Human Rights

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-30026 January 30, 1971

MARIO GUMABON, BLAS BAGOLBAGOL, GAUDENCIO AGAPITO, EPIFANIO

PADUA and PATERNO PALMARES, petitioners,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, respondent.

Jose W. Diokno for petitioners.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A.
Torres and Solicitor Eduardo C. Abaya for respondent.

FERNANDO, J.:

Habeas corpus, the great writ of liberty, is relied upon by petitioners, five in number, for
their release from imprisonment. Meted out life terms for the complex crime of rebellion
with murder and other crimes, they would invoke the People v. Hernandez1 doctrine,
negating the existence of such an offense, a ruling that unfortunately for them was not
handed down until after their convictions had become final. Nor is this the first instance,
a proceeding of this character was instituted, as in Pomeroy v. Director of Prisons,2
likewise a petition for habeas corpus, a similar question was presented. The answer
given was in the negative. Petitioners plead for a new look on the matter. They would
premise their stand on the denial of equal protection if their plea would not be granted.
Moreover they did invoke the codal provision that judicial decisions shall form part of the
legal system of the Philippines,3 necessarily resulting in the conclusion that the
Hernandez decision once promulgated calls for a retroactive effect under the explicit
mandate of the Revised Penal Code as to penal laws having such character even if at
the time of their application a final sentence has been rendered "and the convict is
serving the same."4 These arguments carry considerable persuasion. Accordingly we
find for petitioners, without going so far as to overrule Pomeroy.

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Petitioner Mario Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to
suffer reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
robbery, arson and kidnapping. Petitioners Gaudencio Agapito, Paterno Palmares and
Epifanio Padua, likewise pleaded guilty to the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder and other offenses, and were similarly made to suffer the same penalty in
decisions rendered, as to the first two, on March 8, 1954 and, as to the third, on
December 15, 1955. The last petitioner, Blas Bagolbagol, stood trial also for the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder and other offenses and on January 12,
1954 penalized with reclusion perpetua. Each of the petitioners has been since then
imprisoned by virtue of the above convictions. Each of them has served more than 13
years.5

Subsequently, in People v. Hernandez,6 as above noted, this Court ruled that the
information against the accused in that case for rebellion complexed with murder, arson
and robbery was not warranted under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, there
being no such complex offense.7 In the recently-decided case of People vs. Lava,8 we
expressly reaffirmed the ruling in the Hernandez case rejecting the plea of the Solicitor
General for the abandonment of such doctrine. It is the contention of each of the
petitioners that he has served, in the light of the above, more than the maximum penalty
that could have been imposed upon him. He is thus entitled to freedom, his continued
detention being illegal.9

The fear that the Pomeroy ruling stands as an obstacle to their release on a habeas
corpus proceeding prompted petitioners, as had been mentioned, to ask that it be
appraised anew and, if necessary, discarded. We can resolve the present petition
without doing so. The plea there made was unconvincing, there being a failure to invoke
the contentions now pressed vigorously by their counsel, Attorney Jose W. Diokno, as
to the existence of a denial of a constitutional right that would suffice to raise a serious
jurisdictional question and the retroactive effect to be given a judicial decision favorable
to one already sentenced to a final judgment under Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code.
To repeat, these two grounds carry weight. We have to grant this petition.

1. The fundamental issue, to repeat, is the availability of the writ of habeas corpus
under the circumstances disclosed. Its latitudinarian scope to assure that illegality of
restraint and detention be avoided is one of the truisms of the law. It is not known as the
writ of liberty for nothing. The writ imposes on judges the grave responsibility of
ascertaining whether there is any legal justification for a deprivation of physical freedom.
Unless there be such a showing, the confinement must thereby cease. If there be a
valid sentence it cannot, even for a moment, be extended beyond the period provided
for by law. Any deviation from the legal norms call for the termination of the
imprisonment.

Rightly then could Chafee refer to the writ as "the most important human rights
provision" in the fundamental law. 10 Nor is such praise unique. Cooley spoke of it as
"one of the principal safeguards to personal liberty." 11 For Willoughby, it is "the
greatest of the safeguards erected by the civil law against arbitrary and illegal
imprisonment by whomsoever detention may be exercised or ordered." 12 Burdick
echoed a similar sentiment, referring to it as "one of the most important bulwarks of

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liberty." 13 Fraenkel made it unanimous, for to him, "without it much else would be of no
avail." 14 Thereby the rule of law is assured.

A full awareness of the potentialities of the writ of habeas corpus in the defense of
liberty coupled with its limitations may be detected in the opinions of former Chief
Justices Arellano, 15 Avanceña, 16 Abad Santos, 17 Paras, 18 Bengzon, 19 and the
present Chief Justice. 20 It fell to Justice Malcolm's lot, however to emphasize quite a
few times the breadth of its amplitude and of its reach. In Villavicencio v. Lukban, 21 the
remedy came in handy to challenge the validity of the order of the then respondent
Mayor of Manila who, for the best of reasons but without legal justification, ordered the
transportation of more than 150 inmates of houses of ill-repute to Davao. After referring
to the writ of habeas corpus as having been devised and existing "as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint" the opinion of Justice
Malcolm continued: "The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude
freedom of action is sufficient." 22

The liberality with which the judiciary is to construe habeas corpus petitions even if
presented in pleadings on their face devoid of merit was demonstrated in Ganaway v.
Quilen, 23 where this Court, again through Justice Malcolm, stated: "As standing alone
the petition for habeas corpus was fatally defective in its allegations, this court, on its
motion, ordered before it the record of the lower court in the case entitled Thomas
Casey, et al. v. George Ganaway." 24 It is to Justice Malcolm likewise in Conde v.
Rivera, 25 to whom is traceable the doctrine, one that broadens the field of the
operation of the writ, that a disregard of the constitutional right to speedy trial ousts the
court of jurisdiction and entitles the accused if "restrained of his liberty, by habeas
corpus to obtain his
freedom." 26

So it is in the United States. An 1830 decision 27 of Chief Justice Marshall put the
matter thus: "The writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ, known to the common
law, the great object of which is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without
sufficient cause." Then there is this affirmation from an 1869 decision 28 of the then
Chief Justice Chase: "The great writ of habeas corpus has been for centuries esteemed
the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom." The passing of the years has
only served to confirm its primacy as a weapon on in the cause of liberty. Only the other
year, Justice Fortas spoke for the United States Supreme Court thus: "The writ of
habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom
against arbitrary and lawless state action. ... The scope and flexibility of the writ — its
capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention — its ability to cut through barriers of
form and procedural mazes — have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by
courts and lawmakers. The very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with
the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach
are surfaced and corrected." 29 Justice Fortas explicitly made reference to Blackstone,
who spoke of it as "the great and efficacious writ, in all manner of illegal confinement."
Implicit in his just estimate of its pre-eminent role is his adoption of Holmes' famous

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dissent in Frank v. Mangum: 30 "But habeas corpus cuts through all forms and goes to
the very tissue of the structure."

2. Where, however, the detention complained of finds its origin in what has been
judicially ordained, the range of inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is considerably
narrowed. For if "the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a
court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render
the judgment, or make the order," the writ does not lie. 31 That principle dates back to
1902, 32 when this Court announced that habeas corpus was unavailing where the
person detained was in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or
magistrate. This is understandable, as during the time the Philippines was under
American rule, there was necessarily an adherence to authoritative doctrines of
constitutional law there followed.

One such principle is the requirement that there be a finding of jurisdictional defect. As
summarized by Justice Bradley in Ex parte Siebold, an 1880 decision: "The only ground
on which this court, or any court, without some special statute authorizing it, will give
relief on habeas corpus to a prisoner under conviction and sentence of another court is
the want of jurisdiction in such court over the person or the cause, or some other matter
rendering its proceedings void." 33

There is the fundamental exception though, that must ever be kept in mind. Once a
deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the
judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy
to assail the legality of the detention. 34

3. Petitioners precisely assert a deprivation of a constitutional right, namely, the

denial of equal protection. According to their petition: "In the case at bar, the petitioners
were convicted by Courts of First Instance for the very same rebellion for which
Hernandez, Geronimo, and others were convicted. The law under which they were
convicted is the very same law under which the latter were convicted. It had not and has
not been changed. For the same crime, committed under the same law, how can we, in
conscience, allow petitioners to suffer life imprisonment, while others can suffer only
prision mayor?" 35

They would thus stress that, contrary to the mandate of equal protection, people
similarly situated were not similarly dealt with. What is required under this required
constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons
under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent decision:
"Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal
protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not
identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that
fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on
some in the group equally binding on the rest." 36

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The argument of petitioners thus possesses a persuasive ring. The continued

incarceration after the twelve-year period when such is the maximum length of
imprisonment in accordance with our controlling doctrine, when others similarly
convicted have been freed, is fraught with implications at war with equal protection. That
is not to give it life. On the contrary, it would render it nugatory. Otherwise, what would
happen is that for an identical offense, the only distinction lying in the finality of the
conviction of one being before the Hernandez ruling and the other after, a person duly
sentenced for the same crime would be made to suffer different penalties. Moreover, as
noted in the petition before us, after our ruling in People v. Lava, petitioners who were
mere followers would be made to languish in jail for perhaps the rest of their natural
lives when the leaders had been duly considered as having paid their penalty to society,
and freed. Such a deplorable result is to be avoided.

4. Petitioners likewise, as was made mention at the outset, would rely on Article 22
of the Revised Penal Code which requires that penal judgment be given a retroactive
effect. In support of their contention, petitioners cite U.S. v. Macasaet, 37 U.S.
vs.Parrone, 38 U.S. v. Almencion, 39 People v. Moran, 40 and People v. Parel. 41
While reference in the above provision is made not to judicial decisions but to legislative
acts, petitioners entertain the view that it would be merely an exaltation of the literal to
deny its application to a case like the present. Such a belief has a firmer foundation. As
was previously noted, the Civil Code provides that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the Constitution, as well as legislation, form part of our legal system.
Petitioners would even find support in the well-known dictum of Bishop Hoadley:

"Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is he who
is truly the law-giver to all intents and purposes, and not the person who first thought or
spoke them." It is to be admitted that constitutional law scholars, notably
Frankfurter, 42 Powell, 43 and Thayer, 44 in discussing judicial review as well as the
jurist John Chipman Gray, were much impressed with the truth and the soundness of
the above observations. We do not have to go that far though. Enough for present
purposes that both the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code allow, if they do not call
for, a retroactive application.

It being undeniable that if the Hernandez ruling were to be given a retroactive effect
petitioners had served the full term for which they could have been legally committed, is
habeas corpus the appropriate remedy? The answer cannot be in doubt. As far back as
1910 the prevailing doctrine was announced in Cruz v. Director of Prisons. 45 Thus:
"The courts uniformly hold that where a sentence imposes punishment in excess of the
power of the court to impose, such sentence is void as to the excess, and some of the
courts hold that the sentence is void in toto; but the weight of authority sustains the
proposition that such a sentence is void only as to the excess imposed in case the parts
are separable, the rule being that the petitioner is not entitled to his discharge on a writ
of habeas corpus unless he has served out so much of the sentence as was valid." 46
There is a reiteration of such a principle in Director v. Director of Prisons 47 where it
was explicitly announced by this Court "that the only means of giving retroactive effect
to a penal provision favorable to the accused ... is the writ of habeas corpus." 48 While
the above decision speaks of a trial judge losing jurisdiction over the case, insofar as
the remedy of habeas corpus is concerned, the emphatic affirmation that it is the only

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means of benefiting the accused by the retroactive character of a favorable decision

holds true. Petitioners clearly have thus successfully sustained the burden of justifying
their release.

WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is granted, and it is ordered that
petitioners be forthwith set at liberty.

Dizon and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., concurs in the result.

Castro and Makasiar, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting:

The petitioners at bar, three of whom pleaded guilty1 and two of whom stood
trial,2 were meted out life terms in 1953, 1954 and 1955 for the so-called complex crime
of rebellion with multiple murder and other crimes, and have served or are now entering
into their 17th year of imprisonment, save for petitioner Epifanio Padua who was
sentenced on December 15, 1955 and is completing his 15th year of imprisonment,
(excluding the periods they were under pre-conviction detention). The leaders of the
rebellion who were meted out death and life sentences for the same charge by the
Court of First Instance of Manila had their sentences reduced last near to ten years of
prision mayor by the Court in People v. Lava,3 wherein the Court expressly re-affirmed
the doctrine first laid down in 1956 in People vs. Hernandez,4 that the crime of rebellion
cannot be complexed with other common crimes since such common crimes "assume
the political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients and
consequently cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed
with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty." The Court rejected therein
the State's plea for the reexamination and setting aside of such doctrine, declaring that
"(T)his Court has given this plea of the Solicitor General a very serious consideration,
but after a mature deliberation the members of this Court have decided to maintain that
ruling in the Hernandez case and to adhere to what this Court said in that case." The
said leaders have since been duly freed as having served out their penalty, but their
followers, herein petitioners, are still serving their life sentences.

I concede the validity of the ruling in Pomeroy vs. Director of Prisons5 that "(W)ith
reference to persons in custody pursuant to a final judgment, the rule is that the writ of

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habeas corpus can issue only for want of jurisdiction of the sentencing court, and
cannot function as a writ of error." "I grant, too, that at the time of the Pomeroy decision
in 1960, as noted therein, "the existence of the 'complexed' rebellion (was) still upheld
by a sizable number of lawyers, prosecutors, judges and even justices of this Court."
But with the doctrine first enunciated in 1956 in Hernandez by a bare six-to-four majority
vote having withstood the test of time6 and having been just last year unreservedly
reaffirmed without a single dissent in Lava, it cannot now be gainsaid that it is now part
of our legal system that the crime of "complexed" rebellion does not exist in our Revised
Penal Code. No prosecutor would now file an information for "complexed" rebellion but
simply for the offense of simple rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal
Code, and even if such an information for "complexed" rebellion to be so filed, the trial
courts would be bound to quash such information as not charging an offense on the
strength of Lava and Hernandez.

Petitioners have therefore properly invoked in their favor the provisions of Article 22 of
the Revised Penal Code that:

ART. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws.—Penal laws shall have a retroactive
effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal,
as this term is defined in rule 5 of article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is
serving the same.

in relation to the provisions of Article 8 of the Civil Code that "(J)udicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system
of the Philippines."

The situation of petitioners is no different than it would be if, say, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua were imposed by statute for the crime of simple rebellion at the time
of their conviction and they were accordingly sentenced, and the statutory penalty were
now reduced to prision mayor or 12 years imprisonment; having served out the
maximum penalty of 12 years now imposed by the amended statute, they would be
entitled to invoke the retroactive effect of the statute favoring them.lâwphî1.ñèt The only
difference between the situation given and the present case is that here it is this
Supreme Court, interpreting the laws in discharge of its constitutional prerogative, that
has laid down the doctrine since Hernandez in 1956 that no offense of "complexed"
rebellion exists and petitioners should therefore be now equally entitled to the
retroactive favorable effect of such doctrine.

The actual case of petitioners is that at the time of their conviction, it was
believed — erroneously — that the crime committed by them was punishable by life
imprisonment, but the Court has subsequently judicially determined it not be so and that
the maximum imposable penalty is prision mayor or 12 years. Petitioners-convicts are
entitled to the benefit of this later judicial declaration, just as if a statutory amendment
had been enacted—not because the sentencing court had no jurisdiction or is now
ousted of jurisdiction. The writ prayed for should issue, since as held in Directo vs.
Director of Prisons,7 "the only means of giving retroactive effect to a penal provision

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favorable to the accused where the trial judge has lost jurisdiction over the case, is the
writ of habeas corpus."

The question of jurisdiction of the sentencing court therefore is moot, for it is universally
recognized that relief by habeas corpus may be properly sought in cases of imposition
of excessive penalty, such that the part of the sentence beyond or in excess of the
power of the court to impose is held void, the applicant having already served out the
entire part of the sentence within the court's power. 8 As pointed out by the Court in
Rodriguez vs. Director of Prisons,9 furthermore, "Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code
... extends its benefits even to convicts serving sentence, and the only legal remedy
open to them to make use of such benefits is the writ of habeas corpus inasmuch as, if
the penalty imposed upon them under the former penal law was decreased by the
revised code, the excess has become illegal."

Regardless, therefore, of whether the trial courts that sentenced petitioners to life
sentences had jurisdiction or not to impose such penalty, or were right or wrong in
imposing such penalty, the only relevant question now is whether petitioners have
served the maximum — and lesser — sentence of prision mayor that this Court has by
firm judicial doctrine since 1956 determined to be the penalty that the Revised Penal
Code fixes for the crime of rebellion. Since they have actually served much more than
the maximum imposable penalty, the excess of the sentence imposed upon them over
the imposable maximum of twelve years of prision mayor cannot but be declared illegal
and they should now be set free.

In People vs. Parel, 10 the Court held that the provisions of a new law (Act 3030) for the
prescription of certain election offenses (fixing the same at one year after commission)
were more favorable to the accused than those of the pre-existing law and were
therefore retroactive as to the same offenses committed before the enactment of the
new law. In meeting the objection that the reduced prescription period was by its terms
applicable only to offenses resulting from the new law (which amended the pre-existing
Election Law) and could not be given retroactive effect, the Court found "that practically
all of the offenses defined in the former law are also defined in the same language in
Act 3030 (the new law), the only difference being that the penalties have been
increased." Holding that the retroactivity clause of Article 22 of the Penal Code must
apply in all in which the new law is more favorable to the accused, in the absence of any
express statutory exception, the Court drew this analogy: "Let us suppose that a statute
is enacted defining the crime of murder in the same language in which it is defined in
the Penal Code, but providing that the maximum penalty for the crime defined in the
new statute shall be life imprisonment, the statute containing no provision that it shall
not be retroactive in its effect. Would anyone then maintain that the death penalty might
still be imposed for murder committed before the new statute was enacted?"

The case at bar for petitioners is much stronger. Here, there is no question even as to
the enactment of a law statute describing the crime in the same language and imposing
a lesser penalty, but the settled doctrine of this Court that there does not exist in our
legal system the complex crime of rebellion of which the petitioners stand convicted,
"since rebellion cannot form a complex with common crimes, because the latter are
either absorbed by the rebellion itself or are punishable as independent offenses." 11

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Petitioners here have been convicted for the very same rebellion and under the very
same law for which their leaders, Jose Lava et al., have been convicted. Yet, while their
leaders have since been freed after serving their sentences of ten years of prision
mayor, petitioners as mere followers are serving out the life sentences imposed on
them, notwithstanding their already having served out much more than the maximum
penalty of twelve years of prision mayor imposable upon them. The fact that the legal
doubts about the non-existence of the crime of "complexed" rebellion were cleared up
only in 1956 after they had already been convicted and were serving their sentences
does not make the excess in the penalty imposed upon them beyond the maximum of
twelve years any less illegal.

The rule of prospective and non-retroactive operation of judicial doctrines, and its
corollary rule of the law of the case, have no application here. These salutary rules
decree that rights of parties having been decisively settled and determined by final
judgment of the court of competent jurisdiction with the party adversely affected having
had the opportunity to raise in the case all relevant questions, the decision becomes the
law of the case, and vested rights would be impaired, judicial chaos and disorder ensue
and litigation would be never-ending and would become more intolerable than the
wrongs it is intended to redress, should an adjudicated case be reopened simply
because in another and subsequent case, this Court adopted a new or different
construction of the law under which a different result of the adjudicated case might have
been obtained. Here, the whole question
turns — simply — on the nature of the crime of rebellion as defined in section 134 of the
Revised Penal Code and the maximum penalty imposable therefor under section 135 of
the same Code. As this Court had ruled since 1956--which is now settled doctrine—that
only the crime of simple rebellion exists in our legal system for which the maximum
penalty of prision mayor may be imposed, the excess of the life sentences imposed
upon petitioners over the imposable maximum of prision mayor cannot stand and must
necessarily be declared void.

Prescinding then from the question of jurisdiction of the sentencing courts, the case at
bar presents a clear case of an excess in penalty imposed beyond twelve years of
prision mayor which has become illegal by virtue of this Court's settled doctrine that the
crime of rebellion cannot be complexed with other common crimes. On this ground, as
well as on the further and more fundamental ground that to hold them liable to continue
serving life sentences for a crime that the law—at the time of their conviction as well as
now—punishes only with prision mayor which they have more than fully served, would
be to deny them their constitutional rights of due process and equal protection of the
law.

Any further detention of petitioners, in my view as above discussed, is illegal and

unconstitutional and the petition for habeas corpus should be granted and petitioners
forthwith set at liberty.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal and Villamor, JJ., concur.

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Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting:

The petitioners at bar, three of whom pleaded guilty1 and two of whom stood
trial,2 were meted out life terms in 1953, 1954 and 1955 for the so-called complex crime
of rebellion with multiple murder and other crimes, and have served or are now entering
into their 17th year of imprisonment, save for petitioner Epifanio Padua who was
sentenced on December 15, 1955 and is completing his 15th year of imprisonment,
(excluding the periods they were under pre-conviction detention). The leaders of the
rebellion who were meted out death and life sentences for the same charge by the
Court of First Instance of Manila had their sentences reduced last near to ten years of
prision mayor by the Court in People v. Lava,3 wherein the Court expressly re-affirmed
the doctrine first laid down in 1956 in People vs. Hernandez,4 that the crime of rebellion
cannot be complexed with other common crimes since such common crimes "assume
the political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients and
consequently cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed
with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty." The Court rejected therein
the State's plea for the reexamination and setting aside of such doctrine, declaring that
"(T)his Court has given this plea of the Solicitor General a very serious consideration,
but after a mature deliberation the members of this Court have decided to maintain that
ruling in the Hernandez case and to adhere to what this Court said in that case." The
said leaders have since been duly freed as having served out their penalty, but their
followers, herein petitioners, are still serving their life sentences.

I concede the validity of the ruling in Pomeroy vs. Director of Prisons5 that "(W)ith
reference to persons in custody pursuant to a final judgment, the rule is that the writ of
habeas corpus can issue only for want of jurisdiction of the sentencing court, and
cannot function as a writ of error." "I grant, too, that at the time of the Pomeroy decision
in 1960, as noted therein, "the existence of the 'complexed' rebellion (was) still upheld
by a sizable number of lawyers, prosecutors, judges and even justices of this Court."
But with the doctrine first enunciated in 1956 in Hernandez by a bare six-to-four majority
vote having withstood the test of time6 and having been just last year unreservedly
reaffirmed without a single dissent in Lava, it cannot now be gainsaid that it is now part
of our legal system that the crime of "complexed" rebellion does not exist in our Revised
Penal Code. No prosecutor would now file an information for "complexed" rebellion but
simply for the offense of simple rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal
Code, and even if such an information for "complexed" rebellion to be so filed, the trial
courts would be bound to quash such information as not charging an offense on the
strength of Lava and Hernandez.

Petitioners have therefore properly invoked in their favor the provisions of Article 22 of
the Revised Penal Code that:

ART. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws.—Penal laws shall have a retroactive
effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal,
as this term is defined in rule 5 of article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the

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publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is
serving the same.

in relation to the provisions of Article 8 of the Civil Code that "(J)udicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system
of the Philippines."

The situation of petitioners is no different than it would be if, say, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua were imposed by statute for the crime of simple rebellion at the time
of their conviction and they were accordingly sentenced, and the statutory penalty were
now reduced to prision mayor or 12 years imprisonment; having served out the
maximum penalty of 12 years now imposed by the amended statute, they would be
entitled to invoke the retroactive effect of the statute favoring them. The only difference
between the situation given and the present case is that here it is this Supreme Court,
interpreting the laws in discharge of its constitutional prerogative, that has laid down the
doctrine since Hernandez in 1956 that no offense of "complexed" rebellion exists and
petitioners should therefore be now equally entitled to the retroactive favorable effect of
such doctrine.

The actual case of petitioners is that at the time of their conviction, it was
believed — erroneously — that the crime committed by them was punishable by life
imprisonment, but the Court has subsequently judicially determined it not be so and that
the maximum imposable penalty is prision mayor or 12 years. Petitioners-convicts are
entitled to the benefit of this later judicial declaration, just as if a statutory amendment
had been enacted—not because the sentencing court had no jurisdiction or is now
ousted of jurisdiction. The writ prayed for should issue, since as held in Directo vs.
Director of Prisons,7 "the only means of giving retroactive effect to a penal provision
favorable to the accused where the trial judge has lost jurisdiction over the case, is the
writ of habeas corpus."

The question of jurisdiction of the sentencing court therefore is moot, for it is universally
recognized that relief by habeas corpus may be properly sought in cases of imposition
of excessive penalty, such that the part of the sentence beyond or in excess of the
power of the court to impose is held void, the applicant having already served out the
entire part of the sentence within the court's power. 8 As pointed out by the Court in
Rodriguez vs. Director of Prisons,9 furthermore, "Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code
... extends its benefits even to convicts serving sentence, and the only legal remedy
open to them to make use of such benefits is the writ of habeas corpus inasmuch as, if
the penalty imposed upon them under the former penal law was decreased by the
revised code, the excess has become illegal."

Regardless, therefore, of whether the trial courts that sentenced petitioners to life
sentences had jurisdiction or not to impose such penalty, or were right or wrong in
imposing such penalty, the only relevant question now is whether petitioners have
served the maximum — and lesser — sentence of prision mayor that this Court has by
firm judicial doctrine since 1956 determined to be the penalty that the Revised Penal
Code fixes for the crime of rebellion. Since they have actually served much more than
the maximum imposable penalty, the excess of the sentence imposed upon them over

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the imposable maximum of twelve years of prision mayor cannot but be declared illegal
and they should now be set free.

In People vs. Parel, 10 the Court held that the provisions of a new law (Act 3030) for the
prescription of certain election offenses (fixing the same at one year after commission)
were more favorable to the accused than those of the pre-existing law and were
therefore retroactive as to the same offenses committed before the enactment of the
new law. In meeting the objection that the reduced prescription period was by its terms
applicable only to offenses resulting from the new law (which amended the pre-existing
Election Law) and could not be given retroactive effect, the Court found "that practically
all of the offenses defined in the former law are also defined in the same language in
Act 3030 (the new law), the only difference being that the penalties have been
increased." Holding that the retroactivity clause of Article 22 of the Penal Code must
apply in all in which the new law is more favorable to the accused, in the absence of any
express statutory exception, the Court drew this analogy: "Let us suppose that a statute
is enacted defining the crime of murder in the same language in which it is defined in
the Penal Code, but providing that the maximum penalty for the crime defined in the
new statute shall be life imprisonment, the statute containing no provision that it shall
not be retroactive in its effect. Would anyone then maintain that the death penalty might
still be imposed for murder committed before the new statute was enacted?"

The case at bar for petitioners is much stronger. Here, there is no question even as to
the enactment of a law statute describing the crime in the same language and imposing
a lesser penalty, but the settled doctrine of this Court that there does not exist in our
legal system the complex crime of rebellion of which the petitioners stand convicted,
"since rebellion cannot form a complex with common crimes, because the latter are
either absorbed by the rebellion itself or are punishable as independent offenses." 11
Petitioners here have been convicted for the very same rebellion and under the very
same law for which their leaders, Jose Lava et al., have been convicted. Yet, while their
leaders have since been freed after serving their sentences of ten years of prision
mayor, petitioners as mere followers are serving out the life sentences imposed on
them, notwithstanding their already having served out much more than the maximum
penalty of twelve years of prision mayor imposable upon them. The fact that the legal
doubts about the non-existence of the crime of "complexed" rebellion were cleared up
only in 1956 after they had already been convicted and were serving their sentences
does not make the excess in the penalty imposed upon them beyond the maximum of
twelve years any less illegal.

The rule of prospective and non-retroactive operation of judicial doctrines, and its
corollary rule of the law of the case, have no application here. These salutary rules
decree that rights of parties having been decisively settled and determined by final
judgment of the court of competent jurisdiction with the party adversely affected having
had the opportunity to raise in the case all relevant questions, the decision becomes the
law of the case, and vested rights would be impaired, judicial chaos and disorder ensue
and litigation would be never-ending and would become more intolerable than the
wrongs it is intended to redress, should an adjudicated case be reopened simply
because in another and subsequent case, this Court adopted a new or different

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construction of the law under which a different result of the adjudicated case might have
been obtained. Here, the whole question
turns — simply — on the nature of the crime of rebellion as defined in section 134 of the
Revised Penal Code and the maximum penalty imposable therefor under section 135 of
the same Code. As this Court had ruled since 1956--which is now settled doctrine—that
only the crime of simple rebellion exists in our legal system for which the maximum
penalty of prision mayor may be imposed, the excess of the life sentences imposed
upon petitioners over the imposable maximum of prision mayor cannot stand and must
necessarily be declared void.

Prescinding then from the question of jurisdiction of the sentencing courts, the case at
bar presents a clear case of an excess in penalty imposed beyond twelve years of
prision mayor which has become illegal by virtue of this Court's settled doctrine that the
crime of rebellion cannot be complexed with other common crimes. On this ground, as
well as on the further and more fundamental ground that to hold them liable to continue
serving life sentences for a crime that the law—at the time of their conviction as well as
now—punishes only with prision mayor which they have more than fully served, would
be to deny them their constitutional rights of due process and equal protection of the
law.

Any further detention of petitioners, in my view as above discussed, is illegal and

unconstitutional and the petition for habeas corpus should be granted and petitioners
forthwith set at liberty.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 99 Phil. 515 (1956).

2 107 Phil. 50 (1960).

3 Art. 8 of the Civil Code provides: "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines."

4 According to Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code: "Retroactive effect of penal

laws.—Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty
of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in rule 5 of article 62 of
this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same."

5 Petition, par. 1.1 dated January 11, 1969.lâwphî1.ñèt The above allegations are
expressly admitted in the answer for the respondent Director of Prisons filed by the
Solicitor General on April 10, 1969.

6 99 Phil. 515 (1956).

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7 The petition likewise cited in addition to People v. Hernandez, People v.

Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 (1956); People v. Togonon, 101 Phil. 804 (1957); People v.
Romagoza, 103 Phil. 20 (1958) and People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 (1958). Petition,
par. 1.2.

8 L-4974, May 16, 1969.

9 Petition, par. 1.3.

10 Chafee, The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution, 32 Boston Univ.
Law Rev. 143 (1947).

11 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 709 (1927).

12 3 Willoughby on the Constitution 1612 (1929).

13 Burdick, the Law of the American Constitution 27 (1922).

14 Fraenkel, Our Civil Liberties 6 (1944).

15 Cf. In re Patterson, 1 Phil. 93 (1902).

16 Cf. Ortiz v. del Villar, 57 Phil. 19 (1932).

17 Cf. Slade Perkins v. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil. 271 (1933).

18 Cf. Pomeroy v. Director of Prisons, 107 Phil. 50, 59-62, diss. (1960).

19 Cf. Avelino v. Vera, 77 Phil. 192 (1946).

20 Cf. Saulo v. Cruz, 105 Phil. 315 (1959).

21 39 Phil. 778 (1919).

22 Ibid., p. 790.

23 42 Phil. 805 (1922).

24 Ibid., p. 805.

25 45 Phil. 650 (1924).

26 Ibid., p. 652.

27 Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 202.

28 Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85, 95.

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Human Rights

29 Harris v. Nelson, 22 L Ed 2d 281, 286 (1969).

30 237 US 309, 346 (1915).

31 Section 4, Rule 102 provides: "If it appears that the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or
judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge
had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ
shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person
shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment,
or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person
charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment." 3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, p.
604, 1970 ed.

32 In re Prautch, 1 Phil. 132.

33 100 US 371, 375. According to Ex parte Lange: "On consideration of the petition,
the court was of opinion that the facts therein recited very fairly raised the question
whether the circuit court, in the sentence which it had pronounced, and under which the
prisoner was held, had not exceed its powers. It therefore directed the writ to issue,
accompanied also by a writ of certiorari, to bring before this court the proceedings in the
circuit court under which the petitioner was restrained of his liberty. The authority of this
court in such case, under the Constitution of the United States, and the 14th section of
the judiciary act of 1789 (1 Stat. at L. 73), to issue this writ, and to examine the
proceedings in the inferior court, so far as may be necessary to ascertain whether that
court has exceeded its authority, is no longer open to question." (85 US 163, 165-166
[1874]). Justice Miller, who penned the opinion, cited the following cases: U. S. v.
Hamilton, 3 Dall. 17 (1795); Ex parte Burford, 3 Cranch 448 (1806); Ex parte Bollman, 4
Cranch 75 (1807); Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 7 Pet. 508 (1830); Ex Parte Metzger, 5
How. 176 (1847); Ex parte Kaine, 14 How. 103 (1852); Ex parte Wells, 18 How. 307
(1856); Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (1866); Ex parte Mccardle, 6 Wall. 318 (1868); Ex
parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85 (1869).

34 Cf. Conde v. Rivera, 45 Phil. 650 (1924); Harden v. Director of Prisons, 81 Phil.
741 (1948); Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525 (1949); Chavez v. Court of Appeals,
L-29169, Aug. 1968, 24 SCRA 663; Celeste v. People, L-21435, Jan. 30, 1970, 31
SCRA 391.

35 Petition, par. 5.1, p. 11.

36 J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, L-21064, Feb. 18, 1970,
31 SCRA 413.

37 11 Phil. 447 (1908).

38 24 Phil. 29 (1913).

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Human Rights

39 25 Phil. 648 (1913).

40 44 Phil. 387 (1923).

41 44 Phil. 437 (1923).

42 Frankfurter, The Reading of Statutes, reproduced in Of Law and Men, 47, at p.

53 (1956).

43 Powell, The Logic and Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 1 Selected Essays on

Constitutional Law 474, at p. 481 (1938).

44 Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,
Ibid., 503, at p. 524 (1938).

45 17 Phil. 269.

46 Ibid., pp. 272-273.

47 56 Phil. 692 (1932).

48 Ibid. p. 695.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

1 Petitioners Gumabon, Agapito and Palmares.

2 Petitioners Bagolbagol and Padua.

3 28 SCRA 72, 100 (May 16, 1969).

4 99 Phil. 515 (1956).

5 107 Phil., 50 (1960).

6 Reiterated in People vs. — Geronimo, 100 Phil., 90 (1956); — Togonon, 101

Phil., 804 (1957); — Romagoza, 103 Phil., 20 (1958); and Aquino, 108 Phil., 814
(1960).

7 56 Phil. 692 (1932).

8 Cruz vs. Director of Prisons, 17 Phil. 269 (1910); See also Caluag vs. Pecson, 82
Phil. 8 (1948).

9 57 Phil. 133 (1932).

10 44 Phil. 437 (1932), emphasis copied; see also People vs. Moran, 44 Phil. 387
(1923).

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11 Pomeroy vs. Director of Prisons, supra fn. 5, see pp. 54, 61.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Page 17 of 82
Human Rights

Case 2

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-63345 January 30, 1986

EFREN C. MONCUPA, petitioner,

vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, FABIAN C. VER, GALILEO KINTANAR, FERNANDO
GOROSPE, AND JOSE CASTRO, respondents.

Lorenzo M. Tanada, Jose W. Diokno and Joker Arroyo for petitioner,

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

As early as 1919, in the leading case of Villavicencio v. Lukban (39 Phil. 778, 790), this
Court ruled:

A prime specification of al application for a writ of habeas corpus is

restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished
from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. ...

This latitudinarian scope of the writ of habeas-corpus has, in law, remained

undiminished up to the present. The respondents' contention that the petition has
become moot and academic must necessarily be denied. Efren C. Moncupa may have
been released from his detention cell. The restraints attached to his temporary release,
however, preclude freedom of action and under the Villavicencio v. Lukban rule warrant
this Court's inquiry into the nature of his involuntary restraint and our relieving him of
such restraints as may be illegal.

Petitioner Efren C. Moncupa, together with others, was arrested on April 22, 1982 at
about 10:50 P.M., at the corner of D. Street and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City.
Moncupa D. Tuazon was brought to MIG-15 Camp Bago Bantay, Quezon City where he
was detained. On April 23, 1982, on the allegation that he was a National Democratic
Front (NDF) staff member, a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) was issued against
him and eight (8) other persons.

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After two separate investigations, conducted first, by Lieutenant Colonel Gerardo

Lantoria, Jr., Chief of Task Force Makabansa Investigation Group and second, by
Investigating Fiscal Amado Costales of Quezon City, it was ascertained that the
petitioner was not a member of any subversive organization. Both investigators
recommended the prosecution of the petitioner only for illegal possession of firearms
and illegal possession of subversive documents under Presidential Decree No. 33.

Consequently, two separate informations were filed against the petitioner, one, for
illegal possession of firearms before the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the other for
violation of P.D. 33 before the City Court of Quezon City. Against the other accused,
however, the cases filed were for violation of P.D. 885 as amended. Significantly, the
petitioner was excluded from the charge under the Revised Anti-Subversion Law.
During the pendency of this petition, it is significant that his arraignment and further
proceedings have not been pursued. And yet, the petitioner's motions for bail were
denied by the lower court.

Hence, the petitioner filed the instant petition.

The respondents, in their return of the writ justified the validity of petitioner's detention
on the ground that the privilege of the writ had been suspended as to the petitioner.
However, on August 30, 1983, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss stating that on
May 11, 1983, the petitioner was temporarily released from detention on orders of the
Minister temporary of National Defense with the approval of the President. The
respondents stated. "Since the petitioner is free and no longer under the custody of the
respondents, the present petition for habeas corpus may be deemed moot and
academic as in similar cases.

The issue to be resolved is whether or not the instant petition has become moot and
academic in view of the petitioner's temporary release.

It is to be noted that attached to the petitioner's temporary release are restrictions

imposed on him. These are:

1) His freedom of movement is curtailed by the condition that petitioner gets the
approval of respondents for any travel outside Metro Manila.

2) His liberty of abode is restricted because prior approval of respondents is also

required in case petitioner wants to change his place of residence.

3) His freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition that he should not "participate in
any interview conducted by any local or foreign mass media representatives nor give
any press release or information that is inimical to the interest of national security."

4) He is required to report regularly to respondents or their representatives.

Page 19 of 82
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The petitioner argues that although admittedly his temporary release is an improvement
upon his actual detention, the restrictions imposed by the respondents constitute an
involuntary and illegal restraint on his freedom.

The petitioner stresses that his temporary release did not render the instant petitioner
moot and academic but that "it merely shifted the inquiry from the legality of his actual
detention to the legality of the conditions imposed by the respondents."

We agree with the petitioner.

The reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the temporary
release of the petitioner constitute restraints on the liberty of Mr. Moncupa. Such
restrictions limit the freedom of movement of the petitioner. It is not physical restraint
alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus.

In Villavicencio v. Lukban, the women who had been illegally seized and transported
against their will to Davao were no longer under any official restraint. Unlike petitioner
Moncupa, they were free to change their domicile without asking for official permission.
Indeed, some of them managed to return to Manila. Yet, the Court condemned the
involuntary restraints caused by the official action, fined the Mayor of Manila and
expressed the hope that its "decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an
orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty from Megal encroachment."

In the light of the above ruling, the present petition for habeas corpus has not become
moot and academic. Other precedents for such a conclusion are not wanting.

The decision in Caunca v. Salazar (82 Phil. 851) states:

An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a

prospective employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her
freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force has been exerted to
keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the
deprivation of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer
from one place to another, from to choose one's residence. Freedom may
be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to
erroneous belief in the existence of the will. If the actual effect of such
psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim
is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual
who is illigally deprived of liberty by deprived or physical coercion.

In Tibo v. The Provincial Commander (85 SCRA 564), this Court ruled:

Although the release in the custody of the Deputy Minister did not signify
that petitioners could once again enjoy their full freedom, the application
could have been dismissed, as it could be withdrawn by the parties
themselves. That is a purely voluntary act. When the hearing was held on

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September 7, 1978, it turned out that counsel for petitioner Bonifacio V.

Tupaz could have academic in a hasty manner when he set forth the
above allegations in his manifestation of August 30, 1978, for Attorney
Jose C. Espinas, who appeared for petitioners, while conceding that there
was such a release from confinement, also alleged that it was conditioned
on their restricting their activities as labor union leaders to the premises of
the Trade Unions of the Philippines and ABSOLUTE Services, presumably
in Macaraig as well as the Ministry of labor. As the voting was to take
place in the business firm in Bataan, the acts set would nullify whatever
efforts they could have exerted. To that extent, and with the prohibition
against their going to Bataan, the restraint on liberty was undeniable. If so,
the moot and academic character of the petition was far from clear.

More recently, we had occasion to rule squarely on whether or not a temporary release
from detention renders the petition for writ of habeas corpus moot and academic. As in
this case of Moncupa, the petitioners in Toyoto, et al v. Hon. Fidel Ramos, et al, G.R.
No. 69270, October 15, 1985, were temporarily released from detention. The
respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition for habeas corpus on the ground that
the petitioners had been temporarily released and their case had, therefore, become
moot and academic. The petitioners insisted, however, that their case may be
considered moot and academic only "if their release would be permanent." In ruling for
the petitioners, we said:

Ordinarily, a petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic

when the restraint on the liberty of the petitioners is lifted either
temporarily or permanently. We have so held in a number of cases. But
the instant case presents a different situation. The question to be resolved
is whether the State can reserve the power to re-arrest a person for an
offense after a court of competent jurisdiction has absolved him of the
offense. An affirmative answer is the one suggested by the respondents
because the release of the petitioners being merely 'temporary' it follows
that they can be re-arrested at anytime despite their acquittal by a court of
competent jurisdiction. We hold that such a reservation is repugnant to the
government of laws and not of men principle. Under this principle the
moment a person is acquitted on a criminal charge he can no longer be
detained or re-arrested for the same offense. This concept is so basic and
elementary that it needs no elaboration.

In effect the principle is clear. A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus moot and academic must be one which is free from involuntary restraints. Where
a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms,
where there is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely
involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally
valid has, in the light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person
concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of
the writ.

Page 21 of 82
Human Rights

The respondents have failed to show why the writ may not issue and why the restraints
on the petitioner's freedom of movement should not be lifted.

WHEREFORE, the PETITION is GRANTED. The conditions attached to the temporary

release of the petitioner are declared null and void. The temporary release of the
petitioner is declared ABSOLUTE. No costs,

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin De la Fuente,

Cuevas, Alampay and Patajo, JJ., concur.

Aquino, C.J., took no part.

Plana, J., I reserve my vote.

Page 22 of 82
Human Rights

Case 3

[G.R. No. L-79173. December 1, 1987.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROLANDO N.

ABADILLA, SUSAN S. ABADILLA, in her own behalf and in behalf of the minors
JUNE ELIZABETH, ROLANDO, JR., DAPHINE JENNIFER, MA. THERESA, ANNA
ROSANNA, VINCENT MARCUS and BART JOSEPH, all surnamed
ABADILLA, Petitioners, v. General FIDEL V. RAMOS, Chief of Staff, AFP; Major
General RENATO DE VILLA, Commanding General, Philippine Constabulary &
Vice-Chief of Staff, AFP; and Brigadier General ALEXANDER AGUIRRE,
Commanding General, CAPCOM, PC, Respondents.

DECISION

GANCAYCO, J.:

The validity of the detention of an individual is challenged in this Petition for habeas
corpus. The petitioners are the spouse and minor children of the detainee while the
respondents are ranking officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

The record of the case discloses that on January 27, 1987, a group of officers and
enlisted men of the AFP seized control of the radio-television broadcasting facilities of
the Republic Broadcasting System (GMA-Channel 7) located in Quezon City, ostensibly
for the purpose of toppling the existing constitutional government. While the takeover
might have been a prelude to similar operations throughout the national capital, it did
not succeed. On January 29, 1987, the mutineers surrendered to the military authorities
and the possession of the facility was restored to the owners and managers thereof.
Soon thereafter, the military authorities conducted an investigation of the matter.

On April 18, 1987, a group of enlisted men staged a mutiny inside the Fort Bonifacio
military facility in Makati, Metropolitan Manila. The mutiny, dubbed as "The Black
Saturday Revolt," 1 did not succeed either. After the incident, the military authorities
also conducted an investigation.

The first investigation was concluded on March 12, 1987. The investigation disclosed
that Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) of the AFP was
one of the leaders of the unsuccessful takeover of the GMA radio-television facilities. 2
The Board of Officers investigating the matter recommended that the case of Colonel
Abadilla be endorsed for pre-trial investigation and that the appropriate charges be filed
against him for violation of Article of War 67 (Mutiny or Sedition 1. Article of War 94
(Various Crimes) in relation to Article 139 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 1 of

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Human Rights

Presidential Decree No. 1866, and such other offenses that may be warranted by the
evidence. Accordingly, a charge sheet was prepared against the Colonel.chanrobles
law library : red

The investigation conducted on "The Black Saturday Revolt" ended on May 27, 1987. It
was found at said investigation that Colonel Abadilla was also involved in the mutiny.
The Board of Officers conducting the investigation also recommended that the case be
endorsed for pre-trial investigation and that the appropriate charges be filed against the
Colonel. 3 The Colonel was likewise charged, accordingly.

Colonel Abadilla was at large when both investigations were conducted.

On May 4, 1987 or some two weeks before the second investigation was concluded,
herein respondent Major General Renato De Villa, Commanding General of the PC and
Vice Chief of Staff of the AFP issued an Order for the arrest and confinement of Colonel
Abadilla. 4

On May 21, 1987, respondent AFP Chief of Staff General Fidel V. Ramos issued
General Orders No. 342 dropping Colonel Abadilla from the rolls of regular officers of
the AFP. 5 The pertinent portions of the said General Orders are as follows —

"DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF REGULAR OFFICERS

"The names of the following officers are dropped from the rolls of Regular Officers,
Armed Forces of the Philippines for cause effective as of 9 May 1987 pursuant to Article
of War 117. (Authority: Letter from the President, dated 9 May 1987).

"BRIGADIER GENERAL JOSE MARIA CARLOS ZUMEL . . .

"COLONEL ROLANDO N ABADILLA 0-4937 PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY

(GENERAL STAFF CORPS)

"MAJOR REYNALDO C CABAUATAN . . .

"BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"x x x"

On July 7, 1987, the Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City filed an Information for Slight
Physical Injuries with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metropolitan Manila in Quezon City
against Colonel Abadilla. 6 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 0237558.

On July 27, 1987, a combined element of the Philippine Army and Philippine
Constabulary arrested Colonel Abadilla. 7 He was detained first in Camp Crame in
Quezon City and later, up to the present, in Fort Bonifacio in Makati.

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Human Rights

On July 30, 1987, another Information, this time for violation of Presidential Decree No.
1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition) was filed by the Assistant City
Fiscal of Quezon City against Colonel Abadilla. 8 The case was assigned to Branch 104
of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City and was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-
53382.

On the same date, July 30, 1987, Mrs. Susan S. Abadilla the spouse of Colonel Abadilla
together with their minor children June Elizabeth, Rolando, Jr. Daphine Jennifer, Ma.
Theresa, Anna Rosanna, Vincent Marcus and Bart Joseph, went to this Court and filed
the instant Petition for habeas corpus, challenging the validity of the detention of
Colonel Abadilla. 9

The main arguments in the Petition are as follows —

(1) When Colonel Abadilla was dropped from the rolls of officers effective May 9, 1987,
he became a civilian and as such, the order for his arrest and confinement is null and
void because he was no longer subject to military law;

(2) His detention is illegal because he is not charged with any criminal offense, either
before a civil court or a court-martial;

(3) Even assuming that the order for the arrest and confinement of Colonel Abadilla was
valid at the initial stage, the said order became functus officio and/or moot and
academic when the Colonel was dropped from the rolls of officers;

(4) Even assuming that Colonel Abadilla is subject to military law, his detention remains
illegal because under Article of War 70, a person subject to military law can be detained
only if he is charged with a crime or a serious offense under the Articles of War.

In the meantime, the Regional Trial Court, with Judge Maximiano O. Asuncion presiding
therein, granted the Motion to Quash and the Supplement thereto filed by the counsel of
Colonel Abadilla. Accordingly, the Information in Criminal Case No, Q-53382 was
dismissed by the trial court. 10

In a resolution dated August 4, 1987, this Court resolved to issue the writ of habeas
corpus. The respondents were required to make a return of the writ on August 10, 1987.
11

On August 10, 1987, the respondents, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), submitted the Return of the writ. 12 The main arguments in the Return are as
follows —

(1) In the event that proceedings with a view to military trial are commenced against a
person subject to military law before the termination of military service, military
jurisdiction will fully attach on the said person.;

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Human Rights

(2) The confinement of Colonel Abadilla as a person subject to military jurisdiction is

authorized by Article of War 70; and

(3) The continued confinement of Colonel Abadilla in Fort Bonifacio is imperative and
justified on account of the criminal case/s filed against him by both the military and civil
authorities.

As instructed by this Court, the petitioners submitted their Reply to the Return of the writ
on September 7, 1987. 13 The main arguments in the Reply are as follows —

(1) The pendency of a case in the civil courts has no relevance to the issue of military
jurisdiction over Colonel Abadilla. This view notwithstanding, Criminal Case No. Q-
53382 filed against Colonel Abadilla has been dismissed by the trial court. The
pendency of Criminal Case No. 0237558 filed against the Colonel does not warrant his
continued confinement inasmuch as the Colonel has posted bail for his provisional
liberty;

(2) Colonel Abadilla is not in the active service of the AFP nor is he a person under
sentence adjudged by courts-martial. As such, he does not fall under the category of a
person subject to military law as defined by Article of War 2;

(3) An officer dropped from the rolls by order of the President is fully separated from the
service and is no longer subject to military law (Citing Gloria, Philippine Military Law
Annotated).;

(4) Under Section 10 of the Manual for Courts-Martial, Philippine Army, court-martial
jurisdiction over officers in the military service of the Philippines ceases on discharge or
separation from the service. The case of Colonel Abadilla does not fall under any of the
exceptions to this rule. This observation has been upheld in Martin v. Ver, 123 SCRA
745 (1983);

(5) The pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court in Toth v. Quarles, 350
U.S. 11 (1955), cited in Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, G.R. Nos. 54558 and
69882, May 22, 1987, supports the stand taken by the herein petitioners; and

(6) Under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1850, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1952, court-martial jurisdiction over the person of accused military
personnel cannot be exercised if they are already separated from the active service,
provided that jurisdiction has not attached beforehand unless otherwise provided by
law.

On September 9, 1987, the petitioners submitted their Traverse to the Return of the writ.
14 It is contended therein that, contrary to the view of the Solicitor General, jurisdiction
over a person is acquired not by the mere filing of a charge or information, or by the
commencement of an investigation, but by the arrest of the defendant. The petitioners
stress that inasmuch as Colonel Abadilla was arrested after he had become a civilian,

Page 26 of 82
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the charge sheets prepared against him by the military authorities are null and void for
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the Colonel.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

On September 24, 1987, the petitioners submitted their Additional Traverse together
with a Motion to Decide the Petition. 15 On the issue of military jurisdiction, and in
support of their contentions, they cite the treatise of Colonel William Winthrop entitled
Military Law and Precedents. 16

Inasmuch as the parties herein had already presented their respective arguments, the
case was, therefore, deemed submitted for deliberation.

The sole issue in habeas corpus proceedings is the legality of the detention. 17
Therefore, the issue that must be resolved by this Court is this: Is the detention of
Colonel Abadilla illegal? The resolution of this issue will, of course, relate to the
jurisdiction of the military authorities over the person of Colonel Abadilla.
I.

We shall first resolve the problem of jurisdiction.

In Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 18 this Court held that a military commission
or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses allegedly
committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and that any
judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned. For the same reasons, the
doctrine announced in Aquino, Jr. v. Military Commission No. 2 19 and all decided
cases affirming the same, in so far as they are inconsistent with the Olaguer
pronouncement, were deemed abandoned. There is no doubt, therefore, that military
authorities cannot try civilians.

The petitioners contend that the Olaguer doctrine applies to Colonel Abadilla on the
ground that he had become a civilian since May 9, 1987 when he was dropped from the
rolls of officers of the AFP. They argue that on account of his civilian status, Colonel
Abadilla is no longer subject to military law. In support of their arguments, the petitioners
cite the Articles of War, 20 the Manual for Courts-Martial of the AFP, 21 Presidential
Decree No. 1850, as amended, as well as the dissertations on military law of Colonel
William Winthrop 22 and Colonel Claro Gloria. 23 They likewise invoke the
pronouncement of this Court in Martin v. Ver 24 and that of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Toth v. Quarles.25cralaw:red

On the other hand, the Solicitor General contends that military jurisdiction had fully
attached on Colonel Abadilla inasmuch as proceedings were initiated against him
before the termination of his service in the military.

We agree.

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Human Rights

As early as March, 1987, months before Colonel Abadilla was dropped from the rolls of
officers, the military authorities began the institution of proceedings against him. As of
that time, he was certainly subject to military law. He was under investigation for his
alleged participation in the unsuccessful mutinies when he was an officer of the AFP. As
a military officer, it was incumbent upon him to appear before his superior officers
conducting the investigation even for the purpose of clearing his name. He did not do
so. His superiors could not confine him during the period of investigation because as
stated earlier, he was at large. This disregard for military duty and responsibility may
have prompted his superiors to cause him to be dropped from the rolls of officers.

It is clear that from the very start of this controversy, the military authorities intended to
try Colonel Abadilla as a person subject to military law. This can be gleaned from the
charge sheets prepared against him.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

The fact that Colonel Abadilla was dropped from the rolls of officers cannot and should
not lead to the conclusion that he is now beyond the jurisdiction of the military
authorities. If such a conclusion were to prevail, his very own refusal to clear his name
and protect his honor before his superior officers in the manner prescribed for and
expected from a ranking military officer would be his shield against prosecution in the
first place. His refusal to report for duty or to surrender when ordered arrested, which
led to his name being dropped from the roll of regular officers of the military, cannot
thereby render him beyond the jurisdiction of the military courts for offenses he
committed while still in the military service. This Court cannot countenance such an
absurd situation. Established principles in remedial law call for application.

The military authorities had jurisdiction over the person of Colonel Abadilla at the time of
the alleged offenses. This jurisdiction having been vested in the military authorities, it is
retained up to the end of the proceedings against Colonel Abadilla. Well-settled is the
rule that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but
continues until the case is terminated. 26

The petitioners stress that jurisdiction over a person is acquired not by the mere filing of
a charge or an information, or by the commencement of an investigation, but by the
arrest of the defendant. They maintain that the Colonel was arrested when he was
already a civilian.

The argument is untenable.

The rule that jurisdiction over a person is acquired by his arrest applies only to criminal
proceedings instituted before the regular courts. It does not apply to proceedings under
military law. At the time the military investigations were commenced, Colonel Abadilla
was an officer of the AFP subject to military law. As such, the military authorities had
jurisdiction over his person pursuant to Article of War 2 and Section 8 of the Manual for
Courts-Martial, AFP, which provide as follows —

"Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. — The following persons are subject to these

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articles and shall be understood as included in the term `any person subject to military
law’ or ‘persons subject to military law,’ whenever used in these
articles:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
or of the Philippine Constabulary; . . .;

". . ." and

8. COURTS-MARTIAL — Jurisdiction in general — Persons. — The following persons

are subject to military law:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the Philippine
Constabulary; . . .;

"x x x"

As mentioned earlier, his earlier arrest could not be effected because he was at large.
The initial stages of the investigations had against him before his arrest were, therefore,
not improper.

As a whole, the authorities cited and relied upon by the petitioners do not satisfactorily
support their contentions.

Article of War 2 enumerates who are subject to military law. In March, 1987, Colonel
Abadilla was a military officer. Under this Article, he was subject to military law.

Section 10 of the Manual for Courts-Martial, AFP, which discusses court-martial

jurisdiction in general, states the general rule to be:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The general rule is that court-martial jurisdiction over officers, cadets, soldiers, and
others in the military service of the Philippines ceases on discharge or other separation
from such service, and that jurisdiction as to an offense committed during a period of
service thus terminated is not revived by a reentry into the military service."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Attention is called to the exception mentioned in the last sentence of the Section, to wit
—

"So also, where a dishonorably discharged general prisoner is tried for an offense
committed while a soldier and prior to his dishonorable discharge, such discharge does
not terminate his amenability to trial for the offense."cralaw virtua1aw library

This exception applies to the case of Colonel Abadilla inasmuch as he is at present

confined in Fort Bonifacio upon the orders of his superior officers, and his having been
dropped from the rolls of officers amounts to a dishonorable discharge.

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Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1860, as amended, even acknowledges instances

where military jurisdiction fully attaches on an individual even after he shall have been
separated from active service, to

wit —

"SECTION 1. Court martial jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members of
the Armed Forces. — . . .;

"(b) all persons subject to military law under Article 2 of the aforecited Articles of War
who commit any crime or offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or their
case disposed of under the said Articles of War; Provided, that in either of the
aforementioned situations, the case shall be disposed of or tried by the proper civil or
judicial authorities when court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under
Article 38 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, or court-martial jurisdiction over
the person of the accused military or Integrated National Police can no longer be
exercised by virtue of their separation from the active service without jurisdiction having
duly attached beforehand unless otherwise provided by law; . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)

The dissertations of Colonels Winthrop and Gloria are, at most, persuasive authorities.
Indeed, this Court has cited the treatise of Colonel Winthrop in at least three cases 27
on account of the scholarly discussions contained therein. Works of this nature provide
insight and information which have been of tremendous help to this Court in many
judicial controversies. Regardless of their great value, they cannot prevail over opposing
but nonetheless settled doctrines in Philippine jurisprudence.

These observations notwithstanding, We have gone through the treatise of Colonel

Winthrop and We find the following passage which goes against the contention of the
petitioners, viz —

"3. Offenders in general — Attaching of jurisdiction. It has further been held, and is now
settled law, in regard to military offenders in general, that if the military jurisdiction has
once duly attached to them previous to the date of the termination of their legal period of
service, they may he brought to trial by court-martial after that date, their discharge
being meanwhile withheld. This principle has mostly been applied to cases where the
offense was committed just prior to the end of the term. In such cases the interests of
discipline clearly forbid that the offender should go unpunished. It is held therefore that if
before the day on which his service legally terminates and his right to a discharge is
complete, proceedings with a view to trial are commenced against him — as by arrest
or the service of charges, — the military jurisdiction will fully attach and once attached
may be continued by a trial by court-martial ordered and held after the end of the term
of the enlistment of the accused. . . ." 28

The case of Martin v. Ver 29 cited by the petitioners is not in point. In Martin, this Court
took the opportunity to discuss the general rule that "court-martial jurisdiction over

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Human Rights

persons in the military service of the Philippines ceases upon discharge or separation
from such service" and an exception to the general rule recited in Article of War 95
regarding frauds against the Government.

The case of Toth v. Quarles 30 decided by the Supreme Court of the United States is
also inapplicable.

Toth involves a former serviceman named Audrey M. Toth who, five months after his
honorable discharge from the U.S. Air Force, was arrested by military authorities on a
charge of murder allegedly committed in Korea when he was still an airman. A divided
Supreme Court 31 held that Congress has no power to subject a discharged
serviceman to trial by court-martial for offenses committed by him while in the military
service and so to deprive him of the constitutional safeguards protecting persons
accused of crime in a federal court.

The Toth ruling is inapplicable to the instant case for two reasons.

First — Toth was honorably discharged from the military service. The arrangement was
voluntary on the part of the serviceman. There was an ostensible intention on his part to
live the life of a civilian again. Colonel Abadilla was not honorably discharged. On the
contrary, he was dropped from the rolls of regular officers of the AFP. This arrangement
did not have his express consent. In fact, he was at large at that time.

Second — The proceedings against Toth began after his honorable discharge from the
service. The proceedings against Colonel Abadilla were commenced when he was still
a regular officer of the AFP.

Moreover, the doctrine in Toth is not a unanimous pronouncement as there were some
persuasive dissenting views.

Although Toth was cited in Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 32 the citation
should not be construed as a sweeping endorsement of the entire doctrine therein. Toth
was cited in Olaguer only for the purpose of emphasizing that military commissions or
tribunals cannot try civilians. In Olaguer, this Court relied on the doctrine announced in
Ex-parte Milligan, 33 and not the one in Toth in arriving at the Decision of the
Court.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Another point should be mentioned regarding the matter of jurisdiction. We agree with
the respondents in their assertion that the pendency of a case in the civil courts has no
relevance to the problem of military jurisdiction over Colonel Abadilla. The argument is
well-taken.
II.

The matter of jurisdiction having been settled, We now proceed to discuss the
remaining contentions of the petitioners.

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Human Rights

The petitioners argue that even if it were to be assumed that Colonel Abadilla is subject
to military law, his confinement remains illegal because under Article of War 70, a
person subject to military law can be detained only if he is charged with a crime or a
serious offense under the Articles of War.

The record of the case discloses that Colonel Abadilla has been charged by the military
authorities for violation of Article of War 67 (Mutiny or Sedition) which is a serious
offense, and the corresponding charge sheets have been prepared against him.

The important issue in this Petition has been resolved - the detention of Colonel
Abadilla under the circumstances obtaining in this case is not illegal. For this reason,
the instant Petition for habeas corpusshould be dismissed for lack of merit.

In the light of the foregoing discussion, the motion of petitioners to hold respondent
General Ramos in contempt of court for approving the filing of court martial proceedings
against Colonel Abadilla during the pendency of this case should be and is hereby
denied. The Court has not issued a restraining order enjoining such proceedings. In fact
We now find that the court martial proceedings may proceed inasmuch as the military
authorities have jurisdiction over Colonel Abadilla in the above-stated cases.

One last word. The man in uniform belongs to the elite in public service. His eminent
credential is his absolute loyalty to the Constitution, the flag, his country and his people.
He is the guardian against external and internal aggression.

He is a man of honor and courage. He is a gentleman. He is given arms to insure his

capability as an instrument of peace. When he is drafted in the Philippine Constabulary
he becomes a peace officer, a law enforcer, a law man. Respect for the law is his article
of faith.

However, when he wavers and fails to live up to the highest standard of fidelity to his
country and people, when he defies authority and discipline, when he commits offenses
or when he turns against the very people and government he is sworn to protect, he
becomes an outlaw and a disgrace to his uniform. The state has a right to hold him to
account for his transgressions and to see to it that he can not use the awesome powers
of his status to jeopardize the security and peace of the
citizenry.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for habeas corpus is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (C.J.), Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,

Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Page 32 of 82
Human Rights

Case 4

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 122954. February 15, 2000]

NORBERTO FERIA Y PACQUING, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE

DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, MUNTINLUPA, METRO MANILA
(IN PLACE OF THE JAIL WARDEN OF THE MANILA CITY JAIL), THE PRESIDING
JUDGE OF BRANCH II, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, and THE CITY
PROSECUTOR, CITY OF MANILA, respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

The mere loss or destruction of the records of a criminal case subsequent to conviction
of the accused will not render the judgment of conviction void, nor will it warrant the
release of the convict by virtue of a writ of habeas corpus. The proper remedy is the
reconstitution of judicial records which is as much a duty of the prosecution as of the
defense.

Subject of this petition for review on certiorari are (1) the Decision dated April 28, 1995,
of the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the dismissal of the
petition for habeas corpus filed by petitioner, and (2) the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated December 1, 1995, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration. As
hereafter elucidated, we sustain the judgment of respondent appellate court.

Based on the available records and the admissions of the parties, the antecedents of
the present petition are as follows:

Petitioner Norberto Feria y Pacquing has been under detention since May 21, 1981, up
to present[1] by reason of his conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, in
Criminal Case No. 60677, by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2, for the
jeepney hold-up and killing of United States Peace Corps Volunteer Margaret Viviene
Carmona.

Some twelve (12) years later, or on June 9, 1993, petitioner sought to be transferred
from the Manila City Jail to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City, [2] but the Jail
Warden of the Manila City Jail informed the Presiding Judge of the RTC-Manila, Branch
2, that the transfer cannot be effected without the submission of the requirements,
namely, the Commitment Order or Mittimus, Decision, and Information.[3] It was then
discovered that the entire records of the case, including the copy of the judgment, were

Page 33 of 82
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missing. In response to the inquiries made by counsel of petitioner, both the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Manila and the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 2 attested to the fact that the records of Criminal Case No. 60677 could not be
found in their respective offices. Upon further inquiries, the entire records appear to
have been lost or destroyed in the fire which occurred at the second and third floor of
the Manila City Hall on November 3, 1986.[4]

On October 3, 1994, petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ

of Habeas Corpus[5] with the Supreme Court against the Jail Warden of the Manila City
Jail, the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and the City
Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from confinement on the ground that his
continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal and violative of his
constitutional right to due process.

In its Resolution dated October 10, 1994,[6] the Second Division of this Court resolved -

" x x x (a) to ISSUE the Writ of Habeas Corpus; (b) to ORDER the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to conduct an
immediate RAFFLE of this case among the incumbent judges thereof; and
(c) to REQUIRE [1] the Judge to whom this case is raffled to SET the case
for HEARING on Thursday, October 13, 1994 at 8:30 A.M., try and decide
the same on the merits and thereafter FURNISH this Court with a copy of
his decision thereon; [2] the respondents to make a RETURN of the Writ
on or before the close of office hours on Wednesday, October 12, 1994
and APPEAR PERSONALLY and PRODUCE the person of Norberto
Feria y Pa[c]quing on the aforesaid date and time of hearing to the Judge
to whom this case is raffled, and [3] the Director General, Philippine
National Police, through his duly authorized representative(s) to SERVE
the Writ and Petition, and make a RETURN thereof as provided by law
and, specifically, his duly authorized representative(s) to APPEAR
PERSONALLY and ESCORT the person of Norberto Feria y Pa[c]quing at
the aforesaid date and time of hearing."

The case was then raffled to Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, which on
November 15, 1994, after hearing, issued an Order[7] dismissing the case on the ground
that the mere loss of the records of the case does not invalidate the judgment or
commitment nor authorize the release of the petitioner, and that the proper remedy
would be reconstitution of the records of the case which should be filed with the court
which rendered the decision.

Petitioner duly appealed said Order to the Court of Appeals, which on April 28, 1995,
rendered the assailed Decision[8] affirming the decision of the trial court with the
modification that "in the interest of orderly administration of justice" and "under the
peculiar facts of the case" petitioner may be transferred to the Bureau of Corrections in
Muntinlupa City without submission of the requirements (Mittimus, Decision and
Information) but without prejudice to the reconstitution of the original records.

Page 34 of 82
Human Rights

The Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order having been denied for lack of
merit,[9] petitioner is now before us on certiorari, assigning the following errors of law:[10]

I. WHETHER OR NOT, UNDER THE PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF

THIS CASE, WHERE THE RECORDS OF CONVICTION WERE LOST,
THE PETITIONERS CONTINUED INCARCERATION IS JUSTIFIED
UNDER THE LAW.

COROLLARY TO THIS, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS

RESOLUTION, AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF HEREIN APPELLANTS
PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS IS, IN CONTEMPLATION OF LAW, A
JUDGMENT OR A SUBSTITUTE JUDGMENT, WHICH CAN BE
UTILIZED AS A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR HIS INCARCERATION.

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE RECONSTITUTION OF OFFICIAL

RECORDS LOST/DESTROYED SHOULD BE INITIATED BY THE
GOVERNMENT AND ITS ORGANS, WHO ARE IN CUSTODY OF SUCH,
OR BY THE PRISONER, WHOSE LIBERTY IS RESTRAINED.

Petitioner argues that his detention is illegal because there exists no copy of
a valid judgment as required by Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court,[11] and that the evidence considered by the trial court and Court of Appeals in
the habeas corpus proceedings did not establish the contents of such judgment.
Petitioner further contends that our ruling in Gunabe v. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 993,
995 (1947), that "reconstitution is as much the duty of the prosecution as of the
defense" has been modified or abandoned in the subsequent case of Ordonez v.
Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152, 155 (1994), wherein we held that "[i]t is not the fault
of the prisoners that the records cannot now be found. If anyone is to be blamed, it
surely cannot be the prisoners, who were not the custodians of those records."

In its Comment,[12] the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the sole inquiry in
this habeas corpus proceeding is whether or not there is legal basis to detain petitioner.
The OSG maintains that public respondents have more than sufficiently shown the
existence of a legal ground for petitioners continued incarceration, viz., his conviction by
final judgment, and under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the discharge of
a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment is not authorized. Petitioners
remedy, therefore, is not a petition for habeas corpus but a proceeding for the
reconstitution of judicial records.

The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is traced to antiquity, was
devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. [13] It secures
to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention examined and determined by a
court of justice, and to have the issue ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful
authority.[14] Consequently, the writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of
a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting

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in the restraint of a person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or
(c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such
excess.[15] Petitioners claim is anchored on the first ground considering, as he claims,
that his continued detention, notwithstanding the lack of a copy of a validjudgment of
conviction, is violative of his constitutional right to due process.

Based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there is sufficient
evidence on record to establish the fact of conviction of petitioner which serves as the
legal basis for his detention. Petitioner made judicial admissions, both verbal and
written, that he was charged with and convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide,
and sentenced to suffer imprisonment "habang buhay".

In its Order dated October 17, 1994, the RTC-Manila, Branch 9, made the finding that -
[16]

"During the trial and on manifestation and arguments made by the

accused, his learned counsel and Solicitor Alexander G. Gesmundo who
appeared for the respondents, it appears clear and indubitable that:

(A) Petitioner had been charged with Robbery with Homicide

in Criminal Case No. 60677, Illegal Possession of Firearm in
Criminal Case No. 60678 and Robbery in Band in Criminal
Case No. 60867. ... In Criminal Case No. 60677 (Robbery
with Homicide) the accused admitted in open Court that a
decision was read to him in open Court by a personnel
of the respondent Court (RTC Branch II) sentencing him
to Life Imprisonment (Habang buhay)..." (emphasis
supplied)

Further, in the Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Commitment Order of the Above
Entitled Criminal Case dated June 8, 1993,[17] petitioner himself stated that -

"COMES NOW, the undersigned accused in the above entitled criminal

case and unto this Honorable Court most respectfully move:

1. That in 1981 the accused was charge of (sic) Robbery with

Homicide;

2. That after four years of trial, the court found the accused guilty
and given a Life Sentence in a promulgation handed down in
1985; (emphasis supplied)

3. That after the sentence was promulgated, the Presiding Judge told the
councel (sic) that accused has the right to appeal the decision;

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Human Rights

4. That whether the de oficio counsel appealed the decision is beyond the
accused comprehension (sic) because the last time he saw the counsel
was when the decision was promulgated.

5. That everytime there is change of Warden at the Manila City Jail

attempts were made to get the Commitment Order so that transfer of the
accused to the Bureau of Corrections can be affected, but all in vain;"

Petitioners declarations as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him

under Section 23 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This rule is based upon the
presumption that no man would declare anything against himself, unless such
declaration were true,[18] particularly with respect to such grave matter as his conviction
for the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Further, under Section 4 of Rule 129, "[a]n
admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the
same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by a
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made." Petitioner does not claim any mistake nor does he deny making such
admissions.

The records also contain a certified true copy of the Monthly Report dated January
1985[19] of then Judge Rosalio A. De Leon, attesting to the fact that petitioner was
convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide on January 11, 1985. Such Monthly
Report constitutes an entry in official records under Section 44 of Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence, which is prima facie evidence of facts therein stated.

Public respondents likewise presented a certified true copy of Peoples Journal dated
January 18, 1985, page 2,[20] issued by the National Library, containing a short news
article that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and was
sentenced to "life imprisonment." However, newspaper articles amount to "hearsay
evidence, twice removed"[21]and are therefore not only inadmissible but without any
probative value at all whether objected to or not,[22] unless offered for a purpose other
than proving the truth of the matter asserted. In this case, the news article is admissible
only as evidence that such publication does exist with the tenor of the news therein
stated.

As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the
petitioner who attacks such restraint. In other words, where the return is not subject to
exception, that is, where it sets forth process which on its face shows good ground for
the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new
matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such process.[23] If the detention of
the prisoner is by reason of lawful public authority, the return is considered prima
facie evidence of the validity of the restraint and the petitioner has the burden of proof to
show that the restraint is illegal. Thus, Section 13 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court
provides:

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Human Rights

"SEC. 13. When the return evidence, and when only a plea.If it appears
that the prisoner is in custody under a warrant of commitment in
pursuance of law, the return shall be considered prima facie evidence of
the cause of restraint, but if he is restrained of his liberty by any alleged
private authority, the return shall be considered only as a plea of the facts
therein set forth, and the party claiming the custody must prove such
facts."

