lapses he
has committed, the Court may be seen as an unfeeling tribunal
of last resort willing to sacrifice justice in order to give premium
to the rigidity of its rules of procedure. But the Rules of Court has
not been intended to be rigidly enforced at all times. Rather, it
has been instituted first and foremost to ensure justice to every
litigant. Indeed, its announced objective has been to secure a
"just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding."16 This objective will be beyond realization here
unless the Rules of Court be given liberal construction and
application as the noble ends of justice demand. Thereby, we
give primacy to substance over form, which, to a temple of
justice and equity like the Court, now becomes the ideal
ingredient in the dispensation of justice in the case now awaiting
our consideration.
The petitioner’s right to liberty is in jeopardy. He may be entirely
deprived of such birthright without due process of law unless we
shunt aside the rigidity of the rules of procedure and review his
case. Hence, we treat this recourse as an appeal timely brought
to the Court. Consonant with the basic rule in criminal procedure
that an appeal opens the whole case for review, we should deem
it our duty to correct errors in the appealed judgment, whether
assigned or not.17
The law under which the petitioner was charged, tried and found
guilty of violating is Section 10 (a), Article VI of Republic Act No.
7610, which relevantly states:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation
and other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child’s Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse,
cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions
prejudicial to the child’s development including those covered by
Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not
covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer
the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
xxxx
Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3 (b) of
Republic Act No. 7610, as follows:
Section 3. Definition of terms. –
xxxx
(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or
not, of the child which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty,
sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases,
degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of
a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for
survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an
injured child resulting in serious impairment of his
growth and development or in his permanent incapacity
or death.
xxxx

Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and
the CA to the effect that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back
with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree with
their holding that his acts constituted child abuse within the
purview of the above-quoted provisions. The records did not
establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on
Jayson had been intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and
dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby
intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed
the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of
the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then
overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of
his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the
hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he
lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was
so essential in the crime of child abuse.
It is not trite to remind that under the well-recognized doctrine of
pro reo every doubt is resolved in favor of the petitioner as the
accused. Thus, the Court should consider all possible
circumstances in his favor.18
What crime, then, did the petitioner commit?
Considering that Jayson’s physical injury required five to seven
days of medical attention,19 the petitioner was liable for slight
physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code, to wit:
Article 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. — The
crime of slight physical injuries shall be punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical
injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from
one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance during the
same period.
xxxx
The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which
ranges from one day to 30 days of imprisonment. 20 In imposing
the correct penalty, however, we have to consider the mitigating
circumstance of passion or obfuscation under Article 13 (6) of
the Revised Penal Code,21 because the petitioner lost his reason
and self-control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his will
power.22 Passion or obfuscation may lawfully arise from causes
existing only in the honest belief of the accused.23 It is relevant to
mention, too, that in passion or obfuscation, the offender suffers
a diminution of intelligence and intent. With his having acted
under the belief that Jayson and Roldan had thrown stones at
his two minor daughters, and that Jayson had burned Cherrlyn’s
hair, the petitioner was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
passion. Arresto menor is prescribed in its minimum period (i.e.,
one day to 10 days) in the absence of any aggravating
circumstance that offset the mitigating circumstance of passion.
Accordingly, with the Indeterminate Sentence Law being
inapplicable due to the penalty imposed not exceeding one
year,24 the petitioner shall suffer a straight penalty of 10 days of
arresto menor.
The award of moral damages to Jayson is appropriate. Such
damages are granted in criminal cases resulting in physical
injuries.25 The amount of ₱5,000.00 fixed by the lower courts as
moral damages is consistent with the current jurisprudence.26
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals; and ENTER a new judgment: (a) finding petitioner
George Bongalon GUlLTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES under paragraph 1, Article 266,
of the Revised Penal Code; (b) sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of 10 days of arresto menor; and (c) ordering him to pay
Jayson Dela Cruz the amount of ₱5,000.00 as moral damages,
plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
151
Republic Act No. 9231 December 19, 2003
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELIMINATION OF THE
WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR AND AFFORDING
STRONGER PROTECTION FOR THE WORKING CHILD,
AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACTNO. 7610,
AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "SPECIAL
PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AGAINST CHILD ABUSE,
EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION ACT"
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives
of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7610, as amended,
otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against
Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act", is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 2. Declaration of State Policy and Principles. - It is
hereby declared to be the policy of the State to provide
special protection to children from all forms of abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and
other conditions prejudicial to their development
including child labor and its worst forms; provide
sanctions for their commission and carry out a program
for prevention and deterrence of and crisis intervention
in situations of child abuse, exploitation and
discrimination. The State shall intervene on behalf of
the child when the parent, guardian, teacher or person
having care or custody of the child fails or is unable to
protect the child against abuse, exploitation and
discrimination or when such acts against the child are
committed by the said parent, guardian, teacher or
person having care and custody of the same.
"It shall be the policy of the State to protect and
rehabilitate children gravely threatened or endangered
by circumstances which affect or will affect their survival
and normal development and over which they have no
control.
"The best interests of children shall be the paramount
consideration in all actions concerning them, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities, and
legislative bodies, consistent with the principle of First
Call for Children as enunciated in the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Every effort shall
be exerted to promote the welfare of children and
enhance their opportunities for a useful and happy life."
Section 2. Section 12 of the same Act, as amended, is hereby
further amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 2. Employment of Children - Children below
fifteen (15) years of age shall not be employed except:
"1) When a child works directly under the sole
responsibility of his/her parents or legal
guardian and where only members of his/her
family are employed: Provided, however, That
his/her employment neither endangers his/her
life, safety, health, and morals, nor impairs
his/her normal development: Provided, further,
That the parent or legal guardian shall provide
the said child with the prescribed primary
and/or secondary education; or
"2) Where a child's employment or
participation in public entertainment or
information through cinema, theater, radio,
television or other forms of media is
essential: Provided, That the employment
contract is concluded by the child's parents or
legal guardian, with the express agreement of
the child concerned, if possible, and the
approval of the Department of Labor and

Employment: Provided, further, That the
following requirements in all instances are
strictly complied with:
"(a) The employer shall ensure the
protection, health, safety, morals and
normal development of the child;
"(b) The employer shall institute
measures to prevent the child's
exploitation or discrimination taking
into account the system and level of
remuneration, and the duration and
arrangement of working time; and
"(c) The employer shall formulate and
implement, subject to the approval
and supervision of competent
authorities, a continuing program for
training and skills acquisition of the
child.
"In the above-exceptional cases where any
such child may be employed, the employer
shall first secure, before engaging such child,
a work permit from the Department of Labor
and Employment which shall ensure
observance of the above requirements.
"For purposes of this Article, the term "child"
shall apply to all persons under eighteen (18)
years of age."
Section 3. The same Act, as amended, is hereby further
amended by adding new sections to be denominated as
Sections 12-A, 12-B, 12-C, and 12-D to read as follows:
"Sec. 2-A. Hours of Work of a Working Child. - Under
the exceptions provided in Section 12 of this Act, as
amended:
"(1) A child below fifteen (15) years of age may be
allowed to work for not more than twenty (20) hours a
week: Provided, That the work shall not be more than
four (4) hours at any given day;
"(2) A child fifteen (15) years of age but below eighteen
(18) shall not be allowed to work for more than eight (8)
hours a day, and in no case beyond forty (40) hours a
week;
"(3) No child below fifteen (15) years of age shall be
allowed to work between eight o'clock in the evening
and six o'clock in the morning of the following day and
no child fifteen (15) years of age but below eighteen
(18) shall be allowed to work between ten o'clock in the
evening and six o'clock in the morning of the following
day."
"Sec. 12-B. Ownership, Usage and Administration of
the Working Child's Income. - The wages, salaries,
earnings and other income of the working child shall
belong to him/her in ownership and shall be set aside
primarily for his/her support, education or skills
acquisition and secondarily to the collective needs of
the family: Provided, That not more than twenty percent
(20%) of the child's income may be used for the
collective needs of the family.
"The income of the working child and/or the property
acquired through the work of the child shall be
administered by both parents. In the absence or
incapacity of either of the parents, the other parent shall
administer the same. In case both parents are absent
or incapacitated, the order of preference on parental
152
authority as provided for under the Family Code shall
apply.
"Sec. 12-C. Trust Fund to Preserve Part of the Working
Child's Income. - The parent or legal guardian of a
working child below eighteen (18) years of age shall set
up a trust fund for at least thirty percent (30%) of the
earnings of the child whose wages and salaries from
work and other income amount to at least two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00) annually, for which
he/she shall render a semi-annual accounting of the
fund to the Department of Labor and Employment, in
compliance with the provisions of this Act. The child
shall have full control over the trust fund upon reaching
the age of majority.
"Sec. 12-D. Prohibition Against Worst Forms of Child
Labor. - No child shall be engaged in the worst forms of
child labor. The phrase "worst forms of child labor" shall
refer to any of the following:
"(1) All forms of slavery, as defined under the
"Anti-trafficking in Persons Act of 2003", or
practices similar to slavery such as sale and
trafficking of children, debt bondage and
serfdom and forced or compulsory labor,
including recruitment of children for use in
armed conflict; or
"(2) The use, procuring, offering or exposing of
a child for prostitution, for the production of
pornography or for pornographic
performances; or
"(3) The use, procuring or offering of a child for
illegal or illicit activities, including the
production and trafficking of dangerous drugs
and volatile substances prohibited under
existing laws; or
"(4) Work which, by its nature or the
circumstances in which it is carried out, is
hazardous or likely to be harmful to the health,
safety or morals of children, such that it:
"a) Debases, degrades or demeans
the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child as a human being; or
"b) Exposes the child to physical,
emotional or sexual abuse, or is
found to be highly stressful
psychologically or may prejudice
morals; or
"c) Is performed underground,
underwater or at dangerous heights;
or
"d) Involves the use of dangerous
machinery, equipment and tools such
as power-driven or explosive power-
actuated tools; or
"e) Exposes the child to physical
danger such as, but not limited to the
dangerous feats of balancing,
physical strength or contortion, or
which requires the manual transport
of heavy loads; or
"f) Is performed in an unhealthy
environment exposing the child to
hazardous working conditions,
elements, substances, co-agents or
processes involving ionizing,

radiation, fire, flammable substances,
noxious components and the like, or
to extreme temperatures, noise
levels, or vibrations; or
"g) Is performed under particularly
difficult conditions; or
"h) Exposes the child to biological
agents such as bacteria, fungi,
viruses, protozoans, nematodes and
other parasites; or
"i) Involves the manufacture or
handling of explosives and other
pyrotechnic products."
Section 4. Section 13 of the same Act is hereby amended to
read as follows:
"Sec. 13. Access to Education and Training for Working
Children - "a) No child shall be deprived of formal or
non-formal education. In all cases of employment
allowed in this Act, the employer shall provide a working
child with access to at least primary and secondary
education.
"b) To ensure and guarantee the access of the working
child to education and training, the Department of
Education (DEPED) shall: (1) formulate, promulgate,
and implement relevant and effective course designs
and educational programs; (2) conduct the necessary
training for the implementation of the appropriate
curriculum for the purpose; (3) ensure the availability of
the needed educational facilities and materials; and (4)
conduct continuing research and development program
for the necessary and relevant alternative education of
the working child.
"c) The DEPED shall promulgate a course design under
its non-formal education program aimed at promoting
the intellectual, moral and vocational efficiency of
working children who have not undergone or finished
elementary or secondary education. Such course
design shall integrate the learning process deemed
most effective under given circumstances."
Section 5. Section 14 of the same Act is hereby amended to
read as follows:
"Sec. 14. Prohibition on the Employment of Children in
Certain Advertisements. - No child shall be employed
as a model in any advertisement directly or indirectly
promoting alcoholic beverages, intoxicating drinks,
tobacco and its byproducts, gambling or any form of
violence or pornography."
Section 6. Section 16 of the same Act, is hereby amended to
read as follows:
"Sec. 16. Penal Provisions -
"a) Any employer who violates Sections 12, 12-A, and
Section 14 of this act, as amended, shall be penalized
by imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to
six (6) years or a fine of not less than Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) but not more than Three hundred
thousand pesos (P300,000.00) or both at the discretion
of the court.
"b) Any person who violates the provision of Section 12-
D of this act or the employer of the subcontractor who
employs, or the one who facilitates the employment of a
child in hazardous work, shall suffer the penalty of a
fine of not less than One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) but not more than One million pesos
153
(P1,000,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years,
or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of
the court.
"c) Any person who violates Sections 12-D(1) and 12-
D(2) shall be prosecuted and penalized in accordance
with the penalty provided for by R. A. 9208 otherwise
known as the "Anti-trafficking in Persons Act of
2003": Provided, That Such penalty shall be imposed in
its maximum period.
"d) Any person who violates Section 12-D (3) shall be
prosecuted and penalized in accordance with R.A.
9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002"; Provided, That such
penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period.
"e) If a corporation commits any of the violations
aforecited, the board of directors/trustees and officers,
which include the president, treasurer and secretary of
the said corporation who participated in or knowingly
allowed the violation, shall be penalized accordingly as
provided for under this Section.
"f) Parents, biological or by legal fiction, and legal
guardians found to be violating Sections 12, 12-A, 12-B
and 12-C of this Act shall pay a fine of not less than Ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00) but not more than One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), or be required
to render community service for not less than thirty (30)
days but not more than one (1) year, or both such fine
and community service at the discretion of the
court: Provided, That the maximum length of community
service shall be imposed on parents or legal guardians
who have violated the provisions of this Act three (3)
times; Provided, further, That in addition to the
community service, the penalty of imprisonment of thirty
(30) days but not more than one (1) year or both at the
discretion of the court, shall be imposed on the parents
or legal guardians who have violated the provisions of
this Act more than three (3) times.
"g) The Secretary, of Labor and Employment or his/her
duly authorized representative may, after due notice
and hearing, order the closure of any business firm or
establishment found to have violated any of the
provisions of this Act more than three (3) times. He/she
shall likewise order the immediate closure of such firm
or establishment if:
"(1) The violation of any provision of this Act
has resulted in the death, insanity or serious
physical injury of a child employed in such
establishment; or
"(2) Such firm or establishment is engaged or
employed in prostitution or in obscene or lewd
shows.
"h) In case of such closure, the employer shall be
required to pay the employee(s) the separation pay and
other monetary benefits provided for by law."
Section 7. The same Act is hereby further amended by adding a
new section to be denominated as Section 16-A, to read as
follows:
"Sec. 16-A. Trust Fund from Fines and Penalties - The
fine imposed by the court shall be treated as a Trust
Fund, administered by the Department of Labor and
Employment and disbursed exclusively for the needs,
including the costs of rehabilitation and reintegration
into the mainstream of society of the working children
who are victims of the violations of this Act, and for the
programs and projects that will prevent acts of child
labor."

Section 8. Section 27 of the same Act is hereby amended to
read as follows:
"Sec. 27. Who May File a Complaint - Complaints on
cases of unlawful acts committed against children as
enumerated herein may be filed by the following:
"(a) Offended party;
"(b) Parents or guardians;
"(c) Ascendant or collateral relative within the
third degree of consanguinity;
"(d) Officer, social worker or representative of
a licensed child-caring institution;
"(e) Officer or social worker of the Department
of Social Welfare and Development;
"(f) Barangay chairman of the place where the
violation occurred, where the child is residing
or employed; or
"(g) At least three (3) concerned, responsible
citizens where the violation occurred."
Section 9. The same Act is hereby further amended by adding
new sections to Section 16 to be denominated as Sections 16-A,
16-B and 16-C to read as follows:
"Sec. 16-A. Jurisdiction - The family courts shall have
original jurisdiction over all cases involving offenses
punishable under this Act: Provided, That in cities or
provinces where there are no family courts yet, the
regional trial courts and the municipal trial courts shall
have concurrent jurisdiction depending on the penalties
prescribed for the offense charged.
"The preliminary investigation of cases filed under this
Act shall be terminated within a period of thirty (30)
days from the date of filing.
"If the preliminary investigation establishes a prima
facie case, then the corresponding information shall be
filed in court within forty eight (48) hours from the
termination of the investigation.
"Trial of cases under this Act shall be terminated by the
court not later than ninety (90) days from the date of
filing of information. Decision on said cases shall be
rendered within a period of fifteen (15) days from the
date of submission of the case.
"Sec. 15. Exemptions from Filing Fees. - When the
victim of child labor institutes a separate civil action for
the recovery of civil damages, he/she shall be exempt
from payment of filing fees.
"Sec. 16-C. Access to Immediate Legal, Medical and
Psycho-Social Services - The working child shall have
the right to free legal, medical and psycho-social
services to be provided by the State."
Section 10. Implementing Rules and Regulations - The
Secretary of Labor and Employment, in coordination with the
Committees on Labor and Employment of both Houses of
Congress, shall issue the necessary Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) to effectively implement the provisions of this
Act, in consultation with concerned public and private sectors,
within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this Act.
154
Such rules and regulations shall take effect upon their
publication in two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation.
Section 11. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act is
declared invalid or unconstitutional, the validity of the remaining
provisions hereof shall remain in full force and effect.
Section 12. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, or rules
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly.
Section 13. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15)
days from the date of its complete publication in the Official
Gazette or in at least two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation.
Republic Act No. 9208 May 26, 2003
AN ACT TO INSTITUTE POLICIES TO ELIMINATE
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ESPECIALLY WOMEN AND
CHILDREN, ESTABLISHING THE NECESSARY
INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR THE PROTECTION AND
SUPPORT OF TRAFFICKED PERSONS, PROVIDING
PENALTIES FOR ITS VIOLATIONS, AND FOR OTHER
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives
of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the "Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003".
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the
State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
the respect of individual rights. In pursuit of this policy, the State
shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures and
development of programs that will promote human dignity,
protect the people from any threat of violence and exploitation,
eliminate trafficking in persons, and mitigate pressures for
involuntary migration and servitude of persons, not only to
support trafficked persons but more importantly, to ensure their
recovery, rehabilitation and reintegration into the mainstream of
society.
It shall be a State policy to recognize the equal rights and
inherent human dignity of women and men as enshrined in the
United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights, United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, United Nations
Convention on the Protection of Migrant Workers and their
Families. United Nations Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime Including its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children
and all other relevant and universally accepted human rights
instruments and other international conventions to which the
Philippines is a signatory.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act:
(a) Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment,
transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of
persons with or without the victim's consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders by means
of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of
position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the
person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
control over another person for the purpose of
exploitation which includes at a minimum, the
exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms
of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery,
servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or
receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall
also be considered as "trafficking in persons" even if it

does not involve any of the means set forth in the
preceding paragraph.
(b) Child - refers to a person below eighteen (18) years
of age or one who is over eighteen (18) but is unable to
fully take care of or protect himself/herself from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because
of a physical or mental disability or condition.
(c) Prostitution - refers to any act, transaction, scheme
or design involving the use of a person by another, for
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct in exchange for
money, profit or any other consideration.
(d) Forced Labor and Slavery - refer to the extraction of
work or services from any person by means of
enticement, violence, intimidation or threat, use of force
or coercion, including deprivation of freedom, abuse of
authority or moral ascendancy, debt-bondage or
deception.
(e) Sex Tourism - refers to a program organized by
travel and tourism-related establishments and
individuals which consists of tourism packages or
activities, utilizing and offering escort and sexual
services as enticement for tourists. This includes sexual
services and practices offered during rest and
recreation periods for members of the military.
(f) Sexual Exploitation - refers to participation by a
person in prostitution or the production of pornographic
materials as a result of being subjected to a threat,
deception, coercion, abduction, force, abuse of
authority, debt bondage, fraud or through abuse of a
victim's vulnerability.
(g) Debt Bondage - refers to the pledging by the debtor
of his/her personal services or labor or those of a
person under his/her control as security or payment for
a debt, when the length and nature of services is not
clearly defined or when the value of the services as
reasonably assessed is not applied toward the
liquidation of the debt.
(h) Pornography - refers to any representation, through
publication, exhibition, cinematography, indecent
shows, information technology, or by whatever means,
of a person engaged in real or simulated explicit sexual
activities or any representation of the sexual parts of a
person for primarily sexual purposes.
(i) Council - shall mean the Inter-Agency Council
Against Trafficking created under Section 20 of this Act.
Section 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. - It shall be unlawful for
any person, natural or juridical, to commit any of the following
acts:
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or
receive a person by any means, including those done
under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment
or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of
prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced
labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
(b) To introduce or match for money, profit, or material,
economic or other consideration, any person or, as
provided for under Republic Act No. 6955, any Filipino
woman to a foreign national, for marriage for the
purpose of acquiring, buying, offering, selling or trading
him/her to engage in prostitution, pornography, sexual
exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude
or debt bondage;
(c) To offer or contract marriage, real or simulated, for
the purpose of acquiring, buying, offering, selling, or
155
trading them to engage in prostitution, pornography,
sexual exploitation, forced labor or slavery, involuntary
servitude or debt bondage;
(d) To undertake or organize tours and travel plans
consisting of tourism packages or activities for the
purpose of utilizing and offering persons for prostitution,
pornography or sexual exploitation;
(e) To maintain or hire a person to engage in
prostitution or pornography;
(f) To adopt or facilitate the adoption of persons for the
purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual
exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude
or debt bondage;
(g) To recruit, hire, adopt, transport or abduct a person,
by means of threat or use of force, fraud, deceit,
violence, coercion, or intimidation for the purpose of
removal or sale of organs of said person; and
(h) To recruit, transport or adopt a child to engage in
armed activities in the Philippines or abroad.
Section 5. Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons. - The
following acts which promote or facilitate trafficking in persons,
shall be unlawful:
(a) To knowingly lease or sublease, use or allow to be
used any house, building or establishment for the
purpose of promoting trafficking in persons;
(b) To produce, print and issue or distribute unissued,
tampered or fake counseling certificates, registration
stickers and certificates of any government agency
which issues these certificates and stickers as proof of
compliance with government regulatory and pre-
departure requirements for the purpose of promoting
trafficking in persons;
(c) To advertise, publish, print, broadcast or distribute,
or cause the advertisement, publication, printing,
broadcasting or distribution by any means, including the
use of information technology and the internet, of any
brochure, flyer, or any propaganda material that
promotes trafficking in persons;
(d) To assist in the conduct of misrepresentation or
fraud for purposes of facilitating the acquisition of
clearances and necessary exit documents from
government agencies that are mandated to provide pre-
departure registration and services for departing
persons for the purpose of promoting trafficking in
persons;
(e) To facilitate, assist or help in the exit and entry of
persons from/to the country at international and local
airports, territorial boundaries and seaports who are in
possession of unissued, tampered or fraudulent travel
documents for the purpose of promoting trafficking in
persons;
(f) To confiscate, conceal, or destroy the passport,
travel documents, or personal documents or belongings
of trafficked persons in furtherance of trafficking or to
prevent them from leaving the country or seeking
redress from the government or appropriate agencies;
and
(g) To knowingly benefit from, financial or otherwise, or
make use of, the labor or services of a person held to a
condition of involuntary servitude, forced labor, or
slavery.

Section 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. - The following are
considered as qualified trafficking:
(a) When the trafficked person is a child;
(b) When the adoption is effected through Republic Act
No. 8043, otherwise known as the "Inter-Country
Adoption Act of 1995" and said adoption is for the
purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual
exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude
or debt bondage;
(c) When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in
large scale. Trafficking is deemed committed by a
syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It
is deemed committed in large scale if committed
against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a
group;
(d) When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling,
guardian or a person who exercises authority over the
trafficked person or when the offense is committed by a
public officer or employee;
(e) When the trafficked person is recruited to engage in
prostitution with any member of the military or law
enforcement agencies;
(f) When the offender is a member of the military or law
enforcement agencies; and
(g) When by reason or on occasion of the act of
trafficking in persons, the offended party dies, becomes
insane, suffers mutilation or is afflicted with Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or the Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).
Section 6. Confidentiality. - At any stage of the investigation,
prosecution and trial of an offense under this Act, law
enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges, court personnel and
medical practitioners, as well as parties to the case, shall
recognize the right to privacy of the trafficked person and the
accused. Towards this end, law enforcement officers,
prosecutors and judges to whom the complaint has been
referred may, whenever necessary to ensure a fair and impartial
proceeding, and after considering all circumstances for the best
interest of the parties, order a closed-door investigation,
prosecution or trial. The name and personal circumstances of the
trafficked person or of the accused, or any other information
tending to establish their identities and such circumstances or
information shall not be disclosed to the public.
In cases when prosecution or trial is conducted behind closed-
doors, it shall be unlawful for any editor, publisher, and reporter
or columnist in case of printed materials, announcer or producer
in case of television and radio, producer and director of a film in
case of the movie industry, or any person utilizing tri-media
facilities or information technology to cause publicity of any case
of trafficking in persons.
Section 8. Prosecution of Cases. - Any person who has
personal knowledge of the commission of any offense under this
Act, the trafficked person, the parents, spouse, siblings, children
or legal guardian may file a complaint for trafficking.
Section 9. Venue. - A criminal action arising from violation of this
Act shall be filed where the offense was committed, or where any
of its elements occurred, or where the trafficked person actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided,
That the court where the criminal action is first filed shall acquire
jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts.
Section 10. Penalties and Sanctions. - The following penalties
and sanctions are hereby established for the offenses
enumerated in this Act:
156
(a) Any person found guilty of committing any of the
acts enumerated in Section 4 shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of twenty (20) years and a fine of not less
than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) but not more
than Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00);
(b) Any person found guilty of committing any of the
acts enumerated in Section 5 shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of fifteen (15) years and a fine of not less
than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) but
not more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00);
(c) Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under
Section 6 shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and a fine of not less than Two million pesos
(P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five million pesos
(P5,000,000.00);
(d) Any person who violates Section 7 hereof shall
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and a
fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) but not more than One million pesos
(P1,000,000.00);
(e) If the offender is a corporation, partnership,
association, club, establishment or any juridical person,
the penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president,
partner, manager, and/or any responsible officer who
participated in the commission of the crime or who shall
have knowingly permitted or failed to prevent its
commission;
(f) The registration with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and license to operate of the erring
agency, corporation, association, religious group, tour
or travel agent, club or establishment, or any place of
entertainment shall be cancelled and revoked
permanently. The owner, president, partner or manager
thereof shall not be allowed to operate similar
establishments in a different name;
(g) If the offender is a foreigner, he shall be immediately
deported after serving his sentence and be barred
permanently from entering the country;
(h) Any employee or official of government agencies
who shall issue or approve the issuance of travel exit
clearances, passports, registration certificates,
counseling certificates, marriage license, and other
similar documents to persons, whether juridical or
natural, recruitment agencies, establishments or other
individuals or groups, who fail to observe the prescribed
procedures and the requirement as provided for by
laws, rules and regulations, shall be held
administratively liable, without prejudice to criminal
liability under this Act. The concerned government
official or employee shall, upon conviction, be
dismissed from the service and be barred permanently
to hold public office. His/her retirement and other
benefits shall likewise be forfeited; and
(i) Conviction by final judgment of the adopter for any
offense under this Act shall result in the immediate
rescission of the decree of adoption.
Section 11. Use of Trafficked Persons. - Any person who buys or
engages the services of trafficked persons for prostitution shall
be penalized as follows:
(a) First offense - six (6) months of community service
as may be determined by the court and a fine of Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00); and
(b) Second and subsequent offenses - imprisonment of
one (1) year and a fine of One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00).

Section 12. Prescriptive Period. - Trafficking cases under this
Act shall prescribe in ten (10) years: Provided, however, That
trafficking cases committed by a syndicate or in a large scale as
defined under Section 6 shall prescribe in twenty (20) years.
The prescriptive period shall commence to run from the day on
which the trafficked person is delivered or released from the
conditions of bondage and shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information and shall commence to run again when
such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted
or acquitted or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to the accused.
Section 13. Exemption from Filing Fees. - When the trafficked
person institutes a separate civil action for the recovery of civil
damages, he/she shall be exempt from the payment of filing
fees.
Section 14. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds and
Instruments Derived from Trafficking in Persons. - In addition to
the penalty imposed for the violation of this Act, the court shall
order the confiscation and forfeiture, in favor of the government,
of all the proceeds and properties derived from the commission
of the crime, unless they are the property of a third person not
liable for the unlawful act; Provided, however, That all awards for
damages shall be taken from the personal and separate
properties of the offender; Provided, further, That if such
properties are insufficient, the balance shall be taken from the
confiscated and forfeited properties.
When the proceeds, properties and instruments of the offense
have been destroyed, diminished in value or otherwise rendered
worthless by any act or omission, directly or indirectly, of the
offender, or it has been concealed, removed, converted or
transferred to prevent the same from being found or to avoid
forfeiture or confiscation, the offender shall be ordered to pay the
amount equal to the value of the proceeds, property or
instruments of the offense.
Section 15. Trust Fund. - All fines imposed under this Act and
the proceeds and properties forfeited and confiscated pursuant
to Section 14 hereof shall accrue to a Trust Fund to be
administered and managed by the Council to be used
exclusively for programs that will prevent acts of trafficking and
protect, rehabilitate, reintegrate trafficked persons into the
mainstream of society. Such programs shall include, but not
limited to, the following:
(a) Provision for mandatory services set forth in Section
23 of this Act;
(b) Sponsorship of a national research program on
trafficking and establishment of a data collection system
for monitoring and evaluation purposes;
(c) Provision of necessary technical and material
support services to appropriate government agencies
and non-government organizations (NGOs);
(d) Sponsorship of conferences and seminars to
provide venue for consensus building amongst the
public, the academe, government, NGOs and
international organizations; and
(e) Promotion of information and education campaign
on trafficking.
Section 16. Programs that Address Trafficking in Persons. - The
government shall establish and implement preventive, protective
and rehabilitative programs for trafficked persons. For this
purpose, the following agencies are hereby mandated to
implement the following programs;
(a) Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) - shall make
available its resources and facilities overseas for
trafficked persons regardless of their manner of entry to
157
the receiving country, and explore means to further
enhance its assistance in eliminating trafficking
activities through closer networking with government
agencies in the country and overseas, particularly in the
formulation of policies and implementation of relevant
programs.
The DFA shall take necessary measures for the efficient
implementation of the Machine Readable Passports to
protect the integrity of Philippine passports, visas and
other travel documents to reduce the incidence of
trafficking through the use of fraudulent identification
documents.
It shall establish and implement a pre-marriage, on-site
and pre-departure counseling program on
intermarriages.
(b) Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) - shall implement rehabilitative and protective
programs for trafficked persons. It shall provide
counseling and temporary shelter to trafficked persons
and develop a system for accreditation among NGOs
for purposes of establishing centers and programs for
intervention in various levels of the community.
(c) Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) -
shall ensure the strict implementation and compliance
with the rules and guidelines relative to the employment
of persons locally and overseas. It shall likewise
monitor, document and report cases of trafficking in
persons involving employers and labor recruiters.
(d) Department of Justice (DOJ) - shall ensure the
prosecution of persons accused of trafficking and
designate and train special prosecutors who shall
handle and prosecute cases of trafficking. It shall also
establish a mechanism for free legal assistance for
trafficked persons, in coordination with the DSWD,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and other NGOs
and volunteer groups.
(e) National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women
(NCRFW) - shall actively participate and coordinate in
the formulation and monitoring of policies addressing
the issue of trafficking in persons in coordination with
relevant government agencies. It shall likewise
advocate for the inclusion of the issue of trafficking in
persons in both its local and international advocacy for
women's issues.
(f) Bureau of Immigration (BI) - shall strictly administer
and enforce immigration and alien administration laws.
It shall adopt measures for the apprehension of
suspected traffickers both at the place of arrival and
departure and shall ensure compliance by the Filipino
fiancés/fiancées and spouses of foreign nationals with
the guidance and counseling requirement as provided
for in this Act.
(g) Philippine National Police (PNP) - shall be the
primary law enforcement agency to undertake
surveillance, investigation and arrest of individuals or
persons suspected to be engaged in trafficking. It shall
closely coordinate with various law enforcement
agencies to secure concerted efforts for effective
investigation and apprehension of suspected traffickers.
It shall also establish a system to receive complaints
and calls to assist trafficked persons and conduct
rescue operations.
(h) Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) - shall implement an effective pre-employment
orientation seminars and pre-departure counseling
programs to applicants for overseas employment. It
shall likewise formulate a system of providing free legal
assistance to trafficked persons.

