Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Contents
18. City of Manila v Cabangis XXXX 2
19. Heirs of Lim v Lim XXXX 2
20. Nissan v United Phil Scout 2
21. People v Tandoy 3
22. Air France v Carrascoso 4
23. Heirs of Luna v Afable 7
24. Dantis v Maghinang 12
25. People v Cayabyab 14
26. Tan v. CA 18
27. Republic v Marcos-Manotoc 19
28. BPI v. Fidelity and Surety Co 21
29. Lechugas v CA 23
30 Salimbangon v Tan 25
31. Sps Lequin v Sps Vizconde 28
ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS 31
47. People v Reyes 31
48. People v Yatco 34
49. US v Bay 35
50. Datoon v Judge Kapilig 37
51. Heirs of Clemena v Heirs of Bien 38
52. DBP Pool v Radio Mindanao Network 40
53. People v Aling 42
54. PEOPLE v. VILLARINO 44
55. People v Valero 46
56 People v Tuniaco 48
57 People v Lauga 49
58. Navallo v SB 51
59. Heirs of Barredo v Besanes 53
60. People v Janjalani 57
61. Tan v Rodil Enterprises 58
PRINCIPLE:
In relation to Best Evidence Rule---- A written document speaks a uniform language; the spoken words
can be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air
carrier, adherence to the terms of ticket is desirable.
LONG DIGEST:
FACTS:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on
March 30, 1958.
The defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a
"first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled
in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first
class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a
"white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first
class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would
be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of
the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was
having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and
pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man" and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class"
seat in the plane.
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a first class
ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement
of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any
specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class
ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the
availability of first class seats.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a testimony of a witness can be used as evidence in the presence of written evidence
(airline ticket--- Best Evidence Rule)
SC RULING:
No.
Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first-class ticket was no guarantee
that the passenger to whom the same had been issued, would be accommodated in the first-class
compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to make arrangements upon arrival at every station
for the necessary first-class reservation. It received the corresponding amount in payment of first-class
tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees.
Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that
although plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to
confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the testimony of said witnesses. Oral evidence
cannot prevail over written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits belie the testimony of said witnesses, and
clearly show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any reservation
whatever.
Furthermore, defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga testified that the reservation for a "first class"
accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court cannot believe that after such confirmation
defendant had a verbal understanding with plaintiff that the "first class" ticket issued to him by defendant
would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong.
A written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only
to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is
desirable. The courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket.
Petitioner's trenchant claim is that Carrascoso's action is planted upon breach of contract; that to authorize
an award for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith; and that the decision of the
Court of Appeals fails to make a finding of bad faith.
First, That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others, the
Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first
class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled
Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he was already, seated" and to take a seat
in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations,
thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting
in moral damages. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But,
the inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. The
contract was averred to establish the relation between the parties.
Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the
evidence is not even required.
Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in his notebook
reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain
refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence which is incompetent. We do not think so. The subject
of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the
49a
proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible.
QUICK DIGEST:
FACTS:
X, was a member of a group of Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes. Air France (AF), through
its authorized agent, PAL, issued to X a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From
Manila to Bangkok, X travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of AF forced plaintiff to
vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, there was a "white man", who, the Manager
alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, X refused.
X later on reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane. Now, X sues AF.
AF tried to defend its side by the testimony of its witnesses LZ and RA that although plaintiff paid for,
and was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to confirmation in Hongkong. X
contends that he paid to and received from AF a first class ticket. But AF asserts that said ticket did not
represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did
not have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class
protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first
class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a testimony of a witness can be used as evidence in the presence of written evidence
SC RULING:
No.
The Best Evidence Rule provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. Oral evidence cannot prevail over
written evidence in this instance.
In this case, plaintiff's ticket belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show that the plaintiff was
issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any reservation whatever. The court cannot believe that
after the confirmation of the ticket, the defendant had a verbal understanding with plaintiff that the "first
class" ticket issued to him by defendant would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong. A written
document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve
stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable.
The courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket.
Principle: The best evidence rule requires that the highest available degree of proof must be produced.
For documentary evidence, the contents of a document are best proved by the production of the document
itself to the exclusion of secondary or substitutionary evidence.
Facts:
➢ Petitioner Dantis filed a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession against
Respondent Maghinang. Petitioner alleged that he was the registered owner of subject land,
acquiring such thru an extrajudicial partition of the estate from his deceased father. That
respondent built a house on a part of his estate; that his demands for respondent to vacate were
unheeded.
➢ Respondent Julio denied the allegations. He said that his father bought the land from the
Petitioner’s father and that he has succeeded to its ownership. He also claims that he was entitled
to a separate registration of said lot on the basis of the documentary evidence of sale, and his
open and uninterrupted possession of the property.
➢ Defendant presented the ff evidence to prove the sale of land to his father:
1. Exhibit 3 – affidavit executed by Ignacio Dantis, grandfather of the Petitioner of the agreement to
sell such land
2. Exhibit 4 – an undated handwritten receipt evidencing downpayment for said lot
➢ But defendant admitted that the affidavit was not signed by the alleged vendor, Emilio Dantis, the
father of petitioner. Also, he admitted that the receipt he presented was admittedly a mere
photocopy.
➢ RTC rendered its decision in favor of petitioner. RTC found that the documents would only serve
as proofs that the purchase price for the subject lot had not yet been completely paid and, hence,
Rogelio was not duty-bound to deliver the property to Julio, Jr. The RTC found Julio, Jr. to be a
mere possessor by tolerance.
➢ CA ruled in favor of Defendant Maghinang. It held that the undated receipt was proof of the sale of
the lot. It also ruled that the partial payment of the purchase price, coupled with the delivery gave
efficacy to the oral sale, and that Petitioner was duty-bound to convey what had been sold after
full payment of the selling price.
Issue: WON the pieces of evidence (affidavit and photocopy of the receipt) submitted by the defendant
are adequate proofs of the existence of the alleged oral contract of sale of the lot in dispute.
Ruling:
No.
Exhibit "3," the affidavit of Ignacio, is hearsay evidence and, thus, cannot be accorded any evidentiary
weight. Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends on the competency and credibility of some
persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to be produced. The exclusion of hearsay evidence is
anchored on three reasons: 1) absence of cross-examination; 2) absence of demeanor evidence; and 3)
absence of oath. The affidavit was not identified and its averments were not affirmed by affiant Ignacio.
Accordingly, it must be excluded from the judicial proceedings being an inadmissible hearsay evidence.
Exhibit "4," the undated handwritten receipt, is considered secondary evidence being a mere photocopy
which cannot be admitted to prove the contents of the document. The best evidence rule requires that the
highest available degree of proof must be produced. For documentary evidence, the contents of a
document are best proved by the production of the document itself to the exclusion of secondary or
substitutionary evidence, pursuant to Rule 130, Section 3.
A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5, which states that:
when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its
contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated.
In the case, Defendant failed to prove the due execution of the original of Exhibit "4" as well as its
subsequent loss. Also, his testimony was riddled with improbabilities and contradictions which raise
doubt on the veracity of his evidence. When asked where the original was, Defendant’s testimony gave
the impression that the original of the document was lost while it was in the possession of his parents.
During cross-examination, however, he testified that it was lost while it was in his possession. Further,
Exhibit 4 would not be an adequate proof of the existence of the alleged oral contract of sale because it
failed to provide a description of the subject lot, including its metes and bounds, as well as its full price or
consideration.
Bar Q:
X filed a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession against Y. Y on his defense claims that
his father bought the land from the X’s father and claims its ownership. Y presented 2 pieces of evidence
in court: (a) an affidavit executed by X’s grandfather of the agreement of the sale of said land; and (b) a
photocopy of an undated handwritten receipt evidencing downpayment for said lot. Y admitted that the
affidavit was not signed by the alleged vendor, X’s grandfather. Also, he admitted that the receipt he
presented was admittedly a mere photocopy.
Are the pieces of evidence presented adequate to prove the alleged sale?
❖ The case was directly elevated to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in toto the decision of the
17
trial court.The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence on record and found no cogent reason to
disturb the findings of the trial court and the appellate court.
