TxLIHIS Comments On Texas Action Plan For $57.8 Million CDBG-DR Hurricane Harvey Allocation

1800 West Sixth Street 512.477.
8910
Austin, TX 78703-4795 texashousers.org
February 2, 2018
Hon. George P. Bush, Commissioner

Texas General Land Office
1700 N. Congress Ave
Austin, Texas 78701
Email: gpb@glo.texas.gov

Community Development and Revitalization
P.O. Box 12873
Austin, TX 78711-2873
Email: cdr@glo.texas.gov
Ms. Hadassah Schloss

1700 N. Congress Ave
Austin, Texas 78701
PIALegal@glo.texas.gov
RE: Comment on Draft State of Texas Hurricane Harvey Action Plan
Dear Commissioner Bush, Ms. Schloss and Community Development and Revitalization Staff:
Texas Low Income Housing Information Service (the “TxLIHIS”) submits the following comments on the
Draft State of Texas Hurricane Harvey Action Plan (the “Draft Plan”), which was released by the Texas
General Land Office (the “GLO”) on January 18, 2018.
Our requested actions are indicated in this document in red type.
These comments are organized into five parts:

1. Recommendations for four rights of disaster survivors that should be included in Action Plan.
2. General fair housing and civil rights recommendations for the Draft Plan.
3. Detailed comments on the Draft Plan.
4. Seven proposed Action Plan objectives to achieve a full recovery.
5. Recommended Action Plan initiatives to implement the seven objectives for full recovery.
PART 1: FOUR RIGHTS OF DISASTER SURVIVORS THAT SHOULD BE IN THE ACTION PLAN
The State of Texas should commit to work to secure for Texas disaster survivors four basic rights in the recovery
process. These four rights should be set forth in the Action Plan. They should guide all the elements the State of
Texas incorporates into the Action Plan.
Requested Action 1: Include the four rights below in the Action Plan use them to guide all the elements the State
of Texas incorporates into the Action Plan.
1. The Right to Choose.
● Disaster survivors must have the right to choose where they will live.
● Homeowners and renters must have the right to relocate to where they feel it is best for their
families to live—where it is safe, accessible and affordable and where there are opportunities for
their children and themselves.
● Survivors must be informed of all housing opportunities and options available to them.
● Survivors with disabilities must have accessible housing opportunities and not be directed or
forced into more restrictive housing or institutions.
● The recovery process must provide for the housing needs of survivors who were homeless at the
time disaster struck.
2. The Right to Stay.

● Disaster survivors must have the right to stay or return home to neighborhoods that have
adequate storm protection and other essential public infrastructure that provides protection from
future disasters.
● Tenants of subsidized housing must have a right to stay in subsidized housing that is safe and
accessible in an inclusive neighborhood that meets the needs of their families.
● Tenants of damaged subsidized housing should be presented the option of a Housing Choice
Voucher with assistance in finding an apartment in a neighborhood or community that, in their
judgment, meets the needs of their families.
● Tenants who chose to remain in a subsidized housing development must be offered choices of
safe, quality subsidized housing located in a range of neighborhoods.
3. The Right to Equal Treatment.

● Survivors must be assisted equally and fairly by government in the recovery process.
● Through this recovery, every neighborhood—regardless of the race, ethnicity, economic status,
or disability of the residents—must be provided quality, equal levels of flood protection and equal
access to essential public infrastructure.
4. The Right to Have a Say.

● This is the right of everyone in our democracy, regardless of wealth, ethnicity, tenure or the
language one speaks.
● Being able to have a say in how one’s home and neighborhood are rebuilt is essential for disaster
survivors who have everything at stake.
● Survivors must play an integral role in designing and implementing disaster recovery plans and
programs. Their needs, interests and perspectives must be central to all local, state and federal
response efforts.
● Survivors must be permitted to help design the recovery, understand what is in store for them in
the process, know where they are at all points in the process and be empowered to speak out and
be listened to, in the language that they can understand and communicate in.
PART 2: GENERAL FAIR HOUSING AND CIVIL RIGHTS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE DRAFT PLAN
On December 1, 2009 TxLIHIS and Texas Appleseed filed with HUD a fair housing complaint over the State’s Hurricane
1
Dolly/Ike Action Plan. This complaint was resolved May 25, 2010 with a HUD-approved Conciliation Agreement (CA)
negotiated with the State of Texas.
The agreement was critical for securing compliance with fair housing and civil rights requirements in the
administration of the State’s Hurricane Dolly/Ike CDBG-DR recovery program. The initiatives established under the
agreement worked and addressed the uncertainty and confusion on the part of local governmental sub grantees with
the fair housing and civil rights certifications. Most importantly, the CA ensured that program benefits were provided
1
https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/DOC_4305.PDF
Page 2
consistently and equitably across multiple administering jurisdictions in a non-discriminatory manner. Finally, the CA
made the administration of the program more efficient, cost effective and transparent.
The Hurricane Harvey Draft Plan contains no reference to the CA and adopts none of the provisions necessary to
ensure the same efficiency, cost effectiveness and transparency that are necessary in the administration of present-
day disaster recovery efforts. The Draft Plan contains nothing more than basic boilerplate language2 to guide
compliance by the State and its sub recipients with respect to civil rights and fair housing compliance. Omitting
these provisions invites the kind of chaotic civil rights implementation that occurred after Hurricanes Ike and
Dolly and increases the likelihood of another complaint.
TxLIHIS strongly urges the State to not abandon the practices it carried out under the CA. If the State determines to
abandon the policies it relied on to administer the last large-scale disaster reconstruction program, it must provide a
reasoned analysis of why it is taking this action and what policies it will put in place to replace these policies.
As written, the Draft Plan is plainly inconsistent with the State’s certification that “the grant will be conducted and
administered in conformity with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d) and the Fair Housing Act (42
U.S.C. 3601– 3619) and implementing regulations, and that it will affirmatively further fair housing (24 CFR 5. 152,
definition of “affirmatively furthering fair housing,” and HUD’s implementing regulations for that obligation”3 24 CFR
5.158, 91 CFR 91.110, 91.115-325.
Requested Action 2: Adopt into the final Action Plan the following provisions the State used to administer Hurricane
Dolly/Ike CDBG-DR funds in a manner that reflects any material changes in circumstances caused by Hurricane
Harvey.
1. Update the State’s Analysis of Impediments to Fair Housing (Al) that led to the creation of a simplified and
accelerated fair housing plan and certifications to be adopted by each participating recipient receiving
Hurricane Dolly/Ike CDBG-DR funds from the State of Texas.
2. The State’s updated AI must include and provide separately for the identification and analysis of
impediments to fair housing in each of the regional council jurisdictions and identify appropriate actions
utilizing applicable Hurricane Recovery Funds to overcome the effects of the impediments identified in each
area;
3. Retain a competent Fair Housing expert to review proposed activities advice the State.4
4. Provide mandatory training to recipients on AFFH and civil rights compliance.
5. Provide training to help prepare local government recipients of funds to carry out their responsibilities to
AFFH, and to prepare them to meet their compliance requirements in administering their programs
6. By rule, establish procedures to collect data relevant to actions to AFFH for all programs and require each
recipient to collect and report to GLO as applicable, on a quarterly basis, the following data:
a. For each program activity requiring a direct application by an individual or a non-institutional entity:
the applicant household's income, the household's income as a percentage of area median family
income as defined by HUD. the race and ethnicity of the head of the household. the household's
familial status, and the presence or non-presence of a household member with a disability.
b. For each non-housing program activity directly linked to an individual beneficiary: the beneficiary
household's income and that household's income as a percentage of area median family income as
defined by HUD. the race and ethnicity of the beneficiaries using census or survey data.
2
The Draft Plan states:
All proposed projects will undergo Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing (AFFH) review by the GLO before approval. Such review
will include assessments of (1) a proposed project’s area demography, (2) socioeconomic characteristics, (3) housing configuration
and needs, (4) educational, transportation, and health care opportunities, (5) environmental hazards or concerns, and (6) all other
factors material to the AFFH determination. Applications should show that projects are likely to lessen area racial, ethnic, and low-
income concentrations, and/or promote affordable housing in low-poverty, nonminority areas in response to natural hazard-related
impacts. All sub recipients will certify that they will satisfy the AFFH rule in their grant agreements and will receive GLO training and
technical assistance in meeting their AFFH obligations.
3
Draft Plan, page 61.
4
These experts should have the type of skills and background the experts employed by the State under the Dolly/Ike recovery
possessed. They should have practiced civil rights and fair housing law and be thoroughly familiar with the field.
Page 3
c. For each activity providing housing or housing assistance that is not directly linked to a specific
beneficiary: the cost of the housing unit to the applicant and to the occupant, the maximum
qualifying household income as a percentage of area median family income as defined by HUD,
restrictions regarding the age or familial status of occupants, the presence or non-presence of
design or services that make the housing unit accessible to an individual with a disability, and the
number of fully accessible living units.
d. For each non-housing activity that is identified as principally benefitting low- and moderate-income
persons, a description detailing the methodology used for the determination of the LMI benefit that
permits an independent evaluation of that determination, including a detailed geographic
description of the households benefited with the Census geographies used to make the
determination or, if other methodology was utilized to make the determination, a clear and complete
description of the methodology and data. This description shall include surveys, survey tabulations,
correspondence, sampling methodology, and other material documentation on which GLO has
relied in making its LMI certification.
7. Methods of Distribution (MOD). MODs shall be proposed that describe each recipients' programs, including
a description of the funding levels. eligibility requirements intended beneficiaries, and maximum and
minimum benefit levels. For each program listed in a MOD GLO shall describe how the program will address
identified impediments and AFFH in accordance with the State’s AI. GLO shall not release Hurricane
Recovery Funds for any program until a MOD as described above is proposed, published for public
comment, submitted to GLO for review, and thereafter submitted to and approved by HUD. Before any MOD
is finalized, it shall be posted on the GLO’s website so that it may be reviewed for a period of not less than
fifteen (15) days for public comment.
8. Recipient Performance. GLO shall require recipients to adhere to expenditure performance requirements
with respect to the applicable Hurricane Recovery Funds used for housing, and to submit to performance
evaluations of their expenditure rates every six months. GLO’s proposed performance standards shall be set
at a level of incremental expenditure to reasonably assure that, within a period of no more than eighteen
months from the date of the commencement of the program, each recipient will have identified sufficient
eligible beneficiaries such that the recipient will be able to provide reasonable assurance that the recipient
will be able to expend all applicable Hurricane Recovery Funds utilized for housing in compliance with GLO-
established benchmarks. GLO will require each Recipient to ensure that expenditure of those committed
funds is in compliance with GLO established benchmarks. If a Recipient is unable or unwilling to administer
its allocated Hurricane Recovery Funds in compliance with GLO's benchmarks, the COG5 in which the
Recipient is located will determine, in a manner acceptable to GLO, whether the COG or another eligible
provider with demonstrated capacity will assume responsibility for the administration of those Hurricane
Recovery Funds for the same purposes and for the benefit of the same beneficiaries. If the COG and GLO
cannot find a mutually agreeable administrator, GLO agrees to administer a program to carry out those
responsibilities.
9. GLO shall provide the proposed expenditure performance requirements for public review and comment
fifteen (15) days before they are approved by GLO. GLO will provide a written response to any public
comment.
10. Housing Program Guidelines. GLO shall create a task force comprised of representatives of GLO and the
COGs, that shall in one or more posted public meetings, develop criteria governing all housing programs to
be carried out with Hurricane Recovery Funds. Such recommendations, upon adoption by GLO, will direct
the available scope of housing activities recipients may carry out and will be reflected in an amendment.
GLO must consider these recommendations and approve guidelines which shall include and address but not
be limited to:
a. A list of housing program activities (including appropriate relocation and buyout activities) from
which recipients may select housing programs that they will offer:
b. The cost and benefit criteria for each housing program:
c. The program participant eligibility and qualification criteria for each housing program:
d. Housing quality standards for housing funded with Hurricane Recovery Funds:
5
Councils of Government, regional planning agencies who were sub granted CDBG_DR funds by the State of Texas.
Page 4
e. The priority factors that recipients must consider in administering their overall housing program,
including prioritization for persons at various income levels, persons with special needs, and
relocation programs:
f. An evaluation of the income levels of disaster survivors and the establishment of reasonable
guidelines to ensure that the housing needs of low-, very low and extremely low-income
households are assisted with housing in no less than the proportion to their relative percentages of
the overall populations which suffered housing damage within the community being served by the
program:
g. Appropriate outreach and public awareness measures for housing programs:
h. The recommendations will provide and allow for objectively determined regional adjustments for
these criteria to reflect differences in the costs of delivery for benefits and the economic profile of
local target populations.
11. Use CDBG-DR to support a title clearance and legal assistance program for beneficiaries of the programs
funded from Hurricane Recovery Funds
12. The one-for-one replacement or rehabilitation of all family and elderly public housing units that were
damaged or destroyed as a result of Hurricane Harvey within the local jurisdictions in a manner that
affirmatively furthers fair housing and avoids the perpetuation of segregation by race or national origin.
13. The rehabilitation, reconstruction or construction of single-family and multifamily rental housing units
damaged or destroyed by Hurricane Harvey within the jurisdictions or surrounding regions in a manner that
affirmatively furthers fair housing and avoids the perpetuation of segregation in compliance with the AI in
sufficient numbers and at appropriate rents to affordably house an equal number of Housing Choice
Voucher holders as were living within each jurisdiction at the time of Hurricane Harvey..
14. Work with units of local government in the areas where applicable Hurricane Recovery Funds are to be
administered requiring that zoning and permitting in connection with the use of Hurricane Recovery Funds
are addressed in a manner which is consistent with AFFH6 and other applicable laws.
15. Require all recipients for multifamily and owners of 20 or more units of single family or duplex private rental
housing to accept Housing Choice Voucher holders under the same substantive provisions as those in place
in the State of Texas Low Income Housing Tax Credit program.
16. Fund relocation and buyout assistance for low- and moderate-income victims of Hurricane Harvey living in
FEMA designated ''High Risk Areas" and areas of high minority and poverty concentration as approved by
GLO. These activities will be administered by the COGs under policies developed by GLO. and will use
relocation counselors and licensed real-estate professionals.
17. Propose to HUD to establish a Moving to Opportunity Program, funded at $2 million per year for five years
and operated by Public Housing Authorities, to permit eligible renter households in areas affected by
Hurricane Harvey to locate alternative rental housing in higher opportunity areas. Such funds shall be
expended to provide relocation counseling, security and utility deposits, moving expenses, and reasonable
program administrative expenses under criteria developed by GLO.
18. Prohibit the denial of assistance to applicants who are elderly or disabled based upon an election to defer
property tax payments as permitted under Texas law, or to applicants who have property tax debt so long as
the applicant has entered or agrees to enter into a plan with the appropriate local taxing authority to pay
such taxes.
19. Provide recipients with clear instructions concerning the standards that must be used to establish property
ownership as provided under Texas Government Code §2306.188 and prohibit recipients' use of standards
that are more onerous than those in Texas Government Code §2306.188.
20. Establish clear standards under which all housing constructed or rehabilitated with Hurricane Recovery
Funds shall be designed to be visitable by people with disabilities.
21. Provide full consideration to Hurricane Recovery Fund applications for LMI households with special needs
and will give such applications funding priority.
22. Visitibility standards set forth in Texas Government Code §2306.514(b) shall apply to all housing
constructed with Hurricane Recovery Funds.
23. Establish rules, procedures and funding guidelines requiring their contractors and recipients to (i) adequately
assess the needs of survivors of Hurricane Harvey with disabilities for funding to be carried out with
6
AFFH - Affirmatively Further Fair Housing.
Page 5
Hurricane Recovery Funds and (ii) assign the highest funding priority to programs serving low- and
moderate-income households within this population.
24. Increase the accountability and transparency for Hurricane Recovery Funds by posting on the GLO website,
program amendments, all final MODs, all final program applications, all project status and fund expenditure
reports provided to HUD, and reporting data required in these rules.
25. In the event of noncompliance by a recipient with the applicable terms of this agreement or with federal law
or regulation governing the administration of Hurricane Recovery Funds. GLO shall by rule provide for the
imposition of progressive sanctions. consistent with the requirements of applicable state and federal law. up
to and including a termination of funds to that non-compliant recipient.
COMPLIANCE WITH FAIR HOUSING CERTIFICATIONS
The Draft Plan does not recognize or propose how the State will assess and secure compliance with explicit fair
housing certifications made through the Fair Housing Activity Statement - Texas (FHAST) process FHAST was
developed by the State in the course of implementation of the CA. It is required of CDBG-DR sub recipients of
Hurricane Dolly/Ike CDBG-DR funds as a condition for receipt of the federal funds.7
Requested Action 3: The State should continue the FHAST process for Hurricane Harvey, monitor and enforce local
FHAST fair housing plans.
Many, and probably most of those Dolly/Ike CDBG-DR recipients that prepared and officially adopted local Fair
Housing Activity Statement -Texas are the State’s intended subgrantees of Hurricane Harvey CDBG-DR funds.
Finally, TxLIHIS and our attorney met with senior GLO officials on December 22, 2017 concerning the impact of the
City of Houston’s failure to resolve a HUD Title VI finding8 that the city government had intentionally taken actions
which perpetuated housing segregation with the use of Hurricane Dolly/Ike CDBG-DR funds. The State cannot
distribute CDBG-DR funds to the City as a sub recipient without running afoul of its own civil rights certifications,
which require the State to "[a]ssure that units of local government funded by the State comply with their certifications
to affirmatively further fair housing." 24 C.F.R. §570.487(b)(3).
At that meeting, we expressed the view that it would be best if the City of Houston, acting in compliance with civil
rights laws, administered federal housing and other disaster recovery funds directly on behalf of its citizens.
Regrettably however, the City's decision not to resolve the outstanding civil rights violations makes this unlawful.
TxLIHIS believes that the State of Texas must act to secure Houstonians' access to disaster recovery resources that
would otherwise be unavailable because of the actions of Houston's Mayor.
While the State clearly cannot award funds to the City until HUD resolves its Title VI findings, we informed GLO there
is a clear path for the State to act, provided it do so in a way that neither rewards the City's lawlessness, nor violates
the State's own civil rights obligations. HUD has previously warned states not to distribute CDBG funds to sub
recipients who are out of compliance with their civil rights obligations but HUD has approved approaches by which
states themselves can administer programs (or identify other third parties who can do so, consistent with civil rights
obligations).
Requested Action 4: Include in the Action Plan a process for direct State administration of CDBG-DR funds
earmarked for the City of Houston, including permitting adequate public input and participation, in case the City of
Houston fails to resolve its outstanding Title VI findings.
7
“The Fair Housing Activity Statement - Texas (FHAST) form that was developed as part of the Phase 1 AI is a tool that
jurisdictions receiving state and federal housing and community development funding must use to communicate their role in
affirmatively furthering fair housing choice to the GLO and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).”, STATE OF
TEXAS PLAN FOR FAIR HOUSING CHOICE — PHASE 2, page 5.
8
https://www.scribd.com/document/336506979/HUD-letter-to-Mayor-Sylvester-Turner-find-civil-rights-violations
Page 6
PART 3: DETAILED COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT PLAN
Our detailed comments are based in part on the "Guidance to State and Local Governments and Other Federally
Assisted Recipients Engaged in Emergency Preparedness, Response, Mitigation, and Recovery Activities on
Compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." (the Guidance).9 The Guidance was issued on August 16,
2016 by United States Departments of Justice (DOJ), Homeland Security (DHS), Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), Health and Human Services (HHS), and Transportation (DOT) to assist recipients of federal financial
assistance engaged in emergency management in ensuring that individuals and communities affected by disasters
do not face unlawful discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin (including limited English proficiency
(LEP)) in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d).
Our detailed responses and comments on the Draft Plan are presented below in nine topic areas:
1. Citizen participation.
2. Access, use and methodological approaches to data necessary to produce the Draft Plan.
3. Fair Housing compliance.
4. Geographic needs analysis and assignment of program funds.
5. Calculation of Low and Moderate Income (LMI) need and LMI program design.
6. Prioritization of funds for programs and survivor populations.
7. Disaster recovery program design, rules and monitoring.
8. Resilience and mitigation strategies.
9. Improving clarity of the Action Plan.
TOPIC 1: CITIZEN PARTICIPATION
A. CITIZEN PARTICIPATION PLAN IS INADEQUATE.

The Draft Plan states on page 59, Certification “F”, “The grantee certifies that it is following a detailed citizen
participation plan that satisfies the requirements of 24 CFR 91.105 or 91.115, as applicable (except as
provided for in notices providing waivers and alternative requirements for this grant). Also, each UGLG
receiving assistance from a state grantee must follow a detailed citizen participation plan that satisfies the
requirements of 24 CFR 570.486 (except as provided for in notices providing waivers and alternative
requirements for this grant) ...”
TxLIHIS unsuccessfully sought to find the GLO’s citizen participation plan. We were only able to find a GLO
web page10 that reads in total:
“Citizen participation and engagement is encouraged and required for approval of

long-term disaster recovery plans.
State and local plans related to the distribution of disaster recovery funds contain
a citizen participation requirement to include a public review and comment
period.
The GLO is committed to ongoing citizen access to information and government

transparency.
To learn more about citizen participation for CDBG-DR funded activities please
visit the HUD exchange website:
https://www.hudexchange.info/onecpd/assets/File/2015-CDBG-DR-Training-
Citizen-Participation.pdf”
9
See https://www.justice.gov/crt/fcs/EmergenciesGuidance
10
http://www.glo.texas.gov/recovery/reporting/citizen-participation/index.html
Page 7
The language found on page 53 of the Draft Plan is not a “detailed citizen participation plan.” 24 CFR
91.115(a)(3) requires the Citizen Participation Plan to be published which does not appear to have been
done. Based on the information in the Draft Plan it is not clear if such a plan exists and where it can be
found. There is no contact for citizens to pose questions or request information to permit them to analyze the
plan.
While the statements on page 53 state that: "The GLO will ensure that all citizens have equal access to
information about the programs,", 24 CFR 91.115(a)(2)(ii) requires the state to "encourage citizen
participation" through provisions "designed especially to encourage participation by low- and moderate-
income persons" and "areas where CDBG funds are proposed to be used, and by residents of
predominantly low- and moderate-income neighborhoods" etc. The text of the Draft Plan does not do that
and fails to evidence an action of the GLO’s part to solicit or facilitate such participation.
The State has not published or advised that it has updated its citizen participation plan to reflect regulatory
changes mandated by HUD; it must do so immediately and include the substantive regulatory requirements
in those regulations.
Unlike the GLO, other State of Texas agencies have robust and effective citizen participation processes. For
example, the Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs employs a number of effective strategies
including:
● informational workshops and roundtables for all interested parties held before programs are
developed as well as during program implementation;
● maintaining a social media presence, specifically Twitter, Facebook, Flickr and YouTube, through
which those interested in affordable housing and community services programs in Texas can keep
up to date;
● operation of a Public Comment Center on its Internet website designed to enhance public
participation by making the public comment process easier and more transparent for those
interested in commenting on Department rules and programs;
● voluntary membership email lists, where subscribed individuals and entities can receive email
updates on program information, announcements and trainings;
● a Fair Housing email list to encourage public participation from community-based, legal aid, fair
housing enforcement, housing advocacy, and other external groups and individuals who are
looking for opportunities to engage on Fair Housing topics;
● online forums to encourage topical discussions and gather feedback on proposed policies, rules,
plans, reports, or other activities;
● committees and workgroups, which serve as valuable resources to gather input from people
working at the local level. These groups share information on affordable housing needs and
available resources and help to prioritize these needs;
● surveys which seek direct program input regarding allocation of funds, development of performance
standards and outcomes evaluation, and development of funding, policies, and procedures for the
administration of the federal funds;
● public hearings at locations accessible to all who choose to attend and held at times accessible to
both working and non-working persons. The provision of translation services, the provision of
auxiliary aids, and other accommodations as requested to ensure equal access and opportunity to
the public and the maintenance of a voluntary membership email list which it uses to notify all
interested parties of public hearing and public comment periods’
● ensures the involvement of individuals of low incomes in the allocation of funds and in the planning
process by regular meetings that include community-based institutions and consumers, workgroups
and councils; and
● a 40-day public comment period.
GLO does not appear to provide equivalent efforts with regard to public participation on CDBG funds. While
the Allocation Notice of December 27, 2018 permits GLO to limit public comment to 14 days, the GLO has
the power to extend the comment period pursuant to 24 CFR 91.115. GLO did extend the comment period
Page 8
from February 1 to February 13 because the agency failed to post the Draft Plan in languages other than
English as required under law.
The failure to hold public hearings on the Draft Plan is particularly problematic. 24 CFR.115(e)(1)(ii) - (ii)
provides, “Minimum number of hearings. To obtain the views of residents of the community on housing and
community development needs, including priority non-housing community development needs and
affirmatively furthering fair housing, the citizen participation plan must provide that at least one of these
hearings is held before the proposed consolidated plan is published for comment.” Note that this
requirement is not waived by the December 27, 2017 Notice.
Requested Action 5:
a. Develop, with public participation, a detailed citizen participation plan;
b. Publicize the plan by engaging in outreach to community organizations representing low- and
moderate-income residents in disaster affected areas;11
c. Provide a link to access any citizen participation plan the GLO is relying on in the notice for public
comment on the Draft Plan and in the Draft Plan itself and make the plan available on the GLO
website;
d. Adopt all the citizen participation strategies now used by the Texas Department of Housing and
Community Affairs;
e. Provide for 40-day public comment periods;
f. Hold public hearings in Austin and across disaster affected areas as provided at 24
CFR.115(e)(1)(ii) - (ii) to receive public input on the Draft Plan and henceforth prior to all public
comment opportunities.
B. DRAFT PLAN IS NOT ACCESSIBLE TO PERSONS WITH LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENCY (LEP).
At the time of the publication of the Draft Plan for comment the Draft Plan was not available in Spanish or in
Asian languages represented in disaster recovery areas as required by Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
Executive Order 13166 and HUD’s “Final Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients Regarding
Title VI Prohibition Against National Origin Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proficient Persons, “72
FR 2732 (January 22, 2007). Seven days into the 14-day public comment period the GLO posted a Spanish
translation of the Draft Plan and extended the public comment period. It is not clear to us if the Draft Plan is
available in the applicable Asian languages as required. If translations into those languages are not
available, the GLO must correct this and extend the comment period from the date of their availability.
The websites used by the State to communicate information to beneficiaries about Disaster Recovery
programs and benefits do not appear to be available in languages other than English, and all the documents
and links which provide access to this vital information about recovery from Hurricane Harvey do not appear
to be available to persons with LEP barriers. Texas has previously recognized the importance of translating
critical documents for residents who have limited English proficiency.
In the statewide consolidated action plan, required for grants from the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development, the state’s housing and community affairs department, states that a statewide analysis
showed that three-fourths of its program participants who had limited English proficiency spoke Spanish.
The amendment to this (non-disaster) action plan reads: “The State will make reasonable efforts to provide
language assistance to ensure meaningful access to participation by non-English speaking persons.”
Additionally, the Civil Rights Act (and HUD guidance) provides that agencies and governmental units that
receive federal financial assistance “have a responsibility to ensure meaningful access to programs and
activities by [limited English proficient] persons.”
There is a threshold of persons speaking a particular language that triggers the translation requirement,
though. According to the guidance, HUD expects written translations of vital documents to be provided “for
each eligible LEP language group that constitutes 5% or 1,000, whichever is less, of the population of
11
TxLIHIS is prepared to provide contacts to assist GLO in facilitating meetings with such organizations
Page 9
persons eligible to be served or likely to be affected or encountered.” In the 49 counties declared disaster
areas after Hurricane Harvey, there are more than 241,000 households who are not proficient in English.
This is about 9% of the population in the affected area. And nearly 200,000 of those households are
Spanish-speaking while nearly 30,000 speak an Asian language. More than one in 10 households in Harris
County, where 80% of the $57.8 million is allocated, are limited in their English proficiency.
24 CFR 91.115 (a) (4) provides that the Plan "shall describe the jurisdiction's procedures for assessing its
language needs and identify any need for translation of notices and other vital documents...." GLO should
comply with HUD’s approved 4 element test regarding LEP needs. If the GLO determines that is not
possible in this first Draft Action Plan due to time constraints, the GLO should use Census or ACS data on
languages spoken in the affected areas to identify all languages for which a translation should be provided.
The appropriate translations for Harris County for example, include several Asian languages.
Requested Action 6:
a. Provide translations of the Draft Plan, disaster related websites and related notices in languages
other than English as required by federal laws, regulations and guidance;
b. Repost the Draft Plan for public comment after all the translations are available.
C. PUBLIC NOTIFICATION OF OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON CHANGES TO THE PLAN MUST BE

EXPLICIT.
Concerning the procedure for future amendments or waivers to the Draft Plan once it is accepted by HUD,
page 56 of the Draft Plan states that the GLO will provide, “...interested parties a reasonable opportunity to
examine the plan or amendment’s contents.” There is no definition of “reasonable opportunity.”
Requested Action 7:
a. Include in the Draft Plan a statement that the reasonable comment period for amendments should
be 30 days from the posting of the amendment or 14 days from the date the GLO responds to any
information request made to it by a party for data related to the amendment request, whichever is
longer.
b. Provide that a request by the State of Texas to the HUD Secretary to waive or specify alternative
requirements for any provision of any statute or regulation that the Secretary administers should be
subject to this same public notification and comment period.
TOPIC 2: ACCESS, USE AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO DATA NECESSARY TO PRODUCE THE
DRAFT PLAN
A. FEMA DATA USED IN DRAFT PLAN IS OUTDATED AND INACCURATE.

The Draft Plan states that the FEMA data used was from December 7, 2017.12 At that point, agency data
shows that FEMA had completed inspections on only 54% of valid registrations. Significantly more data was
yet to be reported. One month later the inspection rate had risen to 65% of the 887,000 registrations.
The Draft Plan should use the most current data available from FEMA (which issues updates of their related
publicly-available data 1-2 times per month). Therefore, GLO must perform an updated analysis using the
most current data provided by FEMA and utilize this updated data as the basis of its Action Plan.
Furthermore, there should be regular updates of the needs analyses performed after the adoption of the final
Action Plan using the most current FEMA data as FEMA’s inspections proceed to account for any
substantial changes in the affected population as represented by newer data.
Requested Action 8:
a. Revise the Draft Plan to use the most current available FEMA data;
b. Update needs analysis periodically thereafter as updates to the FEMA data are issued and use this
to update the geographic and LMI analysis that is used for program administration.
12
Page 10
B. FEMA DATA ALONE IS INSUFFICIENT TO ASSESS NEED AND SURVIVOR CHARACTERISTICS.
While FEMA data is one appropriate source for establishing the characteristics and needs of disaster
survivors it cannot form the sole basis for critical program decisions such as Low and Moderate Income
(LMI) household need or impact of the hurricane in neighborhoods that are segregated by race or national
origin. Reliance on only FEMA data to determine LMI need is a flawed methodology because of limitations in
the FEMA assessment process that significantly underestimate LMI need.
A Texas lawsuit involving FEMA’s response to Hurricane Dolly, uncovered a practice by FEMA inspectors in
which they were denying assistance to very low-income homeowners whose homes, if in the opinion of the
inspectors, had deferred maintenance prior to the disaster that may have contributed to the resulting
disaster damage. During the Hurricane Dolly response, FEMA inspectors were instructed to not list damage
as disaster related unless it was without question caused by the disaster. FEMA has been required to stop
using that standard, but its current standards are not available to the public. There is not enough information
available to know whether FEMA is still denying adequate assistance to homeowners whose homes may
have needed repairs before the disaster.
Testimony before Texas Legislative committees this year13 was provided by low-income homeowners who
state that FEMA denied them assistance because of the “pre-existing condition” of their home. This has the
practical effect of excluding these households from the FEMA database GLO used to determine “unmet
housing needs”.
As second problem with relying on FEMA data has to do with property passing outside of probate. In order
for FEMA to agree to inspect the home, the homeowner must prove ownership. Where there were issues in
title, these clients could receive help with rent and personal property, but they did not have an inspection of
home because they did not have ownership so the reported FEMA verified loss is more like that of a renter.
Ownership issues also bleed into SBA loans because without title to home, it is more likely SBA will decline
to make the loan. FEMA often refers to the fact that applicants don't just need to have the deed but
ownership can be established from tax records. However, a lot of low income homeowners pay property
taxes in cash, so their name was not on receipt, so both the taxes and deed are still in the name of dead
relative.
Requested Action 9:
a. Analyze evidence in legal claims brought against FEMA with regard to the underreporting of
damage to low income housing units based on FEMA’s informal policy of denying applicants based
on “deferred maintenance” and “pre-existing condition”;
b. Establish a reasonable multiplier to apply to FEMA unmet housing needs reporting to address this
bias (we recommend increasing Extremely Low Income and Very Low Income homeowner
numbers categorized as “severe” housing need by 25%);
c. Fund attorneys to work with homeowners to establish title so FEMA can conduct inspections;
d. Establish a “2nd look” inspection and review process for homeowners who have been denied FEMA
assistance.
C. DEFICIENCIES OF DRAFT PLAN DEMONSTRATE NEED FOR GLO TO UNDERTAKE DISASTER

RECOVERY PLANNING.
The Draft Plan page 46 states, “Due to the limited amount of funds for this allocation, the GLO is not setting
aside funds for planning. The GLO anticipates setting aside funds for planning with subsequent Hurricane
Harvey CDBG-DR fund allocations.”
Postponing planning is extremely unwise. It is clear from this Draft Plan and from the problems we have
described in these comments with the efforts of the Rebuild Texas Commission to assess infrastructure
13
January 18, 2018 Texas House Urban Affairs Hearing, Summary and video found at https://texashousers.net/2018/01/18/harvey-
survivors-tell-texas-house-urban-affairs-committee-that-safe-housing-is-long-overdue/
Page 11
needs that: 1) there is much critical information missing that is absolutely necessary to properly administer
the recovery program; and 2) that analyzing and understanding post-disaster recovery needs requires
something more than just asking local elected officials what they need. Someone must look at disaster
needs using all the available data and sometimes collect new data through field assessments, surveys, etc.
That is a function that no one inside state government is playing. The results can be seen in the information
gaps of this Draft Plan and the Rebuild Texas Report. Both documents are incomplete. The State’s often
stated attitude toward planning for disaster recovery is, “local officials know best the local needs.” Yet local
officials have repeatedly testified14 they lack access to FEMA and other data to understand local housing
needs. The idea that the State intends to spend billions in federal funds without fully and accurately
assessing the recovery needs is highly inappropriate and will squander public funds.
The onset of the recovery program is the time that planning needs to happen. Before the next round of
billions of disaster recovery funds are available.
Requested Action 10:

a. Utilize $1.5 million to undertake robust research of the nature and characteristics of unmet housing
needs of each geographic region and b) the adequacy of flood control infrastructure at the
neighborhood level paying special attention to missing or substandard infrastructure in low-income
communities;
b. In carrying out the research, use traditional data sources and survey data to produce an accurate
assessment of the demographic and economic characteristics of the populations and communities
affected and the type of housing program and flood control infrastructure required in each
jurisdiction that will be administering CDBG-DR funds;
c. Pay special attention to the needs of special needs populations, extremely low-income households
and other traditionally under participating populations;
d. Produce the report within five months and share the results with local administering jurisdictions to
support their efforts and with the public.
D. DATA USED TO PRODUCE DRAFT PLAN HAS BEEN IMPROPERLY WITHHELD FROM THE PUBLIC.
The data used to produce the needs assessment and the assessment of unmet need has been largely
withheld from the public, making informed public comment on the Draft Plan impossible. TxLIHIS has
repeatedly and unsuccessfully requested FEMA data from both FEMA and GLO. In a further attempt to
secure the data, we made written request for this and other relevant data from the GLO on January 19,
2017. That request has not yet been acknowledged. We requested:
a) immediate access to all the data15 used by the GLO to prepare the Needs Assessment Section
included in the Draft Plan;
b) all data produced by FEMA and provided to the GLO concerning applications and certifications for
individual disaster assistance from Hurricane Harvey set out in detail in our January 19, 2018
request;
c) a detailed explanation of the methodology, formulas and data used to prepare the Needs
Assessment Section included in the Draft Plan.
Our requests were made in accordance with the initial HUD notice (requiring public comment on action
plans), which requires: "All grantees must include sufficient information so that all interested parties will be
able to understand and comment on the action plan and, if applicable, be able to prepare responsive
applications to the grantee. The Draft Plan (and subsequent amendments) must include a single chart or
table that illustrates, at the most practical level, how all funds are budgeted (e.g., by program, sub recipient,
grantee-administered activity, or other category)." Allocations, Common Application, Waivers, and
Alternative Requirements for Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Grantees, 81 FR
83254 at 83260 (Nov. 21, 2016).
14
For example, in the Texas Senate Intergovernmental Relations Committee hearing help on November 1, 2017.
15
HUD regulations require the disclosure of data provided by HUD to the GLO, 24 CFR 91.115(b)(1)(i)
Page 12
a. Grant TxLIHIS’s request for the data in our January 19, 2018 letter to GLO;
b. State in the Draft Plan that the State’s policy will be to provide public notice and access to all data
used by the GLO to determine program priorities and any fund allocations at least fourteen days
prior to those decisions;
c. Include in the Draft Plan and subsequent amendments a single chart or table that illustrates, at the
most practical level, how all funds are budgeted (e.g., by program, sub recipient, grantee-
administered activity, or other category)
E. INADEQUATE ANALYSIS AND DATA PROVIDED ON THE STATUS OF TEMPORARY HOUSING

PROGRAMS.
It is important that GLO report on the data generated through their administration of the five short-term
housing programs listed on the Texas Rebuilds website. Of particular importance are the DALHR and
PREPS programs which expend funds to partially repair single-family homes. These expenditures and
repairs must be considered in the allocation of long-term housing repair assistance. Additionally, an analysis
of the locations of where manufactured housing units have been sited, as well as where beneficiaries of the
Multifamily Lease & Repair and Direct Leasing programs were displaced from can provide valuable insight
as to where long-term housing needs exist.

a. Data related to temporary housing programs administered by the GLO must be reported (number of
applicants, number housed, locations of housing units, demographic characteristics of assisted
households, etc.) and analyzed in the Draft Plan to inform long-term housing needs;
b. The performance of short-term housing activities must be regularly reported for public review.
F. METHODOLOGY USED TO DETERMINE COSTS TO SERVE UNMET NEED FOR HOMEOWNERS AND
RENTERS IS FLAWED.
The draft plan, at Table 5 uses the same multipliers for both owner and renter housing. This approach is
flawed, as the costs per unit are very different for single-family and multi-family construction. These
differences exist not just between hard and soft costs, but most importantly due to the subsidy that will be
required to make rental housing affordable to the predominantly LMI population among renters with unmet
need.
It is also unclear from the three damage categories defined in the Draft Plan whether the assumption being
made is rehabilitation or rebuilding of damaged housing. The "Major-High" category, the largest one of the
three by both for renters and owners, based on local circumstances, could require rehabilitation or
rebuilding. The cost differences between these two recovery activities is significant. In addition, if rebuilding
will be required, there may be additional costs associated with identification or acquisition of new sites in
order to avoid the perpetuation of segregation.
The multipliers used in the Draft Plan appear to be too low when compared to actual per-unit costs for owner
housing. According to activity data from Hurricane Ike & Dolly CDBG-DR as of December 2014, the average
funded amount in Round 1 was $94,000 for reconstruction activities and $42,000 for rehabilitation activities
in 2009-2010 when these activities mostly took place. In Round 2, these average amounts ballooned to
$145,000 for reconstruction and $90,000 for rehabilitation in 2013-2014. Given inflation and the multiple
disasters that the country is recovering from simultaneously, it is reasonable to believe that these costs will
be even higher per home in this recovery. However, the Action Plan utilizes multipliers for unmet needs
budgeting of approximately $59,000 for Major-Low damage, $73,000 for Major-High damage, and $102,000
for Severe damage. These estimates would appear to greatly underfund housing activities in the recovery
process.
Additionally, using personal property damage as a proxy for real property damage for the purposes of
determining unmet rental housing need grossly underestimates the actual need. This is because the value of
damaged personal property can vary widely from affected household to household. In lower income areas
Page 13
where the value of personal property per household can reasonably be expected to be less on average, this
methodology will have the effect of understating the severity of rental housing damage, which will result in
insufficient prioritization and funding directed towards rental housing rehabilitation and rebuilding. This also
stands to geographically underestimate rental housing needs in low income neighborhoods, which poses a
serious Fair Housing issue.

