OSG Memorandum On War On Drugs

Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
MANILA
EN BANC
AILEEN ALMORA, et al.,

Petitioners,
-versus- G.R. NO. 234359
DIRECTOR GENERAL RONALD

DELA ROSA, et al.,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------x
SR. MA. JUANITA R. DAÑO, et

al.,
Petitioners,
- versus - G.R. No. 234484
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL

POLICE (PNP), et al.,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------x
MEMORANDUM
THE RESPONDENTS, through the Office of the Solicitor

General, in compliance with this Honorable Court’s Resolution
dated December 5, 2017, respectfully submit this
Memorandum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. The consolidated Petitions for Writ Amparo,1 and

Writs of Amparo, Injunction and Prohibition, Temporary
1
Petition for the Grant of the Privilege of the Writ of Amparo for Individual Persons and for all the Residents
of 28 Barangays in San Andres Bukid, Manila dated 18 October 2017 (hereinafter the “Daño Petition”).
MEMORANDUM
Almora v. DG dela Rosa and
Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------X
Protection Order and Temporary Restraining Order2 seek to

prohibit the implementation of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Command Memorandum Circular (CMC) No. 2016-163
and Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)
Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 2017-112.4
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ANTECEDENTS
2. On July 1, 2016, the PNP issued CMC No. 16-2016,

otherwise known Anti-Illegal Drugs Campaign Plan-Project:
"Double Barrel". The Project is two-pronged, namely: Project
Tokhang (the “Lower Barrel”), aimed at cleansing drug-
affected barangays, and Project High Value Target (the “Upper
Barrel”), an anti-illegal drug operation against syndicates and
drug personalities. Project Tokhang consists of five stages:
(1) collection and validation of information, (2) coordination,
(3) house-to-house visitation, (4) processing and
documentation, and (5) monitoring and evaluation.
For G.R. No. 234359 (Almora Petition)
3. On July 28, 2016, a drug buy-bust operation was

conducted against Ryan Dave Almora in Baguio City. During
the buy-bust operation, Almora drew his firearm and fired
against the police officers, which prompted the latter to fire
back, resulting in the death of Almora.5
4. In a separate incident on September 13, 2016, Rex

Bustamante Aparri was killed in Tondo, Manila during a routine
Tokhang operation after he drew his gun and fired shots at
approaching police officers.6
5. On June 17, 2017, petitioner Jefferson Acena

Soriano was shot three times by an unknown motorcycle-
riding man in Brgy. Holy Spirit, Commonwealth, Quezon City.7
2
Petition for Writs of Amparo, Injunction, and Prohibition, Temporary Protection Order, and Temporary
Restraining Order dated 10 October 2017 (hereinafter the “Almora Petition”).
3
Annex “A” of Almora Petition.
4
Annex “K” of Almora Petition.
5
Id., pp. 18-19.
6
Id., pp. 19-20.
7
Id., pp. 20-21.
Page 2 of 70
MEMORANDUM
Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------X
For G.R. No. 234484 (Daño Petition)
6. Eighteen of the 39 petitioners are members of the

San Andres Bukid community and concerned citizens.
According to the petitioners, the respondents are responsible
for the following strategic and organized acts:
a. killing Conrado Beroña;8 Jefferson Bunuan, Mark

Anthony Bunuan and Jomar Manaois;9 Ryan Eder,10
Willy de Leon,11 Alvin Mendoza;12 Jerson Colaban,
Jossing Colaban, and Joseph Baculi;13 Gilbert
Buguelme;14 Emiliano Blanco,15 Jerry Estreller, Jr.
and Randy Concordia;16 Delfin Sicson;17 Ramil
Gallo;18 Eduardo M. Gores;19 Joshua Merced, Leo
Geluz and Bimbo Merced;20 Ryan Dimacali;21
Reynaldo Javier, Jr.;22 Dennis Padpad;23 Ramon
Rodriguez;24 Edwin Eduardo;25 John Paul Michael
Enrera;26 Rolly and Ronnie Veros;27 Crisente
Baquial28 Ernesto Martinez Cruz and Elmer Cayubit
Lagunzad;29 Manuel Roy Mañalac, John Paul
Martinez, Rollyn Frias and a certain “Patricia”;30
b. falsifying non-bailable charges against Valerie
8
Daño Petition, p.18.
9
Id., p. 19.
10
Id., p. 20.
11
Id., p. 21.
12
Id., pp. 21-22.
13
Id., pp. 22-23.
14
Id., p. 23.
15
Id., pp. 23-24.
16
Id., pp. 25-27.
17
Id., p. 27.
18
Id., pp. 27-28.
19
Id., p. 28.
20
Id., pp. 28-31.
21
Id., p. 31.
22
Id., pp. 31-32.
23
Id., p. 32.
24
Id., p. 33.
25
Id., p. 34.
26
Id., p. 34.
27
Id., p. 34.
28
Id., p. 35.
29
Id., p. 35.
30
Id., p. 35.
Page 3 of 70
MEMORANDUM
Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------X
Aguilan, Bella Eder, and Mariel Supnet;31
c. illegally arresting Marie Tamayo and Hilario

Miravive;32
d. committing extortion on Francisco Blanco and Raul

Zapanta,33 Reynaldo Javier, Jr.’s pregnant partner
and mother;34 and
e. shooting Jeffrey Degala.35
7. Due to the aforementioned circumstances, the

petitioners felt threatened by the armed men in civilian
clothes who routinely conduct foot patrols at night in their
communities.
8. Meanwhile, on August 29, 2017, the DILG issued

MC No. 2017-112 entitled Revised Guidelines on the
Implementation of Mamamayang Ayaw sa Anomalya,
Mamayang Ayaw sa Iligal Na Droga (MASA MASID), which
requires all cities, municipalities, and barangays to establish
a system of reporting in various modes to gather and assess
information regarding corruption, illegal drugs, criminality,
violent extremism and other threats to peace and security.
9. On October 10, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa

Duterte issued a memorandum directing all government
agencies concerned to leave to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), as sole agency, the conduct of
all campaigns and operations against all those involved in or
connected with illegal drugs.
10. On October 11 and 20, 2017, the Office of the

Solicitor General (OSG) received copies of the Petitions dated
October 10 and 18, 2017.
31
Id., pp. 20-21.
32
Id., p. 24.
33
Id at 24-25.
34
Id. at 31-32.
35
Id. at 34.
Page 4 of 70
MEMORANDUM
Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------X
11. On November 7, 2017, the OSG received this

Honorable Court’s Resolution dated November 7, 2017,
consolidating the petitions and requiring the respondents to
comment on the consolidated petitions within a non-
extendible period of 10 days from notice; and setting the
cases for oral argument on November 21, 2017.
12. On November 16, 2017, the OSG filed a Very

Urgent Manifestation and Motion for the issuance of an
Advisory.
13. On November 17, 2017, the OSG filed its comment

on the consolidated petitions.
14. On November 17, 2017 the OSG received this

Honorable Court’s Advisory of even date.
15. On November 21 and 28 and December 5, 2017,

the oral argument on the consolidated petitions were
conducted.
16. During the December 5, 2017 oral argument, this

Honorable Court required the parties to file their respective
memoranda within 30 days. Moreover, this Honorable Court
directed the OSG to submit all relevant documents pertaining
to the 3,800 deaths and the 35 death incidents in the Daño
petition, among others, within the same period. However, the
period was extended to 60 days, or until February 3, 2018,
upon motion of the Solicitor General.
17. On December 20, 2018, the OSG filed a Motion for

Reconsideration dated December 18, 2018, asking this
Honorable Court to set aside its December 5, 2017 Order
which directed the OSG to submit all information regarding
the 3,800 deaths allegedly related to anti-drug operations of
the respondents. The OSG likewise moved for the
reconsideration of the directive to submit the police reports in
the 35 death incidents in Daño petition. This Honorable
Court has yet to resolve said motion.
Page 5 of 70
MEMORANDUM
Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------X
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I
WHETHER THE REQUISITES FOR FILING A
CLASS SUIT HAVE BEEN SATISFIED BY THE
PETITIONERS IN DAÑO.
II
WHETHER THE PETITIONERS IN DAÑO HAVE
LOCUS STANDI TO FILE THE PETITION.
III
WHETHER THE PETITIONS INVOLVE
MISJOINDERS OF CAUSES OF ACTION.
IV
WHETHER THE ACTS AUTHORIZED OR
CONDUCTED UNDER CMC NO. 16-2016 AND
MC NO. 2017-112, VIOLATE ANY
PROVISIONS OF THE LAW AND THE
CONSTITUTION.
V
WHETHER “VOID FOR VAGUENESS” RULE
APPLIES AS AGAINST CMC NO. 16-2016.
VI
WHETHER THE ACTS AUTHORIZED OR
CONDUCTED UNDER CMC NO. 16-2016 AND
MC NO. 2017-112 VIOLATE THE
PHILIPPINES’ INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
(ICCPR) AND THE MINNESOTA PROTOCOL.
VII
WHETHER PETITIONERS ESTABLISHED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THE RESPONDENTS’
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THEIR RIGHT TO
LIFE, LIBERTY AND SECURITY.
Page 6 of 70
MEMORANDUM
Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------X
VIII
WHETHER THE PRAYERS IN THESE PETITIONS
TRIVIALIZE THE REMEDIES PROVIDED
UNDER THE RULE OF AMPARO.
IX
WHETHER THE APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER, PROHIBITION AND
INTERIM RELIEFS BE DENIED.
ARGUMENT
I. The requisites for filing a

class suit have not been
satisfied by the petitioners
in Daño.
x------------------------------x
18. In Daño, the petitioners aver that they are

“collectively filing this petition as a class suit for and in behalf
of all the residents of twenty-six barangays of the San Andres
Bukid community.”36
19. Their resort to a class suit cannot prosper under

Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
20. Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 12. Class suit. When the subject

matter of the controversy is one of common or
general interest to many persons so numerous
that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a
number of them which the court finds to be
sufficiently numerous and representative as to
fully protect the interests of all concerned may
sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in
36
Daño Petition, p.14.
Page 7 of 70
MEMORANDUM
Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------X
interest shall have the right to intervene to

protect his individual interest.
21. A class suit is only proper where it can clearly be

shown that there is only one right or cause of action pertaining
or belonging in common to many persons, not separately or
severally to distinct individuals. The object of the suit is to
obtain relief for or against numerous persons as a group or as
an integral entity, and not as separate, distinct individuals
whose rights or liabilities are separate from and independent
of those affecting others.37
22. The 39 petitioners in Daño are composed of 18

persons who as they allege are concerned citizens and
members of the Religious of the Good Shepherd (RGS); 19
persons who are either relatives or live-in-partners of alleged
Tokhang victims; one wife of an unnamed person alleged to
be a Tokhang target; and one person who is a drug
surrenderee and self-proclaimed Tokhang target. The 18
RGS petitioners are not real parties in interest, nor can they
claim to be rightful representatives of the residents they
allegedly represent. The petitioners, as a whole, cannot even
be said to have the same interest, nor have they suffered the
same injury borne by the same exact circumstances, if it all.
23. Additionally, an element of a class suit is the

adequacy of representation, which is wanting in this case. In
determining the question of fair and adequate representation
of members of a class, the court must consider (a) whether
the interest of the named party is coextensive with the
interest of the other members of the class, (b) the proportion
of those made parties as it so bears to the total membership
of the class, and (c) any other factor bearing on the ability of
the named party to speak for the rest of the class.38
24. The petitioners do not qualify as a class of persons

who can validly file an Amparo petition collectively for and in
behalf of all residents of the 26 barangays of the San Andres
37
Re: Request of the Plaintiffs, Heirs of the Passengers of the Doña Paz to Set Aside the Order Dated
January 4, 1988 of Judge B.D. Chingcuangco, A.M. 88-1-646-0, March 3, 1988.
38
Sps. Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819. April 8, 2014, citing Justice Vitug in MVRS Publications v.
Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines Inc., G.R. No. 135306. January 28, 2003.
Page 8 of 70
MEMORANDUM
Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------X
Bukid Community, without proof that they adequately

represent the interests of the rest of the residents therein.
25. It is undisputed that the petitioners have not shown

that they have obtained any authority or support from all or
a majority of the residents in said barangays, whose interests
they claim to represent.
26. This is bolstered by the fact that all 26 barangay

captains of San Andres Bukid – the elected representatives of
the residents of these barangays – repudiated in a sworn
statement dated November 7, 2017 the petitioners’ allegation
regarding the peace and order situation in their community,
and pointedly condemned the RGS Foundation for acting on
their behalf without permission.
27. In addition, numerous residents of San Andres