❖ Despite grueling cross-examination by the defense suggesting extortion by the victim's father,
Alpha Jane remained steadfast and consistent that it was appellant who raped her. The victim's
testimony was supported by the medico-legal report of the medico-legal experts.
❖ Dr. Baluyut explained that in her findings, the terms hymenal transection at 5 oclock and
laceration at 5 oclock are synonymous. Dr. Baluyut further explained that there was prior injury
to the victim's hymen which might have been caused by the insertion of a blunt object such as an
erected penis which was compatible with the victim's claim that she had been raped.
Issue: What constitutes as the best evidence to prove the age of a person. (guidelines in appreciating age,
either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance)
Held:
22
In the case of People v. Pruna, the Court took note of conflicting pronouncements concerning the
appreciation of minority, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance. There were a
number of cases where no birth certificate was presented where the Court ruled that the age of the victim
23
was not duly proved. On the other hand, there were also several cases where it was ruled that the age of
the rape victim was sufficiently established despite the failure of the prosecution to present the birth
24
certificate of the offended party to prove her age. Thus, in order to remove any confusion, we set
in Pruna the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying
circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate
and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the
family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such
as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a) If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 7 years old;
b) If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 12 years old;
c) If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim's mother
or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is
expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.78
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the
25
accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
To paraphrase Pruna, the best evidence to prove the age of a person is the original birth certificate or
certified true copy thereof; in their absence, similar authentic documents may be presented such as
baptismal certificates and school records. If the original or certified true copy of the birth certificate is not
available, credible testimonies of the victim's mother or a member of the family may be sufficient under
certain circumstances. In the event that both the birth certificate or other authentic documents and the
testimonies of the victim's mother or other qualified relative are unavailable, the testimony of the victim
may be admitted in evidence provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
Unlike in Pruna, the trial court in this case made a categorical finding that Alpha Jane was only 6 years
old at the time she was raped, based not only on the testimonies of the complainant and her mother, but
also on the strength of the photocopy of Alpha Jane's birth certificate. It is well to note that the defense
did not object to the presentation of the birth certificate; on the contrary it admitted the same 'as to fact of
birth.
26
The Court is not unaware of our ruling in People v. Mantis that a mere photocopy of the birth certificate,
in the absence of any showing that the original copy was lost or destroyed, or was unavailable, without
the fault of the prosecution, does not prove the victim's minority, for said photocopy does not qualify as
competent evidence for that purpose.
However, there are other exceptions to the 'best evidence rule as expressly provided under Section 3, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. ' When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:
a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot
be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.[Emphasis supplied]
Without doubt, a certificate of live birth is a public record in the custody of the local civil registrar who is
a public officer. Clearly, therefore, the presentation of the photocopy of the birth certificate of Alpha Jane
is admissible as secondary evidence to prove its contents. Production of the original may be dispensed
with, in the trial court's discretion, whenever in the case at hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute
27
the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production.
In the case at bar, the defense did not dispute the contents of the photocopied birth certificate; in fact it
admitted the same. Having failed to raise a valid and timely objection against the presentation of this
secondary evidence the same became a primary evidence, and deemed admitted and the other party is
28
bound thereby.
In fine, the prosecution sufficiently proved that Alpha Jane was only six-years-old, being born on
November 26, 1994, when the rape incident happened on August 7, 2001.
BAR Q
On August 10, 2001, Genaro Cayabyab was charged with rape. He was accused of raping Alpha Jane
who was six years and nine months old when the rape was committed. When arraigned, appellant
pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued. Appellant raised the defenses of denial and alibi. The
trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. It found the victim's testimony
consistent with the medical findings of the doctors. Moreover, it applied the rule that an unsubstantiated
defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail over a positive and categorical testimony of a minor victim.
Finally, it appreciated the qualifying circumstance of minority and imposed the penalty of death. The
17
case was directly elevated to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence on record and found no cogent reason to disturb the findings of
the trial court and the appellate court.
➢ What constitutes as the best evidence to prove the age of a person.
26. Tan v. CA
G.R. No. L-56866 June 27, 1985
EDEN TAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PRINCIPLE: The loss may be shown by any person who knew the fact of its loss, or by and one who has
made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination of the place or places where the documents or
papers of similar character are kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been
unable to find it. (Relate so Rule 130 Sec. 2 (a) and Sec. 4) ( Best evidence rule and Secondary Evidence)
Facts: Eden Tan arrived in Manila from Hong Kong, because of her suspicious behavior her baggage was
asked to be examined in which she refused. But the Chief customs agent assigned her an examiner and the
examiner found fancy jewelry hidden under the fruits they were also sewn to her bag and blanket. A case
was filed against her for violation of Section 3602 of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended.In their
defense the appellant testified that she accomplished a baggage declaration presented to her by the
stewardess aboard the plane; that she declared in her baggage declaration all the baggage including one
leather bag and bed cover, personal effects, synthetic stones, fancy jewelries, medicine, clothing and so
forth; that this baggage declaration was not presented as evidence in court and, instead the prosecution
just manifested in court that the baggage declaration could not be found; that the prosecution did not
prove first the loss of the baggage declaration before proving the contents thereof by secondary evidence
through the recollection of witnesses and that even admitting that the prosecution has proved the contents
to be such that appellant stated only "personal effect" in her baggage declaration still the evidence is
insufficient to sustain the conviction of appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue: Did the court err in not asking for proof of the alleged lost document?
Did the court err in admitting secondary evidence due to the loss of the baggage declaration?
Ruling: The general rule concerning proof of a lost instrument is, that reasonable search shall be made for
it in the compliance where it was last known to have been, and if such search does not discover it. then
inquiry should be made of person most likely to have its custody(in the case the prosecutor since all the
documents were transferred to him), or who have some reasons to know of its whereabouts. No fixed rule
as to the necessary proof to establish loss, or what constitutes reasonable search, can be formulated. The
terms "reasonable search" and "in good faith," applied to proof of lost instruments, must be construed and
defined under the facts in each particular case; there is no inflexible definition under which they can be
applied to all cases. The sole object of each proof is, to raise a reasonable presumption, merely that the
instrument is lost. and this is a preliminary inquiry addressed to the discretion of the judge.
The loss may be shown by any person who knew the fact of its loss, or by and one who has made, in the
judgment of the court, a sufficient examination of the place or places where the documents or papers of
similar character are kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to
find it.
The loss of the baggage declaration having been duly established resort to secondary evidence, is
warranted under our rules of evidence.
Bar Question:
Xs baggage was inspected in NAIA objects violating the Tariffs and Customs code were found. X was
sued however the prosecution could not present the baggage declaration saying that it was lost. defense
now objects that proof must be shown that such baggage declaration and the testimonies given by the
witnesses of its existence should no be allowed.
is the objection of the defense proper?
27. Republic v Marcos-Manotoc
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Petitioner,
- versus
Meanwhile, as far as the YEUNGS were concerned, the court found the allegations against them baseless.
Petitioner failed to demonstrate howGlorious Sunwas used as a vehicle for dollar salting; or to show that
they were dummies of the Marcoses. Again, the court held that the documentary evidence relevant to this
allegation was INADMISSIBLE for being mere photocopies, and that the affiants had not been presented
as witnesses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the demurrers filed by the respondents?
RULING:
NO.
It is petitioner’s burden to prove the allegations; the operative act on how and in what manner must be
clearly shown through preponderance of evidence.
The petitioner does not deny that what should be proved are the contents of the documents themselves. It
is imperative; therefore, to submit the original documents that could prove petitioner’s allegations. Thus,
the photocopied documents are in violation of best evidence rule, which mandates that the evidence must
be the original document itself. Furthermore, petitioner did not even attempt to provide a plausible reason
why the originals were not presented, or any compelling ground why the court such documents as
secondary evidence absent the affiant’s testimony.