a. Use separate and accurate rental and homeowner multipliers to accurately assess single and
multifamily reconstruction and rehabilitation costs;
b. Adjust rental cost multipliers to account for differential costs of financing units at different rents to
accommodate households at differing income levels;
c. Specify the type of housing assistance to be provided to households in each damage category;
d. Use the detailed FEMA Individual Assistance data available to GLO to better determine actual
rental housing needs by identifying actual renter households and apartments and develop a more
accurate estimate of the costs associated with rental housing displacement in lieu of relying on data
from renter household personal property losses.
G. METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING UNMET NEED AMONG LMI AND NON-LMI GROUPS IS FLAWED
Consistent with the purposes for which Congress appropriated the recovery funds, HUD has instructed the
State of Texas that 70% of the available funds should be expended by the State to address the recovery
needs of Low and Moderate Income (LMI) households. Some members of the Texas Congressional
delegation had urged the HUD Secretary to use his authority to waive the requirement that funds be
targeted. The Secretary did not do so, but HUD officials have indicated that if State officials can present
HUD data showing that LMI households’ unmet housing needs can be met and funds remain, then HUD will
reconsider granting a waiver to permit the State to spend the federal recovery funds on families above the
Moderate income level. Given that the current amount of funds ultimately available for Texas housing
recovery is a little above $5 billion, that is not a likelihood. There are just too many LMI households in need.
But it is important that the Draft Plan accurately calculate the amount of LMI versus non-LMI need.
The analysis of LMI infrastructure need in the Draft Plan is also wholly inadequate. The Plan’s entire
analysis consists of one map of the entire disaster impacted region and the following “analysis”.
E. Low to Moderate Income Analysis

The following map identifies census block groups that have a low- to moderate-income population
of 51% or more for the 49 eligible counties using HUD’s 2017 Low and Moderate Income Summary
Data (LMISD) for the state of Texas.16
HUD’s December 2017 (61321) Notice states: "To inform the Action Plan, the grantee must conduct an
updated assessment of community impacts and unmet needs to guide the development and prioritization of
planned recovery activities, pursuant to paragraph A.2.a. in section VI of the Prior Notice, as amended in
this notice."
Plainly, the State has done nothing, other than produce a single map of low- to moderate income population
concentrations, to analyze the infrastructure needs of LMI populations. An accurate analysis of LMI
infrastructure need must be included in the Draft Plan and made available for public comment.
The interpretation of Tables 8 and 9 as stated in the Action Plan appear to underestimate the unmet need
for LMI households. The Draft Plan narrative concludes 38% of LMI homeowners and 68% of LMI renters
have unmet housing needs. However, 13% of the households of both tenures according to Table 7 did not
report income according to this table. Therefore, even with these likely underestimated results, the unmet
LMI need could be as high as 51% for homeowners and 81% for renters.
16
Page 14
A compounding problem is that the data relied on for this calculation underreports LMI loss for the reasons
described in above. FEMA excludes from eligibility low-income homeowners from qualifying for assistance
where the housing unit occupied by the household exhibits physical problems that FEMA inspectors
inconsistently and inappropriately classify as “pre-existing conditions.” FEMA’s policy is wrong, but
regardless is not a reason to exclude households from eligibility for CDBG-DR assistance because the
CDBG-DR program is intended to mitigate future disaster risk and improve housing resiliency.
The significantly smaller percentage of homeowners with unmet housing needs in the 31 to 50% of MFI
category, as well as a similar drop among renters in the MFI category, raises a red flag. This outcome of the
unmet needs analysis should give the GLO pause that this group is so underrepresented in the FEMA
unmet needs data. Unfortunately, as discussed above, there is no data available to the public that would
allow for a public review of this unmet need or a vetting of the methodology used to make these
determinations regarding data withholding).

a. The State must analyze the infrastructure needs of LMI populations, include the analysis in the
Draft Plan and made it available for public comment prior to adopting the Action Plan;
b. At a minimum, the Draft Plan should assume that households which did not report income
represent LMI groups proportional to the reported need;
c. The Draft Plan should utilize FEMA data on households denied FEMA assistance to ensure that
these unmet needs are not also overlooked by the GLO in its CDBG-DR activities;
d. Review the data and analyses behind these unmet needs determinations by income group to
understand the significant drop in the 31-50% MFI group and ensure that these households are
adequately served by CDBG-DR activities.
H. METHODOLOGY FAILS TO ACCOUNT FOR DIFFERENTIAL RENTAL HOUSING AFFORDABILITY

NEEDS AND FAIR HOUSING REQUIREMENTS
The Draft Plan must detail how the GLO expects to fund the rehabilitation and construction of rental housing
to meet the unmet needs as demonstrated through analysis of unmet needs by income level as shown in
Table 9 of the Draft Plan. The findings in this table show just 20% of the unmet need is among renters with
incomes above the Low and Moderate Income (LMI) level of 80% of the area median income.
More than half of the LMI renter households identified in the Draft Plan with unmet housing needs earn less
than 30% of the area median income, accounting for 37% of renter unmet need overall.17 Any rehabilitation
or construction of rental housing must be subsidized so that rent levels are affordable to the requisite
number of households at 0-30% MFI, 30-50% MFI. 50-80% MFI and >80% MFI as identified in the Draft
Plan Needs Analysis. Yet, the program described in the Draft Plan only proposes to create rental housing for
households in the highest income category. The Draft Plan provides:
“A minimum of 51% of the units must be restricted for ten or more years to low to
moderate income (LMI) individuals earning 80% or less of the Area Median
Family Income (AMFI) at affordable rents. The rents must comply with High
HOME Investment Partnership (HOME) Rents and other existing Land Use
Restriction Agreement (LURA) restrictions, if applicable.”
Here, the Action Plan utilizes two subsidized rent standards that are not affordable to the majority of renters
with unmet need. First, the Action Plan sets rents that exclude all but the 20% of renter households earning
more than 80% MFI from any CDBG-DR rental housing benefits. Then, it enforces rents at what HUD calls
the High Home Rents. HUD sets High HOME Rents to track local market rents. However, local market rents
are not affordable to at least half of the renters with unmet needs. Using Harris, Jefferson, and Aransas
counties for comparison, renters with incomes below 30% of Median Family Income (MFI) —who make up
17
However, these LMI estimates are too low for reasons discussed in earlier sections of these comments.
Page 15
the largest income group of renters with unmet needs— would be expected to pay roughly 200% more than
they could afford, and renters with income between 30% of MFI and 50% of MFI would be expected to pay
roughly 125% more than they could afford. As a result, units created under the Draft Plan would be
completely unaffordable to lower income renters with unmet needs. High HOME Investment Partnership
(HOME) Rents is an inappropriate rent standard. Rent levels should be established on a case-by-case basis
and set in a manner that proportionately meets the results of local needs analysis of the economic status of
the renters with unmet housing needs. In other words, within each jurisdiction, the overall rental housing
funded should be required to provide rents affordable at 30% MFI, 50% MFI and 80% MFI in the proportion
that households in these rental categories make up the renters in the jurisdiction with unmet housing need.
To do otherwise would be to simply not address the recovery needs of these households by funding housing
that is not affordable to them. It would be the equivalent of requiring assisted homeowners to take out a
mortgage they cannot afford in order to qualify for CDBG-DR assistance.
In meeting the minimum 70% LMI requirement in CDBG-DR regulations, the Action Plan must consider the
actual costs of creating affordable housing units at levels proportionate to the Extremely Low, Very Low, and
Low income need demonstrated through analysis of the available LMI data with the issues laid out in earlier
sections of these comments as well as this section in mind.
As we discuss in other recommendations, the rental program design in the Draft Action plan should explicitly
state the rental program will not perpetuate racial and economic segregation in the funding of rental housing
under the CDBG-DR program. The developments should house households at a variety of rent levels, with
care being taken to develop new rental housing in areas where low-income families, who are
disproportionately persons of color in the disaster impacted region, are permitted housing options in high
opportunity areas and area that are not high poverty or with high concentrations of minority populations. The
details we recommend for achieving these goals are laid out in detail in our other recommendations found
elsewhere in these comments.
Additionally, the Draft Plan fails to analyze the impact of the disaster on renter households who rely on the
assistance of a Housing Choice Voucher (HCV). It is crucial that the GLO understand the extent to which
subsidized housing units at appropriate rent levels are needed across disaster-impacted areas and that GLO
plans to meet those needs. Texas is one of the only states that prohibits governmental units from enacting
ordinances to protect housing voucher holders from discrimination by landlords. TxLIHIS has published
much research on the racial, ethnic and economic segregative effects of voucher holders in Houston and
other cities. The Draft Action plan should affirmatively prohibit CDBG-DR recipients from engaging in this
form of discrimination.
The Draft Plan also fails to analyze the needs of public housing residents who have been displaced because
their public housing developments have been damaged or destroyed.

a. Address methodological problems in the analysis of renter household housing need;
b. Define a rental housing program that proportionately serves renters with affordable rent units in
proportion to their respective share of the households with unmet housing need;
c. Analyze and address the unmet needs of housing choice voucher holders at the jurisdictional level;
d. Analyze and address the unmet needs of public housing residents displaced by the disaster at the
jurisdictional level;
e. Do not adopt High HOME Investment Partnership (HOME) Rents as a rent standard;
f. Rent levels should be established on a case-by-case basis and set in a manner that proportionately
meets the results of local needs analysis of the economic status of the renters with unmet housing
needs;
g. The rental program design in the Draft Plan should explicitly state the rental program will not
perpetuate racial and economic segregation in the funding of rental housing under the CDBG-DR
program;
Page 16
h. The Draft Plan should require that developments funded under the rental program should all house
households at a variety of rent levels, with care being taken to develop new rental housing in areas
where low-income families, who are disproportionately persons of color in the disaster impacted
region, are permitted housing options in high opportunity areas and area that are not high poverty
or with high concentrations of minority populations;
i. Require any landlord receiving any CDBG-DR assistance to enter into a legally binding covenant
not to engage in discrimination against a tenant with any form of government rent voucher that is
enforceable by the state and local government, prospective tenants and their representatives.
I. DATA PROPOSED TO BE COLLECTED AND MADE PUBLIC ON PROGRAM PERFORMANCE IS

INSUFFICIENT.
The Draft Plan states that certain data will be made available through a web site, “The GLO will make the
following items available on www.glo.texas.gov/recovery: (1) the Action Plan (including all amendments);
each Quarterly Performance Report (QPR) as created using the Disaster Recovery Grant Reporting System
(DRGR) system; (2) procurement, policies and procedures; (3) executed CDBG-DR contracts; and (4) status
of services or goods currently being procured by the GLO (e.g., phase of the procurement, requirements for
proposals, etc.).” This is insufficient to permit an assessment of the GLO’s and its’ sub recipients’
performance.
Requested Action 16: The GLO website should provide at a minimum:

a. Monitoring, correspondence, letters, findings and reports;
b. A monthly spreadsheet report for each beneficiary without name or address but with Census Block
Group reporting the following data: city, ZIP Code, county, application submission date, application
status, eligibility status, race of head of household, ethnicity of head of household, if the head of
household is elderly, if there is someone with a disability in the household, the household income,
the household income as a percentage of area median household income, activity type, total DR
amount awarded, total DR amount expended,
c. Copies of complaints received and resolutions;
d. A report on timeline benchmark performance by each sub recipient and contractor.
TOPIC 3: FAIR HOUSING COMPLIANCE
A. FAIR HOUSING ACTIVITIES MUST BE SPECIFIED IN THE DRAFT PLAN.

The combined directives of title I of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 as amended (42
USC§ 5301 and particularly §5304(b)(2)), implementing regulations (24 CFR 570 et seq), the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §2000a et seq.) and the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.) applied to Sandy
recovery funding through the title VIII of the Disaster Recovery Appropriations Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-2) and
the HUD Notice (78 FR 1439), require grantees to affirmatively further fair housing,”(AFFH).
The Draft Plan states on page 42 that “All proposed projects will undergo Affirmatively Furthering Fair
Housing (AFFH) review by the GLO before approval.” This is an important action that we fully support as a
part of GLO’s work throughout the administration of CDBG-DR funds. This statement in the Draft Plan is
insufficient however.

a. Incorporate the same provisions in this Draft Plan that it agreed to in 2010 in the Fair Housing
Conciliation Agreement;
b. Assess the progress of CDBG-DR sub recipients on their Fair Housing Assessment Statements
and require compliance as a mandatory prerequisite to administer CDBG-DR funds;
c. Assess the past successes and failures of the Homeowner Opportunity Program (HOP) that
permitted homeowners to relocate from hazard-prone areas, areas of concentrated poverty, and/or
racially and ethnically segregated areas. From this assessment, modify as needed and implement
the HOP program as an option for Harvey disaster victims;
Page 17
d. Produce regular reporting of indicators at the individual beneficiary level of data needed to assess
Title VI compliance including income, race, national origin, disability and familial status
B. PROPOSED BUYOUT PROGRAM SHOULD NOT BE THE TOP PRIORITY / USE OF EXISTING HARRIS
COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL DISTRICT GUIDELINES MUST COMPLY WITH FAIR HOUSING AND
TITLE VI AND BE SUBJECT TO A PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROCESS.
By far the majority of funds to be expended under this action plan will be $35,465,600 to benefit
approximately 175 LMI households known as the Harris County Residential Buyout Program. The Draft Plan
states the program will be administered in Harris County based on guidelines that are to be developed.
The draft plan indicates this project is prioritized in order to prevent added expense in buyouts from
occurring because homeowners may choose in the short term to rebuild, thus increasing the cost of the
ultimate buyout. Yet there are many other area households who are in temporary or dangerous housing who
will not receive assistance if the buyout program is prioritized. The Draft Plan should instead propose a
program to notify owners that the State intends to implement a buyout plan with the next available allocation
and then program the currently available finds on meeting the massive continuing need for urgent need
housing repairs.
The Harris County Residential Buyout Program guidelines that the Draft Plan says will be used to administer
80% of all the funds should be presented in the Draft Plan or at least linked to so they can be reviewed and
commented on by the public.
When the guidelines for the buyout program are developed the Draft Plan should recognize the special
economic needs of LMI households in a buyout program, the HUD Notice of December 27, 2017 clearly
states (left column, p. 61323) that a buyout for LMI household may "award amount . . . greater than post-
disaster (current) fair market value of that property;" and that: "(b) Low/Mod Housing Incentive (LMHI). When
CDBG-DR funds are used for a housing incentive award, tied to the voluntary buyout or other voluntary
acquisition of housing owned by a qualifying LMI household, for which the housing incentive is for the
purpose of moving outside of the affected floodplain or to a lower-risk area (emphasis added).

a. The Draft Plan should propose use of the available funds for urgent need housing repairs and
providing notice to affected households that the buyout program will be administered with funds
made available in the next funding round;
b. The Harris County Residential Buyout Program guidelines should be included, or their location
referenced in the Draft Plan and the public permitted to read and comment on them as part of the
public comment period for the Draft Plan;
c. The GLO should formally review and approve the buyout program and guidelines for compliance
and consistency with the obligation to Affirmatively Further Fair Housing;
d. The program must operate under an affirmative marketing plan designed to reach classes of
persons protected under the Fair Housing and Civil Rights Acts;
e. The program guidelines must provide participants not simply the current appraised value for their
homes, but enough to be able to purchase a suitable replacement home in a safe, non-
economically distressed neighborhood that suits the needs of the participating household;
f. Just as the GLO provided under its Hurricane Ike CDBG-DR relocation program, the services of
relocation counselors and real estate services should be provided buyout participants and should
operating under the procedures established by the GLO for the “Homeowner Opportunity Program”;
g. The guidelines for the program must be open for review through a public comment process.
C. DRAFT PLAN FAILS TO RECOGNIZE, ADDRESS KNOWN CIVIL RIGHTS INFRASTRUCTURE

VIOLATIONS.
Two unacknowledged Title VI issues are of special concern yet are not acknowledged in the Draft Plan.
Page 18
1) There is evidence, some of it developed through engineering studies undertaken with Hurricane Ike
CDBG-DR funds, that neighborhoods of color have been provided with no storm water collection and
infrastructure or systems that afford lesser levels of storm water protection than that provided by local
jurisdictions to white neighborhoods. For example, 88% of the vast and mostly substandard open ditch
drainage system in the city of Houston are located in African-American and Hispanic neighborhoods.18 To
fail to acknowledge and address these inequities in the provision of storm water protection with a disparate
racial impact would violate Title VI. This issue is the subject of a pending Title VI complaint against the City
of Houston.
2) With regard to the location of government subsidized rental housing there is extensive evidence which the
GLO has access to, that these developments have been historically located in areas of concentrated poverty
and concentrated areas of African-American and Hispanic population and concurrently largely excluded from
majority White, non-Hispanic neighborhoods.19 There is an outstanding and unresolved Title VI finding
against the City of Houston for continuing this practice.

a. The Draft Plan must require the State of Texas and local governmental jurisdictions analyze the
geographic distribution of public storm water infrastructure across neighborhoods and the impact of
differential levels of storm water protection based on racial and ethnic composition on communities;
b. The GLO and local jurisdictions must assess the geographic distribution of government subsidized
housing and use that information to remedy that segregation by using CDBG-DR funds to develop
government-subsidized rental housing outside of the traditional and disadvantaged areas.
TOPIC 4: GEOGRAPHIC NEEDS ANALYSIS AND ASSIGNMENT OF PROGRAM FUNDS
A. DRAFT PLAN PROVIDES NO FOUNDATIONAL BASIS FOR THE GEOGRAPHIC ALLOCATION OF THE
20% NON-HARRIS COUNTY FUNDS.
The Draft Plan provides no factual foundation for the distribution of funding to Aransas, Nueces and Refugio
counties. The Draft Plan must include the criteria and standards for choosing where to spend the funds so
that the distribution of these and subsequent allocations can be based upon transparent rules and
processes.
The Draft Plan states that the HUD instructed that 80% of the available funds be allocated to Harris County,
leaving the State of Texas discretion where to target the remaining 20%.
The GLO’s plan identifies Aransas, Nueces and Refugio counties as the “next most impacted and distressed
counties” that will receive the rest of the federal funds in this allocation. It is important to keep in mind the
State expects to receive additional Community Development Block Grant funds for disaster recovery — at
least $5 billion that has been announced by HUD. But five months after the hurricane, survivors in all of the
impacted counties are crying out for these first available funds now.
We do not take issue with the state fairly and transparently appropriating money to any community ravaged
by the August hurricane. All communities — all survivors — deserve their fair share of these federal dollars
and support from the State to recover quickly and fully. However, the GLO in the Action Plan fails to provide
methodology or access to the data used to make its decision to award all of the remaining funds to Aransas,
Nueces and Refugio counties. And, the current data available to the public indicates that, while these three
counties were severely impacted, they are not near the top of the list for greatest unmet housing need or
number of structures damaged.
18
See https://texashousers.net/2017/08/31/houston-knew-neighborhoods-of-color-were-inadequately-protected-from-even-modest-
storm-events/
19
See https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/02/us/federal-housing-assistance-urban-racial-
divides.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=first-column-region&region=top-
news&WT.nav=top-news
Page 19
Consider the case for Jefferson County, home to Beaumont and Port Arthur. It ranks second in HUD’s
analysis of unmet housing need behind Harris County. Jefferson County and the other top counties with
unmet housing needs are not mentioned at all in the State’s Action Plan. They will have to wait for future
releases of federal funds to help their survivors.
In Aransas, Nueces and Refugio counties, $10.8 million will be used to rehabilitate and reconstruct
affordable multi-family housing projects. This despite the lower number of damaged units compared with
other counties. These counties rank 10th, 12th and 26th respectively in terms of the number of housing units
reported by HUD to have unmet housing needs. HUD reports there are a total of 356 rental housing units
with unmet need in these three counties (264 in Aransas County, 92 in Nueces County and none in Refugio
County). HUD reports the number of rental housing units with unmet need in Jefferson County is 923,
Orange County is 868, Fort Bend County is 451, and Galveston County is 1406.
Finally, HUD requires that the State use federal funds in a way that does not neglect communities of color,
who in the past have been left out of recovery. Jefferson, Orange, Fort Bend and Galveston counties have
significantly higher African American populations compared with Aransas, Nueces and Refugio counties. All
of these counties have similar percentages of Latino residents. GLO officials are supposed to pay special
attention to ensuring that people afforded protection under the civil rights law receive their fair share of
recovery dollars.

a. The Draft Plan should clearly state the basis for the decision to allocate funds to the counties it has
selected;
b. The Draft Plan disclose the rental needs assessment that justifies the commitment of funds to the
counties;
c. The Draft Plan should provide a needs analysis of renters with unmet needs and disclose data that
supports the appropriateness of the rent levels proposed for CDBG-funded rental units to be
created in the counties;
d. The Draft Plan should address the apparent civil rights and Title VI factors in the selection of the
countries chosen as opposed to other counties with greater levels of disaster housing need.
TOPIC 5: CALCULATION OF LOW AND MODERATE INCOME (LMI) NEED AND LMI PROGRAM DESIGN
A. DRAFT PLAN DOES NOT INCLUDE OR RELY ON ANALYSES REQUIRED BY THE HUD NOTICE.
HUD's August 7, 2017 Allocation Notice20 directs Texas jurisdictions on preparing Action Plans, including ". .
. To inform the plan, grantees must conduct an assessment of community impacts and unmet needs to
guide the development and prioritization of planned recovery activities, . . ." The Draft Plan fails to conduct
an adequate analysis of existing unmet need, funding or capacity. Furthermore, the Draft Plan also fails to
provide “a description of the connection between identified unmet needs and the allocation of CDBG–DR
resources by the Grantee”21, as requested in the June 17, 2016 FR Notice.
This is especially problematic when HUD provides a detailed template for how such an assessment could be
carried out.22
20
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-08-07/pdf/2017-16411.pdf - 36812 Federal Register/Vol. 82, No. 150/Monday, August
7, 2017/Notices, at 36817 - § “III. Allocation Framework for Disasters in 2017 or Later”
21
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2016-06-17/pdf/2016-14110.pdf - 39687 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 117 / Friday, June 17,
2016 /
22
“The Disaster Impact and Unmet Needs Assessment Kit guides Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery
(CDBG-DR) grantees through a process for identifying and prioritizing critical unmet needs for long-term community recovery. It is
designed to be used by grantees at any time following a disaster. However, the quality of the assessment is directly tied to the
quality and completeness of the impact data available. Thus, an accurate assessment is typically not possible for months following a
disaster. If during this time, the necessary information is gathered from various entities, the assessment should take into account
work already accomplished, community goals, and the grantee’s capacity to plan for, manage, and implement a coordinated long-
term recovery process. The ultimate goal is to enable the grantee to better design recovery programs that are responsive to the
Page 20
“The tools included in HUD’s CDBG-DR “Disaster Impact and Unmet Needs Assessment Kit” include a
spreadsheet with separate inventories of infrastructure, housing and commercial damage resulting in unmet
needs. The spreadsheet asks for information about 1) damage incurred, 2) funds available, and 3) capacity
to undertake the necessary projects. This type of spreadsheet would have been extremely useful as a way
to inventory damages across the large disaster area, allowing counties, cities, and other local jurisdictions to
catalogue their unmet need. This should be a prerequisite for the allocation of funding. If this type of unmet
needs assessment was, in fact, carried out, a summarized version should be included in the draft Action
Plan in order to explain the rationale for dispersal of funds. For example, the spreadsheet information would
make clear why the decision was made to prioritize owner-occupied households in Harris County, as
opposed to other urgent needs in this “most impacted and distressed” area.

a. In preparation of the Action Plan, the GLO should compile information on Disaster Impact and
Unmet Need, per the HUD recommended process, from local jurisdictions, counties, and/or COGs.
This information should clearly back up the decisions for funding priority and allocation.
b. The Draft Plan should include a summarized Unmet Needs assessment making clear the rationale
for prioritization of particular projects. This should include information on:
• The scope of each type of damage (Infrastructure, Housing, Commercial) by county or
COG region.
• The funding available to cover these needs, and whether these are available from other
sources than CDBG-DR funds.
• The capacity or skills needed to cover these needs, and whether these are available
B. DRAFT PLAN SHOULD DETAIL HOW MAXIMUM FEASIBLE PRIORITY WILL BE GIVEN LMI FAMILIES.
Certification “h” on page 60 of the Draft Plan states, “With respect to activities expected to be assisted with
CDBG-DR funds, the Draft Plan has been developed so as to give the maximum feasible priority to activities
that will benefit low- and moderate-income families.”

a. This obligation should be acknowledged in the needs analysis section of the Draft Plan;
b. The Draft Plan should detail how the funding decisions and program design in the Draft Plan are
designed to meet this requirement
TOPIC 6: PRIORITIZATION OF FUNDS FOR PROGRAMS AND SURVIVOR POPULATIONS
A. THE “REBUILD TEXAS” ASSESSMENT IS INADEQUATE TO ASSESS INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS.

The Draft Plan states on page 35, “The “October 31, 2017, Request for Federal Assistance Critical
Infrastructure Projects" reported $61 billion in projects identified at state and levels. This amount does not
include current FEMA expenditures or CDBG-DR housing allocations.” The Draft Plan’s reliance on this
report is insufficient.
The Draft Plan lists “Rebuild Texas: Request for Federal Assistance Critical Infrastructure Projects” compiled
by the Governor’s Commission to Rebuild Texas as one of three data sources that will be used to make the
determination of how to allocate funds for infrastructure from federal disaster recovery appropriations.
Based on TxLIHIS analysis and public information requests, there was no logical prioritization of needs in
the commission’s request. A review of the list of all projects submitted to the Commission reveals that
despite whatever priority that a local jurisdiction conveyed to the Commission in the project information, the
Commission does not appear to consider this in its choices of what projects to include–everything from a
types and locations of actual needs on the ground. The kit includes several appendices with resources and tools that support the
assessment process.” (https://www.hudexchange.info/resource/2870/disaster-impact-and-unmet-needs-assessment-kit/)
Page 21
replacement for high water vehicles in one of the hardest-hit regions and updates to government buildings,
port expansion projects, housing assistance and general repairs for roads and bridges.
Many critical recovery needs are simply not included in the report. For example, while there is a request for
billions to rebuild housing in Houston and Harris County, not a dollar is included in the report to rebuild
homes in the devastated city of Port Arthur--a city that appears to have not submitted a single project
request to the Commission. While funds are requested for storm water improvements in one small town,
hundreds of equally impacted cities have no flood protection projects included.
State officials seem to have simply asked local government officials, “What do you need?” Some responded,
some didn’t. Some included a comprehensive list of disaster related needs, some only reported needs in
infrastructure but not housing. Some were careful to list only projects directly related to Hurricane Harvey
damage, others took a more liberal view and added other projects with little direct relationship to the
disaster.
The commission’s $61 billion request was released Oct. 31, about two months after Harvey hit. The action
plan from the General Land Office states that now that officials have more data and information on damage,
the $61 billion figure is likely to increase.
Several of the funding requests contained in the governor’s commission report do not directly address flood
mitigation, “future-proofing” or protecting communities from future disasters. While there are many proposed
projects to repair or rebuild city halls and schools, as well as maintenance buildings and equipment, fire and
police facilities, wastewater treatment plants, huge road and bridge projects and other public buildings, there
are comparatively fewer projects for drainage improvements, buyouts, levees, and other projects that would
be expected to best “mitigate the risk” of future flooding.
Of the mitigation projects included in Rebuild Texas, the great bulk of the billions requested would go not to
projects that would provide storm water protection to homes and neighborhoods but to multi-billion-dollar
projects to protect petrochemical plants, dredge harbors and build the controversial $12 billion “Ike Dike.”
Then there are the apparent errors in the report. For example, the Galveston Daily News has reported on a
multi-million-dollar request included in the report to replace a bridge the report twice claims was destroyed.
But the County Engineer told the newspaper the bridge was still standing, still being used, and still safe.
Galveston County sent to the commission a list of local projects that might qualify for federal disaster
assistance and included the San Luis Pass Bridge but did not claim it was destroyed. The newspaper
reports that it was on the county’s list because some in the county think a replacement bridge could be part
of a surge barrier intended to mitigate future storms.
Though specific criteria are listed in the governor’s request, how each request was evaluated against the
criteria is not detailed. Instead, the logic for decisions is elusive. For example, the City of Brownsville, which
was not impacted at all by Hurricane Harvey, requested a $231 million project to improve the Brazos Island
Ship Channel. Although a project from a non-impacted area should not meet the criteria, the commission
determined it merited inclusion. There are a few other big-dollar port improvement projects included in the
$61 billion request, many with no mention of how the project would mitigate future disasters.23
In the cover letter to the Rebuild Texas report, Commissioner John Sharp wrote, “The total amount of this
request is $61 billion, which is based on projects identified at local and state levels and reviewed by experts
in coastal flooding and disaster mitigation.
Yet who made the decisions about what projects were included in the report is shrouded in mystery. While
the commission’s report describes the decision makers as a group of experts, there is no public mention of
23
Undamaged San Luis bridge listed for Harvey funding, By John Wayne Ferguson The Galveston Daily News, Nov 8, 2017,
http://www.galvnews.com/news/article_7badef42-505d-544e-94c3-d64554fc326f.html
Page 22
who these experts are. And there seems to be no way to find out. TxLIHIS filed a request with Rebuild
Texas under the Texas Public Information Act to learn upon which experts the commission relied. The
answer we received was simply, “we have no responsive information.”
TxLIHIS also asked the commission to disclose the criteria it used to select projects and asked for a list of
projects that were not accepted by the commission. The response was, “we have no responsive information”
and initially “we have been advised all submitted projects were requested.” However, on January 31st, this
response was corrected through the production of a full list of over 2,200 projects submitted to the
commission indicating that, in fact, projects were selected from a pool of candidate projects. However, there
is no methodology for how these selections were made, and in reviewing the full list of projects, seemingly
no logic in how projects were ultimately selected to be included in the Request.
Given the errors, failure to prioritize infrastructure needs and inclusion of projects that are not eligible for
funding with CDBG-DR the Rebuild Texas Plan is an insufficient analysis to use as the basis for determining
infrastructure needs for purposes of the State of Texas Action Plan.
Requested Action 23: Undertake a full and accurate survey of infrastructure needs and include it in the
Draft Action Plan.
B. LMI UNMET HOUSING NEEDS SHOULD BE FULLY FUNDED BEFORE OTHER ACTIVITIES.
Page 36 of the Draft Plan states, “While unmet housing needs will be addressed, there still remains
significant unmet need in infrastructure and other non-housing sectors, including future tax revenue loss due
to Hurricane Harvey.”
We propose that the Draft Plan state that all LMI unmet housing needs will be addressed before any funding
will be used for non-housing needs.
Requested Action 24: Adopt the following priorities for use of CDBG-DR funds:
Priority 1: Unmet housing needs of owner and renter households with incomes below 50% MFI;
Priority 2: Unmet housing needs of owner and renter households with incomes between 51% - 80% MFI;
Priority 3: Critical storm water and flood control in neighborhoods with more than 50% population below 50%
MFI;
Priority 4: Critical storm water and flood control in neighborhoods with more than 50% population between
51% - 80% MFI;
Priority 5: All other unmet housing needs;
Priority 6: Addressing critical storm water and flood control in all other neighborhoods.
TOPIC 7: DISASTER RECOVERY PROGRAM DESIGN, RULES AND MONITORING
A. LACK OF A CLEAR PROGRAM EXPLAINATION OF THE SHORT-TERM HOUSING PROGRAMS

The Draft Plan contains a brief description of the short-term housing programs administered by the GLO but
contains no information of the number of households needing such assistance or the number actually being
served. We understand that some of the temporary housing programs listed in the Draft Plan have not been
successful. For example, we believe the “Multifamily Lease and Repair Program” has failed to attract a
single participant.
The use of funds proposed in the Draft Plan for these programs in unclear. It appears the State is using
CDBG-DR funds from this first round of funding to reimburse itself for its 10% share of the cost of one or
more short term housing program. This hardly seems an urgent priority given that the State of Texas has
billions of unobligated State funds in the so called “Rainy Day Fund”.
If, as it appears, funds will be used for the Partial Repair program, the data indicates that it will serve
something under 4,000 homes (program costs of about $20,000 per home, with the State paying 10%, or
$2,000, out of a fund of $8 million. There is no indication of how those homes will be identified: first come
Page 23
first served, targeted by neighborhoods of least or most need, targeted to LMI households, neighborhoods
outside of flood plains to comply with the stated goal of not rebuilding in inundation zones, etc. There is no
indication that fair housing and other required considerations have been considered in the program design.
Requested Action 25: The Draft Plan should:

a. Analyze and report each short-term housing program’s performance;
b. Analyze and report the unmet short-term housing needs by region;
c. Clearly describe how the Draft Plan proposes to use funds to address the needs;
d. Propose modifications and improvements to the design and operation of short-term housing
programs to address the lack of program effectiveness and disaster survivor participation.
B. DATA ON PUBLIC AND SUBSIDIZED HOUSING DAMAGE IS MISSING FROM DRAFT PLAN.
In its entirety, the Draft Plan’s analysis of public and subsidized housing need consists of the following
paragraph.
7. Public Housing Assistance (PHA) Data

The GLO is currently working with its partners to gather information on the impact of Hurricane
Harvey on public housing. Although the GLO can reasonably assume that there was a negative
impact on this population, complete data is not currently available. Once data gathering is
complete, the information will be assessed and determinations of unmet need, based on this data,
will be included in future iterations of this Action Plan.24
The Draft Plan states the GLO is currently working to gather data on the impact of the disaster on public and
assisted housing. That data should have been collected by now, must be reported in the Draft Plan and
should inform the activities identified in the Draft Plan. It has been widely reported that two public housing
developments in Houston (Clayton Homes and Memorial) were destroyed along with a number of HUD
project-based assistance developments. Additionally, TxLIHIS has visited other HUD subsidized
developments where tenants reside in dangerous and substandard conditions. Identifying, assessing the
needs and prioritizing the rehabilitation or reconstruction of these subsidized housing units should be a high
priority activity in the Draft Plan.
TxLIHIS placed a phone call to the HUD Area Office and received a detailed report of public housing and
multifamily damage. Over the entire region HUD reports an estimated $25,590,817.57 in damage, 1,032
tenants displaced and 1,936 total impacted units.25
The GLO has a very slow track record in securing the repair or reconstruction of public and HUD subsidized
housing in previous disasters. A large portion of the remaining unexpended Hurricane Ike CDBG-DR funds
from over seven years ago are those funds set aside for the reconstruction of hundreds of public housing
units in Galveston and Houston. While there were obstacles placed in front of the GLO in undertaking these
projects by lawsuits and unlawful acts on the part of local governments, the GLO should have learned from
these experiences what actions must be taken at the onset of the recovery process to mitigate the
occurrence of these outrageous delays. Yet, the Draft Plan leaves us to believe that, once again, the GLO is
prepared to accept delays in addressing these housing needs of some of the most vulnerable households.
In order to avoid a repeat of the decade of delay in previous CDBG-DR rounds, the Draft Plan should should
provide that all funding to jurisdictions is conditional on their getting prompt completion of restoring public
and other subsidized housing. If the local jurisdictions won’t comply, then the State should step in and
restore the housing.
It is unacceptable that the GLO has been unable to acquire data at this point regarding damaged subsidized
housing and displaced Housing Choice Voucher holders over the five months since the disaster. Funds are
24
25
TxLIHIS would be happy to share the HUD data with GLO.
Page 24
available to the State to identify, plan and remediate the damage to public and subsidized housing, yet, as
noted elsewhere in these comments the GLO has stated it does not intend to utilize any funds for such
planning or assessment purposes.

a. The Draft Plan must be amended to provide an assessment of the damage and disaster recovery
needs of public and subsidized housing;
b. Condition the provision of CDBG-DR assistance to local jurisdictions on the rapid rehabilitation or
reconstruction of public and subsidized housing in a manner that affirmatively furthers fair housing.
C. DIFFERENTIAL ASSISTANCE LEVELS AND HOUSING PROGRAM PROVISIONS BY SUBRECIPIENTS

ARE LIKELY TO BE DISCRIMINATORY.
The Draft Plan provides on page 41, “Each sub recipient will set the maximum amount of assistance
available to a beneficiary under its program to be equal to or less than the housing assistance maximums. A
waiver request must be submitted to the GLO if a sub recipient’s housing assistance maximums exceed the
GLO amounts. The GLO will evaluate each housing assistance waiver request for cost effectiveness.”
Adoption of this provision in the Draft Plan will almost certainly result in serious fair housing and Title VI
violations.
A source of inequity and civil rights violations in previous State-administered CDBG-DR programs was the
widely varying levels of housing assistance between jurisdictions. This problem was successfully addressed
by the State of Texas through adoption and implementation of the following provision as well as other
provisions regarding proof of ownership, affording homeowners the opportunity to relocate, etc. from the
Conciliation Agreement that governed Dolly/Ike recovery:
Housing Program Guidelines. TDHCA shall create a task force comprised of representatives of
TDHCA and the COGs, that shall in one or more posted public meetings, develop criteria governing
all housing Programs to be carried out with Hurricane Recovery Funds. Such recommendations,
upon adoption by TDHCA, will direct the available scope of housing activities Recipients may carry
out and will be reflected in an amendment. TDHCA must consider these recommendations and
approve guidelines which shall include and address but not be limited to:
a. A list of housing Program activities (including appropriate relocation and buyout activities)
from which Recipients may select housing Programs that they will offer:
b. The cost and benefit criteria for each housing Program:
c. The Program participant eligibility and qualification criteria for each housing Program:
d. Housing quality standards for housing funded with Hurricane Recovery Funds:
e. The priority factors that Recipients must consider in administering their overall housing
Program, including prioritization for persons at various income levels, persons with special
needs, and relocation Programs:
f. An evaluation of the income levels of disaster survivors and the establishment of
reasonable guidelines to ensure that the housing needs of low-. very low and extremely
low-income households are assisted with housing in no less than the proportion to their
relative percentages of the overall populations which suffered housing damage within the
community being served by the Program:
g. Appropriate outreach and public awareness measures for housing programs:
h. The recommendations will provide and allow for objectively determined regional
adjustments for these criteria to reflect differences in the costs of delivery for benefits and
the economic profile of local target populations.26
26
Conciliation Agreement, CASE NAME: Texas Low Income Housing Information Service and Texas Appleseed v. State of Texas,
CASE NUMBERS: 06-10-0410-8 (TITLE VIII): 06-10-0410-9 (SECTION 109), pages 14-15
Page 25
a. The Draft Plan should adopt all the provisions related to housing programs and particularly the
provision from the 2010 Conciliation Agreement establishing uniform housing guidelines and the
across jurisdictions and the right of homeowners to relocate from their pre-disaster residence;
b. The Draft Plan should establish standard baseline benefit levels across jurisdictions;
c. The Draft Plan should require that equivalent housing assistance programs are offered across all
jurisdictions in the disaster affected regions;
d. GLO should train administering jurisdictions on the potential Title VI and civil rights violations of
adopting program procedures and guidelines that would discourage or impede members of
protected classes from rebuilding within their jurisdictions.
D. SECTION 3 PLAN MUST BE AVAILABLE FOR PUBLIC COMMENT.

