JOSE G. GARCIA vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and

ADELA TEODORA P. SANTOS
G.R. No. 119063, January 27, 1997

TOPIC: Criminal liability extinguished by the prescription of the crime

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RONIE DE GUZMAN

G.R. No. 185843, March 3, 2010
ECTINGUISHED BY MARRIAGE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JULIET OLACO

G.R. No. 197042,October 17, 2011
CRIMINAL LIABILITY EXTINGUISHED BY DEATH

NARCISO DEGAÑOS vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 162826, October 14, 2013
Novation as a ground for extinguishment of Criminal Liability

BENJAMIN PANGAN y RIVERA, petitioner, vs. HON. LOURDES F. GATBALITE

G.R. No. 141718, January 21, 2005

TOPIC: Computation of the prescription of penalties.

 JOSE G. GARCIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
ADELA TEODORA P. SANTOS
G.R. No. 119063, January 27, 1997

FACTS: On 28 August 1991, petitioner Jose G. Garcia filed with the Quezon City
Prosecutor's Office an "Affidavit of Complaint" charging his wife, private respondent
Adela Teodora P. Santos alias "Delia Santos," with Bigamy, Violation of C.A. No. 142,
as amended by R.A. No. 6085, and Falsification of Public Documents. However, in his
letter of 10 October 1991 to Assistant City Prosecutor George F. Cabanilla, the
petitioner informed the latter that he would limit his action to bigamy.
On 2 March 1992, the private respondent filed a Motion to Quash alleging
prescription of the offense as ground therefor. She contended that by the petitioner's
admissions in his testimony given-on 23 January 1991 in Civil Case and in his complaint
filed with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on 16 October 1991, the petitioner
discovered the commission of the offense as early as 1974. Pursuant then to Article 91
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the period of prescription of the offense started to
run therefrom.
In its 29 June 1992 order, the trial court granted the motion to quash and
dismissed the criminal case

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming the trial
court's order granting the motion to quash the information for bigamy based on
prescription.

RULING: The petitioner's contention that a motion to quash is palpably unmeritorious.

Even People v. Alagao, which he cites, mentions the exceptions to the rule as provided
in paragraphs (f) and (h) of Section 2, and Sections 4 and 5 of the old Rule 117 viz., (a)
extinction of criminal liability, and (b) double jeopardy. His additional claim that the
exception of extinction can no longer be raised due to the implied repeal of the former
Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court occasioned by its non-reproduction after its
revision, is equally without merit. No repeal, express or implied, of the said Section 4
ever took place. While there is no provision in the new Rule 117 that prescribes the
contents of a motion to quash based on extinction of criminal liability, Section 2 thereof
encapsulizes the former Sections 3,4, and 5 of the old Rule 117.

SEC. 2. Form and contents. - The motion to quash shall be in writing signed by
the accused or his counsel. It shall specify distinctly the factual and legal grounds
therefor and the court shall consider no grounds other than those stated therein, except
lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged.

It is clear from this Section that a motion to quash may be based on factual and
legal grounds, and since extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy are retained
as among the grounds for a motion to quash in Section 3 of the new Rule 117, it
necessarily follows that facts outside the information itself may be introduced to prove
such grounds. As a matter of fact, inquiry into such facts may be allowed where the
ground invoked is that the allegations in the information do not constitute the offense
charged.

The Court of Appeals gave credence to the private respondent's evidence and
concluded that the petitioner discovered the private respondent's first marriage in
1974. Since the information in this case was filed in court only on 8 January 1992, or
eighteen years after the discovery of the offense, then the 15-year prescriptive period
had certainly lapsed. It further held that the quash of an information based on
prescription of the offense could be invoked before or after arraignment and even on
appeal, for under Article 89(5) of the RPC, the criminal liability of a person is "'totally
extinguish[ed]' by the prescription of the crime, which is a mode of extinguishing criminal
liability." Thus, prescription is not deemed waived even if not pleaded as a defense.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RONIE DE GUZMAN
G.R. No. 185843, March 3, 2010

FACTS: Ronnie De Guzman, was indicted before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
163, Pasig City, for two counts of rape. He pled not guilty when arraigned. After pretrial
and trial, the trial court found him guilty as charged and imposed on him the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count.

