G.R. No. 143276 July 20, 2004
Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners,
LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL and LEONIDAS ARENAS-
BANAL, respondents.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the
registered owners of 19.3422 hectares of agricultural land
situated in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6296. A portion of the land
consisting of 6.2330 hectares (5.4730 of which is planted to
coconut and 0.7600 planted to palay) was compulsorily acquired
by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657,1 as amended, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
In accordance with the formula prescribed in DAR Administrative
Order No. 6, Series of 1992,2 as amended by DAR Administrative
Order No. 11, Series of 1994,3 the Land Bank of the
Philippines4 (Landbank), petitioner, made the following valuation
of the property:
Acquired property Area in hectares
Coconut land 5.4730
Riceland 0.7600
Respondents rejected the above valuation. Thus, pursuant to
Section 16(d) of R.A. 6657, as amended, a summary
administrative proceeding was conducted before the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation
of the land. Eventually, the PARAD rendered its Decision
affirming the Landbank's valuation.
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Daet, Camarines
Norte, designated as a Special Agrarian Court, a petition for
determination of just compensation, docketed as Civil Case No.
6806. Impleaded as respondents were the DAR and the Landbank.
Petitioners therein prayed for a compensation of P100,000.00 per
hectare for both coconut land and riceland, or an aggregate
amount of P623,000.00.
During the pre-trial on September 23, 1998, the parties submitted
to the RTC the following admissions of facts: (1) the subject
property is governed by the provisions of R.A. 6657, as amended;
(2) it was distributed to the farmers-beneficiaries; and (3) the
Landbank deposited the provisional compensation based on the
valuation made by the DAR.5
On the same day after the pre-trial, the court issued an Order
dispensing with the hearing and directing the parties to submit
their respective memoranda.6
In its Decision dated February 5, 1999, the trial court computed
the just compensation for the coconut land at P657,137.00 and for
the riceland at P46,000.00, or a total of P703,137.00, which is
beyond respondents' valuation of P623,000.00. The court further
awarded compounded interest at P79,732.00 in cash. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1.
the spouses Dr. Vicente Banal and Leonidas Arenas-
Banal, for the 5.4730 hectares of coconut land the sum
of SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN PESOS (P657,137.00) in cash
and in bonds in the proportion provided by law;
2. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners
for the .7600 hectares of riceland the sum of FORTY-SIX
THOUSAND PESOS (P46,000.00) in cash and in bonds in
the proportion provided by law; and
3. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners
the sum of SEVENTY-NINE THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO PESOS (P79,732.00) as the
compounded interest in cash.
IT IS SO ORDERED."7
In determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based the
same on the facts established in another case pending before it
(Civil Case No. 6679, "Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al."), using the
following formula:
For the coconut land
Value
1. Average Gross Production (AGP) x .70 x 9.70
P148,675.19 (price per kilo of coconut) = Net Income (NI)
25,243.36 2. NI / 6% = Price Per Hectare (PPH) (applying
the capitalization formula under Republic Act
P173,918.55 No. 38448 )
For the riceland
1. 2.5 x AGP x Government Support Price
(GSP) = Land Value (LV) or PPH (using the
formula under Executive Order No. 2289 )
2. AGP x 6% compounded annually for 26
years x GSP = Interest (pursuant to DAR AO
No. 13, Series of 1994)
Forthwith, the Landbank filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52163.
On March 20, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a
Decision10 affirming in toto the judgment of the trial court. The
Landbank's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.11
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The fundamental issue for our resolution is whether the Court of
Appeals erred in sustaining the trial court's valuation of the land.
As earlier mentioned, there was no trial on the merits.
To begin with, under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 405 (1990),
the Landbank is charged "primarily" with "the determination of
the land valuation and compensation for all private lands suitable
for agriculture under the Voluntary Offer to Sell or Compulsory
Acquisition arrangement…" For its part, the DAR relies on the
determination of the land valuation and compensation by the
Landbank.12
Based on the Landbank's valuation of the land, the DAR makes an
offer to the landowner.13 If the landowner accepts the offer, the
Landbank shall pay him the purchase price of the land after he
executes and delivers a deed of transfer and surrenders the
certificate of title in favor of the government.14 In case the
landowner rejects the offer or fails to reply thereto, the DAR
adjudicator15 conducts summary administrative proceedings to
determine the compensation for the land by requiring the
landowner, the Landbank and other interested parties to submit
evidence as to the just compensation for the land.16 These
functions by the DAR are in accordance with its quasi-judicial
powers under Section 50 of R.A. 6657, as amended, which
provides:
"SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR
is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine
and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving
the implementation of agrarian reform, except those
falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
x x x."
