PIERSON vs. POST J. W. BRUMAGIM, Administrator of the Estate of ROBERT DYSON v.

3 Cai. R. 175; 1805 N.Y. LEXIS 311 T. T. BRADSHAW, GEO. B. RICH AND J. C. PINKHAM
39 Cal. 24, 1870 WL 827 (Cal.)
Facts:
The case involved an incident that took place in 1805 at an uninhabited beach Facts:
near Southampton, New York, on the southeastern coast of Long Island. Lodowick
Post, a local resident, was out in a hunting party when his hunting dogs caught the
scent of a fox and began pursuing it. As they drew near the fox, Jesse Pierson, JOHNSON & GRAHAM’S LESSEE vs. MCINTOSH
another local resident, saw the fox—though he denied seeing Post and his party— 21 U.S. 8 Wheat. 543 543 (1823)
and promptly killed it and carried it off for himself. Post filed a lawsuit against
Pierson claiming that because had already begun pursuing the fox, the property of Facts:
the fox's pelt and carcass were rightfully his, not Pierson's.

Issue: Whether Lodowick Post, by the pursuit with his hounds acquired such a right
to, or property in, the fox as will sustain an action against Pierson for killing and
taking him away?

Ruling: NO. The Court cited ancient precedent in deciding the case:
If we have recourse to the ancient writers upon general principles of law, the
judgment below is obviously erroneous. Justinian's Institutes, and Fleta, adopt the
principle, that pursuit alone vests no property or right in the huntsman; and that even
pursuit, accompanied with wounding, is equally ineffectual for that purpose, unless
the animal be actually taken. The same principle is recognized by Bracton.

Puffendorf defines occupancy of beasts feræ naturæ, to be the actual corporeal

possession of them, and Bynkershoeck is cited as coinciding in this definition. It is
indeed with hesitation that Puffendorf affirms that a wild beast mortally wounded,
or greatly maimed, cannot be fairly intercepted by another, whilst the pursuit of the
person inflicting the wound continues. The foregoing authorities are decisive to
show that mere pursuit gave Post no legal right to the fox, but that he became the
property of Pierson, who intercepted and killed him.[Citations omitted]
The court reasoned that given the common law requirement to have control over
one's possessions, merely giving chase was not sufficient. Something more was
needed, otherwise law would create a slippery slope.

If the first seeing, starting, or pursuing such animals, without having so wounded,
circumvented or ensnared the animal, so as to deprive them of their natural liberty,
and subject them to the control of their pursuer, should afford the basis of actions
against others for intercepting and killing them, it would prove a fertile course of
quarrels and litigation.

The majority opinion found that though it may have been rude for Pierson to have
killed the fox, there was no reason to object as only the person to mortally wound or
seize the animal can acquire possession of it.
MATEO CARINO vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT
G.R. No. 2869 March 25, 1907

Facts:
 Mateo Carino filed a petition before the Court of Land Registration praying
for that the title to a parcel of land situated in Baguio consisting
approximately 40 hectares be granted to him.
 The Insular Government opposed the granting of these petitions, alleging
that the whole parcel of land is public property of the Government;
 After trial, CLR rendered its judgment that Carino and his predecessors
have not possessed exclusively and adversely any part of the said property.

Issue: W/N the land in question belongs to Carino

Ruling: NO. As has been shown during the trial of this case, this land, of which
mention is made in said possessory information, and upon which is situated the
house now actually occupied by the petitioner, all of which is set forth as argument
as to the possession in the judgment, is "used for pasture and sowing," and belongs
to the class called public lands.

CARINO vs. INSULAR GOVERNMENT

(US CASE)

Facts: