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Patrick McEvoy-Halston

English46llF0l
Dr. StephenRoss
11 October 2002

ChangingSubjectsin RolandBarthes"Deathof the Author" andin JacquesDerrida's"Structure,

Sign, andPlay in the Discourseof the HumanSciences"

Both RolandBarthes,in "Deathofthe Author," andJacquesDerrid4 in "Structure,Sign,

andPlay in the Discourseof the HumanSciences,"makeexplicit statementsconceming


- u.{ "il'. :tt't it'i1,
"subjects"(i.e., individuals) that would be anathemato thosewho believethat certainwriters are

geniuses.It is this afiefact,this particular,subjecf-theAuthor (or engineer)-alongwith its

prestige,that BarthesandDerridaarunost interestedin disassembling.However,Derrida,by

drawing attentionto the leadershipandexceptionalnatureofboth ClaudeL6vi-Shaussand

FriedrichNietzsche,andby characterizingdeconstructionasa critical approachto language

which not only providesmore choicesto the writer, but which enableschoice,implicifly suggests

that he still believesin the writer asernpowered.It is likely that Derridawould preferthat 'tis"

text communicateto readersthat humanistshavevastly both overestimatedandoveremphasized

the contol and creativity of singleindividuals. But given that many of his readerslive in
i

-i\, .. cultureswhich celebrateandbelievein geniuses,De,rridamay haveto be ascarefirl asBarthesis


J
when discussinginnovationto avoid unintentionallyreinforcingreaders'prejudices.

The Norton Antholoey ofTheory andCriticism statesthat structuralism"sharesin the

widespreadand ongoingmodemantihumanismthat decentersthe individual, porhaying the self

of impersonalsyst€rrs. Individuals [accordingto stucfiralist


asa constuct and a consequence

critics] neitheroriginatenor control the conventionsoftheir socialexistence,mentallife, or

mothertongue"(20). And becauseindividualsarebetterunderstoodasacteduponthanaswilful

initiators,structuralistspreferthe term "subject,"which connotesobedienceandsubjugation,to

"person,"which connotesan activewill (20). Both Barthes,a stucfuralist,andDerrida,a

deconstructionist,
usethe word "subject"ratherthan"person"in their texts,andboth critics
L

agreethat individualshavelimited controloverlanguage.

Thoughboth BarthesandDerridabelievethat everyoneis a subject,becausetheyboth

they attend,in particular,


sharean interestin abolishingthe importanceof the Author/engineer,

to the writing-subject(i.e.,the writer). ThoughBarthesis arguingthatthereaderrequiresmore,

not less,attentionthanthe writer normallyreceives,Bartheshopesto makethis argumentby first

how inappropriatethe humanistreverencefor the Author is/was. Barthesis


demonstrating

(1468)that"[an Author's]person,his life,


by the "patheticview of his predecessors"
disgusted

closeattention.Barthesclaimsthatthis conceptionof the


his tastes,his passions"(1466)deserue

writer asgeniusis now known to be misleading--itwas"killed" by the discoveriesof linguistics

Author--thescriptor--eliminates,
(1467). His replacementfor the conceptof an autonomous

noneof his/trerideasareoriginal,because
because (1468),
he/shecanonly "imitats . .'.-lgestures"

andbecausehe/she,asmuchasthe text, is a "spacein which a varietyof [influencesf. .Jolend

andclash"(1468),the "prestigeof the individual"(1466).

be the absolute
Derrida,too, deridesthe ideaof an engineer"who couldsupposedly

constructit'out of nothing"' (965). In fact,


origin of his own discourseandwouldsupposedly

arguably,givenisolatedexamplesfrom his text, Derridaqualifiesa morelimited role for the

writer thanBarthesdoes. Barthesis dramaticallycircumscribingthe traditionalrole of the writer

sothat"his poweris [only] to mix writings"(1468).But Barthes'scriptor,thoughnearly

powerless,still ilranges--thatis, he still hassomeinfluenceon whena thoughtbeginsor ends.