A party who disagrees with the decision of the DAR adjudicator
may bring the matter to the RTC designated as a Special Agrarian
Court17 "for final determination of just compensation."18
In the proceedings before the RTC, it is mandated to apply the
Rules of Court19 and, on its own initiative or at the instance of any
of the parties, "appoint one or more commissioners to examine,
investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute, including
the valuation of properties, and to file a written report thereof x x
x."20 In determining just compensation, the RTC is required to
consider several factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. 6657,
as amended, thus:
"Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. – In
determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition
of the land, the current value of like properties, its
nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by
the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment
made by government assessors shall be considered.
The social and economic benefits contributed by the
farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to
the property, as well as the non-payment of taxes or
loans secured from any government financing
institution on the said land, shall be considered as
additional factors to determine its valuation."
These factors have been translated into a basic formula in DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by DAR
Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, issued pursuant to
the DAR's rule-making power to carry out the object and
purposes of R.A. 6657, as amended.21
The formula stated in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as
amended, is as follows:
"LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)
LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are
present, relevant and applicable.
A.1 When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV
are applicable, the formula shall be:
LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.2 When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV
are applicable, the formula shall be:
LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.3 When both the CS and CNI are not present and only
MV is applicable, the formula shall be:
LV = MV x 2"
Here, the RTC failed to observe the basic rules of procedure and
the fundamental requirements in determining just compensation
for the property. Firstly, it dispensed with the hearing and merely
ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda. Such
action is grossly erroneous since the determination of just
compensation involves the examination of the following factors
specified in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended:
1. the cost of the acquisition of the land;
2. the current value of like properties;
3. its nature, actual use and income;
4. the sworn valuation by the owner; the tax
declarations;
5. the assessment made by government assessors;
6. the social and economic benefits contributed by the
farmers and the farmworkers and by the government to
the property; and
7. the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any
government financing institution on the said land, if any.
Obviously, these factors involve factual matters which can be
established only during a hearing wherein the contending parties
present their respective evidence. In fact, to underscore the
intricate nature of determining the valuation of the land, Section
58 of the same law even authorizes the Special Agrarian Courts to
appoint commissioners for such purpose.
Secondly, the RTC, in concluding that the valuation of
respondents' property is P703,137.00, merely took judicial notice
of the average production figures in the Rodriguez case pending
before it and applied the same to this case without conducting a
hearing and worse, without the knowledge or consent of the
parties, thus:
"x x x. In the case x x x of the coconut portion of the
land 5.4730 hectares, defendants determined the
average gross production per year at 506.95 kilos
only, but in the very recent case of Luz Rodriguez vs.
DAR, et al., filed and decided by this court in Civil Case
No. 6679 also for just compensation for coconut lands
and Riceland situated at Basud, Camarines Norte
wherein also the lands in the above-entitled case are
situated, the value fixed therein was 1,061.52 kilos per
annum per hectare for coconut land and the price per
kilo is P8.82, but in the instant case the price per kilo
is P9.70. In the present case, we consider 506.95 kilos
average gross production per year per hectare to be
very low considering that farm practice for coconut
lands is harvest every forty-five days. We cannot also
comprehended why in the Rodriguez case and in this
case there is a great variance in average production per
year when in the two cases the lands are both coconut
 lands and in the same place of Basud, Camarines Norte.
We believe that it is more fair to adapt the 1,061.52 kilos
per hectare per year as average gross production. In
the Rodriguezcase, the defendants fixed the average
gross production of palay at 3,000 kilos or 60 cavans per
year. The court is also constrained to apply this yearly
palay production in the Rodriguez case to the case at
bar.
xxx xxx xxx
"As shown in the Memorandum of Landbank in this
case, the area of the coconut land taken under CARP is
5.4730 hectares. But as already noted, the average gross
production a year of 506.96 kilos per hectare fixed by
Landbank is too low as compared to the Rodriguez case
which was 1,061 kilos when the coconut land in both
cases are in the same town of Basud, Camarines Norte,
compelling this court then to adapt 1,061 kilos as the
average gross production a year of the coconut land in
this case. We have to apply also the price of P9.70 per
kilo as this is the value that Landbank fixed for this
case.