The presentation of the originals of the aforesaid exhibits is not validly excepted under Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. Under Section 3 (d), when ‘the original document is a public record in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office,’ the original thereof need not be presented. However, all
except one of the exhibits are not necessarily public documents. The transcript of stenographic notes
(TSN) of the proceedings purportedly before the PCGG may be a public document but what the plaintiff
presented was a mere photocopy of the purported TSN which was not a certified copy and was not even
signed by the stenographer who supposedly took down the proceedings. The Rules provide that when the
original document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office; a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof may prove its contents.
In order that secondary evidence may be admissible, there must be proof by satisfactory evidence of (1)
due execution of the original; (2) loss, destruction or unavailability of all such originals and (3)
reasonable diligence and good faith in the search for or attempt to produce the original. None of the
abovementioned requirements were complied by the plaintiff. It is emphasized, even if originals of these
affidavits were presented, they would still be considered hearsay evidence if the affiants do not testify and
identify them.
Petitioner having failed to observe the best evidence rule rendered the offered documentary evidence
futile and worthless in alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth insofar as the specific allegations herein
were concerned.
Hence, Sandiganbayan is correct in granting the respondents respective Demurers to evidence.
BPI filed a case for reformation of instrument on the ground of mistake and it offered the promissory note
as evidence to demonstrate that an error had been committed when reference was made to the Laguna
Coconut Oil Co. in the indorsement of guaranty on the note instead of the person or entity discounting the
note.
The trial court admitted the evidence and ruled that the note could not have been discounted by the
Laguna Coconut Oil Co., and that this must logically have been done by the Bank of the Philippine
Islands.
ISSUE: Whether the promissory note is admissible to prove that the indorsement of guaranty annotated
therein did not refer to Laguna Oil but to the entity discounting the note such as BPI
HELD: NO.
A written agreement is presumed to contain all the terms of the agreement. But evidence of the terms of
the agreement other than the contents of the writing are admissible where a mistake or imperfection of the
writing, or its failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties, is put in issue by the
pleadings.
In this case, the plaintiff has filed three distinct and conflicting complaints. The first case was dismissed
by the trial court for insufficiency of evidence but remanded by the Court for further proceedings. On the
return of the case to the lower court, the judgment was against Fidelity but was reversed and the case
dismissed on appeal. The present case is now one for reformation of instrument on the ground of mistake.
To justify the reformation of a written instrument upon the ground of mistake, the concurrence of three
things are necessary: First, that the mistake should be of a fact; second, that the mistake should be proved
by clear and convincing evidence; and, third, that the mistake should be common to both parties to the
instrument.
In the various pleadings filed by plaintiff, it has not remained loyal to any one theory of the case. For
instance, it has alleged at various times that the guaranty of the defendant was in favor of the Laguna
Coconut Oil Co., and that the guaranty was in favor of the Bank of the Philippine Islands; that the note
was discounted by the Philippine Vegetable Oil Company and that the note was discounted by the Bank of
the Philippine Islands; that there was no mutual mistake and that there was mutual mistake.
With all the various pleadings, all the various incidents, all the various facts, all the various legal
principles, and all the various possibilities to the forefront, the conclusion is that the plaintiff, by , has
failed to establish a mutual mistake.
BAR QUESTION FORMAT
FACTS: In a case for reformation of instrument, the Bank of the Phil. Islands offered as evidence a
promissory note executed by Laguna Oil in favor of Phil. Vegetable Oil with a note signed by Fidelity and
Surety Co. obligating itself to hold harmless Laguna Oil for any loss incurred for discounting the note.
BPI sought reformation of the instrument on the ground of mistake by Fidelity in referring to Laguna Oil.
BPI contends that the guaranty was for the protection of the person or entity discounting the note and not
for Laguna Oil. Is the promissory note admissible to prove BPI’s contention?
HELD: NO. A written agreement is presumed to contain all the terms of the agreement. But evidence of
the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing are admissible where a mistake or
imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties, is put in
issue by the pleadings. Mistake must be shown by proof of the clearest and most satisfactory character
constituting more than a preponderance of the evidence.
29. Lechugas v CA
PRINCIPLE: As explained by a leading commentator on our Rules of Court, the parol evidence rule
does not apply, and may not properly be invoked by either party to the litigation against the other, where
at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question
and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation
established thereby. (Francisco on Evidence, Vol. VII, part I of the Rules of Court, p. 155 citing 32 C.J.S.
79.).
FACTS:
Victoria Lechugas (petitioner) bought a land from a certain Leoncia Lasangue. After the purchase of the
land, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Leoncia Lasangue in her favor specified a certain land Lot
No. 5456 stated in the contract. When the defendants (respondents) occupied Lot No. 5456, petitioner
filed a complaint for forcible entry with damages (ejectment case) against the defendants but it was
dismissed. Petitioner appealed the case to the CFI (now RTC) of Iloilo.
While the appeal for the ejectment case was pending, petitioner filed another case in the RTC for the
recovery of possession against the same defendants involving the same Lot No. 5456. During the trial,
the defendants presented their star witness in the person of Leoncia Lasangue herself.
Leoncia Lasangue testified during the trial. That according to her, the lot that she sold to the petitioner
was not Lot No. 5456 but another lot, Lot 5522. Lasangue did not know how to read and write, so the
document of sale was prepared by the petitioner, thereafter, the former was made to sign it. Based on her
testimony, the lot indicated in the Deed of Sale which she sold to petitioner was erroneous. It was clear
that she did not intend to sell a piece of land already sold by her father to the predecessor-in-interest of the
defendants (respondents). This was objected by the petitioner under the Parole Evidence Rule.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Parole Evidence Rule apply in this case
HELD:
No. The Parole Evidence Rule will not apply in this case because it is Leoncia Lasangue who is one of the
parties to the subject Deed of Sale not the defendants. The defendants in the case were not parties to the
Deed of Sale executed between Leoncia Lasange and petitioner Lechugas.
The petitioner's reliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. The rule is not applicable where the
controversy is between one of the parties to the document and third persons. The deed of sale was
executed by Leoncia Lasangue in favor of Victoria Lechugas. The dispute over what was actually sold is
between petitioner and the private respondents. In the case at bar, through the testimony of Leoncia
Lasangue, it was shown that what she really intended to sell and to be the subject of Exhibit A was Lot
No. 5522 but not being able to read and write and fully relying on the good faith of her first cousin, the
petitioner, she just placed her thumbmark on a piece of paper which petitioner told her was the document
evidencing the sale of land. The deed of sale described the disputed lot instead.
Bar Q: X bought a land from Y. After the purchase of the land, a Deed of Sale was executed. The Deed
of Sale specified Lot No. 5456 as the subject of the contract. When Z occupied Lot No. 5456, X filed an
ejectment suit against Z, thereafter filed a petition for the recovery of possession against the same
defendants and the same disputed lot. Defendants Z took Y to testify before the trial court. Based on Y’s
testimony, the lot indicated in the Deed of Sale which she sold to X was erroneous and not the lot she
intended to sell. X objected on the ground of the Parole Evidence Rule. Rule on the objection.
(1000points)
30 Salimbangon v Tan
CASE NO. 30
SALIMBANGON VS. SPOUSES TAN
PRINCIPLE: The exclusionary provision enumerated in Section 9 of Rule 130 or the parol evidence rule
admits of exceptions. The Tans had put in issue the true intent and agreement of the parties to the partition
when they alleged in their complaint that, contrary to what paragraph 2 quoted above seems to imply, the
easement was actually for the benefit of Lots D and E only. Hence, the Tans were entitled to introduce
evidence to establish the true intent and agreement of the parties although this may depart from what the
partition agreement literally provided.
FACTS:
Guillermo Ceniza died intestate on July 11, 1951, leaving a parcel of land at
Poblacion, Mandaue City. Twenty years later on July 17, 1973 his children Benedicta, Guillermo, Jr.,
Victoria, Eduardo, and Carlos executed an extrajudicial declaration of heirs and partition, adjudicating
and dividing the land among themselves . Lots A, B, and C were adjacent to a city street. But Lots D and
E were not. To give these interior lots access to the street, the heirs established in their extrajudicial
partition an easement of right of way consisting of a 3-meter wide alley between Lots D and E that
continued on between Lots A and B and on to the street which was then embodied in the individual titles
issued to the heirs. The partition resulted in an unequal division of the property so the heirs modified their
agreement by eliminating the easement of right of way along Lots A, D, and E, and instead, imposed a 3-
meter wide alley that ran exclusively along the southwest boundary of Lot B from Lots D and E to the
street. Victoria later swapped lots with Benedicta with the result that Victoria became the owner of Lot A
and there she built a residential house and two garages, one abutted the street while the other used the
easement of right of way of lot B.
