Natural Resources and Environmental Law

Prelims Reviewer

I. Constitutional Provisions on Natural Resources

A. Preamble
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order
to build a just and humane society, and establish a Government that shall
embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and
develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the
blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime
of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate
this Constitution.

B. Article I
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands
and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the
Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial
and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the
insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between,
and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.

C. Article II
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them.

Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature.

D. Article XII
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The
State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of
water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than
the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit
of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and
enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources

by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to
subsistence fishermen and fish- workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations

involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In
such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in
accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.

Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public
domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they
may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines
may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than
twelve hectares thereof, by purchase, homestead, or grant.

Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and

development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the
Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain
which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions
therefor.

Section 4. The Congress shall, as soon as possible, determine, by law, the

specific limits of forest lands and national parks, marking clearly their
boundaries on the ground. Thereafter, such forest lands and national parks
shall be conserved and may not be increased nor diminished, except by law.
The Congress shall provide for such period as it may determine, measures to
prohibit logging in endangered forests and watershed areas.
 Section 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of
indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their
economic, social, and cultural well-being.

The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing
property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of
ancestral domain.

II. Jurisprudence (Part 1)

1. Oposa vs. Factoran

- The right of present and future generations to a balanced and healthful
ecology is an enforceable right, the denial or violation of which by one
who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the
same is a valid cause of action for a class action suit against the
granting of TLAs which was apparently done with grave abuse of
discretion.
- (Concurring opinion of Justice Feliciano) The provisions of the 1987
constitution to which petitioners anchored their claim on (Article II,
Sections 15 & 16), while impressive and proclaims the need to protect
the environment for the sake of posterity, is nevertheless too broad to
be considered self-executing and judicially enforceable in its current
state. The petitioners should show a more specific legal right so that
the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the
relief prayed for.

2. Chavez vs. PEA

- The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged
areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine which holds that the State
owns all lands and waters of the public domain.
- The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973
Constitution banning private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the
1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of
the public domain only through lease.
- Absent two official acts – a classification that these lands are alienable
or disposable and open to disposition and a declaration that these
lands are not needed for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA
remain inalienable lands of the public domain. Only such an official
classification and formal declaration can convert reclaimed lands into
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition
under the Constitution, Title I and Title III83 of CA No. 141 and other
applicable laws.
- Assuming the reclaimed lands of PEA are classified as alienable or
disposable lands open to disposition, and further declared no longer
 needed for public service, PEA would have to conduct a public bidding
in selling or leasing these lands.
- At the public auction sale, only Philippine citizens are qualified to bid
for PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the
public domain. Private corporations are barred from bidding at the
auction sale of any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
- Finally, PEA theorizes that the "act of conveying the ownership of the
reclaimed lands to public respondent PEA transformed such lands of
the public domain to private lands." This theory is echoed by AMARI
which maintains that the "issuance of the special patent leading to the
eventual issuance of title takes the subject land away from the land of
public domain and converts the property into patrimonial or private
property." In short, PEA and AMARI contend that with the issuance of
Special Patent No. 3517 and the corresponding certificates of titles, the
157.84 hectares comprising the Freedom Islands have become private
lands of PEA.
- Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does not vest in
the registrant private or public ownership of the land. Registration is
not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of ownership
previously conferred by any of the recognized modes of acquiring
ownership. Registration does not give the registrant a better right than
what the registrant had prior to the registration. The registration of
lands of the public domain under the Torrens system, by itself, cannot
convert public lands into private lands.

3. Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources

- (Separate Opinion of Justice Puno) The IPRA recognizes the existence
of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples
(ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these
people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and
ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains.
The ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under
customary law which traces its origin to native title.
- Senate Bill No. 1728 seeks to genuinely recognize the IPs right to own
and possess their ancestral land. The bill was prepared also under the
principle of parens patriae inherent in the supreme power of the State
and deeply embedded in Philippine legal tradition. This principle
mandates that persons suffering from serious disadvantage or
handicap, which places them in a position of actual inequality in their
relation or transaction with others, are entitled to the protection of the
State.
- Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a
claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves
or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time
immemorial, continuously until the present, except when interrupted by
war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a
 consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings
with government and/or private individuals or corporations. Ancestral
domains comprise lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural
resources therein and includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture,
residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether
alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas,
bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources.
- Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same
conditions as ancestral domains except that these are limited to lands
and that these lands are not merely occupied and possessed but are
also utilized by the ICCs/IPs under claims of individual or traditional
group ownership. These lands include but are not limited to residential
lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree
lots.
- The private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in
the IPRA is further strengthened by the option given to individual
ICCs/IPs over their individually-owned ancestral lands. For purposes of
registration under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act,
the IPRA expressly converts ancestral land into public agricultural land
which may be disposed of by the State. The necessary implication is
that ancestral land is private. It, however, has to be first converted to
public agricultural land simply for registration purposes.