"The net income of the coconut land is equal to 70% of
the gross income. So, the net income of the coconut
land is 1,061 x .70 x 9.70 equals P7,204.19 per hectare.
Applying the capitalization formula of R.A. 3844 to the
net income of P7,204.19 divided by 6%, the legal rate of
interest, equals P120,069.00 per hectare. Therefore, the
just compensation for the 5.4730 hectares
is P657,137.00.
The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.
Lastly, the RTC erred in applying the formula prescribed under
Executive Order (EO) No. 22826 and R.A. No. 3844,27 as amended,
in determining the valuation of the property; and in granting
compounded interest pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No.
13, Series of 1994.28 It must be stressed that EO No. 228 covers
private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn, while
R.A. 3844 governs agricultural leasehold relation between "the
person who furnishes the landholding, either as owner, civil law
lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the person who
personally cultivates the same."29 Here, the land is planted to
coconut and rice and does not involve agricultural leasehold
relation. What the trial court should have applied is the formula in
DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended by DAR
Administrative Order No. 11 discussed earlier.
As regards the award of compounded interest, suffice it to state
that DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994 does not
apply to the subject land but to those lands taken under
Presidential Decree No. 2730 and Executive Order No. 228 whose
owners have not been compensated. In this case, the property is
covered by R.A. 6657, as amended, and respondents have been
paid the provisional compensation thereof, as stipulated during
the pre-trial.
While the determination of just compensation involves the
exercise of judicial discretion, however, such discretion must be
discharged within the bounds of the law. Here, the RTC wantonly
disregarded R.A. 6657, as amended, and its implementing rules
and regulations. (DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended by
DAR Administrative Order No.11).

"The Riceland taken under Presidential Decree No. 27 as
of October 21, 1972 has an area of .7600 hectare. If in
the Rodriguez case the Landbank fixed the average
gross production of 3000 kilos or 60 cavans of palay per
year, then the .7600 hectare in this case would be 46
cavans. The value of the riceland therefore in this case
is 46 cavans x 2.5 x P400.00 equals P46,000.00.22
"PARC Resolution 94-24-1 of 25 October 1994,
implemented by DAR AO 13, granted interest on the
compensation at 6% compounded annually. The
compounded interest on the 46 cavans for 26 years is
199.33 cavans. At P400.00 per cavan, the value of the
compounded interest is P79,732.00."23 (emphasis added)
Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even
when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court
or before the same judge.24 They may only do so "in the absence
of objection" and "with the knowledge of the opposing
party,"25 which are not obtaining here.
In sum, we find that the Court of Appeals and the RTC erred in
determining the valuation of the subject land. Thus, we deem it
proper to remand this case to the RTC for trial on the merits
wherein the parties may present their respective evidence. In
determining the valuation of the subject property, the trial court
shall consider the factors provided under Section 17 of R.A. 6657,
as amended, mentioned earlier. The formula prescribed by the
DAR in Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by
DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, shall be used in
the valuation of the land. Furthermore, upon its own initiative, or
at the instance of any of the parties, the trial court may appoint
one or more commissioners to examine, investigate and ascertain
facts relevant to the dispute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated March 20, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No.
52163 is REVERSED. Civil Case No. 6806 is REMANDED to the
RTC, Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, for trial on the merits
with dispatch. The trial judge is directed to observe strictly the
procedures specified above in determining the proper valuation
of the subject property.

SO ORDERED.
Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all
proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts. In this regard,
Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit
on the necessity of a hearing before a court takes judicial notice
of a certain matter, thus:

"SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. –

During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on
request of a party, may announce its intention to take
judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be
heard thereon.

