2017 Campanii Presed. SUA 1932 - 2012

Welcoming Their Hatred: Class Populism in
Democratic Rhetoric in American Presidential

Campaigns, 1932–2012
JESSE H. RHODES and KAYLEE T. JOHNSON
Conventional wisdom holds that Democrats have abandoned the language of class populism. Using
a quantitative and qualitative content analysis of hundreds of Democratic presidential campaign speeches
over the 1932–2012 period, we revisit the received view. We provide evidence that Democratic presiden-
tial candidates have made increasingly frequent references to the wealthy; have employed a consistently
adversarial tone in statements referring to the affluent; have made increasingly frequent criticisms of
Republicans’ alleged favoritism toward the rich; and have increasingly linked references to the wealthy
to promises to assist less fortunate Americans through programmatic reforms. Our findings indicate that
class populism is alive and well in Democratic presidential campaign rhetoric.
Keywords: presidential rhetoric, populism, class conflict, Democratic Party
Three days before the 1936 presidential election, Franklin Roosevelt, the Demo-
cratic candidate for president, addressed a packed house at Madison Square Garden in
New York City. In his address, Roosevelt rejected the legacy of “hear-nothing, see-noth-
ing, do-nothing [Republican] Government” that had looked with indifference upon the
suffering inflicted by the Great Depression and promised that under Democratic leader-
ship government officials would “keep our sleeves rolled up” to sustain the economic
recovery and provide work for needy Americans (Roosevelt 1936a). Having made this
pledge, Roosevelt proceeded to the climax of his address, the content of which rendered
the speech one of the most famous in the history of American presidential campaigns.
Reminding listeners that his administration had constantly “struggle[d] with the old
enemies of peace—business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class
antagonism, sectionalism, [and] war profiteering,” he declared:
We now know that Government by organized money is just as dangerous as Government by

organized mob. Never before in all our history have these forces been so united against one
candidate as they stand today. They are unanimous in their hate for me—and I welcome
their hatred. (Roosevelt 1936a, emphasis added)
Jesse H. Rhodes is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University
of Massachusetts, Amherst. He is the author of An Education in Politics: The Origins and Evolution of
No Child Left Behind (Cornell University Press, 2012), along with articles in Perspectives on Politics,
Presidential Studies Quarterly, Political Behavior, Polity, and other journals. Kaylee T. Johnson is a doc-
toral student in the Department of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
92
Presidential Studies Quarterly DOI: 10.1111/psq.12347
Vol. 47, No. 1, March 2017, 92–121 C 2016 Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress
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CLASS POPULISM IN AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS | 93
The crowd of twenty thousand supporters, which had repeatedly interrupted the address
with wild applause, “exploded in delirious enthusiasm. Their thunder rolled around the
hall” (Brands 2008, 454).
Roosevelt’s remarks at Madison Square Garden capped an election campaign charac-
terized by repeated attacks on “economic royalists” and “privileged princes” (Milkis and
Nelson 2005, 277; Brands 2008, 453). And his 1936 campaign has been remembered as
a high-water mark of Democratic rhetorical antagonism toward wealthy opponents of
vigorous federal efforts to regulate the economy and provide working Americans with
security against the risks of unemployment and old age (Skowronek 1997, 303). In fact,
the predominant view among scholars of presidential politics is that the populist antago-
nism toward the rich embodied in Democratic rhetoric during the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries and epitomized in Roosevelt’s 1936 campaign increasingly gave way
from the 1940s onward to more consensual rhetoric emphasizing the unity of interests
between economic classes (Gerring 1997; 1998; Bimes and Mulroy 2004). The assertion
that the Democrats have abandoned populist themes in favor of speech more accommo-
dating to the wealthy has also become the conventional wisdom among contemporary
journalists and pundits. Speaking about the “New Liberalism” of the Democratic Party,
New Yorker essayist George Packer reminded listeners of Roosevelt’s fervent rhetorical
attacks on the well-to-do, concluding that “[i]t’s hard to imagine [Democratic President
Barack] Obama saying anything close to that” (Packer 2009; see also Westen 2011).
Have Democrats in fact abandoned class populism, becoming more accommodating
in their address toward the affluent over time? In an age of high and rising economic
inequality, this is not an idle question. Indeed, it points to an important debate about the
soul of the contemporary Democratic Party. Critics of contemporary Democratic politics
charge that the party’s abandonment of class populism has resulted in an insipid, techno-
cratic mode of address that effectively enshrines the interests and values of the well-to-do
(Hacker and Pierson 2010; Bonica et al. 2013). If Democrats have in fact abandoned pop-
ulism in favor of a passionless consensus rhetoric that resonates with the interests of the
wealthy, then the case for their subservience to the powerful would be strong indeed.
Additionally, such findings would suggest that one of the most effective rhetorical tech-
niques for discussing economic inequities has been lost from mainstream American polit-
ical discourse, at least for the time being. The impoverishment of class rhetoric in
presidential campaigns would seem to preclude frank and accessible discussion about
why economic inequality has increased, how this development has been tied to political
(as well as economic) decisions, and in what ways this problem might be addressed in the
political arena.
However, if Democrats have retained a commitment to class populism in their cam-
paign rhetoric, then the situation is more complex, and arguably more hopeful as well.
The finding that Democrats have continued to make extensive use of class populist
appeals would raise serious questions about the accuracy of claims that the party has
embraced a bland, consensus-oriented philosophy that is blind to the increasing concen-
tration of economic benefits among members of the wealthy elite. Indeed, it would sug-
gest the continuing availability in presidential campaigns of a class-conscious mode of
address capable both of speaking to the causes and consequences of rising economic
94 | RHODES AND JOHNSON
inequality and of proposing political action capable of producing more equitable econom-
ic outcomes.
Given the high stakes attending resolution of this matter, we believe a new look at
the dynamics of class populism in Democratic rhetoric is necessary. In this article we con-
duct a systematic quantitative and qualitative content analysis of every Democratic presi-
dential candidate utterance referring to the wealthy in general election campaigns from
1932–2012—the very period in which class populism allegedly declined as a feature of
Democratic speech—to reevaluate the received view about Democrats’ increasing rhetori-
cal complaisance toward the rich. Our findings directly controvert the conventional wis-
dom that the class populism that once permeated Democratic rhetoric has been replaced
by more consensual patterns of discourse. We find that, far from fading from Democratic
candidate speeches, rhetorical attention to the wealthy has grown exponentially over the
past eight decades. Moreover, Democratic candidates have hardly adopted a warm tone
toward the rich: in fact, quantitative and qualitative measures of tone in statements refer-
ring to the affluent suggest that negative sentiment has held steady over time.
Democratic candidates have not merely contented themselves with mocking the
wealthy, however. They have also used rhetoric to politicize the extreme concentration of
wealth, both by repeatedly—and increasingly—criticizing Republicans for coddling the
rich and by more frequently vowing to raise taxes on the affluent in order to preserve and
extend social programs serving low- and middle-income Americans.
Against the conventional wisdom, our results provide strong evidence that class
populism remains a prominent theme in the Democratic rhetorical repertoire. More gen-
erally, our findings demonstrate the continuing availability in presidential campaigns of
rhetorical themes that facilitate frank and accessible discussion of the phenomenon of ris-
ing economic inequality, the evaluation of the political underpinnings of this develop-
ment, and the consideration of initiatives to redistribute opportunities and resources to
the less fortunate. All told, our findings reveal that the contemporary public sphere is, at
least from the perspective of presidential campaign rhetoric, far more robust and attentive
to matters of economic fairness than prevailing views would lead us to believe.
The Evolution of Democratic Rhetoric Toward the Wealthy
The conventional wisdom—which we reassess in this article—is that rhetoric