However, appellant alleges that he and private complainant contracted marriage

on August 19, 2009. Attached to the motion is the pertinent Certificate of Marriage and a
joint sworn statement (Magkasamang Sinumpaang Salaysay) executed by appellant
and private complainant, attesting to the existence of a valid and legal marriage
between them. Appellant, thus, prays that he be absolved of his conviction for the two
counts of rape and be released from imprisonment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of the appellant and the private complainant will
extinguish the criminal case of rape.

RULING: Yes, on several occasions, the application of the provision to marriages

contracted between the offender and the offended party in the crime of rape, as well as
in the crime of abuse of chastity, to totally extinguish the criminal liability of and the
corresponding penalty that may have been imposed upon those found guilty of the
felony.

Based on the documents, including copies of pictures taken after the ceremony
and attached to the motion, we find the marriage between appellant and private
complainant to have been contracted validly, legally, and in good faith, as an expression
of their mutual love for each other and their desire to establish a family of their
own. Given public policy considerations of respect for the sanctity of marriage and the
highest regard for the solidarity of the family, we must accord appellant the full benefits
of Article 89, in relation to Article 344 and Article 266-C of the RPC.

In relation to Article 266-C of the RPC, Article 89 of the same Code reads

ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal

liability is totally extinguished:
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JULIET OLACO
G.R. No. 197042, October 17, 2011

FACTS: Sometime, on or about the 21st day of August 2004, in the City of Las Pinas,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating with one alias Rena, Victor Catulong, Roland
Baroga and alias Roger, whose true identities and whereabouts are still unknown and
all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, accused OLACO being the
housemaid of Ruben Vinluan y Torno, and as such enjoying the trust and confidence
reposed upon her by her aforementioned employer, with intent to gain and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof and with grave abuse of confidence, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal, and carry away valuable
jewelries.

ISSUS: Whether or not the death of the appellant will extinguish the criminal case.

RULING: The death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability, as well as the civil liability ex delicto. The rationale, therefore, is that the
criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as
the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.
 NARCISO DEGAÑOS vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 162826, October 14, 2013

FACTS: Private complainant Lydia Bordador, a jeweler, testified that accused Narciso
Degaños and Brigida/Aida Luz are brother and sister. She knew them because they are
the relatives of her husband and their Kumpadre/kumadre. Brigida/Aida Luz was the
one who gave instructions to Narciso Degaños to get gold and jewelry from Lydia for
them to sell. Lydia came to know Narciso Degaños because the latter frequently visited
their house selling religious articles and books. While in their house, Narciso Degaños
saw her counting pieces of jewelry and he asked her if he could show the said pieces of
jewelry to his sister, Brigida/Aida Luz, to which she agreed. Thereafter, Narciso
Degaños returned the jewelry and Aida/Brigida Luz called her to ask if she could trust
Narciso Degaños to get the pieces of jewelry from her for Aida/Brigida Luz to sell. Lydia
agreed on the condition that if they could not pay it in cash, they should pay it after one
month or return the unsold jewelry within the said period. She delivered the said jewelry
starting sometime in 1986 as evidenced by several documents entitled "Katibayan at
Kasunduan", the earliest of which is dated March 16, 1986. Everytime Narciso Degaños
got jewelry from her, he signed the receipts in her presence. They were able to pay only
up to a certain point. However, receipt nos. 614 to 745 dated from April 27, 1987 up to
July 20, 1987 (Exhs. "A"-"O") were no longer paid and the accused failed to return the
jewelry covered by such receipts. Despite oral and written demands, the accused failed
and refused to pay and return the subject jewelry. As of October 1998, the total
obligation of the accused amounted to ₱725,000.00.

Private complainant Atty. Jose Bordador corroborated the testimony of his wife,
Lydia. He confirmed that their usual business practice with the accused was for Narciso
Degaños to receive the jewelry and gold items for and in behalf of Brigida/Aida Luz and
for Narciso Degaños to sign the "Kasunduan at Katibayan" receipts while Brigida/Aida
Luz will pay for the price later on. The subject items were usually given to Narciso
Degaños only upon instruction from Brigida/Aida Luz through telephone calls or letters.
For the last one year, the "Kasunduan at Katibayan" receipts were signed in his
presence. Said business arrangement went on for quite some time since Narciso
Degaños and Brigida/Aida Luz had been paying religiously. When the accused
defaulted in their payment, they sent demand letters. It was the accused’s sister, Julie
dela Rosa, who responded, seeking an extension of time for the accused to settle their
obligation.

ISSUE: Whether or not novation may totally or partially extinguish the criminal liability.