(i) Department of the Interior and Local Government
(DILG) - shall institute a systematic information and
prevention campaign and likewise maintain a databank
for the effective monitoring, documentation and
prosecution of cases on trafficking in persons.
(j) Local government units (LGUs) - shall monitor and
document cases of trafficking in persons in their areas
of jurisdiction, effect the cancellation of licenses of
establishments which violate the provisions of this Act
and ensure effective prosecution of such cases. They
shall also undertake an information campaign against
trafficking in persons through the establishment of the
Migrants Advisory and Information Network (MAIN)
desks in municipalities or provinces in coordination with
DILG, Philippine Information Agency (PIA), Commission
on Filipinos Overseas (CFO), NGOs and other
concerned agencies. They shall encourage and support
community based initiatives which address the
trafficking in persons.
In implementing this Act, the agencies concerned may
seek and enlist the assistance of NGOs, people's
organizations (Pos), civic organizations and other
volunteer groups.
Section 17. Legal Protection to Trafficked Persons. - Trafficked
persons shall be recognized as victims of the act or acts of
trafficking and as such shall not be penalized for crimes directly
related to the acts of trafficking enumerated in this Act or in
obedience to the order made by the trafficker in relation thereto.
In this regard, the consent of a trafficked person to the intended
exploitation set forth in this Act shall be irrelevant.
Section 18. Preferential Entitlement Under the Witness
Protection Program. - Any provision of Republic Act No. 6981 to
the contrary notwithstanding, any trafficked person shall be
entitled to the witness protection program provided therein.
Section 19. Trafficked Persons Who are Foreign Nationals. -
Subject to the guidelines issued by the Council, trafficked
persons in the Philippines who are nationals of a foreign country
shall also be entitled to appropriate protection, assistance and
services available to trafficked persons under this Act: Provided,
That they shall be permitted continued presence in the
Philippines for a length of time prescribed by the Council as
necessary to effect the prosecution of offenders.
Section 20. Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking. - There is
hereby established an Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking,
to be composed of the Secretary of the Department of Justice as
Chairperson and the Secretary of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development as Co-Chairperson and shall have the
following as members:
(a) Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs;
(b) Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment;
(c) Administrator, Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration;
(d) Commissioner, Bureau of Immigration;
(e) Director-General, Philippine National Police;
(f) Chairperson, National Commission on the Role of
Filipino Women; and
(g) Three (3) representatives from NGOs, who shall be
composed of one (1) representative each from among
the sectors representing women, overseas Filipino
workers (OFWs) and children, with a proven record of
involvement in the prevention and suppression of
trafficking in persons. These representatives shall be
nominated by the government agency representatives
158
of the Council, for appointment by the President for a
term of three (3) years.
The members of the Council may designate their
permanent representatives who shall have a rank not
lower than an assistant secretary or its equivalent to
meetings, and shall receive emoluments as may be
determined by the Council in accordance with existing
budget and accounting, rules and regulations.
Section 21. Functions of the Council. - The Council shall have
the following powers and functions:
(a) Formulate a comprehensive and integrated program
to prevent and suppress the trafficking in persons;
(b) Promulgate rules and regulations as may be
necessary for the effective implementation of this Act;
(c) Monitor and oversee the strict implementation of this
Act;
(d) Coordinate the programs and projects of the various
member agencies to effectively address the issues and
problems attendant to trafficking in persons;
(e) Coordinate the conduct of massive information
dissemination and campaign on the existence of the
law and the various issues and problems attendant to
trafficking through the LGUs, concerned agencies, and
NGOs;
(f) Direct other agencies to immediately respond to the
problems brought to their attention and report to the
Council on action taken;
(g) Assist in filing of cases against individuals, agencies,
institutions or establishments that violate the provisions
of this Act;
(h) Formulate a program for the reintegration of
trafficked persons in cooperation with DOLE, DSWD,
Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
(TESDA), Commission on Higher Education (CHED),
LGUs and NGOs;
(i) Secure from any department, bureau, office, agency,
or instrumentality of the government or from NGOs and
other civic organizations such assistance as may be
needed to effectively implement this Act;
(j) Complement the shared government information
system for migration established under Republic Act
No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995" with data on cases
of trafficking in persons, and ensure that the proper
agencies conduct a continuing research and study on
the patterns and scheme of trafficking in persons which
shall form the basis for policy formulation and program
direction;
(k) Develop the mechanism to ensure the timely,
coordinated, and effective response to cases of
trafficking in persons;
(l) Recommend measures to enhance cooperative
efforts and mutual assistance among foreign countries
through bilateral and/or multilateral arrangements to
prevent and suppress international trafficking in
persons;
(m) Coordinate with the Department of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC), Department of Trade
and Industry (DTI), and other NGOs in monitoring the
promotion of advertisement of trafficking in the internet;

(n) Adopt measures and policies to protect the rights
and needs of trafficked persons who are foreign
nationals in the Philippines;
(o) Initiate training programs in identifying and providing
the necessary intervention or assistance to trafficked
persons; and
(p) Exercise all the powers and perform such other
functions necessary to attain the purposes and
objectives of this Act.
Section 22. Secretariat to the Council. - The Department of
Justice shall establish the necessary Secretariat for the Council.
Section 23. Mandatory Services to Trafficked Persons. - To
ensure recovery, rehabilitation and reintegration into the
mainstream of society, concerned government agencies shall
make available the following services to trafficked persons:
(a) Emergency shelter or appropriate housing;
(b) Counseling;
(c) Free legal services which shall include information
about the victims' rights and the procedure for filing
complaints, claiming compensation and such other
legal remedies available to them, in a language
understood by the trafficked person;
(d) Medical or psychological services;
(e) Livelihood and skills training; and
(f) Educational assistance to a trafficked child.
Sustained supervision and follow through mechanism that will
track the progress of recovery, rehabilitation and reintegration of
the trafficked persons shall be adopted and carried out.
Section 24. Other Services for Trafficked Persons. -
(a) Legal Assistance. - Trafficked persons shall be
considered under the category "Overseas Filipino in
Distress" and may avail of the legal assistance created
by Republic Act No. 8042, subject to the guidelines as
provided by law.
(b) Overseas Filipino Resource Centers. - The services
available to overseas Filipinos as provided for by
Republic Act No. 8042 shall also be extended to
trafficked persons regardless of their immigration status
in the host country.
(c) The Country Team Approach. - The country team
approach under Executive Order No. 74 of 1993, shall
be the operational scheme under which Philippine
embassies abroad shall provide protection to trafficked
persons insofar as the promotion of their welfare,
dignity and fundamental rights are concerned.
Section 25. Repatriation of Trafficked Persons. - The DFA, in
coordination with DOLE and other appropriate agencies, shall
have the primary responsibility for the repatriation of trafficked
persons, regardless of whether they are documented or
undocumented.
If, however, the repatriation of the trafficked persons shall
expose the victims to greater risks, the DFA shall make
representation with the host government for the extension of
appropriate residency permits and protection, as may be legally
permissible in the host country.
159
Section 26. Extradition. - The DOJ, in consultation with DFA,
shall endeavor to include offenses of trafficking in persons
among extraditable offenses.
Section 27. Reporting Requirements. - The Council shall submit
to the President of the Philippines and to Congress an annual
report of the policies, programs and activities relative to the
implementation of this Act.
Section 28. Funding. - The heads of the departments and
agencies concerned shall immediately include in their programs
and issue such rules and regulations to implement the provisions
of this Act, the funding of which shall be included in the annual
General Appropriations Act.
Section 29. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The Council
shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and
regulations within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this Act.
Section 30. Non-restriction of Freedom of Speech and of
Association, Religion and the Right to Travel. - Nothing in this Act
shall be interpreted as a restriction of the freedom of speech and
of association, religion and the right to travel for purposes not
contrary to law as guaranteed by the Constitution.
Section 31. Separability Clause. - If, for any reason, any section
or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid, the
other sections or provisions hereof shall not be affected thereby.
Section 32. Repealing clause. - All laws, presidential decrees,
executive orders and rules and regulations, or parts thereof,
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly: Provided, That this Act shall not in any
way amend or repeal the provision of Republic Act No. 7610,
otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against
Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act".
Section 33. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15)
days from the date of its complete publication in at least two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.
G.R. No. 211465, December 03, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHIRLEY
A. CASIO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
“Chicks mo dong?”1
With this sadly familiar question being used on the streets of
many of our cities, the fate of many desperate women is sealed
and their futures vanquished. This case resulted in the rescue of
two minors from this pernicious practice. Hopefully, there will be
more rescues. Trafficking in persons is a deplorable crime. It is
committed even though the minor knew about or consented to
the act of trafficking.
This case involves Republic Act No. 9208, 2 otherwise known as
the “Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003.”3
Accused Shirley A. Casio was charged for the violation of
Republic Act No. 9208, Section 4(a), qualified by Section 6(a).
The information against accused, dated May 5, 2008,
states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That on or about the 3rd day of May 2008, at about 1:00 o’clock
A.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent,
with intent to gain, did then and there hire and/or recruit AAA, a
minor, 17 years old and BBB for the purpose of prostitution and
sexual exploitation, by acting as their procurer for different
customers, for money, profit or any other consideration, in
Violation of Sec. 4, Par. (a), Qualified by Sec. 6, Par. ( a), of R.A.
9208 (Qualified Trafficking in Persons).
 160

CONTRARY TO LAW.4 AAA stated that she knew accused was a pimp because AAA
The facts, as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, would usually see her pimping girls to customers in Barangay
are as follows: Kamagayan.22 AAA further testified that on May 2, 2008, accused
solicited her services for a customer. That was the first time that
On May 2, 2008, International Justice Mission (IJM), 5 a non- she was pimped by accused.23 Accused brought her, BBB, and a
governmental organization, coordinated with the police in order certain Jocelyn to Queensland Motel. 24
to entrap persons engaged in human trafficking in Cebu City.6
AAA testified that Jocelyn stayed in the taxi, while she and BBB
Chief PSI George Ylanan, SPO1 Felomino Mendaros, SPO1 Fe went to Room 24. It was in Room 24 where the customer paid
Altubar, PO1 Albert Luardo, and PO1 Roy Carlo Veloso Shirley. The police rushed in and told AAA and BBB to go to the
composed the team of police operatives.7 PO1 Luardo and PO1 other room. AAA was then met by the Department of Social
Veloso were designated as decoys, pretending to be tour guides Welfare and Development personnel who informed her that she
looking for girls to entertain their guests. 8 IJM provided them with was rescued and not arrested.25
marked money, which was recorded in the police blotter.9
AAA described that her job as a prostitute required her to display
The team went to Queensland Motel and rented Rooms 24 and herself, along with other girls, between 7 p.m. to 8 p.m. She
25. These rooms were adjacent to each other. Room 24 was received P400.00 for every customer who selected her.26
designated for the transaction while Room 25 was for the rest of
the police team.10 The prosecution also presented the police operatives during trial.
PSI Ylanan, SPO1 Mendaros, and SPO1 Altubar testified that
PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street after PO1 Veloso had made the missed call to PSI Ylanan, they
in Barangay Kamagayan, Cebu City’s red light district. Accused “rushed to Room 24 and arrested the accused.”27 SPO1 Altubar
noticed them and called their attention by saying “Chicks mo retrieved the marked money worth P1,000.00 from accused’s
dong?” (Do you like girls, guys?). 11 right hand “and upon instruction from PCINSP Ylanan recorded
the same at the ‘police blotter prior operation’. . . .” 28
During trial, PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso testified that their
conversation with accused went as The trial court noted that AAA requested assistance from the IJM
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary “in conducting the operation against the accused.”29
Accused:Chicks mo dong? (Do you like girls, guys?)
Version of the accused
PO1 Unya mga bag-o? Kanang batan-on kay naa mi guests
Luardo: naghulat sa motel. (Are they new? They must be young In defense, accused testified that she worked as a
because we have guests waiting at the motel.) laundrywoman. On the evening of May 2, 2008, she went out to
buy supper. While walking, she was stopped by two men on
Naa, hulat kay magkuha ko. (Yes, just wait and I’ll get board a blue car. The two men asked her if she knew someone
Accused:
them.)12 named Bingbing. She replied that she only knew Gingging but
At that point, PO1 Luardo sent a text message to PSI Ylanan not Bingbing. The men informed her that they were actually
that they found a prospective subject.13 looking for Gingging, gave her a piece of paper with a number
written on it, and told her to tell Gingging to bring companions.
After a few minutes, accused returned with AAA and BBB, When accused arrived home, she contacted Gingging. Gingging
private complainants in this case.14 convinced her to come because allegedly, she would be given
Accused:Kining duha kauyon mo ani? (Are you satisfied with money by the two males.30
these two?)
Ruling of the trial court
PO1 Maayo man kaha na sila modala ug kayat? (Well, are
Veloso: they good in sex?)15 The Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City found accused
Accused gave the assurance that the girls were good in sex. guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
PO1 Luardo inquired how much their services would cost. held31 that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Accused replied, “Tag kinientos” (P500.00).16 Accused had consummated the act of trafficking of person[s] . . .
as defined under paragraph (a), Section 3 of R.A. 9208 for the
PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo convinced accused to come with purpose of letting her engage in prostitution as defined under
them to Queensland Motel. Upon proceeding to Room 24, PO1 paragraph [c] of the same Section; the act of “sexual intercourse”
Veloso handed the marked money to accused. 17 need not have been consummated for the mere “transaction” i.e.
the ‘solicitation’ for sex and the handing over of the “bust money”
As accused counted the money, PO1 Veloso gave PSI Ylanan a of Php1,000.00 already consummated the said act.
missed call. This was their pre-arranged signal. The rest of the
team proceeded to Room 24, arrested accused, and informed . . . .
her of her constitutional rights. The police confiscated the
marked money from accused.18 Meanwhile, AAA and BBB “were WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused, SHIRLEY A. CASIO,
brought to Room 25 and placed in the custody of the GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of trafficking in persons under
representatives from the IJM and the DSWD.” 19 paragraph (a), Section 4 as qualified under paragraph (a),
Section 6 of R.A. 9208 and sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
During trial, AAA testified that she was born on January 27, TWENTY (20) YEARS and to pay a fine of ONE MILLION
1991. This statement was supported by a copy of her certificate (Php1,000,000.00).
of live birth.20
Finally, accused is ordered to pay the costs of these
AAA narrated that in 2007, she worked as a house helper in proceedings.
Mandaue City. In March 2008 she stopped working as a house
helper and transferred to Cebu City. She stayed with her cousin, SO ORDERED[.]32
but she subsequently moved to a boarding house. It was there Ruling of the Court of Appeals
where she met her friend, Gee Ann. AAA knew that Gee Ann
worked in a disco club. When Gee Ann found out that AAA was The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court but
no longer a virgin, she offered AAA work. AAA agreed because modified the fine and awarded moral damages. The dispositive
she needed the money in order to help her father. AAA recalled portion of the decision33 reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
that she had sex with her first customer. She was paid P200.00 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant
and given an additional P500.00 as tip. For the first few weeks, appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 10
Gee Ann provided customers for AAA. Eventually, Gee Ann August 2010 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14
brought her to Barangay Kamagayan, telling her that there were in Cebu City in Crim. Case No. CBU-83122 is AFFIRMED WITH
more customers in that area.21 MODIFICATIONS. The accused-appellant is accordingly
 161

sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Crime (UN CTOC) was “adopted and opened for signature,
Php2,000,000 and is ordered to pay each of the private ratification and accession”54 on November 15, 2000. The UN
complainants Php150,000 as moral damages. CTOC is supplemented by three protocols: (1) the Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
SO ORDERED.34 Women and Children; (2) the Protocol against the Smuggling of
Accused filed a notice of appeal35 on August 28, 2013, which the Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and, (3) the Protocol against the
Court of Appeals noted and gave due course in its Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and
resolution36 dated January 6, 2014. Components and Ammunition.55

The case records of CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 01490 were received On December 14, 2000, the Philippines signed the United
by this court on March 17, 2014.37 Nations “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children” (Trafficking
In the resolution38 dated April 29, 2014, this court resolved to Protocol).56 This was ratified by the Philippine Senate on
notify the parties that they may file their respective supplemental September 30, 2001.57 The Trafficking Protocol’s entry into force
briefs within 30 days from notice. This court also required the was on December 25, 2003.58
Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women to
confirm the confinement of accused.39 In the Trafficking Protocol, human trafficking is defined
as:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Counsel for accused40 and the Office of the Solicitor Article 3
General41 filed their respective manifestations, stating that they
would no longer file supplemental briefs considering that all Use of terms
issues had been discussed in the appellant’s brief and appellee’s
brief filed before the Court of Appeals. Through a letter 42 dated For the purposes of this Protocol:
June 17, 2014, Superintendent IV Rachel D. Ruelo confirmed
accused’s confinement at the Correctional Institution for Women (a) “Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment,
since October 27, 2010. transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of
The sole issue raised by accused is whether the prosecution abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a
was able to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control
However, based on the arguments raised in accused’s brief, the over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation
sole issue may be dissected into the following: shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or
(1) Whether the entrapment operation conducted by the police services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the
was valid, considering that there was no prior surveillance removal of organs;
and the police did not know the subject of the operation;43
(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the
(2) Whether the prosecution was able to prove accused’s guilt intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article
beyond reasonable doubt even though there was no shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in
evidence presented to show that accused has a history of subparagraph (a) have been used;
engaging in human trafficking;44 and
(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt
(3) Whether accused was properly convicted of trafficking in of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered
persons, considering that AAA admitted that she works as a “trafficking in persons” even if this does not involve any of the
prostitute.45 means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article;

Arguments of accused (d) “Child” shall mean any person under eighteen years of age.
Senator Loren Legarda, in her sponsorship speech, stated that
Accused argues that there was no valid entrapment. Instead, the “Anti-Trafficking Act will serve as the enabling law of the
she was instigated into committing the crime.46 The police did not country’s commitment to [the] protocol.”59
conduct prior surveillance and did not even know who their
subject was.47Neither did the police know the identities of the Senator Luisa Ejercito Estrada also delivered a sponsorship
alleged victims. speech and described trafficking in persons as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Accused further argues that under the subjective test, she Trafficking in human beings, if only to emphasize the gravity of
should be acquitted because the prosecution did not present its hideousness, is tantamount to modern-day slavery at work. It
evidence that would prove she had a history of engaging in is a manifestation of one of the most flagrant forms of violence
human trafficking or any other offense. She denied being a pimp against human beings. Its victims suffer the brunt of this
and asserted that she was a laundrywoman. 48 In addition, AAA insidious form of violence. It is exploitation, coercion, deception,
admitted that she worked as a prostitute. Thus, it was her abduction, rape, physical, mental and other forms of abuse,
decision to display herself to solicit customers.49 prostitution, forced labor, and indentured servitude.

Arguments of the plaintiff-appellee . . . .

The Office of the Solicitor General, counsel for plaintiff-appellee As of this time, we have signed the following: the Convention on
People of the Philippines, argued that the trial court did not err in the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women;
convicting accused because witnesses positively identified her the 1995 Convention on the Rights of the Child; the United
as the person who solicited customers and received money for Nations Convention on the Protection of Migrant Workers and
AAA and BBB.50 Entrapment operations are valid and have been their Families; and the United Nations’ Resolution on Trafficking
recognized by courts.51 Likewise, her arrest in flagrante delicto is in Women and Girls, among others.
valid.52 Hence, the trial court was correct in stating that accused
had “fully consummated the act of trafficking of persons. . .” 53 Moreover, we have also expressed our support for the United
Nations’ Convention Against Organized Crime, including the
We affirm accused Shirley A. Casio’s conviction. Trafficking Protocol in October last year.

I. At first glance, it appears that we are very responsive to the

problem. So it seems.
Background of Republic Act No. 9208
Despite these international agreements, we have yet to come up
The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized with a law that shall squarely address human trafficking.60

During the interpellation of Republic Act No. 9208, then
numbered as Senate Bill No. 2444, Senator Teresa Aquino-Oreta
asked if there was a necessity for an anti-trafficking law when
other laws exist that cover trafficking.61
Senator Luisa Ejercito Estrada
explained:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
At present, Mr. President, the relevant laws to the trafficking
issue are the Revised Penal Code, Republic Act No. 8042 or the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act, R[epublic] A[ct] No.
6955 or the Mail-Order Bride Act, and Republic Act No. 8239 or
the Philippine Passport Act. These laws address issues such as
illegal recruitment, prostitution, falsification of public documents
and the mail-order bride scheme. These laws do not respond to
the issue of recruiting, harboring or transporting persons
resulting in prostitution, forced labor, slavery and slavery-like
practices. They only address to one or some elements of
trafficking independent of their results or
consequence.62 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Republic Act No. 9208 was enacted in order to fully
address the issue of human trafficking. Republic Act No. 9208
was passed on May 12, 2003, and approved on May 26, 2003.
II.
Elements of trafficking in persons
The elements of trafficking in persons can be derived from its
definition under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208,
thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) The act of “recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring,
or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders.”
(2) The means used which include “threat or use of force, or
other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of
power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of
the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits
to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another; and
(3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes
“exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of
sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery,
servitude or the removal or sale of organs.”63
On January 28, 2013, Republic Act No. 1036464 was approved,
otherwise known as the “Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons
Act of 2012.” Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208 was
amended by Republic Act No. 10364 as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 3. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended
to read as follows:
“SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act:
“(a) Trafficking in Persons – refers to the recruitment, obtaining,
hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining,
harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s
consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by
means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a
person having control over another person for the purpose of
exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced
labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of
organs.
“The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or
receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation or when the
adoption is induced by any form of consideration for exploitative
purposes shall also be considered as ‘trafficking in persons’ even
if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding
paragraph. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in
persons have been expanded to include the following
acts:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) The act of “recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering,
transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of
persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge,
within or across national borders;”
162
(2) The means used include “by means of threat, or use of force,
or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse
of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability
of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control
over another person”
(3) The purpose of trafficking includes “the exploitation or the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation,
forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or
sale of organs” (Emphasis supplied)
The Court of Appeals found that AAA and BBB were recruited by
accused when their services were peddled to the police who
acted as decoys.65 AAA was a child at the time that accused
peddled her services.66 AAA also stated that she agreed to work
as a prostitute because she needed money.67Accused took
advantage of AAA’s vulnerability as a child and as one who need
money, as proven by the testimonies of the witnesses.68
III.
Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under
Republic Act No. 9208.
Accused claims that AAA admitted engaging in prostitution even
before May 2, 2008. She concludes that AAA was predisposed to
having sex with “customers” for money.69 For liability under our
law, this argument is irrelevant. As defined under Section 3(a) of
Republic Act No. 9208, trafficking in persons can still be
committed even if the victim gives consent.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act:
a. Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment,
transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of
persons with or without the victim's consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders by means
of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of
position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the
persons, or, the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
control over another person for the purpose of
exploitation which includes at a minimum, the
exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms
of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery,
servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
The recruitment transportation, transfer, harboring or
receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall
also be considered as “trafficking in persons” even if it
does not involve any of the means set forth in the
preceding paragraph.70(Emphasis supplied)
The victim’s consent is rendered meaningless due to the
coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed by perpetrators
of human trafficking.71 Even without the use of coercive, abusive,
or deceptive means, a minor’s consent is not given out of his or
her own free will.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9208 enumerates the different acts
of trafficking in persons. Accused was charged under Section
4(a), which states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. — It shall be unlawful for
any person, natural or judicial, to commit any of the following
acts.
a. To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, provide, or receive a
person by any means, including those done under the pretext of
domestic or overseas employment or training or apprenticeship,
for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation,
forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;72
Republic Act No. 9208 further enumerates the instances when
the crime of trafficking in persons is qualified.
SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. — The following are
considered as qualified trafficking:
a. When the trafficked person is a child;
b. When the adoption is effected through Republic Act No.
8043, otherwise known as the “Inter-Country Adoption
Act of 1995” and said adoption is for the purpose of

prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced
labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
c. When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large
scale. Trafficking is deemed committed by a syndicate if
carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring or confederating with one another. It is
deemed committed in large scale if committed against
three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group;
d. When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling,
guardian or a person who exercise authority over the
trafficked person or when the offense is committed by a
public officer or employee;
e. When the trafficked person is recruited to engage in
prostitution with any member of the military or law
enforcement agencies;
f. When the offender is a member of the military or law
enforcement agencies; and
g. When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking
in persons, the offended party dies, becomes insane,
suffers mutilation or is afflicted with Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or the Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). (Emphasis supplied)73
Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 9208 defines “child”
as:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act:
. . . .
b. Child - refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or
one who is over eighteen (18) but is unable to fully take care
of or protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental
disability or condition.74
Based on the definition of trafficking in persons and the
enumeration of acts of trafficking in persons, accused performed
all the elements in the commission of the offense when she
peddled AAA and BBB and offered their services to decoys PO1
Veloso and PO1 Luardo in exchange for money. The offense
was also qualified because the trafficked persons were minors.
Here, AAA testified as to how accused solicited her services for
the customers waiting at Queensland Motel. AAA also testified
that she was only 17 years old when accused peddled her. Her
certificate of live birth was presented as evidence to show that
she was born on January 27, 1991.
The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that accused committed the offense of trafficking in persons,
qualified by the fact that one of the victims was a child. As held
by the trial court:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[T]he act of “sexual intercourse” need not have been
consummated for the mere “transaction” i.e. that ‘solicitation’ for
sex and the handing over of the “bust money” of Php.1,000.00
already consummated the said act.75
IV.
Validity of the entrapment operation
In People v. Doria,76 this court discussed the objective test and
the subjective test to determine whether there was a valid
entrapment operation:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
. . . American federal courts and a majority of state courts use
the “subjective” or “origin of intent” test laid down in Sorrells v.
United States to determine whether entrapment actually
occurred. The focus of the inquiry is on the accused's
predisposition to commit the offense charged, his state of mind
and inclination before his initial exposure to government agents.
All relevant facts such as the accused's mental and character
traits, his past offenses, activities, his eagerness in committing
the crime, his reputation, etc., are considered to assess his state
of mind before the crime. The predisposition test emphasizes the
accused's propensity to commit the offense rather than the
officer's misconduct and reflects an attempt to draw a line
between a “trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the
163
unwary criminal.” If the accused was found to have been ready
and willing to commit the offense at any favorable opportunity,
the entrapment defense will fail even if a police agent used an
unduly persuasive inducement.
Some states, however, have adopted the “objective” test. . . .
Here, the court considers the nature of the police activity
involved and the propriety of police conduct. The inquiry is
focused on the inducements used by government agents, on
police conduct, not on the accused and his predisposition to
commit the crime. For the goal of the defense is to deter unlawful
police conduct. The test of entrapment is whether the conduct of
the law enforcement agent was likely to induce a normally law-
abiding person, other than one who is ready and willing, to
commit the offense; for purposes of this test, it is presumed that
a law-abiding person would normally resist the temptation to
commit a crime that is presented by the simple opportunity to act
unlawfully. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)77
Accused argued that in our jurisprudence, courts usually apply
the objective test in determining the whether there was an
entrapment operation or an instigation.78 However, the use of the
objective test should not preclude courts from also applying the
subjective test. She pointed out that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Applying the “subjective ” test it is worth invoking that accused-
appellant procures income from being a laundry woman. The
prosecution had not shown any proof evidencing accused-
appellant’s history in human trafficking or engagement in any
offense. She is not even familiar to the team who had has [sic]
been apprehending human traffickers for quite some
time.79 (Citations omitted)
Accused further argued that the police should have conducted a
prior surveillance before the entrapment operation.
Time and again, this court has discussed the difference between
entrapment and instigation. In Chang v. People,80 this court
explained that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and
schemes to ensure the apprehension of the criminal while in the
actual commission of the crime. There is instigation when the
accused is induced to commit the crime. The difference in the
nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In
entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of the
criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime comes
from him. In instigation, the law officer conceives the commission
of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea
and carries it into execution.81
Accused contends that using the subjective test, she was clearly
instigated by the police to commit the offense. She denied being
a pimp and claimed that she earned her living as a
laundrywoman. On this argument, we agree with the finding of
the Court of Appeals:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[I]t was the accused-appellant who commenced the transaction
with PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso by calling their attention on
whether they wanted girls for that evening, and when the officers
responded, it was the accused-appellant who told them to wait
while she would fetch the girls for their perusal.82
This shows that accused was predisposed to commit the offense
because she initiated the transaction. As testified by PO1 Veloso
and PO1 Luardo, accused called out their attention by saying
“Chicks mo dong?” If accused had no predisposition to commit
the offense, then she most likely would not have asked PO1
Veloso and PO1 Luardo if they wanted girls.
The entrapment would still be valid using the objective test. The
police merely proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in Barangay
Kamagayan. It was accused who asked them whether they
wanted girls. There was no illicit inducement on the part of the
police for the accused to commit the crime.
When accused was arrested, she was informed of her
constitutional rights.83 The marked money retrieved from her was
recorded in the police blotter prior to the entrapment operation
and was presented in court as evidence. 84
On accused’s alibi that she was merely out to buy her supper
that night, the Court of Appeals noted that accused never
presented Gingging in court. Thus, her alibi was unsubstantiated
and cannot be given credence.85
With regard to the lack of prior surveillance, prior surveillance is
 164

not a condition for an entrapment operation’s validity. 86 In People Human trafficking indicts the society that tolerates the kind of
v. Padua87 this court underscored the value of flexibility in police poverty and its accompanying desperation that compels our
operations:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary women to endure indignities. It reflects the weaknesses of that
A prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an society even as it convicts those who deviantly thrive in such
entrapment or buy-bust operation, the conduct of which has no hopelessness. We should continue to strive for the best of our
rigid or textbook method. Flexibility is a trait of good police work. world, where our choices of human intimacies are real choices,
However the police carry out its entrapment operations, for as and not the last resort taken just to survive. Human intimacies
long as the rights of the accused have not been violated in the enhance our best and closest relationships. It serves as a
process, the courts will not pass on the wisdom thereof. The foundation for two human beings to face life’s joys and
police officers may decide that time is of the essence and challenges while continually growing together with many shared
dispense with the need for prior surveillance. 88 (Citations experiences. The quality of our human relationships defines the
omitted) world that we create also for others.
This flexibility is even more important in cases involving
trafficking of persons. The urgency of rescuing the victims may at Regardless of the willingness of AAA and BBB, therefore, to be
times require immediate but deliberate action on the part of the trafficked, we affirm the text and spirit of our laws. Minors should
law enforcers. spend their adolescence moulding their character in
environments free of the vilest motives and the worse of other
V. human beings. The evidence and the law compel us to affirm the
conviction of accused in this case.
Imposition of fine and award of damages
But this is not all that we have done. By fulfilling our duties, we
The Court of Appeals properly imposed the amount of also express the hope that our people and our government unite
P2,000,000.00. Section 10 (b) of Republic Act No. 9208 provides against everything inhuman. We contribute to a commitment to
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary finally stamp out slavery and human trafficking.
SEC. 10. Penalties and Sanctions. — The following penalties
and sanctions are hereby established for the offenses There are more AAA’s and BBBs out there. They, too, deserve to
enumerated in this Act: be rescued. They, too, need to be shown that in spite of what
their lives have been, there is still much good in our world.
. . . .
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM the decision
c. Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section of the Court of Appeals dated June 27, 2013, finding accused
6 shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not Shirley A. Casio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
less than Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not more Section 4(a), qualified by Section 6(a) of Republic Act No. 9208,
than Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00); and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and
However, we modify by raising the award of moral damages from a fine of P2,000,000.00, with the MODIFICATION that accused-
P150,000.0089 to P500,000.00. We also award exemplary appellant shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103
damages in the amount of P100,000.00. These amounts are in (Indeterminate Sentence Law) in accordance with Section 3 of
accordance with the ruling in People v. Lalli90 where this court Republic Act No. 9346.92
held that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The payment of P500,000 as moral damages and P100,000 as The award of damages is likewise MODIFIED as follows:
exemplary damages for the crime of Trafficking in Persons as a
Prostitute finds basis in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which Accused is ordered to pay each of the private complainants:
states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and (1) P500,000.00 as moral damages; and
analogous cases:
(2) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
SO ORDERED.
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts; REPUBLIC ACT No. 10364
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
AN ACT EXPANDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9208, ENTITLED
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; "AN ACT TO INSTITUTE POLICIES TO ELIMINATE
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ESPECIALLY WOMEN AND
(6) Illegal search; CHILDREN, ESTABLISHING THE NECESSARY
INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR THE PROTECTION AND
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; SUPPORT OF TRAFFICKED PERSONS, PROVIDING
PENALTIES FOR ITS VIOLATIONS AND FOR OTHER
(8) Malicious prosecution; PURPOSES"

(9) Acts mentioned in
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29,
30, 32, 34, and 35.
....
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an
analogous case to the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or
other lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse. To be trafficked as a
prostitute without one’s consent and to be sexually violated four
to five times a day by different strangers is horrendous and
atrocious. There is no doubt that Lolita experienced physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social
humiliation when she was trafficked as a prostitute in Malaysia.
Since the crime of Trafficking in Persons was aggravated, being
committed by a syndicate, the award of exemplary damages is
likewise justified.91
Article 309; Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known as the
"Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012″.
Section 2. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared
that the State values the dignity of every human person
and guarantees the respect of individual rights. In
pursuit of this policy, the State shall give highest priority
to the enactment of measures and development of
programs that will promote human dignity, protect the
people from any threat of violence and exploitation,
eliminate trafficking in persons, and mitigate pressures

for involuntary migration and servitude of persons, not
only to support trafficked persons but more importantly,
to ensure their recovery, rehabilitation and reintegration
into the mainstream of society.
"It shall be a State policy to recognize the equal rights
and inherent human dignity of women and men as
enshrined in the United Nations Universal Declaration
on Human Rights, United Nations Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child, United Nations Convention on the Protection
of Migrant Workers and their Families, United Nations
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime
Including its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children
and all other relevant and universally accepted human
rights instruments and other international conventions
to which the Philippines is a signatory."
Section 3. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act:
"(a) Trafficking in Persons – refers to the
recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing,
offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining,
harboring, or receipt of persons with or without
the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or
across national borders by means of threat, or
use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or
of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve
the consent of a person having control over
another person for the purpose of exploitation
which includes at a minimum, the exploitation
or the prostitution of others or other forms of
sexual exploitation, forced labor or services,
slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of
organs.
"The recruitment, transportation, transfer,
harboring, adoption or receipt of a child for the
purpose of exploitation or when the adoption is
induced by any form of consideration for
exploitative purposes shall also be considered
as ‘trafficking in persons’ even if it does not
involve any of the means set forth in the
preceding paragraph.
"(b) Child – refers to a person below eighteen
(18) years of age or one who is over eighteen
(18) but is unable to fully take care of or
protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because
of a physical or mental disability or condition.
"(c) Prostitution – refers to any act,
transaction, scheme or design involving the
use of a person by another, for sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct in exchange
for money, profit or any other consideration.
"(d) Forced Labor – refers to the extraction of
work or services from any person by means of
enticement, violence, intimidation or threat,
use of, force or coercion, including deprivation
of freedom, abuse of authority or moral
ascendancy, debt-bondage or deception
including any work or service extracted from
any person under the menace of penalty.
"(e) Slavery – refers to the status or condition
of a person over whom any or all of the powers
165
attaching to the right of ownership are
exercised.
"(f) Involuntary Servitude – refers to a
condition of enforced and compulsory service
induced by means of any scheme, plan or
pattern, intended to cause a person to believe
that if he or she did not enter into or continue
in such condition, he or she or another person
would suffer serious harm or other forms of
abuse or physical restraint, or threat of abuse
or harm, or coercion including depriving
access to travel documents and withholding
salaries, or the abuse or threatened abuse of
the legal process.
"(g) Sex Tourism – refers to a program
organized by travel and tourism-related
establishments and individuals which consists
of tourism packages or activities, utilizing and
offering escort and sexual services as
enticement for tourists. This includes sexual
services and practices offered during rest and
recreation periods for members of the military.
"(h) Sexual Exploitation – refers to
participation by a person in prostitution,
pornography or the production of pornography,
in exchange for money, profit or any other
consideration or where the participation is
caused or facilitated by any means of
intimidation or threat, use of force, or other
forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception,
debt bondage, abuse of power or of position or
of legal process, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or giving or
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve
the consent of a person having control over
another person; or in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct caused or facilitated by any
means as provided in this Act.
"(i) Debt Bondage – refers to the pledging by
the debtor of his/her personal services or labor
or those of a person under his/her control as
security or payment for a debt, when the
length and nature of services is not clearly
defined or when the value of the services as
reasonably assessed is not applied toward the
liquidation of the debt.
"(j) Pornography – refers to any
representation, through publication, exhibition,
cinematography, indecent shows, information
technology, or by whatever means, of a person
engaged in real or simulated explicit sexual
activities or any representation of the sexual
parts of a person for primarily sexual
purposes.
"(k) Council – shall mean the Inter-Agency
Council Against Trafficking created under
Section 20 of this Act."
Section 4. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. – It shall be
unlawful for any person, natural or juridical, to commit
any of the following acts:
"(a) To recruit, obtain, hire, provide, offer,
transport, transfer, maintain, harbor, or receive
a person by any means, including those done
under the pretext of domestic or overseas
employment or training or apprenticeship, for

the purpose of prostitution, pornography, or
sexual exploitation;
"(b) To introduce or match for money, profit, or
material, economic or other consideration, any
person or, as provided for under Republic Act
No. 6955, any Filipino woman to a foreign
national, for marriage for the purpose of
acquiring, buying, offering, selling or trading
him/her to engage in prostitution, pornography,
sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery,
involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
"(c) To offer or contract marriage, real or
simulated, for the purpose of acquiring, buying,
offering, selling, or trading them to engage in
prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation,
forced labor or slavery, involuntary servitude or
debt bondage;
"(d) To undertake or organize tours and travel
plans consisting of tourism packages or
activities for the purpose of utilizing and
offering persons for prostitution, pornography
or sexual exploitation;
"(e) To maintain or hire a person to engage in
prostitution or pornography;
"(f) To adopt persons by any form of
consideration for exploitative purposes or to
facilitate the same for purposes of prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor,
slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
"(g) To adopt or facilitate the adoption of
persons for the purpose of prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor,
slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
"(h) To recruit, hire, adopt, transport, transfer,
obtain, harbor, maintain, provide, offer, receive
or abduct a person, by means of threat or use
of force, fraud, deceit, violence, coercion, or
intimidation for the purpose of removal or sale
of organs of said person;
"(i) To recruit, transport, obtain, transfer,
harbor, maintain, offer, hire, provide, receive or
adopt a child to engage in armed activities in
the Philippines or abroad;
"(j) To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor,
obtain, maintain, offer, hire, provide or receive
a person by means defined in Section 3 of this
Act for purposes of forced labor, slavery, debt
bondage and involuntary servitude, including a
scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the
person either:
"(1) To believe that if the person did
not perform such labor or services, he
or she or another person would suffer
serious harm or physical restraint; or
"(2) To abuse or threaten the use of
law or the legal processes; and
"(k) To recruit, transport, harbor, obtain,
transfer, maintain, hire, offer, provide, adopt or
receive a child for purposes of exploitation or
trading them, including but not limited to, the
act of baring and/or selling a child for any
consideration or for barter for purposes of
exploitation. Trafficking for purposes of
exploitation of children shall include:
166
"(1) All forms of slavery or practices
similar to slavery, involuntary
servitude, debt bondage and forced
labor, including recruitment of
children for use in armed conflict;
"(2) The use, procuring or offering of
a child for prostitution, for the
production of pornography, or for
pornographic performances;
"(3) The use, procuring or offering of
a child for the production and
trafficking of drugs; and
"(4) The use, procuring or offering of
a child for illegal activities or work
which, by its nature or the
circumstances in which it is carried
out, is likely to harm their health,
safety or morals; and
"(l) To organize or direct other persons to commit the
offenses defined as acts of trafficking under this Act."
Section 5. A new Section 4-A is hereby inserted in Republic Act
No. 9208, to read as follows:
"SEC. 4-A. Attempted Trafficking in Persons. – Where
there are acts to initiate the commission of a trafficking
offense but the offender failed to or did not execute all
the elements of the crime, by accident or by reason of
some cause other than voluntary desistance, such overt
acts shall be deemed as an attempt to commit an act of
trafficking in persons. As such, an attempt to commit
any of the offenses enumerated in Section 4 of this Act
shall constitute attempted trafficking in persons.
"In cases where the victim is a child, any of the
following acts shall also be deemed as attempted
trafficking in persons:
"(a) Facilitating the travel of a child who travels
alone to a foreign country or territory without
valid reason therefor and without the required
clearance or permit from the Department of
Social Welfare and Development, or a written
permit or justification from the child’s parent or
legal guardian;
"(b) Executing, for a consideration, an affidavit
of consent or a written consent for adoption;
"(c) Recruiting a woman to bear a child for the
purpose of selling the child;
"(d) Simulating a birth for the purpose of
selling the child; and
"(e) Soliciting a child and acquiring the custody
thereof through any means from among
hospitals, clinics, nurseries, daycare centers,
refugee or evacuation centers, and low-income
families, for the purpose of selling the child."
Section 6. A new Section 4-B is hereby inserted in Republic Act
No. 9208, to read as follows:
"SEC. 4-B. Accomplice Liability. – Whoever knowingly
aids, abets, cooperates in the execution of the offense
by previous or simultaneous acts defined in this Act
shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of
Section 10(c) of this Act."