Bukid have also expressed support and gratitude to the PNP
for their work in curbing the proliferation of drugs in the
community. This show of support clearly contradicts the
petitioners’ position, demonstrating an absence of a unified
interest that can be represented in a class suit.
28. The filing of a class suit is incompatible with amparo

petition as pointed out by Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe:
JUSTICE PERLAS-BERNABE:
xxx Now, let’s go to another topic, the
class suit.
ATTY. BUTUYAN:
Yes, Your Honor.
Okay. Now, according to jurisprudence
the necessary elements for the maintenance of
a class suit are that the subject matter of the
controversy be one of common or general
interest to many persons….
ATTY. BUTUYAN:
Yes, Your Honor.
Page 9 of 70
MEMORANDUM
Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------X
….and that such person is so numerous as
to make it impracticable to bring them all to
Court. Now, in the case of Dano petition, what
is the alleged subject matter of controversy that
is one of common or general interest?
ATTY. BUTUYAN:
Your Honor, the right to life, the right to
liberty, and the right to security, Your Honor.
Every time there is a killing it affects the whole
community. Your Honor, the situation in San
Andres Bukid, Your Honor, it is a slum area, the
houses are on top of each other. In fact, in one
alley there would be hundreds of people, Your
Honor, and if there is a killing, Your Honor, there
is fear in the entire community, Your Honor, it
affects everyone. It affects the right to security
of all the people in the community, Your Honor.
But in the case of Mathay vs. Consolidated
Bank and Trust Company, the phrase “subject
matter of the action” was defined as “the
physical facts, the things, real or personal, the
money, lands, chattels, and the like, in relation
to which the suit is prosecuted,” it does not
cover the delict or the wrong committed against
the petitioners, so how do you explain this?
xxx
Now, is a class suit appropriate in this
case when the Dano petition apparently
presents separate and distinct versions of facts
relative to several petitioners while it’s seeking
the relief of the Writ of Amparo?39
II. The petitioners in Daño

have no locus standi to file
the petition.
x------------------------------x
39
TSN – November 21, 2017, pp. 45-47.
Page 10 of 70
MEMORANDUM
Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------X
29. "Legal standing" or locus standi calls for more than

just a generalized grievance.40. It has been defined as
a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the governmental act that is being challenged.41
30. The gist of the question on standing is whether a

party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.42
31. The element of injury is not something that just

anybody with some grievance or pain may assert. It has to
be direct and substantial to make it worth the court’s
time, as well as the effort of inquiry into the
constitutionality of the acts of another department of
government. If the asserted injury is more imagined than
real, or is merely superficial and insubstantial, then the courts
may end up being importuned to decide a matter that does
not really justify such an excursion into constitutional
adjudication.43
32. In David vs. Arroyo44 this Honorable Court explained

the deep-seated rules on locus standi. Thus:
Locus standi is defined as a right of

appearance in a court of justice on a given
question. In private suits, standing is governed
by the real-parties-in interest rule as contained
in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended. It provides that every
action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in
interest. Accordingly, the real-party-in interest
is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Succinctly
40
Jumamil vs. Cafe, G.R. No. 144570, September 21, 2005.
41
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000.
42
Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 166052, August 29, 2007.
43
Galicto vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012.
44
G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006.
Page 11 of 70
MEMORANDUM
Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------X
put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his

own right to the relief sought.45
33. In Ortigas & Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals,46 this

Honorable Court has defined interest as follows:
"Interest" within the meaning of the rule

means material interest, an interest in issue and
to be affected by the decree, as distinguished
from mere interest in the question involved, or
a mere incidental interest. By real interest is
meant a present substantial interest, as
distinguished from a mere expectancy or a
future, contingent, subordinate, or
consequential interest.
34. To qualify a person to be a real party-in-interest in

whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear
to be the present real owner of the right sought to be
enforced.47 The interest of the party must be personal and not
one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of
some third and unrelated party.48 Accordingly, there can be
no legal duel in court when the one who demands
satisfaction from the alleged offender is not even the
offended party.49
35. Furthermore, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo

categorically enumerates those who may file the petition, viz:
Sec. 2. Who May File. – The petition may be filed by

the aggrieved party or by any qualified person or entity in
the following order:
(a) Any member of the immediate

family, namely: the spouse,
children and parents of the
aggrieved party;
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral

relative of the aggrieved party within
the fourth civil degree of consanguinity
45
Emphasis supplied.
46
G.R. No. 126102, December 4, 2000.
47
Rosales vs. ERC, G.R. No. 201852, April 5, 2016.
48
Goco et. al vs. Hon. Court Of Appeals et. al, G.R. No. 157449, April 6, 2010.
49
Stefan Tito Mioza v. Hon. Cesar Tomas Lopez, etc., et al., G.R. No. 170914, April 13, 2011.
Page 12 of 70
MEMORANDUM
Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------X
or affinity, in default of those

mentioned in the preceding
paragraph; or
(c) Any concerned citizen, organization,

association or institution, if there is no
known member of the immediate
family or relative of the aggrieved
party.
The filing of a petition by the aggrieved party

suspends the right of all other authorized parties to
file similar petitions. Likewise, the filing of the
petition by an authorized party on behalf of the
aggrieved party suspends the right of all others,
observing the order established herein.50
36. The foregoing rule clearly provides an exclusive and

successive order as to who is qualified to file a petition for the
writ, for and in behalf of an aggrieved party. The reason for
this is to prevent the indiscriminate and groundless filing of
petitions for amparo, which may even prejudice the right to
life, liberty, or security of an aggrieved party.51 Any concerned
individual or organization cannot just claim any right to file a
petition for amparo in behalf of allegedly aggrieved persons,
where there are existing relatives of the aggrieved party.
37. It is evident in the reading of the petition that the

petitioners utterly disregarded said order.
38. In the case of Daño, 18 of the 39 petitioners anchor

their standing on being: (1) members of the San Andres Bukid
community, and (2) concerned citizens in behalf of all other
alleged victims whose relatives are not able or are unwilling
to join in the Petition. The remaining petitioners, on the other
hand, are composed of one alleged aggrieved party, and
family members of alleged aggrieved parties.52
39. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo is clear in that any

ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved
party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity
can only file in default of the spouse, children and parents of
50
Emphasis supplied.
51
G.R. Nos. 184461-62, May 31, 2011.
52
A more detailed discussion can be read in the Consolidated Comment, pp. 16-18
Page 13 of 70
MEMORANDUM
Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------X
the aggrieved party. In the present case, the collateral

relatives of some of the alleged aggrieved parties have
also joined the petition despite the fact that an
ascendant or spouse has already filed as a petitioner in
their behalf, in blatant violation of the Rule.
40. The Rule further provides that a concerned citizen,

organization, association or institution, can only file suit if
there is no known member of the immediate family or relative
of the aggrieved party. The existence of a known member of
the immediate family or relative excludes a concerned citizen,
organization or institution.
41. There is no proof that there are no known immediate

family members or relatives of the alleged victims. The
allegation that the immediate families or relatives of the
alleged victims of the killings are not able or are unwilling to
file a petition for fear of retaliation by the police does not
necessarily authorize the petitioners to seek relief on their
behaalf under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
42. It is thus beyond cavil that petitioners Sr. Ma. Juanita

Daño, Victoria Factor, Elizabeth Oplida, Corazon Estela,
Avelina Felicidario, Edna Jullar, Rosalinda Aguilar, Josephine
Litang, Abella Matin-Ao, Eleona Martinez, Marilyn Pobocan,
Ma. Lourdes Freires, Maria Elsa Ibarra, Rosie Mationg,
Angeline Munoz, Remedios Espina, Marietta Rodriguez, and
Lucila Camulo, who filed as members of the community or as
concerned citizens, are bereft of any interest to file the
petition.
III. The petitions involve

misjoinder of causes of
action.
x-----------------------------x
1. Petitions for prohibition and

amparo cannot be joined.
Joinder of causes of action
cannot involve special civil
actions.
Page 14 of 70
MEMORANDUM
Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------X
43. The joinder of the Petitions for prohibition and

amparo is specifically enjoined by Section 5, Rule 2 of the
Revised Rules of Courts. There is misjoinder of causes of
action when the requisites set forth in the aforesaid rule are
not met. Section 5 provides:
Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. — A party

may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have
against an opposing party, subject to the following
conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall

comply with the rules on joinder of parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil

actions or actions governed by special
rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the

same parties but pertain to different venues or
jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the
Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes
of action falls within the jurisdiction of said
court and the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are

principally for recovery of money, the
aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of
jurisdiction.53
44. Here, there is a misjoinder of causes of action. The

action for prohibition cannot be joined with the action for the
issuance of the writ of amparo. Considering that the cause of
action in a petition for prohibition is lack or excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the respondent,54 while
that for a writ of amparo is the threat to a petitioner’s life,
liberty or security.55
45. Both Prohibition and Amparo are covered by distinct

and particular sets of rules. Prohibition is governed by Rule
65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure while on the other hand,
53
Emphasis supplied.
54
Section 2, Rule 65, Rules of Court.
55
Section 1, The Rule on Amparo.
Page 15 of 70
MEMORANDUM
Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------X
amparo is governed by a separate rule, the Rule on Amparo.

These two proceedings involved disparate issues.56 Thus, it is
imperative that the individual merits of each issue must be
separately assessed and determined for neither action is
dependent on the other.57
2. The amparo petitions

should have been separately
filed.
46. The aim of the rule on joinder of causes of action is

to avoid multiplicity of suits where the similar parties and
subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action
a complete determination of all matters in controversy and
litigation between the parties involving one subject matter,
and to expedite the disposition of litigation at minimum cost.
47. The individual cited in the petitions were involved

different incidents. The incidents involving Ryan Dave Almora,
Rex Aparri and Jefferson Soriano, as discussed in Almora, are
different from one another. The same thing goes with the
cases of Conrado Beroña, Jefferson Bunuan and the thirty-
three other alleged aggrieved parties in Daño. The
circumstances of each incident define the merit of each claim,
which should be separately threshed out and determined in
individual actions.
48. Moreover, separate petitions for amparo would

ensure observance of the due process right of the parties
which, in turn, would allow a more judicious determination of
each petition’s merits.
IV. The acts authorized or

conducted under CMC No.
16-2016 and MC No. 2017-
112 did not violate any
provisions of the law and
the Constitution.
--------------------------------
56
Republic vs. Hernandez, G.R. No. 117209, February 9, 1996.
57
Id.
Page 16 of 70
MEMORANDUM
Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------X
(A) The policy of the State to

protect human rights as
embodied in Section 11, Article
II of the Constitution was
observed in the issuance of the
assailed circulars.
49. Section 11, Article II of the Constitution provides:
The State values the dignity of every

human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights.
50. The term “human rights” refer to the basic rights

and freedoms that all human beings have. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), of which the Philippines
is a signatory, enumerates these rights and freedoms. In
relation to this case, some of the applicable rights are as
follows:
1. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and

security of person.
2. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.
3. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest,
detention or exile.
4. Everyone charged with a penal offense has the
right to be presumed innocent until proved
guilty.
5. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, or to attacks upon one’s honor
and reputation.58
51. These rights under the UDHR are also embodied in

Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Rightly so, as human
rights law obliges governments to perform, or refrain from
performing, certain acts that aim to promote and protect
these sacrosanct rights by preventing government agents
from abusing their authority.
58
See Universal Declaration on Human Rights.
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52. Surely, the authors of CMC 16-2016 and MC 2017-

