People v.

Tomio
Facts:
Tatsumi Nagao, a Japanese national, came to Manila. Maida Tomio alias Sato
Toshio and Mitamura gave Nagao a pack of cigarettes that the policemen who
searched him said contained marijuana and proceeded to bring him to jail. The
accused acted as interpreters in jail and told Nagao that the penalty for illegal
possession of marijuana is 6 to 12 years imprisonment but the policemen are willing
to accept $100,000 in lieu of this. Nagao agreed and accused told him that they have
advanced the money to the police, Nagao was then brought back to his hotel where
he was not allowed to leave. He called up his friend to ask for help and called up his
dad as well who agreed to send 3M yen. While retrieving money from the bank, the
police, whose help was asked for by the Japanese embassy, brought the accused to
the police district for investigation and were charged with kidnapping and serious
illegal detention.
The accused claims that they were guarding Nagao, they claim that he could
have left them anytime as they did not physically restrain him.
Issue:
1. WON kidnapping for ransom was committed
2. WON court had jurisdiction
Ratio:
1. The accused got Nagao’s passport and his money was taken by the police, he can
not speak Tagalog or English and had no friends or relatives in the Philippines.
Even if he could have left, where would he go without his money and passport?
Plus the fact that Nagao thought he was on a temporary leash by the police,
which would mean at least 6 years imprisonment plus the threat of scandal, that
would cause him ignominy as he is a Buddhist priest. Even though he was not
physically restrained, he was psychologically restrained.
Accused claims that the money they were asking is for is the payment of hotel
expenses and to pay them back for the alleged payment to the police to release
Nagao. The court did not believe this as the evidence points to an elaborate plan
to kidnap Nagao and ask for ransom money. Even assuming that they merely
asked for a loan, they still deprived Nagao of liberty to compel him to pay the
loan.
2. Yes. The crime was committed in various places. Moreover, in the proceedings of
the lower court, the accused never questioned the jurisdiction of the court.
The court also directs the Philippine National Police to conduct a thorough
investigation into the involvement of the five policemen and should the evidence
warrant, file the appropriate criminal and administrative cases against them. As
regards Mitamura efforts must be exerted by the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, in coordination with the National Bureau of Investigation, to have him
investigated and prosecuted, should the evidence warrant.

People v Mercado

No. L-65152
Ponente: J. Relova
Date: August 30, 1984

Petitioner: People of the Philippines

Respondent: Federico Mercado or Alberto Mercado
Relief: Appeal from the decision of CFI of Rizal

FACTS:
 Mercado was the boyfriend of Susan Baylon, the younger sister of complainant
Yvonne Baylon. Susan left the family residence on Sept 1, 1979 and Mercado
suspected that its was Yvonne who instigated her to leave.
 At about 8:30am the next day, Mercado came from behind Yvonne while she was walking on a road at San Carlos Subd, Binagonan
, Rizal. Mercado grabbed Yvonne by the neck and pointed a knife on her throat, then dragged her to the house of his friend
Norma Guerrero. Mercado demanded that Yvonne produce her sister Susan. He then dragged her to the road side.
 The brothers of Yvonne and some neighbors arrived asking Mercado to release
Yvonne, but instead of doing so, Mercado raised the blouse of Yvonne and inserted
his hand underneath it and pointed the knife on her breast. Thereafter, Mercado dragged Yvonne to a store where the Chief of Police
and some policemen talked to him.
Mercado demanded from the police that he wanted to see Susan and that he be given transportation and money. This situation laste
d up to about 12nn.
 The barrio captain arrives and he was able to take hold of Mercado and subdue him.
Yvonne, because of the traumatic experience she was subjected to, lost
consciousness and was brought to the hospital. Her fingers suffered injuries, abrasion on her neck, and a small wound on her stoma
ch.
 On the other hand, Mercado averred that Susan was his wife; that although they were not legally marries, they had been living toget
her for some time in their family house in Tayuman. He also alleged that it was Yvonne who first attempted to stab him, only he was
able to stop her and grab the knife from her, and that was when the barrio captain and the policemen arrived who thought that he wa
s going to stab Yvonne.