Respondent spouses Santos and Erlinda Tan (the Tans) bought Lots B, C, D, and E from all their
owners. The Tans built improvements on Lot B that spilled into the easement area. They also closed the
gate that the Salimbangons built. Unable to use the old right of way, the Salimbangons lodged a complaint
with the City Engineer of Mandaue against the Tans. For their part, the Tans filed an action with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue against the Salimbangons in Civil Case MAN-3223 for the
extinguishment of the easement on Lot B and damages with application for preliminary injunction. The
Salimbangons filed their answer with counterclaims.
After hearing or on February 9, 2001 the RTC rendered judgment, upholding the Salimbangons easement
of right of way over the alley on Lot B, the lot that belonged to the Tans.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed the RTC decision. This prompted
them to file the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in admitting in evidence contrary to the parol evidence rule Eduardo Cenizas
testimony respecting the true intent of the heirs in establishing the easement of right of way as against
what they stated in their written agreement.
RULING:
The Salimbangons point out that the CA ought to have rejected Eduardo Cenizas testimony that the heirs
had intended to establish the easement of right of way solely for the benefit of the interior Lots D and E
which had no access to the city street. The partition agreement also made Lot A, now owned by the
Salimbangons, a beneficiary of that easement.
The parol evidence rule, said the Salimbangons, precluded the parties from introducing testimony that
tended to alter or modify what the parties had agreed on above.
But the exclusionary provision of the parol evidence rule admits of exceptions. Section 9, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence states:
Sec. 9. Evidence of written agreements. - When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the
parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement. However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of
the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
Here, the Tans had put in issue the true intent and agreement of the parties to the partition when they
alleged in their complaint that, contrary to what paragraph 2 quoted above seems to imply, the easement
was actually for the benefit of Lots D and E only. Consequently, with the above averment, the Tans were
entitled to introduce evidence to establish the true intent and agreement of the parties although this may
depart from what the partition agreement literally provided.
At any rate, as the CA said, the Salimbangons did not object at the hearing to admission of Eduardo
Cenizas testimony even when this seemed at variance, as far as they were concerned, with the partition
agreement among the heirs. Consequently, the Salimbangons may also be deemed to have waived their
right to now question such testimony on appeal.
SHORT DIGEST:
GC died intestate on July 11, 1951, leaving a parcel of land. Twenty years later, his children BC, GC,Jr.,
VS, EC, and CC executed an extrajudicial declaration of heirs and partition, adjudicating and dividing the
land among themselves . Lots A, B, and C were adjacent to a city street but Lots D and E were not. The
heirs established in their extrajudicial partition an easement of right of way which was then embodied in
the individual titles issued to the heirs. The partition resulted in an unequal division of the property so the
heirs modified their agreement by eliminating the easement of right of way and instead, imposed a 3-
meter wide alley that ran exclusively along the southwest boundary of Lot B from Lots D and E to the
street. VS later swapped lots with BC with the result that VS became the owner of Lot A and there she
built a residential house and two garages, one abutted the street while the other used the easement of right
of way of lot B.
Respondent spouses ST and ET bought Lots B, C, D, and E from all their owners. They built
improvements on Lot B that spilled into the easement area. Unable to use the old right of way, VS lodged
a complaint with the City Engineer. The Ts filed an action in the RTC for the extinguishment of the
easement on Lot B and damages with application for preliminary injunction which ruled in favor of VS.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed the RTC decision. This prompted
them to file the present petition.
In 1997, respondents represented to petitioners that they had also bought from Carlito de Leon a 1,012-
square meter lot adjacent to petitioners' property and built a house thereon. As later confirmed by de
Leon, however, the 1,012-square meter lot claimed by respondents is part of the 10,115-square meter lot
petitioners bought from him. Petitioners believed the story of respondents, since it was Raymundo who
negotiated the sale of their lot with de Leon. With the consent of respondents, petitioners then constructed
their house on the 500-square meter half-portion of the 1,012 square-meter lot claimed by respondents, as
this was near the road. Respondents' residence is on the remaining 512 square meters of the lot.
Given this situation, a lawyer advised petitioners that the 1,012-square meter lot be segregated from the
subject lot whose title they own and to make it appear that they are selling to respondents 512 square
meters thereof. This sale was embodied in the February 12, 2000 Kasulatan where it was made to appear
that respondents paid PhP 15,000 for the purchase of the 512-square meter portion of the subject lot. In
reality, the consideration of PhP 15,000 was not paid to petitioners. Actually, it was petitioners who paid
respondents PhP 50,000 for the 500-square meter portion where petitioners built their house on, believing
respondents' representation that the latter own the 1,012-square meter lot. In July 2000, petitioners tried to
develop the dried up canal located between their 500-square meter lot and the public road. Respondents
objected, claiming ownership of said dried up canal or sapang patay.
This prompted petitioners to look into the ownership of the dried up canal and the 1,012 square-meter lot
claimed by respondents. Carlito de Leon told petitioners that what he had sold to respondents was the
dried up canal or sapang patay and that the 1,012-square meter lot claimed by respondents really belongs
to petitioners.
Thus, on July 13, 2001, petitioners filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Contract, Sum of
Money and Damages against respondents with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 28 in Cabanatuan
City, praying, among others, for the declaration of the February 12, 2000 Kasulatan as null and void ab
initio, the return of PhP 50,000 they paid to respondents, and various damages.
RTC AND CA:
The trial court found, inter alia, lack of consideration in the contract of sale while the appellate court, in
reversing the decision of the trial court, merely ruled that the contract of sale is not simulated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acceptance of parol evidence applies to the instant case.
RULING:
Yes. Parol evidence applies to the instant case The CA misappreciated the evidence duly adduced during
the trial on the merits.
The appellate court's finding that there was no fraud or fraudulent machinations employed by respondents
on petitioners is bereft of factual evidentiary support. We sustain petitioners' contention that respondents
employed fraud and machinations to induce them to enter into the contract of sale. As such, the CA's
finding of fact must give way to the finding of the trial court that the Kasulatan has to be annulled for
vitiated consent.
The affidavit or Sinumpaang Salaysay of de Leon attests to the foregoing facts. Moreover, de Leon's
testimony in court confirmed and established such facts. These were neither controverted nor assailed by
respondents who did not present any countervailing evidence. On its face, the contract of sale appears to
be supported by a valuable consideration. We, however, agree with the trial court's finding that this is a
simulated sale and unsupported by any consideration, for respondents never paid the PhP 15,000
purported purchase price.
Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence gives both the general rule and exception as
regards written agreements, thus:
SEC. 9. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it
is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if
he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the
execution of the written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills.
The second exception provided for the acceptance of parol evidence applies to the instant case. Lack of
consideration was proved by petitioners' evidence aliunde showing that the Kasulatan did not express the
true intent and agreement of the parties. As explained above, said sale contract was fraudulently entered
into through the misrepresentations of respondents causing petitioners' vitiated consent.
Moreover, the evidence of petitioners was uncontroverted as respondents failed to adduce any proof that
they indeed paid PhP 15,000 to petitioners. Indeed, having asserted their purchase of the 512-square meter
portion of petitioners based on the Kasulatan, it behooves upon respondents to prove such affirmative
defense of purchase. Unless the party asserting the affirmative defense of an issue sustains the burden of
proof, his or her cause will not succeed. If he or she fails to establish the facts of which the matter
asserted is predicated, the complainant is entitled to a verdict or decision in his or her favor.16
In the instant case, the record is bereft of any proof of payment by respondents and, thus, their affirmative
defense of the purported purchase of the 512-square meter portion fails.
The attackers were Huks, and the motive of the killing was obviously the enmity existing between the
outlaw organization and the forces of peace and order.