III. Legislation/Rules of Procedure on Natural Resources and Environment

Legend:
R – Regulation of Exploration, Exploitation, Development, Management and
Utilization of Natural Resources
F – Preservation, Conservation and Protection of Flora and Fauna
P – Pollution Management

1. P.D. 705 - Revised Forestry Code – R

2. R.A. 8550 – Philippine Fisheries Code – R,F
3. R.A. 7076 – People’s Small-Scale Mining Act – R
4. R.A. 7942 – Philippine Mining Act – R
5. R.A. 7586 – National Integrated Protected Areas System Act – F
6. R.A. 9147 – Wildlife Conservation and Protection Act – F
7. R.A. 9072 – National Caves and Caves Resources Management Act – F
8. P.D. 979 – Marine Pollution Decree – P
9. P.D. 1586 – Establishing an Environmental Impact System – P
10. R.A. 9275 – Philippine Clean Water Act – P
11. R.A. 8749 – Philippine Clean Air Act – P
12. R.A. 9003 – Ecological Solid Waste Management Act – P
13. R.A. 6969 – Toxic Substances and Hazardous Waste Act and P.D. 1151 –
Philippine Environmental Policy – P
14. P.D. 1067 – Water Code of the Philippines – R
 15. P.D.1152 – Philippine Environment Code – P,F
16. C.A. 137 – Mining Act - R
17. P.D. 972 – Coal Development Act of 1976 – R
18. R.A. 387 – Petroleum Act of 1949 – R
19. R.A.3931, P.D. 984, E.O. 192 – Pollution Adjudication Board – P
20. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1803 on Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources – R
21. Stockholm Declaration – R,F,P
22. The Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer – P
23. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change – P
24. The London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution – P
25. Asean Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
– R,F
26. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Test – F
27. Rules of Procedure in Environmental Cases – Purely Procedural

IV. Jurisprudence (Part 2)

1. LLDA vs. CA
- The matter of determining whether there is pollution of the environment
that requires control, if not prohibition of the operation of a business
establishment is generally addressed to the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of Section
16 of Executive Order No. 192, series of 1987, has assumed the
powers and functions of the defunct National Pollution Control
Commission created under Republic Act No. 3931.
- As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains
to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the
special law provides for another forum. It must be recognized in this
regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is
specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory
laws to carry out and make effective the declared national policy of
promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of
the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and
Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and
Caloocan.
- Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue
of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the
inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of
pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the
surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy,
the LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or
disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local
government offices/agencies within the region, public corporations, and
private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or
 projects are related to those of the LLDA for the development of the
region.
- The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City
Government of Caloocan to stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin
open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done in violation of
Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant environment
laws, cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of
injunctive powers. By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as
amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the
discontinuance or pollution." (Emphasis supplied) Section 4, par. (d)
explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be
necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
- While the LLDA was not expressly conferred with the right to issue an
ex parte cease and desist order, it can be inferred by necessary
implication that such an issuance was not in excess of the authority
granted to it.

2. Mead vs. Argel

- The power to determine the existence of pollution is vested by
Republic Act No. 3931 in the National Water and Air Pollution Control
Commission.
- Section 6, among others, gives the Commission the authority to
"determine whether a pollution exists in any of the waters and/or
atmospheric air of the Philippines."
- Section 8 contains explicit provisions as to the authority of the
Commission to determine the existence of pollution and to take
appropriate court actions to abate or prevent the same.
- Section 8 likewise excludes from the authority of the Commission only
the determination of and the filing of court actions involving violations
of the New Civil Code on nuisance. It is expressly directed that on
matters not related to nuisance "no court action shall be initiated until
the Commission shall have finally ruled thereon." This provision leaves
little room for doubt that a court action involving the determination of
the existence of pollution may not be initiated until and unless the
Commission has so determined the existence of what in the law is
considered pollution.
- As may be seen from the law, the determination of the existence of
pollution requires investigation, public hearings and the collection of
various information relating to water and atmospheric pollution.
(Sections 6, 7, and 8.) The definition of the term "pollution" in itself
connotes that the determination of its existence requires specialized
knowledge of technical and scientific matters which are not ordinarily
within the competence of Fiscals or of those sitting in a court of justice.
- The Supreme Court decided that the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal lacked
the authority to file the information charging the petitioner with a
 violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3931 there being no prior
finding or determination by the Commission that the act of the
petitioner had caused pollution in any water or atmospheric air of the
Philippines.

3. Tatel vs. Municipality of Virac

- Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal
Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is a settled
principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State
for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as
such are endowed with the police powers in order to effectively
accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation.
- For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the municipality to enact but must also be passed according
to the procedure prescribed by law, and must be in consonance with
certain well established and basic principles of a substantive nature.
These principles require that a municipal ordinance (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or
oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not
prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with
public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable. Ordinance No. 13,
Series of 1952, meets these criteria.
- What is regulated by the ordinance is the construction of warehouses
wherein inflammable materials are stored where such warehouses are
located at a distance of 200 meters from a block of houses and not the
construction per se of a warehouse. The purpose is to avoid the loss of
life and property in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation
of the government.
- As to the third assignment of error, that warehouses similarly situated
as that of the petitioner were not prosecuted, suffice it to say that the
mere fact that the municipal authorities of Virac have not proceeded
against other warehouses in the municipality allegedly violating
Ordinance No. 13 is no reason to claim that the ordinance is
discriminatory. A distinction must be made between the law itself and
the manner in which said law is implemented by the agencies in
charge with its administration and enforcement. There is no valid
reason for the petitioner to complain, in the absence of proof that the
other bodegas mentioned by him are operating in violation of the
ordinance and that the complaints have been lodged against the
bodegas concerned without the municipal authorities doing anything
about it.