Section 7. A new Section 4-C is hereby inserted in Republic Act
No. 9208, to read as follows:
"SEC. 4-C. Accessories. – Whoever has the knowledge
of the commission of the crime, and without having
participated therein, either as principal or as
accomplices, take part in its commission in any of the
following manners:
"(a) By profiting themselves or assisting the
offender to profit by the effects of the crime;
"(b) By concealing or destroying the body of
the crime or effects or instruments thereof, in
order to prevent its discovery;
"(c) By harboring, concealing or assisting in
the escape of the principal of the crime,
provided the accessory acts with abuse of his
or her public functions or is known to be
habitually guilty of some other crime.
"Acts defined in this provision shall be punished in
accordance with the provision of Section 10(d) as
stated thereto."
Section 8. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 5. Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons. –
The following acts which promote or facilitate trafficking
in persons, shall be unlawful:
"(a) xxx
"(b) To produce, print and issue or distribute
unissued, tampered or fake counseling
certificates, registration stickers, overseas
employment certificates or other certificates of
any government agency which issues these
certificates, decals and such other markers as
proof of compliance with government
regulatory and pre-departure requirements for
the purpose of promoting trafficking in
persons;
"(c) xxx
"(d) xxx
"(e) xxx
"(f) xxx
"(g) xxx
"(h) To tamper with, destroy, or cause the
destruction of evidence, or to influence or
attempt to influence witnesses, in an
investigation or prosecution of a case under
this Act;
"(i) To destroy, conceal, remove, confiscate or
possess, or attempt to destroy, conceal,
remove, confiscate or possess, any actual or
purported passport or other travel, immigration
or working permit or document, or any other
actual or purported government identification,
of any person in order to prevent or restrict, or
attempt to prevent or restrict, without lawful
authority, the person’s liberty to move or travel
in order to maintain the labor or services of
that person; or
167
"(j) To utilize his or her office to impede the
investigation, prosecution or execution of
lawful orders in a case under this Act."
Section 9. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. – Violations of
Section 4 of this Act shall be considered as qualified
trafficking:
"x x x
"(d) When the offender is a spouse, an ascendant,
parent, sibling, guardian or a person who exercises
authority over the trafficked person or when the offense
is committed by a public officer or employee;
"x x x
"(f) When the offender is a member of the military or law
enforcement agencies;
"(g) When by reason or on occasion of the act of
trafficking in persons, the offended party dies, becomes
insane, suffers mutilation or is afflicted with Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or the Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS);
"(h) When the offender commits one or more violations
of Section 4 over a period of sixty (60) or more days,
whether those days are continuous or not; and
"(i) When the offender directs or through another
manages the trafficking victim in carrying out the
exploitative purpose of trafficking."
Section 10. Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 7. Confidentiality. – At any stage of the
investigation, rescue, prosecution and trial of an offense
under this Act, law enforcement officers, prosecutors,
judges, court personnel, social workers and medical
practitioners, as well as parties to the case, shall protect
the right to privacy of the trafficked person. Towards this
end, law enforcement officers, prosecutors and judges
to whom the complaint has been referred may,
whenever necessary to ensure a fair and impartial
proceeding, and after considering all circumstances for
the best interest of the parties, order a closed-door
investigation, prosecution or trial. The name and
personal circumstances of the trafficked person or any
other information tending to establish the identity of the
trafficked person and his or her family shall not be
disclosed to the public.
"It shall be unlawful for any editor, publisher, and
reporter or columnist in case of printed materials,
announcer or producer in case of television and radio,
producer and director of a film in case of the movie
industry, or any person utilizing tri-media facilities or
electronic information technology to cause publicity of
the name, personal circumstances, or any information
tending to establish the identity of the trafficked person
except when the trafficked person in a written statement
duly notarized knowingly, voluntarily and willingly
waives said confidentiality.
"Law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges, court
personnel, social workers and medical practitioners
shall be trained on the importance of maintaining
confidentiality as a means to protect the right to privacy
of victims and to encourage victims to file complaints."

Section 11. Section 8 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 8. Initiation and Prosecution of Cases. –
"(a) Initiation of Investigation. – Law enforcement
agencies are mandated to immediately initiate
investigation and counter-trafficking-intelligence
gathering upon receipt of statements or affidavit from
victims of trafficking, migrant workers, or their families
who are in possession of knowledge or information
about trafficking in persons cases.
"(b) Prosecution of Cases. – Any person who has
personal knowledge of the commission of any offense
under this Act, such as the trafficked person, the
parents, spouse, siblings, children or legal guardian
may file a complaint for trafficking.
"(c) Affidavit of Desistance. – Cases involving trafficking
in persons should not be dismissed based on the
affidavit of desistance executed by the victims or their
parents or legal guardians. Public and private
prosecutors are directed to oppose and manifest
objections to motions for dismissal.
"Any act involving the means provided in this Act or any
attempt thereof for the purpose of securing an Affidavit
of Desistance from the complainant shall be punishable
under this Act."
Section 12. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 10. Penalties and Sanctions. – The following
penalties and sanctions are hereby established for the
offenses enumerated in this Act:
"(a) Any person found guilty of committing any of the
acts enumerated in Section 4 shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of twenty (20) years and a fine of not less
than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) but not more
than Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00);
"(b) Any person found guilty of committing any of the
acts enumerated in Section 4-A of this Act shall suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of fifteen (15) years and a
fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) but not more than One million pesos
(P1,000,000.00);
"(c) Any person found guilty of Section 4-B of this Act
shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of fifteen (15)
years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00) but not more than One million
pesos (P1,000,000.00);
"In every case, conviction shall cause and carry the
automatic revocation of the license or registration of the
recruitment agency involved in trafficking. The license
of a recruitment agency which trafficked a child shall be
automatically revoked.
"(d) Any person found, guilty of committing any of the
acts enumerated in Section 5 shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of fifteen (15) years and a fine of not less
than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) but
not more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00);
"(e) Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under
Section 6 shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and a fine of not less than Two million pesos
(P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five million pesos
(P5,000,000.00);
168
"(f) Any person who violates Section 7 hereof shall
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and a
fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) but not more than One million pesos
(P1,000,000.00);
"(g) If the offender is a corporation, partnership,
association, club, establishment or any juridical person,
the penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president,
partner, manager, and/or any responsible officer who
participated in the commission of the crime or who shall
have knowingly permitted or failed to prevent its
commission;
"(h) The registration with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and license to operate of the erring
agency, corporation, association, religious group, tour
or travel agent, club or establishment, or any place of
entertainment shall be cancelled and revoked
permanently. The owner, president, partner or manager
thereof shall not be allowed to operate similar
establishments in a different name;
"(i) If the offender is a foreigner, he or she shall be
immediately deported after serving his or her sentence
and be barred permanently from entering the country;
"(j) Any employee or official of government agencies
who shall issue or approve the issuance of travel exit
clearances, passports, registration certificates,
counseling certificates, marriage license, and other
similar documents to persons, whether juridical or
natural, recruitment agencies, establishments or other
individuals or groups, who fail to observe the prescribed
procedures and the requirement as provided for by
laws, rules and regulations, shall be held
administratively liable, without prejudice to criminal
liability under this Act. The concerned government
official or employee shall, upon conviction, be
dismissed from the service and be barred permanently
to hold public office. His or her retirement and other
benefits shall likewise be forfeited; and
"(k) Conviction, by final judgment of the adopter for any
offense under this Act shall result in the immediate
rescission of the decree of adoption."
Section 13. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 11. Use of Trafficked Persons. – Any person who
buys or engages the services of a trafficked person for
prostitution shall be penalized with the
following: Provided, That the Probation Law
(Presidential Decree No. 968) shall not apply:
"(a) Prision Correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor or six (6) years to
twelve (12) years imprisonment and a fine of
not less than Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) but not more than One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00): Provided,
however, That the following acts shall be
exempted thereto:
"(1) If an offense under paragraph (a) involves
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a
child, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in
its medium period to reclusion perpetua or
seventeen (17) years to forty (40) years
imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) but
not more than One million pesos
(P1,000,000.00);
"(2) If an offense under paragraph (a) involves
carnal knowledge of, or sexual intercourse

with, a male or female trafficking victim and
also involves the use of force or intimidation, to
a victim deprived of reason or to an
unconscious victim, or a victim under twelve
(12) years of age, instead of the penalty
prescribed in the subparagraph above the
penalty shall be a fine of not less than One
million pesos (P1,000,000.00) but not more
than Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00) and
imprisonment of reclusionperpetua or forty (40)
years imprisonment with no possibility of
parole; except that if a person violating
paragraph (a) of this section knows the person
that provided prostitution services is in fact a
victim of trafficking, the offender shall not be
likewise penalized under this section but under
Section 10 as a person violating Section 4;
and if in committing such an offense, the
offender also knows a qualifying circumstance
for trafficking, the offender shall be penalized
under Section 10 for qualified trafficking. If in
violating this section the offender also violates
Section 4, the offender shall be penalized
under Section 10 and, if applicable, for
qualified trafficking instead of under this
section;
"(b) Deportation. – If a foreigner commits any
offense described by paragraph (1) or (2) of
this section or violates any pertinent provision
of this Act as an accomplice or accessory to,
or by attempting any such offense, he or she
shall be immediately deported after serving his
or her sentence and be barred permanently
from entering the country; and
"(c) Public Official. – If the offender is a public
official, he or she shall be dismissed from
service and shall suffer perpetual absolute
disqualification to hold public, office, in addition
to any imprisonment or fine received pursuant
to any other provision of this Act."
Section 14. Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 12. Prescriptive Period. – Trafficking cases under
this Act shall prescribe in ten (10) years: Provided,
however, That trafficking cases committed by a
syndicate or in a large scale as defined under Section
6, or against a child, shall prescribe in twenty (20)
years.
"The prescriptive period shall commence to run from
the day on which the trafficked person is delivered or
released from the conditions of bondage, or in the case
of a child victim, from the day the child reaches the age
of majority, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information and shall commence to run
again when the proceedings terminate without the
accused being convicted or acquitted or are
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to
the accused."
Section 15. Section 16 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 16. Programs that Address Trafficking in
Persons. – The government shall establish and
implement preventive, protective and rehabilitative
programs for trafficked persons. For this purpose, the
following agencies are hereby mandated to implement
the following programs:
"(a) Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) –
shall make available its resources and facilities
overseas for trafficked persons regardless of
their manner of entry to the receiving country,
169
and explore means to further enhance its
assistance in eliminating trafficking activities
through closer networking with government
agencies in the country and overseas,
particularly in the formulation of policies and
implementation of relevant programs. It shall
provide Filipino victims of trafficking overseas
with free legal assistance and counsel to
pursue legal action against his or her
traffickers, represent his or her interests in any
criminal investigation or prosecution, and
assist in the application for social benefits
and/or regular immigration status as may be
allowed or provided for by the host country.
The DFA shall repatriate trafficked Filipinos
with the consent of the victims.
"The DFA shall take necessary measures for
the efficient implementation of the Electronic
Passporting System to protect the integrity of
Philippine passports, visas and other travel
documents to reduce the incidence of
trafficking through the use of fraudulent
identification documents.
"In coordination with the Department of Labor
and Employment, it shall provide free
temporary shelters and other services to
Filipino victims of trafficking overseas through
the migrant workers and other overseas
Filipinos resource centers established
overseas under Republic Act No. 8042, as
amended.
"(b) Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) – shall implement
rehabilitative and protective programs for
trafficked persons. It shall provide counseling
and temporary shelter to trafficked persons
and develop a system for accreditation among
NGOs for purposes of establishing centers and
programs for intervention in various levels of
the community. It shall establish free
temporary shelters, for the protection and
housing of trafficked persons to provide the
following basic services to trafficked persons:
"(1) Temporary housing and food
facilities;
"(2) Psychological support and
counseling;
"(3) 24-hour call center for crisis calls
and technology-based counseling
and referral system;
"(4) Coordination with local law
enforcement entities; and
"(5) Coordination with the Department
of Justice, among others.
"The DSWD must conduct information
campaigns in communities and schools
teaching parents and families that receiving
consideration in exchange for adoption is
punishable under the law. Furthermore,
information campaigns must be conducted
with the police that they must not induce poor
women to give their children up for adoption in
exchange for consideration.
"(c) Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) – shall ensure the strict
implementation and compliance with the rules
and guidelines relative to the employment of

persons locally and overseas. It shall likewise
monitor, document and report cases of
trafficking in persons involving employers and
labor recruiters.
"(d) Department of Justice (DOJ) – shall
ensure the prosecution of persons accused of
trafficking and designate and train special
prosecutors who shall handle and prosecute
cases of trafficking. It shall also establish a
mechanism for free legal assistance for
trafficked persons, in coordination with the
DSWD, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
and other NGOs and volunteer groups.
"(e) Philippine Commission on Women (PCW)
– shall actively participate and coordinate in
the formulation and monitoring of policies
addressing the issue of trafficking in persons in
coordination with relevant government
agencies. It shall likewise advocate for the
inclusion of the issue of trafficking in persons
in both its local and international advocacy for
women’s issues.
"(f) Bureau of Immigration (BI) – shall strictly
administer and enforce immigration and alien
administration laws. It shall adopt measures
for the apprehension of suspected traffickers
both at the place of arrival and departure and
shall ensure compliance by the Filipino
fiancés/fiancées and spouses of foreign
nationals with the guidance and counseling
requirement as provided for in this Act.
"(g) Philippine National Police (PNP) and
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) – shall
be the primary law enforcement agencies to
undertake surveillance, investigation and
arrest of individuals or persons suspected to
be engaged in trafficking. They shall closely
coordinate with each other and with other law
enforcement agencies to secure concerted
efforts for effective investigation and
apprehension of suspected traffickers. They
shall also establish a system to receive
complaints and calls to assist trafficked
persons and conduct rescue operations.
"(h) Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) and Overseas Workers
and Welfare Administration (OWWA) – POEA
shall implement Pre-Employment Orientation
Seminars (PEOS) while Pre-Departure
Orientation Seminars (PDOS) shall be
conducted by the OWWA. It shall likewise
formulate a system of providing free legal
assistance to trafficked persons, in
coordination with the DFA.
"The POEA shall create a blacklist of
recruitment agencies, illegal recruiters and
persons facing administrative, civil and
criminal complaints for trafficking filed in the
receiving country and/or in the Philippines and
those agencies, illegal recruiters and persons
involved in cases of trafficking who have been
rescued by the DFA and DOLE in the receiving
country or in the Philippines even if no formal
administrative, civil or criminal complaints have
been filed: Provided, That the rescued victims
shall execute an affidavit attesting to the acts
violative of the anti-trafficking law. This
blacklist shall be posted in conspicuous places
in concerned government agencies and shall
be updated bi-monthly.
170
"The blacklist shall likewise be posted by the
POEA in the shared government information
system, which is mandated to be established
under Republic Act No. 8042, as amended.
"The POEA and OWWA shall accredit NGOs
and other service providers to conduct PEOS
and PDOS, respectively. The PEOS and
PDOS should include the discussion and
distribution of the blacklist.
"The license or registration of a recruitment
agency that has been blacklisted may be
suspended by the POEA upon a review of the
complaints filed against said agency.
"(i) Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) – shall institute a
systematic information and prevention
campaign in coordination with pertinent
agencies of government as provided for in this
Act. It shall provide training programs to local
government units, in coordination with the
Council, in ensuring wide understanding and
application of this Act at the local level.
"(j) Commission on Filipinos Overseas – shall
conduct pre-departure counseling services for
Filipinos in intermarriages. It shall develop a
system for accreditation of NGOs that may be
mobilized for purposes of conducting pre-
departure counseling services for Filipinos in
intermarriages. As such, it shall ensure that the
counselors contemplated under this Act shall
have the minimum qualifications and training
of guidance counselors as provided for by law.
"It shall likewise assist in the conduct of
information campaigns against trafficking in
coordination with local government units, the
Philippine Information Agency, and NGOs.
"(k) Local government units (LGUs) – shall
monitor and document cases of trafficking in
persons in their areas of jurisdiction, effect the
cancellation of licenses of establishments
which violate the provisions of this Act and
ensure effective prosecution of such cases.
They shall also undertake an information
campaign against trafficking in persons
through the establishment of the Migrants
Advisory and Information Network (MAIN)
desks in municipalities or provinces in
coordination with the DILG, Philippine
Information Agency (PIA), Commission on
Filipinos Overseas (CFO), NGOs and other
concerned agencies. They shall encourage
and support community-based initiatives which
address the trafficking in persons.
"In implementing this Act, the agencies
concerned may seek and enlist the assistance
of NGOs, people’s organizations (POs), civic
organizations and other volunteer groups."
Section 16. A new Section 16-A is hereby inserted into Republic
Act No. 9208, to read as follows:
"SEC. 16-A. Anti-Trafficking in Persons Database. – An
anti-trafficking in persons central database shall be
established by the Inter-Agency Council Against
Trafficking created under Section 20 of this Act. The
Council shall submit a report to the President of the
Philippines and to Congress, on or before January 15 of
every year, with respect to the preceding year’s
programs and data on trafficking-related cases.

"All government agencies tasked under the law to
undertake programs and render assistance to address
trafficking in persons shall develop their respective
monitoring and data collection systems, and databases,
for purposes of ensuring efficient collection and storage
of data on cases of trafficking in persons handled by
their respective offices. Such data shall be submitted to
the Council for integration in a central database system.
"For this purpose, the Council is hereby tasked to
ensure the harmonization and standardization of
databases, including minimum data requirements,
definitions, reporting formats, data collection systems,
and data verification systems. Such databases shall
have, at the minimum, the following information:
"(a) The number of cases of trafficking in
persons, sorted according to status of cases,
including the number of cases being
investigated, submitted for prosecution,
dropped, and filed and/or pending before the
courts and the number of convictions and
acquittals;
"(b) The profile/information on each case;
"(c) The number of victims of trafficking in
persons referred to the agency by destination
countries/areas and by area of origin; and
"(d) Disaggregated data on trafficking victims
and the accused/defendants."
Section 17. Section 17 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 17. Legal Protection to Trafficked Persons.
– Trafficked persons shall be recognized as victims of
the act or acts of trafficking and as such, shall not be
penalized for unlawful acts committed as a direct result
of, or as an incident or in relation to, being trafficked
based on the acts of trafficking enumerated in this Act
or in obedience to the order made by the trafficker in
relation thereto. In this regard, the consent of a
trafficked person to the intended exploitation set forth in
this Act shall be irrelevant.
"Victims of trafficking for purposes of prostitution as
defined under Section 4 of this Act are not covered by
Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code and as such,
shall not be prosecuted, fined, or otherwise penalized
under the said law."
Section 18. A new Section 17-A is hereby inserted into Republic
Act No. 9208, to read as follows:
"SEC. 17-A. Temporary Custody of Trafficked Victims. –
The rescue of victims should be done as much as
possible with the assistance of the DSWD or an
accredited NGO that services trafficked victims. A law
enforcement officer, on a reasonable suspicion that a
person is a victim of any offense defined under this Act
including attempted trafficking, shall immediately place
that person in the temporary custody of the local social
welfare and development office, or any accredited or
licensed shelter institution devoted to protecting
trafficked persons after the rescue."
Section 19. A new Section 17-B is hereby inserted into Republic
Act No. 9208, to read as follows:
"SEC. 17-B. Irrelevance of Past Sexual Behavior,
Opinion Thereof or Reputation of Victims and of
Consent of Victims in Cases of Deception, Coercion
and Other Prohibited Means. – The past sexual
behavior or the sexual predisposition of a trafficked
171
person shall be considered inadmissible in evidence for
the purpose of proving consent of the victim to engage
in sexual behavior, or to prove the predisposition,
sexual or otherwise, of a trafficked person.
Furthermore, the consent of a victim of trafficking to the
intended exploitation shall be irrelevant where any of
the means set forth in Section 3(a) of this Act has been
used."
Section 20. A new Section 17-C is hereby inserted into Republic
Act No. 9208, to read as follows:
"SEC. 17-C. Immunity from Suit, Prohibited Acts and
Injunctive Remedies. – No action or suit shall be
brought, instituted or maintained in any court or tribunal
or before any other authority against any: (a) law
enforcement officer; (b) social worker; or (c) person
acting in compliance with a lawful order from any of the
above, for lawful acts done or statements made during
an authorized rescue operation, recovery or
rehabilitation/intervention, or an investigation or
prosecution of an anti-trafficking case: Provided, That
such acts shall have been made in good faith.
"The prosecution of retaliatory suits against victims of
trafficking shall be held in abeyance pending final
resolution and decision of criminal complaint for
trafficking.
"It shall be prohibited for the DFA, the DOLE, and the
POEA officials, law enforcement officers, prosecutors
and judges to urge complainants to abandon their
criminal, civil and administrative complaints for
trafficking.
"The remedies of injunction and attachment of
properties of the traffickers, illegal recruiters and
persons involved in trafficking may be issued motu
proprio by judges."
Section 21. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 20. Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking.
– There is hereby established an Inter-Agency Council
Against Trafficking, to be composed of the Secretary of
the Department of Justice as Chairperson and the
Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development as Co-Chairperson and shall have the
following as members:
"(a) Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs;
"(b) Secretary, Department of Labor and
Employment;
"(c) Secretary, Department of the Interior and
Local Government;
"(d) Administrator, Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration;
"(e) Commissioner, Bureau of Immigration;
"(f) Chief, Philippine National Police;
"(g) Chairperson, Philippine Commission on
Women;
"(h) Chairperson, Commission on Filipinos
Overseas;
"(i) Executive Director, Philippine Center for
Transnational Crimes; and

"(j) Three (3) representatives from NGOs, who
shall include one (1) representative each from
among the sectors representing women,
overseas Filipinos, and children, with a proven
record of involvement in the prevention and
suppression of trafficking in persons. These
representatives shall be nominated by the
government agency representatives of the
Council, for appointment by the President for a
term of three (3) years.
"The members of the Council may designate their
permanent representatives who shall have a rank not
lower than an assistant secretary or its equivalent to
meetings, and shall receive emoluments as may be
determined by the Council in accordance with existing
budget and accounting rules and regulations."
Section 22. Section 22 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 22. Secretariat to the Council. – The Department
of Justice shall establish the necessary Secretariat for
the Council.
"The secretariat shall provide support for the functions
and projects of the Council. The secretariat shall be
headed by an executive director, who shall be
appointed by the Secretary of the DOJ upon the
recommendation of the Council. The executive director
must have adequate knowledge on, training and
experience in the phenomenon of and issues involved
in trafficking in persons and in the field of law, law
enforcement, social work, criminology, or psychology.
"The executive director shall be under the supervision
of the Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking through
its Chairperson and Co-Chairperson, and shall perform
the following functions:
"(a) Act as secretary of the Council and
administrative officer of its secretariat;
"(b) Advise and assist the Chairperson in
formulating and implementing the objectives,
policies, plans and programs of the Council,
including those involving mobilization of
government offices represented in the Council
as well as other relevant government offices,
task forces, and mechanisms;
"(c) Serve as principal assistant to the
Chairperson in the overall supervision of
council administrative business;
"(d) Oversee all council operational activities;
"(e) Ensure an effective and efficient
performance of council functions and prompt
implementation of council objectives, policies,
plans and programs;
"(f) Propose effective allocations of resources
for implementing council objectives, policies,
plans and programs;
"(g) Submit periodic reports to the Council on
the progress of council objectives, policies,
plans and programs;
"(h) Prepare annual reports of all council
activities; and
"(i) Perform other duties as the Council may
assign."
172
Section 23. A new Section 26-A is hereby inserted into Republic
Act No. 9208, to read as follows:
"SEC. 26-A. Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction. – The State
shall exercise jurisdiction over any act defined and
penalized under this Act, even if committed outside the
Philippines and whether or not such act or acts
constitute an offense at the place of commission, the
crime being a continuing offense, having been
commenced in the Philippines and other elements
having been committed in another country, if the
suspect or accused:
"(a) Is a Filipino citizen; or
"(b) Is a permanent resident of the Philippines;
or
"(c) Has committed the act against a citizen of
the Philippines.
"No prosecution may be commenced against a person
under this section if a foreign government, in
accordance with jurisdiction recognized by the
Philippines, has prosecuted or is prosecuting such
person for the conduct constituting such offense, except
upon the approval of the Secretary of Justice.
"The government may surrender or extradite persons
accused of trafficking in the Philippines to the
appropriate international court if any, or to another State
pursuant to the applicable extradition laws and treaties."
Section 24. Section 28 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby
amended, to read as follows:
"SEC. 28. Funding. – The amount necessary to
implement the provisions of this Act shall be charged
against the current year’s appropriations of the Inter-
Agency Council Against Trafficking under the budget of
the DOJ and the appropriations of the other concerned
departments. Thereafter, such sums as may be
necessary for the continued implementation of this Act
shall be included in the annual General Appropriations
Act."1âwphi1
Section 25. A new Section 28-A is hereby inserted into Republic
Act No. 9208, to read as follows:
"SEC. 28-A. Additional Funds for the Council. – The
amount collected from every penalty, fine or asset
derived from any violation of this Act shall be earmarked
as additional funds for the use of the Council. The fund
may be augmented by grants, donations and
endowment from various sources, domestic or foreign,
for purposes related to their functions, subject to the
existing accepted rules and regulations of the
Commission on Audit."
Section 26. Section 32 of Republic Act No. 9208 of the
Repealing Clause is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 32. Repealing Clause. – Article 202 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and all laws, acts,
presidential decrees, executive orders, administrative
orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with or
contrary to the provisions of this Act are deemed
amended, modified or repealed
accordingly: Provided, That this Act shall not in any way
amend or repeal the provisions of Republic Act No.
7610, otherwise known as the ‘Special Protection of
Child Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act.’"
Section 27. Section 33 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
 173

"SEC. 33. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect fifteen Section 5. Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted as a restriction
(15) days following its complete publication in at least on the freedom of speech and of association for purposes not
two (2) newspapers of general circulation." contrary to law as guaranteed by the Constitution.

Approved, Section 6. All laws, decrees, orders, instructions, rules and

regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are hereby
Republic Act No. 6955 June 13, 1990 repealed or modified accordingly.

AN ACT TO DECLARE UNLAWFUL THE PRACTICE OF Section 7. This Act shall take effect upon its publication for two
MATCHING FILIPINO WOMEN FOR MARRIAGE TO FOREIGN (2) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation.
NATIONALS ON A MAIL ORDER BASIS AND OTHER
SIMILAR PRACTICES, INCLUDING THE ADVERTISEMENT, Approved: June 13, 1990
PUBLICATION, PRINTING OR DISTRIBUTION OF
BROCHURES, FLIERS AND OTHER PROPAGANDA INSERT HERE R.A 10906 (naka PDF kasi)
MATERIALS IN FURTHERANCE THEREOF AND PROVIDING
PENALTY THEREFORE
REPUBLIC ACT No. 7877
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the Philippines in Congress assembled:: AN ACT DECLARING SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNLAWFUL IN
THE EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION OR TRAINING
ENVIRONMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Section 1. It is the policy of the State to ensure and guarantee
the enjoyment of the people of a decent standard of living.
Towards this end, the State shall take measures to protect Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
Filipino women from being exploited in utter disregard of human the Philippines in Congress assembled:
dignity in their pursuit of economic upliftment.
Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Anti-Sexual
Section 2. Pursuant thereto, it is hereby declared unlawful: Harassment Act of 1995."

(a) For a person, natural or juridical, association, club or Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall value the
any other entity to commit, directly or indirectly, any of dignity of every individual, enhance the development of its
the following acts: human resources, guarantee full respect for human rights, and
uphold the dignity of workers, employees, applicants for
employment, students or those undergoing training, instruction
(1) To establish or carry on a business which
or education. Towards this end, all forms of sexual harassment in
has for its purpose the matching of Filipino
the employment, education or training environment are hereby
women for marriage to foreign nationals either
declared unlawful.
on a mail-order basis or through personal
introduction;
Section 3. Work, Education or Training -Related, Sexual
Harassment Defined. - Work, education or training-related sexual
(2) To advertise, publish, print or distribute or
harassment is committed by an employer, employee, manager,
cause the advertisement, publication, printing
supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor,
or distribution of any brochure, flier, or any
coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority,
propaganda material calculated to promote the
influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training
prohibited acts in the preceding subparagraph;
or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise
requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether
(3) To solicit, enlist or in any manner attract or the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted
induce any Filipino woman to become a by the object of said Act.
member in any club or association whose
objective is to match women for marriage to
(a) In a work-related or employment environment,
foreign nationals either on a mail-order basis
sexual harassment is committed when:
or through personal introduction for a fee;

(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in

(4) To use the postal service to promote the
the hiring or in the employment, re-
prohibited acts in subparagraph 1
employment or continued employment of said
hereof.1awphi1©alf
individual, or in granting said individual
favorable compensation, terms of conditions,
(b) For the manager or officer-in-charge or advertising promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to
manager of any newspaper, magazine, television or grant the sexual favor results in limiting,
radio station, or other media, or of an advertising segregating or classifying the employee which
agency, printing company or other similar entities, to in any way would discriminate, deprive
knowingly allow, or consent to, the acts prohibited in the ordiminish employment opportunities or
preceding paragraph. otherwise adversely affect said employee;

Section 3. In case of violation of this Act by an association, club, (2) The above acts would impair the
partnership, corporation, or any other entity, the incumbent employee's rights or privileges under existing
officers thereof who have knowingly participated in the violation labor laws; or
of this Act shall be held liable.1awphil©a1f
(3) The above acts would result in an
Section 4. Any person found guilty by the court to have violated intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment
any of the acts herein prohibited shall suffer an imprisonment of for the employee.
not less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than
eight (8) years, and a fine of not less than Eight thousand pesos
(b) In an education or training environment, sexual
(P8,000) but not more than Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000):
harassment is committed:
Provided, That if the offender is a foreigner, he shall be
immediately deported and barred forever from entering the
country after serving his sentence and payment of fine. (1) Against one who is under the care, custody
or supervision of the offender;

(2) Against one whose education, training,
apprenticeship or tutorship is entrusted to the
offender;
(3) When the sexual favor is made a condition
to the giving of a passing grade, or the
granting of honors and scholarships, or the
payment of a stipend, allowance or other
benefits, privileges, or consideration; or
(4) When the sexual advances result in an
intimidating, hostile or offensive environment
for the student, trainee or apprentice.
Any person who directs or induces another to commit
any act of sexual harassment as herein defined, or who
cooperates in the commission thereof by another
without which it would not have been committed, shall
also be held liable under this Act.
Section 4. Duty of the Employer or Head of Office in a Work-
related, Education or Training Environment. - It shall be the duty
of the employer or the head of the work-related, educational or
training environment or institution, to prevent or deter the
commission of acts of sexual harassment and to provide the
procedures for the resolution, settlement or prosecution of acts
of sexual harassment. Towards this end, the employer or head of
office shall:
(a) Promulgate appropriate rules and regulations in
consultation with and joint1y approved by the
employees or students or trainees, through their duly
designated representatives, prescribing the procedure
for the investigation of sexual harassment cases and
the administrative sanctions therefor.
Administrative sanctions shall not be a bar to
prosecution in the proper courts for unlawful acts of
sexual harassment.
The said rules and regulations issued pursuant to this
subsection (a) shall include, among others, guidelines
on proper decorum in the workplace and educational or
training institutions.
(b) Create a committee on decorum and investigation of
cases on sexual harassment. The committee shall
conduct meetings, as the case may be, with officers
and employees, teachers, instructors, professors,
coaches, trainors, and students or trainees to increase
understanding and prevent incidents of sexual
harassment. It shall also conduct the investigation of
alleged cases constituting sexual harassment.
In the case of a work-related environment, the
committee shall be composed of at least one (1)
representative each from the management, the union, if
any, the employees from the supervisory rank, and from
the rank and file employees.
In the case of the educational or training institution, the
committee shall be composed of at least one (1)
representative from the administration, the trainors,
instructors, professors or coaches and students or
trainees, as the case may be.
The employer or head of office, educational or training
institution shall disseminate or post a copy of this Act for
the information of all concerned.
Section 5. Liability of the Employer, Head of Office, Educational
or Training Institution. - The employer or head of office,
educational or training institution shall be solidarily liable for
damages arising from the acts of sexual harassment committed
in the employment, education
174
or training environment if the employer or head of office,
educational or training institution is informed of such acts by the
offended party and no immediate action is taken.
Section 6. Independent Action for Damages. - Nothing in this Act
shall preclude the victim of work, education or training-related
sexual harassment from instituting a separate and independent
action for damages and other affirmative relief.
Section 7. Penalties. - Any person who violates the provisions of
this Act shall, upon conviction, be penalized by imprisonment of
not less than one (1) month nor more than six (6) months, or a
fine of not less than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000) nor more
than Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000), or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
Any action arising from the violation of the provisions of this Act
shall prescribe in three (3) years.
Section 8. Separability Clause. - If any portion or provision of
this Act is declared void or unconstitutional, the remaining
portions or provisions hereof shall not be affected by such
declaration.
Section 9. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules
and regulations, other issuances, or parts thereof inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
Section 10. Effectivity Clause.- This Act shall take effect fifteen
(15) days after its complete publication in at least two (2)
national newspapers of general circulation.
G.R. No. 155831 February 18, 2008
MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
ROGELIO I. RAYALA, respondent.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 155840 February 18, 2008
ROGELIO I. RAYALA, petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; RONALDO V. ZAMORA, in his
capacity as Executive Secretary; ROY V. SENERES, in his
capacity as Chairman of the National Labor Relations
Commission (in lieu of RAUL T. AQUINO, in his capacity as
Acting Chairman of the National labor Relations
Commission); and MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO, respondents.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 158700 February 18, 2008
The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; and ALBERTO G. ROMULO, in
his capacity as Executive Secretary, petitioners,
vs.
ROGELIO I. RAYALA, respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Sexual harassment is an imposition of misplaced "superiority"
which is enough to dampen an employee’s spirit and her
capacity for advancement. It affects her sense of judgment; it
changes her life.1
Before this Court are three Petitions for Review
on Certiorari assailing the October 18, 2002 Resolution of the
CA’s Former Ninth Division2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026. The