Nery and Laguitan died as a result of the shooting. Private Orsino suffered serious injuries. His leg, shot
and fractured, need about six months to heal.
Pedro Reyes turned state evidence, but he did not confirm every statement he had previously made at the
fiscal's investigation. He testified, however, that at about seven o'clock that night he saw, among the
people gathered at the "pabasa," "Pipit" (Marcelo Due) Piping, Gervasio Due alias Oliveros, Vicente
Gatchalian and Maximino Austria alias Big Boy; that Pipit and Piping (Felipe Sese) called him and told
him that Oliveros wanted to talk with him; that talking with Oliveros he was invited by the latter to speak
to the MP's (the members of the military police, Nery, Laguitan and Orsino); that he refused; that
thereafter he heard several detonations; that he ran to the rice field and there he met Oliveros (Gervasio
Due) and Gatchalian talking, the former declaring he was sure the MP he had shot will die and Gatchalian
making the same assurance as to the MP he (Gatchalian) had shot in turn. Reyes had previously told the
authorities in his affidavit Exhibit A, in addition to what he related in court, that Oliveros, Magallanes and
Big Boy had approached the three MP's and lined them up on the road, after which shots were heard.
Enough, however, may be gathered from his testimony in open court to identify Gatchalian as one of
the assailants, the conversation he overheard in the rice field being admissibile as an admission and as
part of the res gestæ. (U. S. vs. Remigio, 37 Phil., 599; People vs. Nakpil, 52 Phil., 985; People vs.
Durante, 53 Phil., 363.)
In relation to the evidence presented in this case, among the evidence presented were the alleged
admissions or confessions of Gatchalian and Austria. Thus:
Lieutenant Fidel Martinez and Secundino Quintas declared under oath that Vicente Gatchalian admitted
before the latter, while under investigation, that he had shot one of the MPs who died later. Gatchalian
even showed how he had fired at the MP from the back, posing for a picture (Exhibit H).
Lieutenant Quintans likewise asserted that Severino Austria had voluntarily signed the confession Exhibit
E wherein said Austria made the following statements:
Once more, attention should be called to the ruling of this Court in the case of Prats & Co. vs. Phoenix
Insurance Co., 52 Phil., 807, 816-817:
In the course of long experience we have observed that justice is most effectively and expeditiously
administered in the courts where trial objections to the admission of proof are received with least favor.
The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality or technical objections to the
form of the questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first
instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to know with any certainty whether
testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the Attorney
offering the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the
attorney that the proof offered will be connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat
of the battle over which the presides, a judge of first instance may possibly fall into error in judging of the
relevancy of proof where a fair and logical connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and
the proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and
possibly unable to correct the effects of the error without returning the case for a new trial, — a step
which this Court is always very loath to take. On the other hand, the admission of proof in a court of first
instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never result in much
harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to know the law; and it is duty, upon final
consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and material from the irrelevant and immaterial. If
this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this Court then has
all the material before it necessary to make a correct judgment.
There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where questions arise as to admissibility
of evidence for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the erroneous
acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the People can no longer appeal.
49. US v Bay
#49 US vs. BAY
G.R. No. L-9341 August 14, 1914
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SERVANDO BAY, defendant-appellant.
On the night of June 7 of the present year, 1913, in the barrio of San Teodoro of the township of Calapan,
Mindoro, Servando Bay accidentally met Florentina Alcones walking along the beach, and, on finding
that she was alone, did maliciously and criminally drag her toward a place covered with underbrush, and
there by means of force and intimidation did lie with her against her will.
The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution is substantially as follows: That the complaining
witness and the accused are neighbors: that about 7 o'clock in the evening of June 7, 1913, when turning
from her rice field she was joined by the accused, and that a short distance from the mouth of Subaan
River he caught hold of her, picked her up, and carried her to the edge of some thickets, where he threw
her on the ground and attempted to have carnal intercourse with her; that angered by her resistance he
drew his dagger, and force her under threat of her life to accede to his desires; that a party who were
passing near the place where the crime was committed heard her cries, and put into shore; that one of the
party stepped ashore, and seeing the accused get up from the place where the woman claims the crime
was committed. That the accused made no explanation of his conduct or his presence there, and left the
place forthwith; that immediately thereafter the woman, accompanied by some of the party from the boat,
went to the councilman of the barrio and made complaint; that the accused, having been brought before
the councilman and asked had he committed the crime of which he was charged, admitted that he had;
that thereafter the accused was sent to the justice of the peace, who held him for trial.
Upon his evidence the accused was convicted in the RTC.
On appeal, the defense contends that the victim appears to be much more than twice the age of the
accused, and anything but attractive in her personal appearance . His contention is that the charge of rape
is a pure fabrication, and that it was brought by the woman for the sole purpose of wreaking her
vengeance and spite upon the accused, with whom she had a quarrel over the trespass of one of his
carabaos on her land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in accepting as true the testimony of the complaining witness and of
the witnesses called by the prosecution to corroborate her.
RULING:
SC found no error in the proceedings prejudicial to the substantials rights of the accused, and the
judgment entered in the court below convicting and sentencing him.
Her evidence, supported by that of other witnesses for the prosecution, is so convincing and conclusive
that we are forced to believe that he did it in fact commit the atrocious crime with which he is charged.
There can be no possible doubt that he was present when the party on board the boat were attracted to the
place where she raised her outcry charging him with the assault, and that he was present later or when he
presented her complaint to the councilman of the barrio. Under such circumstances, we are convinced that
an innocent man would instantly and indignantly repudiate such a charge, and attempt there and then to
establish his innocence, explaining how he came to be there present with the woman, and the conditions
under which she had made the false charge.
The witnesses called both for the prosecution and the defense go into considerable detail as to all that
occurred at the time when the party on board the boat responded to the calls of the woman and
immediately thereafter, and yet there is not the slightest indication in the evidence that there was on the
part of the accused any such indignant denials and protests as would be expected from an innocent man
suddenly confronted with such a charge under such circumstances. Indeed his conduct at that time was, to
our minds, wholly at variance with that which might fairly be expected from him, granting the truth of his
testimony and that of the other witnesses for the defense.
Having in mind the fact that the trial judge saw and heard the witness testify, and upon a full review of all
the evidence, we are of opinion that there is nothing in the record which would justify us in disturbing the
findings of the court below as to the degree of credit which should be accorded the various witnesses, or
as to the guilt of the accused of the crime of which he was convicted.
A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot thereafter contradict it.
The exception is found only in those rare instances when the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion
and because of strong reasons to support its stand, may relieve a party from the consequences of his
admission. (Jovito Salonga, Philippine Law of Evidence 121 [1958 ed.], Reginal Publishing Company)
The acts or facts admitted do not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless it can be shown
that the admission was made through palpable mistake. (Irlanda v. Pitargue 22 Phil. 383 [1912])
A party's testimony in court sworn to and subject to cross-examination by the other party is not
susceptible to an objection on the ground that it is self-serving. Interest alone is not a ground for
disregarding a party's testimony (National Development Company v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission 126 Phil. 226 [1967])
BAR EXAM QUESTION:
Irene B. Bien is the absolute owner of a riceland described in Tax Declaration (TD) No. 5299, in
Bolo, Albay--one of the lots involved in two consolidated cases for recovery of possession and ownership
filed through her Attorney-in-fact Gregorio Clemea, from Pedro Clemea y Zurbano, the administrator of
the said riceland, who deliberately continued to occupy and usurp the possession and use and has ever
since refused to relinquish the possession of the same to the lawful owner thereof notwithstanding the fact
that he has no right or any color of title over the said land. By reason of this unlawful occupation and
usurpation by Pedro Clemea y Zurbano, Irene B. Bien will suffer damages and in fact suffered damages at
the rate of 50 cavans of palay yearly. In his answer, Pedro Clemea y Zurbano alleged that the land was
his and that it was in his exclusive possession. Neither Bien nor Zurbano lived to see the end of the trial.