112 intended to protect these human rights when they issued
the operational guidelines on the conduct of the government’s
anti-illegal campaign.
53. Section 8 (e) of the CMC provides that all
operations shall conform to the provisions of Republic Act (RA)
No. 9165 and the Rules of Court, and strictly observe the
Rights of the Accused enshrined in the Bill of Rights, other
allied laws, rules and regulations, as well as the
internationally accepted principles of international laws, public
policy, and with due observance of human rights.
54. Moreover, Section 8(f) mandates all concerned

personnel to strictly observe the rights of persons arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation pursuant to R.A. No.
7438 and other existing rules and regulations of the PNP in
the promotion of human rights.
55. The collection and validation stage in which all local

police offices/units/stations and anti-illegal drugs units
conduct validation to acquire specific information on
suspected drug users and pushers in every affected
barangays do not in any manner violate the rights of any drug
personalities. Such activity can be considered as a legally
allowable government activity that taps into the citizenry’s
sense of social responsibility to protect their respective
neighborhoods. Ultimately, the ordinary citizens are given the
opportunity to take part in the government’s anti-drug
program. In this regard, the CMC also requires that the
identity and criminal activities of each target must be properly
documented and verified with all possible sources. This is to
ensure accuracy in detecting drug personalities.
(B) The basic constitutional

right to life, liberty and
property was not violated by
the issuance and
implementation of the
challenged circulars.
56. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution reads:
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Section 1. No person shall be deprived of

life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
57. Project Tokhang is a pragmatic, grassroots

approach to the government’s anti-illegal drug campaign.This
concept involves the conduct of house-to- house visitations to
persuade suspected illegal drug personalities to stop their
illegal drug activities. By simply making house-to-house visits
and pleading to the persons who may be suspected of being
involved in illegal drugs to discontinue their illegal activities,
the PNP certainly could not have violated the aforecited
constitutional provision since there was no deprivation of
one’s right to life, liberty or property committed at that stage
yet.
58. What is proscribed is the taking of life and

deprivation of liberty without due process of law. The
unfortunate incidents that led to the deaths of suspected drug
personalities adverted to by the petitioners as deprivation of
life were the result of legitimate police operations which our
laws and jurisprudence recognized as a legitimate form of
entrapment of persons suspected of being involved in drug
dealings.59 Surely, petitioners cannot expect the police
officers to allow lawless elements to place their lives in danger
without their resorting to means of protecting themselves.
The law recognizes the need of using force in order to defend
his own person and these can be found under Article 11 of the
Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Article 11. The following do not incur any

criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or

rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself.
59
People vs. Carrera, G.R. No. 215731, September 2, 2015.
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....
(5) That a person who acts in the fulfillment

of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right
or office does not incur any criminal liability.
59. For the defense of fulfillment of a duty to prosper,

the following requisites must concur: (1) the accused must
have acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office; and (2) the injury caused or the
offense committed should have been the necessary
consequence of such lawful exercise.60 Both these elements
were present when the respondents undertook the operations
which resulted to the deaths of the persons referred to in the
Daño and Almora petitions.
(C) No unreasonable searches

and seizures were committed
in the conduct of the Tokhang
operations.
60. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be

secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
61. As a general rule, a search, in order to be

considered valid, must be accompanied by a search warrant
validly issued by the courts. This is because the State cannot
in a cavalier fashion intrude into the persons of its citizens as
well as into their houses, papers and effects. The
60
People vs. Dagani y Reyes, G.R. No. 153875 (2006).
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constitutional provision sheathes the private individual with

an impenetrable armor against unreasonable searches and
seizures. It protects the privacy and sanctity of the person
himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint,
and prevents him from being irreversibly "cut off from that
domestic security which renders the lives of the most unhappy
in some measure agreeable.”61
62. There is no search to speak of because no entry is

made unless consented to by the said individual. This is so
because, the CMC provides that the purpose of the house-to-
house visitation is not to enter and search the house but only
to urge the drug personalities to change their ways. In any
case, jurisprudence provides for a valid warrantless searches
in cases where there is a valid waiver made voluntarily and
intelligently.
63. The mere knocking on the door by the police

officers does not constitute an intrusion on a person’s right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. It is completely
within the discretion of the person visited to talk to the police
or even invite them inside the house, or completely ignore
them. In any case, none of the police officers’ acts constitute
a curtailment of the person’s constitutional rights.
64. In Florida v. Jardines,62 where the right against

unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment was put in issue, the United States Supreme
Court categorically ruled that a police officer may knock on
the house of any person without violating the person’s right
against unreasonable searches and seizures, thus:
A license may be implied from the habits

of the country,” notwithstanding the “strict rule
of the English common law as to entry upon a
close.” McKee v. Gratz, 260 U. S. 127, 136
(1922) (Holmes, J.). We have accordingly
recognized that “the knocker on the front door is
treated as an invitation or license to attempt an
entry, justifying ingress to the home by
solicitors, hawkers and peddlers of all kinds.”
61
People v. Bolasa, G.R. 125754, 22 December 1999.
62
596 U.S.__, 26 March 2013, emphasis supplied.
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Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622, 626 (1951).

This implicit license typically permits the visitor
to approach the home by the front path, knock
promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then
(absent invitation to linger longer) leave.
Complying with the terms of that traditional
invitation does not require fine-grained legal
knowledge; it is generally managed without
incident by the Nation’s Girl Scouts and trick-or-
treaters. Thus, a police officer not armed
with a warrant may approach a home and
knock, precisely because that is “no more
than any private citizen might do.”
65. The US Supreme Court, similarly held in Kentucky

v. King63:
When law enforcement officers who

are not armed with a warrant knock on a
door, they do no more than any private
citizen might do. And whether the person
who knocks on the door and requests the
opportunity to speak is a police officer or a
private citizen, the occupant has no
obligation to open the door or to speak. Cf.
Florida v. Royer , 460 U. S. 491, 497–498
(1983). (“[H]e may decline to listen to the
questions at all and may go on his way”). When
the police knock on a door but the occupants
choose not to respond or to speak, “the
investigation will have reached a conspicuously
low point,” and the occupants “will have the kind
of warning that even the most elaborate
security system cannot provide.” Chambers,
395 F. 3d, at 577 (Sutton, J., dissenting). And
even if an occupant chooses to open the door
and speak with the officers, the occupant need
not allow the officers to enter the premises and
may refuse to answer any questions at any
time. Occupants who choose not to stand on
their constitutional rights but instead elect to
attempt to destroy evidence have only
themselves to blame for the warrantless
exigent-circumstances search that may ensue.
63
563 U.S. 452, 16 May 2011, emphasis supplied.
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66. As pointed out by the Solicitor General during the

oral arguments, there is no coercion or intrusion during
Tokhang operations:
Justice Bernabe:
Okay, So, counsel, what constitutes denial
or refusal of the visit?
Solicitor General Calida:

Well, if the door is closed after knocking,
Your Honor, then, the police and the other
barangay officials will move on to the next
house.
Justice Bernabe:
If the suspect appears and refuses entry
into the house, is that a denial or refusal of the
visit?

Well, if he refuses to come out, or talk or
etc. then, the police will not insist, Your Honor.
They will just move on to the next house, Your
Honor.
Justice Bernabe:
Now, if asked to voluntarily surrender, and
he refuses, is that a denial or refusal of the visit?

Well, that is his choice, Your Honor. So,
the police cannot coerce him to admit to
anything or to do something against his will.
Justice Bernabe:
Now, if the person visited accommodated
the visit, but denied involvement in the drug
trade, do the police officers still proceed with the
case against the suspect?

Let me make this clear, Your Honor. The
police just knocks on the door and they are not
allowed to enter the house. They just talk with
the person who will open the door and if the
person does not like to talk to them, they, move
on, Your Honor.
Justice Bernabe:
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But if the person visited accommodated

the visit, but denied involvement in the drug
trade, what procedure do the police officers
follow?

Well, in the CMC No. 16-2016, it does not
provide for any punishment, Your Honor, for
those who deny or refuse the house to house
visitations. What the CMC provides is that this
person shall be referred to the anti-illegal drug
units for case build up.
Justice Bernabe:
So, even if the person visited denied
involvement in the drug trade, his name will still
be referred?

Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Bernabe:
For immediate case build up,....

Because it must be remembered, Your
Honor, there was a first step. The first step is
that there are some intelligence reports that this
person residing in this place, in this house, has
something to do with this drug use, drug abuse
or drug trafficking, Your Honor.
Justice Bernabe:
Now, CMC-16-2016, provides the house to
house visitation is the highlight of project
Tokhang.

Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Bernabe:
Now, it states that the purpose is to
persuade expected illegal drug personalities to
stop their illegal trade activities, is that correct?

Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Bernabe:
Now, what does “to persuade” mean? And
how is this persuasion actually implemented?
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Well, as I've said, the police and the
barangay officials in these house to house visits
will offer another way out for these users. If
they wish to change their lives, the police will
help them in the rehabilitation, Your Honor, drug
rehabilitation.64
67. Verily, the alleged intrusion on the petitioners’

constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures is more imagined than real.
(D) No violation of the rights of

persons under investigation or
persons arrested under
Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution and R.A. No.
743865 by the implementation
of CMC 16-2016 and/or MC
2017-112.
68. Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:
Section 12. (1) Any person under

investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right
to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiate
the free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or
other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission
obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and
civil sanctions for violations of this Section as
TSN dated December 5, 2017, pp. 76-79.

64
Act Defining Certain Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation as well as the
65
Duties of the Arresting, Detaining and Investigation Officers, and providing penalties for violations thereof.
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well as compensation to the rehabilitation of

victims of torture or similar practices, and their
families.
69. The "investigation" above pertains to "custodial

investigation." Custodial investigation commences when a
person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect
in the commission of a crime under investigation, and the
police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect's
participation therein, which tend to elicit an admission.66
70. Custodial investigation involves any questioning

initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way. It is only after the investigation
ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and
begins to focus on a particular suspect, that the suspect is
taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of
interrogations that lend itself to eliciting incriminating
statements, that the rule begins to operate.
71. CMC No. 16-2016 and MC No. 2017-112 do not

violate the provisions of Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution and R.A. No. 7438 as these do not contemplate
a situation involving custodial investigation. The purpose of
Project Tokhang under CMC 16-2016 is to persuade the
surrender of suspected drug personalities; it does not coerce
them to surrender nor effect their arrest. In other words,
Project Tokhang merely encourages the voluntary surrender
of drug suspects to enthuse them to change their ways.
Further, even though the drug surrenderees are not yet under
custodial investigation, CMC 16-2016 provides that said
persons shall be assisted by counsel and witnessed by
parents/guardians and/or barangay officials as expressly
required during the processing and documentation stage.
Thus, the presence of counsel ensures that the surrender was
voluntary and guided by competent counsel. On the other
hand, MC 2017-112 “aims to promote synergy between the
state and the private sector to contribute in ridding the
country of corruption, illegal drugs, criminality, and violent
extremism and other threats to peace and security.” 67
66
People vs. Cabanada, G.R. No. 221424, July 19, 2017.
67
MC No. 2017-112, par. 3.
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Specifically, this memorandum aims, inter alia, to “(s)et up a

mechanism of reporting in the community level mobilizing
community volunteers.”68 Notably, MC 2017-112 merely
involves the collection of information respecting drug
personalities. Such activity can be considered as a legally
allowable government activity that taps into the citizenry’s
sense of social responsibility to protect their respective
neighborhoods. Thereby, the ordinary citizens are given the
opportunity to take part in the government’s anti-drug
program. By the collection of drug-related information
through “drop boxes” which is essentially no different from
the collection of the same information by law enforcement
agencies from informants. In any case, the information
gathered would not be the basis for criminal prosecution.
Such information would still be subject to verification by
adequate competent evidence before any criminal action may
be filed.
72. R.A. No. 7438 provides for the rights of persons

arrested, detained, or under custodial investigation. Thus -
(a) Any person arrested detained or under

custodial investigation shall at all times be
assisted by counsel.
(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone

acting under his order or his place, who arrests,
detains or investigates any person for the
commission of an offense shall inform the latter,
in a language known to and understood by him,
of his rights to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel, preferably
of his own choice, who shall at all times be
allowed to confer privately with the person
arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation. If such person cannot afford the
services of his own counsel, he must be provided
with a competent and independent counsel by
the investigating officer.
(c) The custodial investigation report shall be

reduced to writing by the investigating officer,
provided that before such report is signed, or
thumbmarked if the person arrested or detained
does not know how to read and write, it shall be
read and adequately explained to him by his
68
Id., at par. 3 (3.4).
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counsel or by the assisting counsel provided by

the investigating officer in the language or
dialect known to such arrested or detained
person, otherwise, such investigation report
shall be null and void and of no effect
whatsoever.
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a

person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation shall be in writing and signed by
such person in the presence of his counsel or in
the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in
the presence of any of the parents, elder
brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal
mayor, the municipal judge, district school
supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as
chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial
confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in
any proceeding.
(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained

under the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, or under custodial investigation,
shall be in writing and signed by such person in
the presence of his counsel; otherwise the
waiver shall be null and void and of no effect.
(f) Any person arrested or detained or under

custodial investigation shall be allowed visits by
or conferences with any member of his
immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest
or religious minister chosen by him or by any
member of his immediate family or by his
counsel, or by any national non-governmental
organization duly accredited by the Commission
on Human Rights of by any international non-
governmental organization duly accredited by
the Office of the President. The person's
"immediate family" shall include his or her
spouse, fiancé or fiancée, parent or child, brother
or sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or
aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or ward.
As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall

include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to
a person who is investigated in connection with
an offense he is suspected to have committed,
without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting"
officer for any violation of law.
73. Thus, a cursory review of CMC 16-2016 and MC
2017-112 would show that these do not involve custodial
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investigation, there being no element of force or compulsion

in the CMC nor is any effort made to invite anyone or take
him into custody
(1) The subject is not taken

into custody.
74. The entire Tokhang process is undertaken outside

the subject’s residence; he or she is neither “invited” nor
brought to the police station for interrogation.
75. The presence of police officers outside the subject’s

residence does not place the subject in an unfamiliar or
intimidating environment that is inherent in custodial
investigations. It must be noted that, during Tokhang, his
freedom of action remains unrestrained. He may even refuse
to cooperate.
76. The situation during a Tokhang operation is

therefore completely different from a custodial investigation,
as described in Mesina vs. People,69 viz:
After a person is arrested and his

custodial investigation begins a confrontation
arises which at best may be termed unequal.
The detainee is brought to an army camp or
police headquarters and there questioned and
cross-examined not only by one but as many
investigators as may be necessary to break
down his morale. He finds himself in a strange
and unfamiliar surrounding, and every person
he meets he considers hostile to him. The
investigators are well-trained and seasoned in
their work. They employ all the methods and
means that experience and study has taught
them to extract the truth, or what may pass for
it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are
unlettered and are not aware of their
constitutional rights. And even if they were, the
intimidating and coercive presence of the
officers of the law in such an atmosphere
overwhelms them into silence . . . .
69
G.R. No. 162489, June 17, 2015, Citing People vs. Marra, G.R. No. 108494, September 20, 1994, 236
SCRA 565.
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77. There is no coercive or intimidating presence of

police officers during Tokhang that would allow replication of
the atmosphere of a custodial investigation. Absent any such
coercion or intimidation, the police officers’ interaction with
the subject cannot be considered as constructive custodial
investigation, the validity of which may be viewed in light of
the strict safeguards under Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution. Obviously, not all personal intercourse between
policemen and citizens involves "seizures" of persons. Only
when the officer, by means of physical force or show of
authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen
may we conclude that a "seizure" has occurred.70
(2) There is no interrogation

during Tokhang.
78. The drug personality is not subjected to any

interrogation by the police officers during Tokhang. Rather,
he is merely advised to discontinue any involvement in illegal
drugs, which he can even deny. No coercion whatsoever is
employed against him.
79. Custodial investigation refers to the "questioning

initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way."71 By this definition, the conduct
of an interrogation is the essential element of custodial
investigation, absent which such process cannot be deemed
held.
(E) The issuance and

implementation of the assailed
circulars do not violate the
rights of the accused.
80. Section 14, Article III of the Constitution provides

for the protection of a person accused of a crime, viz:
70
Florida vs. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 1991 citing Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 392 U.S. 19, n. 16, 1968.
71
People vs. Canton, G.R. No. 148825, December 27, 2002.
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1. No person shall be held to answer for a

criminal offense without due process of law.
2. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused

shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him,
to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the
accused: Provided, that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
81. The applicability of this constitutional provision

presupposes an ongoing criminal prosecution. House-to-
house visitation as embodied in CMC No. 16-2016 is merely
an information gathering operation by the police; thus, said
provision cannot be invoked by the petitioners.
(F) Section 17, Article III of

the Constitution on the right of
the accused against self-
incrimination was not violated
by the respondents in
implementing CMC No. 16-
2016.
82. Section 17, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 17. No person shall be compelled

to be a witness against himself.
83. What is prohibited is the use of physical or moral

compulsion to extort communication from the witness or to
otherwise elicit evidence which would not exist were it not for
the actions compelled from the witness. This right can be
invoked in criminal cases.
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84. In relation to the CMC, a voluntary drug

surrenderee is not being compelled to be a witness against
himself. In fact, the CMC requires such surrenderee to be
assisted by counsel, and his processing and documentation
stage to be witnessed by his/her parents/guardians and/or
barangay officials. These requirements are safeguards
against any form of coercion, especially by the police. They
are likewise analogous to the requisites for a valid
extrajudicial confession, that is, said confession must be (a)
voluntary, (b) made with the assistance of a competent and
independent counsel, (c) express, and (d) in writing.72
(G) The case law in People vs.

Doria73 and other similar cases
have laid down tests to
determine whether a buy-bust
operation was properly
conducted.
85. Doria dealt with the validity of buy-bust operations,

which is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers as
an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the
commission of an offense. Entrapment is judicially sanctioned
when undertaken with due regard to constitutional and legal
safeguards. This Honorable Court ruled thus:
We therefore stress that the "objective"

test in buy-bust operations demands that the
details of the purported transaction must be
clearly and adequately shown. This must start
from the initial contact between the poseur-
buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the
promise or payment of the consideration until
the consummation of the sale by the delivery of
the illegal drug subject of the sale. The manner
by which the initial contact was made, whether
or not through an informant, the offer to
purchase the drug, the payment of the "buy-
bust" money, and the delivery of the illegal
drug, whether to the informant alone or the
police officer, must be the subject of strict
scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding
72
People vs. Romulo Tuniaco, G.R No. 185710 (2010).
73
G.R. No. 125299, January 22, 1999.
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citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an

offense. Criminals must be caught but not at all
cost. At the same time, however, examining the
conduct of the police should not disable courts
into ignoring the accused's predisposition to
commit the crime. If there is overwhelming
evidence of habitual delinquency, recidivism or
plain criminal proclivity, then this must also be
considered. Courts should look at all factors to
determine the predisposition of an accused to
commit an offense in so far as they are relevant
to determine the validity of the defense of
inducement.
86. Both CMC No. 16-2016 and MC No. 2017-112 are

not contemplated in Doria since the issuances are merely
operational guidelines which have nothing to do with the
conduct of buy-bust operations. In fact, if Oplan Tokhang is
successful in encouraging drug dependents to be rehabilitated
then certainly the buy-bust police operations will certainly
outlive its usefulness.
(H) Neither may Tokhang be

equated to a “stop and frisk”
scenario as laid down in
Malacat vs. CA74 and People
vs. Chua75 and other cases
adopting Terry vs. Ohio76.
87. Malacat vs. CA and People vs. Chua applied the

doctrine of “stop and frisk” to justify warrantless searches,
viz:
We now proceed to the justification for

and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a
"limited protective search of outer clothing for
weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus: We
merely hold today that where a police officer
observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience
that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed
and presently dangerous, where in the course of
74
G.R. No. 123595, December 12, 1997.
75
G.R. Nos. 136066-7, February 4, 2003.
76
392 US 1, June 10, 1968.
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investigating this behavior he identifies himself

as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries,
and where nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear
for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for
the protection of himself and others in the area
to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to
assault him. Such a search is a reasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment . . . Other
notable points of Terry are that while probable
cause is not required to conduct a "stop and
frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion
or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A
genuine reason must exist, in light of the police
officer's experience and surrounding conditions,
to warrant the belief that the person detained
has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a
"stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: the
general interest of effective crime prevention
and detection, which underlies the recognition
that a police officer may, under appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without
probable cause; and (2) the more pressing
interest of safety and self-preservation which
permit the police officer to take steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he deals is
not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the
police officer.77
88. Both CMC No. 16-2016 and MC No. 2017-112 do not

violate the above doctrine as these are merely operational
guidelines that have nothing to do with stop and frisk
searches. As already mentioned earlier, persons subject to
Tokhang are not frisked or searched whether may the police
officers involved in the Tokhang enter their houses without
their consent.
(I) Article 125 of the Revised

Penal Code on inquest/delivery
of detained persons to the
77
Malacat vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123595 (1997).
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proper judicial authorities was

not violated.
89. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes a

public officer or employee who detains any person for some
legal ground but fails to deliver such person to the proper
judicial authorities within the period prescribed by the RPC,
viz:
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of

detained persons to the proper judicial
authorities. — The penalties provided in the
next preceding article shall be imposed upon the
public officer or employee who shall detain any
person for some legal ground and shall fail to
deliver such person to the proper judicial
authorities within the period of; twelve (12)
hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light
penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18)
hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by
correctional penalties, or their equivalent and
thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes, or offenses
punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or
their equivalent.
In every case, the person detained shall

be informed of the cause of his detention and
shall be allowed upon his request, to
communicate and confer at any time with his
attorney or counsel.
90. Both CMC No. 16-2016 and MC No. 2017-112 do not

concern any delay in the delivery of detained persons to the
proper judicial authorities. They do not call for the police
officers engaged in the Tokhang activity to effect warrantless
arrests if the subject person is not committing a crime.
(J) The respondents did not

deviate from the directives laid
down in Chapter 3, Rule 15.4
of the Revised PNP Operational
Procedures (PNP-OP).
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91. Chapter 3, Rule 15.4 of the Revised PNP-OP

provides for the necessity of inquest proceeding when the
suspect dies during an armed confrontation, viz:
15.4 Inquest Proceeding Necessary When

the Suspect Dies - In cases of armed
confrontation wherein the suspect dies, the
Team Leader of the operating unit shall submit
the incident for inquest before the duty Inquest
Prosecutor prior to the removal of the body from
the scene, except in areas where there are no
Inquest Prosecutors. In which case, the
territorial police unit can proceed with the
investigation.
92. Again, both CMC 16-2016 and MC 2017-112 do not

violate the above provision as these are merely operational
guidelines that do not cover cases where the PNP has to
submit the incident for inquest.
(K) The respondents cannot

be compelled to comply with
the Department of Justice
Circular No. on the duty of the
inquest prosecutor to take the
initiative of making a
procedural investigation
whenever a dead body is found
and there might be foul play.
93. DOJ Circular No. 61, series of 1993 provides for the
procedures on inquest proceedings. Both CMC 16-2016 and
MC 2017-112 do not violate the DOJ Circular because they do
not involve the inquest procedures.
V. The “void for vagueness”

rule does not apply to PNP
CMC No. 16-2016.
---------------------------------
94. The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a

statute may be considered vague, hence facially invalid, if
"men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
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meaning and differ as to its application.78" A statute or act

may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such
instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.79
95. The “void for vagueness” rule finds no application

in the present case.
1. The “void for vagueness”

rule applies only to free speech
cases.
96. The vagueness doctrine is an analytical tool

developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech
cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment
cases. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague
statute and also to one which is overbroad because of possible
"'chilling effect' on protected speech that comes from statutes
violating free speech. A person who does not know whether
his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague
law may simply restrain himself from speaking in order to
avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law
thus chills him into silence."80
97. Since the instant cases do not involve any

curtailment of free speech, the “void for vagueness” is not
applicable.
2. Even by analogy, the “void

for vagueness” rule is
nonetheless inapplicable CMC
78
Romualdez vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 167011, December 11, 2008.
79
Lagman vs. Medialdea, G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771, & 231774, July 4, 2017.
80
Lagman vs. Medialdea, supra.
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No. 16-2016.
98. The “void for vagueness” rule is inapplicable for other

reasons even it can cover non-free speech cases.
2.a The supposed vagueness

in CMC No. 16-2016 does not
pertain to any regulated or
prohibited act.
99. The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a

statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in
terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process of
law."81
100. In the instant case, the supposed vagueness

pertains solely to the meaning of the terms “neutralize” and
“negate” as contained in CMC No. 16-2016. Certainly,
protracted discussions on the meaning of these terms which
have been contained in a various CMCs since 2008 is much
ado about nothing specially if one considers that these terms
do not pertain to any act that is sought to be avoided by the
subjects of the Project Tokhang. Rather, these terms relate
to the procedural recourses of the implementing police
officers and, as such, any vagueness therein cannot be proper
ground for invalidation of the subject circular. As this
Honorable Court held in Samahan ng mga Progresibong
Kabataan vs. Quezon City82, to wit:
Essentially, petitioners only bewail the

lack of enforcement parameters to guide the
local authorities in the proper apprehension of
suspected curfew offenders. They do not assert
any confusion as to what conduct the subject
ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point
to the ordinances' lack of enforcement
guidelines. The mechanisms related to the
implementation of the Curfew Ordinances are,
81
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001.
82
G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017.
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however, matters of policy that are best left for

the political branches of government to resolve.
101. Significantly, CMC No. 16-2016 does not prohibit

any act. It essentially is a manual governing the PNP’s anti-
drug operations. The conduct sought to be regulated or
managed are those of the implementing PNP officers and not
those of the subjects of the PNP’s anti-drug efforts.
2.b There is no vagueness in

CMC No. 16-2016.
102. In any case, there is no vagueness in CMC No. 16-

2016. The terms “negate” and “neutralize” may be construed
in light of the circular’s other provisions, which certainly do
not authorize the killing of the subjects but merely prevent
them legally from continuing with their illicit drug activities.
103. Since the meaning of these terms may be clarified

through the tenor of the pertinent provisions of CMC No. 16-
2016, there is no vagueness to speak of. To warrant
nullification of the circular, the act must be utterly vague on
its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving
clause or by construction.83
104. Thus, the two immediately foregoing circumstances

further bar application, even by analogy, of the “void-for-
vagueness” rule in this case.
VI. The acts authorized or

conducted under the authority
of CMC No. 16-2016 and MC No.
2017-112 do not violate the
Philippines’ international legal
obligations under the
International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and
the Minnesota Protocol.
-------------------------------------
83
Lagman vs. Medialdea, supra, citing People vs. Nazario, 247-A SCRA 276, (1988).
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105. Petitioners Daño, et al., in support of their petition

for writ of Amparo, claimed that the conduct of the
respondents in the drug war in the San Andres Bukid
community violates ICCPR, particularly the Right to Life.84
106. The petitioners’ argument is misplaced.
107. The International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights (ICCPR) is a key human rights treaty, providing a range
of protections for civil and political rights, including freedom
from torture, ill-treatment, and arbitrary detention. As a
State party to the ICCPR, the Philippines has faithfully
complied with its obligations under the treaty by ensuring that
all its legislative, judicial, and administrative measures,
including the two questioned circulars, protect the rights
enshrined in the ICCPR.
108. CMC No. 16-2016 states that “[t]he actual

house to house visitations of suspected drug personalities
shall be the highlight of PROJECT TOKHANG.” In line with
this, the Circular explicitly provides that “[t]he conduct of
house to house visitation must be done in a manner that shall
not violate the rights of the subject.” To carry out this
mandate, the Circular outlines the procedural and substantive
safeguards that must be observed by the PNP, notably the
conduct of visitations based only on properly validated
information regarding suspected drug users and pushers,
and a suspected drug personality’s right to refuse
visitation.
109. At any rate, should these personalities be able to

establish that they are not involved in these illegal activities,
the PNP have likewise set up procedures or guidelines85 in
removing, after proper investigation, such persons from the
drug watchlist, viz:
5. GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES:
84
Daño Petition, p. 50, par. 213.
85
PNP Intelligence Directive Number 02-2017 dated December 5, 2017, otherwise known as The Guidelines
and Procedures on Inclusion and Delisting of Drug Personalities in the Watch List, Attached as Annex “1”
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INCLUSION IN THE WATCH LIST:
The watch list pertaining to drug personalities are

generated from the following, namely:
a. Barangay Anti-Drug Abuse Council (BADAC). As

per DILG Memorandum Circular No. 2015-03 with
subject: Revitalization of Barangay Anti-Drug Abuse
Council (BADAC) and their Role in Drug Clearing
Operations dated June 16, 2015, part of the roles and
responsibilities of BADAC Committee on Operations is
to prepare and maintain a confidential list of
suspected users, pushers, financiers and/or
protectors of illegal drug trade found in the LGU’s area
of jurisdiction;
b. Validated Reports from various sources of

information, namely: sworn statements of victims,
witnesses, and arrested suspects; custodial debriefing
reports (CDRs); intelligence reports, information
reports (IRs), and agent’s reports; signed letter
complaints; and other official documents; and
c. Surrenderers that voluntarily surfaced to authorities

with admission of involvement in illegal drug
activities.
The following procedures are to be followed for the

inclusion of suspected personalities in the drugs watch list:
a. BADAC List:
a.1. Chiefs of Police/Station Commanders shall advise
their respective BADACs to convene a monthly
session purposely for preparing drugs watchlist;
a.2. Generated watch list corresponding Resolutions
shall be consolidated by the Chiefs of
Police/Station Commanders and to be forwarded
to Provincial/City/District Directors; An Oversight
Committee shall be created to review the
submitted BADAC Resolutions for subsequent
concurrence of the Regional Directors; and
a.3. Regional Directors through Chiefs, Regional
Intelligence Divisions shall consolidate BADAC
Lists for submission to the Directorate for
Intelligence.
b. Validated Reports. Units/Offices receiving

information pertaining to illegal drugs shall initiate
series of validation not limited to the following
procedures:
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b.1. Background investigation;

b.2. Confirmatory and consultation with counterparts
and other law enforcement agencies; and
b.3. Chiefs, Regional Intelligence Divisions shall
consolidate, prepare and submit to the
Directorate for Intelligence the following:
b.3.1. List of validated reports from Station

Intelligence Branches (SIBs);
b.3.2. List of validated reports from
Provincial/City Intelligence Branches
(PIBs/CIBs) and/or District Intelligence
Divisions (DIDs); and
b.3.3. List of validated reports from Regional
Intelligence Divisions.
c. Surrenderers.
c.1. Chiefs of Police and/or Station Commanders shall
initiate for the surrender of any drug personality
in his jurisdiction;
c.2. Surrenderers will be made to accomplish the
Biographical Profile Forms (BPF); and
c.3. List of surrendered which forms part of the watch
list, will be consolidated by SIBs for subsequent
submission through channels.
DELETION IN THE WATCH LIST;
The following procedures are to be followed for the

delisting of suspected personalities in the drugs watch list:
a. BADAC
a.1. Chiefs of Police/Station Commanders shall
advise their respective BADACs to convene to a
monthly session purposely for reviewing and
delisting previously listed personalities in the
drugs watch list;
a.2. Delisted personalities with corresponding
Resolutions shall be consolidated by the Chiefs of
Police/Station Commanders to be forwarded to
Provincial/City/District Directors; An Oversight
Committee shall be created to review the
submitted BADAC Resolutions for subsequent
concurrence of the Regional Directors; and
a.3. Regional Directors through Chief, Regional
Intelligence Divisions shall consolidate BADAC
delisted personalities for submission to the
Directorate for Intelligence.
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b. Validated Reports and Surrenderers.

b.1. SIBs, PIBs/CIBs/DIDs, RIDs, shall regularly
review and revalidate drug personalities that
were previously included in the watch list and
determine if they are qualified for delisting; as
necessary, procedures like background
investigation, confirmatory and consultation with
counterparts and other law enforcement
agencies are encouraged; and
b.2. Chiefs, Regional Intelligence Divisions shall
consolidate, prepare and submit to the
Directorate for Intelligence list of Delisted
personalities.
The following are the parameters to be considered in the

deletion of drug personalities in the watch list:
a. If upon validation process, the drug personality is no

longer monitored to be involved in illegal drug
activities for 6 months to 1 year. Validation report
should be supported by documents that will justify the
same (i.e. Background Investigation Report, and
confirmatory and consultation with counterparts and
other law enforcement agencies);
b. Those drug personalities who died as a result of the

following:
b.1. Accident or sickness;

b.2. Natural death;
b.3. Police Operation; and
b.4. Homicide, in all forms and including suicide
c. Those drug personalities who have undergone

complete rehabilitation program; and
d. If the drug personality is no longer monitored in his

last known address or cannot be located within the
jurisdiction of the barangay or municipality concerned
for the period of 6 months to 1 year, the former will
be delisted in the watch list and will be transferred to
the list of suspense file for continuous monitoring and
future reference.
110. Also, it bears stressing that the aggrieved parties in

police operations are not without a remedy For the PNP has a
comprehensive internal disciplinary mechanism, as laid down
in PNP Memorandum Circular No. 2016-062 dated October 3,
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2016,86 which provides clear and simplified disciplinary

guidelines and procedures to be observed by the PNP and IAS.
Its framework consists of four stages, namely:
1) Intervention Stage is the start of the disciplinary

mechanisms where all newly appointed PNP personnel
shall be given programs in order to inculcate the sense
of discipline in each individual. This includes the
Prevention Phase which is an introduction of pro-
active measures to prevent any commission of
offenses or engagement in any illegal activities by and
among PNP personnel as well as the Reformation
Phase wherein personnel charged with disciplinary
and non-disciplinary actions shall undergo various
activities depending upon the resolution or penalty
imposed by disciplinary/appointing authority.87
2) Investigation Stage includes the initial evaluation of

the complaint as well as the immediate recording in
the logbook, determination of jurisdiction, and referral
for pre-charge investigation. The investigator shall
refer the complaint to the proper office in the PNP
which has jurisdiction of the offense charged.88
3) Prosecution and Adjudication Stage. A pre-charge

investigation and a formal investigation will be
conducted during this stage. The pre-charge
investigation includes of docketing of complaint,
submission of counter-affidavit of respondent,
determination of probable cause, approval of the Pre-
Charge Investigation Report and formal charge. On
the other hand, the formal investigation consists of
docketing the formal charge, summons, submission of
answer, pre-hearing conference, submission of
position paper and one-time clarificatory hearing, if
necessary. Within 30 days from receipt of report of
investigation, the disciplinary authority will review and
approve the decision.89
86
Attached as Annex “2”
87
PNP MC 2016-062, pp. 9-11, par. 8.a.1., 8.a.1.a. and 8.a.1.b
88
PNP MC 2016-062, pp. 14-15, par. 8.a.2. and 8.a.2.k.
89
PNP MC 2016-062, pp. 19-20, par. 8.a.3.q., 8.a.3.r., 8.a.3.t
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4) Case Monitoring and Clearance Stage requires

that all complaints or reports against PNP personnel
be submitted for initial evaluation, referred to proper
investigation Office/Unit/Section and immediately
uploaded to the Case Monitoring and Clearance
Section. All criminal and administrative complaints
recorded and uploaded will be regularly monitored.90
111. An administrative complaint may also be initiated

by filing a written sworn statement before the IAS,
accompanied by affidavits of witnesses, if any, and other
evidence in support thereof.91 Furthermore, Section 39, Title
V of R.A. No. 8551, otherwise known as the "Philippine
National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998”
authorizes the Internal Affairs Service (IAS) of the PNP to
conduct, motu proprio, automatic investigation of the
following cases:92
a) incidents where a police personnel discharges a

firearm;
b) incidents where death, serious physical injury, or any
violation of human rights occurred in the conduct of a
police operation;
c) incidents where evidence was compromised,
tampered with, obliterated, or lost while in the custody
of police personnel;
d) incidents where a suspect in the custody of the police
was seriously injured; and
e) incidents where the established rules of engagement
have been violated.
112. With respect to MC No. 2017-112, its declared

purpose is “to promote synergy between the State and the
private sector to contribute in ridding the country of
corruption, illegal drugs, criminality, and violent extremism
and other threats to peace and security.” One of the projects
introduced by the Circular is the MASA MASID, a community
based mechanism of reporting anomalous activities, such as
90
PNP MC 2016-062, p. 22, par. 8.a.4.a and 8.a.4.c.
91
MC No. 2016-002 dated March 7, 2016, otherwise known as the Revised Rules of Procedure before the
Administrative Disciplinary Authorities and the Internal Affairs Service of the Philippine National Police,
hereto attached as Annex “3”. See also the flow chart of non-motu proprio investigation by the IAS, attached
as Annex “4”.
92
A flow chart of motu proprio investigation by the IAS is attached as Annex “5”.
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illegal drug transactions, through hotlines, barangay drop

boxes, emails, or text messages. Contrary to the scenario
painted in the Almora petition, MASA MASID does not involve
pointing furtive fingers on anyone who may be rightly or
wrongly accused of a crime. MC No. 2017-112 expressly
provides for a vetting process, requiring a Technical
Working Group to validate submitted reports and refer
them to concerned government agencies, if needed.
113. Integral to the protection of the right to life likewise

enshrined in the ICCPR is the proper investigation of
suspicious deaths. In this regard, the Minnesota Protocol sets
a common standard of performance in investigating
potentially unlawful deaths, which cover State-sponsored
killings or those committed with the State’s acquiescence.
114. The deaths mentioned in the present petitions while

unfortunate cannot be classified as potentially unlawful under
the Minnesota Protocol. There were no findings that the
killings were State-sponsored killings and that they were
committed with the State’s acquiescence. In particular, 27 out
of the 35 deaths in Daño, and the two deaths in Almora, were
the result of legitimate police operations. The remaining eight
incidents in Daño involve four homicides currently under
investigation and four others that have not been reported.
The assailant in the last incident in Almora, involving Jefferson
Soriano, remains unidentified. Nevertheless, the PNP is
investigating these deaths, demonstrating its good faith
commitment to comply the Minnesota Protocol.
VII. The petitioners failed

to establish by substantial
evidence that the
respondents violated their
right to life, liberty or
security; hence, they are
not entitled to the issuance
of a writ of amparo.
--------------------------------
115. The petitioners are not entitled to the issuance of a
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writ of amparo, as they failed to establish by substantial

evidence that the respondents violated their right to life,
liberty, or security.
116. The remedy of the writ of amparo is an equitable

and extraordinary remedy to safeguard the right of the people
to life, liberty, and security as enshrined in the 1987
Constitution. The Rule on Amparo was issued by this
Honorable as an exercise of its power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights. It aims to address concerns such as extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances, among others.93
117. Section 5 of the Rule on Amparo enumerates what

must be contained in a petition filed thereunder, viz:
Sec. 5. Contents of Petition. - The

petition shall be signed and verified and
shall allege the following:
…
b) The name and personal

circumstances of the respondent
responsible for the threat, act or
omission, or, if the name is unknown or
uncertain, the respondent may be
described by an assumed appellation;
c) The right to life, liberty and

security of the aggrieved party violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission of the respondent, and
how such threat or violation is committed
with the attendant circumstances
detailed in supporting affidavits.
118. Thus, for the petition to prosper, the petitioners

must satisfy the following requisites: (a) the life, liberty, and
security of the aggrieved party, or in this case, the petitioners,
are violated; (b) the acts complained of must be unlawful;
and (c) the manner in which the violation or threat of violation
of life, liberty, and security was committed must be detailed
93
De Lima v. Gatdula, G.R. No. 204528, February 19, 2013; Citations omitted.
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in supporting affidavits. Section 5 (c) of the Rule also requires

that the petitioners allege the cause of action in as complete
a manner as possible and submit affidavits to facilitate the
resolution of the petition, consistent with the summary nature
of the proceeding.94
119. The petitioners failed to satisfy the requirements

for the issuance of the writ.
120. First, the petitioners in G.R. No. 234484,

particularly Sr. Daño and the seventeen lay mission partners
of RGS, are not the aggrieved parties within the
contemplation of the law who are entitled to the benefit and
protection of the writ. As pointed out earlier, they do not have
the locus standi to institute the present petitions, as they do
not stand to be benefitted or injured by the grant or denial of
the petitions.
121. Neither are they qualified to file the petition under

Section 2 of the Rule. Section 2 provides:
Sec. 2. Who may File. - The petition may be

filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified
person or entity in the following order:
(a) Any member of the

immediate family, namely: the spouse,
children and parents of the aggrieved
party;
(b) Any ascendant, descendant

or collateral relative of the aggrieved
party within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity, in default of
those mentioned in the preceding
paragraph; or
(c) Any concerned citizen,

organization, association or
institution, if there is no known
member of the immediate family or
relative of the aggrieved party.
94
Annotation to the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
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122. This provision enumerates the order of priority of

persons who can sue for the writ. The right to sue belongs
first and foremost to the “aggrieved party,” that is, the person
whose right to life, liberty and security is being threatened by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or
of a private individual or entity. In cases where the
whereabouts of the aggrieved party is unknown, the petition
may be filed by the “authorized parties” enumerated under
Section 2 of the Rule, in the following order: (a) any member
of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and
parents of the aggrieved party, (b) any ascendant,
descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within
the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default
of those mentioned in Paragraph (a), or (c) any concerned
citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is no
known member of the immediate family or relative of the
aggrieved party.95 The filing of a petition by the aggrieved
party suspends the rights of all other authorized parties to file
similar petitions. Likewise, the filing of the petition by an
authorized party on behalf of the aggrieved party suspends
the right of all others, observing the order established
therein.96
123. In Boac v. Cadapan,97 this Honorable Court

dismissed the amparo suit filed by “strangers” under the guise
that they are “concerned” with the alleged victim of an
enforced disappearance or extralegal killing, thus:
Petitioners finally point out that the parents of

Sherlyn and Karen do not have the requisite
standing to file the amparo petition on behalf of
Merino. They call attention to the fact that in
the amparo petition, the parents of Sherlyn and
Karen merely indicated that they were concerned
with Manuel Merino as basis for filing the petition on
his behalf.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo

provides:
The filing of a petition by the

aggrieved party suspends the rights of
all other authorized parties to file
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
G.R. Nos. 184461-62, May 31, 2011
Page 49 of 70
MEMORANDUM
Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------X
similar petitions. Likewise, the filing of

the petition by an authorized party on
behalf of the aggrieved party suspends
the right of all others, observing the
order established therein.
Indeed, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen

failed to allege that there were no known members
of the immediate family or relatives of Merino. The
exclusive and successive order mandated by the
above-quoted provision must be followed. The order
of priority is not without reason – “to prevent the
indiscriminate and groundless filing of petitions
for amparo which may even prejudice the right to
life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.”
The Court notes that the parents of Sherlyn

and Karen also filed the petition for habeas
corpus on Merinos behalf. No objection was raised
therein for, in a habeas corpus
proceeding, any person may apply for the writ on
behalf of the aggrieved party.
124. Sr. Daño’s and the 17 lay mission partners’ causes

must suffer the same fate. They themselves admit that they
are not related to those whose who were allegedly killed by
members of the PNP. They also did not allege in their petition
that the aggrieved parties have no known members of the
immediate family or other relatives. Applying Boac, they have
no personality to institute the present petitions. Thus, their
causes of action deserve outright dismissal.
125. The following petitioners are also barred from

joining the suit in G.R. No. 234484, as they violated the order
of those who may file a petition for a writ of amparo under
Section 2 of the Rule:
Petitioners Relationship to the deceased

VALERIE AGUILAN Live-in partner of the
deceased RYAN EDER
ANGEL S. EDER Sister of the deceased RYAN
EDER
MARIEL SUPNET Cousin of the deceased RYAN
EDER
RUSSEL SALVADOR Father of petitioner Angel
Eder’s live-in partner
ABBY S. EDER Sister of the deceased RYAN
EDER
MARIE TAMAYO Live-in partner of the
deceased EMILIANO BLANCO
Page 50 of 70
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Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------X
MICHELLE ESTRELLER Sister-in-law of the deceased

JERRY ESTRELLER, JR.
MARY JANE ESTRELLER Sister of the deceased JERRY
ESTRELLER, JR.
ROSALINDA N. TAN Aunt of the deceased
REYNALDO T. JAVIER, JR.
MARY LUV JAVIER Sister of the deceased
REYNALDO T. JAVIER, JR.
HAIDEE O. SUELEN Niece of the deceased, RAMON
RODRIGUEZ
126. Second, the petitioners failed to prove that the

respondents committed any unlawful act as they failed to
establish their allegations by substantial evidence.
127. Sections 17 and 18 of the Rule specifically require

that the parties establish their claims by substantial evidence
before the privilege of the writ may be granted to them.
Substantial evidence is that amount of evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. It is more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing
or violation that would warrant a finding of liability against the
person charged.98
128. Revisiting the petitions and the affidavits attached

to them will reveal that the petitioners’ allegations are
unsupported by competent eyewitness accounts or
corroborative evidence. The petitions are based mainly on
hearsay and on the assumption that the men in plainclothes
lurking near the crime scenes were police officers.
Considering that the petitioners’ allegations are not
adequately supported by substantial evidence, their claim
that the anti-drug operations conducted by the respondents
are illegal has no leg to stand on.
129. Apropos is the pronouncement of this Honorable

Court in Saez v. Macapagal-Arroyo,99 viz:
The liberality accorded to amparo and habeas

data cases does not mean that a claimant is
dispensed with the onus of proving his case.
98
Mamba vs. Bueno, G.R. No. 191416, February 7, 2017.
99
G.R. No. 183533, September 25, 2012.
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Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
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“Indeed, even the liberal standard of substantial

evidence demands some adequate evidence.”100
130. Third, the allegations of violations or threats of

violation of the petitioners’ right to life, liberty, and security
are based merely on hearsay and speculation. In particular,
Sr. Daño and the seventeen lay mission partners merely took
the cudgels for the victims and their “families who are
[allegedly] unwilling to join the petition for fear of retaliation,”
and based their allegations on news articles and information
they gathered during their visits to the wake of the alleged
victims. On the other hand, while the affidavits submitted by
the other petitioners detailed the circumstances or incidents
surrounding the death of the alleged victims, there is nothing
in the affidavits which remotely indicate that the respondents
violated or threatened to violate the petitioners’ life, liberty,
or security.
131. The petitions allege threats against the petitioners’

life, liberty, and security by reason of their being either a
member or a relative of a member of the community of San
Andres Bukid. However, the threats allegedly made lack the
required specificity, thus, the petitioners’ claim stands on
nebulous grounds. While mere threats fall within the mantle
of protection of the writ of amparo, said threats must still find
rational basis in the surrounding circumstances of the case.101
132. It is indeed unfortunate that loss of lives resulted

from the operations of the police officers. But these incidents
do not automatically render the anti-drug operation
conducted by the respondents “unlawful” as would entitle the
petitioners to the protection of a writ of amparo. To reiterate,
the petitioners failed to prove their allegations by substantial
evidence. To give due course to the petitioner’s patently
baseless petitions would only serve to countenance
harassment suits and “fishing expeditions” that distract law
enforcement agencies from their principal duties or, worse,
dampen their zeal in the pursuit of criminal elements.
Ultimately, the ones who will benefit from the grant of these
petitions will be those who are engaged in the illegal drug
100
Id.
101
Id.
Page 52 of 70
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Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
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trade. This should not be countenanced by this Honorable

Court.
The petitioners’ allegations in

Daño are based on hearsay
evidence.
133. The petitioners’ allegations in Daño are based solely

on hearsay evidence that do not satisfy the quantum of
evidence required by the law.
134. It is a basic legal tenet that a witness can only

testify on matters that are of his or her own personal
knowledge.102 This rule does not change even if the required
standard be substantial evidence, preponderance of evidence,
proof beyond reasonable doubt, or clear and convincing
evidence.103
135. To be sure, in Ladaga v. Mapagu,104 this Honorable

Court held that the evidentiary proceedings in amparo cases
allow a certain flexibility in considering evidence that would
otherwise be disregarded, to wit:
Suitable to, and consistent with this incipiently

unique and informal treatment of amparo cases, the
Court eventually recognized the evidentiary
difficulties that beset amparo petitioners, arising as
they normally would from the fact that the State
itself, through its own agents, is involved in the
enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing that it
is supposedly tasked by law to investigate. Thus, in
Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, the Court laid down a new
standard of relaxed admissibility of evidence to
enable amparo petitioners to meet the required
amount of proof showing the State's direct or
indirect involvement in the purported violations and
found it a fair and proper rule in amparo cases “to
consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in
their totality” and “to consider any evidence
102
Jose v. Angeles, G.R. No. 187899, October 23, 2013.
103
Separate Opinion of Justice Bersamin in Umali, Jr. v. Hernandez, IPI No. 15-35-SB-J, February 23, 2016.
104
G.R. Nos. 189689-91, November 13, 2012.
Page 53 of 70
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Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------X
otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules

to be admissible if it is consistent with the
admissible evidence adduced.” Put simply,
evidence is not to be rejected outright because it is
inadmissible under the rules for as long as it satisfies
“the most basic test of reason – i.e., relevance
of the evidence to the issue at hand and its
consistency with all other pieces of adduced
evidence.”
This measure of flexibility in the admissibility

of evidence, however, does not do away with the
requirement of substantial evidence in showing the
State's involvement in the enforced disappearance,
extrajudicial killing or threats thereof. It merely
permits, in the absence of hard-to-produce direct
evidence, a closer look at the relevance and
significance of every available evidence, including
those that are, strictly speaking, hearsay where the
circumstances of the case so require, and allows the
consideration of the evidence adduced in terms of
their consistency with the totality of the evidence.105
136. Thus, evidence that is otherwise inadmissible may

be considered. This, however, is subject to the qualification
that the otherwise inadmissible evidence must be consistent
with the admissible evidence adduced.
137. The allegations presented by a majority of the

petitioners in the Daño petition are based solely on hearsay
evidence. The plea for a writ of amparo rests on mere news
reports and the Judicial Affidavits of petitioners Daño and RGS
lay mission partners, all of whom lack personal knowledge of
the supposed threats to life, liberty or security.
138. The petitioners cited news reports from various

online sources relative to the deaths of the following: (1)
Conrado Beroña; (2) Jefferson Bunuan, Mark Anthony
Bunuan, Jomar Manaois; (3) Jerson Colaban, Jossing
Colaban, Joseph Baculi; (4) Gilbert Beguelme; (5) Emiliano
Blanco; (6) Delfin Sicson; (7) Joshua Merced, Leo Geluz and
Bimbo Merced; (8) Ryan Dimacali; (9) SPO3 Dennis Padpad;
(10) John Paul Enrera; (11) Rolly Veros and Ronnie Veros;
(12) Crisente Baquial; and (13) Manuel Roy Manalac.106
105
Citations omitted; Emphasis supplied.
106
See footnotes in Daño Petition, pp. 18-35.
Page 54 of 70
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Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------X
139. Petitioner Daño also admitted that she does not

have personal knowledge as to what transpired, but that she
merely gathered information from the “debriefing sessions”
conducted by her and by the RGS lay mission partners with
the family members of those killed, to viz:
Q19. What do you do at the wakes, if any?
A19. We would offer a prayer, then we would hold a

debriefing session for the victim’s family members
and relatives. That’s how we would find out the
details of the killings. 107
140. The following are handwritten accounts of some of

the petitioners who are RGS lay mission partners, who
confirm that “their” respective tokhang stories are actually
not their own, but are sourced from accounts they heard from
neighbors, acquaintances, or relatives etc.:
a. Ako si Abella Matin-ao, babae, ang

edad ko ay 50 years old, may asawa. xxxx Base
sa kuento ng kapitbahay namin na si
Ferdinand Emotan, may kaibigan daw siya na
buong Pamilia, na hinuli tapos ang isang anak
ng oras na iyon wala sa bahay nila. hinuli daw
yon dahil sa mga user sila. Tapos ng nasa
kulungan na. Dinalaw daw ang ina ng isang
anak sa [sic] babae sa kulungan, tapos yong
anak di na nakauwi isinama na doon sa
kulungan ng nanay. At ang base sa salaysay
ng pulis ay kasama siya doon sa
nagdrodroga....
....
b. Ako si Remedios G. Espina, Babae,