RULING: NO, Novation is never presumed, and the animus novandi, whether totally or
partially, must appear by express agreement of the parties, or by their acts that are too
clear and unequivocal to be mistaken.

The extinguishment of the old obligation by the new one is necessary element of
novation which may be affected either expressly or impliedly. The term "expressly"
means that the contracting parties incontrovertibly disclose that their object in executing
the new contract is to extinguish the old one. Upon the other hand, no specific form is
required for an implied novation, and all that is prescribed by law would be an
incompatibility between the two contracts. While there is really no hard and fast rule to
determine what might constitute to be a sufficient change that can bring about novation,
the touchstone for contrarity, however would be an irreconcilable incompatibility
between the old and the new obligations.

There are two ways which could indicate, in fine, the presence of novation and
thereby produce the effect of extinguishing an obligation by another which substitutes
the same. The first is when novation has been explicitly stated and declared in
unequivocal terms. The second is when the old and the new obligations are
incompatible on every point. The test of incompatibility is whether or not the two
obligations can stand together, each one having its independent existence. If they
cannot, they are incompatible and the latter obligation novates the first. Corollarily,
changes that breed incompatibility must be essential in nature and not merely
accidental. The incompatibility must take place in any of the essential elements of the
obligation, such as its object, cause or principal conditions thereof; otherwise, the
change would be merely modificatory in nature and insufficient to extinguish the original
obligation

Novation is not a ground under the law to extinguish criminal liability. Article 89
(on total extinguishment)16 and Article 94 (on partial extinguishrnent) of the Revised
Penal Code list down the various grounds for the extinguishment of criminal liability. Not
being included in the list, novation is limited in its effect only to the civil aspect of the
liability, and, for that reason, is not an efficient defense in estafa. This is because only
the State may validly waive the criminal action against an accused. The role of novation
may only be either to prevent the rise of criminal liability, or to cast doubt on the true
nature of the original basic transaction, whether or not it was such that the breach of the
obligation would not give rise to penal responsibility, as when money loaned is made to
appear as a deposit, or other similar disguise is resorted to.
 BENJAMIN PANGAN y RIVERA, petitioner, vs. HON. LOURDES F. GATBALITE
G.R. No. 141718, January 21, 2005

FACTS: Some time on September 16, 1987, the petitioner was convicted of the offense
charged and was sentenced to serve a penalty of two months and one day of arresto
mayor.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, on October 24, 1988, affirmed in toto the
decision of the Municipal Trial Court.
On August 9, 1991, the case was called for promulgation of the decision in the
court of origin. Despite due notice, counsel for the petitioner did not appear. Notice to
petitioner was returned unserved with the notation that he no longer resided at the given
address. As a consequence, he also failed to appear at the scheduled promulgation.
The court of origin issued an order directing the recording of the decision in the criminal
docket of the court and an order of arrest against the petitioner.
Pursuant to the order of arrest, on January 20, 2000, the petitioner was
apprehended and detained at the Mabalacat Detention Cell. On January 24, 2000,
petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City. He impleaded as respondent the Acting Chief of Police of Mabalacat,
Pampanga. Petitioner contended that his arrest was illegal and unjustified on the
grounds that:

(a) the straight penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor prescribes in five
years under No. 3, Article 93 [of the] Revised Penal Code, and
(b) having been able to continuously evade service of sentence for almost nine years,
his criminal liability has long been totally extinguished under No. 6, Article 89 [of the]
Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the phrase commences to run from the date when the culprit
should evade the service of service of sentence in Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code
on the computation of the prescription of the penalties is construed?

RULING: In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even before
the execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. Now
petitioner begs for the compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a life of
peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the execution of his sentence.
But it was petitioner who chose to become a fugitive. The Court accords compassion
only to those who are deserving. Petitioner's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt
but he refused to answer for the wrong he committed. He is therefore not to be
rewarded therefor.

The Court pronounces that the prescription of penalties found in Article 93 of the
Revised Penal Code, applies only to those who are convicted by final judgment and are
serving sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty. The period for prescription of
penalties begins only when the convict evades service of sentence by escaping during
the term of his sentence. Since petitioner never suffered deprivation of liberty before his
arrest and as a consequence never evaded sentence by escaping during the term of his
service, the period for prescription never began.
Petitioner, however, has by this time fully served his sentence of two months and
one day of arresto mayor and should forthwith be released unless he is being detained
for another offense or charge.