Resolution modified the December 14, 2001 Decision3 of the
Court of Appeals’ Eleventh Division, which had affirmed the
Decision of the Office of the President (OP) dismissing from the
service then National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
Chairman Rogelio I. Rayala (Rayala) for disgraceful and immoral
conduct.
All three petitions stem from the same factual antecedents.
On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo),
then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a Complaint for
sexual harassment against Rayala before Secretary Bienvenido
Laguesma of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
To support the Complaint, Domingo executed an Affidavit
narrating the incidences of sexual harassment complained of,
thus:
xxxx
4. Sa simula ay pabulong na sinasabihan lang ako ni
Chairman Rayala ng mga salitang "Lot, gumaganda ka
yata?"
5. Sa ibang mga pagkakataon nilalapitan na ako ni
Chairman at hahawakan ang aking balikat sabay pisil
sa mga ito habang ako ay nagta-type at habang
nagbibigay siya ng diktasyon. Sa mga pagkakataong
ito, kinakabahan ako. Natatakot na baka mangyari sa
akin ang mga napapabalitang insidente na nangyari na
noon tungkol sa mga sekretarya niyang nagbitiw gawa
ng mga mahahalay na panghihipo ni Chairman.
6. Noong ika-10 ng Setyembre, 1998, nang ako ay
nasa 8th Floor, may nagsabi sa akin na kailangan akong
bumaba sa 7th Floor kung nasaan ang aming opisina
dahil sa may koreksyon daw na gagawin sa mga papel
na tinayp ko. Bumaba naman ako para gawin ito.
Habang ginagawa ko ito, lumabas si Chairman Rayala
sa silid ni Mr. Alex Lopez. Inutusan ako ni Chairman na
sumunod sa kaniyang silid. Nang nasa silid na kami,
sinabi niya sa akin:
Chairman: Lot, I like you a lot. Naiiba ka sa
lahat.
At pagkatapos ako ay kaniyang inusisa tungkol sa mga
personal na bagay sa aking buhay. Ang ilan dito ay
tungkol sa aking mga magulang, kapatid, pag-aaral at
kung may boyfriend na raw ba ako.
Chairman: May boyfriend ka na ba?
Lourdes: Dati nagkaroon po.
Chairman: Nasaan na siya?
Lourdes: Nag-asawa na ho.
Chairman: Bakit hindi kayo nagkatuluyan?
Lourdes: Nainip po.
Chairman: Pagkatapos mo ng kurso mo ay
kumuha ka ng Law at ako ang bahala sa iyo,
hanggang ako pa ang Chairman dito.
Pagkatapos ay kumuha siya ng pera sa kaniyang
amerikana at inaabot sa akin.
Chairman: Kuhanin mo ito.
Lourdes: Huwag na ho hindi ko kailangan.
175
Chairman: Hindi sige, kuhanin mo. Ayusin mo
ang dapat ayusin.
Tinanggap ko po ang pera ng may pag-aalinlangan.
Natatakot at kinakabahan na kapag hindi ko tinanggap
ang pera ay baka siya magagalit kasabay na rito ang
pagtapon sa akin kung saan-saan opisina o kaya ay
tanggalin ako sa posisyon.
Chairman: Paglabas mo itago mo ang pera.
Ayaw ko ng may makaka-alam nito. Just the
two of us.
Lourdes: Bakit naman, Sir?
Chairman: Basta. Maraming tsismosa diyan sa
labas. But I don’t give them a damn. Hindi ako
mamatay sa kanila.
Tumayo na ako at lumabas. Pumanhik na ako ng
8th Floor at pumunta ako sa officemate ko na si Agnes
Magdaet. Ikinwento ko ang nangyari sa akin sa opisina
ni Chairman. Habang kinikwento ko ito kay Agnes ay
binilang namin ang pera na nagkakahalaga ng tatlong
libong piso (PHP 3,000). Sinabi ni Agnes na isauli ko
raw ang pera, pero ang sabi ko ay natatakot ako baka
magalit si Sir. Nagsabi agad kami kay EC Perlita
Velasco at sinalaysay ko ang nangyari. Sinabi niya na
isauli ko ang pera at noong araw ding iyon ay
nagpasiya akong isauli na nga ito ngunit hindi ako
nagkaroon ng pagkakataon dahil marami siyang naging
bisita. Isinauli ko nga ang pera noong Lunes,
Setyembre 14, 1998.
7. Noong huling linggo ng Setyembre, 1998, ay may
tinanong din sa akin si Chairman Rayala na hindi ko
masikmura, at sa aking palagay at tahasang
pambabastos sa akin.
Chairman: Lot, may ka live-in ka ba?
Lourdes: Sir, wala po.
Chairman: Bakit malaki ang balakang mo?
Lourdes: Kayo, Sir ha! Masama sa amin ang
may ka live-in.
Chairman: Bakit, ano ba ang relihiyon ninyo?
Lourdes: Catholic, Sir. Kailangan ikasal muna.
Chairman: Bakit ako, hindi kasal.
Lourdes: Sir, di magpakasal kayo.
Chairman: Huh. Ibahin na nga natin ang
usapan.
8. Noong Oktubre 29, 1998, ako ay pumasok sa kwarto
ni Chairman Rayala. Ito ay sa kadahilanang ang fax
machine ay nasa loob ng kaniyang kwarto. Ang nag-
aasikaso nito, si Riza Ocampo, ay naka-leave kaya ako
ang nag-asikaso nito noong araw na iyon. Nang
mabigyan ko na ng fax tone yung kausap ko, pagharap
ko sa kanan ay nakaharang sa dadaanan ko si
Chairman Rayala. Tinitingnan ako sa mata at ang titig
niya ay umuusad mula ulo hanggang dibdib tapos ay
ngumiti na may mahalay na pakahulugan.
9. Noong hapon naman ng pareho pa ring petsa, may
nag-aapply na sekretarya sa opisina, sinabi ko ito kay
Chairman Rayala:

Lourdes: Sir, si Pinky po yung applicant, mag-
papainterview po yata sa inyo.
Chairman: Sabihin mo magpa-pap smear
muna siya
Chairman: O sige, i-refer mo kay Alex. (Alex
Lopez, Chief of Staff).
10. Noong Nobyembre 9, 1998, ako ay tinawag ni
Chairman Rayala sa kaniyang opisina upang kuhanin
ko ang diktasyon niya para kay ELA Oscar Uy. Hindi pa
kami nakakatapos ng unang talata, may pumasok na
bisita si Chairman, si Baby Pangilinan na sinamahan ni
Riza Ocampo. Pinalabas muna ako ni Chairman. Nang
maka-alis na si Ms. Pangilinan, pinapasok na niya ako
ulit. Umupo ako. Lumapit sa likuran ko si Chairman,
hinawakan ang kaliwang balikat ko na pinipisil ng
kanang kamay niya at sinabi:
Chairman: Saan na ba tayo natapos?
Palakad-lakad siya sa aking likuran habang nag-didikta.
Huminto siya pagkatapos, at nilagay niya ang kanang
kamay niya sa aking kanang balikat at pinisil-pisil ito
pagkatapos ay pinagapang niya ito sa kanang bahagi
ng aking leeg, at pinagapang hanggang kanang tenga
at saka kiniliti. Dito ko inalis ang kaniyang kamay sa
pamamagitan ng aking kaliwang kamay. At saka ko
sinabi:
Lourdes: Sir, yung kamay ninyo alisin niyo!
Natapos ko rin ang liham na pinagagawa niya pero
halos hindi ko na maintindihan ang na-isulat ko dahil sa
takot at inis na nararamdaman ko.4
After the last incident narrated, Domingo filed for leave of
absence and asked to be immediately transferred. Thereafter,
she filed the Complaint for sexual harassment on the basis of
Administrative Order No. 250, the Rules and Regulations
Implementing RA 7877 in the Department of Labor and
Employment.
Upon receipt of the Complaint, the DOLE Secretary referred the
Complaint to the OP, Rayala being a presidential appointee. The
OP, through then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, ordered
Secretary Laguesma to investigate the allegations in the
Complaint and create a committee for such purpose. On
December 4, 1998, Secretary Laguesma issued Administrative
Order (AO) No. 280, Series of 1998, 5 constituting a Committee
on Decorum and Investigation (Committee) in accordance with
Republic Act (RA) 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of
1995.6
The Committee heard the parties and received their respective
evidence. On March 2, 2000, the Committee submitted its report
and recommendation to Secretary Laguesma. It found Rayala
guilty of the offense charged and recommended the imposition of
the minimum penalty provided under AO 250, which it
erroneously stated as suspension for six (6) months.
The following day, Secretary Laguesma submitted a copy of the
Committee Report and Recommendation to the OP, but with the
recommendation that the penalty should be suspension for six
(6) months and one (1) day, in accordance with AO 250.
On May 8, 2000, the OP, through Executive Secretary Zamora,
issued AO 119,7 the pertinent portions of which read:
Upon a careful scrutiny of the evidence on record, I
concur with the findings of the Committee as to the
culpability of the respondent [Rayala], the same having
been established by clear and convincing evidence.
However, I disagree with the recommendation that
respondent be meted only the penalty of suspension for
176
six (6) months and one (1) day considering the
circumstances of the case.
What aggravates respondent’s situation is the
undeniable circumstance that he took advantage of his
position as the superior of the complainant. Respondent
occupies the highest position in the NLRC, being its
Chairman. As head of said office, it was incumbent
upon respondent to set an example to the others as to
how they should conduct themselves in public office, to
see to it that his subordinates work efficiently in
accordance with Civil Service Rules and Regulations,
and to provide them with healthy working atmosphere
wherein co-workers treat each other with respect,
courtesy and cooperation, so that in the end the public
interest will be benefited (City Mayor of Zamboanga vs.
Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 785 [1990]).
What is more, public service requires the utmost
integrity and strictest discipline (Gano vs. Leonen, 232
SCRA 99 [1994]). Thus, a public servant must exhibit at
all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity, and
"utmost devotion and dedication to duty" (Sec. 4 (g), RA
6713), respect the rights of others and shall refrain from
doing acts contrary to law, and good morals (Sec. 4(c)).
No less than the Constitution sanctifies the principle
that a public office is a public trust, and enjoins all
public officers and employees to serve with the highest
degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency
(Section 1, Article XI, 1987 Constitution).
Given these established standards, I see respondent’s
acts not just [as] a failure to give due courtesy and
respect to his co-employees (subordinates) or to
maintain good conduct and behavior but defiance of the
basic norms or virtues which a government official must
at all times uphold, one that is contrary to law and
"public sense of morality." Otherwise stated, respondent
– to whom stricter standards must apply being the
highest official [of] the NLRC – had shown an attitude, a
frame of mind, a disgraceful conduct, which renders him
unfit to remain in the service.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent
Rogelio I. Rayala, Chairman, National Labor Relations
Commission, is found guilty of the grave offense of
disgraceful and immoral conduct and is
hereby DISMISSED from the service effective upon
receipt of this Order.
SO ORDER[ED].
Rayala filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the OP denied
in a Resolution8 dated May 24, 2000. He then filed a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure before this Court on June 14, 2000.9 However, the
same was dismissed in a Resolution dated June 26, 2000 for
disregarding the hierarchy of courts.10 Rayala filed a Motion for
Reconsideration11 on August 15, 2000. In its Resolution12 dated
September 4, 2000, the Court recalled its June 26 Resolution
and referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) for
appropriate action.
The CA rendered its Decision13 on December 14, 2001. It held
that there was sufficient evidence on record to create moral
certainty that Rayala committed the acts he was charged with. It
said:
The complainant narrated her story complete with
details. Her straightforward and uninhibited testimony
was not emasculated by the declarations of
Commissioner Rayala or his witnesses. x x x
Moreover, Commissioner Rayala has not proven any
vicious motive for Domingo and her witnesses to invent

their stories. It is very unlikely that they would perjure
themselves only to accommodate the alleged
conspiracy to oust petitioner from office. Save for his
empty conjectures and speculations, Rayala failed to
substantiate his contrived conspiracy. It is a hornbook
doctrine that conspiracy must be proved by positive and
convincing evidence (People v. Noroña, 329 SCRA 502
[2000]). Besides, it is improbable that the complainant
would concoct a story of sexual harassment against the
highest official of the NLRC and thereby expose herself
to the possibility of losing her job, or be the subject of
reprisal from her superiors and perhaps public ridicule if
she was not telling the truth.
It also held that Rayala’s dismissal was proper. The CA pointed
out that Rayala was dismissed for disgraceful and immoral
conduct in violation of RA 6713, the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees. It held that the OP
was correct in concluding that Rayala’s acts violated RA 6713:
Indeed, [Rayala] was a public official, holding the
Chairmanship of the National Labor Relations
Commission, entrusted with the sacred duty of
administering justice. Occupying as he does such an
exalted position, Commissioner Rayala must pay a high
price for the honor bestowed upon him. He must
comport himself at all times in such a manner that the
conduct of his everyday life should be beyond reproach
and free from any impropriety. That the acts complained
of were committed within the sanctuary of [his] office
compounded the objectionable nature of his
wrongdoing. By daring to violate the complainant within
the solitude of his chambers, Commissioner Rayala
placed the integrity of his office in disrepute. His
disgraceful and immoral conduct warrants his removal
from office.14
Thus, it dismissed the petition, to wit:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition
is hereby DISMISSED and Administrative Order No.
119 as well [as] the Resolution of the Office of the
President in O.P. Case No. 00-E-9118 dated May 24,
2000 are AFFIRMED IN TOTO. No cost.
SO ORDERED.15
Rayala timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Justices
Vasquez and Tolentino voted to affirm the December 14
Decision. However, Justice Reyes dissented mainly because AO
250 states that the penalty imposable is suspension for six (6)
months and one (1) day.16 Pursuant to the internal rules of the
CA, a Special Division of Five was constituted.17 In its October
18, 2002 Resolution, the CA modified its earlier Decision:
ACCORDINGLY, the Decision dated December [14],
2001 is MODIFIED to the effect that the penalty of
dismissal is DELETED and instead the penalty of
suspension from service for the maximum period of one
(1) year is HEREBY IMPOSED upon the petitioner. The
rest of the challenged decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Domingo filed a Petition for Review18 before this Court, which we
denied in our February 19, 2003 Resolution for having a
defective verification. She filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which the Court granted; hence, the petition was reinstated.
Rayala likewise filed a Petition for Review 19 with this Court
essentially arguing that he is not guilty of any act of sexual
harassment.
Meanwhile, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the CA’s October 18, 2002 Resolution. The CA denied the same
in its June 3, 2003 Resolution, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
177
ACCORDINGLY, by a majority vote, public respondents’
Motion for Reconsideration, (sic) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic then filed its own Petition for Review.20
On June 28, 2004, the Court directed the consolidation of the
three (3) petitions.
G.R. No. 155831
Domingo assails the CA’s resolution modifying the penalty
imposed by the Office of the President. She raises this issue:
The Court of Appeals erred in modifying the penalty for
the respondent from dismissal to suspension from
service for the maximum period of one year. The
President has the prerogative to determine the proper
penalty to be imposed on an erring Presidential
appointee. The President was well within his power
when he fittingly used that prerogative in deciding to
dismiss the respondent from the service.21
She argues that the power to remove Rayala, a presidential
appointee, is lodged with the President who has control of the
entire Executive Department, its bureaus and offices. The OP’s
decision was arrived at after affording Rayala due process.
Hence, his dismissal from the service is a prerogative that is
entirely with the President.22
As to the applicability of AO No. 250, she argues that the same
was not intended to cover cases against presidential appointees.
AO No. 250 refers only to the instances wherein the DOLE
Secretary is the disciplining authority, and thus, the AO does not
circumscribe the power of the President to dismiss an erring
presidential appointee.
G.R. No. 155840
In his petition, Rayala raises the following issues:
I. CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS, THE ACTS OF HEREIN PETITIONER
DO NOT CONSTITUTE SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS
LAID DOWN BY THE En Banc RULING IN THE CASE
OF AQUINO vs. ACOSTA, ibid., AS WELL AS IN THE
APPLICATION OF EXISTING LAWS.
II. CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, INTENT IS AN
INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT IN A CASE FOR
SEXUAL HARASSMENT. THE HONORABLE COURT
ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT IT IS AN OFFENSE
THAT IS MALUM PROHIBITUM.
III. THE INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE, THE OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, AND NOW, THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, HAS MISAPPLIED AND
EXPANDED THE DEFINITION OF SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE UNDER R.A.
No. 7877, BY APPLYING DOLE A.O. 250, WHICH
RUNS COUNTER TO THE RECENT
PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THIS HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT.23
Invoking Aquino v. Acosta,24 Rayala argues that the case is the
definitive ruling on what constitutes sexual harassment. Thus, he
posits that for sexual harassment to exist under RA 7877, there
must be: (a) demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor;
(b) the same is made a pre-condition to hiring, re-employment,
or continued employment; or (c) the denial thereof results in
discrimination against the employee.

Rayala asserts that Domingo has failed to allege and establish
any sexual favor, demand, or request from petitioner in
exchange for her continued employment or for her promotion.
According to Rayala, the acts imputed to him are without malice
or ulterior motive. It was merely Domingo’s perception of malice
in his alleged acts – a "product of her own imagination" 25 – that
led her to file the sexual harassment complaint.
Likewise, Rayala assails the OP’s interpretation, as upheld by
the CA, that RA 7877 is malum prohibitum such that the defense
of absence of malice is unavailing. He argues that sexual
harassment is considered an offense against a particular person,
not against society as a whole. Thus, he claims that intent is an
essential element of the offense because the law requires as
a conditio sine qua non that a sexual favor be first sought by the
offender in order to achieve certain specific results. Sexual
harassment is committed with the perpetrator’s deliberate intent
to commit the offense.26
Rayala next argues that AO 250 expands the acts proscribed in
RA 7877. In particular, he assails the definition of the forms of
sexual harassment:
Rule IV
FORMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Section 1. Forms of Sexual Harassment. – Sexual
harassment may be committed in any of the following
forms:
a) Overt sexual advances;
b) Unwelcome or improper gestures of affection;
c) Request or demand for sexual favors including but
not limited to going out on dates, outings or the like for
the same purpose;
d) Any other act or conduct of a sexual nature or for
purposes of sexual gratification which is generally
annoying, disgusting or offensive to the victim.27
He posits that these acts alone without corresponding demand,
request, or requirement do not constitute sexual harassment as
contemplated by the law.28 He alleges that the rule-making power
granted to the employer in Section 4(a) of RA 7877 is limited
only to procedural matters. The law did not delegate to the
employer the power to promulgate rules which would provide
other or additional forms of sexual harassment, or to come up
with its own definition of sexual harassment.29
G.R. No. 158700
The Republic raises this issue:
Whether or not the President of the Philippines may
validly dismiss respondent Rayala as Chairman of
the NLRC for committing acts of sexual
harassment.30
The Republic argues that Rayala’s acts constitute sexual
harassment under AO 250. His acts constitute unwelcome or
improper gestures of affection and are acts or conduct of a
sexual nature, which are generally annoying or offensive to the
victim.31
It also contends that there is no legal basis for the CA’s reduction
of the penalty imposed by the OP. Rayala’s dismissal is valid and
warranted under the circumstances. The power to remove the
NLRC Chairman solely rests upon the President, limited only by
the requirements under the law and the due process clause.
The Republic further claims that, although AO 250 provides only
a one (1) year suspension, it will not prevent the OP from validly
178
imposing the penalty of dismissal on Rayala. It argues that even
though Rayala is a presidential appointee, he is still subject to
the Civil Service Law. Under the Civil Service Law, disgraceful
and immoral conduct, the acts imputed to Rayala, constitute
grave misconduct punishable by dismissal from the
service.32 The Republic adds that Rayala’s position is invested
with public trust and his acts violated that trust; thus, he should
be dismissed from the service.
This argument, according to the Republic, is also supported by
Article 215 of the Labor Code, which states that the Chairman of
the NLRC holds office until he reaches the age of 65 only during
good behavior.33 Since Rayala’s security of tenure is conditioned
upon his good behavior, he may be removed from office if it is
proven that he has failed to live up to this standard.
All the issues raised in these three cases can be summed up in
two ultimate questions, namely:
(1) Did Rayala commit sexual harassment?
(2) If he did, what is the applicable penalty?
Initially, however, we must resolve a procedural issue raised by
Rayala. He accuses the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as
counsel for the Republic, of forum shopping because it filed a
motion for reconsideration of the decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
61026 and then filed a comment in G.R. No. 155840 before this
Court.
We do not agree.
Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse
judgment or order has been rendered in one forum, of seeking
and possibly securing a favorable opinion in another forum, other
than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari.34 It consists of
filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause
of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose
of obtaining a favorable judgment.35
There is forum shopping when the following elements concur: (1)
identity of the parties or, at least, of the parties who represent the
same interest in both actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted
and relief prayed for, as the latter is founded on the same set of
facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars such that
any judgment rendered in the other action will amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration or will constitute litis
pendentia.36
Reviewing the antecedents of these consolidated cases, we note
that the CA rendered the assailed Resolution on October 18,
2002. The Republic filed its Motion for Reconsideration on
November 22, 2002. On the other hand, Rayala filed his petition
before this Court on November 21, 2002. While the Republic’s
Motion for Reconsideration was pending resolution before the
CA, on December 2, 2002, it was directed by this Court to file its
Comment on Rayala’s petition, which it submitted on June 16,
2003.
When the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the
Republic filed its own Petition for Review with this Court on July
3, 2003. It cited in its "Certification and Verification of a Non-
Forum Shopping" (sic), that there was a case involving the same
facts pending before this Court denominated as G.R. No.
155840. With respect to Domingo’s petition, the same had
already been dismissed on February 19, 2003. Domingo’s
petition was reinstated on June 16, 2003 but the resolution was
received by the OSG only on July 25, 2003, or after it had filed
its own petition.37
Based on the foregoing, it cannot be said that the OSG is guilty
of forum shopping. We must point out that it was Rayala who
filed the petition in the CA, with the Republic as the adverse
party. Rayala himself filed a motion for reconsideration of the
CA’s December 21, 2001 Decision, which led to a more
favorable ruling, i.e., the lowering of the penalty from dismissal to
one-year suspension. The parties adversely affected by this

ruling (Domingo and the Republic) had the right to question the
same on motion for reconsideration. But Domingo directly filed a
Petition for Review with this Court, as did Rayala. When the
Republic opted to file a motion for reconsideration, it was merely
exercising a right. That Rayala and Domingo had by then already
filed cases before the SC did not take away this right. Thus,
when this Court directed the Republic to file its Comment on
Rayala’s petition, it had to comply, even if it had an unresolved
motion for reconsideration with the CA, lest it be cited for
contempt.
Accordingly, it cannot be said that the OSG "file[d] multiple suits
involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a
favorable judgment."
We now proceed to discuss the substantive issues.
It is noteworthy that the five CA Justices who deliberated on the
case were unanimous in upholding the findings of the Committee
and the OP. They found the assessment made by the Committee
and the OP to be a "meticulous and dispassionate analysis of
the testimonies of the complainant (Domingo), the respondent
(Rayala), and their respective witnesses." 38 They differed only
on the appropriate imposable penalty.
That Rayala committed the acts complained of – and was guilty
of sexual harassment – is, therefore, the common factual finding
of not just one, but three independent bodies: the Committee,
the OP and the CA. It should be remembered that when
supported by substantial evidence, factual findings made by
quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are accorded great
respect and even finality by the courts. 39 The principle, therefore,
dictates that such findings should bind us.40
Indeed, we find no reason to deviate from this rule. There
appears no valid ground for this Court to review the factual
findings of the CA, the OP, and the Investigating Committee.
These findings are now conclusive on the Court. And quite
significantly, Rayala himself admits to having committed some of
the acts imputed to him.
He insists, however, that these acts do not constitute sexual
harassment, because Domingo did not allege in her complaint
that there was a demand, request, or requirement of a sexual
favor as a condition for her continued employment or for her
promotion to a higher position.41 Rayala urges us to apply to his
case our ruling in Aquino v. Acosta.42
We find respondent’s insistence unconvincing.
Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule,
which states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public
officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability.
An action for each can proceed independently of the
others.43 This rule applies with full force to sexual harassment.
The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA
7877. Section 3 thereof defines work-related sexual harassment
in this wise:
Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual
Harassment Defined. – Work, education or training-
related sexual harassment is committed by an
employer, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer,
teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any
other person who, having authority, influence or moral
ascendancy over another in a work or training or
education environment, demands, requests or
otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other,
regardless of whether the demand, request or
requirement for submission is accepted by the object of
said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment,
sexual harassment is committed when:
179
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring
or in the employment, re-employment or continued
employment of said individual, or in granting said
individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions,
promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the
sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or
classifying the employee which in a way would
discriminate, deprive or diminish employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said
employee;
(2) The above acts would impair the employee’s rights
or privileges under existing labor laws; or
(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive environment for the employee.
This section, in relation to Section 7 on penalties, defines the
criminal aspect of the unlawful act of sexual harassment. The
same section, in relation to Section 6, authorizes the institution
of an independent civil action for damages and other affirmative
relief.
Section 4, also in relation to Section 3, governs the procedure for
administrative cases, viz.:
Sec. 4. Duty of the Employer or Head of Office in a
Work-related, Education or Training Environment. – It
shall be the duty of the employer or the head of the
work-related, educational or training environment or
institution, to prevent or deter the commission of acts of
sexual harassment and to provide the procedures for
the resolution, settlement or prosecution of acts of
sexual harassment. Towards this end, the employer or
head of office shall:
(a) Promulgate appropriate rules and
regulations in consultation with and jointly
approved by the employees or students or
trainees, through their duly designated
representatives, prescribing the procedure for
the investigation or sexual harassment cases
and the administrative sanctions therefor.
Administrative sanctions shall not be a bar to
prosecution in the proper courts for unlawful
acts of sexual harassment.
The said rules and regulations issued pursuant
to this section (a) shall include, among others,
guidelines on proper decorum in the workplace
and educational or training institutions.
(b) Create a committee on decorum and
investigation of cases on sexual harassment.
The committee shall conduct meetings, as the
case may be, with other officers and
employees, teachers, instructors, professors,
coaches, trainors and students or trainees to
increase understanding and prevent incidents
of sexual harassment. It shall also conduct the
investigation of the alleged cases constituting
sexual harassment.
In the case of a work-related environment, the
committee shall be composed of at least one (1)
representative each from the management, the union, if
any, the employees from the supervisory rank, and from
the rank and file employees.
In the case of the educational or training institution, the
committee shall be composed of at least one (1)
representative from the administration, the trainors,
teachers, instructors, professors or coaches and
students or trainees, as the case maybe.

The employer or head of office, educational or training
institution shall disseminate or post a copy of this Act for
the information of all concerned.
The CA, thus, correctly ruled that Rayala’s culpability is not to be
determined solely on the basis of Section 3, RA 7877, because
he is charged with the administrative offense, not the criminal
infraction, of sexual harassment.44 It should be enough that the
CA, along with the Investigating Committee and the Office of the
President, found substantial evidence to support the
administrative charge.
Yet, even if we were to test Rayala’s acts strictly by the
standards set in Section 3, RA 7877, he would still be
administratively liable. It is true that this provision calls for a
"demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor." But it is not
necessary that the demand, request or requirement of a sexual
favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It
may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the
offender. Holding and squeezing Domingo’s shoulders, running
his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, having
inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money allegedly
for school expenses with a promise of future privileges, and
making statements with unmistakable sexual overtones – all
these acts of Rayala resound with deafening clarity the
unspoken request for a sexual favor.
Likewise, contrary to Rayala’s claim, it is not essential that the
demand, request or requirement be made as a condition for
continued employment or for promotion to a higher position. It is
enough that the respondent’s acts result in creating an
intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the
employee.45 That the acts of Rayala generated an intimidating
and hostile environment for Domingo is clearly shown by the
common factual finding of the Investigating Committee, the OP
and the CA that Domingo reported the matter to an officemate
and, after the last incident, filed for a leave of absence and
requested transfer to another unit.
Rayala’s invocation of Aquino v. Acosta46 is misplaced, because
the factual setting in that case is different from that in the case at
bench. In Aquino, Atty. Susan Aquino, Chief of the Legal and
Technical Staff of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), charged then
CTA Presiding Judge (now Presiding Justice) Ernesto Acosta of
sexual harassment. She complained of several incidents when
Judge Acosta allegedly kissed her, embraced her, and put his
arm around her shoulder. The case was referred to CA Justice
Josefina G. Salonga for investigation. In her report, Justice
Salonga found that "the complainant failed to show by
convincing evidence that the acts of Judge Acosta in greeting
her with a kiss on the cheek, in a `beso-beso’ fashion, were
carried out with lustful and lascivious desires or were motivated
by malice or ill motive. It is clear from the circumstances that
most of the kissing incidents were done on festive and special
occasions," and they "took place in the presence of other people
and the same was by reason of the exaltation or happiness of
the moment." Thus, Justice Salonga concluded:
In all the incidents complained of, the respondent's
pecks on the cheeks of the complainant should be
understood in the context of having been done on the
occasion of some festivities, and not the assertion of
the latter that she was singled out by Judge Acosta in
his kissing escapades. The busses on her cheeks were
simply friendly and innocent, bereft of malice and lewd
design. The fact that respondent judge kisses other
people on the cheeks in the 'beso-beso' fashion, without
malice, was corroborated by Atty. Florecita P. Flores,
Ms. Josephine Adalem and Ms. Ma. Fides Balili, who
stated that they usually practice 'beso-beso' or kissing
on the cheeks, as a form of greeting on occasions when
they meet each other, like birthdays, Christmas, New
Year's Day and even Valentine's Day, and it does not
matter whether it is Judge Acosta's birthday or their
birthdays. Theresa Cinco Bactat, a lawyer who belongs
to complainant's department, further attested that on
occasions like birthdays, respondent judge would
likewise greet her with a peck on the cheek in a 'beso-
beso' manner. Interestingly, in one of several festive
180
occasions, female employees of the CTA pecked
respondent judge on the cheek where Atty. Aquino was
one of Judge Acosta's well wishers.
In sum, no sexual harassment had indeed transpired on
those six occasions. Judge Acosta's acts of bussing
Atty. Aquino on her cheek were merely forms of
greetings, casual and customary in nature. No evidence
of intent to sexually harass complainant was apparent,
only that the innocent acts of 'beso-beso' were given
malicious connotations by the complainant. In fact, she
did not even relate to anyone what happened to her.
Undeniably, there is no manifest sexual undertone in all
those incidents.47
This Court agreed with Justice Salonga, and Judge Acosta was
exonerated.
To repeat, this factual milieu in Aquino does not obtain in the
case at bench. While in Aquino, the Court interpreted the acts (of
Judge Acosta) as casual gestures of friendship and camaraderie,
done during festive or special occasions and with other people
present, in the instant case, Rayala’s acts of holding and
squeezing Domingo’s shoulders, running his fingers across her
neck and tickling her ear, and the inappropriate comments, were
all made in the confines of Rayala’s office when no other
members of his staff were around. More importantly, and a
circumstance absent in Aquino, Rayala’s acts, as already
adverted to above, produced a hostile work environment for
Domingo, as shown by her having reported the matter to an
officemate and, after the last incident, filing for a leave of
absence and requesting transfer to another unit.
Rayala also argues that AO 250 does not apply to him. First, he
argues that AO 250 does not cover the NLRC, which, at the time
of the incident, was under the DOLE only for purposes of
program and policy coordination. Second, he posits that even
assuming AO 250 is applicable to the NLRC, he is not within its
coverage because he is a presidential appointee.
We find, however, that the question of whether or not AO 250
covers Rayala is of no real consequence. The events of this
case unmistakably show that the administrative charges against
Rayala were for violation of RA 7877; that the OP properly
assumed jurisdiction over the administrative case; that the
participation of the DOLE, through the Committee created by the
Secretary, was limited to initiating the investigation process,
reception of evidence of the parties, preparation of the
investigation report, and recommending the appropriate action to
be taken by the OP. AO 250 had never really been applied to
Rayala. If it was used at all, it was to serve merely as an auxiliary
procedural guide to aid the Committee in the orderly conduct of
the investigation.
Next, Rayala alleges that the CA erred in holding that sexual
harassment is an offense malum prohibitum. He argues that
intent is an essential element in sexual harassment, and since
the acts imputed to him were done allegedly without malice, he
should be absolved of the charges against him.
We reiterate that what is before us is an administrative case for
sexual harassment. Thus, whether the crime
of sexual harassment is malum in se or malum prohibitum is
immaterial.
We also reject Rayala’s allegations that the charges were filed
because of a conspiracy to get him out of office and thus
constitute merely political harassment. A conspiracy must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence. His bare assertions
cannot stand against the evidence presented by Domingo. As we
have already ruled, the acts imputed to Rayala have been
proven as fact. Moreover, he has not proven any ill motive on the
part of Domingo and her witnesses which would be ample
reason for her to conjure stories about him. On the contrary, ill
motive is belied by the fact that Domingo and her witnesses – all
employees of the NLRC at that time – stood to lose their jobs or
suffer unpleasant consequences for coming forward and
charging their boss with sexual harassment.