49, may asawa xxx Ang aking isasalaysay ay
iyong pangyayari sa aming barangay na
nagkaroong [sic] ng Operasyon kung saan iyon
ay ang paghuhuli sa mga gumagamit ng droga
at sa mga nagbebenta. xxx nakatanggap ako
ng Text message mula sa isa naming
kasama na si Vicky Factor. Ang sabi niya
”Halika dito medy, dito kami sa barangay 770,
107
Judicial Affidavit of Sr. Ma. Juanita R. Daño, p. 6, Annex “A” in the Daño Petition.
Page 55 of 70
MEMORANDUM
Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------X
madaming pulis.”... agad ay pumunta ako at

ang aking kasama na si Corazon estella sa brg
[sic] 770, habang naglalakad kami, napahinto
kami dahil nakasalubong namin ang PEDEA
[sic], nakakatakot sila, ang lalaki ng katawan at
puro armado xxx alas 10:00 ng gabi
nakatanggap ako ng chat mula kay Vicky
Factor...at ang sabi niya...maraming nahuli,
mga 25 katao. nahuli na si Boyet, si Omar at
Binay....
....
c. Ako si Avelina L. Felicidario, may

sapat na gulang, anim na po’t taong gulang
isang biyuda may pitong anak xxx Ang isang
member namin sa Basic Ecclessial Community
(BEC) ang kanyang anak ay binaril na kumakain
sa karinderia ayon sa sinabi ng kanyang ina
na si Anafe Mendoza na hindi ko na maalala
kung kailan nangyari iyon. xxx [K]ailan lang
May 23, na may napatay at hinuli ang asawang
babae at ang nanay nito. Ayon sa kwento ni
Eufrocina Palomique, isang (BEC member
din) nakita niya na ang bumaril ay may takip
ang mukha hindi nya nakita ang pagbaril sa loob
ng bahay pero narinig nya ang dalawang putok
ng baril kaya ang kwento nya sobra syang
natakot at nerbiyos kaya ayon sa kanyang
kwento ako ay lubhang natatakot din....
....
d. Ako si Josephine L. Litang, babae,

54 taon gulang at biyuda xxx Noon may
narinig ako na balita na may pinatay naman
dito banda sa may Oro A Extension na biktima
ng EJK kahit na ako ay may takot pinuntahan ko
ang lugar at bahay na pinanyarihan ang aking
nakausap ay ang kapitbahay at kumpare ng
isa sa biktima ng EJK....
....
e. Ako si Edna V. Jullar, isang babaeng

may hustong Edad na (52 yrs) may asawa xxx
Ang tokhang story ko po ay tungkol dito sa
aking kapitbahay na hinaras po siya ng mga
pulis, pilit dinala….
....
Page 56 of 70
MEMORANDUM
Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------X
f. Ako po si Marietta B. Rodriguez,

babae, 43 years old, may asawa. xxx Ilang
buwan na po ang nakalipas yong kalapit kong
kapitbahay ay pinasok ng mga pulis ng biglaan.
xxx Ang kwentong ito ay narinig ko mismo
sa anak ko kasi nong nangyari ito siya ay
kasalukuyang nasa labas, at pag-akyat niya ay
sinabi nga ng anak ko na maraming polis polis
ang pumasok doon sa kalapit bahay....
....
g. Ako po si Maria Elsa J. Ibarra, isang

”babae.” Nasa hustong gulang, idad (54 years
old), hiwalay sa asawa. xxx Ang aking kwentong
Tokhang Ay naganap sa lugar naming sa brgy
775. Ang lugar naming ay talamak rin sa droga
kaya lang sa awa ng diyos wala pa napatay sa
lugar namin xxx Pero ayon sa narinig ko may
asset daw na nagsumbong sa mga pulis....
....
h. Ako si Corazon Estela, babae 59 na

taong gulang, may asawa at anak xxx Sa
pangyayari ng Tokhang, nagsusurvey kami
sa bahay bahay. May isang babae na nagsabi
na marami raw Police at PDA [sic] sa lugar ng
Oro B. Sabi niya mayroong silang huhulihin
kaya nag punta kami doon sa lugar nagsabi
noon babae mga alas kwatro ng hapon noon….
....
i. Ako po si Rosalinda C. Aguilar,

babae, 59 yrs.old may asawa. xxx Ang akin
pong kuwentong tokhang ay tungkol sa
anak ng kasamahan naming sa BEC na si
Anafe. Narinig ko sa mga nakakita na ito’y
nangyari bandang alas-dos ng madaling araw....
....
j. Ako po si Elizabeth G. Oplida, may

asawa at apat na anak xxx Noong May 6, 2017
sabado nakabalita ako ng natokhang xxx Siya si
Ryan Dimacali alyas Oxo xxx natokhang daw siya
dahil sa pwestuhan ang [sic] bahay nya ng droga.
Pero bago daw natokhang ilang beses raw
syang pinagsabihan na itigil na ang kangyang
Page 57 of 70
MEMORANDUM
Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------X
gawaing papapapwesto ngunit di siya nakinig

nagpatuloy pa rin siya....108
141. In Razon Jr. v. Tagitis,109 this Honorable Court

emphasized that a relaxation of the rules on the admissibility
of hearsay evidence should not be equated to a total disregard
of the standards set forth by the rules of court:
Suffice it to say that we continue to adhere to

the substantial evidence rule that the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo requires, with some adjustments for
flexibility in considering the evidence presented.
When we ruled that hearsay evidence (usually
considered inadmissible under the general rules of
evidence) may be admitted as the circumstances of
the case may require, we did not thereby dispense
with the substantial evidence rule; we merely
relaxed the evidentiary rule on the admissibility of
evidence, maintaining all the time the standards of
reason and relevance that underlie every evidentiary
situation. This, we did, by considering the totality of
the obtaining situation and the consistency of the
hearsay evidence with the other available evidence
in the case.110
142. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant

evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. It is more than a mere imputation of
wrongdoing or violation that would warrant a finding of
liability against the person charged.111
143. Information gathered by petitioners Daño and the

RGS lay mission partners through debriefing sessions with
family members of the persons killed, and from stories related
by neighbors and other persons who allegedly witnessed or
heard other details about killings, can barely be considered
substantial evidence. Their lack of personal knowledge thus
makes the information they have as double or multiple
hearsay, since it is based upon “third-hand” information
related to them by someone who heard it from others.112
108
See DAÑO-W to DAÑO-Z; DAÑO-AA to DAÑO-EE; and DAÑO-GG, all attached to the Judicial
Affidavit of Sr. Ma. Juanita R. Daño, Annex “A” in the Petition dated October 18, 2017.
109
G.R. No. 182498, February 16, 2010.
110
Id.
111
Supra note 104 citing Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871, February 18, 2010.
112
People v. Garcia and Caranguinan, G.R. No. 124514, July 6, 2000.
Page 58 of 70
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Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------X
144. Multiple hearsay is no more competent than single

hearsay,113 and such statements on their own do not satisfy
the standards provided by the Rule on Amparo. Mere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute
substantial evidence.114
145. The fact that the evidence presented by petitioners

are hearsay in character already casts doubt on the veracity
and trustworthiness of their allegations. What is worse, these
hearsay evidence are not supplemented or corroborated by
any other admissible evidence.
146. Indubitably, hearsay allegations make up the

majority of petitioners’ evidence. Thus, while the evidentiary
rule on the admissibility of evidence was relaxed in amparo
cases as held in Razon v. Tagitis,115 the totality of the
evidence presented in the Daño petition still failed to meet the
quantum of evidence required.
VIII. The prayers in these

petitions trivialize the
remedies provided under
the Rule of Amparo.
x-----------------------------x
147. Finally, the remedies sought by both petitions are

beyond the scope of an amparo petition and therefore this
Honorable Court should refuse to take cognizance of the case.
148. Daño, et al. devoted seven pages of their petition

in seeking twenty-four remedies, while Almora has five pages
containing five main remedies and seventeen sub-remedies.
149. The Almora petition prays, among others, that:
113
Id.
114
Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. 46496, February 27, 1940 citing Consolidated Edison
Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.
115
Supra note 109.
Page 59 of 70
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Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
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a. A temporary restraining order and/or

preliminary injunction be issued;
b. Respondents or any of their agents,

representatives or assigns be
prohibited from implementing or
enforcing any instructions, commands
or utterances of President Duterte to
the PNP and/or DILG in relation to the
war on drugs;
c. The Writ of Amparo be granted and

issued to safeguard the people’s right
to life, liberty and security;
d. The PNP, through the PNP Chief, be

held directly responsible for the
disclosure of material facts known to
the government and to their offices
regarding the extralegal killings of
Ryan Dave Almora and Rex Appari and
the shooting of Jefferson Soriano;
e. The NBI be directed to conduct a

thorough and impartial investigation
into the deaths of Ryan Dave Almora
and Rex Appari and the shooting of
Jefferson Soriano;
f. The police officers involved in all cases

of “nanlaban” to submit: (a) the
firearm/s allegedly used by the
deceased to the NBI for forensic
examination and safekeeping, and (b)
the firearms/ that the police
discharged to the NBI for forensic
examination;
g. The IAS and/or NAPOLCOM be

required to submit a monthly report to
the Court;
h. The above-mentioned obligations be

directly enforceable against whoever
Page 60 of 70
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Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------X
may be the incumbent PNP Chief and

DILG Secretary or Officer-in-Charge,
under pain of contempt.116
150. On the other hand, the Daño petition seeks, among

others, viz:
a. To direct respondents PDG Dela Rosa

and C/Supt Joel Napoleon Coronel to
relieve or cause the relief of
respondents Domingo, Corpuz,
Sagaysay and the entire MPD Station
6 and to transfer or cause their
transfer to another territory outside of
Metro Manila.
b. To direct the Commission on Human

Rights, the Department of Health and
the Department of Social Welfare and
Development to conduct visitation of
detained petitioners twice a month.
c. To direct respondents to furnish all the

documents, reports, and evidence in
connection with all the deaths subject
of this case.
d. To direct respondents to obtain the

written consent of the next of kin of
any victim to deliver the cadaver to
particular funeral parlor.117
151. To put it plainly, the writ of amparo cannot include

the visitation of the detainees by the CHR, DOH, and
DSWD,118 submission to the Office of the City Prosecutor or
the Office of the Ombudsman of documents or evidence
relating to police operations prior to the filing of any
complaint,119 or directing the respondents to furnish relatives
or victims’ next of kins copies of documents and evidence
116
Almora petition, pp. 36 to 40.
117
Daño petition, pp. 52 to 58.
118
Daño petition, p. 53, par. c of the Reliefs.
119
Id. at p. 57, par. q.
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MEMORANDUM
Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------X
without need of demands.120 Neither may an order issued

directing the respondents to deliver the cadaver to a funeral
parlor.121 These prayers are not only beyond the scope and
contemplation of the rule on amparo, they would also
consume significant resources of the PNP, which if granted,
would impinge on the ability of the PNP to perform its
mandate to maintain law and order. The fundamental function
of the writ of amparo is to cause the disclosure of details
concerning the extrajudicial killing or the enforced
disappearance of an aggrieved party.122 While the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo accords the Court a wide latitude in crafting
remedies to address an enforced disappearance or
extrajudicial killing, it cannot (without violating the nature of
the writ of Amparo as a summary remedy that provides rapid
judicial relief) grant remedies that would complicate and
prolong rather than expedite the investigations already
ongoing.123
152. Moreover, it should not be lost sight of that the

alleged extralegal killings subject of these petitions occured
sometime in 2016 and early 2017. If indeed the petitioners’
lives were on the line, they should have filed the present
actions at the earliest possible time if only to prevent
accountable police officers from committing any further
human rights violation.
153. In addition, the petitioners’ prayer for the

submission of all firearms used in the “nanlaban” cases to the
NBI for forensic examination and that monthly reports be
submitted to the court on the status of the investigation of
these “nanlaban” cases are without basis and even border on
the absurd.
154. While judicial intervention is equally available to the

petitioners, the reliefs they seek cannot be granted through
the blanket issuance of a writ of amparo. If at all, the
petitioners should file the proper administrative and criminal
cases against erring police officers. Significantly, a separate
proceeding may also be the appropriate remedy for those
120
Id. at p. 55 & 57, pars. f & r.
121
Id. at p. 87, par. v.
122
Mison v. Gallegos, G.R. No. 210759, June 23, 2015.
123
Burgos v. Esperon, Jr., G.R. No. 178497, February 4, 2014.
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Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
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contesting the so-called “nanlaban” cases of the PNP for after

all, order calling for an NBI investigation is not contemplated
under the Rules on Amparo.
IX. The application for writ

of preliminary injunction,
temporary restraining
order, prohibition and
interim reliefs must be
denied.
x-----------------------------x
155. The above allegations are hereby reproduced by

reference in support of the respondents' opposition to the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction and TRO. In
addition, respondents state that:
1. The petitioners failed to

show the existence of a
material right to warrant the
issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or
TRO.
156. A writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO are

preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights
and interests.
157. The requisites for the grant of a preliminary

injunction are as follows:124
(1) The applicant must have a clear and

unmistakable right to be protected,
that is, a right in esse;
(2) There is a material and substantial

invasion of such right;
(3) There is an urgent need for the writ to

prevent irreparable injury to the
124
Liberty Broadcasting Network, Inc. v. Atlocan Wireless System, Inc., G.R. Nos. 205875 & 208916, June
30, 2015.
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Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
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applicant; and
(4) No other ordinary, speedy, and

adequate remedy exists to prevent the
infliction of irreparable injury.125
158. Jurisprudence provides that in a proceeding to

determine whether to issue a writ of preliminary injunction,
the applicant must show that it has a clear legal right to be
protected and that the other party's act against which the writ
is to be directed violates that right.126
159. In both petitions, the petitioners base their claim

for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo on the violation of their
rights, and continuous threats to, their life, liberty and
security. In particular, Daño, et al. allege that respondents’
anti-illegal drug campaign violates several constitutional and
statutory provisions, as well as administrative rules and
regulations such as the Revised Philippine National Police
Operational Procedures and Department of Justice Circular
No. 61.
160. It is evident that petitioners in both Daño and