antagonistic toward the wealthy has declined substantially as a feature of Democratic
political speech since its heyday in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, sup-
planted by a new language of inclusiveness, reconciliation between economic classes, and
technocratic competence (see especially Gerring 1997; 1998; Bimes and Mulroy 2004).
According to Gerring, between 1896 and 1948 “Democrats’ political philosophy could
be encapsulated in the ideal of majority rule and in the populist narrative in which the
people fought for their rights against an economic and political elite” (Gerring 1998,
189). After 1948, however, “the [Democratic] party’s agenda was broadened. . .to include
a host of social groups and political issues that did not fit neatly into the masses-versus-
classes perspective of the Populist period “(1997, 168–69; see also 1998, 188–89, 232–
33). Furthermore, Gerring contends,
Forsaking the shrill polemics of [William Jennings] Bryan, the party now adopted the
soothing tones and reassuring demeanor of Adlai Stevenson. A rhetoric of reconciliation
replaced one of resentment. . .References to illicit business practices died out, to be replaced
by a resolutely pro-business perspective. The organizing theme of Democratic ideology
changed from an attack against ‘special privilege,’ to a call for inclusion.1
This development was attended by the ascendance of a new technocratic rhetoric that,
rather than highlighting class inequalities, “focused on [aggregate] outputs—i.e., eco-
nomic performance—and particularly on the three major indicators of inflation, employ-
ment, and growth” (Gerring 1998, 236).
This view is also reflected in Terri Bimes and Quinn Mulroy’s (2004) important
study of presidential populism. Through an analysis of presidential inaugural and state of
the union messages, Bimes and Mulroy (2004, 136) contend that “the language of [class]
populism, which in the nineteenth century constituted one of the most formidable rhe-
torical weapons in the arsenal of Democratic presidents, has faded and been displaced by a
more consensual language.”2 Beginning with Andrew Jackson in 1829, “Democratic
presidents, conceiving of themselves as tribunes of the people, peppered their addresses
and messages with images of the working classes struggling against a monied elite, as
well as of workers and farmers battling against manufacturing interests,” they write
(Bimes and Mulroy 2004, 137). In the twentieth century, however (and especially follow-
ing Harry Truman’s departure from office in 1952), Democratic presidents increasingly
adopted “consensual rhetoric emphasizing the interdependence of interests” and the pri-
ority of technocratic management of the economy for the benefit of all Americans (Bimes
and Mulroy 2004, 138).3
Both Gerring and Bimes and Mulroy view the decline of class populism in Demo-
cratic rhetoric as detrimental to the vitality of American democracy, especially insofar as
it pointed to the ascendance of a bland managerial politics that failed to speak directly to
class inequalities or engage the interest of ordinary Americans. Gerring presents postwar
Democratic rhetoric as essentially arid and uninspiring, exclaiming that “. . .it was the
very colorlessness of Adlai Stevenson –his all-embracing, non-offending character—that
was to stamp the postwar epoch in Democratic history” (Gerring 1998, 233). He also
1. Gerring (1998, 235) briefly notes that George McGovern, Jimmy Carter, and Walter Mondale
“integrated Populist themes into their rhetoric on a regular basis,” but dismisses these exceptions to his over-
arching argument on the grounds that “these occasional notes of protest were not nearly as vehement or shrill
as those registered by their predecessors in the 1896–1948 period” and “only one of these candidates made it
to the White House.”
2. Bimes and Mulroy’s definition of “populism” does not confine itself to class populism: all presi-
dential appeals that pit the people against a special interest fit their definition. In practice, however, Demo-
cratic presidential populism has frequently been characterized in class terms, while Republicans have tended
to rage against bureaucrats, special interests, academics, and liberals.
3. Bimes and Mulroy (2004, 136, fn.2) briefly acknowledge that Democratic candidates may have
continued to draw upon populist appeals in their campaigns, but do not follow up on this important amend-
ment to their main argument.
contends that Democrats’ adoption of technocratic and universalistic themes proceeded

hand in hand with the party’s elevation of “a resolutely pro-business perspective” over the
interests of labor unions and ordinary workers (Gerring 1998, 233; see also 251–52). In
similar fashion, Bimes and Mulroy (2004, 157) portray the decline of class populism as
exemplifying a “taming” of Democratic speech that obscured simmering class tensions
and inequities. They wistfully conclude that “[t]he critical, confrontational presidency
created by nineteenth-century Democrats, which thrived on populist attacks on the ‘mon-
ied powers,’ is gone and all but forgotten. . .” (Bimes and Mulroy 2004, 158).
Other studies of Democratic politics have echoed the conventional view that Demo-
crats from the 1950s onward have sought to embrace more consensual political themes,
with adverse consequences for the vibrancy of American politics. Democratic politics in
the 1960s are typically portrayed as a period in which consensus themes eclipsed forth-
right discussion of class interests and conflicts. For example, research on John F. Kennedy
has often underscored his commitment to an elite managerialism in domestic and foreign
affairs oriented toward service of the American people as a whole (Wander 1984; Miroff
1976; Murphy 2004). Prominent interpretations of Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society”
initiatives likewise insist that the president grounded these innovations not in a conflict-
based ideology of “masses versus classes” but in a universal vision of justice and liberation
(Milkis 2005; Skowronek 1997, 347–48). Echoing Gerring and Bimes and Mulroy,
scholars have claimed that the disappearance of populist motifs from Democratic rhetoric
by the 1960s undermined Democrats’ capacity to speak to matters of economic justice.
Indeed, Katznelson (1989) goes so far as to conclude that “[t]he Great Society. . .is best
understood in terms of a larger dynamic of reform in the postwar era that undercut, more
than it reinforced, the prospects for an American social democratic politics.”
Analyses of more recent Democratic leaders provide further grist for the view that
Democrats have abandoned the language of class conflict, thus rendering candid discus-
sion both of class inequities and of potential solutions difficult, if not impossible. For
example, studies of Bill Clinton’s efforts to fashion a “new” Democratic Party have
highlighted his focus on broadly popular themes of economic growth and human capital
development rather than class-based redistribution (e.g., Hale 1995; Baer 2000; Borrelli
2001). In similar fashion, most analyses of Obama’s philosophy have underscored the con-
sensual essence of his political thought, foregrounding the president’s desire to bridge
political, economic, racial, and religious divides (e.g., Kloppenberg 2009; Schultz 2009;
Smith 2012). Critics have alleged that this consensus orientation has both reflected and
further advanced Democrats’ increasing subservience to the rich. For example, Westen
(2011) charges that “[w]hen faced with the greatest economic crisis, the greatest levels of
economic inequality, and the greatest levels of corporate influence on politics since the
Depression, Barack Obama stared into the eyes of history and chose to avert his gaze.
Instead of indicting the people whose recklessness wrecked the economy he put them in
charge of it.”
What accounts for Democrats’ alleged abandonment of the language of class popu-
lism? The conventional wisdom holds that populist appeals against the wealthy were
done in as a rhetorical device both by their declining germaneness to post–World War II
Democratic politics and by changing political conditions (most notably the increasing
political power of the wealthy in relation to that of the working and lower classes) that
rendered this speech politically unsustainable. According to Gerr>:235) briefly />, 236–
37), consensus among Democrats on the federal government’s central role in managing
the American economy rendered class-conflict rhetoric irrelevant, and encouraged party
leaders to embrace an alternative language revolving around the themes of abundance and
growth. Bimes and Mulroy (2004, 137–38) agree, noting that “as the Democratic Party
shifted its stance from being the party against government to being the party for govern-
ment, Democratic presidents gradually moved away from the fiery, antagonistic rhetoric
of the nineteenth century. Instead, they found that consensual rhetoric emphasizing the
interdependence of interests was better suited to their state-building and state-
maintaining aspirations.”
At the same time, the gradual deterioration of the working class—and especially
organized labor –as a political force and the attendant rise of a powerful organized busi-
ness community (Hacker and Pierson 2010) further discouraged Democrats’ continued
use of populist appeals. According to this view, with organized wealth in ascendance
Democrats had strong electoral incentives to jettison antagonistic rhetoric in favor of
appeals that would cement new alliances with affluent Americans. Thus, for example,
Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson argue that “important elements of the Democratic Party
have responded to the shifting balance of organized power [in favor of the rich] by reposi-
tioning themselves on a number of critical issues, including taxation and deregulation, in
ways that have undercut the party’s traditional commitment to egalitarian policies”
(Hacker and Pierson 2010, 173; see also Bonica et al. 2014, 113).
Reasons for Reconsidering the Received Wisdom
The received view holds that Democratic presidential candidates have abandoned
class populism, instead embracing a bland universalism that both declines to speak to the
problem economic inequality and fails to propose solutions to divergent class outcomes.
Yet, we believe, there are both theoretical and methodological reasons to reconsider this
set of arguments.
At the theoretical level, previous studies have emphasized developments that may
have discouraged Democratic candidates and presidents from criticizing the wealthy and
the policies that disproportionately benefit them, but they have given short shrift to
countervailing trends in the distribution of economic rewards, the ideological and class
polarization of the parties, and the dynamics of party competition that may have encour-
aged Democrats to make greater use of this rhetorical strategy. First and foremost, as
Figure 1 shows, the broadly shared prosperity that informed Democrats’ alleged abandon-
ment of populism between the 1950s and the 1970s has disappeared. Since the 1970s,
the incomes of lower- and middle-class Americans have stagnated, while those of the
wealthiest Americans have grown exponentially (Piketty and Saez 2003, updated 2015;
Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez 2011).
Rising economic inequality has been accompanied by notable media attention to
the matter, as well as by intensifying public concern with the extreme concentration of
FIGURE 1. Real Income, by Percentile, 1933–2014 (Excluding Capital Gains)
wealth. These developments may have incentivized Democratic candidates to exploit

resentment toward the “undeserving rich” as a way of mobilizing frustrated Americans to
support their candidacies (McCall 2013).
Complementing this incentive is the growing ideological polarization, as well as
the stable or increasing class polarization, of the electorate. Over the past five decades the
Democratic Party has gradually become the home of political liberals, while conservatives
have increasingly gravitated to the Republican Party (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998;
2008; Bafumi and Shapiro 2009; Levendusky 2009). Meanwhile, the class polarization of
the parties—in which less affluent/service, skilled, and semi-skilled Americans tend to
identify with the Democratic Party, and wealthier/professional-managerial Americans
associate with the Republican Party—has been either stable or expanding, depending on
the measurement (Stonecash, Brewer, and Petersen 2000; Brewer and Stonecash 2001;
2007; Nadeau et al. 2004; Knuckey 2013). These trends have likely made Democratic
audiences increasingly sympathetic to populist rhetoric, potentially emboldening Demo-
cratic candidates and presidents to provide more generous measures of it in their cam-
paign communications.
Finally, the increasingly competitive nature of presidential politics since the late
1960s may have induced Democratic candidates to make greater use of class populist
appeals. As Figure 2, which summarizes Democratic presidential fortunes between 1932
and 2012, suggests, Democrats’ dominance of presidential elections between 1932 and
1964 gave way to a period of much tougher competition between the parties for the presi-
dency afterward. Indeed, between 1968 and 1992 Democrats occupied the presidency for
only 4 of 24 years; since 1992, they have traded off two-term presidencies with Republi-
can standard bearers.
When presidential candidates are less certain of their electoral prospects, they are
more likely to employ aggressive campaign strategies, such as negative issue appeals, per-
sonal attacks, and partisan rhetoric (Damore 2002; 2004; Sigelman and Buell 2003;
Vavreck 2009). The less auspicious presidential election climate since the late 1960s may
FIGURE 2. Democratic Popular Vote Margin (Percent), Presidential Elections, 1932–2012
have provided further encouragement to Democratic candidates to resurrect the risky