Derrida'swriter is describedasmerely"follow[ing] . .)'traces' whereverit leads"(970). He/she


/
g]" (97013i-t.]dto the agencyof
ldcompletely passiveagentby "surrender[in
becomes'almost
': - '..'/
signifiers. Derridadescribesthis activity asan "adventure"(970),but, at times,this adventureis

so that it seemsthat it is the signifiersthat adventure,with the writer merely


characterized

providingtransport.
3

However,if a writer's powersarevastlylimited comparedto the humanistconceptionof

them,thenno singleindividualwa:rantsthe attentionformerlylavisheduponthem. Indeed,too

muchattentionto anyparticularwriter risks conveyingthe impressionthat it is exactlythe

writer's "person,his life, his tastes,his passions"(1466),ffid maybeevenhis geniuswhich are

worth noting. The subjectasgeniusis the fundamentalconceptionof an individualto be avoided

becausea
by thosewho favour analyzinga text's complexityovera writer's consciousness,

geniusoriginates;he/sheis construedasthe sourceof his/hertext. Yet both Barthesand

that therehavebeen
Derrida,who explicitly denythatwritersareoriginators,both acknowledge

very importantinnovationsin critical thoughtwhich haveleadto a moresophisticated

of language.Thereis nothingintrinsicallyproblematicabouttheir
understanding

with
of contributions. But sinceinnovationhasfor so long beenassociated
acknowledgement

both BarthesandDerridacancounton havingtheir qualifiedappreciation


the effortsof geniuses,

by readers. Barthes,however,moresothanDerrida,carefullydealswith
beingmisunderstood

with greatindividuals.
innovationin his text so asto minimizeits association

Barthesnot only tellsus thatit is "the text itself [which]plays"(1472),thatit is language

which "'performs,'andnotfr. 1'him (1467),he convinces


us thatindividualsareless
,1"
t'
\,tSI

importantthat we might heretoforeimagined.Importantdevelopments


in the historyof thought,

suchasthe moresophisticated
understanding
of the writer asan integratedsubject,ffie

acknowledged
by Barthes,but he creditsthemto the work of a collective--linguists,
for example-

-ratherthanto the effortsof oneman. He refersto the discoveriesof "recentresearch"(L469),

which conveysa sensethat researchnaturallygivesrise to discoveries.In this instance,he also

refersto the effortsof a specificresearcher,


but within parenthesis
("(J.-P.Vernant)"[1469]),so

that its inclusionin the text seemsoptional. Barthesunderstands


that if he wantsto persuadehis

readersthat "voice [should]losr . jtr origin" (1466),he is bestservedby referringto groupsor


collectives,whereinthe individualvoiceis lost,whenassigningcreditfor importantdiscoveries.

WhenDerridadescribesimportantinnovationshe not only refersto the work of specific

thernsothattheir leadershipandtheir decisions,right


individuals,but describesand dramatizes

Nietzscheas"show[ing]. . . us theway,"
or wrong,seemto be worth noting. Derridadescribes

orvery
as"[bringrng]to lighl .:1freeplat''Q70).Theyareeitherprophets,
andL6vi-strauss

prophet-like.They seemto be unusualandnoteworthymen--orrather,flawedheroes.Derrida

comesvery closeto declaringLdvi-straussnostalgic(heacfuallysays,"oneno lessperceivesin

an ethicof nostalgiafor origins"t970]). He alsodescribes


his work a sortof ethicpresence,

tragicallyflawedherois a highly Romantic


Nietzscheas"seeking"(970). The ever-seeking,

(andhumanist)conceptionof a man. Indeed,arguably,the only thing missingfrom this

characterizationisthe Romanticconceptionof the heroasa manof genius. The reader,

andNietzsche,then,in Derrida'stext,come
however,^uy(:tnl in theblank.i; Both L6vi-Strauss

closeto resemblingthe humanistideaof a personthat stucturalistsamongstothersaretrying to

abolish.