They were substituted by their respective heirs. The heirs of Zurbano insist that they cannot be held liable
to the heirs of Bien for the harvest on the following grounds: (1) The heirs of Zurbano never took
possession of the property declared in TD No. 5299 and (2) The evidence, the testimony in court of the
Attorney-in-fact Gregorio Clemea, relied upon by the appelate court to determine the amount of damages,
proceeding as it did from one of the plaintiffs, was self-serving and therefore could not have been a
proper basis for such an award.
ISSUES:
Was the contention of the heirs of Zurbano that they never took possession of the land in issue tenable?
Was the testimonial evidence of the Attorney-in-fact Gregorio Clemea self-serving and therefore could
not have been a proper basis for an award of damages?
ANSWERS:
No, their contention that they never took possession of the land was untenable.
No, the testimonial evidence of the Attorney-in-fact Gregorio Clemea was not self-serving and could be
a proper basis for an award of damages.
RULING:
1. The predecessor Pedro Clemea y Zurbano alleged in his answer that the land declared in
TD 5299 was in his exclusive possession. That statement, insofar as it confirmed the allegation in the
complaint that petitioners' predecessor had retained possession of the land in question, took on the
character of a judicial admission contemplated in Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court:
An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of proceedings in the same case, does not
require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made.
A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot thereafter contradict it.
The exception is found only in those rare instances when the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion
and because of strong reasons to support its stand, may relieve a party from the consequences of his
admission. (Jovito Salonga, Philippine Law of Evidence 121 [1958 ed.], Reginal Publishing Company)
The acts or facts admitted do not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless it can be shown
that the admission was made through palpable mistake. (Irlanda v. Pitargue 22 Phil. 383 [1912]). The rule
was more forcibly stated by Mr. Justice Street in the 1918 decision Ramirez v. Orientalist Co. 38 Phil. 634
[1918]:
An admission made in a pleading can not be controverted by the party making such admission; and all
proof submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should simply be ignored by the court,
whether objection is interposed by the opposite party or not.
The above Ramirez ruling was reiterated in Joes Radio and electrical Supply v. Alto Electronics
Corp., 104 Phil. 333 (1958) and Santiago v. De los Santos, 158 Phil. 809 (1974)
And in Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil 227 (1948), the Court declared that:
the allegations, statements, or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A
party cannot subsequently take a position contrary to, or inconsistent with, his pleadings.
The assertion of the Heirs of Zurbano that they were never in possession of the land cannot hold up
against these pronouncements. As substituting defendants, they were bound by the admission of Pedro
Clemea y Zurbano, their predecessor in the litigation (31A C.J.S. Evidence 302). Without any showing
that the admission was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made, petitioners
cannot now contradict it.
Self-serving evidence is not to be taken literally to mean any evidence that serves its proponent's interest
(Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 311 Phil. 813 [1995]). The term, if used with any legal sense, refers only to
acts or declarations made by a party in his own interest at some place and time out of court, and it does
not include testimony that he gives as a witness in court (31A C.J.S. Evidence 302). Evidence of this sort
is excluded on the same ground as any hearsay evidence, that is, lack of opportunity for cross-
examination by the adverse party and on the consideration that its admission would open the door to fraud
and fabrication (National Development Company v. Workmen's Compensation Commission 126 Phil. 226
[1967]). In contrast, a party’s testimony in court sworn and subject to cross-examination by the other
party is not susceptible to an objection on the ground that it is self-serving. (National Development
Company v. Workmen's Compensation Commission 126 Phil. 226 [1967]).
For all the Heirs of Zurbano's protestations against the use of Gregorio Clemea's testimony, they never
once alleged, much less tried to show, that the latter's testimony was inaccurate or untrue. Thus, the Court
cannot subscribe to the view that a party’s testimony favorable to himself must be disregarded on account
solely of his interest in the case. Interest alone is not a ground for disregarding a party's testimony
(National Development Company v. Workmen's Compensation Commission 126 Phil. 226 [1967]). The
interest of a witness does not ipso facto deprive his testimony of probative force or require it to be
disregarded, and the trier of facts is entitled to accept as much of the witness testimony as he finds
credible and to reject the rest (32A C.J.S. Evidence 1031 [2]).
Hence, the Court held that the appellate court committed no reversible error in relying on Gregorio
Clemea’s testimony. The award of damages must stand.
Principle:
The testimony of the accused that he was married to the deceased was an admission against his penal
interest. It was a confirmation of the maxim semper praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption "that a
man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage" (Sec. 5[bbl, Rule 131, Rules of Court).
Facts:
Accused was charged of paracide for killing his wife. Accused admitted in open court voluntarily that he
is married with the victim and he killed the victim. Accused was sentenced to death by the trial court.
Issue:
Is their a need to adduce evidence that accused is married to the victim in order to convict him in a crime
paracide?
Ruling:
No.
The testimony of the accused that he was married to the deceased was an admission against his penal
interest. It was a confirmation of the maxim semper praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption "that a
man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage"
He and the deceased had five children. He alluded in his testimony to his father-in-law. That implies that
the deceased was his lawful wife. The fact that he bitterly resented her infidelity. Her failure to visit him n
prison and her neglect of their children are other circumstances confirmatory of their marital status.
The contention that the accused did not understand fully he nature and effect of Ms plea of guilty is belied
by the record. The trial judge, a Muslim, took pans to follow the rule that in case a plea of guilty is
entered in a capital case, evidence should be received in order to leave no room for reasonable doubt that
the accused is guilty of the offense charged and that he had full knowledge of the meaning and
consequences of his plea of guilty (People vs. Duaban, L-31912, August 24, 1979).
In this case, the arraignment was postponed three times in order to enable his counsel to confer with him
and explain to him the consequences of his plea of guilty. The accused testified. His confession and the
affidavit of the policemen who investigated him were presented in evidence.
The contention that the crime was mitigated by the plea of guilty lack of intention to commit so grave a
wrong and the circumstance that the accused is a non-Christian is not well taken because he is a quasi-
recidivist. The special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism cannot be offset by generic
investigating circumstances.
The fact that he escaped from confinement in order to kill his wife shows a high degree of perversity and
incorrigibility His being a non-Christian cannot serve to extenuate the heinousness of his offense. He
understood the gravity of his crime because he had attained some education. He reached first year high
school and he used to be a checker in a stevedoring firm.
However, only since Justices (Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad
Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera) voted for the imposition of the death penalty.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is affirmed with the modification that, for lack of one vote, the
accused is sentenced to reclusion perpetua Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Lucila Valero alias Rosing and Alfonsito Valero alias “Pipe”, a deafmute whose case was
dismissed since he didn’t understand the proceedings against him, were accused in two separate
complaints, one for double murder and the other for frustrated murder. In the morning of February 22,
1969, two children of Ceferino Velasco died of poisoning while his other child, Imelda, almost died had it
not been for medical assistance. They were at the balcony of their house where they ate the bread. During
the investigation, it was revealed that Ceferino Velasco was seen throwing poisoned rats into a river near
his house; the dead bodies of the children, the dead puppies under the balcony, and slices of bread
containing poison were found in the crime scene. The bread contained endrin, a poisonous substance.
According to the autopsy and necropsy report, the children died due to endrin poisoning.
The prosecution presents evidence to prove that the bread was given to the children by Pipe, who
received the same from Rosing; while the defense’ evidence sought to prove that the children might have
eaten one of the poisoned bread, which was used by their father to poison rats in his garden. The
prosecution presented 3 witnesses: Rodolfo Quilang, who allegedly saw the defendant Rosing hand
“something wrapped in a piece of paper” to Pipe; and Federico Jaime and Ceferino Velasco, who
allegedly obtained information regarding the incident from Pipe, after interviewing him through sign
language. During the course of the proceedings, it was established that Quilang made several
inconsistencies in his testimony and was observed to be lying; and that both Jaime and Velasco
testimonies only add confusion as to the source of the poisoned bread.
The trial court gave weight to the prosecution’s evidence and conjured the accused’s psychiatric
abnormality as probable cause to find the defendant guilty as charged and sentenced the latter to death.
Issue: Whether or not the admission of evidence was proper to warrant the imposition of the death
penalty against the defendant.
Jaime and Velasco’s testimonies are purely hearsay and are inadmissible.