strategy of class populism as a means to revive their political fortunes.
There are also methodological reasons to revisit the received view that Democratic
candidates and presidents have abandoned the language of class populism. While many
studies have alleged this development, only Gerring (1997; 1998) and Bimes and
Mulroy (2004) have attempted to study it in a rigorous way. However, both studies
have methodological limitations. Gerring’s (1997; 1998) impressive qualitative analy-
sis incorporates information from thousands of stump speeches throughout Democratic
campaigns. But his quantitative analysis draws on a much more limited sample of docu-
ments—namely, party platforms and nomination acceptance addresses. If this subset of
addresses is not representative of all Democratic candidate campaign materials,
Gerring’s quantitative analysis might not provide a comprehensive account of how the
frequency, tone, and policy content of statements about the wealthy have changed over
time. In truth, there are strong reasons to believe that the subset of speeches on which
Gerring relies in his quantitative analysis are not representative of the whole: unlike
campaign stump speeches, the party platforms and nomination acceptance addresses are
formal communications designed for broad dissemination and governed by ceremonial
rituals (Nordvold 1970; Benoit 1999), and thus may be less likely to include the fiery
or antagonistic appeals that candidates deliver on the hustings for smaller audiences
comprising primarily supporters.
Bimes and Mulroy’s (2004, 141) otherwise impressive analysis suffers from the
same limitation—an exclusive reliance on a small and arguably unrepresentative, set of
ceremonial speeches (inaugural messages and state of the union addresses) as the basis for
drawing conclusions about trends in presidential populism. Indeed, Teten (2003, 336–
37) cautions that “making generalizations from trends that only appear in both inaugu-
rals and state of the union addresses may not accurately reflect rhetorical change due to
the traditional constraints placed on certain types of presidential speech.” Thus, like
Gerring’s, Bimes and Mulroy’s analysis is vulnerable to the criticism that the unrepresen-
tative nature of the speeches selected for analysis might confound assessment of longitu-
dinal trends in the volume and intensity of rhetorical populism in Democratic
communications.
Studying Class Populism in Democratic Rhetoric: A New

Approach
The subject of this study is explicit Democratic statements referring to the wealthy
in the context of presidential campaigns.4 Along with Gerring, Bimes and Mulroy, and
other analysts, we view statements pertaining to the rich as potentially evincing the phe-
nomenon of class populism, that is, a style of argumentation in which the president/
candidate presents the people—often embodied in him/herself—opposing a corrupt, self-
interested, or unrepresentative economic elite enjoying unfair access to government
largesse. (We say “potentially” because it is possible that statements pertaining to the
wealthy reflect other rhetorical tropes.) And with Gerring (1994; 1998), we study this
rhetoric in the context of presidential campaigns because such communications are—
given their elite authorship, national orientation, and mobilizing purpose—the most likely
sites of verifiable content pointing to candidates and parties’ broader political ideologies.5
Indeed, given that stump speeches are political addresses intended to fire up partisan sup-
porters, they are arguably the most likely sites of class populist rhetoric. In contrast, many
if not most major speeches by sitting presidents—especially inaugural and state of the
union addresses—are not ideal for the analysis we propose, largely because the use of class-
based (and especially antagonistic) rhetoric is sharply constrained by the relatively staid
norms governing these ceremonial genres (e.g., Beasley 2001; Teten 2003).6
In this study we examine longitudinal trends in Democratic presidential candidate
rhetoric about the wealthy in general election (September 1–Election Day) stump
speeches over the 1932–2012 period.7 We chose the stump speech as the preferred medi-
um for our analysis because—unlike other campaign communications such as televised
campaign ads, website content, or social media posts—stump speeches have played an
integral role in campaigns throughout the period under study and can be analyzed in a
comparable way across campaigns quite distant in time.8
4. Because broadsides against the wealthy and government policies that favor them are the character-
istic features of class populism, we believe that statements explicitly referring to the affluent are the most
likely sites of class populist rhetoric.
5. As Gerring (1994: 732) explains, “the role of party ideology within national politics is best stud-
ied by focusing on party elites, where ideological modes of thought are most prevalent; on the presidential
wing of the parties, where national, rather than state or local, values and beliefs are most likely to be repre-
sented; [and] on what party leaders said, the explicit, and hence most easily verifiable, content of party
ideologies. . .”
6. However, it is possible that presidents may make more extensive use of such appeals in minor
speeches and other remarks. This possibility awaits further scholarly investigation.
7. We excluded speeches made during primary campaigns because primaries are held within parties
and involve multiple candidates, and thus primary campaign speeches are not readily comparable with
addresses made in the context of general election contests. Additionally, the role of primary campaigns has
changed dramatically over the 1932–2012 period, making over-time comparisons problematic. We did not
include nomination acceptance addresses, radio addresses, video presentations/montages, Q&A sessions with
reporters, or victory/concession speeches. Additionally, for sitting presidents, we excluded speeches primarily
relating to responsibilities as chief executive/head of state.
8. Televised campaign advertisements are of great importance in presidential campaigns. Unfortu-
nately, while the storyboards of presidential campaign ads are available for campaigns between 1952 and
2012 (television ads did not appear prior to 1952), information about the frequency of ad airings is not.
Because ads vary greatly in the frequency of airings, analyses that do not include airing data misrepresent the
We focus on the 1932–2012 period for both methodological and practical reasons.
If previous studies of Democratic class populism have been hampered by the use of an
unrepresentative sample of speeches, we wanted to ground our study in a large assemblage
of addresses that permits valid comparisons over time. Unfortunately, large troves of
Democratic campaign speeches do not exist for the nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries, in substantial part because parties played the central role in organizing presidential
campaigns and presidential candidates were not expected to campaign aggressively and
publicly for office during this period (e.g., Milkis 1993; Troy 2012; Milkis and Nelson
2015).9
For the 1932–2012 period, however, the full texts of hundreds of Democratic presi-
dential general election stump speeches are available in digitized format, making them
readily accessible for large-scale quantitative and qualitative content analysis. Over the
1952–1996 period these addresses were collected in a joint effort by Pew and the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania’s Annenberg Public Policy Center and are available on CD-ROM
(Annenberg/Pew 1998); while for the 1932–1948 and 2004–2012 periods they are avail-
able from the American Presidency Project online (americanpresidency.org). Addresses
from the 2000 presidential campaign have been archived by the Stanford Political Com-
munication Lab (pcl.stanford.edu/). Because comparable speech data is available over the
1932–2012 period, we restrict our analysis to this time frame.
Admittedly, our analysis does not extend backward in time to the nineteenth centu-
ry, as do those of Gerring and Bimes and Mulroy, respectively. For the purposes of our
analysis, however, the left-truncation of our data is not as problematic as it initially
appears. We take no issue with Gerring’s, Bimes and Mulroy’s, and others’ characteriza-
tion of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a period in which class popu-
lism was commonplace in Democratic speeches; rather, we seek to reevaluate the claim
that there has been a notable decline in class populism since its alleged heyday (which
extends from 1896 to 1948 in Gerring’s telling and from 1828 to 1948 in Bimes and
Mulroy’s analysis). As noted, our focus on revisiting the putative decline of Democratic
class populism is driven by the especially high stakes surrounding resolution of this par-
ticular matter.10
Given our research objective, having full coverage of Democratic rhetoric in the
more recent era is far more important than replicating the findings of previous scholars
overall tone of candidates’ messages. Websites and social media posts have only recently become important to
presidential campaigns; consequently, these media were not appropriate for our purposes.
9. As Gerring (1998: 293) notes, “Prior to 1876, only a few presidential nominees addressed the
American public during the course of the general election. . .After 1876, presidential nominees were more
voluble but still did not formally ‘campaign,’ restricting their remarks to nonpolitical themes and remaining
in one location (at home or at the White House). Because presidential candidates themselves held aloof from
the hustings, it was necessary to draw on a wide range of partisan rhetoric to represent the parties’ views dur-
ing the nineteenth century. . .” According to Gerring, only after 1904 did presidential candidates play the
central role in campaigns. Other researchers (Milkis 1993; Troy 2012) place the date later.
10. What makes the alleged decline of Democratic class populism so troubling is that it occurred
during the same period that economic inequality increased dramatically. If the alleged decline of Democratic
class populism is substantiated, it would suggest that the language best suited to politicizing and addressing
economic injustices disappeared just as it was most needed.
for the earlier period.11 Crucially, the series in our possession includes a period (1932–
1948) that is generally considered part of the golden age of Democratic class populism. If
the conventional wisdom about the decline of class populism in Democratic rhetoric is
correct, it should be apparent in the data we have collected: the frequency and intensity of
class populist rhetoric should be substantially lower among all candidates in the post-
1948 period compared to Roosevelt and Truman. However, if our alternative view that
Democrats have maintained (and perhaps extended) their commitment to class populism
is correct, there should be considerable continuities in Democratic rhetoric across the
1932–1948 and 1952–2012 periods, respectively.
For each campaign, we constructed a file containing the full text of all of the stump
speeches made by the Democratic candidate during the general election campaign. The
next step involved isolating statements referring to the affluent. To do this, we wrote a
Ruby script (https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/) employing a large keyword dictionary to
identify and capture paragraphs explicitly mentioning rich individuals or groups. The
dictionary of terms and phrases is available in the Supplemental Materials.12 Importantly,
while our keyword dictionary contains numerous terms and phrases that are neutral or
positive descriptors of the wealthy (e.g., “wealthy,” “affluent,” “high-income,” “highly
successful,” “upper class,” etc.), it also includes many that have pejorative connotations in
the American context (e.g., “rich,” “monied,” “the haves,” “multi-millionaires,” “silk-
stocking,” etc.), allowing for identification of a variety of types of references to the rich.13
This procedure resulted in the capture of more than 1,000 statements containing referen-
ces to the keywords, with the number of statements varying considerably across candi-
dates and campaigns. Keyword-based extraction of text inevitably results in the capture
of false-positive matches, so we manually read every captured paragraph to remove such
statements.14 Our final dataset comprises 965 statements.
Following the methodological strategies of Gerring and Bimes and Mulroy, we
used quantitative and qualitative methods in concert to assess trends in class populism in
Democratic candidate rhetoric over the past eight decades. Quantitative content analysis
methods were employed to characterize general tendencies in the tone and content of can-
didate statements pertaining to the wealthy and thereby provide an overarching sense of
longitudinal trends in the presence of class populism in Democratic rhetoric. Because our
11. Gerring’s analysis concluded with the 1996 election, while Bimes and Mulroy’s runs through
2004.
12. We used online thesauruses to generate the keywords for our dictionary. We were attentive to
the possibility that terms used to refer to the wealthy might have changed over time, so we employed a wide
range of terms, including some that are not part of contemporary usage.
13. We thought it desirable to capture statements employing both positively- and negatively-
inflected references to the rich, on the grounds that (1) some statements using positively-inflected references
might, on observation, reveal negative or critical sentiment toward the wealthy and (2) some statements using
negatively-inflected references might upon review reveal positive sentiment toward the affluent. Casting a
wide net allowed us to examine the broadest range of statements including references to the wealthy, and thus
arrive at the firmest conclusions.
14. We also removed statements in which a mention of the wealthy was made within a laundry list
of references to various groups in society (this occurred fairly frequently). To demonstrate that we could
remove false-positive matches and laundry-list references reliably, we independently coded a random sample
of 250 units. We achieved a high level of intercoder reliability (Krippendorf’s alpha 5 .85) on this data
“cleaning” task.
quantitative analysis is primarily concerned with challenging the central descriptive

claim of previous work—that class populist appeals have declined as a feature of Demo-
cratic rhetoric—we focus on presenting descriptive quantitative trends.
We then used a close reading of our texts to contextualize these patterns, interpret
the meaning of candidates’ rhetoric, and draw qualitative comparisons across candidates
and over time. This careful reading, which closely follows the example of previous
research in the genre we address in this paper, is an essential methodological compliment
to our descriptive quantitative analysis. While quantitative content analysis methods
facilitate the making of broad generalizations about large numbers of texts, they are
inherently reductive, especially when applied to complex texts such as presidential cam-
paign speeches. Thus, quantitative methods risk obscuring important patterns that are
not easily reducible to blunt numerical summaries (Grimmer and Stewart 2013, 4).
Indeed, given that we are analyzing a particularly complex, multifaceted concept—class
populism—it is especially important to present rich qualitative documentation to sup-
port our interpretation of the rough generalizations our quantitative methods permit. In
the end, our robust qualitative evidence “allow[s] the reader to evaluate the evidence
without relying entirely on the authors’ own authority. . ..[and] provides a depth other-
wise lacking in discussions of abstract concepts and content-analysis statistics” (Gerring
1998, 298).
As a first step in our analysis we tracked the frequency of candidate statements per-
taining to the wealthy over time. The routine discussion of the wealthy is a necessary—
though not sufficient—condition of class populism, so we traced the frequency of rhetoric
pertaining to the upper class across the 1932–2012 period, operationalized as the number
of statements referring to the wealthy per 1,000 words of address.
Class populist appeals involve a generally negative attitude toward the affluent.
Thus, beyond gauging overarching trends in the frequency of statements about the weal-
thy, we also sought to evaluate broad patterns in tone or sentiment. Throughout the
1932–2012 period, there were essentially no statements lauding the wealthy or asking
for the political support of the rich, so a simple coding scheme contrasting “positive” ver-
sus “negative” statements was not feasible as a strategy of measuring class populism. As
an alternative, we used a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods to gauge
the tone of candidate statements. As a first step, we applied the open-source Lexicoder
computer program (http://www.lexicoder.com/) developed by Young and Soroka (2012).
Lexicoder utilizes a large sentiment lexicon to characterize the overall tone of political
texts.15 Following Young and Soroka, we use “average net tone”—the average of the pro-
portion of positive words minus the proportion of negative words across all of a given can-
didate’s statements—as one measure of class populism in candidates’ rhetoric about the
wealthy.16 We tracked trends in average net tone toward the wealthy over time.
15. Lexicoder’s performance has been validated against human coding, providing strong confidence
in its effectiveness in characterizing sentiment in political communications. Importantly, Lexicoder includes
a number of preprocessing routines, including stemming, punctuation removal, and disambiguation of nega-
tion phrases, to improve performance.
16. It is important to note that this method can only provide a bird’s eye view of the content of can-
didates’ rhetoric toward the rich.
We also examined the frequency of use of pejorative terms to refer to affluent indi-
viduals and groups. To accomplish this, we first created a new dictionary comprising a
subset of our keyword terms with uncomplimentary connotations (this dictionary is pro-
vided in the Supplemental Materials), and then employed the text mining R package tm
(http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/tm/index.html) to count the number of times
such terms were used by each candidate. We tracked the frequency of pejorative references
to the wealthy per 1,000 words of address for each candidate. Finally, to provide further
insight on the tone of candidates’ rhetoric toward the wealthy—and, especially, to detect
patterns of antagonistic speech that could not be identified via the quantitative meth-
ods—we engaged in a close reading of our texts, with a particular eye for antagonistic rhe-
toric closely associated with class populism. We provide extensive qualitative examples
of this style of rhetoric, as well as cross-campaign comparisons of this mode of address.
A central characteristic of class populist rhetoric is the accusation that the opposi-
tion party is an instrument of affluent Americans and distorts government policy to the
advantage of the wealthy. We thus investigated this pattern of argumentation in detail.
As a first quantitative step, we coded all statements in our data set to differentiate
between those that included such claims and those that did not.17 We tabulated the fre-
quency of such statements per 1,000 words of address. Then, to shed light both on the
particular techniques Democratic candidates employed to level this charge and the spe-
cific policy issues Democrats accused Republicans of distorting in favor of the rich, we
read all statements accorded this code to identify qualitative patterns.
In addition to charging that the opposition is showering government benefits on
the wealthy, class populism features presidential/candidate promises to work on behalf of
the people to remediate inequities in the distribution of social and economic opportuni-
ties. Indeed, such rhetorical linkages are crucial; after all, criticisms of the rich unaccom-
panied by proposals to assist the less fortunate might be fairly characterized as demagogic
appeals designed to manipulate popular passions simply on the basis of envy or rage.
We employed quantitative and qualitative content analysis to investigate this phe-
nomenon. First, we used a keyword dictionary derived from Wood (2009), available in
the Supplemental Materials, to identify statements containing both a reference to the
wealthy and discussion of one or more of nine major areas of public policy (crime, defense,
education, environment, health, race, size of government/taxation, urban, and welfare),
on the grounds that such statements were most likely to include rhetoric featuring criti-
cism of policies favoring the wealthy, promises to help nonwealthy groups, or both.18 We
tracked longitudinal trends in the frequency of such statements per 1,000 words of
address. By itself, however, this quantitative method is insufficient to demonstrate the
technique of linking criticisms of the wealthy to promises to redistribute social and eco-
nomic opportunities. To show this mode of address in action, we engaged in a qualitative
17. Our independent coding of a random sample of 250 units demonstrated that we achieved an
acceptable level of intercoder reliability (Krippendorf’s alpha 5 .83) on this task.
18. As Wood 2009 argues, focusing on these nine policy areas is justified because previous research
has demonstrated that attitudes about these nine policies comprise the major components of mass ideology. It
should also be noted that this exercise had the additional benefit of helping to differentiate between substan-
tive policy talk and rhetorical “fluff.”
reading of all statements tagged with this code and present extensive qualitative
examples.19
While we believe our approach permits a thorough analysis of the evolution of class
populism in the rhetoric of Democratic presidential candidates, some important caveats
are in order. First, our study does not provide a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of
the overarching ideology of Democratic presidential candidates or the Democratic Party.
Second, our research does not document trends in other (i.e., nonclass related) forms of
populist appeals. Third, while doing so is not necessary for our purpose of reassessing the
alleged decline of class populism in Democratic rhetoric since 1948, our analysis admit-
tedly cannot shed light on the scope of class populism prior to 1932. And finally, the con-
clusions of our study are limited to Democratic presidential campaigns; we cannot know
whether and to what extent they generalize to other contexts, such as the rhetoric of sit-
ting Democratic presidents. With these caveats in mind, we proceed to a discussion of
our findings.
Class Populism in Democratic Candidate Rhetoric, 1932–2012
Frequency of References to the Wealthy

In order for Democratic candidates to employ the technique of class populism effec-
tively in presidential campaigns, they must speak about the wealthy on a regular basis.
Figure 3 traces the frequency of presidential rhetoric pertaining to the wealthy over the
1932–2012 period.20
Figure 3 reveals a dramatic trend, and one that is unanticipated by the received wis-
dom. Indeed, as the Figure shows, the frequency of Democratic candidate rhetoric refer-
ring to the wealthy has grown exponentially over time, achieving its highest levels in the
1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.
Tone of Rhetoric Toward the Wealthy

However, the fact that the volume of references to the wealthy has increased does
not, in itself, constitute definitive evidence of the continuing importance of class popu-
lism. Conceivably, contemporary Democratic candidates could be talking more frequent-
ly—but also more solicitously—about the wealthy (e.g., Gerring 1997, 168–69).
19. We acknowledge that candidate promises to remediate inequities in social and economic oppor-
tunities also occur in statements that do not include references to the wealthy (and are thus not captured in
our analysis). However, since class populism revolves around the theme of fighting on behalf of the people
against an economic elite, for the purposes of our project we thought it was most appropriate to examine such
promises in the context of statements in which references to the wealthy were made.
20. During the 1940 and 1944 general election campaigns, Democratic candidate Franklin
Roosevelt made no statements referring to the wealthy. Roosevelt’s reticence on the subject of the rich in the
1940 and 1944 campaigns likely reflected extraordinary circumstances surrounding these contests – his
unprecedented campaigns for a 3rd and 4th term, respectively, as well as the nation’s involvement in the cata-
clysm of World War II – which rendered harsh class rhetoric untenable as a campaign strategy.
FIGURE 3. Frequency of Democratic Candidate Statements Referring to the Wealthy per 1,000
Words of Address, by Presidential Campaign, 1932–2012
To begin to investigate the content of Democratic candidate rhetoric toward the

affluent, we turn to a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the tone of the statements in
our analysis. Figure 4 presents the results of our Lexicoder analysis of the average net tone
of Democratic candidate statements involving references to the wealthy over the 1932–
2012 period.
As Figure 4 shows, there has been considerable variation in the average net tone of
Democratic statements referring to the wealthy over this period.21 In some campaigns,
average net tone is noticeably more positive than in others. Crucially for our purposes,
however, there is no clear demarcation between the class-populist 1932–1948 period, on
one hand, and the allegedly conciliatory 1952–2012 era, on the other. Indeed, the average
net tones of campaigns in the two periods are virtually identical (.028 and .029, respec-
tively), and a linear trend line explains essentially none of the variance in the over-time
trend. Put simply: with average net tone as the measure, at least, the two periods are
indistinguishable.
When we examine the frequency of pejorative references to the wealthy, we find
similar results (see Figure 5).
Although there is considerable variation in the rate of pejorative references to the
wealthy over time, it is not the case that these allusions were more common in the earlier,
1932–1948 period. In fact, the average rate of pejorative references to the wealthy is
slightly higher in the 1952–2012 period—.13 references per 1,000 words versus .11
references—though substantively this difference is negligible. Also of note, there are
some campaigns in the more recent period (McGovern’s 1972 campaign and Dukakis’
1988 effort, especially) that rival the disdainful tone of Truman’s famous 1948 campaign
21. Throughout the period, Democratic candidate statements referring to the wealthy have had a
positive average net tone. This likely reflects the complexity of language, in which words with positive
valence can be employed to convey opposition to the interests or values of the wealthy. In practice, this is
common, as when presidential candidates employ humor to ridicule the wealthy (or Republican coddling of
the rich), or when they mix criticism of the rich and/or the policies serving them with promises to take posi-
tive steps to help non-wealthy Americans. For our purposes, the key empirical point is that average net tone
is not significantly more positive in the more recent period than it was in the more distant era. As we show in
what follows, the positive average net tone of the statements in our analysis definitively does not indicate posi-
tive Democratic sentiment toward the wealthy.
FIGURE 4. Average Net Tone of Democratic Candidate Statements Referring to the Wealthy,
by Presidential Campaign, 1932–2012
FIGURE 5. Frequency of Democratic Candidate Pejorative References to Wealthy per 1,000

Words of Address, by Presidential Campaign, 1932–2012
and exceed that of any of Roosevelt’s campaigns. This second measure of sentiment—like
the first—suggests far more similarities than differences in the tone of Democratic rhetor-
ic relating to the wealthy across the 1932–1948 and 1952–2012 periods, respectively.
Meanwhile, our reading of Democratic candidate statements referring to the weal-
thy over the 1932–2012 period reveals striking continuity in Democratic antagonism
toward the well-to-do over time. Democratic references to the wealthy routinely bristle
with acrimony, as the candidates position themselves on the side of the people against an
affluent economic elite. In 1948, Harry Truman famously declared, “Now, as I have said
time and again, there is one basic issue in this campaign. This is it: The Democratic Party
and the people against special privilege and the privileged few. That is the issue in this
campaign” (Truman 1948a). But this theme was echoed again and again in subsequent
Democratic campaigns. Twenty-four years later, 1972 Democratic nominee George
McGovern inveighed against his Republican opponent Richard Nixon’s alleged favorit-
ism toward the affluent, proclaiming, “I want government of the people instead of
government for the privileged. And that is the kind of government we will begin to build
on January 20, 1973” (McGovern 1972a). Michael Dukakis, the 1988 Democratic nomi-
nee, echoed the theme of the people versus the privileged, averring, “We must never for-
get—though some would have us do so—that the dream belongs not just to the
privileged few—but to all of us” (Dukakis 1988a). And Al Gore’s 2000 presidential cam-
paign featured this exposition of the populist credo:
. . . I know this about the job of the President: It is the only job in the Constitution that is
charged with the responsibility of fighting for all the people. Not one state or one district;
not the wealthy or the powerful—but all the people. Those who need a voice; those who
need a champion; those who need to be lifted up so they are never left behind. (Gore 2000a)
This rhetorical theme continues to find an important place in Democratic campaign

rhetoric. During the 2012 presidential campaign Barack Obama repeatedly delivered var-
iations of the charge that wealthy elites were attempting to buy the election in order to
distort policy making to suit their narrow interests:
. . . I want everybody to understand over these next 2 months, over these next 63 days, you
will see more ads, more negative ads, more insults and distractions and baloney than you’ve
ever seen. And it will be supported by $10 million checks from wealthy donors that like
things just the way they are. And they’re counting on you maybe not to vote for [Republican
presidential nominee Mitt] Romney, but they’re counting on you to feel discouraged. And
they figure if you don’t vote then big oil will write our energy future, and insurance compa-
nies will write our health care plans, and politicians will dictate what a woman can or can’t
do when it comes to her own health. (Obama 2012a)
On some occasions, Democratic candidates have indicated that they did not even
especially want the support of affluent Americans. “The Republicans are welcome to Mr.
[John] Connolly [Richard Nixon’s former Secretary of the Treasury] and his exclusive
club of oil millionaires,” McGovern exclaimed during the 1972 campaign. “I want the oil
workers, the steelworkers, the machinists, the teachers, and millions of other Americans
who live on the wages of their work instead of tax loopholes” (McGovern 1972b). “If you
believe that America is not a jungle where it’s just survival of the richest or the fittest—
whatever that means—if you believe that we are family and we should care for one anoth-
er, then pull the lever that says Mondale-Ferraro,” Walter Mondale exclaimed on the
1984 campaign trail (Mondale 1984a). “When you cast your vote this year taxes are on
the ballot—George Bush wants to give you four more years of tax giveaways for million-
aires and a higher tax burden for you,” John Kerry suggested in 2004. “My fellow Ameri-
cans, do you want four more years of all that?” (Kerry 2004a).22
22. In their 1992 and 2008 campaigns, respectively, Bill Clinton and Barack Obama took a some-
what different rhetorical tack. They both averred that they “wanted to create more millionaires”, but only
under the condition that wealthy people submitted to tax increases and/or tax reforms that directed business
owners to spend more money to create jobs for less-fortunate Americans. As Clinton claimed on the campaign
trail, “I would love to see the Clinton-Gore administration produce more millionaires than Bush and Reagan
but I’ve got this crazy notion that it ought to happen the old-fashioned way, by putting the rest of America to
work, and letting the rest of America earn for the work that they do (Clinton 1992e).”
Criticism of Republican Coddling of the Wealthy

In addition to expressing animosity toward the rich, class-based populism holds
that the wealthy are undeserving beneficiaries of government largesse doled out by the
opposition. The results of our examination of the frequency of Democratic criticisms of
Republican favoritism toward the wealthy are presented in Figure 6.
Our findings are striking. Both Franklin Roosevelt’s 1936 campaign and Harry
Truman’s 1948 campaign are noted for the frequency of their attacks on Republicans’
alleged cosseting of wealthy Americans. Yet our quantitative content analysis finds that
many subsequent Democratic campaigns—especially those of George McGovern (1972),
Michael Dukakis (1988), Al Gore (2000), John Kerry (2004), and Barack Obama
(2012)—leveled charges of this type on an even more frequent basis. In fact, over the
1932–2012 period there has been a dramatic increase in the frequency of such rhetoric in
Democratic campaign speeches (a linear trend explains 54% of the variance in this mode
of rhetoric).
It would be a mistake to believe that the stridency of Democratic attacks on Repub-
licans’ alleged pampering of the affluent has slackened over time. In fact, there has been
considerable continuity in the tone of these charges, even as their frequency has increased.
Democrats have consistently claimed that the Republican Party has been in the back
pocket of the affluent. “The Republicans are not interested in the welfare of the whole
people,” Harry Truman exclaimed on the 1948 campaign trail. “They are only interested
in special privilege, they are only interested in helping the rich” (Truman 1948b). But
Adlai Stevenson excoriated the GOP in similar fashion during the 1956 campaign, when
the conventional wisdom holds that Democrats were moving toward conciliatory appeals:
President Eisenhower’s Cabinet reflects the true spirit of the Republican party. The qualifi-
cations were not past public service. The criterion was financial success. He chose a Cabinet
of business managers and millionaires. I have said that the party of Lincoln had become the
party of Cadillac but this is exactly the kind of Cabinet we should expect and should have in
a Republican administration. (Stevenson 1956a)
This refrain has stood the test of time. Paraphrasing Truman, Jimmy Carter bluntly
explained during the 1976 campaign that “[t]he Republicans believe that the power of
government should be used first of all to help the rich and privileged people in this
country. . . Mr. Truman’s words are still true today” (Carter 1976a). Eight years later,
Walter Mondale employed humor to make his point: “Mr. Reagan believes a president
should serve all the people in his country club. I believe a president should serve all the
people in our country” (Mondale 1984b). Michael Dukakis echoed this sentiment in a
more direct fashion, averring that the election of a Republican president would “lead[] to
an America of privilege—an America where the very rich get even richer and the rest of
us just get by” (Dukakis 1988b). And in his 2004 campaign, John Kerry offered another
variation of this argument, arguing that
George [W.] Bush came into office four years ago with a very clear philosophy about how he
would run this country. Time and time again he has made the same choice to use the power
FIGURE 6. Frequency of Democratic Candidate Statements Criticizing Republican Coddling of

the Wealthy per 1,000 Words of Address, by Presidential Campaign, 1932–2012
of the presidency to give more and more to those with the most—more to the wealthiest
individuals, more to the most well-connected . . . (Kerry 2004b)
Democratic candidates have also consistently emphasized the contrast between the
GOP’s alleged capture by the affluent and their party’s allegiance to the people. In some
cases, this argument was short and sweet. “Now that man [Richard Nixon, the Republi-
can presidential nominee], that Republican candidate has got money power,” Hubert
Humphrey announced during the 1968 campaign. “I tell you what we got—people
power” (Humphrey 1968). Others emphasized, as Jimmy Carter did during the 1980
campaign, “[The Democrats] are not a rich man’s party. . .but we are rich in our diversity,
rich in representing the diversity which is America itself and the source of a great portion
of our strength” (Carter 1980a). Other candidates have employed more elaborate pro-
grammatic contrasts to make their point. “Mr. [George Herbert Walker Bush, the
Republican presidential nominee] believes that the way to make the economy grow is to
put more wealth in the hands of the wealthy even if it means less opportunity in the lives
of the middle class,” Bill Clinton contended in a 1992 campaign speech. “But I believe
the way to make the economy grow is to invest in our children’s education, invest in our
workers’ skills, invest in our families’ health care, and put some discipline back into the
federal budget by asking the wealthy to pay their fair share . . .” (Clinton 1992).
Moving beyond general claims about Republicans’ slavish adherence to the
demands of the affluent, Democratic candidates have consistently charged that Republi-
cans have bestowed undeserved largesse on the wealthy in the form of lavish tax cuts. To
be sure, such arguments were common in the 1932–1948 period. “Once more this year
we must choose between democracy in taxation and special privilege in taxation,” Frank-
lin Roosevelt declaimed apocalyptically on the 1936 campaign trail. “Are you willing to
turn the control of the Nation’s taxes back to special privilege?” (Roosevelt 1936b). Dur-
ing the 1948 campaign, Harry Truman leveled a similar charge against the GOP, thun-
dering that “[a]mong the first things [Republicans] did when they got control of the
Congress of the United States—that awful 80th Congress which has shown conclusively
that they are for the special interests—was to pass a rich man’s tax bill for themselves and
to begin to take liberties away from labor” (Truman 1948c).
Yet very similar rhetoric has pervaded Democratic presidential campaigns all the
way up to the present. Democratic candidates have routinely accused Republicans of
bestowing enormous tax benefits on the rich but little on those with more moderate
incomes. “[Republicans] changed the tax laws,” Adlai Stevenson alleged during the 1956
campaign, “and shortchanged the less fortunate by giving 91 cents out of every dollar of
tax cut to the corporations and higher-income taxpayers” (Stevenson 1956b). During the
1972 campaign George McGovern reproached the Nixon administration for enacting a
tax “giveaway” for the most affluent that was “stacked on top of a tax structure that
already works like a sieve for the rich and a sponge for the worker” (McGovern 1972c).
The 1984 Democratic presidential nominee Walter Mondale raged that, “[i]n Mr.
Reagan’s America, if you’re rich they give you tax cuts. If you’re not they give you cheese”
(Mondale 1984b). And Michael Dukakis complained in his 1988 campaign that his
Republican opponent, George H. W. Bush, wanted to “. . . give the wealthiest one per-
cent of Americans $30,000. The rest of us get twenty bucks” (Dukakis 1988c).
Democratic candidates have also repeatedly emphasized that tax cuts for the wealthy
threatened commitments to nonaffluent Americans. During the 2000 presidential cam-
paign, Al Gore warned audiences that “[the Republicans’] plan would take as much as
$360 billion from Medicare, and then use more than 70 percent of that to pay for a tax
cut that gives the wealthiest one percent almost half the benefits” (Gore 2000a). “[Repub-
lican presidential nominee John McCain] defended his plan to give $300 billion in tax
cuts to corporations and the wealthiest Americans,” 2008 Democratic nominee Barack
Obama complained. “But he had nothing to say about the fact that wages have flat-lined
and jobs are being shipped overseas” (Obama 2008a). And Obama’s 2012 campaign fea-
tured repeated accusations that Republicans’ tax promises to the rich threatened myriad
government commitments to vulnerable groups.
And let me tell you, I will be fine without a tax cut. I really would. Mitt Romney will defi-
nitely be fine without a tax cut. Don’t need it. And as long as I’m President I’m not going to
turn Medicare into a voucher just to pay for another millionaire’s tax cut. I’m not going to
make young people pay more to go to college just for a tax cut for me or Mitt Romney.
(Obama 2012b)
Criticism of Policies Benefiting the Wealthy and Promises to the Nonaffluent

Class populist appeals not only feature criticism of policies disproportionately
benefiting the wealthy; they also involve specific promises to nonaffluent groups to work
to address inequalities in social and economic opportunities. In this way, they make the
programmatic, redistributive facets of their populist rhetoric explicit for their audiences.
As a first step in investigating whether Democratic candidates linked criticisms of
the wealthy to policy promises to the nonaffluent, we identified statements in our data set
mentioning the wealthy that also referred to one or more important areas of policy, and
FIGURE 7. Frequency of Democratic Candidate Statements Referring to the Wealthy and

Mentioning a Policy Area, by Campaign and Policy Area, 1932–2012
traced the frequency of such statements (by policy area) per 1,000 words of address over
the 1932–2012 period. These results are presented in Figure 7.
Several patterns are evident in the figure. First, the frequency of these statements
has grown tremendously over time. With the exception of Truman’s 1948 campaign, the
rate of this type of rhetoric is negligible until McGovern’s 1972 campaign, but then
increases substantially (with some ups and downs) through the end of the time series.
This implies that Democrats have increasingly mentioned the wealthy in the context of
broader policy discussions. Second, there is a definite pattern in the types of policies that
are discussed in statements referring to the wealthy: throughout the period, size of gov-
ernment/tax policy dominates by a large margin, followed by health and education.23
These patterns indicate that matters relating to size of government/tax, health, and
education policy have played an increasingly prominent part in Democratic candidate
statements referring to the wealthy. But how do these trends relate to the phenomenon of
class populism? Focusing on the three areas receiving most candidate attention, our thor-
ough qualitative review of these statements shows that they comprise in large part criti-
cism of policies that disproportionately benefit the rich and promises to expand
opportunities for nonaffluent groups.
As we have already seen, criticism of Republican tax policies overly generous to the
wealthy (and onerous to nonaffluent groups) has been a staple of Democratic candidate
rhetoric throughout the period, though the frequency of such statements has increased
substantially over time. However, this theme has often been joined to populist promises
23. The keywords used to select statements pertaining to the Size of Government/Taxation category
include buzz-phrases indicating conservative opposition to government, such as “big government”, “excessive
government”, and “over-regulation,” as well as a bevy of keywords pertaining to tax policy. In practice,
though, Democratic candidates never used the phrases pertaining to the size of government; they only
employed the keywords referring to taxation, and they always advocated higher taxes on the wealthy (or,
much less frequently, targeted tax cuts for job-creating measures), as well as tax cuts for middle- and lower-
income taxpayers.
to redistribute the burden of taxation so that it falls more heavily on the wealthy. For
example, George McGovern exclaimed during the 1972 campaign that
. . . this country began with the cry “No taxation without representation.” We ought to
modify that to read “No taxation without justice.” And that means doing something about
these preferences and shelters and loopholes in our tax laws and those which permit those
who are best able to pay to get by without paying any tax at all. (McGovern 1972d)
Similar themes peppered the addresses of subsequent Democratic candidates. “I refuse to

make middle-income taxpayers pay more,” Walter Mondale vowed in 1984, “so million-
aires and big corporations can pay less, or nothing at all” (Mondale 1984b). In a similar
vein, Bill Clinton announced during the 1992 campaign that “I want to ask the wealthy
to pay their fair share of taxes for a change . . . But I don’t want to hurt the middle class
and the poor who are already poorer than they used to be and paying more for health care”
(Clinton 1992a).
Arguments about the need to shift the tax burden from the working and middle
classes to the wealthy have continued to feature in Democratic tax rhetoric, arguably
becoming even more pointed over time. “This election is a choice between four more years
of tax giveaways for millionaires along with a higher tax burden for you,” John Kerry
warned during the 2004 campaign. “Or a president who will cut middle-class taxes, raise
the minimum wage, and make sure we guarantee women an equal day’s pay for an equal
day’s work” (Kerry 2004c). During the 2008 campaign, Barack Obama avowed that
John McCain thinks that the way to rebuild this economy is to double down on George
Bush’s policy of giving more and more tax breaks to those at the very top in the false hope
that it will all trickle down. I think it’s time to rebuild the middle class . . .. (Obama
2008b)
This rhetoric returned during Obama’s 2012 reelection campaign. “[W]e cannot afford
to double down on the same, old, top-down economic policies that caused this mess [the
2008 economic crisis] in the first place,” Obama boomed. “We can’t afford another round
of tax cuts for the wealthy, folks, we’ve got to give and maintain tax cuts for you” (Obama
2012c).
Democratic statements referring to the wealthy and discussing health policy have
been focused on two central themes, both of which reflect elements of class populism:
promises to extend health coverage to all Americans (and not just the “privileged few”)
and criticism of Republican tax proposals that would threaten the fiscal integrity of
health programs—primarily Medicare and Medicaid—on which millions of nonaffluent
Americans rely. Since the 1980s, especially, Democratic candidates have made repeated
promises to make health care accessible to all rather than a “privilege of the wealthy.” “I
want to talk about how we can strengthen American families by making America first
in the health of our people—and I mean the health of all our people, not just the privi-
leged few,” Michael Dukakis pronounced on the 1988 campaign trail (Dukakis 1988d).
During the 1992 campaign, Bill Clinton explained his health plan in the following
way:
[B]y the end of this decade we will have a health care system that is the envy of the world,
not only for the best doctors, the best pharmaceuticals, the best health care that the best of
us can afford, the wealthy of us can afford, those of us that have the best policies now. We
will have a system that. . .[provides] basic good quality affordable health care to all of our people.
(Clinton 1992b, emphasis added)
“I believe we are ready to leave the failed policies of the past behind,” John Kerry
announced, “and look toward the future with the hope that America will finally fulfill the
promise . . . that in the richest country on Earth health care is not a privilege for the
elected, connected, or the wealthy, it is a right for all Americans” (Kerry 2004d). During
his 2008 campaign, Barack Obama made essentially the same point, framed as a contrast
between Republican and Democratic approaches: “[John McCain] wants to double down
on a health care policy that only works for the healthy and the wealthy. I want to cut costs
and expand coverage for all Americans” (Obama 2008c).
Democrats have also have raised the fearful specter that Republican tax promises would
gut existing health care programs (as well as other federal commitments). “In the Republican
future tax increases and program cuts will fall heaviest on working Americans of average
means just as they did before,” Walter Mondale warned during the 1984 campaign. “. . . I
refuse to make your family pay more so that millionaires can pay less. And I refuse to cut
Social Security and Medicare and student loans. . .so that big corporations can pay nothing at
all” (Mondale 1984b). During the 1988 campaign Michael Dukakis posed the question, “[I]f
Mr. Bush wants another tax giveaway for the rich; and if he can’t think of a single weapons
system in the budget that he opposes; and if he says he’s going to bring down the deficit; then
how’s he going to do it without raiding the Social Security trust funds and trying to cut Social
Security and Medicare again?” (Dukakis 1988c). “Right now Medicare is running a surplus,”
Al Gore announced three election cycles later, during better budgetary days. “[But] [s]ome
see that surplus as a piggy bank they can use for a tax cut that primarily benefits the wealthi-
est Americans at the expense of everyone else” (Gore 2000a).
Meanwhile, Democratic candidate statements involving both mentions of the weal-
thy and references to education policy have tended either to emphasize how Republicans’
favoritism toward the rich harmed (or threatened to harm) educational and other oppor-
tunities for nonaffluent Americans or to suggest how increased spending on education
could help level the economic playing field. Antecedents for this first theme appeared in
the 1940s and 1950s. Harry Truman warned during the 1948 campaign that a Republi-
can win would portend “unity in giving tax relief to the rich at the expense of the poor—
unity in refusing to give aid to our schools—unity in letting prices go sky high in order
to protect excessive profits—unity in whittling away the benefits of the New Deal . . .”
(Truman 1948d). Adlai Stevenson echoed this argument in 1956, contending that
“[w]here business interests are involved [Republicans]. . . have not been bashful. It is a
matter of cutting taxes for the well-to-do. . . But when human interests are concerned . . .
where the need is to wipe out poverty or to build schools and hospitals, to clear slums,
even to distribute the Salk vaccine—there no one leads” (Stevenson 1956c).
But such arguments have remained present—indeed, increased in frequency—since
the 1980s. “Down through the ages for the last fifty years at least every great advance has
been made for working people for farmers, for young people to get a better education . . .
every time the Republicans have been against it,” Jimmy Carter warned in 1980. “. . . But
they tend to mislead the people just before an election and because they have enormous
campaign contributions from the rich they can dominate the radio and the television and
they can send out a false message which quite often misleads people” (Carter 1980b).
“. . .[I]f you don’t like what [Ronald Reagan] has tried to do to Social Security and school
lunch and student loans and help for the poor and the disadvantaged and the handicapped,
re-elect him and you ain’t seen nothing yet,” Walter Mondale admonished. “If you didn’t
like the way they handled that tax situation where if you make $200,000 dollars a year he
gave you $60,000 in tax relief; If you made $30,000 a year or less all things considered your
taxes went up . . . elect Mr. Reagan and you haven’t seen anything yet” (Mondale 1984c).
Bill Clinton made a similar point during the 1992 campaign, contending
Trickle-down economics—the [Republican] idea that if you just keep taxes low on the
wealthiest Americans and minimize the role of the national government in the life of the
economy, you can grow it. They’ve had twelve years, look what’s happened . . . The college
dropout rate is twice the high school dropout rate because so many young people go and cannot afford to
stay.” (Clinton 1992c, emphasis added)
“The choice in this election couldn’t be more clear,” John Kerry advised listeners in
2004.
Do we want four more years of lost jobs and falling wages . . . four more years of rising health
care costs . . . four more years of raiding Social Security to give tax cuts to the wealthy . . .
four more years of schools being shortchanged leaving millions of children behind . . . If you
do then you should vote for George W Bush. (Kerry 2004e)
At the same time, Democrats have (increasingly, by our evidence) argued for poli-
cies that would “put our kids first. . . [so that] every young American has just as much
right to go on to college and vocational school as the children of the wealthy,” as Walter
Mondale put it (Mondale 1984d). As Bill Clinton argued in the 1992 campaign, Demo-
cratic education policy
. . . means Head Start and other preschool programs for every child who needs it—not just
talking about it but doing it. It means smaller classes in those early grades and counselors to
help the kids who need support and who can’t get it at home. It means the opportunity to
have access to computers and to labs and to languages. Even if you’re a poor inner-city kid or a
poor kid in a rural area you got to have access to these things too because your world will be shaped by
them just the same as if you’re in a very wealthy suburban school. (Clinton 1992d, emphasis added)
During his 2000 campaign, Al Gore articulated a similar sentiment, emphasizing that “I
don’t believe we should spend all the bucks—the entire federal surplus—on a huge tax
cut for the wealthy . . . which would leave local schools under-funded and too often help-
less to solve their problems.” Instead, Gore argued, “let’s invest in education . . .”
(2000b). Barack Obama’s 2008 campaign tied education spending to the broader theme
of making social investments to help ordinary (as opposed to wealthy) Americans:
I do believe that government should do that which we cannot do for ourselves—protect us