Almora failed to show any clear legal right for the injunctive
relief to issue. The petitioners failed to show compelling
evidence that their life, liberty and security are in imminent
danger. In fact, the very nature of the ultimate reliefs they
pray for could be characterized as a broad plea to strike down
prevailing law enforcement practices on alleged constitutional
grounds rather than on distinctive and personal threats to
their lives and safety.
161. It should be underscored that the administrating

anti-drug campaign has been hugely successful and thus
accounts for the surge in the President’s popularity rating.
162. At the same time, many barangay officials who

unwittingly signed the petition in the Daño case are retracting
their signatures.
125
Emphasis supplied.
126
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) v. Nasipit Integrted Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc. (NIASSI),
G.R. No. 214864, March 22, 2017.
.
Page 64 of 70
MEMORANDUM
Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------X
163. There being no clear prima facie showing that the

life, liberty or security of a petitioner is in immediate or
continuing danger, there would be no basis for any issuance
of a TRO or Preliminary Injunction.
2. There is no basis to grant

interim reliefs.
164. Section 14, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the Rule on

Amparo states:
SEC. 14. Interim Reliefs. — Upon filing of

the petition or at anytime before final judgment, the
court, justice or judge may grant any of the following
reliefs:
(a) Temporary Protection Order. – The court,

justice or judge, upon motion or motu
proprio, may order that the petitioner or the
aggrieved party and any member of the
immediate family be protected in a
government agency or by an accredited
person or private institution capable of
keeping and securing their safety. If the
petitioner is an organization, association or
institution referred to in Section 3(c) of this
Rule, the protection may be extended to the
officers involved….
(c) Production Order. – The court, justice or

judge, upon verified motion and after due
hearing, may order any person in possession,
custody or control of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, or
objects in digitized or electronic form, which
constitute or contain evidence relevant to the
petition or the return, to produce and permit
their inspection, copying or photographing by
or on behalf of the movant….
165. In Lozada, Jr., et al. vs. President Arroyo,127 this

Honorable Court ruled that interim relief in amparo
proceedings can only be resorted to if there is clear showing
of an imminent and continuing threat on the life and liberty of
127
G.R. Nos. 184379-80, April 24, 2012.
Page 65 of 70
MEMORANDUM
Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------X
a petitioner. Absent such showing, this Honorable Court will

dismiss applications for Temporary Protection Orders, viz.:
Finally, with respect to the interim reliefs

sought by petitioners, this Court, in Yano v.
Sanchez, declined to grant the prayer for the
issuance of a TPO, as well as Inspection and
Production Orders, upon a finding that the
implicated public officials were not accountable
for the disappearance subject of that case.
Analogously, it would be incongruous to grant
herein petitioners prayer for a TPO and
Inspection and Production Orders and at the
same time rule that there no longer exists any
imminent or continuing threat to Lozada’s right
to life, liberty and security. Thus, there is no
basis on which a prayer for the issuance of these
interim reliefs can be anchored.128
166. Considering that the petitioners were unable to

present the slightest credible showing that threats on their
life, liberty, and security are continuing and persistent, in that
they failed to show a nexus between the series of alleged
extralegal killings in San Andres Bukid and the present threat
to their safety, there is no justification for the issuance of a
Temporary Protection Order.
167. Ironically, according to the Daño petitioners what

would effectively reduce the threats to the lives and well-
being of the residents of San Andres Bukid would be to grant
the their prayer for a one-kilometer perimeter129 where
respondent law enforcers would not be allowed to enter.
168. Section 24 of R.A. No. 6975130 states:
Section 24. Powers and Functions. – The

PNP shall have the following powers and
functions:
128
Citations omitted.
129
Daño Petition, p. 52.
130
Otherwise known as DILG Act of 1990.
Page 66 of 70
MEMORANDUM
Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------X
(a) Enforce all laws and ordinances

relative to the protection of lives and
properties;
(b) Maintain peace and order and take

all necessary steps to ensure public safety;
(c) Investigate and prevent crimes,

effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring
offenders to justice and assist in their
prosecution;….
169. If the Daño’s prayer for a one-kilometer radius

where the respondent law enforcers would not be allowed to
enter were granted, that would produce threats to their own
lives and well-being for the police officers would be unable to
perform their mandate to enforce law and order. To elaborate,
as shown in the map131, the yellow portion is San Andres
Bukid, the red is Dagonoy and the blue covers Punta. The
zones encircled by the red lines indicate the 1-kilometer
radius where respondents would not be allowed to operate in
case this Honorable court would grant petitioners’ prayer for
police-free zones. The respondents would thus be limited to
operating within less than one-half of Punta, and would not
be able to enter the entire San Andres Bukid and Dagonoy.
Affected establishments in these areas include three banks,
eight schools, four gasoline stations and eight pawnshops.
These numbers do not include small businesses and
residential areas, which the respondents would not be able to
patrol and protect. Additionally, they would not be able to
provide police assistance to other areas in Manila or to nearby
cities like Makati and Mandaluyong, in case a situation calling
for their inter-police station assistance occurs.
170. Prescinding, the petitioners’ prayer for issuance of

a production order must also be denied as it is predicated on
bare allegations of extralegal killings, falsification, illegal
arrest, and extortion committed by the respondents.
171. In Balao v. Macapagal-Arroyo,132 this Honorable

Court upheld the trial court’s denial of the grant of production
and inspection orders predicated on bare allegations. A court
131
Map of the area of responsibility of Manila Police District Station 6, as Annex “6”.
132
G.R. No. 186050 & G.R. No. 186059, December 13, 2011.
Page 67 of 70
MEMORANDUM
Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------X
cannot therefore sanction a fishing expedition by precipitate

issuance of production orders on the basis of insufficient
demands of one party, to wit:
An inspection order is an interim relief

designed to give support or strengthen the claim
of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to
aid the court before making a decision. A basic
requirement before an amparo court may grant
an inspection order is that the place to be
inspected is reasonably determinable from the
allegations of the party seeking the order. In
this case, the issuance of inspection order was
properly denied since the petitioners specified
several military and police establishments
based merely on the allegation that the
testimonies of victims and witnesses in previous
incidents of similar abductions involving
activists disclosed that those premises were
used as detention centers. In the same vein, the
prayer for issuance of a production order was
predicated on petitioners’ bare allegation that it
obtained confidential information from an
unidentified military source, that the name of
James was included in the so-called Order of
Battle. Indeed, the trial court could not have
sanctioned any "fishing expedition" by
precipitate issuance of inspection and
production orders on the basis of insufficient
claims of one party.133
172. Also, the issuance of a production order would

entail tremendous expenditure and use of government
resources if every police operation would be subject to a strict
scrutiny simply on the basis of vague accusations and
baseless speculations.
173. The production order cannot be used to cover up

for the petitioners’ failure to establish substantial evidence of
an actual violation of or threat to their rights to life, liberty
and security that would entitle them to the grant of the
interim relief prayed for.
174. It is respectfully submitted that granting the
133
Underscoring supplied.
Page 68 of 70
MEMORANDUM
Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------X
present petitions is fraught with repercussions to law

enforcement operations, and to peace and order in the
community and to the administration of justice.
The following statistics are worthy of emphasis:
From July 1, 2016 to January 17, 2018, our

law enforcement officers were able to seize
2,577.05 kilos worth of shabu with a street
value of Php13.24 billion pesos.

law enforcement officers were able to seize
drugs and laboratory equipment in the
amount of Php19.34 billion pesos.

law enforcement officers were able to arrest
119, 361 drug personalities.
From July 1, 2016 to December 27, 2017,

there are 5,072 drug cleared barangays.134
175. It cannot be denied that the government's drug

program has achieved a considerable level of success. It is
submitted that the multifarious items prayed for by
petitioners would only unduly hamper these successful
government efforts to stop the proliferation of illegal drugs
because drug personalities would abuse the remedy of
amparo as redefined in the present petitions. This would open
the floodgate to any persons hurling groundless accusations
against our police officers which would in turn, result in
widespread disillusionment and demoralization, preventing
them from performing their functions with zeal and
dedication.
176. If the PNP would be impeded from performing its

official functions, 2,577.05 kilos worth of shabu or more would
once again spread over our communities. Worse, allowing the
creation of numerous “police free zones” will result in virtual
anarchy culminating in widespread criminality, spreading like
a malady in our community which would only tear apart
134
http://pia.gov.ph/realnumbers/socialcards?p=1
Page 69 of 70
MEMORANDUM
Daño v. PNP
G.R. Nos. 234539 and 234484
X-------------------------------------X
communities, the bedrock of our nation's family and youth.
177. Moreover, by granting the present petition, a

dangerous precedent is created where amparo proceedings
will be used as a tool by drug personalities in order to “fish”
for evidence, in the guise of protecting their human rights,
which they may later use against police officers conducting
legitimate operations.
178. The resulting indiscriminate filing of

unsubstantiated amparo petitions will render the true essence
of the remedy worthless. Such misuse and abuse of amparo
will ultimately congest court dockets and delay the processing
of cases in the courts of justice, which in the end, defeats the
summary nature of an amparo proceeding.
179. Lastly, granting this petition may open the

floodgates for the filing of similar procedurally defective
amparo petitions where petitioners and their lawyers blatantly
disregard the requirements of the rules and later on invoke
“interest of substantial justice” as an excuse for their
shameless indifference to the rules.
PRAYER
The respondents consequently pray that this Honorable

Court:
1. DISMISS the consolidated petitions for lack

of merit;
2. DENY the application for the issuance of a writ
of amparo;
3. DENY the application for interim reliefs; and
4. DENY the application for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order.
The respondents request such further or other relief that

this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable under the
premises.
Makati City for the City of Manila, February 2, 2018.
Page 70 of 70

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Republic of the Philippines

AILEEN ALMORA, et al.,

DIRECTOR GENERAL RONALD

SR. MA. JUANITA R. DAÑO, et

- versus - G.R. No. 234484

THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL

THE RESPONDENTS, through the Office of the Solicitor

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. The consolidated Petitions for Writ Amparo,1 and

Protection Order and Temporary Restraining Order2 seek to

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ANTECEDENTS

2. On July 1, 2016, the PNP issued CMC No. 16-2016,

For G.R. No. 234359 (Almora Petition)

3. On July 28, 2016, a drug buy-bust operation was

4. In a separate incident on September 13, 2016, Rex

5. On June 17, 2017, petitioner Jefferson Acena

For G.R. No. 234484 (Daño Petition)

6. Eighteen of the 39 petitioners are members of the

a. killing Conrado Beroña;8 Jefferson Bunuan, Mark

b. falsifying non-bailable charges against Valerie

Aguilan, Bella Eder, and Mariel Supnet;31

c. illegally arresting Marie Tamayo and Hilario

d. committing extortion on Francisco Blanco and Raul

e. shooting Jeffrey Degala.35

7. Due to the aforementioned circumstances, the

8. Meanwhile, on August 29, 2017, the DILG issued

9. On October 10, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa

10. On October 11 and 20, 2017, the Office of the

11. On November 7, 2017, the OSG received this

12. On November 16, 2017, the OSG filed a Very

13. On November 17, 2017, the OSG filed its comment

14. On November 17, 2017 the OSG received this

15. On November 21 and 28 and December 5, 2017,

16. During the December 5, 2017 oral argument, this

17. On December 20, 2018, the OSG filed a Motion for

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

I. The requisites for filing a

18. In Daño, the petitioners aver that they are

19. Their resort to a class suit cannot prosper under

20. Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 12. Class suit. When the subject

interest shall have the right to intervene to

21. A class suit is only proper where it can clearly be

22. The 39 petitioners in Daño are composed of 18

23. Additionally, an element of a class suit is the

24. The petitioners do not qualify as a class of persons

Bukid Community, without proof that they adequately

25. It is undisputed that the petitioners have not shown

26. This is bolstered by the fact that all 26 barangay

27. In addition, numerous residents of San Andres

28. The filing of a class suit is incompatible with amparo

II. The petitioners in Daño

29. "Legal standing" or locus standi calls for more than

30. The gist of the question on standing is whether a

31. The element of injury is not something that just

32. In David vs. Arroyo44 this Honorable Court explained

Locus standi is defined as a right of

put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his

33. In Ortigas & Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals,46 this

"Interest" within the meaning of the rule

34. To qualify a person to be a real party-in-interest in

35. Furthermore, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo

Sec. 2. Who May File. – The petition may be filed by