Furthermore, Rayala decries the alleged violation of his right to
due process. He accuses the Committee on Decorum of
railroading his trial for violation of RA 7877. He also scored the
OP’s decision finding him guilty of "disgraceful and immoral
conduct" under the Revised Administrative Code and not for
violation of RA 7877. Considering that he was not tried for
"disgraceful and immoral conduct," he argues that the verdict is a
"sham and total nullity."
We hold that Rayala was properly accorded due process. In
previous cases, this Court held that:
[i]n administrative proceedings, due process has been
recognized to include the following: (1) the right to
actual or constructive notice of the institution of
proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal
rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or
with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses
and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights;
(3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so
constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as
well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal
which is supported by substantial evidence submitted
for consideration during the hearing or contained in the
records or made known to the parties affected.48
The records of the case indicate that Rayala was afforded all
these procedural due process safeguards. Although in the
beginning he questioned the authority of the Committee to try
him,49 he appeared, personally and with counsel, and
participated in the proceedings.
On the other point raised, this Court has held that, even in
criminal cases, the designation of the offense is not controlling,
thus:
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor
the designation of the offense charged or the particular
law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere
conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the
description of the crime charged and the particular facts
therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of
must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense
is intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime
will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly
allege the elements of the crime charged. Every
element of the offense must be stated in the
information. What facts and circumstances are
necessary to be included therein must be determined
by reference to the definitions and essentials of the
specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the
elements of a crime in the information is to inform the
accused of the nature of the accusation against him so
as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense.50
It is noteworthy that under AO 250, sexual harassment amounts
to disgraceful and immoral conduct.51 Thus, any finding of liability
for sexual harassment may also be the basis of culpability for
disgraceful and immoral conduct.
With the foregoing disquisitions affirming the finding that Rayala
committed sexual harassment, we now determine the proper
penalty to be imposed.
Rayala attacks the penalty imposed by the OP. He alleges that
under the pertinent Civil Service Rules, disgraceful and immoral
conduct is punishable by suspension for a period of six (6)
months and one (1) day to one (1) year. He also argues that
since he is charged administratively, aggravating or mitigating
circumstances cannot be appreciated for purposes of imposing
the penalty.
Under AO 250, the penalty for the first offense is suspension for
six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year, while the penalty
181
for the second offense is dismissal.52 On the other hand, Section
22(o), Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
the Administrative Code of 198753 and Section 52 A(15) of
the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service54 both provide that the first offense of disgraceful and
immoral conduct is punishable by suspension of six (6) months
and one (1) day to one (1) year. A second offense is punishable
by dismissal.
Under the Labor Code, the Chairman of the NLRC shall hold
office during good behavior until he or she reaches the age of
sixty-five, unless sooner removed for cause as provided by
law or becomes incapacitated to discharge the duties of the
office.55
In this case, it is the President of the Philippines, as the proper
disciplining authority, who would determine whether there is a
valid cause for the removal of Rayala as NLRC Chairman. This
power, however, is qualified by the phrase "for cause as provided
by law." Thus, when the President found that Rayala was indeed
guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Chief Executive
did not have unfettered discretion to impose a penalty other than
the penalty provided by law for such offense. As cited above, the
imposable penalty for the first offense of either the administrative
offense of sexual harassment or for disgraceful and immoral
conduct is suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one
(1) year. Accordingly, it was error for the Office of the President
to impose upon Rayala the penalty of dismissal from the service,
a penalty which can only be imposed upon commission of a
second offense.
Even if the OP properly considered the fact that Rayala took
advantage of his high government position, it still could not
validly dismiss him from the service. Under the Revised Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,56 taking
undue advantage of a subordinate may be considered as an
aggravating circumstance57 and where only aggravating and no
mitigating circumstances are present, the maximum penalty shall
be imposed.58Hence, the maximum penalty that can be imposed
on Rayala is suspension for one (1) year.
Rayala holds the exalted position of NLRC Chairman, with the
rank equivalent to a CA Justice. Thus, it is not unavailing that
rigid standards of conduct may be demanded of him. In Talens-
Dabon v. Judge Arceo,59 this Court, in upholding the liability of
therein respondent Judge, said:
The actuations of respondent are aggravated by the
fact that complainant is one of his subordinates over
whom he exercises control and supervision, he being
the executive judge. He took advantage of his position
and power in order to carry out his lustful and lascivious
desires. Instead of he being in loco parentis over his
subordinate employees, respondent was the one who
preyed on them, taking advantage of his superior
position.
In yet another case, this Court declared:
As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by more
exacting work ethics. He failed to live up to his higher
standard of responsibility when he succumbed to his
moral perversity. And when such moral perversity is
perpetrated against his subordinate, he provides a
justifiable ground for his dismissal for lack of trust and
confidence. It is the right, nay, the duty of every
employer to protect its employees from oversexed
superiors.60
It is incumbent upon the head of office to set an example on how
his employees should conduct themselves in public office, so
that they may work efficiently in a healthy working atmosphere.
Courtesy demands that he should set a good example.61
Rayala has thrown every argument in the book in a vain effort to
effect his exoneration. He even puts Domingo’s character in
question and casts doubt on the morality of the former President

who ordered, albeit erroneously, his dismissal from the service.
Unfortunately for him, these are not significant factors in the
disposition of the case. It is his character that is in question here
and sadly, the inquiry showed that he has been found wanting.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the October
18, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
61026 is AFFIRMED. Consequently, the petitions in G.R. Nos.
155831, 155840, and 158700 are DENIED. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic Act No. 9344
AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE
JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the Philippines in Congress assembled:
TITLE
GOVERNING PRINCIPLES
CHAPTER 1 a bondsman, to guarantee his/her appearance before
TITLE, POLICY AND DEFINITION OF TERMS
Section 1. Short Title and Scope. - This Act shall be known as
the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006."It shall cover
the different stages involving children at risk and children in
conflict with the law from prevention to rehabilitation and
reintegration.
SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policy. - The following State
policies shall be observed at all times:
(a) The State recognizes the vital role of children and
youth in nation building and shall promote and protect
their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social
well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and
nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public
and civic affairs.
(b) The State shall protect the best interests of the child
through measures that will ensure the observance of
international standards of child protection, especially
those to which the Philippines is a party. Proceedings
before any authority shall be conducted in the best
interest of the child and in a manner which allows the
child to participate and to express himself/herself freely.
The participation of children in the program and policy
formulation and implementation related to juvenile
justice and welfare shall be ensured by the concerned
government agency.
(c) The State likewise recognizes the right of children to
assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and
special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty and exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial
to their development.
(d) Pursuant to Article 40 of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the State
recognizes the right of every child alleged as, accused
of, adjudged, or recognized as having infringed the
penal law to be treated in a manner consistent with the
promotion of the child's sense of dignity and worth,
taking into account the child's age and desirability of
promoting his/her reintegration. Whenever appropriate
and desirable, the State shall adopt measures for
dealing with such children without resorting to judicial
proceedings, providing that human rights and legal
safeguards are fully respected. It shall ensure that
182
children are dealt with in a manner appropriate to their
well-being by providing for, among others, a variety of
disposition measures such as care, guidance and
supervision orders, counseling, probation, foster care,
education and vocational training programs and other
alternatives to institutional care.
(e) The administration of the juvenile justice and welfare
system shall take into consideration the cultural and
religious perspectives of the Filipino people, particularly
the indigenous peoples and the Muslims, consistent
with the protection of the rights of children belonging to
these communities.
(f) The State shall apply the principles of restorative
justice in all its laws, policies and programs applicable
to children in conflict with the law.
SEC. 3. Liberal Construction of this Act. - In case of doubt,
the interpretation of any of the provisions of this Act, including its
implementing rules and regulations (IRRs), shall be construed
liberally in favor of the child in conflict with the law.
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - The following terms as used in
this Act shall be defined as follows:
I
(a) "Bail" refers to the security given for the release of
the person in custody of the law, furnished by him/her or
any court. Bail may be given in the form of corporate
security, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance.
(b) "Best Interest of the Child" refers to the totality of the
circumstances and conditions which are most congenial
to the survival, protection and feelings of security of the
child and most encouraging to the child's physical,
psychological and emotional development. It also
means the least detrimental available alternative for
safeguarding the growth and development of the child.
(e) "Child" refers to a person under the age of eighteen
(18) years.
(d) "Child at Risk" refers to a child who is vulnerable to
and at the risk of committing criminal offenses because
of personal, family and social circumstances, such as,
but not limited to, the following:
(1) being abused by any person through
sexual, physical, psychological, mental,
economic or any other means and the parents
or guardian refuse, are unwilling, or unable to
provide protection for the child;
(2) being exploited including sexually or
economically;
(3) being abandoned or neglected, and after
diligent search and inquiry, the parent or
guardian cannot be found;
(4) coming from a dysfunctional or broken
family or without a parent or guardian;
(5) being out of school;
(6) being a streetchild;
(7) being a member of a gang;
(8) living in a community with a high level of
criminality or drug abuse; and
(9) living in situations of armed conflict.

(e) "Child in Conflict with the Law" refers to a child who
is alleged as, accused of, or adjudged as, having
committed an offense under Philippine laws.
(f) "Community-based Programs" refers to the programs
provided in a community setting developed for
purposes of intervention and diversion, as well as
rehabilitation of the child in conflict with the law, for
reintegration into his/her family and/or community.
(g) "Court" refers to a family court or, in places where
there are no family courts, any regional trial court.
(h) "Deprivation of Liberty" refers to any form of
detention or imprisonment, or to the placement of a
child in conflict with the law in a public or private
custodial setting, from which the child in conflict with the
law is not permitted to leave at will by order of any
judicial or administrative authority.
(i) "Diversion" refers to an alternative, child-appropriate
process of determining the responsibility and treatment
of a child in conflict with the law on the basis of his/her
social, cultural, economic, psychological or educational
background without resorting to formal court
proceedings.
(j) "Diversion Program" refers to the program that the
child in conflict with the law is required to undergo after
he/she is found responsible for an offense without
resorting to formal court proceedings.
(k) "Initial Contact With-the Child" refers to the
apprehension or taking into custody of a child in conflict
with the law by law enforcement officers or private
citizens. It includes the time when the child alleged to
be in conflict with the law receives a subpoena under
Section 3(b) of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure or summons under Section 6(a) or
Section 9(b) of the same Rule in cases that do not
require preliminary investigation or where there is no
necessity to place the child alleged to be in conflict with
the law under immediate custody.
(I) "Intervention" refers to a series of activities which are
designed to address issues that caused the child to
commit an offense. It may take the form of an
individualized treatment program which may include
counseling, skills training, education, and other
activities that will enhance his/her psychological,
emotional and psycho-social well-being.
(m) "Juvenile Justice and Welfare System" refers to a
system dealing with children at risk and children in
conflict with the law, which provides child-appropriate
proceedings, including programs and services for
prevention, diversion, rehabilitation, re-integration and
aftercare to ensure their normal growth and
development.
(n) "Law Enforcement Officer" refers to the person in
authority or his/her agent as defined in Article 152 of the
Revised Penal Code, including a barangay tanod.
(0) "Offense" refers to any act or omission whether
punishable under special laws or the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.
(p) "Recognizance" refers to an undertaking in lieu of a
bond assumed by a parent or custodian who shall be
responsible for the appearance in court of the child in
conflict with the law, when required.
(q) "Restorative Justice" refers to a principle which
requires a process of resolving conflicts with the
maximum involvement of the victim, the offender and
183
the community. It seeks to obtain reparation for the
victim; reconciliation of the offender, the offended and
the community; and reassurance to the offender that
he/she can be reintegrated into society. It also
enhances public safety by activating the offender, the
victim and the community in prevention strategies.
(r) "Status Offenses" refers to offenses which
discriminate only against a child, while an adult does
not suffer any penalty for committing similar acts. These
shall include curfew violations; truancy, parental
disobedience and the like.
(s) "Youth Detention Home" refers to a 24-hour child-
caring institution managed by accredited local
government units (LGUs) and licensed and/or
accredited nongovernment organizations (NGOs)
providing short-term residential care for children in
conflict with the law who are awaiting court disposition
of their cases or transfer to other agencies or
jurisdiction.
(t) "Youth Rehabilitation Center" refers to a 24-hour
residential care facility managed by the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), LGUs,
licensed and/or accredited NGOs monitored by the
DSWD, which provides care, treatment and
rehabilitation services for children in conflict with the
law. Rehabilitation services are provided under the
guidance of a trained staff where residents are cared for
under a structured therapeutic environment with the
end view of reintegrating them into their families and
communities as socially functioning individuals.
Physical mobility of residents of said centers may be
restricted pending court disposition of the charges
against them.
(u) "Victimless Crimes" refers to offenses where there is
no private offended party.
CHAPTER 2
PRINCIPLES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE AND WELFARE
SEC. 5. Rights of the Child in Conflict with the Law. - Every
child in conflict with the law shall have the following rights,
including but not limited to:
(a) the right not to be subjected to torture or other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
(b) the right not to be imposed a sentence of capital
punishment or life imprisonment, without the possibility
of release;
(c) the right not to be deprived, unlawfully or arbitrarily,
of his/her liberty; detention or imprisonment being a
disposition of last resort, and which shall be for the
shortest appropriate period of time;
(d) the right to be treated with humanity and respect, for
the inherent dignity of the person, and in a manner
which takes into account the needs of a person of
his/her age. In particular, a child deprived of liberty shall
be separated from adult offenders at all times. No child
shall be detained together with adult offenders. He/She
shall be conveyed separately to or from court. He/She
shall await hearing of his/her own case in a separate
holding area. A child in conflict with the law shall have
the right to maintain contact with his/her family through
correspondence and visits, save in exceptional
circumstances;
(e) the right to prompt access to legal and other
appropriate assistance, as well as the right to challenge
the legality of the deprivation of his/her liberty before a

court or other competent, independent and impartial
authority, and to a prompt decision on such action;
(f) the right to bail and recognizance, in appropriate
cases;
(g) the right to testify as a witness in hid/her own behalf
under the rule on examination of a child witness;
(h) the right to have his/her privacy respected fully at all
stages of the proceedings;
(i) the right to diversion if he/she is qualified and
voluntarily avails of the same;
(j) the right to be imposed a judgment in proportion to
the gravity of the offense where his/her best interest,
the rights of the victim and the needs of society are all
taken into consideration by the court, under the
principle of restorative justice;
(k) the right to have restrictions on his/her personal
liberty limited to the minimum, and where discretion is
given by law to the judge to determine whether to
impose fine or imprisonment, the imposition of fine
being preferred as the more appropriate penalty;
(I) in general, the right to automatic suspension of
sentence;
(m) the right to probation as an alternative to
imprisonment, if qualified under the Probation Law;
(n) the right to be free from liability for perjury,
concealment or misrepresentation; and
(o) other rights as provided for under existing laws,
rules and regulations.
The State further adopts the provisions of the United Nations
Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile
Justice or "Beijing Rules", United Nations Guidelines for the
Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency or the "Riyadh Guidelines",
and the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles
Deprived of Liberty.
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child
fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission
of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However,
the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant
to Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of
age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be
subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted
with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to
the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not
include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in
accordance with existing laws.
SEC. 7. Determination ofAge. - The child in conflict with the law
shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all
the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven
to be eighteen (18) years old or older. The age of a child may be
determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate
or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these
documents, age may be based on information from the child
himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical
appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of
doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her
favor.
184
Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with the law
prior to the filing of the information in any appropriate court may
file a case in a summary proceeding for the determination of age
before the Family Court which shall decide the case within
twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the appropriate pleadings
of all interested parties.
If a case has been fiied against the child in conflict with the law
and is pending in the appropriate court, the person shall file a
motion to determine the age of the child in the same court where
the case is pending. Pending hearing on the said motion,
proceedings on the main case shall be suspended.
In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges
and other government officials concerned shall exert all efforts at
determining the age of the child in conflict with the law.
TITLE II
STRUCTURES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE AND WELFARE
SEC. 8. Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC). - A
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC) is hereby created
and attached to the Department of Justice and placed under its
administrative supervision. The JJWC shall be chaired by an
undersecretary of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development. It shall ensure the effective implementation of this
Act and coordination among the following agencies:
(a) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC);
(b) Department of Education (DepEd);
(c) Department of the Interior and Local Government
(DILG);
(d) Public Attorney's Office (PAO);
(e) Bureau of Corrections (BUCOR);
(f) Parole and Probation Administration (PPA)
(g) National Bureau of Investigation (NBI);
(h) Philippine National Police (PNP);.
(i) Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP);
(i) Commission on Human Rights (CHR);
(k) Technical Education and Skills Development
Authority (TESDA);
(l) National Youth Commission (NYC); and
(m) Other institutions focused on juvenile justice and
intervention programs.
The JJWC shall be composed of representatives, whose ranks
shall not be lower than director, to be designated by the
concerned heads of the following departments or agencies:
(a) Department of Justice (DOJ);
(b) Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD);
(c) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC)

(d) Department of Education (DepEd);
(e) Department of the Interior and Local Government
(DILG)
(f) Commission on Human Rights (CHR);
(g) National Youth Commission (NYC); and
(h) Two (2) representatives from NGOs, one to be
designated by the Secretary of Justice and the other to
be designated by the Secretary of Social Welfare and
Development.
The JJWC shall convene within fifteen (15) days from the
effectivity of this Act. The Secretary of Justice and the Secretary
of Social Welfare and Development shall determine the
organizational structure and staffing pattern of the JJWC.
The JJWC shall coordinate with the Office of the Court
Administrator and the Philippine Judicial Academy to ensure the
realization of its mandate and the proper discharge of its duties
and functions, as herein provided.
SEC. 9. Duties and Functions of the JJWC. - The JJWC shall
have the following duties and functions:
(a) To oversee the implementation of this Act;
(b) To advise the President on all matters and policies
relating to juvenile justice and welfare;
(c) To assist the concerned agencies in the review and
redrafting of existing policies/regulations or in the
formulation of new ones in line with the provisions of
this Act;
(d) To periodically develop a comprehensive 3 to 5-year
national juvenile intervention program, with the
participation of government agencies concerned, NGOs
and youth organizations;
(e) To coordinate the implementation of the juvenile
intervention programs and activities by national
government agencies and other activities which may
have an important bearing on the success of the entire
national juvenile intervention program. All programs
relating to juvenile justice and welfare shall be adopted
in consultation with the JJWC;
(f) To formulate and recommend policies and strategies
in consultation with children for the prevention of
juvenile delinquency and the administration of justice,
as well as for the treatment and rehabilitation of the
children in conflict with the law;
(g) To collect relevant information and conduct
continuing research and support evaluations and
studies on all matters relating to juvenile justice and
welfare, such as but not limited to:
(1) the performance and results achieved by
juvenile intervention programs and by activities
of the local government units and other
government agencies;
(2) the periodic trends, problems and causes
of juvenile delinquency and crimes; and
(3) the particular needs of children in conflict
with the law in custody.
185
The data gathered shall be used by the JJWC in the
improvement of the administration of juvenile justice
and welfare system.
The JJWC shall set up a mechanism to ensure that
children are involved in research and policy
development.
(h) Through duly designated persons and with the
assistance of the agencies provided in the preceding
section, to conduct regular inspections in detention and
rehabilitation facilities and to undertake spot inspections
on their own initiative in order to check compliance with
the standards provided herein and to make the
necessary recommendations to appropriate agencies;
(i) To initiate and coordinate the conduct of trainings for
the personnel of the agencies involved in the
administration of the juvenile justice and welfare system
and the juvenile intervention program;
(j) To submit an annual report to the President on the
implementation of this Act; and
(k) To perform such other functions as may be
necessary to implement the provisions of this Act.
SEC. 10. Policies and Procedures on Juvenile Justice and
Welfare. - All government agencies enumerated in Section 8
shall, with the assistance of the JJWC and within one (1) year
from the effectivity of this Act, draft policies and procedures
consistent with the standards set in the law. These policies and
procedures shall be modified accordingly in consultation with the
JJWC upon the completion of the national juvenile intervention
program as provided under Section 9 (d).
SEC. 11. Child Rights Center (CRC). - The existing Child
Rights Center of the Commission on Human Rights shall ensure
that the status, rights and interests of children are upheld in
accordance with the Constitution and international instruments
on human rights. The CHR shall strengthen the monitoring of
government compliance of all treaty obligations, including the
timely and regular submission of reports before the treaty
bodies, as well as the implementation and dissemination of
recommendations and conclusions by government agencies as
well as NGOs and civil society.
TITLE III
PREVENTION OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
CHAPTER 1
THE ROLE OF THE DIFFERENT SECTORS
SEC. 12. The Family. - The family shall be responsible for the
primary nurturing and rearing of children which is critical in
delinquency prevention. As far as practicable and in accordance
with the procedures of this Act, a child in conflict with the law
shall be maintained in his/her family.
SEC. 13. The Educational System. - Educational institutions
shall work together with families, community organizations and
agencies in the prevention of juvenile delinquency and in the
rehabilitation and reintegration of child in conflict with the law.
Schools shall provide adequate, necessary and individualized
educational schemes for children manifesting difficult behavior
and children in conflict with the law. In cases where children in
conflict with the law are taken into custody or detained in
rehabilitation centers, they should be provided the opportunity to
continue learning under an alternative learning system with basic
literacy program or non- formal education accreditation
equivalency system.

SEC. 14. The Role of the Mass Media. - The mass media shall
play an active role in the promotion of child rights, and
delinquency prevention by relaying consistent messages through
a balanced approach. Media practitioners shall, therefore, have
the duty to maintain the highest critical and professional
standards in reporting and covering cases of children in conflict
with the law. In all publicity concerning children, the best interest
of the child should be the primordial and paramount concern.
Any undue, inappropriate and sensationalized publicity of any
case involving a child in conflict with the law is hereby declared a
violation of the child's rights.
SEC. 15. Establishment and Strengthening of Local
Councils for the Protection of Children. - Local Councils for
the Protection of Children (LCPC) shall be established in all
levels of local government, and where they have already been
established, they shall be strengthened within one (1) year from
the effectivity of this Act. Membership in the LCPC shall be
chosen from among the responsible members of the community,
including a representative from the youth sector, as well as
representatives from government and private agencies
concerned with the welfare of children.
The local council shall serve as the primary agency to coordinate
with and assist the LGU concerned for the adoption of a
comprehensive plan on delinquency prevention, and to oversee
its proper implementation.
One percent (1%) of the internal revenue allotment of
barangays, municipalities and cities shall be allocated for the
strengthening and implementation of the programs of the LCPC:
Provided, That the disbursement of the fund shall be made by
the LGU concerned.
SEC. 16. Appointment of Local Social Welfare and
Development Officer. - All LGUs shall appoint a duly licensed
social worker as its local social welfare and development officer
tasked to assist children in conflict with the law.
SEC. 17. The Sangguniang Kabataan. - The Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) shall coordinate with the LCPC in the formulation
and implementation of juvenile intervention and diversion
programs in the community.
CHAPTER
COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE INTERVENTION PROGRAM
SEC. 18. Development of a Comprehensive Juvenile
Intervention Program. - A Comprehensive juvenile intervention
program covering at least a 3-year period shall be instituted in
LGUs from the barangay to the provincial level.
The LGUs shall set aside an amount necessary to implement
their respective juvenile intervention programs in their annual
budget.
The LGUs, in coordination with the LCPC, shall call on all
sectors concerned, particularly the child-focused institutions,
NGOs, people's organizations, educational institutions and
government agencies involved in delinquency prevention to
participate in the planning process and implementation of
juvenile intervention programs. Such programs shall be
implemented consistent with the national program formulated
and designed by the JJWC. The implementation of the
comprehensive juvenile intervention program shall be reviewed
and assessed annually by the LGUs in coordination with the
LCPC. Results of the assessment shall be submitted by the
provincial and city governments to the JJWC not later than
March 30 of every year.
SEC. 19. Community-based Programs on Juvenile Justice
and Welfare. - Community-based programs on juvenile justice
and welfare shall be instituted by the LGUs through the LCPC,
school, youth organizations and other concerned agencies. The
LGUs shall provide community-based services which respond to
the special needs, problems, interests and concerns of children
186
and which offer appropriate counseling and guidance to them
and their families. These programs shall consist of three levels:
(a) Primary intervention includes general measures to
promote social justice and equal opportunity, which
tackle perceived root causes of offending;
(b) Secondary intervention includes measures to assist
children at risk; and
(c) Tertiary intervention includes measures to avoid
unnecessary contact with the formal justice system and
other measures to prevent re-offending.
TITLE IV
TREATMENT OF CHILDREN BELOW THE AGE OF CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY
SEC. 20. Children Below the Age of Criminal
Responsibility. - If it has been determined that the child taken
into custody is fifteen (15) years old or below, the authority which
will have an initial contact with the child has the duty to
immediately release the child to the custody of his/her parents or
guardian, or in the absence thereof, the child's nearest relative.
Said authority shall give notice to the local social welfare and
development officer who will determine the appropriate programs
in consultation with the child and to the person having custody
over the child. If the parents, guardians or nearest relatives
cannot be located, or if they refuse to take custody, the child may
be released to any of the following: a duly registered
nongovernmental or religious organization; a barangay official or
a member of the Barangay Council for the Protection of Children
(BCPC); a local social welfare and development officer; or when
and where appropriate, the DSWD. If the child referred to herein
has been found by the Local Social Welfare and Development
Office to be abandoned, neglected or abused by his parents, or
in the event that the parents will not comply with the prevention
program, the proper petition for involuntary commitment shall be
filed by the DSWD or the Local Social Welfare and Development
Office pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise
,known as "The Child and Youth Welfare Code".
2
TITLE V
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM
CHAPTER I
INITIAL CONTACT WITH THE CHILD
SEC. 21. Procedure for Taking the Child into Custody. - From
the moment a child is taken into custody, the law enforcement
officer shall:
(a) Explain to the child in simple language and in a
dialect that he/she can understand why he/she is being
placed under custody and the offense that he/she
allegedly committed;
(b) Inform the child of the reason for such custody and
advise the child of his/her constitutional rights in a
language or dialect understood by him/her;
(e) Properly identify himself/herself and present proper
identification to the child;
(d) Refrain from using vulgar or profane words and from
sexually harassing or abusing, or making sexual
advances on the child in conflict with the law;

(e) Avoid displaying or using any firearm, weapon,
handcuffs or other instruments of force or restraint,
unless absolutely necessary and only after all other
methods of control have been exhausted and have
failed;
(f) Refrain from subjecting the child in conflict with the
law to greater restraint than is necessary for his/her
apprehension;
(g) Avoid violence or unnecessary force;
(h) Determine the age of the child pursuant to Section 7
of this Act;
(i) Immediately but not later than eight (8) hours after
apprehension, turn over custody of the child to the
Social Welfare and Development Office or other
accredited NGOs, and notify the child's apprehension.
The social welfare and development officer shall explain
to the child and the child's parents/guardians the
consequences of the child's act with a view towards
counseling and rehabilitation, diversion from the
criminal justice system, and reparation, if appropriate;
(j) Take the child immediately to the proper medical and
health officer for a thorough physical and mental
examination. The examination results shall be kept
confidential unless otherwise ordered by the Family
Court. Whenever the medical treatment is required,
steps shall be immediately undertaken to provide the
same;
(k) Ensure that should detention of the child in conflict
with the law be necessary, the child shall be secured in
quarters separate from that of the opposite sex and
adult offenders;
(l) Record the following in the initial investigation:
1. Whether handcuffs or other instruments of
restraint were used, and if so, the reason for
such;
2. That the parents or guardian of a child, the
DSWD, and the PA0 have been informed of
the apprehension and the details thereof; and
3. The exhaustion of measures to determine
the age of a child and the precise details of the
physical and medical examination or the failure
to submit a child to such examination; and
(m) Ensure that all statements signed by the child
during investigation shall be witnessed by the child's
parents or guardian, social worker, or legal counsel in
attendance who shall affix his/her signature to the said
statement.
A child in conflict with the law shall only be searched by a law
enforcement officer of the same gender and shall not be locked
up in a detention cell.
SEC. 22. Duties During Initial Investigation. - The law
enforcement officer shall, in his/her investigation, determine
where the case involving the child in conflict with the law should
be referred.
The taking of the statement of the child shall be conducted in the
presence of the following: (1) child's counsel of choice or in the
absence thereof, a lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office; (2)
the child's parents, guardian, or nearest relative, as the case
may be; and (3) the local social welfare and development officer.
In the absence of the child's parents, guardian, or nearest
relative, and the local social welfare and development officer, the
187
investigation shall be conducted in the presence of a
representative of an NGO, religious group, or member of the
BCPC.
After the initial investigation, the local social worker conducting
the same may do either of the following:
(a) Proceed in accordance with Section 20 if the child is
fifteen (15) years or below or above fifteen (15) but
below eighteen (18) years old, who acted without
discernment; and
(b) If the child is above fifteen (15) years old but below
eighteen (18) and who acted with discernment, proceed
to diversion under the following chapter.
CHAPTER 2
DIVERSION
SEC. 23. System of Diversion. - Children in conflict with the law
shall undergo diversion programs without undergoing court
proceedings subject to the conditions herein provided:
(a) Where the imposable penalty for the crime
committee is not more than six (6) years imprisonment,
the law enforcement officer or Punong Barangay with
the assistance of the local social welfare and
development officer or other members of the LCPC
shall conduct mediation, family conferencing and
conciliation and, where appropriate, adopt indigenous
modes of conflict resolution in accordance with the best
interest of the child with a view to accomplishing the
objectives of restorative justice and the formulation of a
diversion program. The child and his/her family shall be
present in these activities.
(b) In victimless crimes where the imposable penalty is
not more than six (6) years imprisonment, the local
social welfare and development officer shall meet with
the child and his/her parents or guardians for the
development of the appropriate diversion and
rehabilitation program, in coordination with the BCPC;
(c) Where the imposable penalty for the crime
committed exceeds six (6) years imprisonment,
diversion measures may be resorted to only by the
court.
SEC. 24. Stages Where Diversion May be Conducted. -
Diversion may be conducted at the Katarungang Pambarangay,
the police investigation or the inquest or preliminary investigation
stage and at all 1evels and phases of the proceedings including
judicial level.
SEC. 25. Conferencing, Mediation and Conciliation. - A child
in conflict with law may undergo conferencing, mediation or
conciliation outside the criminal justice system or prior to his
entry into said system. A contract of diversion may be entered
into during such conferencing, mediation or conciliation
proceedings.
SEC. 26. Contract of Diversion. - If during the conferencing,
mediation or conciliation, the child voluntarily admits the
commission of the act, a diversion program shall be developed
when appropriate and desirable as determined under Section 30.
Such admission shall not be used against the child in any
subsequent judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative proceedings.
The diversion program shall be effective and binding if accepted
by the parties concerned. The acceptance shall be in writing and
signed by the parties concerned and the appropriate authorities.
The local social welfare and development officer shall supervise
the implementation of the diversion program. The diversion
proceedings shall be completed within forty-five (45) days. The
period of prescription of the offense shall be suspended until the
completion of the diversion proceedings but not to exceed forty-
five (45) days.

The child shall present himself/herself to the competent
authorities that imposed the diversion program at least once a
month for reporting and evaluation of the effectiveness of the
program.
Failure to comply with the terms and conditions of the contract of
diversion, as certified by the local social welfare and
development officer, shall give the offended party the option to
institute the appropriate legal action.
The period of prescription of the offense shall be suspended
during the effectivity of the diversion program, but not exceeding
a period of two (2) years.
SEC. 27. Duty of the Punong Barangay When There is No
Diversion. - If the offense does not fall under Section 23(a) and
(b), or if the child, his/her parents or guardian does not consent
to a diversion, the Punong Barangay handling the case shall,
within three (3) days from determination of the absence of
jurisdiction over the case or termination of the diversion
proceedings, as the case may be, forward the records of the
case of the child to the law enforcement officer, prosecutor or the
appropriate court, as the case may be. Upon the issuance of the
corresponding document, certifying to the fact that no agreement
has been reached by the parties, the case shall be filed
according to the regular process.
SEC. 28. Duty of the Law Enforcement Officer When There
is No Diversion. - If the offense does not fall under Section
23(a) and (b), or if the child, his/her parents or guardian does not
consent to a diversion, the Women and Children Protection Desk
of the PNP, or other law enforcement officer handling the case of
the child under custody, to the prosecutor or judge concerned for
the conduct of inquest and/or preliminary investigation to
determine whether or not the child should remain under custody
and correspondingly charged in court. The document
transmitting said records shall display the word "CHILD" in bold
letters.
SEC. 29. Factors in Determining Diversion Program. - In
determining whether diversion is appropriate and desirable, the
following factors shall be taken into consideration:
(a) The nature and circumstances of the offense
charged;
(b) The frequency and the severity of the act;
(c) The circumstances of the child (e.g. age, maturity,
intelligence, etc.);
(d) The influence of the family and environment on the
growth of the child;
(e) The reparation of injury to the victim;
(f) The weight of the evidence against the child;
(g) The safety of the community; and
(h) The best interest of the child.
SEC. 30. Formulation of the Diversion Program. - In
formulating a diversion program, the individual characteristics
and the peculiar circumstances of the child in conflict with the
law shall be used to formulate an individualized treatment.
The following factors shall be considered in formulating a
diversion program for the child:
(a) The child's feelings of remorse for the offense
he/she committed;
188
(b) The parents' or legal guardians' ability to guide and
supervise the child;
(c) The victim's view about the propriety of the
measures to be imposed; and
(d) The availability of community-based programs for
rehabilitation and reintegration of the child.
SEC. 31. Kinds of Diversion Programs. - The diversion
program shall include adequate socio-cultural and psychological
responses and services for the child. At the different stages
where diversion may be resorted to, the following diversion
programs may be agreed upon, such as, but not limited to:
(a) At the level of the Punong Barangay:
(1) Restitution of property;
(2) Reparation of the damage caused;
(3) Indemnification for consequential damages;
(4) Written or oral apology;
(5) Care, guidance and supervision orders;
(6) Counseling for the child in conflict with the
law and the child's family;
(7)Attendance in trainings, seminars and
lectures on:
(i) anger management skills;
(ii) problem solving and/or conflict
resolution skills;
(iii) values formation; and
(iv) other skills which will aid the child
in dealing with situations which can
lead to repetition of the offense;
(8) Participation in available community-based
programs, including community service; or
(9) Participation in education, vocation and life
skills programs.
(b) At the level of the law enforcement officer and the
prosecutor:
(1) Diversion programs specified under
paragraphs (a)(1) to (a)(9) herein; and
(2) Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds
or instruments of the crime;
(c) At the level of the appropriate court:
(1) Diversion programs specified under
paragraphs(a)and (b) above;
(2) Written or oral reprimand or citation;
(3) Fine:
(4) Payment of the cost of the proceedings; or
(5) Institutional care and custody.

CHAPTER
PROSECUTION
SEC. 32. Duty of the Prosecutor's Office. - There shall be a
specially trained prosecutor to conduct inquest, preliminary
investigation and prosecution of cases involving a child in conflict
with the law. If there is an allegation of torture or ill-treatment of a
child in conflict with the law during arrest or detention, it shall be
the duty of the prosecutor to investigate the same.
SEC. 33. Preliminary Investigation and Filing of
Information. - The prosecutor shall conduct a preliminary
investigation in the following instances: (a) when the child in
conflict with the law does not qualify for diversion: (b) when the
child, his/her parents or guardian does not agree to diversion as
specified in Sections 27 and 28; and (c) when considering the
assessment and recommendation of the social worker, the
prosecutor determines that diversion is not appropriate for the
child in conflict with the law.
Upon serving the subpoena and the affidavit of complaint, the
prosecutor shall notify the Public Attorney's Office of such
service, as well as the personal information, and place of
detention of the child in conflict with the law.
Upon determination of probable cause by the prosecutor, the
information against the child shall be filed before the Family
Court within forty-five (45) days from the start of the preliminary
investigation.
CHAPTER
COURT PROCEEDINGS
SEC. 34. Bail. - For purposes of recommending the amount of
bail, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority shall be
considered.
SEC. 35. Release on Recognizance. - Where a child is
detained, the court shall order:
(a) the release of the minor on recognizance to his/her
parents and other suitable person;
(b) the release of the child in conflict with the law on
bail; or
(c) the transfer of the minor to a youth detention
home/youth rehabilitation center.
The court shall not order the detention of a child in a jail pending
trial or hearing of his/her case.
SEC. 36. Detention of the Child Pending Trial. - Children
detained pending trial may be released on bail or recognizance
as provided for under Sections 34 and 35 under this Act. In all
other cases and whenever possible, detention pending trial may
be replaced by alternative measures, such as close supervision,
intensive care or placement with a family or in an educational
setting or home. Institutionalization or detention of the child
pending trial shall be used only as a measure of last resort and
for the shortest possible period of time.
Whenever detention is necessary, a child will always be detained
in youth detention homes established by local governments,
pursuant to Section 8 of the Family Courts Act, in the city or
municipality where the child resides.
In the absence of a youth detention home, the child in conflict
with the law may be committed to the care of the DSWD or a
local rehabilitation center recognized by the government in the
province, city or municipality within the jurisdiction of the court.
The center or agency concerned shall be responsible for the
child's appearance in court whenever required.
189
3 SEC. 37. Diversion Measures. - Where the maximum penalty
imposed by law for the offense with which the child in conflict
with the law is charged is imprisonment of not more than twelve
(12) years, regardless of the fine or fine alone regardless of the
amount, and before arraignment of the child in conflict with the
law, the court shall determine whether or not diversion is
appropriate.
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child
who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged,
the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which
may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead
of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place
the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence,
without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension
of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already
eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various
chcumstances of the child, the court shall impose the
appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme
Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
SEC. 39. Discharge of the Child in Conflict with the Law. -
Upon the recommendation of the social worker who has custody
of the child, the court shall dismiss the case against the child
whose sentence has been suspended and against whom
disposition measures have been issued, and shall order the final
discharge of the child if it finds that the objective of the
4 disposition measures have been fulfilled.
The discharge of the child in conflict with the law shall not affect
the civil liability resulting from the commission of the offense,
which shall be enforced in accordance with law.
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to
Court. - If the court finds that the objective of the disposition
measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have
not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully
failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or
rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be
brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18)
years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall
determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this
Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended
sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches
the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
SEC. 41. Credit in Service of Sentence. - The child in conflict
with the law shall be credited in the services of his/her sentence
with the full time spent in actual commitment and detention
under this Act.
SEC. 42. Probation as an Alternative to Imprisonment. - The
court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a child in
conflict with the law, and upon application at any time, place the
child on probation in lieu of service of his/her sentence taking
into account the best interest of the child. For this purpose,
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968, otherwise known as
the "Probation Law of 1976", is hereby amended accordingly.
CHAPTER 5
CONFIDENTIALITY OF RECORDS AND PROCEEDINGS
SEC. 43. Confedentiality of Records and Proceedings. - All
records and proceedings involving children in conflict with the
law from initial contact until final disposition of the case shall be
considered privileged and confidential. The public shall be
excluded during the proceedings and the records shall not be
disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone by any of the parties or
the participants in the proceedings for any purpose whatsoever,
except to determine if the child in conflict with the law may have
his/hes sentence suspended or if he/she may be granted