Certification “E” on page 59 states that the GLO will comply with §3.
The local hiring, especially of low- and moderate-income persons is critical in light of the negative impacts
on employment that has resulted from the disaster.
There is nothing in the Draft Plan describing any action or policy that complies or furthers the goals of §3
employment and contracting (such as: The GLO will create a list of eligible §3 contractors in each county
and will require all contractors receiving CDBG-DR funds to post all job openings on a central webpage).
TxLIHIS engaged extensively with GLO during the Hurricane Dolly/Ike recovery process to develop and
implement effective §3.

a. The Draft Plan should provide a link to, recognize and commit to the §3 Hurricane Ike/Dolly
established practices as a starting point for a §3 plan;
b. GLO should assess the effectiveness of the §3 efforts in previous disasters and report those results
in the Draft Plan;
c. GLO should propose how to improve on local hiring effectiveness under a §3 Plan in this recovery;
d. The §3 Plan and subsequent substantive changes should be subject to the public comment
process afforded citizens for the Draft Plan;
e. All job openings related to disaster recovery, from the State, subcontractors and other recipients
should be posted on a central webpage.
E. ANTI-DISPLACEMENT PLAN NOT INCLUDED IN DRAFT PLAN.

On page 59 the Draft Plan offers the following certification, “a. The grantee certifies that it has in effect and
is following a residential anti-displacement and relocation assistance plan in connection with any activity
assisted with funding under the CDBG program.”
There is no reference or citation to this Anti-Displacement Plan in the body of the Draft Plan. This document
should be referenced and included in the public comment process. Without a citation or indication as to
where the residential anti-displacement and relocation assistance plan can be found or how it can be
obtained it is impossible to provide public comment.

a. Develop a residential anti-displacement and relocation assistance plan;
b. Include the residential anti-displacement and relocation assistance plan in the Draft Plan and
provide an opportunity for public comment.
F. CERTIFICATION OF SUBRECIPIENT CAPACITY TO ADMINISTER IS NOT CREDIBLE.

Certification “l” on page 60 of the Draft Plan states, “The grantee certifies that it (and any subrecipient or
administering entity) currently has or will develop and maintain the capacity to carry out disaster recovery
activities in a timely manner…”
Page 26
The Draft Plan does not otherwise specify as to how this will be carried out. It should.
The problem of slow rate program services is by far the most complained of problem with the State of Texas’
administration of past CDBG-DR programs. Housing programs administered by GLO and by local
government jurisdictions have spanned more than seven years and are still not complete. There is no
indication that any lessons have been learned or will be implemented by the GLO that will ensure that in this
recovery the disaster recovery will be carried out in a timely manner.
Requested Action 30: Incorporate in the Draft Plan and enforce the provisions of the 2010 Fair Housing
Conciliation Agreement that each sub recipient be assigned performance benchmarks on a timeline and if
the benchmarks are not met, the State will transfer program responsibility to another contractor or take over
program administration itself.
TOPIC 8: RESILIENCE AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES
A. PROPOSED ELEVATION STANDARDS ARE INADEQUATE TO PREVENT REPEAT STRUCTURE

FLOODING.
Certification “m” on page 60 of the Draft Plan states, “The grantee certifies that it will not use CDBG-DR
funds for any activity in an area identified as flood prone for land use or hazard mitigation planning
purposes by the state, local, or tribal government or delineated as a Special Flood Hazard Area in FEMA’s
most current flood advisory maps, unless it also ensures that the action is designed or modified to minimize
harm to or within the floodplain, in accordance with Executive Order 11988 and 24 CFR part 55.”
The only reference in the Draft Plan regarding not using CDBG-DR funds in an area identified as “flood
prone” is the stated requirement. The Draft Plan’s sole requirement is the elevation of structure two feet
above the level of the annual floodplain.” This is insufficient to comply with this certification.
The Draft Plan requires the elevation of structures, “at least 2 feet above the annual floodplain elevation.”
The repeated flooding events in the past several years shows that floodplain elevation definitions now in
place are inadequate to inform what is a safe elevation. GLO should also require an assessment of the
maximum level of flooding in the area of a protected project in all recent storm events and require elevation
at least two feet above that level as well as 2 feet above the annual floodplain elevation.
Requested Action 31: Conduct assessment of the maximum flood level in the area of each protected
project during storm events over the past 3 years and require the elevation of structures at least two feet
above the highest level as well as 2 feet above the annual floodplain elevation.
TOPIC 9: NEEDS OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES, HOMELESS, CHILDREN AGING OUT OF FOSTER CARE
A. PLAN FAILS TO ANALYZE NEEDS AND DENIES ASSISTANCE TO THE HOMELESS.

The Draft Plan describes the agencies serving Texas homeless persons. The only analysis of homeless
needs reads:
The GLO has been in communication with the Texas Homeless Network (THN) and the Ending
Community Homelessness Coalition (ECHO) for data tied to the impacts of Hurricane Harvey on
the homeless population in Texas. THN and ECHO informed the GLO that they are currently
engaged in efforts to identify homeless persons impacted by the hurricane. Data gathering will be
completed at the end of January 2018. It will then be assessed and provided to the GLO so that
further determinations can be made on how local communities can better assist their homeless
populations.
Page 27
No funds from this allocation will be set aside specifically to offset and prevent homelessness, but
the next allocation is expected to be much larger. The GLO plans to create a more substantial
homelessness prevention program from future funds.27
This in insufficient to comply with HUD’s direction for an Action Plan. The State cannot simply state that it is
waiting on a nonprofit agency to conduct a survey and therefore it is not providing any assistance to this
population.

a. Conduct a needs assessment of the disaster recovery needs of people with disabilities, homeless,
children aging out of foster care;
b. Include the assessment in the report;
c. Describe how the State intends to meet the needs of these populations in the Draft Plan;
d. Publish the plan and provide the public an opportunity to comment on it.
B. FAILS TO ASSESS NEEDS OF SPECIAL NEEDS POPULATIONS, INCLUDING

PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES.
The provisions in the Draft Plan relating to the needs of persons with disabilities and
activities to assist this population is particularly insufficient and must be corrected.

a. The Draft Plan should require both quality inspections and code compliance inspections on all
projects funded with CDBG-DR. Site inspections should be required on all projects to ensure
quality and compliance with building codes;
b. The Draft Plan should encourage and support sub recipients’ efforts to update and strengthen local
compliance codes to mitigate hazard risks due to sea level rise, high winds, storm surge, and
flooding where applicable;
c. In the project application, the Draft Plan should require sub recipients will submit an explanation of
both current and future planned codes to mitigate hazard risks;
d. The Draft plan should state that GLO will provide technical guidance on hazard mitigation code
examples;
e. For reconstruction or new construction of residential buildings, the Draft Plan should require
recipients to follow the ENERGY STAR program for Green Building Standards; For rehabilitation of
non-substantially damaged residential buildings, the Draft Plan should require recipients to follow
the guidelines to the extent applicable as specified in the HUD CPD Green Building Retrofit
Checklist;
f. For infrastructure projects, the Draft Plan should state that GLO will encourage recipients, to the
extent practicable, to implement green building practices;
g. For reconstruction or new construction of residential buildings, the Draft Plan should require
recipients to follow the minimum construction standards for accessibility adopted for previous
disaster recovery efforts including accessible features;
h. For rehabilitation of non-substantially damaged residential buildings, the Draft Plan should require
architectural barrier removal or accessible features as required to make assisted units accessible
and/or visitable as required;
i. The Draft Plan should state that the GLO and sub recipients will develop a process to assess the
impact of the disaster on persons with disabilities and incorporate this data into program design for
the next rounds of CDBG-DR programs.
27
Page 28
TOPIC 11: IMPROVING CLARITY OF THE ACTION PLAN
A. PORTIONS OF THE DRAFT PLAN ARE CONFUSING, UNDEFINED AND UNCLEAR AND AMBIGUOUS
The December 27, 2017 Allocation Notice at 82 FR 61320 -- confirms that these funds are subject to, among
others, the November 21, 2016 Allocation Notice28 At p. 83260 which requires:
d. Clarity of Action Plan. All grantees must include sufficient information so that all interested
parties will be able to understand and comment on the action plan and, if applicable, be able to
prepare responsive applications to the grantee. The action plan (and subsequent amendments)
must include a single chart or table that illustrates, at the most practical level, how all funds are
budgeted (e.g., by program, sub recipient, grantee-administered activity, or other category).
As stated above there are a number of confusing, undefined and unclear statements, types of analysis and
ambiguities in the Draft Plan. For example, the following statement from page 37,
“Due to the 90 percent federal cost share tied to the approximate cost amount, the total PA
infrastructure unmet need for these localities will be calculated from the remaining 10 percent of the
projected cost amount plus 15 percent of the approximate cost as a resiliency multiplier.”
The Draft Plan should be able to be understood by a citizen. This is often not the case.