from harm and provide a decent education for our children; invest in new roads and new sci-
ence and technology. . .It should ensure a shot at success not only for those with money and power
and influence but for every single American who’s willing to work. (Obama 2008d, emphasis
added)
Exceptional Cases
While we believe our analysis documents striking continuities in the theme of class
populism in Democratic candidate rhetoric over the 1932–2012 period—and, arguably,
provides evidence that the frequency and intensity of this mode of argumentation has
increased over time—there are some exceptions to this pattern. Three campaigns are espe-
cially noticeable in this regard: John Kennedy’s 1960 campaign; Lyndon Johnson’s 1964
effort and Bill Clinton’s 1996 reelection campaign. Kennedy and Johnson rarely ever
mentioned the wealthy, let alone criticized them; and while Clinton referenced the afflu-
ent much more frequently the tone of his 1996 rhetoric was hardly populist.24
What accounts for these exceptions? For Johnson and Clinton, the answer probably
lies in the unusual, and especially advantageous, strategic circumstances surrounding
their respective campaigns. Both of these Democrats were incumbent presidents cruising
to victory against weak Republican opponents (Barry Goldwater and Robert Dole, respec-
tively) in relatively good economic times. Under such auspicious political conditions,
there was little incentive to employ provocative “class warfare” rhetoric on the campaign
trail: in truth, the Democratic candidates enjoyed such tremendous advantages that they
could play it safe rhetorically and still anticipate impressive electoral victories (e.g.,
Johnson 2009, chap. 5; Hohenberg 1997, chap. 27–34). Additionally, for Johnson—
though certainly not for Clinton—a relatively low level of economic inequality (Piketty
and Saez 2003, updated 2015) likely reduced the salience of class tensions, reinforcing
Johnson’s disinclination to employ antagonistic class appeals.
While (like Johnson) Kennedy campaigned under conditions of relatively low eco-
nomic inequality, in other ways his strategic situation was much less auspicious than that
of either Johnson or Clinton. Indeed, in 1960 Kennedy was a nonincumbent engaged in a
hard-fought contest with a formidable Republican opponent, Richard Nixon. Because
such adverse strategic circumstances might be expected to incentivize the use of class pop-
ulist appeals—but did not—we must look for an alternative explanation of the absence of
class populist rhetoric in Kennedy’s speech. We suspect Kennedy’s rejection of class pop-
ulism was reflective of his distinctive political worldview. Indeed, far from focusing on
the domestic redistributive and regulatory questions that had dominated the New Deal
and Fair Deal eras, Kennedy asserted a globally minded ideology emphasizing “masculine
24. Indeed, all of Clinton’s 1996 utterances including references to the wealthy were comprised of
variations on the optimistic theme that “If we keep to our commitment to make sure that every classroom
and library in every school in the United States is hooked up to the Information Superhighway by the year
2000, every child for the first time in the history of this country–every child–will have access to the same
information at the same level of quality in the same time as every other child—rich, poor, or middle class.
That will revolutionize education” (Clinton 1996a).
vigor,” personal sacrifice, and national glory in winning the Cold War (e.g., Milkis and
Nelson 2003. 310–11; Dean 1998; Wander 1984). As Kennedy (1960, emphasis added)
himself put it in his 1960 address accepting the Democratic presidential nomination,
[I]n 1960 the cause of liberalism cannot content itself with carrying on the fight for human justice
and economic liberalism here at home. For here and around the world the fear of war hangs over
us every morning and every night.
Within a conceptual framework that prioritized the United States’ world-historic role in
confronting the Soviets and spreading the benefits of democracy, rhetoric antagonistic
toward the wealthy was not simply irrelevant—it was counterproductive, insofar as it
undermined the ethos of collective purpose and self-sacrifice necessary to accomplish this
objective.
Conclusion
Has class populism—historically a powerful weapon in Democrats’ rhetorical arse-

nal—declined as a feature of Democratic address? The received wisdom is that Democrats
abandoned class populism as a rhetorical device following the New Deal/Fair Deal era, as
they became the party of government, adapted themselves to the new challenges of manag-
ing the national economy and policing the world, and became increasingly dependent on the
political patronage of affluent Americans. Rather than continuing to excoriate the wealthy,
the conventional view suggests, Democrats increasingly adopted consensual language that
implicitly (and often explicitly) acknowledged, and thereby reinforced, the political power of
the well-to-do. This development, the predominant view suggests, abetted the impoverish-
ment of contemporary American political discourse by foreclosing frank discussion of politi-
cal responses to the deteriorating economic position of less fortunate Americans.
We believe the conventional wisdom suffers from theoretical and methodological
limitations. At the theoretical level, the prevailing perspective points to plausible reasons
to expect the decline of class populism in Democratic speech since the late 1940s, but
completely ignores countervailing developments (rising economic inequality, increasing
ideological and class polarization, and the increasing competitiveness of presidential cam-
paigns) that could have plausibly encouraged Democratic candidates to continue to
employ antagonistic rhetoric toward the wealthy. And at the methodological level,
because previous research has relied on a small and unrepresentative sample of speeches as
the basis for analysis, it is unclear whether the findings from these studies present a full
and accurate characterization of the trajectory of class populist appeals in Democratic rhe-
toric. In short, the unflattering characterization of contemporary Democratic politics
ensconced in the conventional wisdom rests on foundations that are unsound.
In this article we reevaluate the received view, undertaking an intensive quantita-
tive and qualitative content analysis of Democratic candidate statements about the afflu-
ent in hundreds of presidential campaign stump speeches over the 1932–2012 period.
Our results present a strong challenge to the conventional wisdom that class populism
has faded from Democratic rhetoric. Far from avoiding antagonistic appeals toward the
rich, Democratic presidential candidates have made increasingly frequent references to
the wealthy, have employed a consistently adversarial tone in statements referring to the
affluent, have made increasingly frequent criticisms of Republicans’ alleged favoritism
toward the rich, and have increasingly linked critical references to the wealthy to prom-
ises to assist less fortunate Americans through programmatic reforms. All of our findings
point to the conclusion that—contrary to the received view—class populism is alive and
well as a feature of Democratic presidential campaign rhetoric.
We suspect that the persistence—if not intensification—of class populism in Demo-
cratic campaign rhetoric derives from political developments that have made this mode of
address of continuing relevance to electoral politics. The dramatic increase in economic
inequality, the ideological and class polarization of the parties, and the decline of the Demo-
crats’ virtual lock on the presidency after 1964 have combined to make class populism a
trope of continuing, and perhaps increasing, utility for Democratic presidential candidates.
Our research has important implications for our understanding of the evolution of
Democratic politics over the past eight decades. First, our findings suggest the enduring
centrality of class conflict—and, particularly, of skepticism of the “undeserving rich”—
within the Democratic public philosophy (Abbott 1990). Indeed, our research indicates
that, by continuing to make class populism an important feature of their campaign rhe-
toric, Democratic candidates may be contributing to the widespread perception that the
Democratic Party is the “party of the people” and the Republican Party is the “party of
the rich” (Nicholson and Segura 2012). Equally important, our research suggests that
there is much more to contemporary Democratic rhetoric than an arid, technocratic dis-
course that implicitly (or explicitly) reinforces the political dominance of the affluent. By
continuing to castigate the wealthy, criticize Republicans for coddling the rich, and pro-
pose redistributive measures in order to ameliorate economic inequality, Democratic
presidential candidates have helped to keep alive class populist themes that are essential
to political efforts to improve the life chances of the less fortunate.
To be sure, ours is not the last word on class populism in American presidential and party
politics. Future research could extend our study to examine class populist appeals in the noncer-
emonial addresses of Democratic presidents. Analysts could assess whether and why Democrat-
ic congressional candidates have employed the language of class populism in their campaigns.
And scholars could investigate how class populist rhetoric influences the political attitudes and
candidate evaluations of Democratic, independent, and Republican voters. Such work would
expand our understanding of how populist appeals have shaped American party politics.
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Welcoming Their Hatred: Class Populism in

Democratic Rhetoric in American Presidential

Keywords: presidential rhetoric, populism, class conflict, Democratic Party

We now know that Government by organized money is just as dangerous as Government by

The Evolution of Democratic Rhetoric Toward the Wealthy

The conventional wisdom—which we reassess in this article—is that rhetoric

contends that Democrats’ adoption of technocratic and universalistic themes proceeded

Reasons for Reconsidering the Received Wisdom

FIGURE 1. Real Income, by Percentile, 1933–2014 (Excluding Capital Gains)

wealth. These developments may have incentivized Democratic candidates to exploit

FIGURE 2. Democratic Popular Vote Margin (Percent), Presidential Elections, 1932–2012

have provided further encouragement to Democratic candidates to resurrect the risky

Studying Class Populism in Democratic Rhetoric: A New

quantitative analysis is primarily concerned with challenging the central descriptive

Class Populism in Democratic Candidate Rhetoric, 1932–2012

Frequency of References to the Wealthy

Tone of Rhetoric Toward the Wealthy

To begin to investigate the content of Democratic candidate rhetoric toward the

FIGURE 5. Frequency of Democratic Candidate Pejorative References to Wealthy per 1,000

This rhetorical theme continues to find an important place in Democratic campaign

Criticism of Republican Coddling of the Wealthy

FIGURE 6. Frequency of Democratic Candidate Statements Criticizing Republican Coddling of

Criticism of Policies Benefiting the Wealthy and Promises to the Nonaffluent

FIGURE 7. Frequency of Democratic Candidate Statements Referring to the Wealthy and

Similar themes peppered the addresses of subsequent Democratic candidates. “I refuse to

I do believe that government should do that which we cannot do for ourselves—protect us

Has class populism—historically a powerful weapon in Democrats’ rhetorical arse-

Annenberg/Pew. 1998. Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse. [CD-ROM].

———. 2008c. Address in Londonderry, New Hampshire. October 15.

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