Public respondents having sufficiently shown good ground for the detention, petitioners
release from confinement is not warranted under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court which provides that -

"Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. - If it appears that

the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment
or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to
issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall
not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the
person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in
the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an
offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment."

In the case of Gomez v. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 458 (1946), accused was convicted
by the trial court of the crime of rape, and was committed to the New Bilibid Prison.
Pending appeal with the Court of Appeals, the records of the case were, for reasons
undisclosed, completely destroyed or lost. Accused then filed a petition for the issuance
of the writ of habeas corpuswith the Supreme Court. The Court denied the petition,
ruling thus:

"The petition does not make out a case. The Director of Prisons is holding
the prisoner under process issued by a competent court in pursuance of a
lawful, subsisting judgment. The prisoner himself admits the legality of his
detention. The mere loss or destruction of the record of the case does not
invalidate the judgment or the commitment, or authorize the prisoners
release."

Note further that, in the present case, there is also no showing that petitioner duly
appealed his conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, hence for all intents and
purposes, such judgment has already become final and executory. When a court has
jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged, its judgment,
order, or decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus.[24] Put another way,
in order that a judgment may be subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus, it must be
void for lack of jurisdiction.[25] Thus, petitioners invocation of our ruling in Reyes v.
Director of Prisons, supra, is misplaced. In the Reyes case, we granted the writ and

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ordered the release of the prisoner on the ground that "[i]t does not appear that the
prisoner has been sentenced by any tribunal duly established by a competent authority
during the enemy occupation" and not because there were no copies of the decision
and information. Here, a copy of the mittimus is available. And, indeed, petitioner does
not raise any jurisdictional issue.

The proper remedy in this case is for either petitioner or public respondents to initiate
the reconstitution of the judgment of the case under either Act No. 3110,[26] the general
law governing reconstitution of judicial records, or under the inherent power of courts to
reconstitute at any time the records of their finished cases in accordance with Section 5
(h) of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court.[27] Judicial records are subject to reconstitution
without exception, whether they refer to pending cases or finished cases.[28] There is no
sense in limiting reconstitution to pending cases; finished cases are just as important as
pending ones, as evidence of rights and obligations finally adjudicated.[29]

Petitioner belabors the fact that no initiative was taken by the Government to
reconstitute the missing records of the trial court. We reiterate, however, that
"reconstitution is as much the duty of the prosecution as of the defense."[30] Petitioners
invocation of Ordoez v. Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152 (1994), is misplaced since
the grant of the petition for habeas corpustherein was premised on the loss of
records prior to the filing of Informations against the prisoners, and therefore "[t]he
government has failed to show that their continued detention is supported by a valid
conviction or by the pendency of charges against them or by any legitimate cause
whatsoever." In this case, the records were lost after petitioner, by his own admission,
was already convicted by the trial court of the offense charged. Further, the same
incident which gave rise to the filing of the Information for Robbery with Homicide also
gave rise to another case for Illegal Possession of Firearm,[31] the records of which
could be of assistance in the reconstitution of the present case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1] He was initially detained at the Manila City Jail, then transferred to the Youth
Rehabilitation Center, Camp Sampaguita, Muntinlupa, and later, pursuant to the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 28, 1995, transferred to the
Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City; Petition for Habeas Corpus, Records, p. 5.
[2] Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Commitment Order of the Above Entitled Criminal

Case, Annex "F", Records, p. 31-32.

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[3] Letter dated November 26, 1993 to Hon. Napoleon Flojo, Presiding Judge, RTC-
Manila, Branch 2, from C/Insp. JMP Warden Reynaldo E. Erlano, Annex "L" to the
Petition for Habeas Corpus, Records, p. 42.
[4] Petition, Records, p. 9; Certification dated November 17, 1993, by Emilia V. Queri,

Chief, Records Division, City Prosecutors Office, Records, p. 38; Certification dated
April 8, 1987 by Zenaida A. Arabiran, OIC, Administrative Division, City Fiscals Office,
Manila, Records, p. 39.
[5] Records, pp. 1-14.
[6] Id. at 61.
[7] Id. at 121-122.
[8] Rollo, pp. 43-46.
[9] Rollo, p. 50.
[10] Memorandum, Rollo, p. 156; Petition for Review, Rollo, pp. 14-15.

[11] Section 1 of Rule 120 provides:

"Section 1. Judgment defined. - The term judgment as used in this Rule means the
adjudication by the court that the accused is guilty or is not guilty of the offense
charged, and the imposition of the proper penalty and civil liability provided for by law on
the accused."

Section 2 provides:

"Section 2. Form and contents of judgment. - The judgment must be written in the
official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and
shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the
accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.

If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense
constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances attending the commission thereof, if there are any; (b) the participation of
the accused in the commission of the offense, whether as principal, accomplice or
accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (d) the civil
liability or damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from the accused by the
offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate
action has been reserved or waived.
In case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist, the judgment shall make a finding on the civil liability of
the accused in favor of the offended party."
[12] Rollo, pp. 66-102; Public Respondents filed a Manifestation and Motion in lieu of

Memorandum; Rollo, pp. 134-135.

[13] Velasco v. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 677, 679 (1995); Nava v. Gatmaitan, 90

Phil. 172, 176 (1951); Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778, 788 (1919).
[14] Nava v. Gatmaitan, 90 Phil. 172, 176 (1951); Quintos v. Director of Prisons, 55 Phil.

304, 306 (1930).

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[15] Andal v. People of the Philippines. et. al., G.R. Nos. 138268-69, May 26, 1999, p. 3;
Harden v. Director of Prisons, 81 Phil. 741, 746 (1948); Cruz v. Director of Prisons, 17
Phil. 269, 272 (1910).
[16] Records, pp. 69-70.
[17] Annex "F" of the Petition for Habeas Corpus, Records, pp. 31-32.
[18] Francisco, R., Basic Evidence, 1991 ed., p. 116.
[19] Records, p. 52.
[20] Id. at 90.
[21] State Prosecutors v. Muro, 251 SCRA 111, 113 (1995), citing 3 Jones,

Commentaries on Evidence, 2d. ed., Sec. 1084.

[22] State Prosecutors v. Muro, 251 SCRA 111, 113 (1995); Salonga v. Cruz Pao, 134

SCRA 438, 451 (1985).

[23] 39 Am Jur 2d 152.
[24] Harden v. Director of Prisons, 81 Phil. 741, 749-750 (1948).
[25] 39 C.J.S. 35; 39 Am Jur 2d 11, 28, 30, 64.
[26] AN ACT TO PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE PROCEDURE FOR THE

RECONSTITUTION OF THE RECORDS OF PENDING JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

AND BOOKS, DOCUMENTS, AND FILES OF THE OFFICE OF THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS, DESTROYED BY FIRE OR OTHER PUBLIC CALAMITIES, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES; See also Almario v. Ibaez, 81 Phil. 592 (1948); Zafra v. De Aquino, 84
Phil. 507 (1949).
[27] Yatco v. Cruz, 6 SCRA 1078, 1081 (1962); Wee Bin v. Republic, 100 SCRA 139,

149 (1980).
[28] Erlanger & Galinger v. Exconde, 93 Phil. 894, 900 (1953).
[29] Ibid.
[30] Gunabe v. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 993, 995 (1947); See also People v. Catoltol,

Sr., 265 SCRA 109, 112 (1996), where it was the Public Attorneys Office which initiated
the request for the reconstitution of the burned records of a decided case for rape;
Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128803, September 25, 1998, p. 541,
where it was plaintiff, through counsel, which moved for the reconstitution of a pending
civil case.
[31] People of the Philippines v. Norberto Feria y Pacquing, Criminal Case No. 60678,

decided by the RTC-Manila, Branch 4 on January 24, 1983, convicting accused

(petitioner herein); Records, Annex "C" to the Petition, p. 23-25.

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Case 5

G.R. No. 139789 July 19, 2001

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF POTENCIANO

ILUSORIO, ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner,
vs.
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO-YAP, JOHN DOES and
JANE DOES, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 139808 July 19, 2001

POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K.

ILUSORIO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.

RESOLUTION

PARDO, J.:

Once again we see the sad tale of a prominent family shattered by conflicts on
expectancy in fabled fortune.

On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, the matriarch who was so lovingly inseparable
from her husband some years ago, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals 1 for habeas
corpus to have custody of her husband in consortium.

On April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the petition
for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject, Potenciano Ilusorio.

Thus, on October 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court an
appeal via certiorari pursuing her desire to have custody of her husband Potenciano
Ilusorio.2 This case was consolidated with another case3 filed by Potenciano Ilusorio
and his children, Erlinda I. Bildner and Sylvia K. Ilusorio appealing from the order giving
visitation rights to his wife, asserting that he never refused to see her.

On May 12, 2000, we dismissed the petition for habeas corpus4 for lack of merit, and
granted the petition5 to nullify the Court of Appeals' ruling6 giving visitation rights to
Erlinda K. Ilusorio.7

What is now before the Court is Erlinda's motion to reconsider the decision. 8

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On September 20, 2000, we set the case for preliminary conference on October 11,
2000, at 10:00 a. m., without requiring the mandatory presence of the parties.

In that conference, the Court laid down the issues to be resolved, to wit:

(a) To determine the propriety of a physical and medical examination of petitioner

Potenciano Ilusorio;

(b) Whether the same is relevant; and

(c) If relevant, how the Court will conduct the same.9

The parties extensively discussed the issues. The Court, in its resolution, enjoined the
parties and their lawyers to initiate steps towards an amicable settlement of the case
through mediation and other means.

On November 29, 2000, the Court noted the manifestation and compliance of the
parties with the resolution of October 11, 2000.10

On January 31, 2001, the Court denied Erlinda Ilusorio's manifestation and motion
praying that Potenciano Ilusorio be produced before the Court and be medically
examined by a team of medical experts appointed by the Court.11

On March 27, 2001, we denied with finality Erlinda's motion to reconsider the Court's
order of January 31 , 2001.12

The issues raised by Erlinda K. Ilusorio in her motion for reconsideration are mere
reiterations of her arguments that have been resolved in the decision.

Nevertheless, for emphasis, we shall discuss the issues thus:

First. Erlinda K. Ilusorio claimed that she was not compelling Potenciano to live with her
in consortium and that Potenciano's mental state was not an issue. However, the very
root cause of the entire petition is her desire to have her husband's custody.13 Clearly,
Erlinda cannot now deny that she wanted Potenciano Ilusorio to live with her.

Second. One reason why Erlinda K. Ilusorio sought custody of her husband was that
respondents Lin and Sylvia were illegally restraining Potenciano Ilusorio to fraudulently
deprive her of property rights out of pure greed.14 She claimed that her two children
were using their sick and frail father to sign away Potenciano and Erlinda's property to
companies controlled by Lin and Sylvia. She also argued that since Potenciano retired
as director and officer of Baguio Country Club and Philippine Oversees
Telecommunications, she would logically assume his position and control. Yet, Lin and
Sylvia were the ones controlling the corporations.15

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Human Rights

The fact of illegal restraint has not been proved during the hearing at the Court of
Appeals on March 23, 1999.16Potenciano himself declared that he was not prevented by
his children from seeing anybody and that he had no objection to seeing his wife and
other children whom he loved.

Erlinda highlighted that her husband suffered from various ailments. Thus, Potenciano
Ilusorio did not have the mental capacity to decide for himself. Hence, Erlinda argued
that Potenciano be brought before the Supreme Court so that we could determine his
mental state.

We were not convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated to choose
whether to see his wife or not. Again, this is a question of fact that has been decided in
the Court of Appeals.

As to whether the children were in fact taking control of the corporation, these are
matters that may be threshed out in a separate proceeding, irrelevant in habeas corpus.

Third. Petitioner failed to sufficiently convince the Court why we should not rely on the
facts found by the Court of Appeals. Erlinda claimed that the facts mentioned in the
decision were erroneous and incomplete. We see no reason why the High Court of the
land need go to such length. The hornbook doctrine states that findings of fact of the
lower courts are conclusive on the Supreme Court.17 We emphasize, it is not for the
Court to weigh evidence all over again.18 Although there are exceptions to the
rule,19 Erlinda failed to show that this is an exceptional instance.

Fourth. Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and Articles 68 and 69 of
the Family Code support her position that as spouses, they (Potenciano and Erlinda)
are duty bound to live together and care for each other. We agree.

The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity.20 The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual
affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to
enforce consortium.21

Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano,
having separated from bed and board since 1972. We defined empathy as a shared
feeling between husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual
intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process.

Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with "amor gignit
amorem" respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of
its value as a sublime social institution.22

On June 28, 2001, Potenciano Ilusorio gave his soul to the Almighty, his Creator and
Supreme Judge. Let his soul rest in peace and his survivors continue the much
prolonged fracas ex aequo et bono.

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IN VIEW WHEREOF, we DENY Erlinda's motion for reconsideration. At any rate, the
case has been rendered moot by the death of subject.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51689.
2 Docketed as G.R. No. 139789.
3 G. R No. 139808.
4 G. R. No. 139789.
5 G. R. No. 139808.
6 In CA-G.R. SP No. 51689, promulgated on April 5, 1999.
7 Decision, Rollo of G.R. No. 139808, pp. 290-A — 290-J.
8 Promulgated on May 12, 2000.
9 Rollo of G. R No. 139808, p. 409.
10 Rollo of G. R No. 139808, p. 438.
11 Rollo of G. R No. 139808, p. 453-A.
12 Rollo of G. R No. 139808, p. 596.
13 Rollo of G. R. No. 139789, p. 24.
14 Rollo of G.R. No. 139808, p. 311.
15 Rollo of G.R. No. 139789, p. 560.
16Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G. R. SP No. 51689, Rollo of G.R. No.
139789, pp. 29-38.
17 Omandam vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128750, January 18, 2001.

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Human Rights

18 Co vs. Court of Appeals, 317 Phil. 230, 238 [1995]; Gobonseng, Jr. vs. Court
of Appeals, 316 Phil. 570 [1995].
19Romago Electric Co. vs. Court of Appeals, G. R No. 125947, June 8, 2000;
Halili vs. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 465 [1998]; Bautista vs. Mangaldan Rural
Bank, Inc., 230 SCRA 16 [1994].
20 Art. 68, Family Code.
21Tsoi vs. Lao-Tsoi, 334 Phil. 294 [1997], citing Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120
Phil. 1298 [1964].
22 Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals, supra, Note 21.

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Case 6
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 158802. November 17, 2004]

IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA (detained at
the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City) REYNALDO DE VILLA, petitioner,
JUNE DE VILLA, petitioner-relator, vs. THE DIRECTOR, NEW BILIBID
PRISONS, respondent.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court. Petitioner Reynaldo de Villa, joined by his son, petitioner-relator June de
Villa, seeks a two-fold relief: First, that respondent Director of Prisons justify the basis
for the imprisonment of petitioner Reynaldo de Villa; and second, that petitioner be
granted a new trial.[1] These reliefs are sought on the basis of purportedly exculpatory
evidence, gathered after performing deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing on samples
allegedly collected from the petitioner and a child born to the victim of the rape.
By final judgment dated February 1, 2001, in People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo
de Villa,[2] we found petitioner guilty of the rape of Aileen Mendoza, his niece by affinity;
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusin perpetua; and ordered him to pay the
offended party civil indemnity, moral damages, costs of the suit, and support for Leahlyn
Corales Mendoza, the putative child born of the rape. Petitioner is currently serving his
sentence at the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City.
As summarized in our Decision dated February 1, 2001, Aileen Mendoza charged
petitioner Reynaldo de Villa with rape in an information dated January 9, 1995, filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. When arraigned on January 26, 1995, petitioner
entered a plea of not guilty.[3]
During the trial, the prosecution established that sometime in the third week of April
1994, at about 10:00 in the morning, Aileen Mendoza woke up in her familys rented
room in Sagad, Pasig, Metro Manila, to find petitioner on top of her. Aileen was then
aged 12 years and ten months. She was unable to shout for help because petitioner
covered her mouth with a pillow and threatened to kill her. Aileen could not do anything
but cry. Petitioner succeeded in inserting his penis inside her vagina. After making
thrusting motions with his body, petitioner ejaculated. This encounter allegedly resulted
in Aileens pregnancy, which was noticed by her mother, Leonila Mendoza, sometime in
November 1994. When confronted by her mother, Aileen revealed that petitioner raped
her. Aileens parents then brought her to the Pasig Police Station, where they lodged a
criminal complaint against petitioner.[4]

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Human Rights

Dr. Rosaline Cosidon, who examined Aileen, confirmed that she was eight months
pregnant and found in her hymen healed lacerations at the 5:00 and 8:00 positions. On
December 19, 1994, Aileen gave birth to a baby girl whom she named Leahlyn
Mendoza.[5]
In his defense, petitioner alleged that, at the time of the alleged rape, he was
already 67 years old. Old age and sickness had rendered him incapable of having an
erection. He further averred that Aileens family had been holding a grudge against him,
which accounted for the criminal charges. Finally, he interposed the defense of alibi,
claiming that at the time of the incident, he was in his hometown of San Luis,
Batangas.[6]
The trial court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
qualified rape, and sentenced him to death, to indemnify the victim in the amount of
P50,000.00, to pay the costs of the suit and to support the child, Leahlyn Mendoza.[7]
On automatic review,[8] we found that the date of birth of Aileens child was medically
consistent with the time of the rape. Since it was never alleged that Aileen gave birth to
a full-term nine-month old baby, we gave credence to the prosecutions contention that
she prematurely gave birth to an eight-month old baby by normal delivery.[9] Thus, we
affirmed petitioners conviction for rape, in a Decision the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, finding accused-appellant

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS that he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusin perpetua and
ordered to pay the offended party P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral
damages; costs of the suit and to provide support for the child Leahlyn Corales
Mendoza.