a. Revise the Draft Plan to eliminate confusing, undefined and unclear statements, undefined analysis
and ambiguities;
b. Provide a single chart or table that illustrates, at the most practical level, how all funds are
budgeted;
c. Provide an understandable interpretation for the passage cited above from page 37.
PART 4: SEVEN PROPOSED ACTION PLAN OBJECTIVES TO ACHIEVE A FULL RECOVERY
PRINCIPLE 1: Securing help from government of all levels is accessible, understandable and timely.
PRINCIPLE 2: Everyone in need receives safe, temporary, accessible housing where they can reconnect
with family and community.
PRINCIPLE 3: Displaced people have access to all the resources they need to recover housing, personal
property and transportation; disaster rebuilding jobs and contracts are locally sourced and
provide fair wages.
PRINCIPLE 4: Everyone is fairly assisted to recover fully and promptly through transparent and accountable
programs and compliance with civil rights laws, with survivors having a say in the way assistance is
provided.
PRINCIPLE 5: All homeowners are able to quickly repair or rebuild in safe, quality neighborhoods of their
choice that fit the needs of their families.
PRINCIPLE 6: Renters quickly get quality, affordable, accessible rental housing in safe, quality
neighborhoods of their choice that fits the needs of their families.
PRINCIPLE 7: All neighborhoods are free from environmental hazards, have equal quality public
infrastructure and are safe and resilient.
28
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2016-11-21/pdf/2016-27969.pdf
Page 29
PART 5: RECOMMENDED ACTION PLAN INITIATIVES TO IMPLEMENT SEVEN OBJECTIVES FOR FULL
RECOVERY
Requested Action 35: Include the following initiatives the Draft Plan for make securing help from government
of all levels accessible, understandable and timely.
a. Designate a permanent lead state agency for disaster recovery; establish statutory protocols
and oversight for recovery efforts.29
b. Support the coordination of government-funded recovery efforts with faith-based and community
groups.30
c. Undertake outreach and communications efforts to reach all survivors; include door-to-door
canvassing and special outreach efforts to hard-to-reach populations; distribute easily
understandable multilingual materials.31
d. Federal and state authorities provide technical assistance and support to all local
governmental entities implementing disaster recovery programs.32
29
Over the past twelve years, responsibility at the state level for long-term disaster recovery has shifted among three different
state agencies: the Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs, the Texas Office of Rural Affairs and the Texas General
Land Office. Legislation proposed by Senator Eddie Lucio, Jr. (SB 1673, 2017 Regular Session), considered during the past three
sessions of the Texas Legislature designating a state agency to lead disaster recovery has failed to pass. The result is a lack of
formal institutional capacity over time to design and administer disaster recovery programs, contributing to long startup times and
delays in beginning long-term recovery programs (i.e., CDBG-DR funded) each time a disaster strikes.
The solution is to statutorily designate the state agency for disaster recovery and to develop programs in the time period between
disasters so that those programs can be deployed immediately when a disaster strikes.
30
Volunteer- and faith-based organizations are an essential part of disaster recovery. The state needs to designate a formal liaison
through the Texas Faith-Based and Community Initiative for organizations that are engaged in disaster recovery work and build
protocols to ensure that their work seamlessly integrates into the rebuilding programs funded by the state. The experience in past
disasters has been that too often volunteer and faith-based organizations undertake intermediate levels of repairs to homes which
are later demolished and rebuilt with government long-term disaster recovery funds. This is a waste of valuable resources and labor
which should be addressed in this disaster.
The formal liaison should promote collaborations between these voluntary efforts and government programs. A summit should be
scheduled immediately for the major volunteer and faith-based groups and the state leaders of disaster recovery to coordinate their
work. Government agencies also need to provide logistical support and reimbursement for the cost of materials incurred by
volunteer and faith-based organizations in order to permit them to assist more survivors.
The governor should also direct the Texas National Guard to cooperate and assist faith-based organizations doing disaster
recovery with both personnel and logistical support.
One of the great things that comes out of disaster recovery efforts in our state is the outpouring of voluntary donations and labor.
It is vital that government agencies recognize and support the desire of individuals and organizations to contribute and to help. To
support individuals' and organizations' interests in donating time and money to the recovery process, the Texas Faith-Based and
Community Initiative should help identify the most effective ways donors can help survivors at the different phases of the recovery
process. In doing so, the Initiative must not be prescriptive or restrict individual voluntary initiatives. But the Initiative can and should
point people to voluntary activities and funds where they can be most effective. A website should be created listing volunteer
opportunities, dates and places along with qualifications for volunteers. It is vitally important that these voluntary activities also be
appropriately coordinated with FEMA and CDBG-DR program requirements in order that the volunteers' contributions are effective in
the recovery process. To oversee these cross-sector collaborations, a special advisory board should be created, composed of major
voluntary and faith-based organizations, the Texas National Guard, key representatives of FEMA and the administering agencies of
the state's CDBG-DR program.
31
The comprehensive outreach and communications strategy should identify hard-to-reach populations including language
minorities. It should develop linguistically and culturally appropriate messaging strategies. The government entities involved in
recovery should coordinate the production of materials and the process for ongoing communications to keep disaster survivors fully
informed of where they stand in the short- and long-term application and recovery program process. The outreach and
communications strategy should incorporate door-to-door outreach to low-income communities and vulnerable populations. From
prior disaster recovery efforts, we know that door-to-door outreach to low-income impacted communities is essential to ensure that
persons who are not staying in shelters are able to access the resources available to them. This one-on-one outreach is especially
critical for serving vulnerable populations including seniors and persons with severe disabilities who either do not have information
about the resources available or are unable to apply for the resources.
32
An important lesson from Hurricane Ike is that local governmental entities designated by the state to take charge of disaster
recovery efforts did not, from the onset of the process, have the technical expertise needed to effectively design and implement
disaster rebuilding programs. There has historically been a large reliance on consultants in large engineering firms to step in to
provide the capacity that local governments lack to administer programs. The services of these entities are very expensive and the
process of contracting and putting them in place is time-consuming. Steps should be taken to maximize the ability of local
governments to undertake these tasks of rebuilding while minimizing their reliance on these expensive third-party consultants.
To the extent local governmental entities are put in charge of disaster recovery efforts after Harvey, it is critical that they are also
provided with extensive, ongoing technical assistance before they begin their work as well as throughout the duration of the
recovery programs. Technical assistance should include civil rights concerns identified in other disaster recovery situations.
Page 30
e. Expand the role of case managers to assist survivors to navigate the recovery process from shelter
and temporary housing to permanent housing.33
f. Operate a tracking system to keep survivors informed where they stand in processes related to
application and program benefits for short-term and long-term recovery.34
g. Fund legal aid organizations and their coordination with pro bono attorneys to help survivors
access recovery assistance and handle appeals.35
h. All communications and meetings must be accessible to people in their primary languages
and program staff able to communicate with survivors in the relevant language.36
i. Ensure accommodations are made for people with disabilities and the process for
survivors requesting accommodations is publicized and easily accessible and usable by
people with disabilities.37
33
Past disasters have shown that navigators dedicated to assisting people through the bureaucratic aspects of the recovery
process are essential to disaster survivors being able to successfully apply for and receive FEMA assistance. A problem that arose
in prior disasters is that the role of these "navigators" has been limited to the FEMA process. The second phase of disaster
rebuilding-the long-term disaster recovery work in which homeowners interact with government agencies utilizing federal Community
Development Block Grant-Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) funds-has also been frustrating and very difficult for survivors to navigate.
To help families progress more quickly through the different phases of recovery programs, case managers, or "navigators," should
be assigned permanently to disaster survivors to navigate them through the entire recovery process, from the shelters to obtaining
permanent housing, including: (1) the process of getting out of the shelters; (2) applications for FEMA assistance; (3) FEMA
appeals, (4) resolving problems that develop over time regarding FEMA assistance and temporary housing; and (5) applying for and
receiving repairs or rebuilding assistance through CDBG-DR funded programs.
The navigators should also connect survivors with the other resources they need to recover, for example, helping children enroll
in school; connecting survivors to mental health and other trauma- informed care, ensuring continuity of access to health care and
medication, and helping survivors address employment and financial issues that arise out of the disaster.
The navigators should be fluent in the primary language of their clients. Our experience from prior disasters with the RAPIDO
program has taught us that it is best to have also persons who are native language speakers working with survivors. It is also a best
practice to recruit and train as navigators residents from affected communities, who the survivors can more easily communicate with
and relate to.
34
One of the most effective things that can be done to reduce the trauma and uncertainty that disaster survivors experience is to
help them understand the stages of the disaster recovery process and where they stand in terms of the process and accessing
assistance. This task is made complex because of the lack of coordination between FEMA temporary assistance programs and
long-term disaster recovery programs administered by state and local governments.
Jurisdictions need to quickly set up the policies, procedures, and qualifications for the jurisdiction's long-term rebuilding programs
in order to inform survivors of the rebuilding process in its entirety. An essential role of navigators assigned to survivors (see
recommendation 1.5. above) should be to provide survivors a timeline of the key steps for disaster recovery and to keep survivors
up-to-date regarding where they currently are on that timeline and to help them anticipate the requirements they face in order to take
the next step.
The state and jurisdictions should work with communications experts to develop a simple, easy-to- understand document that
presents this timeline to survivors. Government administrators should also identify key decision points for survivors on the timeline
to give them enough time to consider in advance the decisions they will be asked to make.
35
Legal assistance is a critical component of disaster recovery. Thousands of low-income families impacted by large-scale
disasters need legal services provided by legal aid organizations and their pro bono partners in order to access rebuilding
resources, meet their basic survival needs, and land back on their feet. Immediate legal needs include: (1) education on how to
avoid exploitation and consumer scams; (2) help replacing important legal documents and filing insurance claims; (3) assistance
navigating complex programmatic requirements embedded in disaster recovery programs such as drafting documents that FEMA
often requires proving up ownership or a person's rental status; and (4) assistance with the appeals processes for claims denials. A
report issued after Hurricane Katrina found that legal aid organizations in Louisiana did not have the capacity to handle anywhere
from 66 to 80% of calls for assistance. Texas legal aid organizations will face similar capacity limits without additional funding and
one of those organizations, Lone Star Legal Aid in Houston, lost its Houston offices from a fire from the Harvey flooding.
36
The communities impacted by Hurricane Harvey are linguistically very diverse, and thousands of survivors speak a primary
language other than English. In Texas Congressional District 27, for example, which includes Refugio, Nueces, and Matagorda
counties, more than 200,000 households speak a language other than English at home, and more than 60,000 households are not
proficient in English. Students in the Houston Independent School District speak around 100 different languages. Since
communication is a vital element in rapid disaster recovery, it is vital that recovery programs provide written communication in the
primary language of the survivor and employ staff who can speak fluently in the primary language of the survivor. A report on
recovery from Sandy found that affected families were unable to access assistance because of lack of language access, and HUD
required disaster recovery programs to reopen so that language minorities could benefit from the programs.
Recipients of federal financial assistance have a legal obligation to reduce language barriers that can preclude meaningful access
by Limited English Proficiency (LEP) persons to important government services. In certain circumstances, the failure to ensure that
LEP persons can effectively participate in or benefit from federally-assisted programs and activities violates Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, and federal agencies' Title VI regulations against national origin discrimination.
37
Persons with disabilities often have special needs with regards to housing, transportation and services. The Fair Housing Act,
Section 504, the Housing and Community Development Act of 1987 and the Americans with Disabilities Act ensure that persons
Page 31
Requested Action 36: Include the following initiatives the Draft Plan to secure for everyone in need safe,
temporary, accessible housing where they can reconnect with family and community.
a. Provide temporary housing through a FEMA/HUD disaster voucher program (DVP).38
b. Fund the disaster voucher program adequately to allow tenants to access safe, quality, accessible
housing.39
c. Fund a regional tenants’ council to help survivors who rent understand their rights and
responsibilities under Texas law.40
d. Enact local short-term rent stabilization policies to prevent landlord rent gouging.41
e. Permit local municipalities and state agencies to suspend housing evictions during the months
immediately following a disaster.42
with disabilities may request and obtain accommodations for their needs, including structural accessibility where needed. These
laws cannot legally, nor should they be, waived. Leadership of the recovery process must clearly communicate to all parties in the
disaster recovery the provisions of these laws and enforce the mandate that they are complied with and enforced.
38
During the Hurricane Ike recovery program (as well as other subsequent natural disasters such as Superstorm Sandy), FEMA
and HUD entered into a joint agreement for HUD to administer a FEMA- funded temporary housing assistance program called the
Disaster Housing Assistance Program (DHAP), which is now called the Disaster Voucher Program, or DVP. DVP uses vouchers to
provide temporary rental housing for disaster survivors, utilizing the administrative infrastructure of local public housing authorities,
which already administer vouchers under HUD's Housing Choice Voucher Program. DHAP was a significant improvement over
previous hotel-motel programs and the approach in Houston after Hurricane Katrina. During the recovery from Hurricane Katrina,
the City of Houston took on the task of block leasing apartments from landlords to house Katrina evacuees who resettled in
Houston. While there were positive elements of this city-initiated program, the end results were not optimal. Many of the apartments
block leased by the city were of marginal quality and were heavily concentrated in deteriorating, lower-income neighborhoods with
large blocks of dilapidated apartment projects. The result was an overconcentration of extremely low-income households, racial
isolation, and other problems associated with the forced concentration of the evacuees in vulnerable neighborhoods and unsafe
apartments. Additionally, the handoff of the program from the City to FEMA and later to HUD was problematic.
For these reasons, we urge the approach FEMA and HUD developed under Hurricane Ike in Texas through the DHAP program. It
will be important that the program is administered in a manner that does not overly concentrate families with extremely low incomes
in existing high poverty areas or in apartment developments where all of the tenants have low incomes. In order to provide adequate
housing opportunities for survivors with vouchers, DVP will need to incorporate robust outreach to landlords in higher opportunity
areas as well as policies to combat discrimination by landlords (see below).
39
In order to ensure that disaster survivors can return to housing close to their jobs, schools and families, and that the economic
recovery of communities is not delayed by the inability of its workforce to return home, HUD and FEMA will need to increase the
level of housing assistance in many areas to a level above the pre-set HUD Fair Market Rents. After Sandy, FEMA increased the
amount of rental assistance to disaster survivors in New York and New Jersey by an additional 25 % after determining that there
was not an adequate supply of rental units available at the Fair Market Rents.
Low-income survivors in rural areas struck by Hurricane Harvey face particular challenges in returning to their jobs and
communities. In Victoria, where the closest FEMA-approved hotel is 100 miles away, displaced residents face extraordinarily long
commutes or the loss of their jobs. And because of the destruction of most of the affordable rental housing that existed in small
towns like Refugio, returning long-term will not be possible for many low-income residents unless funding is provided to rebuild
affordable rental housing.
40
More than 40% of households in Beaumont, Port Arthur and Corpus Christi are renters. In Houston alone, more than 1.4 million
people are renters, along with another 800,000 people in Harris County. Tenants living in homes that were destroyed or damaged
by Hurricane Harvey face new challenges in navigating complex state laws and lease provisions to understand their rights and
responsibilities regarding repairs, rental payments, and other issues arising out of the disaster.
Both Austin and Dallas have nonprofit organizations that are focused on assisting tenants with rental housing issues, and the
Austin nonprofit (the Austin Tenants Council) also helps landlords and tenants mediate disputes and investigates fair housing
complaints. By offering similar services, a new regional tenants' council serving the areas impacted by Harvey would educate
tenants and landlords about their rights and responsibilities under the law, reduce disputes between landlords and tenants that end
up in court, and help protect the health and safety of tenants whose rental units are dangerous and uninhabitable.
41
Major natural disasters on the scale of Hurricane Harvey result in rental housing shortages and rent hikes due to the restricted
supply of housing. For example, after Hurricane Katrina, the price of a rental unit went up an average of 40 %, and after Superstorm
Sandy the median rent increased 20%, making it impossible for many impacted families to return to their communities and pushing
many families into homelessness. To protect renters in the areas impacted by Hurricane Harvey from similar price increases, the
city councils of cities and towns facing a rental housing shortage should utilize their authority under Texas law (Local Government
Code, Section 214.902), to each adopt an ordinance placing a cap on residential rents in their jurisdiction, and Governor Abbott
should approve the ordinances (under the Local Government Code. Ordinances restricting rents are not effective until approved by
the Governor).
42
After a disaster, many impacted families are unable to make their monthly housing payment for the next one to three months until
they can land on their feet, access their mail, and resume employment. Recognizing the barriers that disaster survivors face in
making their housing payments after a large-scale disaster strikes, Freddie Mac and FHA have enacted a 90-day moratorium on
evictions and foreclosures for homeowners impacted by Hurricane Harvey with Freddie Mac and FHA-insured home mortgages.
Page 32
f. Enact state laws and policies to prevent landlord housing discrimination against survivors using
Disaster Recovery Vouchers and Housing Choice Vouchers; step up HUD’s Fair Housing
investigation and enforcement efforts.43
Requested Action 37: Include the following initiatives the Draft Plan providing displaced people
access to all the resources they need to recover housing, personal property and transportation;
disaster rebuilding jobs and contracts are locally sourced and provide fair wages.
a. Ensure disaster survivors have access to food, education, health care, mental health services,
and other critical resources they need to recover.44
b. Provide an expedited process for families to access FEMA funds to repair, replace or enter into a
short-term lease for a car.45
c. Employ social workers to assist survivors with special social needs.46
d. Maintain and enforce worksite safety standards and prevailing wages.47
Texas should extend similar relief to renters by enacting legislation suspending rental housing evictions in the impacted areas for a
three-month period. New York City placed a similar moratorium on evictions in areas impacted by Superstorm Sandy.
43
To provide displaced persons, including persons with disabilities, with access to housing in low- poverty areas and with access to
jobs and transportation, it is critical to enact laws and policies prohibiting landlords from discriminating against tenants who have
received rental housing assistance. After Hurricane Katrina, a study found that 82% of landlords in the greater New Orleans region
refused to rent to tenants with vouchers. African-American tenants were impacted the hardest by these discriminatory policies.
Without interventions to protect low-income, minority tenants with housing assistance, their housing options will be largely restricted
to high poverty, racially segregated neighborhoods and to apartment developments with high concentrations of poverty, impacting
their ability to recover from Harvey as well as their long-term life outcomes.
Policy interventions to expand housing options for renters should include: (1) a state law prohibiting landlords from discriminating
against tenants with Disaster Recovery and Housing Choice Vouchers; (2) the elimination of the state law (Tex. Local Government
Code Section 250.007) barring cities from enacting ordinances that protect tenants with vouchers from discrimination and other
sources of housing assistance (the state law exempts only ordinances that protect veterans with vouchers); and (3) a policy
requiring all apartment owners receiving any rebuilding assistance to accept a certain percentage of tenants with housing vouchers
and to bar the owners from discriminating against tenants on the basis of having a voucher or other source of housing assistance.
In addition to voucher discrimination, other potential types of housing discrimination-including discrimination against survivors
based on race, national origin, disability, and familial status be combatted as thousands of vulnerable families find themselves
seeking to find rental housing. HUD's Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity (FHEO) should immediately make available
substantial financial, educational, technical and training resources to ramp up an aggressive fair housing enforcement program in
the areas impacted by Hurricane Harvey. This should include the widespread use of matched pair fair housing testing to root out
and enforce against violations of fair housing law.
FHEO should also assign investigators and attorneys under the supervision of the FHEO systemic investigations unit in
Washington DC to monitor CDBG-DR programs and to examine patterns and practices and complaints against local governments
over failures to comply with Title VI, Fair Housing and the requirement to Affirmatively Further Fair Housing. These issues must be
handled in DC so coordination with headquarters CDBG is possible.
44
This is particularly critical for special needs populations including persons with disabilities, children in foster care, and homeless
youth.
45
Regrettably, public transportation infrastructure in the disaster areas is generally insufficient to serve many of the impacted
neighborhoods. Most workers in the impacted areas of Texas must rely upon private transportation (e.g. car or truck) to travel to
work, transport their children to school and doctor's appointments, and shop for goods and services. The quick restoration of private
vehicles for disaster survivors is therefore essential.
In past disasters, FEMA has at times made available funds for up to $5000 to repair or replace a single vehicle for each affected
household. Given the flooding impacts from Harvey, this level of assistance will simply be inadequate to allow most disaster
survivors to replace their personal vehicles. FEMA should increase the maximum to $10,000. Alternatively, FEMA should permit
disaster survivors to enter into reimbursable short-term auto leases. FEMA should also change its policies to allow for an additional
increase in the level of personal transportation assistance in cases where a household can demonstrate that is has two or more
working adults who both need replacement vehicles to access employment. FEMA should also waive existing program restrictions
that exclude many families from accessing FEMA assistance for auto replacement.
46
Research and evaluation following Hurricane Katrina identified that a significant number of the impacted families affected faced
significant social service needs. Problems included domestic violence issues, unresolved mental health challenges, social isolation,
and child neglect and abuse. These problems are not inherent among survivors, but in any large-scale natural disaster affecting
hundreds of thousands of households, it is inevitable that many families will face such challenges. The research literature indicates
that the trauma and displacement of the disaster exacerbates many of these problems. Therefore, it is essential that trained social
workers be available to assist families as necessary with these problems.
47
The economic disruption associated with this disaster is on an epic scale. It is vital that disaster recovery activities produce
employment opportunities and economic stimulus for workers whose regular work has been disrupted by the disaster. In past
disasters there have been calls for the repeal or temporary suspension of workplace safety and prevailing wage rules. Those waiver
requests have wisely been universally rejected. The economic stimulus to the area would be reduced if wages are reduced, and
Page 33
e. Support legal aid and fair housing organizations to assist with survivors’ legal issues as they go
through the recovery process, such as consumer protection matters, mortgage foreclosure
problems, and insurance claims.48
f. Establish protocols to maximize the hiring and contracting of unemployed and underemployed
local residents and small businesses.49
g. Provide information to survivors, volunteers and workers engaged in the recovery about
exposure to environmental, health and safety hazards in the cleanup.50
Requested Action 38: Include the following initiatives the Draft Plan so that everyone is fairly assisted to
recover fully and promptly through transparent and accountable programs and compliance with civil rights
laws, with survivors having a say in the way assistance is provided.
a. Make individual renter and homeowner recovery the highest priority.51
b. If Congress fails to appropriate enough CDBG-DR funds to fully cover all housing needs, use
80% of CDBG-DR assistance for low- and moderate-income families, including those making
less than 30% of the median family income.52
prevailing wages will ensure that disaster recovery programs are able to fill positions. Further, much of the recovery work that will be
done will involve workers being placed in contaminated and potentially hazardous environments. To protect the health and lives of
these workers, it is critical that workplace safety rules be strictly enforced.
48
In addition to needing immediate assistance with accessing disaster recovery programs (see Recommendation 1.g.) thousands
of impacted families will need critical, longer-term legal aid to recover from Harvey, such as assistance with clearing clouded titles
on homes, representation in mortgage foreclosures, and protection against disaster-related fraud and scams. Funding is also
needed to support wide scale legal education programs to inform victims about their legal rights and to help them avoid scammers
who prey on the most vulnerable disaster victims (especially seniors and immigrants). The resources of legal aid organizations in
Texas were already stretched extremely thin prior to Hurricane Harvey, and, without additional funding, the organizations will be
unable to meet the critical legal needs arising out of this disaster.
49
As noted earlier, the economic displacement of the workforce in the affected regions is a significant problem that needs to be
overcome to recover from this disaster. The large expenditures for public infrastructure and repairing and replacing homes and
businesses offer significant job opportunities that should be made available on a priority basis to disaster survivors. The hiring of
local low-income residents should be a core operating principle in disaster-recovery contracts.
Existing rules for the HUD Section 3 program should be enforced and also be modified to prioritize extending contracting
opportunities and employment opportunities to disaster survivors. The federal and state government should retain experts in
outreach and communications to develop and distribute multilingual marketing of contracting and job opportunities for disaster
survivors. The agencies should also establish protocols for setting contracting and hiring goals and for publicly reporting progress
towards those goals.
50
As OSHA and other government agencies have identified, homeowners, renters, volunteers and paid workers engaged in clean-
up work after a flood are exposed to a host of health and safety hazards. Hazards include contamination from chemicals, dangerous
levels of mold, human sewage, spilled gasoline storage tanks, unsafe drinking water, live electrical wires, toxic air, and much more.
Many of those returning to their homes or assisting with recovery efforts are unaware of these hazards. Community education
should raise public awareness of these hazards and inform residents and workers about the actions they need to take to protect
their health and safety.
51
Ideally, federal long-term disaster recovery funds should be sufficient to address the needs of both infrastructure and individual
household recovery. However, that has not been the case in recent major disasters impacting Texas. Therefore, there will be a need
for state and local governments to set funding priorities.
Federal, state and local governments should establish a clear policy that the housing recovery of individuals and families takes
precedence in the allocation of public funds for disaster recovery. The State of Texas established such a priority in the
administration of Hurricane Ike/Dolly disaster recovery funds by setting a requirement that 55% of all funds be expended to address
the housing needs of hurricane survivors. For Hurricane Harvey disaster recovery funds, a minimum of 55% of the funds should
likewise be designated to address the housing needs of the survivors. The percentage of funding that is allocated towards assisting
renters versus homeowners should be made in proportion to their respective worst-case housing needs.
52
In assisting survivors with securing rental housing, it is essential that rental units funded with disaster recovery funds are priced at
a range of rent levels to meet the needs of all impacted families. Overall, at least 80% of individual long-term disaster recovery
assistance should be dedicated towards serving households making less than 80% of the median family income, with a priority on
serving the rental housing needs of the most vulnerable populations, including those making less than 30% of the median family
income. To generate a more accurate assessment of the disaster recovery needs of the rental population affected by Hurricane
Harvey and to guide funding allocations to produce housing at various rent levels, the State of Texas should utilize the FEMA claims
data, in conjunction with the U.S. Census data utilized by HUD to report "worst-case housing needs" to Congress.
In past disaster rebuilding programs, governmental entities have failed to designate the rent levels that are to be served through
the rental housing assistance programs. This has resulted in a disproportionate number of housing units provided to households
with incomes above 50% of median family income and an inadequate number of units affordable to households with incomes below
50% and 30% of median family income. As a result, the housing needs of extremely low-income families-families who often have the
direst housing needs-have been largely underserved. These discrepancies have been due in large part to the historical reliance
upon federal Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) as a layered subsidy to supplement the disaster recovery funds. LIHTC
Page 34
c. Use small-area aggregated FEMA claims data to fairly allocate funds across
jurisdictions and neighborhoods to serve survivors in proportion to need.53
d. Establish binding program performance goals and timelines for all public and private agencies
administering government recovery funds.54
e. Set up an independent state public commission with staff, reporting to the Governor and Texas
Legislature, to oversee and advise on all aspects of the recovery.55
f. Appoint a state inspector general for disaster recovery reporting to the independent recovery
commission to audit, investigate and oversee recovery programs.56
g. Provide effective public participation in design and oversight of disaster recovery.57
projects should be prioritized and enhanced with additional equity (such as through an additional National Housing Trust Fund
allocation), CDBG-DR or rent vouchers to produce rents affordable below 50% and 30% of median family income.
53
The allocation of disaster recovery resources for the rebuilding and repair of communities and housing must be fair, equitable and
based upon an objective assessment of need. This requires good data. The baseline data for making these determinations is the
claims data collected by FEMA and certified by FEMA's field inspectors. In order to allocate the money fairly across the different
geographies impacted by the disaster and to ensure that disaster survivors across different income levels, housing tenures and
ethnicities are fairly and proportionately assisted with these public funds, the FEMA claims data needs to be quickly made available
to local and state government agencies and to public interest organizations.
Procedures should be put in place to safeguard individually-identifying claims data from being made public while still providing a
granularity of geographic location to permit the assessment of needs at the neighborhoods level. Individual FEMA claims data
should also be accessible by outreach workers to use to contact eligible survivors about applications for low-term recovery
assistance.
54
Nine years after Hurricanes Ike and Dolly, state and local governments have still not completed the construction of all of the
housing they committed to rebuild with CDBG-DR funds. (This time period includes two separate allocations of federal funds and the
implementation of a different set of housing reconstruction programs for each allocation). In response to the slow rate of housing
reconstruction following Hurricane Rita, the 2010 Fair Housing Conciliation Agreement negotiated with the State of Texas governing
Ike and Dolly funds (https://archives.hud.gov/news/2010/doc_4305.pdf ) included a provision that established expenditure and
program benchmarks for Round 2 housing programs administered by sub recipients, and provided for regional Council of
Governments or the state to take over administration of programs when sub recipients did not meet benchmarks (see Section
II.B.1.d of the Conciliation Agreement). Despite this provision in the Agreement and the failure to meet the benchmarks, no transfer
of authority away from a low- performing governmental jurisdiction never took place.
It is essential for the Governor and the Legislature to establish a timeline for the reasonable completion of disaster recovery for
Hurricane Harvey and to hold the administering government agencies accountable for completion based on that timeline. For owner-
occupied housing, the state should establish a benchmark that 50% of all the housing units will be completed no later than 18
months from August 26, 2017, and that 100% of the units will be completed within three years. With regards to rental housing, all
rehabilitation of rental housing should be completed within 12 months of August 26, 2017, and all newly constructed rental housing
should be completed within three years.
55
The size, scope and complexity of disaster recovery makes both program delivery and program oversight challenging. Two of the
three state agencies that have managed disaster recovery in the past in Texas-the Texas Department of Housing and Community
Affairs and the Texas Department of Rural Affairs-both had boards of directors that attempted to exercise oversight over their
agency's administration of these programs. The Texas General Land Office is headed by an elected official and the agency lacks an
oversight board. Each agency oversaw a program in which disaster recovery extended over lengthy periods of time and far longer
than was intended. Independent oversight and accountability would be needed to increase accountability and ensure that programs
are fully implemented in an efficient and effective manner.
We propose an independent commission composed of elected officials and subject matter experts independent of the state and
local agencies responsible for administering the programs. This commission should be bipartisan and appointed by the governor. It
should report to the governor and the legislature on progress in disaster recovery and make recommendations on program priorities,
the design of programs, expediting recovery and the cost-effective use of resources. It should also be tasked with making
recommendations to better prepare the state to recover from future natural disasters.
56
To supplement and support the work of the independent oversight commission for disaster recovery, the state should establish
an inspector general to oversee disaster recovery program administration at the state and the local level and to report and make
recommendations to the commission, the Governor and the legislature regarding the timely and efficient use of public resources to
expedite the recovery effort. In past disasters the state auditor's office has sought to audit and report on disaster recovery. It is
apparent that there is a need for continuing and ongoing oversight of the billions of dollars of public funds at a level of the state
auditor's office is not equipped to provide. The independence of the Inspector General's office will ensure that prompt and honest
assessments as to the effectiveness of the recovery effort are available.
57
First, the opportunity to participate in government is key in a democracy. Second, in order to understand the needs of disaster
survivors, agencies engaged in post-disaster rebuilding need to hear from the people impacted by the disaster. Third, disaster
survivors have experienced the trauma of having their material possessions and home taken away from them by a force (the
hurricane) they could not control. It is critical that survivors are afforded the power and agency to take control of their lives in the
recovery. This means the ability to participate in shaping the recovery program.
Given the regrettable absence of any pre-existing long-term rebuilding plans in Texas, the planning process must now begin
immediately. In past disasters public participation has followed the narrow letter of federal law by posting notices of formal hearings
and comment periods early in the recovery when decisions affecting large, general allocations of funds are made. These
Page 35
h. Extend the Hurricane Ike/Dolly fair housing agreement into the Hurricane Harvey program to
ensure that disaster recovery actions further fair housing; provide training and ongoing review of
program design and administration to ensure compliance with fair housing, Section 504 and Title
VI laws.58
i. Assist immigrants to recover homes, personal property and to rebuild their lives; prevent
predatory and exploitative practices; suspend enforcement of SB 4.59
j. Require apartment developments funded with CDBG-DR or Low Income Housing Tax Credits
to provide apartments affordable for extremely low income households; require new apartments
to be located in quality neighborhoods that do not flood and have access to good schools and
services.60
opportunities for participation, while important to the overall direction for the recovery program, are not the opportunities that will
engage most survivors. Survivors are instead more interested in having a voice in how programs directly affect their homes and
neighborhoods.
For this reason, there needs to be an emphasis on citizen engagement in: 1) the local allocation of funds to specific infrastructure
and flood control; 2) the specifics of owner-occupied housing reconstruction including procedures relating to the homeowner and
benefit levels; 3) proposals for any voluntary neighborhood buyouts. There should also be targeted engagement at the community or
neighborhood level in the most heavily impacted places. Planners familiar with the parameters and constraints of the recovery
program should work with neighborhood leaders in in key communities to advance these important public participation opportunities
to assist residents in coming up with viable and realistic recommendations.
When it comes to process, this rapid planning process must seek community-informed recovery decisions through inclusive and
participatory methods, using planners and professional community engagement staff that conducts outreach, community
engagement, that facilitates citizens in the process of developing and implementing recovery plans for individuals and
neighborhoods.
58
The state's failure to recognize and comply with fair housing laws during the initial phases of the hurricanes Ike and Dolly
recovery program resulted in a fair housing complaint being filed and a conciliation agreement being signed
(https://archives.hud.gov/news/2010/doc_4305.pdf ) The provisions of this agreement served the communities and disaster
survivors well over the course of the recovery. The state should incorporate the provisions of the Hurricane Ike/Dolly fair housing
agreement into the Hurricane Harvey recovery program.
The State of Texas and many of the local jurisdictions impacted by Hurricane Harvey have submitted to HUD their formal Analysis
of Impediments to Fair Housing and action plans. The state and local jurisdictions must comply with their plans in the design and
implementation of recovery programs. The state and cities have certified to HUD they will comply with the plans they developed and
submitted. Fair Housing laws cannot legally nor, should they be waived. Compliance will not slow disaster recovery but must guide a
number of key decisions. Jurisdictions simply must ensure that decision makers are informed of fair housing requirements and abide
by those requirements before they take actions that would put their governmental jurisdictions in violation of the law.
In administering CDBG-DR funds for hurricanes Ike and Dolly the Texas General Land Office hired staff with expertise in
compliance with fair housing laws. These land office staff undertook formal assessments of fair housing compliance with all
applications for the construction of rental housing with funds from the disaster recovery program. This internal staff expertise along
with a review process for compliance with fair housing laws should be put in place by the administering agency for Hurricane Harvey
recovery.
Smaller cities and counties that are not designated CDBG Entitlement Communities have not prepared and submitted to HUD an
Assessment of Fair Housing or the now superseded Analysis of Impediments to Fair Housing. To help jurisdictions understand and
comply with Fair Housing law, the State of Texas established an expedited fair housing assessment process for Hurricane Ike/Dolly
disaster recovery programs. This accelerated assessment and review, known as the Fair Housing Assessment Statement - Texas or
FHAST Form) proved highly successful and not burdensome for smaller governments. The existing FHAST process should be
carried forward in the Hurricane Harvey recovery process.
59
Persons without documentation tend to be employed in jobs in the service and construction industries. Texas should recognize
that these persons contribute to the economy and have provided critical labor for reconstruction following past disasters. Therefore,
the recovery needs of undocumented immigrants should be provided for and the state should suspend enforcement of SB 4.
If a large number of construction workers are stopped from working in disaster impacted areas the result will be that the rebuilding
process will be greatly slowed, and costs of construction will rise dramatically. The immediate impact will be on non-government
funded construction. It is unlikely that government funded rebuilding project would employ undocumented workers. But privately
funded homes repairs and the state's service economy will be severely impacted by the impact of SB 4. The loss of a large part of
the labor force will have dramatic inflationary impact on the economy as the labor supply shrinks. This will drive up the cost of
recovery and reduce the impact of the available federal funds to provide crucial infrastructure and to rebuild homes.
The FEMA standard for assistance is as follows, ""To be considered for assistance, at least one person in the household must be
a U.S. citizen or by legal definition a "qualified alien" or "non-citizen national" with a Social Security number. A 'qualified alien'
includes, but is not limited to, someone who holds permanent residency, refugee, or asylum status. "non-citizen nationals" are
citizens of the U.S. territories. If a parent or guardian registers with FEMA on behalf of a U.S. citizen child living in the household,
FEMA does not collect information on the immigration status of other household members."
https://www.fema.gov/news-release/2016/06/20/us-citizens-qualified-aliens-non-citizen-nationals-should-register-fem
60
The mistakes of past disaster recovery that permitted LIHTC developments to be constructed without producing any units with
rents affordable to the renter population displaced by the hurricane must not be repeated. See the comments in note 24 for ways to
supplement housing tax credits with other funding programs to accommodate a percentage of more affordable rent levels.
Page 36
k. FEMA, HUD and state and local government should ensure that people who were homeless
at the time of the disaster are eligible for benefits.61
Requested Action 39: Include the following initiatives the Draft Plan so that homeowners are able to
quickly repair or rebuild in safe, quality neighborhoods of their choice that fit the needs of their families.
a. Fund a rapid repair program to quickly repair and stabilize the homes of the most vulnerable
homeowners within the first three months.62
b. Continue the Texas Homeowner Opportunity Program (HOP) in the current recovery, permitting
all homeowners to choose to: 1) rebuild on site; 2) rebuild in a safer neighborhood; or 3)
purchase an existing home in a less vulnerable neighborhood.63
c. Establish procedures to use recovery funds in a way that does not reinforce racial/ethnic
segregation and allows homeowners to rebuild in neighborhoods with adequate public
infrastructure and no hazardous environmental exposure.64
d. Apply and enforce accessibility and “visitability” standards for persons with
disabilities to all housing constructed under the disaster recovery.65
61
Homeless providers working at shelters in the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey reported that at one point FEMA intake workers
were informing homeless persons that they needed a residential address to apply for FEMA assistance.
62
A rapid, large-scale repair and rebuilding program needs to be set up immediately to quickly repair the homes of the most
vulnerable homeowners, including seniors, persons with disabilities, and families with children. The program needs to provide a
single point of contact for the home repair process and mobilize and coordinate assistance from the private and public sectors.
After prior hurricanes hit Texas, many survivors from those storms lived in hazardous homes for years waiting for them to be
repaired. The blue tarps on the roofs of homes across the impacted areas were an all-too-common sign of the failure of government
programs to effectively provide relief to homeowners. These delays were unacceptable and must not be repeated with Harvey.
Funding should be provided for a repair program that can quickly complete repairs to the homes of the most vulnerable survivors.
The National Guard and Americorps volunteers should be deployed to support the repair program.
A model program in this regard is SBP USA, a national nonprofit rebuilding program that was created in response to Katrina and
utilizes Americorps volunteers to quickly repair and rebuilt homes. SBP also mobilizes and coordinates the efforts of the private
sector to assist with repairs. For a summary of the SBP program, see http://sbpusa.org/what-we-do/share, and
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/31/nyregion/sandy-harvey-hurricane-recovery-lessons.html?mcubz=0&_r=0.
63
In its Ike Round 2 housing program, the State of Texas established a first of its kind homeowner mobility program that allowed
homeowners participating in the CDBG-DR funded home reconstruction program the option to relocate out of FEMA hazard areas.
The program, known as the Homeowner Mobility Program or HOP, provided homeowners whose pre-storm houses were located in
a FEMA designated hazard area and an area of highly concentrated poverty with the option of having a replacement home rebuilt on
their current lot, the option to rebuild in another safer neighborhood, or the option to use the amount of funds allocated for the
reconstruction of their home to purchase a home in a better, safer neighborhood.
This program is a national model. The objective is for recovery programs to extend to survivors the right to choose where to live
and to make that option a real one. It is morally and legally wrong for a government funded recovery program to force people to
remain in a pre-disaster location against their wishes and interests.
In the Hurricane Harvey recovery process, the state and local governmental jurisdictions have the opportunity to incorporate
lessons learned, including the importance of high-quality mobility counseling and of ensuring that choosing relocation did not delay
the homeowner's housing recovery longer than rebuilding in place took, The HOP program both mitigated the effect of future
disasters by allowing families to move out of FEMA hazard areas, and ensured that the state was in compliance with the Fair
Housing Act and other civil rights laws.
64
Compliance with fair housing law is a requirement for eligibility for housing and community development grant funds, including
CDBG-DR. But incorporating fair housing and civil rights into post- disaster programs is also important for complete recovery that
increases individual and community resilience. Research has conclusively shown that low-income children who are able to move out
of low- opportunity areas into neighborhoods with good schools and safe streets will be demonstrably more economically successful
overall. Living in higher opportunity neighborhoods outside areas of concentrated poverty provides a bridge to opportunity for adults,
making it more likely they will find and keep good jobs, reducing their dependence on public systems. As Justice Kennedy observed
in a recent Supreme Court decision on fair housing, continuing segregation gives rise to inequality and racial tension and police
misconduct and unrest in many communities. Providing a broader range of residential, educational and employment opportunities
will diminish those conditions. That is particularly important as the nation (and Texas) become majority minority in the next couple
decades. Communities that have taken active steps to reduce racial/ethnic and income segregation have prospered: Seattle,
Portland, Montgomery County (MD), New Jersey, etc. Businesses need an educated and capable workforce in the next generation,
and perpetuating segregation reduces those qualities in the workforce. Because it is the law and for all these reasons, the disaster
recovery programs must be designed and administered in a manner to dismantle the legacy of residential racial segregation in
Texas.
65
Texas law (Government Code, Section 2306.514) requires that affordable, single family housing assisted with financial support
from the State of Texas be "visitable." These provisions ensure that the house can accommodate the residents of the home, family
members and guests as they age and likely experience, at some point in their lives, a mobility disability. The costs associated with
these minor accommodations at the time a home is newly constructed-including providing a no step entrance and doors that a
Page 37
e. Fund and support the operation of RAPIDO (rapid temporary-to-permanent homeowner
rebuilding) programs as large-scale demonstrations across the disaster area.66
f. Adopt terms of Senate Bill 1673 (2017 Regular Session) for advance local disaster rebuilding
preparation with Texas A&M’s Hazard Reduction and Recovery Center.67
g. Provide property tax breaks for the reconstructed homes of low-income families.68
h. Continue the Texas Title Project to assist lower-income homeowners with clouded titles to
clear their home property titles.69
Requested Action 40: Include the following initiatives the Draft Plan for renters to quickly get quality,
affordable, accessible rental housing in safe, quality neighborhoods of their choice that fits the needs
of their families.
a. Provide renters with counseling on options to move to safer neighborhoods.70
wheelchair can get through-are minimal. The administering agencies for disaster rebuilding should ensure awareness and
compliance with the existing Texas statute.
66
In 2013 the Texas Legislature directed funding of a demonstration project for the rapid development of post-disaster replacement
housing using a temporary to permanent housing approach. This is a building and design approach in which a smaller housing unit
is first built and occupied as temporary housing by the homeowner while a larger, permanent house is constructed around the
temporary house.
The RAPIDO demonstration program was pilot tested at the direction of the Texas Legislature with the construction of 20 homes
in the Lower Rio Grande Valley for Hurricane Dolly survivors. The results of the demonstration program in the Texas Lower Rio
Grande Valley was highly successful. Known as RAPIDO, the model has gone onto win national awards and recognition, including
the Smithsonian Institution's National Design Award and the exhibition of RAPIDO homes in the Smithsonian Cooper-Hewitt
National Design Museum.
Key advantages of the program are that it allows the capture of the federal expenditure of funds for temporary housing in the
permanent housing. FEMA often expends between $70,000 and $100,000 to deploy a trailer as temporary housing. The cost of the
temporary housing unit in the RAPIDO housing model is closer to $20,000 and the cost of the finished completed permanent
structure is $65,000 more, bringing the total replacement house cost to approximately $85,000. By saving the cost of the FEMA
temporary housing, this program would permit significantly more households to be assisted with the available funds. More
information on RAPIDO can be found at: http://www.bcworkshop.org/rapido/
67
Over the past two legislative sessions the Texas Senate has nearly unanimously passed legislation authored by State Senator
Eddie Lucio, Jr to permit local jurisdictions to develop advanced plans for post- disaster rebuilding of owner-occupied houses for
lower income residents. Unfortunately, the legislation has failed to pass over three legislative sessions in the Texas House of
Representatives.
The legislation permits local jurisdictions to develop, in conjunction with the Texas A&M University hazard reduction and recovery
center, and appropriate local plan for the rapid rebuilding of housing following a natural disaster. The legislation seeks to reduce the
amount of time between the onset of a disaster and the start of reconstruction of homes by securing advanced preclearance of local
disaster recovery plans by the state agency responsible for long-term disaster recovery. Had the legislation passed there would
have been recovery plans in place that would have greatly accelerated the home rebuilding process for lower income households.
68
As the homes of low-income households are repaired or rebuilt after a disaster, homeowners are often confronted with higher tax
appraisals and thus higher tax bills, with the perverse effect that the homeowners are then "taxed out" of their homes.
The Texas Legislature should adopt a law allowing local governmental entities to adopt a circuit breaker tax program, which
would allow for a cap to be placed on the percentage of income that a homeowner contributes towards property taxes, helping
protect against the displacement of families and seniors from our communities. Local taxing entities also have the authority under
Chapter 312 of the Texas Tax Code to adopt a local property tax abatement policy for reinvestment zones that exempts all or part of
the increase in the value of a home for a period of up to ten years.
Utilizing their authority under Chapter 312, local governmental entities in the areas impacted by Harvey should adopt a tax
abatement program for apartment owners that agree to include a certain percentage of affordable housing for low-income renters in
their rebuilt properties.
69
After hurricanes Katrina, Dolly, Ike, and Rita, tens of thousands of homeowners faced long delays or denials of assistance
because of clouds on their title, which are very prevalent in low-income, minority communities. Several years after Ike, the General
Land Office funded a Texas Title Project housed at the University of Texas School of Law to clear land titles of homeowners who
applied for rebuilding assistance under the HOP program. This program was very successful, but it was funded by the state many
years after Ike hit Texas, extending the delays homeowners confronted to rebuild. A similar program should be funded immediately
to identify homeowner survivors with title issues and to start delivering title clearing assistance to them. The project could marshal
the resources of pro bono attorneys for "easier" clouded title fixes, while staff attorneys for the project will be needed to tackle the
more difficult clouded title issues, which can sometimes take up to two years to remedy. Without title clearing assistance, thousands
of homeowners will be unable to repair their homes, and many will have no choice but to abandon their homes, creating a multitude
of issues and costs for local governments from code enforcement costs to the loss of property tax revenue from those homes.
70
The mobility opportunities for homeowners in the HOP program (see Recommendation 5.b.) should be expanded to renters.
Survivors from Harvey who are renters should be provided with mobility counseling, apartment location services and financial
assistance with deposits and moving expenses to have the option to move to safer neighborhoods or better places for their families.
Recommendation 7.b. calls for a disaster and social neighborhood vulnerability index to be developed and publicized. The results of
Page 38
b. All tenants in damaged or destroyed subsidized housing must be provided the option of choosing
between a home in a subsidized apartment development or receiving a Housing Choice Voucher
to rent privately-owned housing; vouchers must be portable to allow survivors to move to other
cities and regions if they choose to move.71
c. A dedicated portion of CDBG-DR funds and Low Income Housing Tax Credits should be set
aside to reconstruct HUD-subsidized apartments in appropriate locations.72
d. Assess survivor incomes and target funding to address their rental housing needs.73
e. Rebuild (without a loss of units as mixed-income developments) HUD-subsidized and
affordable, privately-owned rental housing in quality, safe, diverse neighborhoods; relocate
all publicly-funded housing out of 100-year floodplains.74
f. Provide for the replacement of scattered-site, single-family rental housing in quality,
neighborhoods that are not vulnerable to future disasters.75
this index should be made available to renters and homeowners to use as they consider where to relocate to avoid future exposure
to flooding and other natural disasters and to identify quality neighborhoods.
71
HUD subsidized apartment developments in many parts of the disaster-impacted region were constructed many years ago.
Today most are located in hazardous or otherwise unsafe locations. The disaster recovery program must avoid simply rebuilding
these apartments back in their pre-storm locations but instead should: 1) offer the tenants of these development the opportunity to
choose to move into private housing with a Housing Choice Voucher; and 2) rebuild developments that are currently in hazardous or
otherwise unsafe locations in better places. For survivors who choose a voucher, they should have the option to use their voucher in
another city or region (i.e., the vouchers should be "portable").
When HUD-subsidized apartments are rebuilt, they should fully comply with HUD locational, design, marketing and environmental
guidelines. Apartment developments should be developed not as "projects" housing only families below the poverty level, but
instead house a mixed-income population and should be marketed using techniques and language that will reach people least likely
to know about and apply for the housing, given its location and local demographics, following long-standing HUD guidelines to
encourage an ethnically and racially diverse tenant population. The result of the redevelopment process should be to replace unit for
unit the same number of subsidized apartments renting to extremely low income tenants but should do so in a manner that affords
the residents access to higher quality neighborhoods and the ability to live in an economically and racially integrated environment.
72
In previous disasters HUD subsidized apartments were forced to compete with new, privately owned apartment developments
and with rehabilitation requests for private, unsubsidized apartments. The HUD housing stock has invaluable rental housing
subsidies attached to the developments. These subsidies permit the apartments to be affordable to extremely low-income
households that private apartments cannot serve without deep public subsidy. It is of paramount importance that existing HUD-
subsidized apartments not be lost because funds are not available to repair those units or to move and rebuild the apartments in
safer and better locations. At least four HUD subsidized developments in Houston are located in flood hazard areas and one
property is actually located within a floodway. HUD has issued a Title VI finding against the city finding that the city has unlawfully
segregated government-subsidized developments over time. This finding must be addressed. The need to do so also makes it
imperative that funds are set aside to address the segregation of this existing subsidized housing stock.
73
Low-income renters, most of whom live paycheck to paycheck, are particularly vulnerable when a disaster strikes. Prior to
Hurricane Harvey, Texas already faced a severe shortage of affordable rental housing for low-income households, with a shortage
of more than 400,000 affordable rental units in the impacted areas. And many of the apartments that were affordable were
substandard and concentrated in distressed neighborhoods. Hurricane Harvey, damaging thousands of affordable units, has
dramatically exacerbated the difficulties that low-income renters face in accessing safe housing in safe and quality neighborhoods.
Houston alone saw upwards of 100,000 apartment units damaged from the hurricane. Prior disasters have highlighted how access
to affordable, quality rental housing is critical to helping impacted low-income families bounce back from the storm and ensuring that
communities have the population and workforce they need to recover.
Simply creating rental units is not enough however. The rental housing must be affordable to survivors, many of whom have very
low incomes. "Trickle-down" does not work in rental markets in large metropolitan areas experiencing dynamic growth. The recovery
process must fund the development of rental housing at specific rent levels. This housing must be in areas with good schools,
grocery stores, access to jobs and transportation and generally where renters want and need to live, not simply in locations where
developers can access the lowest priced real estate.
74
Affordable rental housing in many of the impacted areas is highly concentrated in distressed neighborhoods and areas prone to
recurring flooding whenever there are heavy rains. In the Greenspoint neighborhood of Houston, for example, where one of every
three residents live below the poverty line, 72% of all multifamily housing is in the 100-year flood plain and some are located in the
floodway. Many of the 17 apartment complexes that were heavily damaged during the 2016 Tax Day flood were awaiting repair
when Harvey hit. The apartments in this area also flooded in 2001 and 2002. (see www.houstonchronicle.com/local/gray-
matters/article/Greenspoint-poverty-and-flooding-7303300.php).
Among the apartment communities that are the most vulnerable to recurring flooding are a large number of publicly-subsidized
apartments. Houston, for example, has at least eight privately-owned, publicly-subsidized apartment complexes that are located
within the 100-year floodplain (given the recent recurrence of flooding in these areas, they could be more accurately classified as 5-
year floodplains).
Instead of repeatedly spending precious disaster recovery resources on rebuilding properties in such vulnerable areas, these
properties should be relocated to areas that are not vulnerable to flooding and to locations where residents have access to important
neighborhood amenities and safe and stable communities.
Page 39
g. Secure a federal allocation of Housing Choice Vouchers to achieve within disaster areas per
capita parity of federally subsidized housing with other large US cities.76
h. Prohibit landlords receiving recovery assistance from discriminating against tenants with
housing vouchers or income derived by persons with a disability; expand landlord participation
in voucher programs in safe, diverse neighborhoods.77
Requested Action 41: Include the following initiatives the Draft Plan to ensure all neighborhoods are
free from environmental hazards, have equal quality public infrastructure and are safe and resilient.
a. Update FEMA flood maps and Flood Insurance Rate Maps to accurately assess where
floodplains are located and to reflect the reality of current flood risk.78
b. Assess the impacted areas and produce a disaster and social neighborhood vulnerability
index used to target public infrastructure and environmental programs and provide information
to survivors to use to choose where they want to live.79
75
At the time Hurricane Harvey struck Texas, there was already a severe shortage of housing affordable in the impacted areas.
The shortage of housing for Extremely Low Income (ELI) households (households earning less than 30 % of the area median family
income) was at least 164,000 units, while the shortage of affordable and available rental housing units for households with Very Low
Incomes (VLI) (31 to 51 % of median family income) was at least 148,000 units. In Texas Congressional District 14, for example,
which includes Freeport, parts of Beaumont and many smaller towns impacted by Harvey, there were only 32 affordable rental units
available for every 100 ELI household, and in the Houston-Sugar Land area there were only 18 units for every 100 ELI household
(for maps of other districts see http://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Texas.pdf). In short, there was a critical shortage of affordable rental
units available prior to Hurricane Harvey. The disaster has greatly increased this critical shortage. Housing units that meet minimum
building standards and that have rents affordable to households earning 30 % of median family income and below are largely those
that have a government subsidy.
It is not only multi-family rental housing that is needed. It appears at this early stage of the damage assessment that affordable
single-family rental housing has been very hard hit. Single family rentals can provide access to some higher quality areas and more
appropriate housing that some multifamily housing. Single family housing can also reinforce the neighborhood fabric of
neighborhoods where single family housing is the predominant housing type. The process for repairing and reconstructing single
family rental housing must be explicitly provided for in the disaster recovery process. Following Hurricane Ike and Dolly, the City of
Houston set aside funds to provide the reconstruction of affordable single-family rental housing in desirable, rapidly gentrifying near
Northside and Eastside neighborhoods. The city's failure to adequately focus on this initiative has resulted in those funds remaining
unspent today, nine years after Hurricane Ike. Lessons should be learned from this and applied to Hurricane Harvey recovery.
76
The Hurricane Harvey disaster-impacted region is home of a large and growing number of extremely low-income households
(i.e., households at or below 30% of median family income; the income amount depends on the county and is around $16,500 for a
family of four in the Jefferson County or Refugio County). Many of those households reside in substandard housing located within
flood hazard areas that are prone to recurrent flooding.
Perversely, the region has a dramatically lower per capita supply of government subsidized housing than most other regions of
the country. This is due to historical federal policies governing the allocation of government subsidized housing, the rapid recent
growth in the number of low-income households within the disaster-impacted region and the historical reticence of local
governmental entities within the region to apply for subsidized housing as it became available from HUD. This deficit of subsidized
housing exposes extremely low-income households to greater vulnerability to disasters. As part of a disaster recovery package,
state and local governments and HUD should cooperate to document the need of housing for extremely low-income households
within the region, and HUD should provide a special appropriation of Housing Choice Vouchers to raise access to HUD-subsidized
housing to a per capita level that is equivalent to the level of vouchers in older major cities in the United States.
77
See Recommendation 2.f. above and the discussion in the endnote of that recommendation regarding policies opening up
housing opportunities for renters with vouchers and other forms of housing assistance. Policy interventions to expand housing
options for renters with vouchers and other forms of housing assistance should include: (1) a state law prohibiting landlords from
discriminating against tenants with Disaster Recovery (DHAP or DVP) and Housing Choice Vouchers or a source of income derived
as a result of being a person with a disability; (2) the elimination of the state law (Tex. Local Government Code Section 250.007)
barring cities from enacting ordinances that protect tenants with vouchers or other forms of housing assistance from discrimination
(the existing state law exempts ordinances that protect veterans with vouchers); and (3) a policy requiring all apartment owners
receiving any rebuilding assistance to accept a certain percentage of tenants with housing vouchers and to bar the owners from
discriminating against tenants on the basis of having a voucher or other source of housing assistance.
78
The FEMA flood maps and Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) are woefully out of date and inaccurate for the impacted areas
and need to be updated. Communities in the Harvey impacted areas have experienced three "500-year" flood events in the past few
years, and many of the areas inside and outside of the 100-year floodplain are subject to frequent flooding. Eighty percent of
homeowners affected by Harvey did not have flood insurance. As a result of the inadequate maps, it is very difficult for average
consumers to make informed decisions about where to live and to determine their home's risk of flooding. Immediately, before any
rebuilding takes place, the cities, counties and state should work with FEMA to revise the flood hazard areas. The failed rollout of
the Biggert-Waters Act of 2012 has also meant that flood insurance premiums continue to be based on outdated and inaccurate
maps.
79
In addition to updating the FEMA flood maps (see the above recommendation), maps of the communities along the Texas coast
should be generated to include up-to-date information delineating wind, surge, and flood damage, hazardous facilities, and socio-
Page 40
c. Invest in local drainage infrastructure and other infrastructure needed to meet a base-level
standard of flood protection and safety for all residents; eliminate the racial and ethnic
disparities that exist in residents’ access to flood protection.80
d. Develop a comprehensive, voluntary neighborhood buyout program in areas of major
environmental risk near industrial facilities, refineries and rail and port facilities.81
e. Provide voluntary individual buyouts to permit survivors to relocate away from flood hazards,
environmental hazards, segregated areas and other unsafe conditions.82
f. Fully remediate EPA Superfund and other high priority environmental hazard sites near
residential and flood hazard areas.83
demographic data related to social vulnerability (income, race/ethnicity, gender, education, age, transportation dependence, etc.).
These maps should be made publicly available to both decision-makers and residents to guide the targeting of public infrastructure,
particularly storm water management infrastructure and environmental remediation efforts and so that residents can make informed
decisions about the risk of exposure to both natural and chemical hazards when determining where to rebuild.
80
When spending disaster recovery funds on infrastructure, it is important that governmental entities budget both for regional
drainage infrastructure and neighborhood-level drainage infrastructure. It is also critical that investments are made with a focus on
eliminating racial and ethnic disparities in the drainage infrastructure that exists in many neighborhoods across the areas impacted
by Hurricane Harvey. Infrastructure funds must be allocated in a manner that ensures that all neighborhoods meet minimum
standards for local drainage and can sustain without damage at least a 25-year flood event. While these improvements would not
protect all neighborhoods from another disaster on the scale of Hurricane Harvey, they would help mitigate damage from future
large storms, provide much relief from smaller recurring flooding events, and bring communities into compliance with Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Many of the low-income neighborhoods of color impacted by Hurricane Harvey face recurring flooding as a result of inadequate
drainage infrastructure. For example, according to a 2014 engineering study by the City of Houston: 1) 88 % of the un-engineered
open drainage ditches in the city are located in majority minority neighborhoods; and 2) 43% of the city's open drainage ditches
provide inadequate storm water protection from a two-year rain event-despite the fact that most of these neighborhoods have been
part of the city for more than half a century. (See https://texashousers.net/2017/08/31/houston- knew-neighborhoods-of-color-were-
inadequately-protected-from-even-modest-storm-events/). Other low- income communities across the areas impacted by Hurricane
Harvey face similar inequities in drainage infrastructure. The lack of even basic drainage protection in these communities of color
must be remediated to bring cities into compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and should be addressed through the
Hurricane Harvey disaster recovery funds.
81
There are several neighborhoods within the disaster impacted region with extreme exposure to environmental risks that must be
addressed. For example, the West Port Arthur neighborhood is a "fence line" community abutting the state's largest refinery and
hazardous waste incinerator. In Corpus Christi, the Hillcrest and Washington-Coals neighborhoods are located next to refineries,
chemical plants, sewage treatment facilities and the port and are the subject of a limited voluntary buyout program being carried out
in conjunction with the construction of the new harbor bridge project. Adjoining the large Exxon refinery in Beaumont and the port
facility are a number of low-income, African-American neighborhoods. The Houston Manchester neighborhood is surrounded by
chemical plants and refineries and has severe exposure to air emissions and is at risk simply by its close proximity to the plants.
To increase the health and safety of residents living in hazardous neighborhoods, the State of Texas and local jurisdictions should
develop neighborhood-wide voluntary buyout programs in neighborhoods exposed to major environmental risk, in consultation with
property owners and residents and with the surrounding refineries, ports and industrial developments. The structure of the voluntary
buyout program adopted for the Hillcrest neighborhood of Corpus Christi could serve as a model elsewhere. That program uses the
buyout standards and process of the federal Uniform Relocation Act to carry out the voluntary sale of homes. This program permits
homeowners to receive enough funds to obtain a home that is in good condition in a safe neighborhood based on present market
conditions as opposed to receiving simply the assessed (and depressed) value for their home in its environmentally blighted
neighborhood.
82
In instances where remediation or large-scale neighborhood buyouts cannot take place, disaster survivors residing near
environmental hazards or in areas that frequently flood should be prioritized for individual voluntary buyouts. A policy should be
established that rental housing will not be assisted with disaster recovery funds for reconstruction within 100-year flood hazard
areas under any circumstance. Homeowners residing within 100-year flood hazard areas should be informed of the risks and
provided the opportunity to rebuild with in the hazard area provided that the residential structure and parking areas are
reconstructed in a manner that elevates them above the revised 100-year floodplain.
83
It has been widely reported that at least 14 Environmental Protection Agency designated Superfund sites within the disaster-
affected regions were flooded or were damaged by Harvey and may have been compromised by the hurricane. The long-term
presence of Superfund sites within heavily populated areas presents an unacceptable health and safety risk which should be
addressed with disaster recovery funds. Many of the Superfund sites have been designated for decades, yet not fully remediated.
To clean up the sites, the state should work with the Environmental Protection Agency to secure necessary resources, along with
utilizing the funding made available in conjunction with the Hurricane Harvey recovery. Other environmental hazards include
exposure to dangerous levels to air pollutants in neighborhoods near refineries and chemical plants, such as the plastics plant in
Point Comfort that released about 1.3 million pounds of excess emissions including benzene after the storm, and a chemical plant in
Crosby, Texas that exploded after Hurricane Harvey, filling the air with dangerous smoke and triggering an evacuation of the area.
In addition to the Superfund sites, there are a number of lower level environmental dangers within residential neighborhoods on
the Gulf Coast. For example, in the Old Spanish Trail neighborhood of Houston, the abandoned CES chemical storage site abuts
schools, churches and single-family residences. Floodwaters from Hurricane Harvey left standing water on this site that is heavily
contaminated. The storm likely washed contaminants onto the adjoining properties. Cities, counties and the state should conduct an
Page 41
g. Build resilient, flood-safe homes that will survive future disasters.84
h. Support comprehensive and coordinated testing of water, soil and air quality in the impacted
areas and create a portal to publicly share test results.85
i. Establish an advisory network to oversee, coordinate and provide technical assistance during the
recovery, comprised of university and other subject matter experts on environmental and fair
housing law, engineering, urban planning, housing, disaster recovery, floodplain management
and disaster impacted citizens.86
j. Ensure the safe and proper testing, classification and disposal of cleanup waste.87
k. Rebuild damaged public schools to be models of excellence and innovation.88
Thank you for your consideration of these comments and recommendations. We look forward to reading your
reasoned responses to our requested actions. Please call on us if we can provide clarification or additional
information.
Sincerely,
Chrishelle Palay Christina Rosales John Henneberger