probation under the Probation Law, or to enforce the civil liability
imposed in the criminal action.
The component authorities shall undertake all measures to
protect this confidentiality of proceedings, including non-
disclosure of records to the media, maintaining a separate police
blotter for cases involving children in conflict with the law and
adopting a system of coding to conceal material information
which will lead to the child's identity. Records of a child in conflict
with the law shall not be used in subsequent proceedings for
cases involving the same offender as an adult, except when
beneficial for the offender and upon his/her written consent.
A person who has been in conflict with the law as a child shall
not be held under any provision of law, to be guilty of perjury or
of concealment or misrepresentation by reason of his/her failure
to acknowledge the case or recite any fact related thereto in
response to any inquiry made to him/her for any purpose.
TITLE VI
REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION
SEC. 44. Objective of Rehabilitation and Reintegration. - The
objective of rehabilitation and reintegration of children in conflict
with the law is to provide them with interventions, approaches
and strategies that will enable them to improve their social
functioning with the end goal of reintegration to their families and
as productive members of their communities.
SEC. 45. Court Order Required. - No child shall be received in
any rehabilitation or training facility without a valid order issued
by the court after a hearing for the purpose. The details of this
order shall be immediately entered in a register exclusively for
children in conflict with the law. No child shall be admitted in any
facility where there is no such register.
SEC. 46, Separate Facilities from Adults. - In all rehabilitation
or training facilities, it shall be mandatory that children shall be
separated from adults unless they are members of the same
family. Under no other circumstance shall a child in conflict with
the law be placed in the same confinement as adults.
The rehabilitation, training or confinement area of children in
conflict with the law shall provide a home environment where
children in conflict with the law can be provided with quality
counseling and treatment.
SEC. 47. Female Children. - Female children in conflict with the
law placed in an institution shall be given special attention as to
their personal needs and problems. They shall be handled by
female doctors, correction officers and social workers, and shall
be accommodated separately from male children in conflict with
the law.
SEC. 48. Gender-Sensitivity Training. - No personnel of
rehabilitation and training facilities shall handle children in
conflict with the law without having undergone gender sensitivity
training.
SEC. 49. Establishment of Youth Detention Homes. - The
LGUs shall set aside an amount to build youth detention homes
as mandated by the Family Courts Act. Youth detention homes
may also be established by private and NGOs licensed and
accredited by the DSWD, in consultation with the JJWC.
SEC. 50. Care and Maintenance of the Child in Conflict with
the Law. - The expenses for the care and maintenance of a child
in conflict with the law under institutional care shall be borne by
his/her parents or those persons liable to support
him/her: Provided, That in case his/her parents or those persons
liable to support him/her cannot pay all or part of said expenses,
the municipality where the offense was committed shall pay one-
third (1/3) of said expenses or part thereof; the province to which
190
the municipality belongs shall pay one-third (1/3) and the
remaining one-third (1/3) shall be borne by the national
government. Chartered cities shall pay two-thirds (2/3) of said
expenses; and in case a chartered city cannot pay said
expenses, part of the internal revenue allotments applicable to
the unpaid portion shall be withheld and applied to the
settlement of said obligations: Provided, further, That in the
event that the child in conflict with the law is not a resident of the
municipality/city where the offense was committed, the court,
upon its determination, may require the city/municipality where
the child in conflict with the law resides to shoulder the cost.
All city and provincial governments must exert effort for the
immediate establishment of local detention homes for children in
conflict with the law.
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural
Camps and other Training Facilities. - A child
in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of
the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of
confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp
and other training facilities that may be established, maintained,
supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with
the DSWD.
SEC. 52. Rehabilitation of Children in Conflict with the Law. -
Children in conflict with the law, whose sentences are
suspended may, upon order of the court, undergo any or a
combination of disposition measures best suited to the
rehabilitation and welfare of the child as provided in the Supreme
Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
If the community-based rehabilitation is availed of by a child in
conflict with the law, he/she shall be released to parents,
guardians, relatives or any other responsible person in the
community. Under the supervision and guidance of the local
social welfare and development officer, and in coordination with
his/her parents/guardian, the child in conflict with the law shall
participate in community-based programs, which shall include,
but not limited to:
(1) Competency and life skills development;
(2) Socio-cultural and recreational activities;
(3) Community volunteer projects;
(4) Leadership training;
(5) Social services;
(6) Homelife services;
(7) Health services; .
(8) Spiritual enrichment; and
(9) Community and family welfare services.
In accordance therewith, the family of the child in conflict with the
law shall endeavor to actively participate in the community-
based rehabilitation.
Based on the progress of the youth in the community, a final
report will be forwarded by the local social welfare and
development officer to the court for final disposition of the case.
If the community-based programs are provided as diversion
measures under Chapter II, Title V, the programs enumerated
above shall be made available to the child in conflict with the law.
SEC. 53. Youth Rehabilitation Center. - The youth
rehabilitation center shall provide 24-hour group care, treatment

and rehabilitation services under the guidance of a trained staff
where residents are cared for under a structured therapeutic
environment with the end view of reintegrating them in their
families and communities as socially functioning individuals. A
quarterly report shall be submitted by the center to the proper
court on the progress of the children in conflict with the law.
Based on the progress of the youth in the center, a final report
will be forwarded to the court for final disposition of the case. The
DSWD shall establish youth rehabilitation centers in each region
of the country.
SEC. 54. Objectives of Community Based Programs. - The
objectives of community-based programs are as follows:
(a) Prevent disruption in the education or means of
livelihood of the child in conflict with the law in case
he/she is studying, working or attending vocational
learning institutions;
(b) Prevent separation of the child in conflict with the
law from his/her parents/guardians to maintain the
support system fostered by their relationship and to
create greater awareness of their mutual and reciprocal
responsibilities;
(c) Facilitate the rehabilitation and mainstreaming of the
child in conflict with the law and encourage community
support and involvement; and
(d) Minimize the stigma that attaches to the child in
conflict with the law by preventing jail detention.
SEC. 55. Criteria of Community-Based Programs. - Every
LGU shall establish community-based programs that will focus
on the rehabilitation and reintegration of the child. All programs
shall meet the criteria to be established by the JJWC which shall
take into account the purpose of the program, the need for the
consent of the child and his/her parents or legal guardians, and
the participation of the child-centered agencies whether public or
private.
SEC. 56. After-Care Support Services for Children in
Conflict with the Law. - Children in conflict with the law whose
cases have been dismissed by the proper court because of good
behavior as per recommendation of the DSWD social worker
and/or any accredited NGO youth rehabilitation center shall be
provided after-care services by the local social welfare and
development officer for a period of at least six (6) months. The
service includes counseling and other community-based
services designed to facilitate social reintegration, prevent re-
offending and make the children productive members of the
community.
TITLE VII
GENERAL PROVISIONS
CHAPTER 1
EXEMPTING PROVISIONS
SEC. 57. Status Offenees. - Any conduct not considered an
offense or not penalized if committed by an adult shall not be
considered an offense and shall not be punished if committed by
a child.
SEC. 58. Offenses Not Applicable to Children. - Persons
below eighteen (18) years of age shall be exempt from
prosecution for the crime of vagrancy and prostitution under
Section 202 of the Revised Penal Code, of mendicancy under
Presidential Decree No. 1563, and sniffing of rugby under
Presidential Decree No. 1619, such prosecution being
inconsistent with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child: Provided, That said persons shall undergo appropriate
counseling and treatment program.
191
SEC. 59. Exemption from the Application of Death Penalty. -
The provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and other special laws
notwithstanding, no death penalty shall be imposed upon
children in conflict with the law.
CHAPTER 2
PROHIBITED ACTS
SEC. 60. Prohibition Against Labeling and Shaming. - In the
conduct of the proceedings beginning from the initial contact with
the child, the competent authorities must refrain from branding or
labeling children as young criminals, juvenile delinquents,
prostitutes or attaching to them in any manner any other
derogatory names. Likewise, no discriminatory remarks and
practices shall be allowed particularly with respect to the child's
class or ethnic origin.
SEC. 61. Other Prohibited Acts. - The following and any other
similar acts shall be considered prejudicial and detrimental to the
psychological, emotional, social, spiritual, moral and physical
health and well-being of the child in conflict with the law and
therefore, prohibited:
(a) Employment of threats of whatever kind and nature;
(b) Employment of abusive, coercive and punitive
measures such as cursing, beating, stripping, and
solitary confinement;
(c) Employment of degrading, inhuman end cruel forms
of punishment such as shaving the heads, pouring
irritating, corrosive or harmful substances over the body
of the child in conflict with the law, or forcing him/her to
walk around the community wearing signs which
embarrass, humiliate, and degrade his/her personality
and dignity; and
(d) Compelling the child to perform involuntary servitude
in any and all forms under any and all instances.
CHAPTER 3
PENAL PROVISION
SEC. 62. Violation of the Provisions of this Act or Rules or
Regulations in General. - Any person who violates any
provision of this Act or any rule or regulation promulgated in
accordance thereof shall, upon conviction for each act or
omission, be punished by a fine of not less than Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) but not more than Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) or suffer imprisonment of not less than eight
(8) years but not more than ten (10) years, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court, unless a higher
penalty is provided for in the Revised Penal Code or special
laws. If the offender is a public officer or employee, he/she shall,
in addition to such fine and/or imprisonment, be held
administratively liable and shall suffer the penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification.
CHAPTER 4
APPROPRIATION PROVISION
SEC. 63. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to carry out
the initial implementation of this Act shall be charged to the
Office of the President. Thereafter, such sums as may be
necessary for the continued implementation of this Act shall be
included in the succeeding General Appropriations Act.
An initial amount of Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) for the
purpose of setting up the JJWC shall be taken from the proceeds
of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office.

TITLE VIII
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
SEC. 64. Children in Conflict with the Law Fifteen (15) Years
Old and Below. - Upon effectivity of this Act, cases of children
fifteen (15) years old and below at the time of the commission of
the crime shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be
referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development
officer. Such officer, upon thorough assessment of the child, shall
determine whether to release the child to the custody of his/her
parents, or refer the child to prevention programs as provided
under this Act. Those with suspended sentences and undergoing
rehabilitation at the youth rehabilitation center shall likewise be
released, unless it is contrary to the best interest of the child.
SEC. 65. Children Detained Pending Dial. - If the child is
detained pending trial, the Family Court shall also determine
whether or not continued detention is necessary and, if not,
determine appropriate alternatives for detention.
If detention is necessary and he/she is detained with adults, the
court shall immediately order the transfer of the child to a youth
detention home.
SEC. 66. Inventory of "Locked-up" and Detained Children in
Conflict with the Law. - The PNP, the BJMP and the BUCOR
are hereby directed to submit to the JJWC, within ninety (90)
days from the effectivity of this Act, an inventory of all children in
conflict with the law under their custody.
SEC. 67. Children Who Reach the Age of Eighteen (18) Years
Pending Diversion and Court Proceedings. - If a child reaches
the age of eighteen (18) years pending diversion and court
proceedings, the appropriate diversion authority in consultation
with the local social welfare and development officer or the
Family Court in consultation with the Social Services and
Counseling Division (SSCD) of the Supreme Court, as the case
may be, shall determine the appropriate disposition. In case the
appropriate court executes the judgment of conviction, and
unless the child in conflict the law has already availed of
probation under Presidential Decree No. 603 or other similar
laws, the child may apply for probation if qualified under the
provisions of the Probation Law.
SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are
Serving Sentence. - Persons who have been convicted and are
serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who
were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time the
commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are
serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive
application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate
dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be
adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they
are so qualified under this Act or other applicable law.
TITLE IX
FINAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 69. Rule Making Power. - The JJWC shall issue the IRRs
for the implementation of the provisions of this act within ninety
(90) days from the effectivity thereof.
SEC. 70. Separability Clause. - If, for any reason, any section
or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid by
the Supreme Court, the other sections or provisions hereof not
dfected by such declaration shall remain in force and effect.
SEC. 71. Repealing Clause. - All existing laws, orders, decrees,
rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
192
SEC. 72. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15)
days from its publication in at least two (2) national newspapers
of general circulation.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10630
AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE
SYSTEM IN THE PHILIPPINES, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9344, OTHERWISE KNOWN
AS THE "JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006"
AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. The Title of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby
amended to read as follows: "An Act Establishing a
Comprehensive Juvenile Justice and Welfare System, Creating
the Juvenile justice and Welfare Council under the Department
of Social Welfare and Development, Appropriating Funds
Therefor, and for Other Purposes."
Section 2. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. – The following terms as
used in this Act shall be defined as follows:
"x x x
"(s) ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ – refers to a 24-hour child-caring
institution established, funded and managed by local
government units (LGUs) and licensed and/or
accredited nongovernment organizations (NGOs)
providing short-term residential care for children in
conflict with the law who are above fifteen (15) but
below eighteen (18) years of age who are awaiting
court disposition of their cases or transfer to other
agencies or jurisdiction.
"Part of the features of a ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ is an
intensive juvenile intervention and support center. This
will cater to children in conflict with the law in
accordance with Sections 20, 20-A and 20-B hereof.
"A multi-disciplinary team composed of a social worker,
a psychologist/mental health professional, a medical
doctor, an educational/guidance counselor and a
Barangay Council for the Protection of Children (BCPC)
member shall operate the ‘Bahay Pag-asa’. The team
will work on the individualized intervention plan with the
child and the child’s family.
"x x x."
Section 3. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. – A
child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be exempt from
criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to
an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this
Act.
"A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the
day of the fifteenth anniversary of his/her birthdate.
"A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen
(18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal
liability and be subjected to an intervention program,
unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which
case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate
proceedings in accordance with this Act.

"The exemption from criminal liability herein established
does not include exemption from civil liability, which
shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws."
Section 4. Section 8 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 8. Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC).
– A Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC) is
hereby created and attached to the Department of
Social Welfare and Development and placed under its
administrative supervision. The JJWC shall be chaired
by an Undersecretary of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development. It shall ensure the effective
implementation of this Act and coordination among the
following agencies:
"(a) Department of Justice (DOJ);
"(b) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC);
"(c) Department of Education (DepED);
"(d) Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG);
"(e) Public Attorney’s Office (PAO);
"(f) Bureau of Corrections (BUCOR);
"(g) Parole and Probation Administration
(PPA);
"(h) National Bureau of Investigation (NBI);
"(i) Philippine National Police (PNP);
"(j) Bureau of Jail Management and Penology
(BJMP);
"(k) Commission on Human Rights (CHR);
"(l) Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority (TESDA);
"(m) National Youth Commission (NYC); and
"(n) Other institutions focused on juvenile
justice and intervention programs.
"The JJWC shall be composed of representatives,
whose ranks shall not be lower than director, to be
designated by the concerned heads of the following
departments or agencies and shall receive emoluments
as may be determined by the Council in accordance
with existing budget and accounting rules and
regulations:
"(1) Department of Justice (DOJ);
"(2) Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD);
"(3) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC);
"(4) Department of Education (DepED);
"(5) Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG);
"(6) Commission on Human Rights (CHR);
193
"(7) National Youth Commission (NYC);
"(8) Two (2) representatives from NGOs, to be
designated by the Secretary of Social Welfare
and Development, to be selected based on the
criteria established by the Council;
"(9) Department of Health (DOH); and
"(10) One (1) representative each from the
League of Provinces, League of Cities, League
of Municipalities and League of Barangays.
"There shall be a Regional Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Committee (RJJWC) in each region. The RJJWCs will
be under the administration and supervision of the
JJWC. The RJJWC shall be chaired by the director of
the regional office of the DSWD. It shall ensure the
effective implementation of this Act at the regional and
LGU levels and the coordination among its member
agencies.
"The RJJWC will be composed of permanent
representatives who shall have a rank not lower than an
assistant regional director or its equivalent to be
designated by the concerned department heads from
the following agencies and shall receive emoluments as
may be determined by the Council in accordance with
existing budget and accounting rules and regulations:
"(i) Department of Justice (DOJ);
"(ii) Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD);
"(iii) Department of Education (DepED);
"(iv) Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG);
"(v) Commission on Human Rights (CHR);
"(vi) Department of Health (DOH);
"(vii) Two (2) representatives from NGOs
operating within the region selected by the
RJJWC based on the criteria established by
the JJWC;
"(viii) One (1) sectoral representative from the
children or youth sector within the region; and
"(ix) One (1) representative from the League of
Provinces/ Cities/ Municipalities/ Barangays of
the Philippines.
"The JJWC shall convene within fifteen (15) days from
the effectivity of this Act. The Secretary of Social
Welfare and Development shall determine the
organizational structure and staffing pattern of the
JJWC national secretariat and the RJJWC secretariat.
"In the implementation of this Act, the JJWC shall
consult with the various leagues of local government
officials.
"The JJWC shall coordinate with the Office of the Court
Administrator and the Philippine Judicial Academy to
ensure the realization of its mandate and the proper
discharge of its duties and functions, as herein
provided."
Section5. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby
amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 9. Duties and Functions of the JJWC. – The
JJWC shall have the following duties and functions:
"(a) To oversee the implementation of this Act;
"(b) To advise the President on all matters and
policies relating to juvenile justice and welfare;
"(c) To assist the concerned agencies in the
review and redrafting of existing
policies/regulations or in the formulation of
new ones in line with the provisions of this Act;
"(d) To periodically develop a comprehensive 3
to 5-year national juvenile intervention
program, with the participation of government
agencies concerned, NGOs and youth
organizations;
"(e) To coordinate the implementation of the
juvenile intervention programs and activities by
national government agencies and other
activities which may have an important bearing
on the success of the entire national juvenile
intervention program. All programs relating to
juvenile justice and welfare shall be adopted in
consultation with the JJWC;
"(f) To consult with the various leagues of local
government officials in the formulation and
recommendation of policies and strategies for
the prevention of juvenile delinquency and the
promotion of juvenile justice and welfare;
"(g) To formulate and recommend policies and
strategies in consultation with children for the
prevention of juvenile delinquency and the
administration of justice, as well as for the
treatment and rehabilitation of the children in
conflict with the law;
"(h) To collect relevant information and conduct
continuing research and support evaluations
and studies on all matters relating to juvenile
justice and welfare, such as, but not limited to:
"(1) The performance and results
achieved by juvenile intervention
programs and by activities of the local
government units and other
government agencies;
"(2) The periodic trends, problems
and causes of juvenile delinquency
and crimes; and
"(3) The particular needs of children
in conflict with the law in custody.
"The data gathered shall be used by the JJWC
in the improvement of the administration of
juvenile justice and welfare system.
"The JJWC shall submit an annual report to
Congress on the implementation of the
provisions of this Act.
"The JJWC shall set up a mechanism to
ensure that children are involved in research
and policy development.
"(i) Through duly designated persons and with
the assistance of the agencies provided in the
preceding section, to conduct regular
inspections in detention and rehabilitation
194
facilities and to undertake spot inspections on
their own initiative in order to check
compliance with the standards provided herein
and to make the necessary recommendations
to appropriate agencies;
"(j) To initiate and coordinate the conduct of
trainings for the personnel of the agencies
involved in the administration of the juvenile
justice and welfare system and the juvenile
intervention program;
"(k) To submit an annual report to the
President on the implementation of this Act;
and
"(l) To perform such other functions as may be
necessary to implement the provisions of this
Act."
"SEC. 9-A. Duties and Functions of the RJJWC. – The
RJJWC shall have the following duties and functions:
"(a) To oversee and ensure the effective
implementation of this Act at the regional level
and at the level of the LGUs;
"(b) To assist the concerned agencies in the
implementation and in compliance with the
JJWC’s adopted policies/regulations or provide
substantial inputs to the JJWC in the
formulation of new ones in line with the
provisions of this Act;
"(c) To assist in the development of the
comprehensive 3 to 5-year local juvenile
intervention program, with the participation of
concerned LGUs, NGOs and youth
organizations within the region and monitor its
implementation;
"(d) To coordinate the implementation of the
juvenile intervention programs and activities by
national government agencies and other
activities within the region;
"(e) To oversee the programs and operation of
the intensive juvenile intervention and support
center established within the region;
"(f) To collect relevant regional information and
conduct continuing research and support
evaluations and studies on all matters relating
to juvenile justice and welfare within the
region, such as, but not limited to:
"(1) Performance and results
achieved by juvenile intervention
programs and by activities of the
LGUs and other government
agencies within the region;
"(2) The periodic trends, problems
and causes of juvenile delinquency
and crimes from the LGU level to the
regional level; and
"(3) The particular needs of children
in conflict with the law in custody
within their regional jurisdiction.
"The data gathered shall be forwarded by the
RJJWC to the JJWC on an annual basis and
as may be deemed necessary by the JJWC.

"(g) Through duly designated persons and with
the assistance of the agencies provided in the
preceding section, to conduct regular
inspections in detention and rehabilitation
facilities within the region and to undertake
spot inspections on their own initiative in order
to check compliance with the standards
provided herein and to make the necessary
reports and recommendations to appropriate
agencies and to the JJWC;
"(h) To initiate and coordinate the conduct of
trainings for the personnel of the agencies
involved in the administration of the juvenile
justice and welfare system and the juvenile
intervention program within the region;
"(i) To submit an annual report to the JJWC on
the implementation of this Act; and
"(j) To perform such other functions as may be
determined by the JJWC to implement the
provisions of this Act."
Section 6. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 20. Children Below the Age of Criminal
Responsibility. – If it has been determined that the child
taken into custody is fifteen (15) years old or below, the
authority which will have an initial contact with the child,
in consultation with the local social welfare and
development officer, has the duty to immediately
release the child to the custody of his/her parents or
guardian, or in the absence thereof, the child’s nearest
relative. The child shall be subjected to a community-
based intervention program supervised by the local
social welfare and development officer, unless the best
interest of the child requires the referral of the child to a
youth care facility or ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ managed by
LGUs or licensed and/or accredited NGOs monitored by
the DSWD.
"The local social welfare and development officer shall
determine the appropriate programs for the child who
has been released, in consultation with the child and
the person having custody over the child. If the parents,
guardians or nearest relatives cannot be located, or if
they refuse to take custody, the child may be released
to any of the following:
"(a) A duly registered nongovernmental or
religious organization;
"(b) A barangay official or a member of the
Barangay Council for the Protection of
Children (BCPC);
"(c) A local social welfare and development
officer; or, when and where appropriate, the
DSWD.
"If the child has been found by the local social welfare
and development officer to be dependent, abandoned,
neglected or abused by his/her parents and the best
interest of the child requires that he/she be placed in a
youth care facility or ‘Bahay Pag-asa’, the child’s
parents or guardians shall execute a written
authorization for the voluntary commitment of the
child: Provided, That if the child has no parents or
guardians or if they refuse or fail to execute the written
authorization for voluntary commitment, the proper
petition for involuntary commitment shall be
immediately filed by the DSWD or the Local Social
Welfare and Development Office (LSWDO) pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, otherwise
known as ‘The Child and Youth Welfare Code’ and the
195
Supreme Court rule on commitment of
children: Provided, further, That the minimum age for
children committed to a youth care facility or ‘Bahay
Pag-asa’ shall be twelve (12) years old."
"SEC. 20-A. Serious Crimes Committed by Children
Who Are Exempt From Criminal Responsibility. – A
child who is above twelve (12) years of age up to fifteen
(15) years of age and who commits parricide, murder,
infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention
where the victim is killed or raped, robbery, with
homicide or rape, destructive arson, rape, or
carnapping where the driver or occupant is killed or
raped or offenses under Republic Act No. 9165
(Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002)
punishable by more than twelve (12) years of
imprisonment, shall be deemed a neglected child under
Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, and shall be
mandatorily placed in a special facility within the youth
care faculty or ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ called the Intensive
Juvenile Intervention and Support Center (IJISC).
"In accordance with existing laws, rules, procedures
and guidelines, the proper petition for involuntary
commitment and placement under the IJISC shall be
filed by the local social welfare and development officer
of the LGU where the offense was committed, or by the
DSWD social worker in the local social welfare and
development officer’s absence, within twenty-four (24)
hours from the time of the receipt of a report on the
alleged commission of said child. The court, where the
petition for involuntary commitment has been filed shall
decide on the petition within seventy-two (72) hours
from the time the said petition has been filed by the
DSWD/LSWDO. The court will determine the initial
period of placement of the child within the IJISC which
shall not be less than one (1) year. The multi-
disciplinary team of the IJISC will submit to the court a
case study and progress report, to include a psychiatric
evaluation report and recommend the reintegration of
the child to his/her family or the extension of the
placement under the IJISC. The multi-disciplinary team
will also submit a report to the court on the services
extended to the parents and family of the child and the
compliance of the parents in the intervention program.
The court will decide whether the child has successfully
completed the center-based intervention program and
is already prepared to be reintegrated with his/her
family or if there is a need for the continuation of the
center-based rehabilitation of the child. The court will
determine the next period of assessment or hearing on
the commitment of the child."
"SEC. 20-B. Repetition of Offenses. – A child who is
above twelve (12) years of age up to fifteen (15) years
of age and who commits an offense for the second time
or oftener: Provided, That the child was previously
subjected to a community-based intervention program,
shall be deemed a neglected child under Presidential
Decree No. 603, as amended, and shall undergo an
intensive intervention program supervised by the local
social welfare and development officer: Provided,
further, That, if the best interest of the child requires
that he/she be placed in a youth care facility or ‘Bahay
Pag-asa’, the child’s parents or guardians shall execute
a written authorization for the voluntary commitment of
the child: Provided, finally, That if the child has no
parents or guardians or if they refuse or fail to execute
the written authorization for voluntary commitment, the
proper petition for involuntary commitment shall be
immediately filed by the DSWD or the LSWDO pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended."
"SEC. 20-C. Exploitation of Children for Commission of
Crimes. – Any person who, in the commission of a
crime, makes use, takes advantage of, or profits from
the use of children, including any person who abuses
his/her authority over the child or who, with abuse of
confidence, takes advantage of the vulnerabilities of the

child and shall induce, threaten or instigate the
commission of the crime, shall be imposed the penalty
prescribed by law for the crime committed in its
maximum period."
"SEC. 20-D. Joint Parental Responsibility. – Based on
the recommendation of the multi-disciplinary team of
the IJISC, the LSWDO or the DSWD, the court may
require the parents of a child in conflict with the law to
undergo counseling or any other intervention that, in the
opinion of the court, would advance the welfare and
best interest of the child.
"As used in this Act, ‘parents’ shall mean any of the
following:
"(a) Biological parents of the child; or
"(b) Adoptive parents of the child; or
"(c) Individuals who have custody of the child.
"A court exercising jurisdiction over a child in conflict
with the law may require the attendance of one or both
parents of the child at the place where the proceedings
are to be conducted.
"The parents shall be liable for damages unless they
prove, to the satisfaction of the court, that they were
exercising reasonable supervision over the child at the
time the child committed the offense and exerted
reasonable effort and utmost diligence to prevent or
discourage the child from committing another offense."
"SEC. 20-E. Assistance to Victims of Offenses
Committed by Children. – The victim of the offense
committed by a child and the victim’s family shall be
provided the appropriate assistance and psychological
intervention by the LSWDO, the DSWD and other
concerned agencies."
Section 7. Section 22 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 22. Duties During Initial Investigation. – The law
enforcement officer shall, in his/her investigation,
determine where the case involving the child in conflict
with the law should be referred.
"The taking of the statement of the child shall be
conducted in the presence of the following: (1) child’s
counsel of choice or in the absence thereof, a lawyer
from the Public Attorney’s Office; (2) the child’s parents,
guardian, or nearest relative, as the case may be; and
(3) the local social welfare and development officer. In
the absence of the child’s parents, guardian, or nearest
relative, and the local social welfare and development
officer, the investigation shall be conducted in the
presence of a representative of an NGO, religious
group, or member of the BCPC.
"The social worker shall conduct an initial assessment
to determine the appropriate interventions and whether
the child acted with discernment, using the discernment
assessment tools developed by the DSWD. The initial
assessment shall be without prejudice to the
preparation of a more comprehensive case study
report. The local social worker shall do either of the
following:
"(a) Proceed in accordance with Section 20 if
the child is fifteen (15) years or below or above
fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years old,
who acted without discernment; and
196
"(b) If the child is above fifteen (15) years old
but below eighteen (18) and who acted with
discernment, proceed to diversion under the
following chapter."
Section 8. Section 33 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 33. Preliminary Investigation and Filing of
Information. – The prosecutor shall conduct a
preliminary investigation in the following instances: (a)
when the child in conflict with the law does not qualify
for diversion; (b) when the child, his/her parents or
guardian does not agree to diversion as specified in
Sections 27 and 28; and (c) when considering the
assessment and recommendation of the social worker,
the prosecutor determines that diversion is not
appropriate for the child in conflict with the law.
"Upon serving the subpoena and the affidavit of
complaint, the prosecutor shall notify the Public
Attorney’s Office of such service, as well as the
personal information, and place of detention of the child
in conflict with the law.
"Upon determination of probable cause by the
prosecutor, the information against the child shall be
filed before the Family Court within forty-five (45) days
from the start of the preliminary investigation. The
information must allege that the child acted with
discernment."
Section 9. Section 49 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 49. Establishment of ‘Bahay Pag-Asa’. – Each
province and highly-urbanized city (the LGUs) shall be
responsible for building, funding and operating a ‘Bahay
Pag-asa’ within their jurisdiction following the standards
that will be set by the DSWD and adopted by the JJWC.
"Every ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ will have a special facility called
the IJISC. This Center will be allocated for children in
conflict with the law in accordance with Sections 20, 20-
A and 20-B hereof. These children will be required to
undergo a more intensive multi-disciplinary intervention
program. The JJWC in partnership with, but not limited
to, the DSWD, the DOH, the DepED and the DILG, will
develop and set the standards for the implementation of
the multi-disciplinary intervention program of the IJISC.
Upon institutionalization of the IJISC program, the
JJWC will continue to monitor and provide technical
assistance to the multi-disciplinary teams operating the
said centers."
Section 10. Section 50 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 50. Care and Maintenance of the Child in
Conflict with the Law. – x x x
"The LGUs expected expenditures on the local juvenile
intervention program for children at risk and children in
conflict with the law shall be included in the LGUs
annual budget. Highly-urbanized cities and provincial
governments should include a separate budget for the
construction and maintenance of the ‘Bahay Pag-asa’
including the operation of the IJISC within the ‘Bahay
Pag-asa’."
Section 11. Section 57 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 57. Status Offenses. – Any conduct not
considered an offense or not penalized if committed by

an adult shall not be considered an offense and shall
not be punished if committed by a child."
"SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. –
Ordinances enacted by local governments concerning
juvenile status offenses such as, but not limited to,
curfew violations, truancy, parental disobedience, anti-
smoking and anti-drinking laws, as well as light offenses
and misdemeanors against public order or safety such
as, but not limited to, disorderly conduct, public scandal,
harassment, drunkenness, public intoxication, criminal
nuisance, vandalism, gambling, mendicancy, littering,
public urination, and trespassing, shall be for the
protection of children. No penalty shall be imposed on
children for said violations, and they shall instead be
brought to their residence or to any barangay official at
the barangay hall to be released to the custody of their
parents. Appropriate intervention programs shall be
provided for in such ordinances. The child shall also be
recorded as a ‘child at risk’ and not as a ‘child in conflict
with the law’. The ordinance shall also provide for
intervention programs, such as counseling, attendance
in group activities for children, and for the parents,
attendance in parenting education seminars."
Section 12. Mandatory Registry of Children in Conflict with the
Law. – All duty-bearers, including barangay/BCPC workers, law
enforcers, teachers, guidance counselors, social workers and
prosecutors who will receive report, handle or refer cases of
children in conflict with the law, shall ensure a faithful recordation
of all pertinent information, such as age, residence, gender,
crime committed or accused of and the details of the intervention
or diversion, as the case may be, under which they will undergo
or has undergone, of all children in conflict with the law to
guarantee the correct application of the provisions of this Act and
other laws. The JJWC shall lead in the establishment of a
centralized information management system on children in
conflict with the law. This provision is however without prejudice
to Section 43 of this Act.
Section 13. Section 63 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 63. Appropriations. – The amount necessary to
carry out the provisions of this Act shall be charged
against the current year’s appropriations of the JJWC
under the budget of the Department of Justice.
Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the
continued implementation of this Act shall be included
in the budget of the DSWD under the annual General
Appropriations Act: Provided, That the amount of Four
hundred million pesos (P400,000,000.00) shall be
appropriated for the construction of ‘Bahay Pag-asa’
rehabilitation centers in provinces or cities with high
incidence of children in conflict with the law to be
determined and identified by the DSWD and the JJWC
on a priority basis: Provided, further, That the said
amount shall be coursed through the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) for its proper
implementation.
"The LGUs concerned shall make available, from its
own resources or assets, their counterpart share
equivalent to the national government contribution of
Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00) per rehabilitation
center.
"In addition, the Council may accept donations, grants
and contributions from various sources, in cash or in
kind, for purposes relevant to its functions, subject to
the usual government accounting and auditing rules
and regulations."
Section 14. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – The JJWC
shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations within sixty
(60) days from the effectivity of this Act.
197
Section 15. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act is
held unconstitutional, other provisions not affected thereby shall
remain valid and binding.
Section 16. Repealing Clause. – All laws, decrees, ordinances
and rules inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
modified or repealed accordingly.
Section 17. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen
(15) days after the completion of its publication in the Official
Gazette or in at least two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation.
Approved,
Republic Act No. 9775
AN ACT DEFINING THE CRIME OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY,
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Anti-
Child Pornography Act of 2009."
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes the vital
role of the youth in nation building and shall promote and protect
their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, emotional,
psychological and social well-being. Towards this end, the State
shall:
(a) Guarantee the fundamental rights of every child
from all forms of neglect, cruelty and other conditions
prejudicial to his/her development;
(b) Protect every child from all forms of exploitation and
abuse including, but not limited to:
(1) the use of a child in pornographic
performances and materials; and
(2) the inducement or coercion of a child to
engage or be involved in pornography through
whatever means; and
(c) Comply with international treaties to which the
Philippines is a signatory or a State party concerning
the rights of children which include, but not limited to,
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child of
the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and
Child Pornography, the International Labor Organization
(ILO) Convention No.182 on the Elimination of the
Worst Forms of Child Labor and the Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. -
(a) "Child" refers to a person below eighteen (18) years
of age or over, but is unable to fully take care of
himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation
or discrimination because of a physical or mental
disability or condition.
For the purpose of this Act, a child shall also refer to:
(1) a person regardless of age who is
presented, depicted or portrayed as a child as
defined herein; and
(2) computer-generated, digitally or manually
crafted images or graphics of a person who is

represented or who is made to appear to be a
child as defined herein.
(b) "Child pornography" refers to any representation,
whether visual, audio, or written combination thereof, by
electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any
other means, of child engaged or involved in real or
simulated explicit sexual activities.
(c) "Explicit Sexual Activity" includes actual or simulated
- (c) To publish offer, transmit, sell, distribute, broadcast,
(1) As to form:
(i) sexual intercourse or lascivious act
including, but not limited to, contact involving
genital to genital, oral to genital, anal to
genital, or oral to anal, whether between
persons of the same or opposite sex;
(2) bestiality;
(3) masturbation;
(4) sadistic or masochistic abuse;
(5) lascivious exhibition of the genitals,
buttocks, breasts, pubic area and/or anus; or
(6) use of any object or instrument for
lascivious acts
(d) "Internet address" refers to a website, bulletin board
service, internet chat room or news group, or any other
internet or shared network protocol address.
(e) "Internet cafe or kiosk" refers to an establishment
that offers or proposes to offer services to the public for
the use of its computer/s or computer system for the
purpose of accessing the internet, computer games or
related services.
(f) "Internet content host" refers to a person who hosts
or who proposes to host internet content in the
Philippines.
(g) "Internet service provider (ISP)" refers to a person or
entity that supplies or proposes to supply, an internet
carriage service to the public.
(h) "Grooming" refers to the act of preparing a child or
someone who the offender believes to be a child for
sexual activity or sexual relationship by communicating
any form of child pornography. It includes online
enticement or enticement through any other means.
(i) "Luring" refers to the act of communicating, by
means of a computer system, with a child or someone
who the offender believes to be a child for the purpose
of facilitating the commission of sexual activity or
production of any form of child pornography.(2)
Bestiality;
(j) "Pandering" refers to the act of offering, advertising,
promoting, representing or distributing through any
means any material or purported material that is
intended to cause another to believe that the material or
purported material contains any form of child
pornography, regardless of the actual content of the
material or purported material.
(k) "Person" refers to any natural or juridical entity.
198
Section 4. Unlawful or Prohibited Acts. - It shall be unlawful for
any person:
(a) To hire, employ, use, persuade, induce or coerce a
child to perform in the creation or production of any
form of child pornography;
(b) To produce, direct, manufacture or create any form
of child pornography;
advertise, promote, export or import any form of child
pornography;
(d) To possess any form of child pornography with the
intent to sell, distribute, publish, or broadcast: Provided.
That possession of three (3) or more articles of child
pornography of the same form shall be prima facie
evidence of the intent to sell, distribute, publish or
broadcast;
(e) To knowingly, willfully and intentionally provide a
venue for the commission of prohibited acts as, but not
limited to, dens, private rooms, cubicles, cinemas,
houses or in establishments purporting to be a
legitimate business;
(f) For film distributors, theaters and telecommunication
companies, by themselves or in cooperation with other
entities, to distribute any form of child pornography;
(g) For a parent, legal guardian or person having
custody or control of a child to knowingly permit the
child to engage, participate or assist in any form of child
pornography;
(h) To engage in the luring or grooming of a child;
(i) To engage in pandering of any form of child
pornography;
(j) To willfully access any form of child pornography;
(k) To conspire to commit any of the prohibited acts
stated in this section. Conspiracy to commit any form of
child pornography shall be committed when two (2) or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of any of the said prohibited acts and
decide to commit it; and
(l) To possess any form of child pornography.
Section 5. Syndicated Child Pornography - The crime of child
pornography is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out
by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or
confederating with one another and shall be punished under
Section 15(a) of this Act.
Section 6. Who May File a Complaint. - Complaints on cases of
any form of child pornography and other offenses punishable
under this Act may be filed by the following:
(a) Offended party;
(b) Parents or guardians;
(c) Ascendant or collateral relative within the third
degree of consanguinity;
(d) Officer, social worker or representative of a licensed
child-caring institution;
(e) Officer or social worker of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD);