ISSUE1: WON the lower court erred in not ruling that Mercado’s guilt has not been proven – NO
HELD/RATIO1:
The issue revolves around the credibility of the witnesses. Well settled is the rule that “unless there is a showing that the trial court overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case, the appellate
court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower court. For having had the opportunity of observing the demeanor and behavior of the
witnesses while testifying, the trial court, more than the reviewing tribunal, is in a better position to gauge their credibility, and properly appreciate
the relative weight of the often conflicting evidence for both parties”.

ISSUE2: WON Mercado should be convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention – YES

HELD/RATIO2:
While the defense argued that Mercado should be convicted of grave coercion only sicne his purpose was to force Yvonne to produce Susan,
the Court believes this was without merit. Following the Ablaza case, “the victim was actually restrained or deprived of her freedom, and that
makes proper the prosecution of the accused under Art 267 of the RPC (illegal detention)”.

ISSUE3: WON Mercado should be credited with mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation – NO

HELD/RATIO3:

Said mitigating circumstance cannot be invoked in favor of the accused whose relationship with her was illegitimate. The obfuscation must arise
from lawful sentiments.

ISSUE4: WON Mercado should be credited with the period of his preventive detention – YES

HELD/RATIO4:

He has been detained since Sept 2, 1979 and therefore, in accordance with Art 29 of the RPC, the period of his preventive detention should be
deducted from the term of his sentence (reclusion perpetua).

DISPOSITIVE:

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs. Appellant should be credited with the full time of his preventive imprisonment upon
a showing that he agreed to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, he shall be credited with 4/5 of
the time of such preventive imprisonment.

NOTES:

Elements of the crime of illegal detention (Art 267, RPC):

1) that the offender is a private individual

2) that he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty
3) that the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal
4) in the commission of the offense, any of the ff circumstances is present

a) that the kidnapping or detention last for more than 5 days

b) that it is committed simulating public authority

c) that any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or

threats to kill him are made

d) that the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer

Illegal detention is committed by a private person while arbitrary detention (Art 124, RPC) is committed by a public officer, usually a law-enforcing
authority. There is illegal detention in forcible abduction. When the violent taking of a woman is motivated by lewd designs, forcible abduction
under Art 342 is the offense (against chastity); when it is not so motivated, the offense is kidnapping under Art 267 (against personal liberty).