"After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the

proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a
party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow
the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive
of a material issue in the case." (emphasis added)
G.R. No. 100911 May 16, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAILON KULAIS and IMAM TARUK ALAH, accused-appellants.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Well entrenched in our criminal law and procedure is the rule that,
unless otherwise specifically required, the testimony of a single
eyewitness if credible and trustworthy is sufficient to support a
finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. And since the
determination of credibility is within the province of the trial court
which has the opportunity to examine and observe the demeanor
of witnesses appellate courts will not generally interfere in this
jurisdiction. Guided by these established precepts, we deny the
instant appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga City, Br. 12, 1 which on 13 February 1991 found
accused Jailon Kulais y Mohamad, Imam Taruk Alah y Salih,
Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and
Hadjirul Plasin y Alih guilty as principals of kidnapping for
ransom and sentenced each of them to life imprisonment.
In the same Decision, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos, Norma
Sahiddan de Kulais and Jaliha Hussin de Kamming were
considered accomplices to the crime and meted lesser penalties,
while Freddie Manuel alias "Ajid" was acquitted of the charges
filed against him.
The charges against co-accused Majid Samson alias Commander
Bungi, Awalon Kamlon alias Commander Kamlon, Carlos
Falcasantos and several John Does who all remained at large
were archived until their arrest could be effected.
Of the eight (8) accused who were convicted only Jailon Kulais
appealed from the judgment of the trial court and accordingly
filed his appellant's brief within the reglementary period. Imam
Taruk Alah y Salih who manifested before this Court that he filed
a notice of appeal in the court a quo, however, failed to pursue his
case as he did not submit his appellant's brief within the
prescribed period. Accordingly, this discussion concerns only
appellant Kulais who has perfected his appeal.
In the main, the appeal raises two (2) issues: first, that the
testimony of lone eyewitness and alleged kidnap victim Airman
Second Class (A2C) Ruben Monteverde of the Philippine Air
Force is "marred with contradictions, impossibilities and
improbabilities" 2 and thus fails to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt; and, second, that the trial court erred
in not finding that appellant was a victim of an illegal arrest.
The propositions are unavailing. The trial court which had an
opportunity to observe both the witnesses for the prosecution
and for the defense gave credence to the prosecution witnesses
and their testimonies. Theirs were "positive, clear and
convincing," 3 ruled the court a quo. Thus, eyewitness and kidnap
victim A2C Monteverde testified that on 30 January 1990 at about
six-thirty in the morning he was riding a Fortune Bus on his way
to the city to report for duty. He came from Ipil, Zamboanga del
Sur. Somewhere in Sitio Texas, Barangay Tictapul, Vitali,
Zamboanga City, armed members of the Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF) stopped the bus he was riding and dragged out
some eleven (11) passengers. He was the seventh person
dragged. The captives were then herded to the mountains of
Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur, where they were transferred from
one site to another and held hostage for about one (1) month.
During their month-long detention, they were ordered among
others to fetch water, cook, and carry the clothes of their
kidnappers whom they came to know. They were likewise ordered
to write ransom letters to their relatives. For his part, A2C
Monteverde was directed by Commander Kamlon to ask for
P30,000.00 from his relatives in exchange for his freedom. On 6
March 1990, during an encounter between his captors and the
pursuing military, A2C Monteverde was able to escape. He
immediately went to the 482nd PC Company in Ipil, Zamboanga
del Sur, to report his abduction. The lone eyewitness account of
kidnap victim A2C Monteverde, candid and straightforward, is
sufficient to convict appellant of kidnapping for ransom.
On 27 May 1990 the military conducted an operation which
resulted in the capture of some members of the group believed to
be responsible for the kidnapping of A2C Monteverde and a
number of civilians. A2C Monteverde named and pinpointed them
in open court: Jailon (accused-appellant) who identified himself
as Jailon Kulais; Taruk who identified himself as Imam Taruk
Alah; Salam who identified himself as Salvador
Mamaril; Mating who identified herself as Jumatiya
Amlani; Hadjirul who identified himself as Hadjirul Plasin;
and Jainuddin who identified himself as Jainuddin Hassan. He
also pointed to Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan, who were
likewise apprehended but whose names he could not recall,
and Commander Kamlon, Commander Falcasantos, Commander
Bungi, Sapari, Uling, Hassim, Jamlin, and others who were not
apprehended.
Thus, since it appears that the trial court did not overlook facts or
circumstances which may otherwise affect the result of the case,
its findings regarding the credibility of witnesses cannot be
overturned. The trial court is in a better position to decide this
question after having heard the witnesses themselves and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying. Hence when
the trial court, as in the case at bench, declares that the testimony
of A2C Monteverde was "positive, clear and convincing," 4 its
declaration must be sustained and respected. Furthermore,
absent any showing that A2C Monteverde was actuated by any
improper motive, his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
Anent the second issue, appellant is now estopped from
questioning any defect in the manner of his arrest as he failed to
move for the quashing of the information before the trial court.
Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest was cured
when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
trial court by entering a plea of "not guilty" and by participating in
the trial. 5 What is more, his submission that he was not
apprehended during a skirmish but while plowing his field
becomes puerile when pitted against the positive testimony of Lt.
Melquiades Feliciano who led Charlie Task Force BFK (Bungi,
Falcasantos and Kamlon) in apprehending him and his
companions. Credence is accorded to the testimony of Lt.
Melquiades that appellant was captured during a military
offensive, which testimony the trial court characterized as
"positive, clear and convincing."6
The Court however takes notice of the error in the imposition of
the penalty against accused-appellant, which should be reclusion
perpetua and not life imprisonment. We have repeatedly
emphasized that reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment are not
synonymous but distinct in nature, in duration and in accessory
penalties.
WHEREFORE, except for the penalty imposed which should
be reclusion perpetua and not life imprisonment, the judgment
appealed from finding accused-appellant JAILON KULIS y
MOHAMAD guilty of kidnapping for ransom is AFFIRMED. He is
therefore sentenced to reclusion perpetua with all the accessory
penalties provided by law, and to pay the costs.
The appeal interposed by accused Imam Taruk Alah is
DISMISSED for his failure to prosecute his appeal, pursuant to
Sec. 8, Rule 124, Rules of Court. Consequently, his conviction as
principal for kidnapping with ransom stands.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 114776 February 2, 2000
MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES
LIMITED, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated October 29, 1993, in C.A. G.R. No. CV 34476, as well as its
Resolution dated February 28, 1994, which denied the motion for
reconsideration.
The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent appellate
court are as follows:
Sometime in 1978, plaintiff [Menandro B. Laureano, herein
petitioner], then Director of Flight Operations and Chief Pilot of
Air Manila, applied for employment with defendant company
[herein private respondent] through its Area Manager in Manila.
On September 30, 1978, after the usual personal interview,
defendant wrote to plaintiff, offering a contract of employment as
an expatriate B-707 captain for an original period of two (2) years
commencing on January 21, 1978. Plaintiff accepted the offer and
commenced working on January 20, 1979. After passing the six-
month probation period, plaintiffs appointment was confirmed
effective July 21, 1979. (Annex "B", p. 30, Rollo).
On July 21, 1979, defendant offered plaintiff an extension of his
two-year contract to five (5) years effective January 21, 1979 to
January 20, 1984 subject to the terms and conditions set forth in
the contract of employment, which the latter accepted (Annex "C"
p. 31, Rec.).
During his service as B-707 captain, plaintiff on August 24, 1980,
while in command of a flight, committed a noise violation offense
at the Zurich Airport, for which plaintiff apologized.(Exh. "3", p.
307, Rec.).
Sometime in 1980, plaintiff featured in a tail scraping incident
wherein the tail of the aircraft scraped or touched the runway
during landing. He was suspended for a few days until he was
investigated by board headed by Capt. Choy. He was
reprimanded.
On September 25, 1981, plaintiff was invited to take a course of A-
300 conversion training at Aeroformacion, Toulouse, France at
dependant's expense. Having successfully completed and passed
the training course, plaintiff was cleared on April 7, 1981, for solo
duty as captain of the Airbus A-300 and subsequently appointed
as captain of the A-300 fleet commanding an Airbus A-300 in
flights over Southeast Asia. (Annexes "D", "E" and "F", pp. 34-38,
Rec.).
Sometime in 1982, defendant, hit by a recession, initiated cost-
cutting measures. Seventeen (17) expatriate captains in the
Airbus fleet were found in excess of the defendant's requirement
(t.s.n., July 6, 1988. p. 11). Consequently, defendant informed its
expatriate pilots including plaintiff of the situation and advised
them to take advance leaves. (Exh. "15", p. 466, Rec.)
Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time,
defendant decided to terminate its excess personnel (t.s.n., July
6, 1988, p. 17). It did not, however, immediately terminate it's A-
300 pilots. It reviewed their qualifications for possible promotion
to the B-747 fleet. Among the 17 excess Airbus pilots reviewed,
twelve were found qualified. Unfortunately, plaintiff was not one
of the twelve.