(f) Local social welfare development officer;
(g) Barangay chairman;
(h) Any law enforcement officer;
(i) At least three (3) concerned responsible citizens
residing in the place where the violation occurred; or
(j) Any person who has personal knowledge of the
circumstances of the commission of any offense under
this Act.
Section 7. Appointment of Special Prosecutors. - The
Department of Justice (DOJ) shall appoint or designate special
prosecutors to prosecute cases for the violation of this Act.
Section 8. Jurisdiction. - Jurisdiction over cases for the violation
of this Act shall be vested in the Family Court which has
territorial jurisdiction over the place where the offense or any of
its essential elements was committed pursuant to Republic Act
No. 8369, otherwise known as "Family Courts Act of 1997".
Section 9. Duties of an Internet Service Provider (ISP). - All
internet service providers (ISPs) shall notify the Philippine
National Police (PNP) or the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) within seven (7) days from obtaining facts and
circumstances that any form of child pornography is being
committed using its server or facility. Nothing in this section may
be construed to require an ISP to engage in the monitoring of
any user, subscriber or customer, or the content of any
communication of any such person: Provided, That no ISP shall
be held civilly liable for damages on account of any notice given
in good faith in compliance with this section.
Furthermore, an ISP shall preserve such evidence for purpose of
investigation and prosecution by relevant authorities.
An ISP shall, upon the request of proper authorities, furnish the
particulars of users who gained or attempted to gain access to
an internet address which contains any form of child
pornography.
All ISPs shall install available technology, program or software to
ensure that access to or transmittal of any form of child
pornography will be blocked or filtered.
An ISP who shall knowingly, willfully and intentionally violate this
provision shall be subject to the penalty provided under Section
15(k) of this Act.
The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) shall
promulgate within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this Act
the necessary rules and regulations for the implementation of
this provision which shall include, among others, the installation
of filtering software that will block access to or transmission of
any form of the child pornography.
Section 10. Responsibility of Mall Owners/Operators and
Owners or Lessors of Other Business Establishments. - All mall
owners/operators and owners or lessors of other business
establishments shall notify the PNP or the NBI within seven (7)
days from obtaining facts and circumstances that child
pornography is being committed in their
premises. Provided, That public display of any form of child
pornography within their premises is a conclusive presumption of
the knowledge of the mall owners/operators and owners or
lessors of other business establishments of the violation of this
Act: Provided, further, That a disputable presumption of
knowledge by mall owners/operators and owners or lessors of
other business establishments should know or reasonably know
that a violation of this Act is being committed in their premises.
Photo developers, information technology professionals, credit
card companies and banks and any person who has direct
199
knowledge of any form of child pornography activities shall have
the duty to report any suspected child pornography materials or
transactions to the proper authorities within seven (7) days from
discovery thereof.
Any willful and intentional violation of this provision shall be
subject to the penalty provided under Section 15(l) of this Act.
Section 11. Duties of an Internet Content Host. - An internet
content host shall:
(a) Not host any form of child pornography on its
internet address;
(b) Within seven (7) days, report the presence of any
form of child pornography, as well as the particulars of
the person maintaining, hosting, distributing or in any
manner contributing to such internet address, to the
proper authorities; and
(c) Preserve such evidence for purposes of
investigation and prosecution by relevant authorities.
An internet content host shall, upon the request of proper
authorities, furnish the particulars of users who gained or
attempted to gain access to an internet address that contains
any form of child pornography.
An internet content host who shall knowingly, willfully and
intentionally violate this provision shall be subject to the penalty
provided under Section 15(j) of this Act: Provided, That the
failure of the internet content host to remove any form of child
pornography within forty-eight (48) hours from receiving the
notice that any form of child pornography is hitting its server shall
be conclusive evidence of willful and intentional violation thereof.
Section 12. Authority to Regulate Internet Café or Kiosk. - The
local government unit (LGU) of the city or municipality where an
internet café or kiosk is located shall have the authority to
monitor and regulate the establishment and operation of the
same or similar establishments in order to prevent violation of
the provisions of this Act.
Section 13. Confidentiality. - The right to privacy of the child
shall be ensured at any stage of the investigation, prosecution
and trial of an offense under this Act. Towards this end, the
following rules shall be observed:
(a) The judge, prosecutor or any officer of the law to
whom the complaint has been referred to may,
whenever necessary to ensure a fair and impartial
proceeding and after considering all circumstances for
the best interest of the child conduct a closed-door
investigation, prosecution or trial;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the child,
including the child's immediate family, or any other
information tending to establish his/her identity shall not
be disclosed to the public;
(c) Any record regarding a child shall be confidential
and kept under seal. Except upon written request and
order of the court, a record shall be released only to the
following:
(1) Members of the court staff for
administrative use;
(2) The prosecuting attorney;
(3) Defense counsel;
(4) The guardian ad litem;

(5) Agents of investigating law enforcement
agencies and
(6) Other persons as determined by the court.
(d) Any form of child pornography that is part of the
court records shall be subject to a protective order that
provides as follows:
(1) Any form of child pornography may be
viewed only by the parties, their counsel, their
expert witness and guardian ad litem;
(2) Neither form of child pornography nor any
portion thereof shall be divulged to any other
person, except as necessary for investigation,
prosecution or trial; and
(3) No person shall be granted access to any
form of child pornography or any part thereof
unless he/she signs a written affirmation that
he/she has received and read a copy of the
protection order; that he/she submits to the
jurisdiction of the court with respect to the
protective order; and that, in case of violation
thereof, he/she will be subject to the contempt
power of the court; and
(e) In cases when prosecution or trial is conducted
behind closed doors, it shall be unlawful for any editor,
publisher and reporter or columnist in case of printed
materials, announcer or producer in case of television
and radio, producer and director of a film in case of the
movie industry, or any person utilizing the tri-media
facilities or information technology to publish or
broadcast the names of the victims of any case of child
pornography.
Any violation of this provision shall be subject to the penalty
provided for under Section 15(m) of this Act.
Section 14. Care, Custody and Treatment of a Child Victim. -
The DSWD shall ensure that the child who is a victim of any form
of child pornography is provided appropriate care, custody and
support for their recovery and reintegration in accordance with
existing laws.
The child and his family shall be entitled to protection as well as
to the rights and benefits of witnesses under Republic Act No.
6981, otherwise known as "The Witness Protection, Security and
Benefit Act".
The child shall also be considered as a victim of a violent crime
defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 7309, otherwise
known as "An Act Creating a Board of Claims under the
Department of Justice for Victims of Unjust Imprisonment or
Detention and Victims of Violent Crimes and for Other
Purposes", so that the child may claim compensation therein.
Section 15. Penalties and Sanctions. - The following penalties
and sanctions are hereby established for offenses enumerated in
this Act:
(a) Any person found guilty of syndicated child
pornography as defined in Section 5 of this Act shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of not
less than Two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) but not
more than Five million pesos (Php5,000,000.00);
(b) Any person found guilty of violating Section 4(a), (b)
and (c) of this Act shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period and a fine of not less
than One million pesos (Php1,000,000.00) but not more
than Two million (Php2,000,000.00);
200
(c) Any person found guilty of violating Section 4(d), (e)
and (f) of this Act shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its medium period and a fine of not less
than Seven hundred fifty thousand pesos
(Php750,000.00) but not more than One million pesos
(Php1,000,000.00);
(d) Any person found guilty of violating Section 4(g) of
this Act shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal in
its minimum period and a fine of not less than Five
hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more
than Seven hundred thousand pesos (Php700,000.00);
(e) Any person found guilty of violating Section 4(h) of
this Act shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its
maximum period and a fine of not less than Three
hundred thousand pesos (Php300,000.00) but not more
than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00);
(f) Any person found guilty of violating Section 4(I) of
this Act shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period and a fine of not less than Three
hundred thousand pesos (php300,000.00) but not more
than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00);
(g) Any person found guilty of violating Section 4(j) of
this Act shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in
its maximum period and a fine of not less than Two
hundred thousand pesos (Php200,000.00) but not more
than Three hundred thousand pesos (Php300,000.00);
(h) Any person found guilty of violating Section 4(k) of
this Act shall suffer the penalty of prision correccionalin
its medium period and a fine of not less than One
hundred thousand pesos (php100,000.00) but not more
than Two hundred fifty thousand pesos
(php250,000.00);
(i) Any person found guilty of violating Section 4(l) of
this Act shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum period and a fine of not less than Fifty
thousand pesos (Php50,000.00) but not more than One
hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00);
(j) Any person found guilty of violating Section 11 of this
Act shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its
medium period and a fine of not less than One million
pesos (Php1,000,000.00) but not more than Two million
pesos (Php2,000,000.00) for the first offense. In the
case of a subsequent offense, the penalty shall be a
fine not less than Two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00)
but not more than Three million pesos
(Php3,000,000.00) and revocation of its license to
operate and immediate closure of the establishment;
(k) Any ISP found guilty of willfully and knowingly failing
to comply with the notice and installation requirements
under Section 9 of this Act shall suffer the penalty of a
fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(Php500,000.00) but not more than One million pesos
(Php1,000,000.00) for the first offense. In case of
subsequent offense, the penalty shall be a fine of not
less than One million pesos (Php1,000,000.00) but not
more than Two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) and
revocation of its license to operate;
(l) Any mall owner-operator and owner or lessor of other
business establishments including photo developers,
information technology professionals, credit card
companies and banks, found guilty of willfully and
knowingly failing to comply with the notice requirements
under Section 10 of this Act shall suffer the penalty of a
fine of not less than One million pesos
(Php1,000,000.00) but not more than Two million pesos
(Php2,000,000.00) for the first offense. In the case of a
subsequent offense, the penalty shall be a fine of not
less than Two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) but not

more than Three million pesos (Php3,000,000.00) and
revocation of its license to operate and immediate
closure of the establishment; and
(m) Any person found guilty of violating Section 13 of
this Act shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum period and a fine of not less than One
hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) but not more
than Three hundred thousand pesos (Php300,000.00).
Section 16. Common Penal Provisions. -
(a) If the offender is a parent, ascendant, guardian,
step-parent or collateral relative within the third degree
of consanguinity or affinity or any person having control
or moral ascendancy over the child, the penalty
provided herein shall be in its maximum
duration; Provided, That this provision shall not apply to
Section 4(g) of this Act;
(b) If the offender is a juridical person, the penalty shall
be imposed upon the owner, manager, partner, member
of the board of directors and/or any responsible officer
who participated in the commission of the crime or shall
have knowingly permitted or failed to prevent its
commissions;
(c) If the offender is a foreigner, he/she shall be
immediately deported after the complete service of
his/her sentence and shall forever be barred from
entering the country; and
(d) The penalty provided for in this Act shall be imposed
in its maximum duration if the offender is a public officer
or employee.
Section 17. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds, Tools
and Instruments Used in Child Pornography. - In addition to the
penalty imposed for the violation of this Act, the court shall order
the confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the government of all
the proceeds, tools and instruments used in the commission of
the crime, unless they are the property of a third person not
liable for the unlawful act; Provided, however, That all awards for
damages shall be taken from the personal and separate
properties of the offender; Provided, further, That if such
properties are insufficient, the deficiency shall be taken from the
confiscated and forfeited proceeds, tools and instruments.
All proceeds derived from the sale of properties used for the
commission of any form of child pornography shall accrue to the
special account of the DSWD which shall be used exclusively for
the implementation of this Act.
When the proceeds, tools and instruments used in the
commission of the offense have been destroyed diminished in
value or otherwise rendered worthless by any act or omission,
directly or indirectly, of the offender, or it has been concealed,
removed, converted or transferred to prevent the same from
being found or to avoid forfeiture or confiscation, the offender
shall be ordered to pay the amount equal to the value of the
proceeds, tools and instruments used in the commission of the
offense.1avvphi1
Section 18. Mandatory Services to Victims of Child
Pornography. - To ensure recovery, rehabilitation and
reintegration into the mainstream of society concerned
government agencies and the LGUs shall make available the
following services to victims of any form of child pornography:
(a) Emergency shelter or appropriate housing;
(b) Counseling;
(c) Free legal services, which shall include information
about the victim's rights and the procedure for filing of
complaints, claims for compensation and such other
201
legal remedies available to them in a language
understood by the child;
(d) Medical or psychological services;
(e) Livelihood and skills training; and
(f) Educational assistance.
Sustained supervision and follow through mechanism that will
track the progress of recovery, rehabilitation and reintegration of
the child victims shall adopted and carried out.
Section 19. Programs for Victims of Child Pornography. The
Inter-Agency Council Against Child Pornography created under
Section 20 of this Act shall develop and implement the
necessary programs that will prevent any form of child
pornography, as well as protect, heal and reintegrate the child
into the mainstream of society. Such programs shall include beat
but not limited to the following:
(a) Provision of mandatory services including
counseling free legal services, medical or psychological
services, livelihood and skills training and educational
assistance to the child pursuant to Section 18 of this
Act;
(b) Sponsorship of a national research program on any
form of child pornography and other acts covered by
the law and the establishment of a data collection
system for monitoring and evaluation purposes;
(c) Provision of necessary technical and material
support services to appropriate government agencies
and nongovernmental organizations:
(d) Sponsorship of conferences and seminars to
provide venue for consensus building amongst the
public, the academe , government, nongovernmental
and international organizations and
(e) Promotion of information and education campaign.
Section 20. Inter - Agency Council against Child Pornography. -
There is hereby established an Inter-Agency Council against
Child Pornography to be composed of the Secretary of the
DSWD as chairperson and the following as members:
(a) Secretary of the Department of Justice:
(b) Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment
(c) Secretary of the Department of Science and
Technology
(d) Chief of the Philippine National Police;
(e) Chairperson of the Commission on Information and
Communications Technology;
(g) Commissioner of the National Telecommunications
Commission;
(h) Executive Director of the Council for the Welfare of
Children;
(i) Executive Director of the Philippine Center for
Transnational Crimes;
(j) Executive Director of the Optical Media Board;
(k) Director of the National Bureau of Investigation; and

(l) Three (3) representatives from children's
nongovernmental organizations. These representatives
shall be nominated by the government agency
representatives of the Council for appointment by the
President for a term of three (3) years and may be
renewed upon renomination and reappointment by the
Council and the President respectively.
The members of the Council mat designate their permanent
representatives, who shall have a rank not lower than assistant
secretary or its equivalent, to meetings and shall receive
emoluments as may be determined by the Council in accordance
with existing budget and accounting rules and regulations.
The DSWD shall establish the necessary Secretariat for the
Council.
Section 21. Functions of the Council. - The Council shall have
the following powers and functions:
(a) Formulate comprehensive and integrated plans and
programs to prevent and suppress any form of child
pornography;
(b) Promulgate rules and regulations as may be
necessary for the effective implementation of this Act;
(c) Monitor and oversee the strict implementation of this
Act;
(d) Coordinate the programs and projects of the various
members agencies effectively address the issues and
problems attendant to child pornography;
(e) Conduct and coordinate massive information
disseminations and campaign on the existence of the
law and the various issues and problems attendant to
child pornography;
(f) Direct other agencies to immediately respond to the
problems brought to their attention and report to the
Council on the action taken;
(g) Assist in the filling of cases against individuals,
agencies, institutions or establishments that violate the
provisions of this Act;
(h) Formulate a program for the reintegration of victims
of child pornography;
(i) Secure from any department, bureau, office, agency
or instrumentality of the government or from NGOs and
other civic organizations such assistance as may be
needed to effectively implement this Act;
(j) Complement the shared government information
system relative to child abuse and exploitation and
ensure that the proper agencies conduct a continuing
research and study on the patterns and schemes of any
form of child pornography which form basis for policy
formulation and program direction;
(k) develop the mechanism to ensure the timely,
coordinated and effective response to cases of child
pornography;
(l) Recommend measures to enhance cooperative
efforts and mutual assistance among foreign countries
through bilateral and/or multilateral arrangements to
prevent and suppress any form of child pornography;
(m) Adopt measures and policies to protect the rights
and needs of the victims of child pornography who are
foreign nationals in the Philippines;
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(n) maintain a database of cases of child pornography;
(o) Initiate training programs in identifying and providing
the necessary intervention or assistance to victims of
child pornography.
(p) Submit to the President and the Congressional
Oversight committee credited herein the annual report
on the policies, plans, programs and activities of the
Council relative to the implementation of this Act; and
(q) Exercise all the powers and perform such other
functions necessary to attain the purposes and
objectives of this Act.
Section 22. Child Pornography as a Transnational Crime. -
Pursuant to the Convention on transnational Organized Crime,
the DOJ may execute the request of a foreign state for
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of any form of child
pornography by: (1) conducting a preliminary investigation
against the offender and, if appropriate, to file the necessary
charges in court; (2) giving information needed by the foreign
state; and (3) to apply for an order of forfeiture of any proceeds
or monetary instrument or properly located in the Philippines
used in connection with child pornography in the
court; Provided, That if the DOJ refuses to act on the request of
for delaying the execution thereof: Provided, further, That the
principles of mutuality and reciprocity shall, for this purpose, be
at all times recognized.
Section 23. Extradition. - The DOJ, in consultation with the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), shall endeavor to include
child pornography among extraditable offenses in future treaties.
Section 24. Congressional Oversight Committee. -There is
hereby created a Congressional Oversight Committee composed
of five (5) members from the Senate and five (5) members from
the House of Representatives. The members from the Senate
shall be appointed by the Senate President based on
proportional representation of the parties or coalition therein with
at least one (1) member representing the Minority. The members
from the House of Representative shall be appointed by the
Speaker, also based on proportional representation of the parties
or coalitions therein with the Chair of the House of Committee on
Welfare of Children and at least one (1) member representing
the Minority
The Committee shall be headed by the respective Chairs of the
Senate Committee on Youth, Women and Family relations and
the House of Representatives Committee on Justice. The
Secretariat of the Congressional Oversight Committee shall
come from the existing Secretariat personnel of the Committees
of the Senate and the House of Representatives concerned.
The Committee shall monitor and ensure the effective
implementation of this Act, determine inherent weakness and
loopholes in the law. Recommend the necessary remedial
legislator or administrative measures and perform such other
duties and functions as may be necessary to attain the
objectives of this Act.
Section 25. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to
implement the provisions of the Anti-Child Pornography Act and
the operationalization of the Inter-Agency Council Against Child
Pornography shall be included in the annual General
Appropriations Act.
Section 26. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The Inter-
Agency Council Against Child pornography shall promulgate the
necessary implementing rules and regulations within ninety (90)
days from the effectivity of this Act.
Section 27. Suppletory Application of the Revised Penal Code. -
The Revised penal Code shall be suppletorily applicable to this
Act.

Section 28. Separability Clause. - If any part of this Act is
declared unconstitutional or invalid, the other provisions not
affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.
Section 29. Repealing Clause. - All laws, presidential decrees,
executive orders, administrative orders, rules and regulations
inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of this Act are
deemed amended, modified or repealed accordingly.
Section 30. Effectivity. - This Act shall effect after fifteen (15)
days following its complete publication in the Official Gazette or
in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
Approved,
Republic Act No. 9710 August 14, 2009
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE MAGNA CARTA OF WOMEN
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as "The
Magna Carta of Women".
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - Recognizing that the
economic, political, and sociocultural realities affect women's
current condition, the State affirms the role of women in nation
building and ensures the substantive equality of women and
men. It shall promote empowerment of women and pursue equal
opportunities for women and men and ensure equal access to
resources and to development results and outcome. Further, the
State realizes that equality of men and women entails the
abolition of the unequal structures and practices that perpetuate
discrimination and inequality. To realize this, the State shall
endeavor to develop plans, policies, programs, measures, and
mechanisms to address discrimination and inequality in the
economic, political, social, and cultural life of women and men.
The State condemns discrimination against women in all its
forms and pursues by all appropriate means and without delay
the policy of eliminating discrimination against women in keeping
with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and other international
instruments consistent with Philippine law. The State shall
accord women the rights, protection, and opportunities available
to every member of society.
The State affirms women's rights as human rights and shall
intensify its efforts to fulfill its duties under international and
domestic law to recognize, respect, protect, fulfill, and promote
all human rights and fundamental freedoms of women,
especially marginalized women, in the economic, social, political,
cultural, and other fields without distinction or discrimination on
account of class, age, sex, gender, language, ethnicity, religion,
ideology, disability, education, and status. The State shall
provide the necessary mechanisms to enforce women's rights
and adopt and undertake all legal measures necessary to foster
and promote the equal opportunity for women to participate in
and contribute to the development of the political, economic,
social, and cultural realms.
The State, in ensuring the full integration of women's concerns in
the mainstream of development, shall provide ample
opportunities to enhance and develop their skills, acquire
productive employment and contribute to their families and
communities to the fullest of their capabilities.
In pursuance of this policy, the State reaffirms the right of women
in all sectors to participate in policy formulation. planning,
organization, implementation, management, monitoring, and
evaluation of all programs, projects, and services. It shall support
policies, researches, technology, and training programs and
other support services such as financing, production, and
marketing to encourage active participation of women in national
development.
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Section 3. Principles of Human Rights of Women. - Human
rights are universal and inalienable. All people in the world are
entitled to them. The universality of human rights is
encompassed in the words of Article 1 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which states that all human beings
are free and equal in dignity and rights.
Human rights are indivisible. Human rights are inherent to the
dignity of every human being whether they relate to civil, cultural,
economic, political, or social issues.
Human rights are interdependent and interrelated. The fulfillment
of one right often depends, wholly or in part, upon the fulfillment
of others.
All individuals are equal as human beings by virtue of the
inherent dignity of each human person. No one, therefore,
should suffer discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, gender,
age, language, sexual orientation, race, color, religion, political,
or other opinion, national, social, or geographical origin,
disability, property, birth, or other status as established by human
rights standards.
All people have the right to participate in and access information
relating to the decision- making processes that affect their lives
and well-being. Rights-based approaches require a high degree
of participation by communities, civil society, minorities, women,
young people, indigenous peoples, and other identified groups.
States and other duty-bearers are answerable for the
observance of human rights. They have to comply with the legal
norms and standards enshrined in international human rights
instruments in accordance with the Philippine Constitution.
Where they fail to do so, aggrieved rights-holders are entitled to
institute proceedings for appropriate redress before a competent
court or other adjudicator in accordance with the rules and
procedures provided by law.
CHAPTER II
DEFINITION OF TERMS
Section 4. Definitions. - For purposes of this Act, the following
terms shall mean:
(a) "Women Empowerment" refers to the provision,
availability, and accessibility of opportunities, services,
and observance of human rights which enable women
to actively participate and contribute to the political,
economic, social, and cultural development of the
nation as well as those which shall provide them equal
access to ownership, management, and control of
production, and of material and informational resources
and benefits in the family, community, and society.
(b) "Discrimination Against Women" refers to any
gender-based distinction, exclusion, or restriction which
has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the
recognition, enjoyment, or exercise by women,
irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality
of men and women, of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil,
or any other field.
It includes any act or omission, including by law; policy,
administrative measure, or practice, that directly or
indirectly excludes or restricts women in the recognition
and promotion of their rights and their access to and
enjoyment of opportunities, benefits, or privileges.
A measure or practice of general application is
discrimination against women if it fails to provide for
mechanisms to offset or address sex or gender-based
disadvantages or limitations of women, as a result of
which women are denied or restricted in the recognition
and protection of their rights and in their access to and
enjoyment of opportunities, benefits, or privileges; or

women, more than men, are shown to have suffered the
greater adverse effects of those measures or practices.
Provided, finally, That discrimination compounded by or
intersecting with other grounds, status, or condition,
such as ethnicity, age, poverty, or religion shall be
considered discrimination against women under this
Act.
(c) "Marginalization" refers to a condition where a whole
category of people is excluded from useful and
meaningful participation in political, economic, social,
and cultural life.
(d) "Marginalized" refers to the basic, disadvantaged, or
vulnerable persons or groups who are mostly living in
poverty and have little or no access to land and other
resources, basic social and economic services such as
health care, education, water and sanitation,
employment and livelihood opportunities, housing,
social security, physical infrastructure; and the justice
system.
These include, but are not limited to, women in the
following sectors and groups:
(1) "Small Farmers and Rural Workers" refers
to those who are engaged directly or indirectly
in small farms and forest areas, workers in
commercial farms and plantations, whether
paid or unpaid, regular or season-bound.
These shall include. but are not limited to, (a)
small farmers who own or are still amortizing
for lands that is not more than three (3)
hectares, tenants, leaseholders, and stewards;
and (b) rural workers who are either wage
earners, self-employed, unpaid family workers
directly and personally engaged in agriculture,
small-scale mining, handicrafts, and other
related farm and off-farm activities;
(2) "Fisherfolk" refers to those directly or
indirectly engaged in taking, culturing, or
processing fishery or aquatic resources. These
include, but are not to be limited to, women
engaged in fishing in municipal waters, coastal
and marine areas, women workers in
commercial fishing and aquaculture, vendors
and processors of fish and coastal products,
and subsistence producers such as shell-
gatherers, managers, and producers of
mangrove resources, and other related
producers:
(3) "Urban Poor" refers to those residing in
urban and urbanizable slum or blighted areas,
with or without the benefit of security of abode,
where the income of the head of the family
cannot afford in a sustained manner to provide
for the family's basic needs of food, health,
education, housing, and other essentials in life;
(4) "Workers in the Formal Economy" refers to
those who are employed by any person acting
directly or indirectly in the interest of an
employer in relation to an employee and shall
include the government and all its branches,
subdivisions, and instrumentalities, all
government- owned and -controlled
corporations and institutions, as well as
nonprofit private institutions or organizations;
(5) "Workers in the Informal Economy" refers
to self-employed, occasionally or personally
hired, subcontracted, paid and unpaid family
workers in household incorporated and
unincorporated enterprises, including home
204
workers, micro-entrepreneurs and producers,
and operators of sari-sari stores and all other
categories who suffer from violation of workers'
rights:
(6) "Migrant Workers" refers to Filipinos who
are to be engaged, are engaged, or have been
engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of
which they are not legal residents, whether
documented or undocumented;
(7) "Indigenous Peoples" refers to a group of
people or homogenous societies identified by
self-ascription and ascription by other, who
have continuously lived as organized
community on communally bounded and
defined territory, and who have, under claims
of ownership since time immemorial, occupied;
possessed customs, tradition, and other
distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through
resistance to political, social, and cultural
inroads of colonization, non- indigenous
religions and culture, became historically
differentiated from the majority of Filipinos.
They shall likewise include peoples who are
regarded as indigenous on account of their
descent from the populations which inhabited
the country, at the dime of conquest or
colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-
indigenous religions and cultures, or the
establishment of present state boundaries,
who retain some or all of their own social,
economic, cultural, and political institutions,
but who may have been displaced from their
traditional domains or who may have resettled
outside their ancestral domains as defined
under Section 3(h), Chapter II of Republic Act
No. 8371, otherwise known as "The
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997" (IPRA
of 1997);
(8) "Moro" refers to native peoples who have
historically inhabited Mindanao, Palawan, and
Sulu, and who are largely of the Islamic faith;
(9) "Children" refers to those who are below
eighteen (18) years of age or over but are
unable to fully take care of themselves or
protect themselves from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because
of a physical or mental disability or condition;
(10) "Senior Citizens" refers to those sixty (60)
years of age and above;
(11) "Persons with Disabilities" refers to those
who are suffering from restriction or different
abilities, as a result of a mental, physical, or
sensory impairment to perform an activity in
the manner or within the range considered
normal for a human being; and
(12) "Solo Parents" refers to those who fall
under the category of a solo parent defined
under Republic Act No. 8972, otherwise known
as the "Solo Parents Welfare Act of 2000".
(e) "Substantive Equality" refers to the full and equal
enjoyment of rights and freedoms contemplated under
this Act. It encompasses de jure and de facto equality
and also equality in outcomes.
(f) "Gender Equality" refers to the principle asserting the
equality of men and women and their right to enjoy
equal conditions realizing their full human potentials to
contribute to and benefit from the results of

development, and with the State recognizing that all
human beings are free and equal in dignity and rights.
(g) "Gender Equity" refers to the policies, instruments,
programs, services, and actions that address the
disadvantaged position of women in society by
providing preferential treatment and affirmative action.
Such temporary special measures aimed at
accelerating de facto equality between men and women
shall not be considered discriminatory but shall in no
way entail as a consequence the maintenance of
unequal or separate standards. These measures shall
be discontinued when the objectives of equality of
opportunity and treatment have been achieved.
(h) "Gender and Development (GAD)" refers to the
development perspective and process that are
participatory and empowering, equitable, sustainable,
free from violence, respectful of human rights,
supportive of self-determination and actualization of
human potentials. It seeks to achieve gender equality
as a fundamental value that should be reflected in
development choices; seeks to transform society's
social, economic, and political structures and questions
the validity of the gender roles they ascribed to women
and men; contends that women are active agents of
development and not just passive recipients of
development assistance; and stresses the need of
women to organize themselves and participate in
political processes to strengthen their legal rights.
(i) "Gender Mainstreaming" refers to the strategy for
making women's as well as men's concerns and
experiences an integral dimension of the design,
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of policies
and programs in all political, economic, and societal
spheres so that women and men benefit equally and
inequality is not perpetuated. It is the process of
assessing the implications for women and men of any
planned action, including legislation, policies, or
programs in all areas and at all levels.
(j) "Temporary Special Measures" refers to a variety of
legislative, executive, administrative, and regulatory
instruments, policies, and practices aimed at
accelerating this de facto equality of women in specific
areas. These measures shall not be considered
discriminatory but shall in no way entail as a
consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate
standards. They shall be discontinued when their
objectives have been achieved.
(k) "Violence Against Women" refers to any act of
gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to
result in, physical, sexual, or psychological harm or
suffering to women, including threats of such acts,
coercion, or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether
occurring in public or in private life. It shall be
understood to encompass, but not limited to, the
following:
(1) Physical, sexual, psychological, and
economic violence occurring in the family,
including battering, sexual abuse of female
children in the household, dowry-related
violence, marital rape, and other traditional
practices harmful to women, non-spousal
violence, and violence related to exploitation;
(2) Physical, sexual, and psychological
violence occurring within the general
community, including rape, sexual abuse,
sexual harassment, and intimidation at work, in
educational institutions and elsewhere,
trafficking in women, and prostitution; and
205
(3) Physical, sexual, and psychological
violence perpetrated or condoned by the State,
wherever it occurs.
It also includes acts of violence against women as
defused in Republic Acts No. 9208 and 9262.
(l) "Women in the Military" refers to women employed in
the military, both in the major and technical services,
who are performing combat and/or noncombat
functions, providing security to the State, and protecting
the people from various forms of threat. It also includes
women trainees in all military training institutions.
(m) "Social Protection" refers to policies and programs
that seek to reduce poverty and vulnerability to risks
and enhance the social status and rights of all women,
especially the marginalized by promoting and protecting
livelihood and employment, protecting against hazards
and sudden loss of income, and improving people's
capacity to manage risk. Its components are labor
market programs, social insurance, social welfare, and
social safety nets.
CHAPTER III
DUTIES RELATED TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN
The State, private sector, society in general, and all individuals
shall contribute to the recognition, respect, and promotion of the
rights of women defined and guaranteed under this Act.
Section 5. The State as the Primary Duty-Bearer. - The State,
as the primary duty-bearer, shall:
(a) Refrain from discriminating against women and
violating their rights;
(b) Protect women against discrimination and from
violation of their rights by private corporations, entities,
and individuals; and
(c) Promote and fulfill the rights of women in all
spheres, including their rights to substantive equality
and non-discrimination.
The State shall fulfill these duties through law, policy, regulatory
instruments, administrative guidelines, and other appropriate
measures, including temporary special measures.
Recognizing the interrelation of the human rights of women, the
State shall take measures and establish mechanisms to promote
the coherent and integrated implementation, and enforcement of
this Act and related laws, policies, or other measures to
effectively stop discrimination against and advance the rights of
women.
The State shall keep abreast with and be guided by progressive
developments in human rights of women under international law
and design of policies, laws, and other measures to promote the
objectives of this Act.
Section 6. Duties of the State Agencies and
Instrumentalities. - These duties of the State shall extend to all
state agencies, offices, and instrumentalities at all levels and
government-owned and -controlled corporations, subject to the
Constitution and pertinent laws, policies, or administrative
guidelines that define specific duties of state agencies and
entities concerned.
Section 7. Suppletory Effect. - This chapter shall be deemed
integrated into and be suppletory to other provisions of this Act,
particularly those that guarantee specific rights to women and
define specific roles and require specific conduct of state organs.

CHAPTER IV
RIGHTS AND EMPOWERMENT
Section 8. Human Rights of Women. - All rights in the
Constitution and those rights recognized under international
instruments duly signed and ratified by the Philippines, in
consonance with Philippine law, shall be rights of women under
this Act to be enjoyed without discrimination.
Section 9. Protection from Violence. - The State shall ensure
that all women shall be protected from all forms of violence as
provided for in existing laws. Agencies of government shall give
priority to the defense and protection of women against gender-
based offenses and help women attain justice and healing.
Towards this end, measures to prosecute and reform offenders
shall likewise be pursued.
(a) Within the next five (5) years, there shall be an incremental
increase in the recruitment and training of women in the police
force, forensics and medico-legal, legal services, and social work
services availed of by women who are victims of gender-related
offenses until fifty percent (50%) of the personnel thereof shall
be women.
(b) Women shall have the right to protection and security in
situations of armed conflict and militarization. Towards this end,
they shall be protected from all forms of gender-based violence,
particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all forms
of violence in situations of armed conflict. The State shall
observe international standards for the protection of civilian
population in circumstances of emergency and armed conflict. It
shall not force women, especially indigenous peoples, to
abandon their lands, territories, and means of subsistence, or
relocate them in special centers for military purposes under any
discriminatory condition.
(c) All government personnel involved in the protection and
defense of women against gender-based violence shall undergo
a mandatory training on human rights and gender sensitivity
pursuant to this Act.
(d) All local government units shall establish a Violence Against
Women's Desk in every barangay to ensure that violence against
women cases are fully addressed in a gender-responsive
manner.
Section 10. Women Affected by Disasters, Calamities, and
Other Crisis Situations. - Women have the right to protection
and security in times of disasters, calamities, and other crisis
situations especially in all phases of relief, recovery,
rehabilitation, and construction efforts. The State shall provide
for immediate humanitarian assistance, allocation of resources,
and early resettlement, if necessary. It shall also address the
particular needs of women from a gender perspective to ensure
their full protection from sexual exploitation and other sexual and
gender- based violence committed against them. Responses to
disaster situations shall include the provision of services, such
as psychosocial support, livelihood support, education,
psychological health, and comprehensive health services,
including protection during pregnancy.
Section 11. Participation and Representation. - The State
shall undertake temporary special measures to accelerate the
participation and equitable representation of women in all
spheres of society particularly in the decision-making and policy-
making processes in government and private entities to fully
realize their role as agents and beneficiaries of development.
The State shall institute the following affirmative action
mechanisms so that women can participate meaningfully in the
formulation, implementation, and evaluation of policies, plans,
and programs for national, regional, and local development:
(a) Empowerment within the Civil Service. - Within the
next five (5) years, the number of women in third (3rd)
206
level positions in government shall be incrementally
increased to achieve a fifty-fifty (50-50) gender balance;
(b) Development Councils and Planning Bodies. - To
ensure the participation of women in all levels of
development planning and program implementation, at
least forty percent (40%) of membership of all
development councils from the regional, provincial, city,
municipal and barangay levels shall be composed of
women;
(c) Other Policy and Decision-Making Bodies. -
Women's groups shall also be represented in
international, national, and local special and decision-
making bodies;
(d) International Bodies. - The State shall take all
appropriate measures to ensure the opportunity of
women, on equal terms with men and without any
discrimination, to represent their governments at the
international level and to participate in the work of
international organizations;
(e) Integration of Women in Political Parties. - The State
shall provide incentives to political parties with women's
agenda. It shall likewise encourage the integration of
women in their leadership hierarchy, internal policy-
making structures, appointive, and electoral nominating
processes; and
(f) Private Sector. - The State shall take measures to
encourage women leadership in the private sector in
the form of incentives.
Section 12. Equal Treatment Before the Law. - The State shall
take steps to review and, when necessary, amend and/or repeal
existing laws that are discriminatory to women within three (3)
years from the effectivity of this Act.
Section 13. Equal Access and Elimination of Discrimination
in Education, Scholarships, and Training. - (a) The State shall
ensure that gender stereotypes and images in educational
materials and curricula are adequately and appropriately revised.
Gender-sensitive language shall be used at all times. Capacity-
building on gender and development (GAD), peace and human
rights, education for teachers, and all those involved in the
education sector shall be pursued toward this end. Partnerships
between and among players of the education sector, including
the private sector, churches, and faith groups shall be
encouraged.
(b) Enrollment of women in nontraditional skills training in
vocational and tertiary levels shall be encouraged.
(c) Expulsion and non-readmission of women faculty due to
pregnant;- outside of marriage shall be outlawed. No school shall
turn out or refuse admission to a female student solely on the
account of her having contracted pregnancy outside of marriage
during her term in school.
Section 14. Women in Sports. - The State shall develop,
establish, and strengthen programs for the participation of
women and girl-children in competitive and noncompetitive
sports as a means to achieve excellence, promote physical and
social well-being, eliminate gender-role stereotyping, and
provide equal access to the full benefits of development for all
persons regardless of sex, gender identity, and other similar
factors.
For this purpose, all sports-related organizations shall create
guidelines that will establish and integrate affirmative action as a
strategy and gender equality as a framework in planning and
implementing their policies, budgets, programs, and activities
relating to the participation of women and girls in sports.