Houston co-director communications director co-director
inventory of hazardous sites that are proximate to residential development in flood-prone areas and should utilize disaster recovery
funds to clean up, remediate, purchase and appropriately repurpose the sites.
84
On a recurring basis in Texas, housing units that were rebuilt after a hurricane or storm have subsequently suffered damage in
another disaster and have had to be rebuilt again. This is an expensive and frustrating lesson of the need to build in a more resilient
manner. To improve the resiliency of homes in the hurricane impacted areas, the state and local governments should set a minimum
base level of elevation required for all reconstructed homes in the floodplain. Additional funds should be allocated to sufficiently
elevate homes that are repaired but not reconstructed. The state should also adopt the design and construction standards approved
by the Texas A&M University Hazard Reduction and Recovery Center to ensure that all homes along the coast that are rebuilt after
Hurricane Harvey can survive the winds of a category three hurricane (i.e., 129 m.p.h. wind speeds) and are resilient to flooding.
85
A number of organizations are currently involved in testing community-level environmental impacts from Hurricane Harvey, but
these efforts are not comprehensive and are largely uncoordinated (and may also be duplicative in some areas) because there is no
common portal available for sharing the testing data conducted in communities and for facilitating collaborative testing efforts.
Funding should be made available to support comprehensive and coordinated testing efforts, including funding for a publicly
accessible portal for the sharing of testing data, identifying gaps in testing and identifying environmentally hazardous areas in
Texas.
86
The regional advisory network should include an opportunity for national experts to provide input on topics necessary to an
expedited, equitable, just, environmentally-responsible and resilient recovery. Given the great deal of interest from across the nation
and world, many researchers will be interested in understanding the causes and consequences of Hurricane Harvey. An advisory
network would coordinate and harness the knowledge of these researchers and apply that knowledge to the recovery process of the
Texas Coast and the many different issues that have arisen from Hurricane Harvey.
87
The cleanup from Hurricane Harvey will represent one of the biggest waste-disposal projects in U.S. history. It is essential to the
health and safety of Texas residents that a plan is put in place immediately to ensure that the debris from the hurricane is properly
tested, classified and disposed of, in a manner that does not expose residents to environmental hazards. Funding should also be
provided to support programs to safely reduce and recycle demolition waste when it is safe to do so, as well as funding to support
the monitoring and enforcement of disposal violations. After hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, organizations in New Orleans and New
York stepped in to reduce demolition waste. Similar efforts should be supported in Texas.
88
Dozens of public schools across the Hurricane Harvey impact zone suffered major damage and many will have to be rebuilt. In
the rebuilding process, the state, school districts, and cities have the opportunity through community engagement with impacted
families and communities and incorporation of national best practices to rebuild the schools as models of excellence, integration and
innovation and to be the leaders in 21st Century public education.
Page 42