SO ORDERED.[10]
Three years after the promulgation of our Decision, we are once more faced with
the question of Reynaldo de Villas guilt or innocence.
Petitioner-relator in this case, June de Villa, is the son of Reynaldo. He alleges that
during the trial of the case, he was unaware that there was a scientific test that could
determine once and for all if Reynaldo was the father of the victims child, Leahlyn.
Petitioner-relator was only informed during the pendency of the automatic review of
petitioners case that DNA testing could resolve the issue of paternity. [11] This
information was apparently furnished by the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) Anti-
Death Penalty Task Force, which took over as counsel for petitioner.
Thus, petitioners brief in People v. de Villa sought the conduct of a blood type test
and DNA test in order to determine the paternity of the child allegedly conceived as a
result of the rape.[12] This relief was implicitly denied in our Decision of February 21,
2001.
On March 16, 2001, Reynaldo de Villa filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
the Decision, wherein he once more prayed that DNA tests be conducted. [13] The Motion

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was denied with finality in a Resolution dated November 20, 2001. [14] Hence, the
Decision became final and executory on January 16, 2002.[15]
Petitioner-relator was undaunted by these challenges. Having been informed that
DNA tests required a sample that could be extracted from saliva, petitioner-relator
asked Billy Joe de Villa, a grandson of Reynaldo de Villa and a classmate of Leahlyn
Mendoza, to ask Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile cup.[16] Leahlyn readily agreed and
did so. Billy Joe took the sample home and gave it to the petitioner-relator, who
immediately labeled the cup as Container A.
Petitioner-relator then gathered samples from four grandchildren of Reynaldo de
Villa. These samples were placed in separate containers with distinguishing labels and
temporarily stored in a refrigerator prior to transport to the DNA Analysis Laboratory at
the National Science Research Institute (NSRI).[17] During transport, the containers
containing the saliva samples were kept on ice.
Petitioner-relator requested the NSRI to conduct DNA testing on the sample given
by Leahlyn Mendoza, those given by the grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa, and that
given by Reynaldo de Villa himself. The identities of the donors of the samples, save for
the sample given by Reynaldo de Villa, were not made known to the DNA Analysis
Laboratory.[18]
After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report on March 21, 2003,
which showed that Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired any of the children whose
samples were tested, due to the absence of a match between the pertinent genetic
markers in petitioners sample and those of any of the other samples, including
Leahlyns.[19]
Hence, in the instant petition for habeas corpus, petitioner argues as follows:

DNA ANALYSIS ON PATERNITY SHOWS CONCLUSIVELY THAT PETITIONER DE

VILLA IS NOT THE FATHER OF LEAHLYN MENDOZA; HIS CONVICTION FOR
RAPE, BASED ON THE FACT THAT LEAHLYN WAS SIRED AS A RESULT OF THE
ALLEGED RAPE, CANNOT STAND AND MUST BE SET ASIDE.[20]

xxxxxxxxx

A NEW TRIAL TO CONSIDER NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE IS PROPER AND

MAY BE ORDERED BY THIS COURT IN VIEW OF THE RESULTS OF THE DNA
TESTS CONDUCTED.[21]
Considering that the issues are inter-twined, they shall be discussed together.
In brief, petitioner relies upon the DNA evidence gathered subsequent to the trial in
order to re-litigate the factual issue of the paternity of the child Leahlyn Mendoza.
Petitioner alleges that this issue is crucial, considering that his conviction in 2001 was
based on the factual finding that he sired the said child. Since this paternity is now
conclusively disproved, he argues that the 2001 conviction must be overturned.

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Human Rights

In essence, petitioner invokes the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus to collaterally
attack the 2001 Decision. The ancillary remedy of a motion for new trial is resorted to
solely to allow the presentation of what is alleged to be newly-discovered evidence. This
Court is thus tasked to determine, first, the propriety of the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus to release an individual already convicted and serving sentence by virtue of a
final and executory judgment; and second, the propriety of granting a new trial under the
same factual scenario.
The extraordinary writ of habeas corpus has long been a haven of relief for those
seeking liberty from any unwarranted denial of freedom of movement. Very broadly, the
writ applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which a person has been
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person has been withheld
from the person entitled thereto.[22] Issuance of the writ necessitates that a person be
illegally deprived of his liberty. In the celebrated case of Villavicencio v. Lukban,[23] we
stated that [a]ny restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. [24]
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual
seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under
some form of illegal restraint. If an individuals liberty is restrained via
some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Concomitant to this
principle, the writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to directly assail a judgment
rendered by a competent court or tribunal which, having duly acquired jurisdiction, was
not deprived or ousted of this jurisdiction through some anomaly in the conduct of the
proceedings.
Thus, notwithstanding its historic function as the great writ of liberty, the writ
of habeas corpus has very limited availability as a post-conviction remedy. In the recent
case of Feria v. Court of Appeals,[25] we ruled that review of a judgment of conviction is
allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only in very specific
instances, such as when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been
a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court
had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been
imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess.[26]
In this instance, petitioner invokes the writ of habeas corpus to assail a final
judgment of conviction, without, however, providing a legal ground on which to anchor
his petition. In fine, petitioner alleges neither the deprivation of a constitutional right, the
absence of jurisdiction of the court imposing the sentence, or that an excessive penalty
has been imposed upon him.
In fine, petitioner invokes the remedy of habeas corpus in order to seek the review
of findings of fact long passed upon with finality. This relief is far outside the scope
of habeas corpusproceedings. In the early case of Abriol v. Homeres,[27] for example,
this Court stated the general rule that the writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error, and
should not be thus used. The writ of habeas corpus, whereas permitting a collateral
challenge of the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal issuing the process or judgment by
which an individual is deprived of his liberty, cannot be distorted by extending the
inquiry to mere errors of trial courts acting squarely within their jurisdiction.[28] The
reason for this is explained very simply in the case of Velasco v. Court of

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Human Rights

Appeals:[29] a habeas corpus petition reaches the body, but not the record of the
case. [30] A record must be allowed to remain extant, and cannot be revised, modified,
altered or amended by the simple expedient of resort to habeas corpus proceedings.
Clearly, mere errors of fact or law, which did not have the effect of depriving the trial
court of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the defendant, are not correctible
in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus; if at all, these errors must be
corrected on certiorari or on appeal, in the form and manner prescribed by law. [31] In the
past, this Court has disallowed the review of a courts appreciation of the evidence in a
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, as this is not the function of said
writ.[32] A survey of our decisions in habeas corpus cases demonstrates that, in general,
the writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ which furnishes an extraordinary
remedy; it may thus be invoked only under extraordinary circumstances. [33] We have
been categorical in our pronouncements that the writ of habeas corpus is not to be used
as a substitute for another, more proper remedy. Resort to the writ of habeas corpus is
available only in the limited instances when a judgment is rendered by a court or
tribunal devoid of jurisdiction. If, for instance, it can be demonstrated that there was a
deprivation of a constitutional right, the writ can be granted even after an individual has
been meted a sentence by final judgment.
Thus, in the case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals,[34] the writ of habeas corpus was
held to be available where an accused was deprived of the constitutional right against
self-incrimination. A defect so pronounced as the denial of an accuseds constitutional
rights results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction, and therefore invalidates the trial and
the consequent conviction of the accused. That void judgment of conviction may be
challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas
corpus.[35] Later, in Gumabon v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons,[36] this Court ruled
that, once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered
the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate
remedy to assail the legality of the detention.[37] Although in Feria v. Court of
Appeals[38] this Court was inclined to allow the presentation of new evidence in a
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, this was an exceptional situation. In
that case, we laid down the general rule, which states that the burden of proving illegal
restraint by the respondent rests on the petitioner who attacks such restraint. Where the
return is not subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth a process which, on its face,
shows good ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to
allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such
process.[39]
In the recent case of Calvan v. Court of Appeals,[40] we summarized the scope of
review allowable in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. We ruled
that the writ of habeas corpus, although not designed to interrupt the orderly
administration of justice, can be invoked by the attendance of a special circumstance
that requires immediate action. In such situations, the inquiry on a writ of habeas
corpus would be addressed, not to errors committed by a court within its jurisdiction, but
to the question of whether the proceeding or judgment under which a person has been
restrained is a complete nullity. The probe may thus proceed to check on the power and
authority, itself an equivalent test of jurisdiction, of the court or the judge to render the

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order that so serves as the basis of imprisonment or detention.[41] It is the nullity of an

assailed judgment of conviction which makes it susceptible to collateral attack through
the filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Upon a perusal of the records not merely of this case but of People v. de Villa, we
find that the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing.
First, the denial of a constitutional right has not been alleged by petitioner. As such,
this Court is hard-pressed to find legal basis on which to anchor the grant of a writ
of habeas corpus. Much as this Court sympathizes with petitioners plea, a careful
scrutiny of the records does not reveal any constitutional right of which the petitioner
was unduly deprived.
We are aware that other jurisdictions have seen fit to grant the writ
of habeas corpus in order to test claims that a defendant was denied effective aid of
counsel.[42] In this instance, we note that the record is replete with errors committed by
counsel, and it can be alleged that the petitioner was, at trial, denied the effective aid of
counsel. The United States Supreme Court requires a defendant alleging incompetent
counsel to show that the attorneys performance was deficient under a reasonable
standard, and additionally to show that the outcome of the trial would have been
different with competent counsel.[43] The purpose of the right to effective assistance of
counsel is to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial.[44]
The U.S. Supreme Court asserts that in judging any claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, one must examine whether counsels conduct undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process to such an extent that the trial did not produce a
fair and just result.[45] The proper measure of attorney performance is reasonable under
the prevailing professional norms, and the defendant must show that the representation
received fell below the objective standard of reasonableness. [46] For the petition to
succeed, the strong presumption that the counsels conduct falls within the wide range
or reasonable professional assistance must be overcome.[47]
In the case at bar, it appears that in the middle of the appeal, the petitioners counsel
of record, a certain Atty. Alfonso G. Salvador, suddenly and inexplicably withdrew his
appearance as counsel, giving the sole explanation that he was leaving for the United
States for an indefinite period of time by virtue of a petition filed in his favor. [48] In the
face of this abandonment, petitioner made an impassioned plea that his lawyer be
prevented from this withdrawal in a handwritten Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and
Opposition of Counsels Withdrawal of Appearance with Leave of Court received by this
Court on September 14, 1999.[49] Petitioner alleged that his counsels withdrawal is an
untimely and heartbreaking event, considering that he had placed all [his] trust and
confidence on [his counsels] unquestionable integrity and dignity.[50]
While we are sympathetic to petitioners plight, we do not, however, find that there
was such negligence committed by his earlier counsel so as to amount to a denial of a
constitutional right. There is likewise no showing that the proceedings were tainted with
any other jurisdictional defect.
In fine, we find that petitioner invokes the remedy of the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus to seek a re-examination of the records of People v. de Villa, without asserting

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any legal grounds therefor. For all intents and purposes, petitioner seeks a reevaluation
of the evidentiary basis for his conviction. We are being asked to reexamine the weight
and sufficiency of the evidence in this case, not on its own, but in light of the new DNA
evidence that the petitioner seeks to present to this Court. This relief is outside the
scope of a habeas corpus petition. The petition for habeas corpus must, therefore, fail.
Coupled with the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, petitioner seeks
a new trial to re-litigate the issue of the paternity of the child Leahlyn Mendoza.
It must be stressed that the issue of Leahlyn Mendozas paternity is not central to
the issue of petitioners guilt or innocence. The rape of the victim Aileen Mendoza is an
entirely different question, separate and distinct from the question of the father of her
child. Recently, in the case of People v. Alberio,[51] we ruled that the fact or not of the
victims pregnancy and resultant childbirth are irrelevant in determining whether or not
she was raped. Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the
child which the victim bore was fathered by the purported rapist, or by some unknown
individual, is of no moment in determining an individuals guilt.
In the instant case, however, we note that the grant of child support to Leahlyn
Mendoza indicates that our Decision was based, at least in small measure, on the
victims claim that the petitioner fathered her child. This claim was given credence by the
trial court, and, as a finding of fact, was affirmed by this Court on automatic review.
The fact of the childs paternity is now in issue, centrally relevant to the civil award of
child support. It is only tangentially related to the issue of petitioners guilt. However, if it
can be conclusively determined that the petitioner did not sire Leahlyn Mendoza, this
may cast the shadow of reasonable doubt, and allow the acquittal of the petitioner on
this basis.
Be that as it may, it appears that the petitioner once more relies upon erroneous
legal grounds in resorting to the remedy of a motion for new trial. A motion for new trial,
under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, is available only for a limited period of
time, and for very limited grounds. Under Section 1, Rule 121, of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, a motion for new trial may be filed at any time before a judgment
of conviction becomes final, that is, within fifteen (15) days from its promulgation or
notice. Upon finality of the judgment, therefore, a motion for new trial is no longer an
available remedy. Section 2 of Rule 121 enumerates the grounds for a new trial:

SEC. 2. Grounds for a new trial.The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following
grounds:

(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused
have been committed during the trial;

(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not
with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if
introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment.

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In the case at bar, petitioner anchors his plea on the basis of purportedly newly-
discovered evidence, i.e., the DNA test subsequently conducted, allegedly excluding
petitioner from the child purportedly fathered as a result of the rape.
The decision sought to be reviewed in this petition for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus has long attained finality, and entry of judgment was made as far back
as January 16, 2002. Moreover, upon an examination of the evidence presented by the
petitioner, we do not find that the DNA evidence falls within the statutory or
jurisprudential definition of newly- discovered evidence.
A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if
the following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that
said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that that, if
admitted, it would probably change the judgment.[52] It is essential that the offering party
exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial
but nonetheless failed to secure it.[53]
In this instance, although the DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered after the
trial, we nonetheless find that it does not meet the criteria for newly-discovered
evidence that would merit a new trial. Such evidence disproving paternity could have
been discovered and produced at trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence.
Petitioner-relators claim that he was unaware of the existence of DNA testing until
the trial was concluded carries no weight with this Court. Lack of knowledge of the
existence of DNA testing speaks of negligence, either on the part of petitioner, or on the
part of petitioners counsel. In either instance, however, this negligence is binding upon
petitioner. It is a settled rule that a party cannot blame his counsel for negligence when
he himself was guilty of neglect.[54] A client is bound by the acts of his counsel, including
the latters mistakes and negligence.[55] It is likewise settled that relief will not be granted
to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the
remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or to a mistaken mode of procedure. [56]
Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence presented by
petitioner and his counsel, we are not convinced that Reynaldo de Villa is entitled to
outright acquittal. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, even if it is
conclusively proven that Reynaldo de Villa is not the father of Leahlyn Mendoza, his
conviction could, in theory, still stand, with Aileen Mendozas testimony and positive
identification as its bases.[57] The Solicitor General reiterates, and correctly so, that the
pregnancy of the victim has never been an element of the crime of rape. [58] Therefore,
the DNA evidence has failed to conclusively prove to this Court that Reynaldo de Villa
should be discharged. Although petitioner claims that conviction was based solely on a
finding of paternity of the child Leahlyn, this is not the case. Our conviction was based
on the clear and convincing testimonial evidence of the victim, which, given credence by
the trial court, was affirmed on appeal.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for habeas corpus and
new trial is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

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No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna,
Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., and Panganiban, J., joins Carpio and Callejo, Sr., JJ., in their
separate opinion.
Carpio, J., please see separate concurring opinion.
Callejo, Sr., J., please see separate opinion.
Corona, J., on leave.

[1] Rollo, p. 9.
[2] G.R. No. 124639, 1 February 2001, 351 SCRA 25.
[3] Id., p. 27.
[4] Id.
[5] Id., pp. 27, 31-32.
[6] Id., pp. 28, 30.
[7] Id., p. 28.
[8] Id.
[9] Id., pp. 31-32.
[10] Id., pp. 34-35.
[11] Rollo, pp. 4-5.
[12] Rollo, People v. de Villa, pp. 121-123.
[13] Rollo, p. 94.
[14] Id., p. 102.
[15] Id., p. 103.
[16] Id., p. 5.
[17] Id.
[18] Id.
[19] Id., pp. 12-13, 124.
[20] Id., p. 6.
[21] Id., p. 8.
[22] RULES OF COURT, Rule 102, sec. 1.

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[23] 39 Phil. 778 (1919).

[24] Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778, 790 (1919).
[25] 382 Phil. 412 (2000).
[26] Feria v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 412, 421 (2000). (Citations omitted)
[27] 84 Phil. 525 (1949).
[28] Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525, 530, 533 (1949). (Citations omitted)
[29] G.R. No. 118644, 7 July 1995, 245 SCRA 677.
[30] Velasco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118644, 7 July 1995, 245 SCRA 677, 684.
[31] Felipe v. Director of Prisons, 24 Phil. 121 (1913), cited in In re Garcia, G.R. No.
141443, 30 August 2000. (Citations omitted)
[32] Ngo Yao Tit v. Sheriff of Manila, 27 Phil. 378, 382 (1914).
[33] Calvan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140823, 3 October 2000. (Citations omitted)
[34] G.R. No. 29169, 19 August 1968, 24 SCRA 663.
[35] Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 133 Phil. 661, 682-683 (1968).
[36] 147 Phil. 363 (1971).
[37] Gumabon v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, 147 Phil. 363, 369 (1971).
[38] 382 Phil. 412 (2000).
[39] Feria v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 412, 423 (2000). (Citations omitted)
[40] G.R. No. 140823, 3 October 2000.
[41] Calvan v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[42] ANTIEAU, THE PRACTICE OF EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES: HABEAS CORPUS
AND THE OTHER COMMON LAW WRITS 169, citing Strickland v. Washington
(1984) 466 US 668, 104 S Ct 2052, 80 L Ed 2d; Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980) 446 US
335, 100 S Ct 1708, 64 L Ed 333; Scalf v. Bennet (1967) 260 Iowa 393, 147 NW
2d 860; Smith v. Woodley (ND 1969) 164 NW 2d 594; Kime v. Brewer (Iowa
1970) 182 NW 2d 154; Crosby v. State (1962) 241 SC 40, 126 SE 2d 843; United
States ex rel. Thomas v. Zelker (SD NY 1971) 332 F Supp 595; Sand v. Estelle
(5th Cir. 1977) 551 F 2d 49, 559 F 2d 364, cert dnd 434 US 1076; McQueen v.
Swenson (8th Cir. 1977) 560 F 2d 959; Davis v. Alabama (5th Cir. 1979) 596 F 2d
1214; Kemp v. Leggett (5th Cir. 1981) 635 F 2d 453; Goodwin v. Balkcom
(11th Cir. 1982) 684 F 2d 794; Ex parte Barnes (Tex Crim App 1972) 478 SW 2d
547; In re Larkin (Tex Crim App 1967) 420 SW 2d 958; Vela v. Estelle (5 th Cir
1983) 708 F 2d 954.
[43] ANTIEAU, THE PRACTICE OF EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES: HABEAS CORPUS
AND THE OTHER COMMON LAW WRITS 169, citing Strickland v. Washington
(1984) 466 US 668, 104 S Ct 2052, 80 L Ed 2d 674.