The State will also provide material and nonmaterial incentives
to local government units, media organizations, and the private
sector for promoting, training, and preparing women and girls for
participation in competitive and noncompetitive sports, especially
in local and international events, including, but not limited to, the
Palarong Pambansa, Southeast Asian Games, Asian Games,
and the Olympics.
No sports event or tournament will offer or award a different
sports prize, with respect to its amount or value, to women and
men winners in the same sports category: Provided, That the
said tournament, contest, race, match, event, or game is open to
both sexes: Provided, further, That the sports event or
tournament is divided into male or female divisions.
The State shall also ensure the safety and well-being of all
women and girls participating in sports, especially, but not limited
to, trainees, reserve members, members, coaches, and mentors
of national sports teams, whether in studying, training, or
performance phases, by providing them comprehensive health
and medical insurance coverage, as well as integrated medical,
nutritional, and healthcare services.
Schools, colleges, universities, or any other learning institution
shall take into account its total women student population in
granting athletic scholarship. There shall be a pro
rata representation of women in the athletic scholarship program
based on the percentage of women in the whole student
population.
Section 15. Women in the Military. - The State shall pursue
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination of women in
the military, police, and other similar services, including revising
or abolishing policies and practices that restrict women from
availing of both combat and noncombat training that are open to
men, or from taking on functions other than administrative tasks,
such as engaging in combat, security-related, or field operations.
Women in the military shall be accorded the same promotional
privileges and opportunities as men, including pay increases,
additional remunerations and benefits, and awards based on
their competency and quality of performance. Towards this end,
the State shall ensure that the personal dignity of women shall
always be respected.
Women in the military, police, and other similar services shall be
provided with the same right to employment as men on equal
conditions. Equally, they shall be accorded the same capacity as
men to act in and enter into contracts, including marriage.
Further, women in the military, police; and other similar services
shall be entitled to leave benefits such as maternity leave, as
provided for by existing laws.
Section 16. Nondiscriminatory and Nonderogatory Portrayal
of Women in Media and Film. - The State shall formulate
policies and programs for the advancement of women in
collaboration with government and nongovernment media-
related organizations. It shall likewise endeavor to raise the
consciousness of the general public in recognizing the dignity of
women and the role and contribution of women in the family;
community, and the society through the strategic use of mass
media.
For this purpose, the State shall ensure allocation of space;
airtime, and resources, strengthen programming, production,
and image-making that appropriately present women's needs,
issues, and concerns in all forms of media, communication,
information dissemination, and advertising.
The State, in cooperation with all schools of journalism,
information, and communication, as well as the national media
federations and associations, shall require all media
organizations and corporations to integrate into their human
resource development components regular training on gender
equality and gender-based discrimination, create and use
gender equality guidelines in all aspects of management,
training, production, information, dissemination, communication,
207
and programming; and convene a gender equality committee
that will promote gender mainstreaming as a framework and
affirmative action as a strategy, and monitor and evaluate the
implementation of gender equality guidelines.
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive
Health Services. - The State shall, at all times, provide for a
comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health
services and programs covering all stages of a woman's life
cycle and which addresses the major causes of women's
mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for
comprehensive health services, due respect shall be accorded to
women's religious convictions, the rights of the spouses to found
a family in accordance with their religious convictions, and the
demands of responsible parenthood, and the right of women to
protection from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and
substances.
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services
to address pregnancy and infant health and nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective
methods of family planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality
education and health services without prejudice to the
primary right and duty of parents to educate their
children;
(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract
infections, including sexually transmitted diseases, HIV,
and AIDS;
(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract
cancers like breast and cervical cancers, and other
gynecological conditions and disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and management of
pregnancy-related complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women and children,
women and children victims and survivors shall be
provided with comprehensive health services that
include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal
interventions and assistance towards healing, recovery,
and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual
dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and medical
standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-
bearing years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental
health problems of women and girls. In addition, healthy
lifestyle activities are encouraged and promoted
through programs and projects as strategies in the
prevention of diseases.
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The
State shall provide women in all sectors with appropriate, timely,
complete, and accurate information and education on all the
above-stated aspects of women's health in government
education and training programs, with due regard to the
following:
(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in
the rearing of the youth and the development of moral
character and the right of children to be brought up in

an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the
enrichment and strengthening of character;
(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms
human dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning
methods including fertility awareness.
Section 18. Special Leave Benefits for Women. - A woman
employee having rendered continuous aggregate employment
service of at least six (6) months for the last twelve (12) months
shall be entitled to a special leave benefit of two (2) months with
full pay based on her gross monthly compensation following
surgery caused by gynecological disorders.
Section 19. Equal Rights in All Matters Relating to Marriage
and Family Relations. - The State shall take all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all
matters relating to marriage and family relations and shall
ensure:
(a) the same rights to enter into and leave marriages or
common law relationships referred to under the Family
Code without prejudice to personal or religious beliefs;
(b) the same rights to choose freely a spouse and to
enter into marriage only with their free and full consent.
The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no
legal effect;
(c) the joint decision on the number and spacing of their
children and to have access to the information,
education and means to enable them to exercise these
rights;
(d) the same personal rights between spouses or
common law spouses including the right to choose
freely a profession and an occupation;
(e) the same rights for both spouses or common law
spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition,
management, administration, enjoyment, and
disposition of property;
(f) the same rights to properties and resources, whether
titled or not, and inheritance, whether formal or
customary; and
(g) women shall have equal rights with men to acquire,
change, or retain their nationality. The State shall
ensure in particular that neither marriage to an alien nor
change of nationality by the husband during marriage
shall automatically change the nationality of the wife,
render her stateless or force upon her the nationality of
the husband. Various statutes of other countries
concerning dual citizenship that may be enjoyed equally
by women and men shall likewise be considered.
Customary laws shall be respected: Provided, however, That
they do not discriminate against women.
CHAPTER V of fisheries and aquatic resources, and all the
RIGHTS AND EMPOWERMENT OF MARGINALIZED
SECTORS
Women in marginalized sectors are hereby guaranteed all civil,
political, social, and economic rights recognized, promoted, and
protected under existing laws including, but not limited to, the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, the Urban Development and
Housing Act, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the
Fisheries Code, the Labor Code, the Migrant Workers Act, the
Solo Parents Welfare Act, and the Social Reform and Poverty
Alleviation Act.
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Section 20. Food Security and Productive Resources. - The
State recognizes the contribution of women to food production
and shall ensure its sustainability and sufficiency with the active
participation of women. Towards this end, the State shall
guarantee, at all times, the availability in the market of safe and
health-giving food to satisfy the dietary needs of the population,
giving particular attention to the specific needs of poor girl-
children and marginalized women, especially pregnant and
lactating mothers and their young children. To further address
this, the State shall ensure:
(a) Right to Food. - The State shall guarantee the
availability of food in quantity and quality sufficient to
satisfy the dietary needs of individuals, the physical and
economic accessibility for everyone to adequate food
that is culturally acceptable and free from unsafe
substances and culturally accepted, and the accurate
and substantial information to the availability of food,
including the right to full, accurate, and truthful
information about safe and health-giving foods and how
to produce and have regular and easy access to them;
(b) Right to Resources for Food Production. - The State
shall guarantee women a vital role in food production by
giving priority to their rights to land, credit, and
infrastructure support, technical training, and
technological and marketing assistance. The State shall
promote women-friendly technology as a high priority
activity in agriculture and shall promote the right to
adequate food by proactively engaging in activities
intended to strengthen access to, utilization of, and
receipt of accurate and substantial information on
resources and means to ensure women's livelihood,
including food security:
(1) Equal status shall be given to women and
men, whether married or not, in the titling of
the land and issuance of stewardship contracts
and patents;
(2) Equal treatment shall be given to women
and men beneficiaries of the agrarian reform
program, wherein the vested right of a woman
agrarian reform beneficiary is defined by a
woman's relationship to tillage, i.e., her direct
and indirect contribution to the development of
the land;
(3) Customary rights of women to the land,
including access to and control of the fruits
and benefits, shall be recognized in
circumstances where private ownership is not
possible, such as ancestral domain claims:
(4) Information and assistance in claiming
rights to the land shall be made available to
women at all times;
(5) Equal rights to women to the enjoyment,
use, and management of land, water, and
other natural resources within their
communities or ancestral domains;
(6) Equal access to the use and management
rights and benefits accruing to stakeholders in
the fishing industry;
(7) Equal status shall be given to women and
men in the issuance of stewardship or lease
agreements and other fishery rights that may
be granted for the use and management of
coastal and aquatic resources. In the same
manner, women's organizations shall be given
equal treatment as with other marginalized
fishers organizations in the issuance of
stewardship or lease agreements or other

fishery rights for the use and management of
such coastal and aquatic resources which may
include providing support to women-engaged
coastal resources;
(8) There shall be no discrimination against
women in the deputization of fish wardens;
(9) Women-friendly and sustainable agriculture
technology shall be designed based on
accessibility and viability in consultation with
women's organizations;
(10) Access to small farmer-based and
controlled seeds production and distribution
shall be ensured and protected;
(11) Indigenous practices of women in seed
storage and cultivation shall be recognized,
encouraged, and protected;
(12) Equal rights shall be given to women to
be members of farmers' organizations to
ensure wider access to and control of the
means of production;
(13) Provide opportunities for empowering
women fishers to be involved in the control
and management, not only of the catch and
production of aquamarine resources but also,
to engage in entrepreneurial activities which
will add value to production and marketing
ventures; and
(14) Provide economic opportunities for the
indigenous women. particularly access to
market for their produce.
In the enforcement of the foregoing, the requirements of law
shall be observed at all times.
Section 21. Right to Housing. - The State shall develop
housing programs for women that are localized, simple,
accessible, with potable water, and electricity, secure, with viable
employment opportunities and affordable amortization. In this
regard, the State shall consult women and involve them in
community planning and development, especially in matters
pertaining to land use, zoning, and relocation.
Section 22. Right to Decent Work. - The State shall
progressively realize and ensure decent work standards for
women that involve the creation of jobs of acceptable quality in
conditions of freedom, equity, security, and human dignity.
(a) Decent work involves opportunities for work that are
productive and fairly remunerative as family living wage, security
in the workplace, and social protection for families, better
prospects for personal development and social integration,
freedom for people to express their concerns organize,
participate in the decisions that affect their lives, and equality of
opportunity and treatment for all women and men.
(b) The State shall further ensure:
(1) Support services and gears to protect them from
occupational and health hazards taking into account
women's maternal functions;
(2) Support services that will enable women to balance
their family obligations and work responsibilities
including, but not limited to, the establishment of day
care centers and breast-feeding stations at the
workplace, and providing maternity leave pursuant to
the Labor Code and other pertinent laws;
209
(3) Membership in unions regardless of status of
employment and place of employment; and
(4) Respect for the observance of indigenous peoples'
cultural practices even in the workplace.
(c) In recognition of the temporary nature of overseas work, the
State shall exert all efforts to address the causes of out-migration
by developing local employment and other economic
opportunities for women and by introducing measures to curb
violence and forced and involuntary displacement of local
women. The State shall ensure the protection and promotion of
the rights and welfare of migrant women regardless of their work
status, and protect them against discrimination in wages,
conditions of work, and employment opportunities in host
countries.
Section 23. Right to Livelihood, Credit, Capital, and
Technology. - The State shall ensure that women are provided
with the following:
(a) Equal access to formal sources of credit and capital;
(b) Equal share to the produce of farms and aquatic
resources; and
(c) Employment opportunities for returning women
migrant workers taking into account their skills and
qualifications. Corollarily, the State shall also promote
skills and entrepreneurship development of returning
women migrant workers.
Section 24. Right to Education and Training. - The State shall
ensure the following:
(a) Women migrant workers have the opportunity to
undergo skills training, if they so desire, before taking
on a foreign job, and possible retraining upon return to
the country:
(b) Gender-sensitive training and seminars; and
(c) Equal opportunities in scholarships based on merit
and fitness, especially to those interested in research
and development aimed towards women-friendly farm
technology.
Section 25. Right to Representation and Participation. - The
State shall ensure women's participation in policy-making or
decision-making bodies in the regional, national, and
international levels. It shall also ensure the participation of
grassroots women leaders in decision and policy-making bodies
in their respective sectors including, but not limited to, the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) and its local
counterparts; community-based resource management bodies or
mechanisms on forest management and stewardship; the
National Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Management Council
(NFARMC) and its local counterparts; the National Commission
on Indigenous Peoples; the Presidential Commission for the
Urban Poor; the National Anti-Poverty Commission; and, where
applicable, the local housing boards.
Section 26. Right to Information. - Access to information
regarding policies on women, including programs, projects, and
funding outlays that affect them, shall be ensured.
Section 27. Social Protection. -
(a) The Social Security System (SSS) and the
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth)
shall support indigenous and community-based social
protection schemes.
(b) The State shall institute policies and programs that
seek to reduce the poverty and vulnerability to risks and
 210

enhance the social status and rights of the marginalized (b) Medical and dental services;
women by promoting and protecting livelihood and
employment, protecting against hazards and sudden; (c) Psychological evaluation;
loss of income, and improving people's capacity to
manage risks.
(d) Counseling;
(c) The State shall endeavor to reduce and eventually
eliminate transfer costs of remittances from abroad (e) Psychiatric evaluation;
through appropriate bilateral and multilateral
agreements. It shall likewise provide access to (f) Legal services;
investment opportunities for remittances in line with
national development efforts. (g) Productivity skills capability building;

(d) The State shall establish a health insurance (h) Livelihood assistance;
program for senior citizens and indigents.

(i) Job placement;

(e) The State shall support women with disabilities on a
community-based social protection scheme.
(j) Financial assistance: and
Section 28. Recognition and Preservation of Cultural
Identity and Integrity. - The State shall recognize and respect (k) Transportation assistance.
the rights of Moro and indigenous women to practice, promote,
protect, and preserve their own culture, traditions, and Section 32. Protection of Girl-Children. - (a) The State shall
institutions and to consider these rights in the formulation and pursue measures to eliminate all forms of discrimination against
implementation of national policies and programs. To this end, girl-children in education, health and nutrition, and skills
the State shall adopt measures in consultation with the sectors development.
concerned to protect their rights to their indigenous knowledge
systems and practices, traditional livelihood, and other
(b) Girl-children shall be protected from all forms of abuse and
manifestations of their cultures and ways of life: Provided, That
exploitation.
these cultural systems and practices are not discriminatory to
women.
(c) Equal access of Moro and indigenous girl-children in the
Madaris, schools of living culture and traditions, and the regular
Section 29. Peace and Development. - The peace process
schools shall be ensured.
shall be pursued with the following considerations:

(d) Gender-sensitive curriculum, including legal literacy, books,

(a) Increase the number of women participating in
and curriculum in the Madaris and schools of living culture and
discussions and decision-making in the peace process,
traditions shall be developed.
including membership in peace panels recognizing
women's role in conflict- prevention and peace-making
and in indigenous system of conflict resolution; (e) Sensitivity of regular schools to particular Moro and
indigenous practices, such as fasting in the month of Ramadan,
choice of clothing (including the wearing of hijab), and availability
(b) Ensure the development and inclusion of women's
of halal food shall be ensured.
welfare and concerns in the peace agenda in the
overall peace strategy and women's participation in the
planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of Section 33. Protection of Senior Citizens. - The State shall
rehabilitation and rebuilding of conflict-affected areas; protect women senior citizens from neglect, abandonment,
domestic violence, abuse, exploitation, and discrimination.
Towards this end, the State shall ensure special protective
(c) The institution of measures to ensure the protection
mechanisms and support services against violence, sexual
of civilians in conflict-affected communities with special
abuse, exploitation, and discrimination of older women.
consideration for the specific needs of women and girls:

Section 34. Women are entitled to the recognition and protection

(d) Include the peace perspective in the education
of their rights defined and guaranteed under this Act including
curriculum and other educational undertakings; and
their right to nondiscrimination.

(e) The recognition and support for women's role in

Section 35. Discrimination Against Women is Prohibited. -
conflict-prevention, management, resolution and
Public and private entities and individuals found to have
peacemaking, and in indigenous systems of conflict
committed discrimination against women shall be subject to the
resolution.
sanctions provided in Section 41 hereof. Violations of other rights
of women shall be subject to sanctions under pertinent laws and
Section 30. Women in Especially Difficult Circumstances. - regulations.
For purposes of this Act, "Women in Especially Difficult
Circumstances" (WEDC) shall refer to victims and survivors of
CHAPTER VI
sexual and physical abuse, illegal recruitment, prostitution,
INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS
trafficking, armed conflict, women in detention, victims and
survivors of rape and incest, and such other related
circumstances which have incapacitated them functionally. Local Section 36. Gender Mainstreaming as a Strategy for
government units are therefore mandated to deliver the Implementing the Magna Carta of Women. - Within a period
necessary services and interventions to WEDC under their prescribed in the implementing rules and regulations, the
respective jurisdictions. National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW)
shall assess its gender mainstreaming program for consistency
with the standards under this Act. It shall modify the program
Section 31. Services and Interventions. - WEDC shall be
accordingly to ensure that it will be an effective strategy for
provided with services and interventions as necessary such as,
implementing this Act and attaining its objectives.
but not limited to, the following:

All departments, including their attached agencies, offices,

(a) Temporary and protective custody;
bureaus, state universities and colleges, government-owned and

-controlled corporations, local government units, and other
government instrumentalities shall adopt gender mainstreaming
as a strategy to promote women's human rights and eliminate
gender discrimination in their systems, structures, policies,
programs, processes, and procedures which shall include, but
not limited to, the following:
(a) Planning, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation for
GAD. GAD programs addressing gender issues and
concerns shall be designed and implemented based on
the mandate of government agencies and local
government units, Republic Act No. 7192, gender
equality agenda of the government and other GAD-
related legislation, policies, and commitments. The
development of GAD programs shall proceed from the
conduct of a gender audit of the agency or the local
government unit and a gender analysis of its policies,
programs, services and the situation of its clientele; the
generation and review of sex-disaggregated data; and
consultation with gender/women's rights advocates and
agency/women clientele. The cost of implementing
GAD programs shall be the agency's or the local
government unit's GAD budget which shall be at least
five percent (5%) of the agency's or the local
government unit's total budget appropriations.
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7192, otherwise known as
the Women in Development and Nation Building Act,
which allocates five percent (5%) to thirty percent (30%)
of overseas development assistance to GAD,
government agencies receiving official development
assistance should ensure the allocation and proper
utilization of such funds to gender-responsive programs
that complement the government GAD funds and
annually report accomplishments thereof to the National
Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and the
Philippine Commission on Women (PCW).
The utilization and outcome of the GAD budget shall be
annually monitored and evaluated in terms of its
success in influencing the gender-responsive
implementation of agency programs funded by the
remaining ninety-five percent (95%) budget.
The Commission on Audit (COA) shall conduct an
annual audit on the use of the GAD budget for the
purpose of determining its judicious use and the
efficiency, and effectiveness of interventions in
addressing gender issues towards the realization of the
objectives of the country's commitments, plans, and
policies on women empowerment, gender equality, and
GAD.
Local government units are also encouraged to develop
and pass a GAD Code based on the gender issues and
concerns in their respective localities based on
consultation with their women constituents and the
women's empowerment and gender equality agenda of
the government. The GAD Code shall also serve as
basis for identifying programs, activities, and projects
on GAD.
Where needed, temporary gender equity measures
shall be provided for in the plans of all departments,
including their attached agencies, offices, bureaus,
state universities and colleges, government-owned and
-controlled corporations, local government units, and
other government instrumentalities.
To move towards a more sustainable, gender-
responsive, and performance-based planning and
budgeting, gender issues and concerns shall be
integrated in, among others, the following plans:
(1) Macro socioeconomic plans such as the
Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan
and Medium-Term Philippine Investment Plan;
211
(2) Annual plans of all departments, including
their attached agencies, offices, bureaus, state
universities and colleges, and government-
owned and -controlled corporations; and
(3) Local plans and agenda such as executive-
legislative agenda, comprehensive
development plan (CDP), comprehensive land
use plan (CLUP), provincial development and
physical framework plan (PDPFP), and annual
investment plan.
(b) Creation and/or Strengthening of the GAD Focal
Points (GFP). All departments, including their attached
agencies, offices, bureaus, state universities and
colleges, government- owned and -controlled
corporations, local government units, and other
government instrumentalities shall establish or
strengthen their GAD Focal Point System or similar
GAD mechanism to catalyze and accelerate gender
mainstreaming within the agency or local government
unit.
The GAD Focal Point System shall be composed of the
agency head or local chief executive, an executive
committee with an Undersecretary (or its equivalent),
local government unit official, or office in a strategic
decision-making position as Chair; and a technical
working group or secretariat which is composed of
representatives from various divisions or offices within
the agency or local government unit.
The tasks and functions of the members of the GFP
shall form part of their regular key result areas and shall
be given due consideration in their performance
evaluation.
(c) Generation and Maintenance of GAD Database. All
departments, including their attached agencies, offices,
bureaus, state universities and colleges, government-
owned and - controlled corporations, local government
units, and other government instrumentalities shall
develop and maintain a GAD database containing
gender statistics and sexdisaggregated data that have
been systematically gathered, regularly updated; and
subjected to; gender analysis for planning,
programming, and policy formulation.
Section 37. Gender Focal Point Officer in Philippine
Embassies and Consulates. - An officer duly trained on GAD
shall be designated as the gender focal point in the consular
section of Philippine embassies or consulates. Said officer shall
be primarily responsible in handling gender concerns of women
migrant workers. Attached agencies shall cooperate in
strengthening the Philippine foreign posts' programs for the
delivery of services to women migrant workers.
Section 38. National Commission on the Role of Filipino
Women (NCRFW). - The National Commission on the Role of
Filipino Women (NCRFW) shall be renamed as the Philippine
Commission on Women (PCW), the primary policymaking and
coordinating body of the women and gender equality concerns
under the Office of the President. The PCW shall be the overall
monitoring body and oversight to ensure the implementation of
this Act. In doing so, the PCW may direct any government
agency and instrumentality, as may be necessary, to report on
the implementation of this Act and for them to immediately
respond to the problems brought to their attention in relation to
this Act. The PCW shall also lead in ensuring that government
agencies are capacitated on the effective implementation of this
Act. The chairperson shall likewise report to the President in
Cabinet meetings on the implementation of this Act.
To the extent possible, the PCW shall influence the systems,
processes, and procedures of the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches of government vis-a-vis GAD to ensure the
implementation of this Act.

To effectively and efficiently undertake and accomplish its
functions, the PCW shall revise its structure and staffing pattern
with the assistance of the Department of Budget and
Management.
Section 39. Commission on Human Rights (CHR). - The
Commission, acting as the Gender and Development Ombud,
consistent with its mandate, shall undertake measures such as
the following:
(a) Monitor with the PCW and other state agencies,
among others, in developing indicators and guidelines
to comply with their duties related to the human rights of
women, including their right to nondiscrimination
guaranteed under this Act;
(b) Designate one (1) commissioner and/or its Women's
Human Rights Center to be primarily responsible for
formulating and implementing programs and activities
related to the promotion and protection of the human
rights of women, including the investigations and
complaints of discrimination and violations of their rights
brought under this Act and related laws and regulations;
(c) Establish guidelines and mechanisms, among
others, that will facilitate access of women to legal
remedies under this Act and related laws, and enhance
the protection and promotion of the rights of women,
especially marginalized women;
(d) Assist in the filing of cases against individuals,
agencies, institutions, or establishments that violate the
provisions of this Act; and
(e) Recommend to the President of the Philippines or
the Civil Service Commission any possible
administrative action based on noncompliance or failure
to implement the provisions of this Act.
Section 40. Monitoring Progress and Implementation and
Impact of this Act. - The PCW, in coordination with other state
agencies and the CHR, shall submit to Congress regular reports
on the progress of the implementation of this Act highlighting the
impact thereof on the status and human rights of women:
Provided, That the second report shall include an assessment of
the effectiveness of this Act and recommend amendments to
improve its provisions: Provided, finally, That these reports shall
be submitted to Congress every three (3) years or as determined
in the implementing rules and regulations.
Section 41. Penalties. - Upon finding of the CHR that a
department, agency, or instrumentality of government,
government-owned and -controlled corporation, or local
government unit has violated any provision of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations, the sanctions under
administrative law, civil service, or other appropriate laws shall
be recommended to the Civil Service Commission and/or the
Department of the Interior and Local Government. The person
directly responsible for the violation as well as the head of the
agency or local chief executive shall be held liable under this Act.
If the violation is committed by a private entity or individual, the
person directly responsible for the violation shall be liable to pay
damages.
Filing a complaint under this Act shall not preclude the offended
party from pursuing other remedies available under the law and
to invoke any of the provisions of existing laws especially those
recently enacted laws protecting women and children, including
the Women in Development and Nation Building Act (Republic
Act No. 7192), the Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act (Republic Act No.
7610), the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 (Republic Act No.
7877), the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8353), the
Rape Victim Assistance and Protection Act of 1998 (Republic Act
No. 8505), the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (Republic
Act No. 9208) and the Anti- Violence Against Women and Their
212
Children Act of 2004 (Republic Act No. 9262). If violence has
been proven to be perpetrated by agents of the State including,
but not limited to, extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances,
torture, and internal displacements, such shall be considered
aggravating offenses with corresponding penalties depending on
the severity of the offenses.
Section 42. Incentives and Awards. - There shall be
established an incentives and awards system which shall be
administered by a board under such rules and regulations as
may be promulgated by the PCW to deserving entities,
government agencies, and local government units for their
outstanding performance in upholding the rights of women and
effective implementation of gender-responsive programs.
Section 43. Funding. - The initial funding requirements for the
implementation of this Act shall be charged against the current
appropriations of the agencies concerned. Thereafter, such sums
as may be necessary for the implementation of this Act shall be
included in the agencies' yearly budgets under the General
Appropriations Act.
The State shall prioritize allocation of all available resources to
effectively fulfill its obligations specified under this Act. The State
agencies' GAD budgets, which shall be at least five percent (5%)
of their total budgetary allocation, shall also be utilized for the
programs and activities to implement this Act.
Section 44. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - As the
lead agency, the PCW shall, in coordination with the Commission
on Human Rights and all concerned government departments
and agencies including, as observers, both Houses of Congress
through the Committee on Youth, Women and Family Relations
(Senate) and the Committee on Women and Gender Equality
(House of Representatives) and with the participation of
representatives from nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and
civil society groups with proven track record of involvement and
promotion of the rights and welfare of Filipino women and girls
identified by the PCW, formulate the implementing rules and
regulations (IRR) of this Act within one hundred eighty (180)
days after its effectivity.
Section 45. Separability Clause. - If any provision or part
hereof is held invalid or unconstitutional, the remainder of the
law or the provisions not otherwise affected shall remain valid
and subsisting.
Section 46. Repealing Clause. - Any law, presidential decree or
issuance, executive order, letter of instruction, administrative
order, rule, or regulation contrary to, or inconsistent with, the
provisions of this Act is hereby repealed, modified, or amended
accordingly.
Section 47. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen
(15) days after its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of
general circulation.
Approved,
BULLYING
RA 10627
Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Fifteenth Congress
Third Regular Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-third
day of July, two thousand twelve.
[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10627]

AN ACT REQUIRING ALL ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY
SCHOOLS TO ADOPT POLICIES TO PREVENT AND
ADDRESS THE ACTS OF BULLYING IN THEIR
INSTITUTIONS
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known as the “Anti-
Bullying Act of 2013”.
SEC. 2. Acts of Bullying. – For purposes of this Act, “bullying”
shall refer to any severe or repeated use by one or more
students of a written, verbal or electronic expression, or a
physical act or gesture, or any combination thereof, directed at
another student that has the effect of actually causing or placing
the latter in reasonable fear of physical or emotional harm or
damage to his property; creating a hostile environment at school
for the other student; infringing on the rights of the other student
at school; or materially and substantially disrupting the education
process or the orderly operation of a school; such as, but not
limited to, the following:
a. Any unwanted physical contact between the bully and the
victim like punching, pushing, shoving, kicking, slapping, tickling,
headlocks, inflicting school pranks, teasing, fighting and the use
of available objects as weapons;
b. Any act that causes damage to a victim’s psyche and/or
emotional well-being;
c. Any slanderous statement or accusation that causes the victim
undue emotional distress like directing foul language or profanity
at the target, name-calling, tormenting and commenting
negatively on victim’s looks, clothes and body; and
d. Cyber-bullying or any bullying done through the use of
technology or any electronic means.
SEC. 3. Adoption of Anti-Bullying Policies. – All elementary and
secondary schools are hereby directed to adopt policies to
address the existence of bullying in their respective institutions.
Such policies shall be regularly updated and, at a minimum, shall
include provisions which:
(a) Prohibit the following acts:
(1) Bullying on school grounds; property immediately adjacent to
school grounds; at school-sponsored or school-related activities,
functions or programs whether on or off school grounds; at
school bus stops; on school buses or other vehicles owned,
leased or used by a school; or through the use of technology or
an electronic device owned, leased or used by a school;
(2) Bullying at a location, activity, function or program that is not
school-related and through the use of technology or an
electronic device that is not owned, leased or used by a school if
the act or acts in question create a hostile environment at school
for the victim, infringe on the rights of the victim at school, or
materially and substantially disrupt the education process or the
orderly operation of a school; and
(3) Retaliation against a person who reports bullying, who
provides information during an investigation of bullying, or who is
a witness to or has reliable information about bullying;
(b) Identify the range of disciplinary administrative actions that
may be taken against a perpetrator for bullying or retaliation
213
which shall be commensurate with the nature and gravity of the
offense: Provided, That, in addition to the disciplinary sanctions
imposed upon a perpetrator of bullying or retaliation, he/she shall
also be required to undergo a rehabilitation program which shall
be administered by the institution concerned. The parents of the
said perpetrator shall be encouraged by the said institution to
join the rehabilitation program;
(c) Establish clear procedures and strategies for:
(1) Reporting acts of bullying or retaliation;
(2) Responding promptly to and investigating reports of bullying
or retaliation;
(3) Restoring a sense of safety for a victim and assessing the
student’s need for protection;
(4) Protecting from bullying or retaliation of a person who reports
acts of bullying, provides information during an investigation of
bullying, or is witness to or has reliable information about an act
of bullying; and
(5) Providing counseling or referral to appropriate services for
perpetrators, victims and appropriate family members of said
students;
(d) Enable students to anonymously report bullying or
retaliation: Provided, however, That no disciplinary administrative
action shall be taken against a perpetrator solely on the basis of
an anonymous report;
(e) Subject a student who knowingly makes a false accusation of
bullying to disciplinary administrative action;
(f) Educate students on the dynamics of bullying, the anti-
bullying policies of the school as well as the mechanisms of such
school for the anonymous reporting of acts of bullying or
retaliation;
(g) Educate parents and guardians about the dynamics of
bullying, the anti-bullying policies of the school and how parents
and guardians can provide support and reinforce such policies at
home; and
(h) Maintain a public record of relevant information and statistics
on acts of bullying or retaliation in school: Provided, That the
names of students who committed acts of bullying or retaliation
shall be strictly confidential and only made available to the
school administration, teachers directly responsible for the said
students and parents or guardians of students who are or have
been victims of acts of bullying or retaliation.
All elementary and secondary schools shall provide students and
their parents or guardians a copy of the anti-bullying policies
being adopted by the school. Such policies shall likewise be
included in the school’s student and/or employee handbook and
shall be conspicuously posted on the school walls and website, if
there is any.
The Department of Education (DepED) shall include in its
training programs, courses or activities which shall provide
opportunities for school administrators, teachers and other
employees to develop their knowledge and skills in preventing or
responding to any bullying act.
SEC. 4. Mechanisms to Address Bullying. – The school principal
or any person who holds a comparable role shall be responsible
 214

for the implementation and oversight of policies intended to SEC. 10. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days
address bullying. after its publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of
general circulation.
Any member of the school administration, student, parent or
volunteer shall immediately report any instance of bullying or act Approved: SEP 12 2013
of retaliation witnessed, or that has come to one’s attention, to
the school principal or school officer or person so designated by
the principal to handle such issues, or both. Upon receipt of such
a report, the school principal or the designated school officer or
person shall promptly investigate. If it is determined that bullying
or retaliation has occurred, the school principal or the designated
school officer or person shall:

(a) Notify the law enforcement agency if the school principal or

designee believes that criminal charges under the Revised Penal
Code may be pursued against the perpetrator;

(b) Take appropriate disciplinary administrative action;

(c) Notify the parents or guardians of the perpetrator; and

(d) Notify the parents or guardians of the victim regarding the

action taken to prevent any further acts of bullying or retaliation.

If an incident of bullying or retaliation involves students from

more than one school, the school first informed of the bullying or
retaliation shall promptly notify the appropriate administrator of
the other school so that both may take appropriate action.

SEC. 5. Reporting Requirement. – All schools shall inform their

respective schools division superintendents in writing about the
anti-bullying policies formulated within six (6) months from the
effectivity of this Act. Such notification shall likewise be an
administrative requirement prior to the operation of new schools.

Beginning with the school year after the effectivity of this Act, and
every first week of the start of the school year thereafter, schools
shall submit a report to their respective schools division
superintendents all relevant information and statistics on acts of
bullying or retaliation. The schools division superintendents shall
compile these data and report the same to the Secretary of the
DepED who shall likewise formally transmit a comprehensive
report to the Committee on Basic Education of both the House of
Representatives and the Senate.

SEC. 6. Sanction for Noncompliance. – In the rules and

regulations to be implemented pursuant to this Act, the Secretary
of the DepED shall prescribe the appropriate administrative
sanctions on school administrators who shall fail to comply with
the requirements under this Act. In addition thereto, erring
private schools shall likewise suffer the penalty of suspension of
their permits to operate.

SEC. 7. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – Within ninety

(90) days from the effectivity of this Act, the DepED shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to implement the
provisions of this Act.

SEC. 8. Separability Clause. – If, for any reason, any provision of

this Act is declared to be unconstitutional or invalid, the other
sections or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall
continue to be in full force or effect.

SEC. 9. Repealing Clause. – All laws, decrees, orders, rules and

regulations or parts thereof which are inconsistent with or
contrary to the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed,
amended or modified accordingly.