There are several compelling reasons that should have made the trial Court reject the testimony of both
Jaime and Velasco. Pipe who was the alleged source of the vital information for the prosecution was never
presented as a witness either for the prosecution or for the defense. Jaime and Velasco were presented as
prosecution witnesses to convey to the Court what they learned from Pipe by sign language.
The evidence is purely hearsay. The presentation of such evidence likewise violates the principle of res
inter alios acta. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.
With particular reference to the testimony of Ceferino Velasco, its admission cannot be justified by
claiming that it is a part of the res gestae. When Pipe allegedly revealed to Ceferino Velasco that the
source of the poisoned bread was the defendant, the children had not eaten or tasted it. Nobody was yet
poisoned. Stated otherwise, there was no startling occurrence yet. With reference to the testimony of
Jaime, there is no showing that Pipe made the extrajudicial revelation spontaneously when he was still
under the influence of startling occurrence. Pipe made his extrajudicial revelation not spontaneously but
after an interview through the complicated process of sign language.
The evidence violates defendant’s constitutional right to meet the witnesses face to face and violates
due process.
To give weight to the testimonies of Federico Jaime and Ceferino Velasco, whether considered as hearsay
evidence or as part of res gestae and make the same the basis for the imposition of the death penalty
gravely violates the constitutional right of the defendant to meet the witnesses face to face and to subject
Pipe to the rigid test of cross-examination, the only effective means to test the truthfulness, memory,
intelligence, and in this particular case, the ability of the deaf-mute, Alfonsito Valero alias Pipe, to
communicate with the outside world. In a conflict between a provision of the constitution giving the
defendant a substantive right and mere technical rules of evidence, we have no choice but to give effect to
the constitution.
The cross-examination of Pipe, the source of the vital information for the prosecution, would have shown
clearly his incompetence as a witness. During the preliminary investigation in the Municipal Court,
experts on deaf-mutes like Belen Herreros who is the official interpreter of the only school for the deaf
and the blind in the Philippines, assisted by Mrs. Felicidad Vinluan who is the principal of the school of
the deaf and the blind, Mesdames Gilda Tatum and Salud Natividad, examined Alfonsito Valero alias Pipe
and reported to the Municipal Court that "questions addressed to him (Alfonsito Valero) and answers
given by him cannot be accurately interpreted."
SHORT DIGEST:
Facts:
Accused is sentenced to death for double murder and frustrated murder due to poisoning. The prosecution
presents three witnesses to prove the charge against the defendant. Among the three witnesses, two of
them testified as to what P told them after interviewing the latter through sign language. P, a deafmute
who was present during the incident, was never made a witness by the prosecution or the defense; nor was
he cross-examined.
Answer:
Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value. Further, whether the
testimony of a witness is considered as hearsay evidence or as part of res gestae, will gravely violate the
constitutional right of the defendant to meet the witnesses face to face.
In this case, the testimony of the witnesses is only hearsay since the same information was
acquired by them from P. Since P was not presented as a witness for the prosecution or the defense, any
information obtained from him would violate the defendant’s constitutional right to meet the witnesses
face to face. Hence, the witnesses’ testimony is inadmissible.
56 People v Tuniaco
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ROMULO TUNIACO, JEFFREY DATULAYTA and ALEX ALEMAN, Accused.
ALEX ALEMAN, Appellant.
Principle:
Requirements for valid extrajudicial declaration.
Confession to be admissible must be a) voluntary; b) made with the assistance of a competent and
independent counsel; c) express; and d) in writing.
Bar Q.
Accused A, B and C were charged with murder of X. C's statement regarding the case was taken by the
police officer extrajudicially after being informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to the
assistance of counsel of his own choice and asked him if he was willing to give a statement. C admitted
that they killed X. Trial court rendered judgment finding C guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on his
confession. Is C's extrajudicial admissible in evidence? What are the requirements for valid extrajudicial
declaration?
Suggested answer:
Yes. Confession to be admissible must be a) voluntary; b) made with the assistance of a competent and
independent counsel; c) express; and d) in writing. These requirements were met here. The accused was
assisted by counsel during custodial investigation. Furthermore, it is a settled rule that where the
defendant did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not institute any criminal or
administrative action against his supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence of violence was
presented, all these will be considered as indicating voluntariness. All requirements are met, thus, C's
admission is admissible in evidenc.
57 People v Lauga
G.R. No. 186228 March 15, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ANTONIO LAUGA Y PINA ALIAS
TERIO, Accused-Appellant.
Principle: The extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel,
inadmissible in evidence.
Short digest:
FACTS: L was accused of the crime of qualified rape against his own daughter, 13 years old. One of the
witnesses for the prosecution was B, a bantay bayan in the barangay. B invited L to the police station and
L admitted to him that he raped his daughter because he was unable to control himself.
L contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellant’s extrajudicial confession without counsel admissible in evidence?
RULING: No.
The specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the
authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related
function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for
under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.
Therefore, the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in
evidence.
However, SC agreed with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of the appellant was not deduced
solely from the assailed extrajudicial confession but "from the confluence of evidence showing his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt."
Long digest:
FACTS:
Appellant Lauga was charged of qualified rape by his daughter. Testimonies revealed that the victim was
left alone at home while his father was having drinking spree at the neighbor’s place. Her mother decided
to leave because appellant has the habit of mauling her mother every time he gets drunk. Her only brother
also went out with some neighbors.
At around 10pm, appellant woke up the victim, removed his pants and slid inside the blanket covering the
victim and removed her pants and underwear. Appellant had warned the victim not to shout for help. He
proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her daughter by threatening her with his fist and a knife. Soon
after, the victim’s brother arrived and saw her crying. Appellant claimed he scolded the victim for staying
out late. The two decided to leave the house.
While on their way to their maternal grandmother’s house, victim recounted to her brother what happened
to her. They later told the incident to their grandmother and uncle who sought the assistance of Moises
Boy Banting. Banting found appellant in his house wearing only his underwear. He was invited to the
police station to which he obliged. Appellant admitted to Banting that he indeed raped her daughter
because he was unable to control himself.
The trial court convicted the accused for qualified rape. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed with modification
the ruling of the trial court. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellant’s extrajudicial confession without counsel admissible in evidence?
HELD: Negative.
Barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the "bantay
bayan," are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of
peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises
Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan,"
particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a
state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights
provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is
concerned.
Even if the extrajudicial confessions were not admitted as evidence, it does not warrant the
acquittal of the accused. The appellant’s conviction is upheld because of the strong evidence showing his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
58. Navallo v SB
G.R. No. 97214 July 16, 1994
DIGEST
Facts: Petitioner is the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of Numancia National Vocational School.
Provincial Auditor Espino found Navallo to be short of P16,483.62. Leopoldo A. Dulguime was directed
by Espino to complete the preliminary examination and to conduct a final audit. Dulguime broke the seal,
opened the vault, and made a new cash count. Dulguime next examined the cashbook of Navallo.
Dulguime confirmed Navallo's shortage of P16,483.62. Dulguime made a Report of Examination and
wrote Navallo a letter demanding the restitution of the missing amount. The latter neither complied nor
offered any explanation for the shortage.
On 11 May 1978, an information charging petitioner with having violated Article 217, paragraph 4, of the
Revised Penal Code, was filed with the then Court of First Instance of Surigao del Norte.
A warrant of arrest was issued, followed by two alias warrants of arrest, but accused-petitioner Ernesto
Navallo still then could not be found.
On 15 November 1984, Navallo was finally arrested. He was, however, later released on provisional
liberty upon the approval of his property bail bond. When arraigned by the Regional Trial Court ("RTC")
on 18 July 1985, he pleaded not guilty. On 22 May 1986, upon motion of the prosecution, the RTC
transferred the case and transmitted its records to the Sandiganbayan. On 27 January 1989, Special
Prosecutor Luz L. Quiñones-Marcos opined that since Navallo had already been arraigned before the case
was transferred to the Sandiganbayan, the RTC should continue taking cognizance of the case. The matter
was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman which held otherwise. The information was docketed
(Criminal Case No. 13696) with the Sandiganbayan. A new order for Navallo's arrest was issued by the
Sandiganbayan. The warrant was returned with a certification by the RTC Clerk of Court that the accused
had posted a bail bond. The bond, having been later found to be defective, on 30 August 1989, a new
bond was approved and transmitted to the Sandiganbayan.