On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his
termination effective November 1, 1982 and that he will be paid
three (3) months salary in lieu of three months notice (Annex "I",
pp. 41-42, Rec.). Because he could not uproot his family on such
short notice, plaintiff requested a three-month notice to afford
him time to exhaust all possible avenues for reconsideration and
retention. Defendant gave only two (2) months notice and one (1)
month salary. (t.s.n., Nov. 12, 1987. p. 25).
Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal
dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. Defendant moved to dismiss
on jurisdiction grounds. Before said motion was resolved, the
complaint was withdrawn. Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant
case for damages due to illegal termination of contract of
services before the court a quo (Complaint, pp. 1-10, Rec.).
Again, defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss
alleging inter alia: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case, and (2) that Philippine courts have no
jurisdiction over the instant case. Defendant contends that the
complaint is for illegal dismissal together with a money claim
arising out of and in the course of plaintiffs employment "thus it
is the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who have the jurisdiction
pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code" and that, since plaintiff
was employed in Singapore, all other aspects of his employment
contract and/or documents executed in Singapore. Thus,
defendant postulates that Singapore laws should apply and
courts thereat shall have jurisdiction. (pp. 50-69, Rec.).
In traversing defendant's arguments, plaintiff claimed that: (1)
where the items demanded in a complaint are the natural
consequences flowing from a breach of an obligation and not
labor benefits, the case is intrinsically a civil dispute; (2) the case
involves a question that is beyond the field of specialization of
labor arbiters; and (3) if the complaint is grounded not on the
employee's dismissal per se but on the manner of said dismissal
and the consequence thereof, the case falls under the jurisdiction
of the civil courts. (pp. 70-73, Rec.)
On March 23, 1987, the court a quo denied defendant's motion to
dismiss (pp. 82-84, Ibid). The motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied. (p. 95 ibid.)
On September 16, 1987, defendant filed its answer reiterating the
grounds relied upon in its motion to dismiss and further arguing
that plaintiff is barred by laches, waiver, and estoppel from
instituting the complaint and that he has no cause of action . (pp.
102-115)1
On April 10, 1991, the trial court handed down its decision in favor
of plaintiff. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff
Menandro Laureano and against defendant Singapore Airlines
Limited, ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amounts of —
SIN$396,104.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the
current rate of exchange at the time of payment, as and for
unearned compensation with legal interest from the filing of the
complaint until fully paid;
SIN$154,742.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the
current rate of exchange at the time of payment; and the further
amounts of P67,500.00 as consequential damages with legal
interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid;
P1,000,000.00 as and for moral damages; P1,000,000.00 as and for
exemplary damages; and P100,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
Costs against defendant.
SO ORDERED.2
Singapore Airlines timely appealed before the respondent court
and raised the issues of jurisdiction, validity of termination,
estoppel, and damages.
On October 29, 1993, the appellate court set aside the decision of
the trial court, thus,
. . . In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal
termination was filed by plaintiff-appellee only on January 8, 1987
or more than four (4) years after the effectivity date of his
dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action
has already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The complaint is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.3
Petitioner's and Singapore Airlines' respective motions for
reconsideration were denied.
Now, before the Court, petitioner poses the following queries:
1. IS THE PRESENT ACTION ONE BASED ON CONTRACT WHICH
PRESCRIBES IN TEN YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1144 OF THE NEW
CIVIL CODE OR ONE FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM AN INJURY
TO THE RIGHTS OF THE PLAINTIFF WHICH PRESCRIBES IN
FOUR YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1146 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE?
2. CAN AN EMPLOYEE WITH A FIXED PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT
BE RETRENCHED BY HIS EMPLOYER?
3. CAN THERE BE VALID RETRENCHMENT IF AN EMPLOYER
MERELY FAILS TO REALIZE THE EXPECTED PROFITS EVEN IF IT
WERE NOT, IN FACT, INCURRING LOSSES?