TxLIHIS Comments On Texas Action Plan For $57.8 Million CDBG-DR Hurricane Harvey Allocation

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Titolo originale

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

TxLIHIS Comments On Texas Action Plan For $57.8 Million CDBG-DR Hurricane Harvey Allocation

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

1800 West Sixth Street 512.477.

Hon. George P. Bush, Commissioner

Texas General Land Office

Ms. Hadassah Schloss

RE: Comment on Draft State of Texas Hurricane Harvey Action Plan

Our requested actions are indicated in this document in red type.

These comments are organized into five parts:

2. The Right to Stay.

3. The Right to Equal Treatment.

4. The Right to Have a Say.

COMPLIANCE WITH FAIR HOUSING CERTIFICATIONS

TOPIC 1: CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

A. CITIZEN PARTICIPATION PLAN IS INADEQUATE.

“Citizen participation and engagement is encouraged and required for approval of

The GLO is committed to ongoing citizen access to information and government

C. PUBLIC NOTIFICATION OF OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON CHANGES TO THE PLAN MUST BE

A. FEMA DATA USED IN DRAFT PLAN IS OUTDATED AND INACCURATE.

C. DEFICIENCIES OF DRAFT PLAN DEMONSTRATE NEED FOR GLO TO UNDERTAKE DISASTER

Requested Action 10:

E. INADEQUATE ANALYSIS AND DATA PROVIDED ON THE STATUS OF TEMPORARY HOUSING

Requested Action 12:

Requested Action 13:

E. Low to Moderate Income Analysis

Requested Action 14:

H. METHODOLOGY FAILS TO ACCOUNT FOR DIFFERENTIAL RENTAL HOUSING AFFORDABILITY

Requested Action 15:

I. DATA PROPOSED TO BE COLLECTED AND MADE PUBLIC ON PROGRAM PERFORMANCE IS

Requested Action 16: The GLO website should provide at a minimum:

TOPIC 3: FAIR HOUSING COMPLIANCE

A. FAIR HOUSING ACTIVITIES MUST BE SPECIFIED IN THE DRAFT PLAN.

Requested Action 17:

Requested Action 18:

C. DRAFT PLAN FAILS TO RECOGNIZE, ADDRESS KNOWN CIVIL RIGHTS INFRASTRUCTURE

Requested Action 19:

TOPIC 4: GEOGRAPHIC NEEDS ANALYSIS AND ASSIGNMENT OF PROGRAM FUNDS

Requested Action 20:

Requested Action 21:

Requested Action 22:

TOPIC 6: PRIORITIZATION OF FUNDS FOR PROGRAMS AND SURVIVOR POPULATIONS

A. THE “REBUILD TEXAS” ASSESSMENT IS INADEQUATE TO ASSESS INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS.

TOPIC 7: DISASTER RECOVERY PROGRAM DESIGN, RULES AND MONITORING

A. LACK OF A CLEAR PROGRAM EXPLAINATION OF THE SHORT-TERM HOUSING PROGRAMS

Requested Action 25: The Draft Plan should:

7. Public Housing Assistance (PHA) Data

Requested Action 26:

C. DIFFERENTIAL ASSISTANCE LEVELS AND HOUSING PROGRAM PROVISIONS BY SUBRECIPIENTS

D. SECTION 3 PLAN MUST BE AVAILABLE FOR PUBLIC COMMENT.

Requested Action 28:

E. ANTI-DISPLACEMENT PLAN NOT INCLUDED IN DRAFT PLAN.

Requested Action 29:

F. CERTIFICATION OF SUBRECIPIENT CAPACITY TO ADMINISTER IS NOT CREDIBLE.

TOPIC 8: RESILIENCE AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES

A. PROPOSED ELEVATION STANDARDS ARE INADEQUATE TO PREVENT REPEAT STRUCTURE

A. PLAN FAILS TO ANALYZE NEEDS AND DENIES ASSISTANCE TO THE HOMELESS.

Requested Action 32:

B. FAILS TO ASSESS NEEDS OF SPECIAL NEEDS POPULATIONS, INCLUDING

Requested Action 33:

Requested Action 34:

PART 4: SEVEN PROPOSED ACTION PLAN OBJECTIVES TO ACHIEVE A FULL RECOVERY

Chrishelle Palay Christina Rosales John Henneberger

Potrebbero piacerti anche