People vs Lim

The Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City convicted as charged appellant Benjamin Lim for three
counts of rape and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the rape committed in 1993
and two death penalties for the two rapes committed in 1994 and 1996. The conviction was mainly based
on the testimony of the victim Jovelyn Morada who is the youngest daughter of the appellants common-
law wife Vivian Cebrian to her husband Jose Morada, Sr., that on August 19, 1996, at around three oclock
in the morning, while she was asleep in their house in Panacan, Davao City when she was awakened, she
was already far from where here youngest sister was sleeping. Then, her stepfather pulled down her skirt
and panty and inserted his penis into her vagina. She tried to extricate herself from the appellant, but
appellant threatened to kill her. Appellant left the room shortly before her sister woke up and turned on
the light. She further testified that the appellant raped her in the same house in 1993 and 1994. On the
other hand, the appellant interposed impotency as a defense.
Hence, this appeal.
The Court ruled that the trial court, which had the opportunity to see Jovelyn while testifying, found her
testimony to be natural and unhesitant. The rule is settled that the trial courts appreciation of the
evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is good reason for doing otherwise. Accused-
appellant has not shown that the trial court misappreciated the evidence.
Also, impotency, being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of
potency. In this case, even the doctor who performed a manual stimulation of accused-appellants penis
but failed to make it erect, could not say that accused-appellant had no erection before the
examination. To the contrary, he admitted that it was possible that accused-appellant was still capable of
sexual intercourse.
The decision of the trial court was AFFIRMED.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; TRIAL COURTS APPRECIATION OF EVIDENCE WILL NOT BE
DISTURBED ON APPEAL.- The trial court, which had the opportunity to see Jovelyn while testifying, found
her testimony to be natural and unhesitant. The rule is settled that the trial courts appreciation of the
evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is good reason for doing otherwise. Accused-
appellant has not shown that the trial court misappreciated the evidence.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE; MORAL ASCENDANCY OF THE ACCUSED TAKES THE PLACE OF FORCE AND
INTIMIDATION; CASE AT BAR.- Accused-appellant was not just an occasional visitor in the house of
complainant. While he may not have stayed with Jovelyn and her mother all the time as he worked in
Santiago, Agusan del Norte, the fact is that he made conjugal visits to Jovelyn smother, begetting in five
years four children. Two of the children were born during the time accused-appellant said he was in
Santiago, Agusan del Norte. Indeed, accused-appellant went to Davao City where Vivian lived once or
twice every three months, each visit lasting from one week to two weeks. (Vivian herself estimated that
she and accused-appellant had been living together for almost 15 years.) From this, it can reasonably be
inferred that accused-appellant had become part of Jovelyns family life and that accused-appellant, as the
common-law husband of her mother, had gained such moral ascendancy over Jovelyn that any resistance
that normally should be expected from any other girl could not have been put up by her. As has been said,
the moral ascendancy of the accused takes the place of force and intimidation as an element of rape.
3. ID.; ID.; FORCE AND INTIMIDATION; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR.- Moreover, Jovelyns testimony shows
that force and intimidation were indeed used to make her submit to the will of accused-appellant. With
respect to the rape in 1996, she testified that despite her resistance accused-appellant succeeded in
ravishing her. She was threatened with death if she made an outcry. With regard to the 1994 rape, she
testified she also resisted accused-appellants advances, but was not able to free herself because of
accused-appellants superior strength. In 1993, when she was raped for the first time, accused-appellant
held her tightly and later the rape she was warned not to tell her mother that she had been raped. As
pointed out by the Solicitor General, Jovelyn was only 12 in 1993 when she was raped for the first time by
accused-appellant. She could easily be intimidated into submission by someone whom she knew was her
mother live-in-partner. As stated in People vs. Maglente, the test is whether the threat or intimidation
produces a reasonable fear in the victim that if she resists or does not yield to the desires of the accused,
that threat would be carried out. In this case, we are convinced from the evidence that accused-appellant