An argumentcanbe madethat it is absurdto accuseDerridaof reinforcinghumanist

that thereire gteatindividualssimplybecausehe attendscloselyto the thoughtof


assumptions

both NietzscheandL6vi-Strauss.Both writersareattendedto becausetheir work undermines

humanistconventions. It is Neitzsche'srealizationthatwe should"passbeyondman and

humanism"(970)that Derridafindspraise-worthy.L6vi-straussis describedasshowingthe

w&y,b/nottowards someabsolutefinal truth,but towardsanunderstanding


of the

indeterminatenatureof language.If L6vi-Straussis portrayedasa prophet,then,his message,

that therecanbe no final truth, is unlike anythingprophesiedbefore. Moreover,if Barthes'text

is deemedespeciallywell-suitedfor minimizingdramaticallydifferent,evenopposite,

understandings
by readersof a writer's intendedmessage,
thenit is only fair to notethat Barthes
)

hasno problemconceptualizingof an individualasa shamanso long ashe is not also

asa genius(1466). And neitherL6vi-Straussnor Nietzscheis creditedby Derrida


characterized
' l
/ t 1

for originating anything;,(terely for discovering aspectsof languagethat have always existed. i

Yet in the passagewhere he acceptsthe conception of an individual as a shaman,Barthes

that in "ordinaryculture""[t]he imageof literaturql .js tyrannicallycenteredon the


emphasizes

author"(1466). If Barthesis correct,thenchangingmodernconceptionsof the writer asgenius

requiresthe extra-carethat he takesto avoidappearingto centreargumentsaroundthe works of

of, in particular,L6vi-Strauss,
anyonewriter. Derrida'slengthydiscussions which include

effectof reinforcinga reader'spossible


sizeablequotationsfrom his works,risk theunintended

pre-existingbeliefin "GreatMen."

Barthesavoidsconveyingthis impression,perhaps,becausehe follows what he preaches:

that is, his text is influencedby a writer who focuseson readersasmuch ason writers. Whereas

and
Derridamay haveus thinking of the writer asa man"whoseindividualconsciousness

choice"(Norton 20) arerelevant,because'his" text suggests


that thesequalitiesmay indeedbe

relevantto him. Unlike Barthes,who shareswith Derridathe conceptionof writing asa

performance,Derridadoesnot (andlikely doesnot intendto) convinceus that it is the language

which "'performs,'andnot [thewriter]" (1467).Thoughthereareselectstatements


in Derrida's

text which canbe quotedto help arguethe contrary,the likely over-allimpressiona readerhas

afterreadingthe text is that Derridais excitedaboutdeconstruction,


not becauseit somehow

enableslanguage,but becauseit makesthe writer moreconsciousof the waysof languagethan

he hadbeenpreviously.

Derridaprobablyintendsto encourage of how languageand


both a broaderawareness

culturecontributeto andcontrolindividualchoice,ffid how this discoveryactuallyexpands

individual choice. Derridais sophisticated,


ffid his argumentfor the co-existence
of seemingly
6

paradoxicaloutcomesis intelligible. But readersmight soonforgetthat Derrida,though

anpoweringchoice,doesnot believein the singularlyempoweredmind (the genius).Thebelief

in genius,in the powerof individualwill andcreativity,is so sfrong(in Westernculturesat least)

that readersmay havetroublereadingthis particulartext of Derrida'sin a way that doesnot

reinforcetheir prejudices.

NeitherBarthesnor Derridabeliev?nuta writer is a personwho, unassisted,


is a source

of original ideas. But, by attendingso closelyto specificwriters,aswell asto their texts,Derrida

may strengthenratherthanweakenpre-existingassociations
readershaveof writers. If Derrida's

takes,perhapsdeconstruction
delightin individual choicetypifiesthe directiondeconstruction

owesits ongoingpopularityin partbecauseit canbe madeto fit with humanistassumptions


of

an empoweredindividual.

Works Cited

Derrida,Jacques."Structure,Sign,andPlay in the Discourseof the HumanSciences."&g

Critical Tradition: ClassicTextsandContemporaqv


Trends. Ed. DanielRichter.

Boston: BedfordBooks, 1989.959-971.

Richter,David H., ed. The Critical Tradition: ClassicTextsandContemporaqv


Trends. Boston:

BedfordBooks, 1989.

Roland,Barthes."The Deathof the Author." TheNortonAntholoeyof TheoryandCriticism.


'
r:r-\f'r
Ed. VincentB. Leitch. New York: W. W. NortonandCompany,2001.1466-1470.

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