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[44] FLANGO, HABEAS CORPUS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 49.

[45] FLANGO, HABEAS CORPUS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 49, citing
Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 US 668, 104 S Ct 2052, 80 L Ed 2d, at 687.
[46] Id., p. 688.
[47] Id., p. 690.
[48] Rollo, G.R. No. 124639, p. 76.
[49] Id., pp. 72-75.
[50] Id., p. 72.
[51] G.R. No. 152584, 6 July 2004.
[52] REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 121, Section 2 (b); People v.
Judavar, G.R. No. 135521, 11 April 2002.
[53] Colinares v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90828, 5 September 2000, 339 SCRA 609,
618, citing Tumang v. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 328, 334 (1989); Garrido v.
Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 450, 456 (1994).
[54] Villanueva v. People, G.R. No. 135098, 330 SCRA 695, 703 (2000);
citing Macapagal v. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 491, 502 (1997).
[55] Id., pp. 702-703.
[56] See Spouses Mesina v. Meer, G.R. No. 146845, 2 July 2002, p. 10.
[57] People v. Molleda, G.R. No. 153219, 1 December 2003.
[58] People v. Mendoza, G.R. Nos. 46693-94, 31 July 2003.

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Case 7

EN BANC

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION G.R. No. 160792

FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
CAPT. GARY ALEJANO, PN (MARINES)
CAPT. NICANOR FAELDON, PN (MARINES)
CAPT. GERARDO GAMBALA, PA
LT. SG JAMES LAYUG, PN
CAPT. MILO MAESTRECAMPO, PA
LT. SG ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, PN
HOMOBONO ADAZA, and
ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL) PULIDO,
Petitioners,
Present:
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
Puno,
Panganiban,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
- versus - Carpio,
Austria-Martinez,
Corona,
Carpio Morales,
Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna,
Tinga,
Chico-Nazario, and
Garcia, JJ.
GEN. PEDRO CABUAY,
GEN. NARCISO ABAYA,
SEC. ANGELO REYES, and Promulgated:
SEC. ROILO GOLEZ,
Respondents. August 25, 2005

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

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DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This petition for review[1] seeks to nullify the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals
dated 17 September 2003 and Resolution dated 13 November 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No.
78545. The Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution dismissed the petition for habeas
corpus filed by lawyers Homobono Adaza and Roberto Rafael Pulido (petitioners) on
behalf of their detained clients Capt. Gary Alejano (PN-Marines), Capt. Nicanor Faeldon
(PN-Marines), Capt. Gerardo Gambala (PA), Lt. SG James Layug (PN), Capt. Milo
Maestrecampo (PA), and Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV (PN) (detainees).

Petitioners named as respondent Gen. Pedro Cabuay (Gen. Cabuay), Chief of

the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP), who has
custody of the detainees. Petitioners impleaded Gen. Narciso Abaya (Gen. Abaya),
Sec. Angelo Reyes and Roilo Golez, who are respectively the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Secretary of National Defense and National
Security Adviser, because they have command responsibility over Gen. Cabuay.

Antecedent Facts

Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior
officers, entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments
(Oakwood), an upscale apartment complex, located in the business district of Makati
City. The soldiers disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and planted explosive
devices in its immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced their
support for the administration and called for the resignation of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members.

Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities after several negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers later
defused the explosive devices they had earlier planted. The soldiers then returned to
their barracks.

On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all
the Major Service Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP
Detention Center. The transfer took place while military and civilian authorities were
investigating the soldiers involvement in the Oakwood incident.

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On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup detat with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers involved in the 27
July 2003 Oakwood incident. The government prosecutors accused the soldiers of coup
detat as defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines, as amended. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784. The
trial court later issued the Commitment Orders giving custody of junior officers Lt. SG
Antonio Trillanes IV (Trillanes) and Capt. Gerardo Gambala to the Commanding
Officers of ISAFP.

On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major Service Commanders to
take into custody the military personnel under their command who took part in the
Oakwood incident except the detained junior officers who were to remain under the
custody of ISAFP.

On 11 August 2003, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Supreme
Court. On 12 August 2003, the Court issued a Resolution, which resolved to:

(a) ISSUE the WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; (b) require respondents to

make a RETURN of the writ on Monday, 18 August 2003, at 10:00 a.m.
before the Court of Appeals; (c) refer the case to the Court of Appeals
for RAFFLE among the Justices thereof for hearing, further proceedings
and decision thereon, after which a REPORT shall be made to this Court
within ten (10) days from promulgation of the decision.[3]

Thus, the Court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus dated 12 August 2003 directing
respondents to make a return of the writ and to appear and produce the persons of the
detainees before the Court of Appeals on the scheduled date for hearing and further
proceedings.

On the same date, the detainees and their other co-accused filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the trial
court granted.

On 18 August 2003, pursuant to the directives of the Court, respondents

submitted their Return of the Writ and Answer to the petition and produced the
detainees before the Court of Appeals during the scheduled hearing. After the parties
filed their memoranda on 28 August 2003, the appellate court considered the petition
submitted for decision.

On 17 September 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision dismissing

the petition. Nonetheless, the appellate court ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was in charge
of implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center, to uphold faithfully the
rights of the detainees in accordance with Standing Operations Procedure No. 0263-04.

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The appellate court directed Gen. Cabuay to adhere to his commitment made in court
regarding visiting hours and the detainees right to exercise for two hours a day.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals found the petition bereft of merit. The appellate court
pointed out that the detainees are already charged of coup detat before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees
confinement is under a valid indictment, the legality of which the detainees and
petitioners do not even question.

The Court of Appeals recognized that habeas corpus may also be the
appropriate remedy to assail the legality of detention if there is a deprivation of a
constitutional right. However, the appellate court held that the constitutional rights
alleged to have been violated in this case do not directly affect the detainees liberty.
The appellate court ruled that the regulation of the detainees right to confer with their
counsels is reasonable under the circumstances.

The appellate court declared that while the opening and reading of Trillanes letter
is an abhorrent violation of his right to privacy of communication, this does not justify the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The violation does not amount to illegal restraint,
which is the proper subject of habeas corpus proceedings.

The Court of Appeals thus dismissed the petition and ordered Gen. Cabuay to
fulfill the promise he made in open court to uphold the visiting hours and the right of the
detainees to exercise for two hours a day. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition is

hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Cabuay is hereby ORDERED to
faithfully adhere to his commitment to uphold the constitutional rights of
the detainees in accordance with the Standing Operations Procedure No.
0263-04 regarding visiting hours and the right of the detainees to exercise
for two (2) hours a day.

SO ORDERED.[4]

The Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues for resolution:

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A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

REVIEWING AND REVERSING A DECISION OF THE SUPREME
COURT;

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACKNOWLEDGING THE

APPROPRIATENESS OF THE REMEDY PETITIONERS SEEK;
and

C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASSERTING THE LEGALITY

OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE DETAINED JUNIOR OFFICERS
DETENTION.[5]

The Ruling of the Court

The petition lacks merit.

Petitioners claim that the Courts 12 August 2003 Order granted the petition and
the Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals only for a factual hearing.
Petitioners thus argue that the Courts Order had already foreclosed any question on the
propriety and merits of their petition.

Petitioners claim is baseless. A plain reading of the 12 August 2003 Order shows
that the Court referred to the Court of Appeals the duty to inquire into the cause of the
junior officers detention. Had the Court ruled for the detainees release, the Court would
not have referred the hearing of the petition to the Court of Appeals. The Court would
have forthwith released the detainees had the Court upheld petitioners cause.

In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an individual before the court is
a preliminary step in the hearing of the petition.[6] The respondent must produce the
person and explain the cause of his detention. [7] However, this order is not a ruling on
the propriety of the remedy or on the substantive matters covered by the remedy. Thus,
the Courts order to the Court of Appeals to conduct a factual hearing was not an
affirmation of the propriety of the remedy of habeas corpus.
For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily
includes the determination of the propriety of the remedy. If a court finds the alleged
cause of the detention unlawful, then it should issue the writ and release the detainees.
In the present case, after hearing the case, the Court of Appeals found that habeas
corpus is inapplicable. After actively participating in the hearing before the Court of

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Appeals, petitioners are estopped from claiming that the appellate court had no
jurisdiction to inquire into the merits of their petition.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not the
proper remedy to address the detainees complaint against the regulations and
conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center. The remedy of habeas corpus has one
objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person.[8] The purpose of the writ is
to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty. [9] If the inquiry
reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If,
however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.
The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of error.[10] Neither can it
substitute for an appeal.[11]

Nonetheless, case law has expanded the writs application to circumstances

where there is deprivation of a persons constitutional rights. The writ is available where
a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional
freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely
involuntary but are also unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally
valid has later become arbitrary.[12]

However, a mere allegation of a violation of ones constitutional right is not

sufficient. The courts will extend the scope of the writ only if any of the following
circumstances is present: (a) there is a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in
the unlawful restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the
sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty is imposed and such sentence is void as to the
excess.[13] Whatever situation the petitioner invokes, the threshold remains high. The
violation of constitutional right must be sufficient to void the entire proceedings. [14]

Petitioners admit that they do not question the legality of the detention of the
detainees. Neither do they dispute the lawful indictment of the detainees for criminal
and military offenses. What petitioners bewail is the regulation adopted by Gen. Cabuay
in the ISAFP Detention Center preventing petitioners as lawyers from seeing the
detainees their clients any time of the day or night. The regulation allegedly curtails the
detainees right to counsel and violates Republic Act No. 7438 (RA 7438). [15] Petitioners
claim that the regulated visits made it difficult for them to prepare for the important
hearings before the Senate and the Feliciano Commission.

Petitioners also point out that the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center violated
the detainees right to privacy of communication when the ISAFP officials opened and
read the personal letters of Trillanes and Capt. Milo Maestrecampo (Maestrecampo).
Petitioners further claim that the ISAFP officials violated the detainees right against
cruel and unusual punishment when the ISAFP officials prevented the detainees from
having contact with their visitors. Moreover, the ISAFP officials boarded up with iron
bars and plywood slabs the iron grills of the detention cells, limiting the already poor
light and ventilation in the detainees cells.

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Pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon

confinement.[16] However, the fact that the detainees are confined makes their rights
more limited than those of the public.[17] RA 7438, which specifies the rights of
detainees and the duties of detention officers, expressly recognizes the power of the
detention officer to adopt and implement reasonable measures to secure the safety of
the detainee and prevent his escape. Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides:

Section 4. Penalty Clause. a) x x x

b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member
of the immediate family of a person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister or by his
counsel, from visiting and conferring privately chosen by him or by any
member of his immediate family with him, or from examining and treating
him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of the day or, in
urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not
less than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of four
thousand pesos (P4,000.00).

The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer

with custodial responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may undertake
such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure his safety
and prevent his escape. (Emphasis supplied)

True, Section 4(b) of RA 7438 makes it an offense to prohibit a lawyer from

visiting a detainee client at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night.
However, the last paragraph of the same Section 4(b) makes the express qualification
that notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4(b), the detention officer has the power
to undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the safety of
the detainee and prevent his escape.

The last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 prescribes a clear standard. The
regulations governing a detainees confinement must be reasonable measures x x x to
secure his safety and prevent his escape. Thus, the regulations must be reasonably
connected to the governments objective of securing the safety and preventing the
escape of the detainee. The law grants the detention officer the authority to undertake
such reasonable measures or regulations.

Petitioners contend that there was an actual prohibition of the detainees right to
effective representation when petitioners visits were limited by the schedule of visiting
hours. Petitioners assert that the violation of the detainees rights entitle them to be
released from detention.

Petitioners contention does not persuade us. The schedule of visiting hours does
not render void the detainees indictment for criminal and military offenses to warrant the
detainees release from detention. The ISAFP officials did not deny, but merely

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regulated, the detainees right to counsel. The purpose of the regulation is not to render
ineffective the right to counsel, but to secure the safety and security of all detainees.
American cases are instructive on the standards to determine whether regulations on
pre-trial confinement are permissible.

In Bell v. Wolfish,[18] the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court held that
regulations must be reasonably related to maintaining security and must not be
excessive in achieving that purpose. Courts will strike down a restriction that is arbitrary
and purposeless.[19] However, Bell v. Wolfish expressly discouraged courts from
skeptically questioning challenged restrictions in detention and prison facilities. [20] The
U.S. Supreme Court commanded the courts to afford administrators wide-ranging
deference in implementing policies to maintain institutional security.[21]

In our jurisdiction, the last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides the
standard to make regulations in detention centers allowable: such reasonable
measures as may be necessary to secure the detainees safety and prevent his
escape. In the present case, the visiting hours accorded to the lawyers of the detainees
are reasonably connected to the legitimate purpose of securing the safety and
preventing the escape of all detainees.

While petitioners may not visit the detainees any time they want, the fact that the
detainees still have face-to-face meetings with their lawyers on a daily basis clearly
shows that there is no impairment of detainees right to counsel. Petitioners as counsels
could visit their clients between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. with a lunch break at 12:00
p.m. The visiting hours are regular business hours, the same hours when lawyers
normally entertain clients in their law offices. Clearly, the visiting hours pass the
standard of reasonableness. Moreover, in urgent cases, petitioners could always seek
permission from the ISAFP officials to confer with their clients beyond the visiting hours.

The scheduled visiting hours provide reasonable access to the detainees, giving
petitioners sufficient time to confer with the detainees. The detainees right to counsel is
not undermined by the scheduled visits. Even in the hearings before the Senate and the
Feliciano Commission,[22] petitioners were given time to confer with the detainees, a fact
that petitioners themselves admit.[23] Thus, at no point were the detainees denied their
right to counsel.

Petitioners further argue that the bars separating the detainees from their visitors
and the boarding of the iron grills in their cells with plywood amount to unusual and
excessive punishment. This argument fails to impress us. Bell v. Wolfish pointed out
that while a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance
with due process of law, detention inevitably interferes with a detainees desire to live
comfortably.[24] The fact that the restrictions inherent in detention intrude into the
detainees desire to live comfortably does not convert those restrictions into
punishment.[25] It is when the restrictions are arbitrary and purposeless that courts will
infer intent to punish.[26] Courts will also infer intent to punish even if the restriction
seems to be related rationally to the alternative purpose if the restriction appears

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excessive in relation to that purpose.[27] Jail officials are thus not required to use the
least restrictive security measure.[28] They must only refrain from implementing a
restriction that appears excessive to the purpose it serves.[29]

We quote Bell v. Wolfish:

One further point requires discussion. The petitioners assert, and

respondents concede, that the essential objective of pretrial confinement
is to insure the detainees presence at trial. While this interest undoubtedly
justifies the original decision to confine an individual in some manner, we
do not accept respondents argument that the Governments interest in
ensuring a detainees presence at trial is the only objective that may justify
restraints and conditions once the decision is lawfully made to confine a
person. If the government could confine or otherwise infringe the liberty of
detainees only to the extent necessary to ensure their presence at trial,
house arrest would in the end be the only constitutionally justified form of
detention. The Government also has legitimate interests that stem from its
need to manage the facility in which the individual is detained. These
legitimate operational concerns may require administrative measures that
go beyond those that are, strictly speaking, necessary to ensure that the
detainee shows up at trial. For example, the Government must be able to
take steps to maintain security and order at the institution and make
certain no weapons or illicit drugs reach detainees. Restraints that are
reasonably related to the institutions interest in maintaining jail security do
not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if they are
discomforting and are restrictions that the detainee would not have
experienced had he been released while awaiting trial. We need not here
attempt to detail the precise extent of the legitimate governmental
interests that may justify conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention. It is
enough simply to recognize that in addition to ensuring the detainees
presence at trial, the effective management of the detention facility once
the individual is confined is a valid objective that may justify imposition of
conditions and restrictions of pretrial detention and dispel any inference
that such restrictions are intended as punishment.[30]

An action constitutes a punishment when (1) that action causes the inmate to
suffer some harm or disability, and (2) the purpose of the action is to punish the
inmate.[31]Punishment also requires that the harm or disability be significantly greater
than, or be independent of, the inherent discomforts of confinement.[32]

Block v. Rutherford,[33] which reiterated Bell v. Wolfish, upheld the blanket

restriction on contact visits as this practice was reasonably related to maintaining
security.The safety of innocent individuals will be jeopardized if they are exposed to
detainees who while not yet convicted are awaiting trial for serious, violent offenses and
may have prior criminal conviction.[34] Contact visits make it possible for the detainees to

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hold visitors and jail staff hostage to effect escapes.[35] Contact visits also leave the jail
vulnerable to visitors smuggling in weapons, drugs, and other contraband.[36] The
restriction on contact visits was imposed even on low-risk detainees as they could also
potentially be enlisted to help obtain contraband and weapons. [37] The security
consideration in the imposition of blanket restriction on contact visits was ruled to
outweigh the sentiments of the detainees.[38]

Block v. Rutherford held that the prohibition of contact visits bore a rational
connection to the legitimate goal of internal security.[39] This case reaffirmed the hands-
off doctrine enunciated in Bell v. Wolfish, a form of judicial self-restraint, based on the
premise that courts should decline jurisdiction over prison matters in deference to
administrative expertise.[40]

In the present case, we cannot infer punishment from the separation of the
detainees from their visitors by iron bars, which is merely a limitation on contact visits.
The iron bars separating the detainees from their visitors prevent direct physical contact
but still allow the detainees to have visual, verbal, non-verbal and limited physical
contact with their visitors. The arrangement is not unduly restrictive. In fact, it is not
even a strict non-contact visitation regulation like in Block v. Rutherford. The limitation
on the detainees physical contacts with visitors is a reasonable, non-punitive response
to valid security concerns.