used threat and intimidation to subjugate complainants will and break her resistance down.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ABSENCE OF INJURY DOES NOT NEGATE THE COMMISSION OF
RAPE.- Thus, the fact that no injury was noted on Jovelyn by the attending physician does not negate the
fact that she was raped.
5. ID.; ID.; ABSENCE OF LACERATIONS IN VICTIMS HYMEN DOES NOT BELIE THE CHARGES OF RAPE.-Nor
does the absence of lacerations in Jovelyns hymen and sperm in her vagina belie her charges of rape. The
presence of laceration in the hymen is not necessary to prove rape. The absence of spermatozoa in the
vagina, on the other hand, could be due to a number of reasons, such as vertical drainage of the semen
from the vagina, the acidity of the vagina, or washing of the vagina immediately after sexual intercourse,
as pointed by us in another case.
6. ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION IS IN FAVOR OF POTENCY.- In truth, impotency being an abnormal condition
should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency. In this case, even the doctor who
performed a manual stimulation of accused-appellants penis but failed to make it erect could not say that
accused-appellant had no erection before the examination. To the contrary, he admitted that it was
possible that accused-appellant was still capable of sexual intercourse.
7. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE; DATE OF COMMISSION IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT THEREOF.- In any case,
the date of the commission of the rapes is not an essential element of the crime. The exact dates and time
of the rapes committed in 1993 and 1994 are not material to accused-appellants defense that he became
impotent as a result of an accident he had because his claim is that the accident took place in 1990 or
1992, before the commission of the crimes imputed to him. For the same reasons, the fact that Jovelyn
testified that she was raped on August L9, 1996 even though the information in Criminal Case No.37373-
96 alleged that the rape took place on or about August 18, 1996 is not an obstacle to his conviction of said
rape.
8. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; INFORMATION; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES MUST BE
ALLEGED THEREIN.- This Court has held that the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her
relationship to the offender being a special qualifying circumstance, which increases the penalty as
opposed to a generic aggravating circumstance which only affects the period of the penalty, should be
alleged in the information because of the accuseds right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR.- Although stepfather refers to a man who is married to the
victims mother after the death of the victims biological father, accused-appellant is also alleged in the
three informations as the common-law husband of complainants mother. The relationship of accused-
appellant to complainant is thus alleged together with her age at the time of the commission of the
crime. This makes the cases at bar different from People vs. Manggasin, supra , because in that case,
accused-appellant was alleged to be the stepfather of the complainant but the evidence showed that he
was not married to complainant smother. There was thus no proof of the relationship alleged in the
information and, therefore, it was held that the qualifying circumstance was not proved. On the other
hand, in these cases, the relationship of common-law spouse of complainants mother was both alleged
and proved and, therefore, the legal requirement has been satisfied justifying the imposition by the trial
court of the death penalty.
10. ID.; EVIDENCE; DOUBT AS TO THE EXACT DATE OF COMMISSION OF CRIME MUST BE RESOLVED IN
FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED; CASE AT BAR.- While it is true that R.A. 7659 took effect on December 31, 1993
(not January 1, 1994 as held by the trial court), because of the failure of the prosecution to establish in
Criminal Case No. 37,372-96 that the 1993 rape was committed on that date, it is in keeping with the
principle that doubts should be resolved in favor of accused-appellant that the penalty imposed for this
crime is the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua.
11. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE; CIVIL LIABILITY; MORAL DAMAGES; P50,000.00 SHOULD BE AWARDED IN
EACH CASE WITHOUT NEED OF PROOF.- The amount of damages awarded by the trial court must also be
modified in line with our recent rulings. Moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 should be awarded
in each of the three cases. This award is automatically made in rape cases without need of proof for it is
assumed that the complainant has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award.