Navallo filed a motion to quash, contending (1) that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the
offense and the person of the accused and (2) that since the accused had already been arraigned by the
RTC, the attempt to prosecute him before the Sandiganbayan would constitute double jeopardy. On 15
September 1989, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying Navallo's motion. On 20 October 1989,
Navallo was arraigned; he pleaded, "not guilty," to the charge. Trial ensued.
The Sandiganbayan pronounced that the accused guilty of the crime of malversation of public
funds.Accused-petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
Issue: a) Whether the petitioner was under custodial investigation when he signed the certification
prepared by State Auditing Examiner Leopoldo Dulguime.
b) Whether the guilt of petitioner has been established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt
as to warrant his conviction for the offense imputed against him.
Ruling: A) No. Well-settled is the rule that such rights are invocable only when the accused is under
"custodial investigation," or is "in custody investigation," which we have since defined as any
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." A person under a normal audit examination is
not under custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law
enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. In any case, the allegation of his having been
"pressured" to sign the Examination Report prepared by Dulguime appears to be belied by his own
testimony.
Navallo may have been persuaded, but certainly not pressured, to sign the auditor's report. Furthermore,
Navallo again contradicted himself when, in his very petition to this Court, he stated:
Bearing in mind the high respect of the accused with his superior officer and taking into consideration his
gratitude for the favors that his superior officer has extended him in recommending him the position he
held even if he was not an accountant, he readily agreed to sign the auditor's report even if he was not
given the opportunity to explain the alleged shortage.
B) Yes. Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code states that "(t)he failure of a public officer to have duly
forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to
personal use." An accountable officer, therefore, may be convicted of malversation even in the absence of
direct proof of misappropriation as long as there is evidence of shortage in his accounts which he is
unable to explain.
The claim that the amount of the shortage represented the unliquidated cash advance of Macasemo does
not inspire belief. No details whatsoever were given by the accused on the matter such as, for instance,
when and for what purpose was the alleged cash advance granted, what step or steps were taken by
Navallo or Macasemo to liquidate it. In fact, Navallo admitted that he did not even ask Macasemo as to
how he (Navallo) could be relieved of his responsibility for the missing amount when he was promised by
Macasemo that everything would be all right. When Navallo was already in Manila, he did not also even
write Macasemo about the shortage.
Finally, the pretense that the missing amount was the unliquidated cash advance of Macasemo and that
Navallo did not collect tuition fees in 1976 was advanced for the first time during the trial, that is, 12 long
solid years after the audit on January 30, 1978. Nothing was said about it at the time of the audit and
immediately thereafter.
Facts: Petitioner is the collecting and disbursing officer of a vocational school. He was found to have
misappropriated public funds for private benefit after a COA audit. He failed to restitute the amount
despite COA demands. A warrant of arrest was issued but petitioner pleaded not guilty and invokes his
right to custodial investigation since during the COA audit and actual cash count he was made to sign the
certification on the fund shortage in the absence of a counsel. He further contends that the shortage of
funds was due to the assurance of certain M to settle his unliquidated cash advance and his failure to do so
resulted to the fund shortage.
Issue: a) Whether the petitioner was under custodial investigation when he signed the certification
prepared by State Auditing Examiner Leopoldo Dulguime.
b) Whether the guilt of petitioner has been established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt
as to warrant his conviction for the offense imputed against him.
Ruling: A) No. Well-settled is the rule that such rights are invocable only when the accused is
under "custodial investigation," or is "in custody investigation," which we have since defined as any
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." A person under a normal audit examination is
not under custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law
enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. In any case, the allegation of his having been
"pressured" to sign the Examination Report prepared by Dulguime appears to be belied by his own
testimony.
B) Yes. Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code states that "(t)he failure of a public officer to have duly
forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to
personal use." An accountable officer, therefore, may be convicted of malversation even in the absence of
direct proof of misappropriation as long as there is evidence of shortage in his accounts which he is
unable to explain.
In the first place, it is undisputed that Barredo was an employee of Javier in the latter’s logging business.
Barredo, like his co-employees, was allowed to live in the bunkhouse of the company for his
convenience. Clearly, therefore, the relationship of Javier and Barredo was one between an employer and
an employee, and not between a landowner and a tenant. The continued stay of Barredo in the premises of
the company was the result of the Order of the then Ministry of Labor which recognized the terms of the
amicable settlement of Barredo and Javier in their labor dispute. It cannot be therefore claimed that such
order converted the relationship of Barredo and Javier into one of tenancy as clearly Barredo’s stay in the
property was by mere tolerance and was ordered by the Ministry of Labor. Moreover, the inexistence of
tenancy relations is bolstered by the fact that Barredo’s stay was "free of charge" as contained in the order
of the Ministry of Labor.
Furthermore, this Court is inclined to believe that Barredo’s activities in the properties cannot be
classified as one for agricultural production. The records show that Barredo did not plant any additional
coconut trees other than the ones already planted. While the DARAB ruled that Barredo had planted crops
and vegetables, the extent of such production was not described and, more importantly, is not supported
by evidence on record. Other than his bare allegation, Barredo has failed to substantiate the extent of his
so-called agricultural production.
ON RULES OF EVIDENCE
This Court finds that the offer of 100 square meters of land to Barredo by Javier does not prove the
existence of a tenancy agreement. Section 27, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides that an
offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability. We share the observation of the CA that such
offer may have stemmed from a motivation to buy peace or as an act of compassion for Barredo.
Based on the foregoing discussion, Barredo’s petition must fail. The existence of a tenancy relationship
cannot be presumed and allegations that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of
27
tenure. Occupancy and continued possession of the land will not ipso facto make one a de
28
jure tenant. Based on the evidence as presented by Barredo, he has failed to discharge his burden of
proving that all the essential elements of tenancy exist. It bears to stress that this Court has ruled time and
again that all the requisites of an agricultural tenancy must be proved by substantial evidence and the
absence of one will not make an alleged tenant a de jure tenant.
The MARO declared that because of the insufficiency of evidence, the determination of the existence of
tenancy relationship could not be ascertained. Likewise, the Regional Adjudicator declared that Barredo
was not the tenant of Javier. It was, therefore, incorrect for the DARAB to reverse such conclusions and
findings, more so since its own findings were not supported by evidence on record.
Petition is DENIED.
Short digest:
Facts:
Javier owns a logging company, Barredo was employed as a heavy equipment mechainic and he was
allowed to stay in the bunkhouse. The business suffered reverses, in consequence he was terminated from
his employment. This prompted Barredo to file illegal dismissal case against Javier. The two parties
entered into a compromise agreement, Barredo was allowed to remain in the bankhouse and given
financial assistance (This was also by virtue of the order of the Ministry of Labor).
Javier sold his lots to Besañes, the latter ousted Barredo. Barredo then filed a case before MARO alleging
that there was tenancy relationship bet. Javier and him. MARO and DAR ruled that there was an absence
of tenancy agreement. CA ruled otherwise.
ISSUE:
WON there was tenancy relationship existed.
RULING:
NO.
the relationship of Javier and Barredo was one between an employer and an employee, and not between a
landowner and a tenant. The continued stay of Barredo in the premises of the company was the result of
the Order of the then Ministry of Labor which recognized the terms of the amicable settlement of Barredo
and Javier in their labor dispute. It cannot be therefore claimed that such order converted the relationship
of Barredo and Javier into one of tenancy as clearly Barredo’s stay in the property was by mere tolerance
and was ordered by the Ministry of Labor.
RULES ON EVIDENCE:
This Court finds that the offer of 100 square meters of land to Barredo by Javier does not prove the
existence of a tenancy agreement. Section 27, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides that an
offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability. We share the observation of the CA that such
offer may have stemmed from a motivation to buy peace or as an act of compassion for Barredo.
Petition is DENIED.