The boarding of the iron grills is for the furtherance of security within the ISAFP
Detention Center. This measure intends to fortify the individual cells and to prevent the
detainees from passing on contraband and weapons from one cell to another. The
boarded grills ensure security and prevent disorder and crime within the facility. The
diminished illumination and ventilation are but discomforts inherent in the fact of
detention, and do not constitute punishments on the detainees.
We accord respect to the finding of the Court of Appeals that the conditions in the
ISAFP Detention Center are not inhuman, degrading and cruel. Each detainee, except
for Capt. Nicanor Faeldon and Capt. Gerardo Gambala, is confined in separate cells,
unlike ordinary cramped detention cells. The detainees are treated well and given
regular meals. The Court of Appeals noted that the cells are relatively clean and livable
compared to the conditions now prevailing in the city and provincial jails, which are
congested with detainees. The Court of Appeals found the assailed measures to be
reasonable considering that the ISAFP Detention Center is a high-risk detention facility.
Apart from the soldiers, a suspected New Peoples Army (NPA) member and two
suspected Abu Sayyaf members are detained in the ISAFP Detention Center.

We now pass upon petitioners argument that the officials of the ISAFP Detention
Center violated the detainees right to privacy when the ISAFP officials opened and read
the letters handed by detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo to one of the petitioners
for mailing. Petitioners point out that the letters were not in a sealed envelope but simply
folded because there were no envelopes in the ISAFP Detention Center. Petitioners
contend that the Constitution prohibits the infringement of a citizens privacy rights

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unless authorized by law. The Solicitor General does not deny that the ISAFP officials
opened the letters.
Courts in the U.S. have generally permitted prison officials to open and read all
incoming and outgoing mail of convicted prisoners to prevent the smuggling of
contraband into the prison facility and to avert coordinated escapes. [41] Even in the
absence of statutes specifically allowing prison authorities from opening and inspecting
mail, such practice was upheld based on the principle of civil deaths. [42] Inmates were
deemed to have no right to correspond confidentially with anyone. The only restriction
placed upon prison authorities was that the right of inspection should not be used to
delay unreasonably the communications between the inmate and his lawyer. [43]

Eventually, the inmates outgoing mail to licensed attorneys, courts, and court
officials received respect.[44] The confidential correspondences could not be
censored.[45]The infringement of such privileged communication was held to be a
violation of the inmates First Amendment rights.[46] A prisoner has a right to consult with
his attorney in absolute privacy, which right is not abrogated by the legitimate interests
of prison authorities in the administration of the institution.[47] Moreover, the risk is small
that attorneys will conspire in plots that threaten prison security.[48]

American jurisprudence initially made a distinction between the privacy rights

enjoyed by convicted inmates and pre-trial detainees. The case of Palmigiano v.
Travisono[49] recognized that pre-trial detainees, unlike convicted prisoners, enjoy a
limited right of privacy in communication. Censorship of pre-trial detainees mail
addressed to public officials, courts and counsel was held impermissible. While
incoming mail may be inspected for contraband and read in certain instances, outgoing
mail of pre-trial detainees could not be inspected or read at all.

In the subsequent case of Wolff v. McDonnell,[50] involving convicted prisoners,

the U.S. Supreme Court held that prison officials could open in the presence of the
inmates incoming mail from attorneys to inmates. However, prison officials could not
read such mail from attorneys. Explained the U.S. Supreme Court:

The issue of the extent to which prison authorities can open and inspect
incoming mail from attorneys to inmates, has been considerably narrowed in
the course of this litigation. The prison regulation under challenge provided
that (a)ll incoming and outgoing mail will be read and inspected, and no
exception was made for attorney-prisoner mail. x x x

Petitioners now concede that they cannot open and read mail from attorneys
to inmates, but contend that they may open all letters from attorneys as long
as it is done in the presence of the prisoners. The narrow issue thus
presented is whether letters determined or found to be from attorneys may
be opened by prison authorities in the presence of the inmate or whether
such mail must be delivered unopened if normal detection techniques fail to
indicate contraband.

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xxx
x x x If prison officials had to check in each case whether a communication
was from an attorney before opening it for inspection, a near impossible task
of administration would be imposed. We think it entirely appropriate that the
State require any such communications to be specially marked as originating
from an attorney, with his name and address being given, if they are to
receive special treatment. It would also certainly be permissible that prison
authorities require that a lawyer desiring to correspond with a prisoner, first
identify himself and his client to the prison officials, to assure that the letters
marked privileged are actually from members of the bar. As to the ability to
open the mail in the presence of inmates, this could in no way constitute
censorship, since the mail would not be read. Neither could it chill such
communications, since the inmates presence insures that prison officials will
not read the mail. The possibility that contraband will be enclosed in letters,
even those from apparent attorneys, surely warrants prison officials opening
the letters. We disagree with the Court of Appeals that this should only be
done in appropriate circumstances. Since a flexible test, besides being
unworkable, serves no arguable purpose in protecting any of the possible
constitutional rights enumerated by respondent, we think that petitioners, by
acceding to a rule whereby the inmate is present when mail from attorneys is
inspected, have done all, and perhaps even more, than the Constitution
requires.[51]

In Hudson v. Palmer,[52] the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an inmate has no
reasonable expectation of privacy inside his cell. The U.S. Supreme Court explained
that prisoners necessarily lose many protections of the Constitution, thus:

However, while persons imprisoned for crime enjoy many protections of the
Constitution, it is also clear that imprisonment carries with it the
circumscription or loss of many significant rights. These constraints on
inmates, and in some cases the complete withdrawal of certain rights, are
justified by the considerations underlying our penal system. The curtailment
of certain rights is necessary, as a practical matter, to accommodate a
myriad of institutional needs and objectives of prison facilities, chief among
which is internal security. Of course, these restrictions or retractions also
serve, incidentally, as reminders that, under our system of justice, deterrence
and retribution are factors in addition to correction.[53]

The later case of State v. Dunn,[54] citing Hudson v. Palmer,

abandoned Palmigiano v. Travisono and made no distinction as to the detainees
limited right to privacy.State v. Dunn noted the considerable jurisprudence in the United
States holding that inmate mail may be censored for the furtherance of a substantial
government interest such as security or discipline. State v. Dunn declared that if

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complete censorship is permissible, then the lesser act of opening the mail and reading
it is also permissible. We quote State v. Dunn:

[A] right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally

incompatible with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and their
cells required to ensure institutional security and internal order. We are
satisfied that society would insist that the prisoners expectation of privacy
always yield to what must be considered a paramount interest in
institutional security. We believe that it is accepted by our society that
[l]oss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of
confinement.

The distinction between the limited privacy rights of a pre-trial detainee and a
convicted inmate has been blurred as courts in the U.S. ruled that pre-trial detainees
might occasionally pose an even greater security risk than convicted inmates. Bell v.
Wolfish reasoned that those who are detained prior to trial may in many cases be
individuals who are charged with serious crimes or who have prior records and may
therefore pose a greater risk of escape than convicted inmates.[55] Valencia v.
Wiggins[56] further held that it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners
and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security.

American cases recognize that the unmonitored use of pre-trial detainees non-
privileged mail poses a genuine threat to jail security. [57] Hence, when a detainee places
his letter in an envelope for non-privileged mail, the detainee knowingly exposes his
letter to possible inspection by jail officials.[58] A pre-trial detainee has no reasonable
expectation of privacy for his incoming mail.[59] However, incoming mail from lawyers of
inmates enjoys limited protection such that prison officials can open and inspect the
mail for contraband but could not read the contents without violating the inmates right to
correspond with his lawyer.[60] The inspection of privileged mail is limited to physical
contraband and not to verbal contraband.[61]

Thus, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the opening and reading of
the detainees letters in the present case violated the detainees right to privacy of
communication. The letters were not in a sealed envelope. The inspection of the folded
letters is a valid measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters
for the inspection of contraband.

The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not
confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who
received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as
the detainees personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters for
mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential communication
between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention
Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication

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between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not read the
letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees.

That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizens

privacy rights[62] is a guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to
persons who are detained or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those detained is
subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful detention
or imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted
prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy rights.

In assessing the regulations imposed in detention and prison facilities that are alleged to
infringe on the constitutional rights of the detainees and convicted prisoners, U.S.
courtsbalance the guarantees of the Constitution with the legitimate concerns of prison
administrators.[63] The deferential review of such regulations stems from the principle
that:

[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible

strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate
security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable
problems of prison administration.[64]

The detainees in the present case are junior officers accused of leading 300
soldiers in committing coup detat, a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua.[65] The
junior officers are not ordinary detainees but visible leaders of the Oakwood incident
involving an armed takeover of a civilian building in the heart of the financial district of
the country. As members of the military armed forces, the detainees are subject to the
Articles of War.[66]

Moreover, the junior officers are detained with other high-risk persons from the
Abu Sayyaf and the NPA. Thus, we must give the military custodian a wider range of
deference in implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center. The military
custodian is in a better position to know the security risks involved in detaining the junior
officers, together with the suspected Abu Sayyaf and NPA members. Since the
appropriate regulations depend largely on the security risks involved, we should defer to
the regulations adopted by the military custodian in the absence of patent arbitrariness.

The ruling in this case, however, does not foreclose the right of detainees and
convicted prisoners from petitioning the courts for the redress of grievances.
Regulations and conditions in detention and prison facilities that violate the
Constitutional rights of the detainees and prisoners will be reviewed by the courts on a
case-by-case basis. The courts could afford injunctive relief or damages to the
detainees and prisoners subjected to arbitrary and inhumane conditions.
However, habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions of
confinement.[67] The writ of habeas corpus will only lie if what is challenged is the fact or
duration of confinement.[68]

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WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court

of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78545.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

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RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

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[1] Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

[2] Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga, with Associate Justices
Romeo A. Brawner and Arturo D. Brion, concurring.
[3] Rollo, p. 24.
[4] Ibid., pp. 52-53.
[5] Ibid., p. 23.

[6] See Sections 6-8, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.

[7] Section 6, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.
[8] In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of David Cruz y Gonzaga, 379 Phil. 558 (2000).
[9] Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.
[10] In the Matter of Petition for the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus: Re: Azucena

L. Garcia, 393 Phil. 718 (2000).

[11] Galvez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114046, 24 October 1994, 237 SCRA 685.
[12] Ilusorio v. Bildner, 387 Phil. 915 (2000); Moncupa v. Enrile, 225 Phil. 191 (1986).
[13] Andal v. People, 367 Phil. 154 (1999).
[14] Calvan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140823, 3 October 2000, 341 SCRA 806.
[15] An Act Defining Certain Rights of the Person Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial

Investigation, as well as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining, and Investigating

Officers and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof.
[16] Ford v. City of Boston, 154 F. Supp.2d 123 (2001).
[17] Ibid.

[18] 441 U.S. 520 (1979).

[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.

[22] Rollo, pp. 16-18.

[23] Ibid., p. 16.

[24] Supra note 18.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.

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[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.; Fischer v. Winter, 564 F. Supp. 281 (1983).

[32] Ibid.
[33] 468 U.S. 576 (1984).
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.

[41] In re Jordan, Cr. 15734, 15755 (1972).

[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Corpus Juris Secundum, 120, June 2005.
[45] Ibid. See also In re Jordan, supra note 41.
[46] Ibid.

[47] In re Jordan, supra note 41.

[48] Ibid.
[49] 317 F. Supp. 776 (1970).
[50] 418 U.S. 539 (1974).

[51] Citations omitted.

[52] 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
[53] Citations omitted.
[54] 478 So.2d 659 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1985).

[55] Supra note 18.

[56] 981 F.2d 1440 (1993).
[57] Corpus Juris Secundum, supra note 44.
[58] Ibid.

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[59] Ibid.

[60] In re Jordan, supra note 41.

[61] Ibid.
[62] Section 3 of Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution declares that:

The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable

except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order
requires otherwise as prescribed by law. (Emphasis supplied)
[63] Wirsching v. Colorado, 360 F.3d 1191 (2004).
[64] Ibid.
[65] Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code.
[66] Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended.

[67] Peterson v. Ward, 823 So. 2d 1146 (2002).

[68] Ibid.

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Case 8

FIRST DIVISION

FELIPE N. MADRIAN, G.R. No. 159374

Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,*
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA,** JJ.

FRANCISCA R. MADRIAN,
Respondent. Promulgated:
July 12, 2007

x------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

When a family breaks up, the children are always the victims. The ensuing battle for custody
of the minor children is not only a thorny issue but also a highly sensitive and heart-rending affair.
Such is the case here. Even the usually technical subject of jurisdiction became emotionally
charged.

Petitioner Felipe N. Madrian and respondent Francisca R. Madrian were married on July 7, 1993 in
Paraaque City. They resided in San Agustin Village, Brgy. Moonwalk, Paraaque City.

Their union was blessed with three sons and a daughter: Ronnick, born on January 30, 1994;
Phillip, born on November 19, 1996; Francis Angelo, born on May 12, 1998 and Krizia Ann, born on
December 12, 2000.

After a bitter quarrel on May 18, 2002, petitioner allegedly left their conjugal abode and took their
three sons with him to Ligao City, Albay and subsequently to Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Respondent sought
the help of her parents and parents-in-law to patch things up between her and petitioner to no avail.
She then brought the matter to the Lupong Tagapamayapa in their barangay but this too proved
futile.

Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of Ronnick, Phillip and Francis Angelo in
the Court of Appeals, alleging that petitioners act of leaving the conjugal dwelling and going to Albay
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and then to Laguna disrupted the education of their children and deprived them of their mothers
care. She prayed that petitioner be ordered to appear and produce their sons before the court and to
explain why they should not be returned to her custody.

Petitioner and respondent appeared at the hearing on September 17, 2002. They initially agreed that
petitioner would return the custody of their three sons to respondent. Petitioner, however, had a
change of heart[1] and decided to file a memorandum.

On September 3, 2002, petitioner filed his memorandum [2] alleging that respondent was unfit to take
custody of their three sons because she was habitually drunk, frequently went home late at night or
in the wee hours of the morning, spent much of her time at a beer house and neglected her duties as
a mother. He claimed that, after their squabble on May 18, 2002, it was respondent who left, taking
their daughter with her. It was only then that he went to Sta. Rosa, Laguna where he worked as a
tricycle driver. He submitted a certification from the principal of the Dila Elementary School in Sta.
Rosa, Laguna that Ronnick and Phillip were enrolled there. He also questioned the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals claiming that under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 (otherwise known as the Family
Courts Act of 1997) family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition
for habeas corpus filed by respondent.[3]

For her part, respondent averred that she did not leave their home on May 18, 2002 but was
driven out by petitioner. She alleged that it was petitioner who was an alcoholic, gambler and drug
addict. Petitioners alcoholism and drug addiction impaired his mental faculties, causing him to
commit acts of violence against her and their children. The situation was aggravated by the fact that
their home was adjacent to that of her in-laws who frequently meddled in their personal problems.[4]

On October 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals[5] rendered a decision[6] asserting its authority to
take cognizance of the petition and ruling that, under Article 213 of the Family Code, respondent was
entitled to the custody of Phillip and Francis Angelo who were at that time aged six and four,
respectively, subject to the visitation rights of petitioner. With respect to Ronnick who was then eight
years old, the court ruled that his custody should be determined by the proper family court in a
special proceeding on custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it was denied.
Hence, this recourse.

Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition for habeas
corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts under RA 8369. He
invokes Section 5(b) of RA 8369:

Section 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. The Family Courts shall have

exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:

xxxxxxxxx

b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to

the latter;
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xxxxxxxxx

Petitioner is wrong.

In Thornton v. Thornton,[7] this Court resolved the issue of the Court of Appeals jurisdiction to issue
writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369
giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions:

The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is
nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
corpusinvolving the custody of minors.

xxxxxxxxx

We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the
custody of minors.

xxxxxxxxx

The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction

of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to
the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA
7092 [An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals] and BP 129 [The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980] are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does
not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas
corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must
be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 that family courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions
for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.[8] (emphases
supplied)

The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over petitions for habeas corpus was further affirmed by A.M.
No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in
Relation to Custody of Minors:
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the
adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of
Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides
that:

Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. A verified petition

for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with
the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region
to which the Family Court belongs.
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xxxxxxxxx

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme

Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so
granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
The writ may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular
court within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor
may be found for hearing and decision on the merits.

From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas
corpus cases where the custody of minors is involved.[9] (emphases supplied)

We note that after petitioner moved out of their Paraaque residence on May 18, 2002, he twice
transferred his sons to provinces covered by different judicial regions. This situation is what
the Thornton interpretation of RA 8369s provision on jurisdiction precisely addressed:

[The reasoning that by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas
corpus cases, the lawmakers intended them to be the sole courts which can issue
writs of habeas corpus] will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like
[respondent] without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals
who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless
since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in
their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from
one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in
a habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse
could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed [RA
8369].[10]

Moreover, a careful reading of Section 5(b) of RA 8369 reveals that family courts are vested
with original exclusive jurisdiction in custody cases, not in habeas corpus cases. Writs of habeas
corpus which may be issued exclusively by family courts under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 pertain to
the ancillary remedy that may be availed of in conjunction with a petition for custody of minors
under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. In other words, the issuance of the writ is merely ancillary to the
custody case pending before the family court. The writ must be issued by the same court to avoid
splitting of jurisdiction, conflicting decisions, interference by a co-equal court and judicial instability.

The rule therefore is: when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all
auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by
such court or officer.[11] Once a court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it does
so to the exclusion of all other courts, including related incidents and ancillary matters.
Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
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RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

(On leave)
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

(No part)
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

* On leave.
** No part.
[1] Both parties accused each others parents of constant meddling in their family life.
[2] Rollo, pp. 44-56.
[3] Id.
[4] Id., pp. 37-43.
[5] First Division.
[6] Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia

(now a member of the Supreme Court) and Bernardo P. Abesamis (retired) concurring. Rollo,
pp. 19-26.
[7] G.R. No. 154598, 16 August 2004, 436 SCRA 550.
[8] Id.

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[9] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] Section 6, Rule 135, Rules of Court.

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