People vs. Ramos, 39 SCRA 236

 Facts:

Feliciano M. Ramos filed a petition through the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 50, of
Villasis, Pangasinan for the automatic review of the death penalty imposed upon him by the 11th
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Villasis-Sto. Tomas at Villasis, Pangasinan.
On October 16, 1995, Elizabeth T. Ramos filed a criminal complaint for rape against him. It
was alleged therein that appellant was able to perpetrate the felony against the minor complainant
through the use of force and intimidation in its execution. After considering the evidence presented
during the trial and the arguments presented by appellant, the MCTC found out that the appellant
was guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
The court a quo condemned appellant to death, the penalty prescribe for the crime of rape
because the complainant is not only a minor (14 yrs. old) but the very own child of the appellant.
It is stated under the amendatory provisions introduced by Republic Act No. 7659 to Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code. The lower court further ordered appellant to indemnify his victim in
the amount of P50, 000.00 and to pay her moral damages of P25, 000.00 and exemplary damages
in the sum of P25, 000.00.
 Issue:

Whether or not, death penalty should be imposed against Feliciano M. Ramos.

 Held:

NO. The court a quo arrived at this conclusion under the notion that the particular rape
involved is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Then, taking the relationship of appellant
and complainant as a generic aggravating circumstance, the MCTC imposed the higher of the two
indivisible penalties which is the capital punishment. Treating relationship as a generic aggravating
circumstance, MCTC considered the relationship of appellant and complainant as attendant in the
case despite the absence of any allegation thereof in the information.
Appellant takes issue in this point, by asserting that since the fact of relationship was not
alleged in the information, only the penalty prescribe for simple rape can be imposed upon
him. This is where the RTC depart from the conclusions of the lower court and agree with
appellant's position.
A rape by a father of his minor daughter is punishable by the single indivisible penalty of
death and not by reclusion perpetua to death, as the lower court erroneously believed.
While Republic Act No. 7659 did not give a legal designation to the crime of rape attended
by any of the seven new circumstances introduced in Article 335 on December 31, 1993, the Court
has referred to such crime as qualified rape in a number of its decisions. However, with or without
a name for this kind of rape, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship
with the offender gives a different character to the rape defined in the first part of Article 335. They
raise the imposable penalty upon a person accused of rape from reclusion perpetua to the higher
and supreme penalty of death. Such an effect conjointly puts relationship and minority of the
offended party into the nature of a special qualifying circumstance.
As this qualifying circumstance was not pleaded in the information or in the complaint against
appellant, he cannot be convicted of qualified rape because he was not properly informed that he
is being accused of qualified rape. The Constitution guarantees the right of every person accused
in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. This
right finds amplification and implementation in the different provisions of the Rules of Court.
The facts stated in the body of the information determine the crime of which the accused
stands charged and for which he must be tried. This recital of the essentials of a crime delineates
the nature and cause of accusation against an accused.
It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the
complaint or information. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set
out in an information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to
have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
An accused person cannot be convicted of an offense higher than that with which he is charged
in the complaint or information on which he is tried. It matters not how conclusive and convincing
the evidence of guilt may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any offense, unless it is charged
in the complaint or information on which he is tried or is necessarily included therein. He has a
right to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on
trial. To convict an accused of a higher offense than that charged in the complaint or information
on which he is tried would be an unauthorized denial of that right.
Moreover, it would be a denial of the due process of law, if he is charge with simple rape and
be convicted of its qualified form punishable with death although the attendant circumstance
qualifying the offense and resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on
which he was arraigned.
Contrary, therefore, to the pose of the lower court and the Solicitor General, the non-allegation
of the relationship between appellant and offended party in an information for a rape is a bar to the
imposition of the death penalty since relationship in this particular form of rape is a qualifying and
not merely aggravating. Having been informed only of the elements of simple rape, appellant can
only be convicted of such crime and accordingly be punished with reclusion perpetua.
Now, it is accepted that qualifying circumstances not pleaded in the indictment but duly
proven without objection during the trial may be considered as aggravating circumstances. The
general principles of criminal law provide that aggravating circumstances, even if not alleged in
the information, may be proven during the trial over the objection of the defense and may be
appreciated in imposing the sentence. Such evidence merely forms part of the proof of the actual
commission of the offense and its consideration by the courts do not violate the constitutional right
of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
However, in the case before the RTC, the aggravating circumstance of relationship becomes
inconsequential in view of the nature of reclusion perpetua prescribe for the felony of simple
rape. The general criminal code states that in all cases in which the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed. Therefore, the
appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead of death penalty.

People vs Pablo Estacio

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PABLO ESTACIO AND MARITESS ANG

G.R. No. 171655, July 22, 2009

Kidnapping with murder

FACTS: At around 10:00 in the evening of October 10, 1995, Maritess, together with Estacio and Sumipo,
arrived at Casa Leonisa, a bar-restaurant at Examiner Street, Quezon City where the three of them would
meet with Charlie Mancilla Chua (the victim). Maritess had earlier told Sumipo that she would settle her
debt to the victim and then "deretsong dukot na rin x x x kay Charlie [the victim]." Sumipo assumed,
however, that Maritess was just joking
Not long after, Estacio pulled out a gun and ordered the victim to pull the car over. As the victim
complied, Estacio, with a gun pointed at him, pulled him to the backseat as Maritess transferred to the
backseat, sat beside the victim, tied the victim’s hands behind his back, and placed tape on his mouth.
While Sumipo tried to dissuade appellants from pursuing their plan, they replied that they would kill the
victim so that he would not take revenge. On Estacio’s instruction, Sumipo drove towards San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan and on reaching a secluded place, Estacio ordered Sumipo to stop the car as he did.
Maritess and Estacio then brought the victim to a grassy place. Estacio with bloodied hands later
resurfaced.
After which, they called the victim’s mother and demanded money from her. The victim’s mother
having agreed to the demand, Maritess and Estacio directed her to place the money in a garbage can near
Pizza Hut in Greenhills at 11:30 in the evening. Estacio and Sumipo later proceeded to Pizza Hut, and as
they were seated there, a patrol car passed by, drawing them to leave and part ways. Sumipo soon learned
that Maritess and Estacio sold Chua’s gun, watch, and necklace from the proceeds of which he was given
P7,000
On May 16, 1996, Sumipo surrendered to the National Bureau of Investigation. On May 23, 1996,
Estacio surrendered to the police. The police then informed the victim’s mother that Estacio had admitted
having killed her son, and that he offered to accompany them to the crime scene

ISSUE: Are the accused guilty of kidnapping for ransom?

RULING: In the case at bar, kidnapping was not sufficiently proven. Although appellants bound and gagged
Chua and transported him to Bulacan against his will, they did these acts to facilitate his killing, not
because they intended to detain or confine him. As soon as they arrived at the locus criminis, appellants
wasted no time in killing him. That appellants’ intention from the beginning was to kill the victim is
confirmed by the conversation which Sumipo heard in the car in which Maritess said that a knife would
be used to kill him so that it would not create noise.The subsequent demand for ransom was an
afterthought which did not qualify appellants’ prior acts as kidnapping.
where the evident purpose of taking the victims was to kill them, and from the acts of the accused
it cannot be inferred that the latter’s purpose was actually to detain or deprive the victims of their liberty,
the subsequent killing of the victims constitute the crime of murder, hence the crime of kidnapping does
not exist and cannot be considered as a component felony to produce the complex crime of kidnapping
with murder. The crime committed was thus plain Murder. The killing was qualified by treachery. The
victim was gagged, bound, and taken from Quezon City to an isolated place in Bulacan against his will to
prevent him from defending himself and to facilitate the killing
PEOPLE vs. TY
263 SCRA 746

FACTS: Vicente Ty and Carmen Ty were charged with the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor.

In November 1987, Johanna Sombong brought her seven-month old daughter, Arabella, to Sir John
Medical and Maternity Clinic which was owned and operated by the accused-appellants. Arabella was
diagnosed to be suffering bronchitis and diarrhea and was confined for three days. Sombong could not
pay the hospital bills and since no one could take care of her daughter at home, she left her at the nursery
of the hospital, which she was charged P50.00 per day. Arabella was transferred to the clinic extension
and she was taken care of by a yaya hired by her mother. Nothing was heard from the complainant so Dr.
Ty notified the barangay captain of the child’s abandonment. After two years, Arabella was entrusted to
a guardian, Lilibeth Neri. After five years, Sombong came back to claim her daughter. She filed a petition
for habeas corpus against accused-appellant with the RTC of Quezon City but was summarily dismissed
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the alleged detention was perpetrated in Caloocan City. Then,
a criminal case was filed against accused-appellants and an administrative case was filed against Dr.
Carmen Ty before the Board of Medicine of PRC. The case was subsequently dismissed for failure to
prosecute. Then on October 13, 1992, Sombong filed a petition for habeas corpus against the alleged
guardians of her daughter and the petition was granted and ordered the immediate delivery of Cristina
Grace Neri having found that she was the daughter of Sombong. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, said
decision was reversed on the ground that Cristina and complainant’s daughter are not one and the same
person.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused appellants are guilty of kidnapping and failure to return a minor?

RULING: No, the Court ruled that before a conviction for kidnapping and failure to return a minor under
Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code can be had, two elements must concur, namely: (a) the offender
has been entrusted with the custody of the minor, and (b) the offender deliberately fails to restore said
minor to his parents or guardians. The essential element herein is that the offender is entrusted with the
custody of the minor but what is actually punishable is not the kidnapping of the minor, as the title of the
article seems to indicate, but rather the deliberate failure or refusal of the custodian of the minor to
restore the latter to his parents or guardians.

The said failure or refusal must not only be deliberate but must also be persistent as to oblige the parents
or the guardians of the child to seek the aid of the courts in order to obtain custody. The word deliberate
as used in the article must imply something more than mere negligence; it must be premeditated,
obstinate, headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong. In the case at bar, it is
evident that there was no deliberate refusal or failure on the part of the accused-appellants to restore
the custody of the complainant’s child to her.