At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on the
assumption of jurisdiction by the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 9. The trial court rightly ruled on the application of
Philippine law, thus:
Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the
plaintiff is legal under the Singapore Laws because of the
defendant's failure to show which specific laws of Singapore
Laws apply to this case. As substantially discussed in the
preceding paragraphs, the Philippine Courts do not take judicial
notice of the laws of Singapore. The defendant that claims the
applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has the burden of
proof. The defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine
law should be applied.4
Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when
defendant filed its appeal before said court.5 On this matter,
respondent court was correct when it barred defendant-appellant
below from raising further the issue of jurisdiction.6
Petitioner now raises the issue of whether his action is one based
on Article 1144 or on Article 1146 of the Civil Code. According to
him, his termination of employment effective November 1, 1982,
was based on an employment contract which is under Article
1144, so his action should prescribe in 10 years as provided for in
said article. Thus he claims the ruling of the appellate court based
on Article 1146 where prescription is only four (4) years, is an
error. The appellate court concluded that the action for illegal
dismissal originally filed before the Labor Arbiter on June 29,
1983, but which was withdrawn, then filed again in 1987 before
the Regional Trial Court, had already prescribed.
In our view, neither Article 11447 nor Article 11468 of the Civil
Code is here pertinent. What is applicable is Article 291 of the
Labor Code, viz:
Art. 291. Money claims. — All money claims arising from
employee-employer relations accruing during the effectivity of
this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the
cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.
xxx xxx xxx
What rules on prescription should apply in cases like this one has
long been decided by this Court. In illegal dismissal, it is settled,
that the ten-year prescriptive period fixed in Article 1144 of the
Civil Code may not be invoked by petitioners, for the Civil Code is
a law of general application, while the prescriptive period fixed in
Article 292 of the Labor Code [now Article 291] is a SPECIAL LAW
applicable to claims arising from employee-employer relations.9
More recently in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals,10 where the
money claim was based on a written contract, the Collective
Bargaining Agreement, the Court held:
. . . The language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its
application only to "money claims specifically recoverable under
said Code" but covers all money claims arising from an
employee-employer relations" (Citing Cadalin v. POEA
Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, 764 [1994]; and Uy v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 261 SCRA 505, 515 [1996]). . . .
It should be noted further that Article 291 of the Labor Code is a
special law applicable to money claims arising from employer-
employee relations; thus, it necessarily prevails over Article 1144
of the Civil Code, a general law. Basic is the rule in statutory
construction that "where two statutes are of equal theoretical
application to a particular case, the one designed therefore
should prevail." (Citing Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
157 SCRA 282, 294.) Generalia specialibus non derogant.11
In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the appellate
court's conclusion that petitioner's action for damages due to
illegal termination filed again on January 8, 1987 or more than
four (4) years after the effective date of his dismissal on
November 1, 1982 has already prescribed.
In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal
termination was filed by plaintiff-appelle only on January 8, 1987
or more than four (4) years after the effectivity date of his
dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action
has already prescribed.
We base our conclusion not on Article 1144 of the Civil Code but
on which sets the prescription period at three (3) years and which
governs under this jurisdiction.
Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period was
tolled when he filed his complaint for illegal dismissal before the
Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission.
However, this claim deserves scant consideration; it has no legal
leg to stand on. In Olympia International, Inc., vs., Court of
Appeals, we held that "although the commencement of a civil
action stops the running of the statute of prescription or
limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by the
plaintiff leaves in exactly the same position as though no action
had been commenced at all."12
Now, as to whether petitioner's separation from the company due
to retrenchment was valid, the appellate court found that the
employment contract of petitioner allowed for pre-termination of
employment. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it said,
It is a settled rule that contracts have the force of law between the
parties. From the moment the same is perfected, the parties are
bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly
stipulated but also to all consequences which, according to their
nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. Thus,
when plaintiff-appellee accepted the offer of employment, he was
bound by the terms and conditions set forth in the contract,
among others, the right of mutual termination by giving three
months written notice or by payment of three months salary.
Such provision is clear and readily understandable, hence, there
is no room for interpretation.

xxx xxx xxx

Further, plaintiff-appellee's contention that he is not bound by the

provisions of the Agreement, as he is not a signatory thereto,
deserves no merit. It must be noted that when plaintiff-appellee's
employment was confirmed, he applied for membership with the
Singapore Airlines Limited (Pilots) Association, the signatory to
the aforementioned Agreement. As such, plaintiff-appellee is
estopped from questioning the legality of the said agreement or
any proviso contained therein.13

Moreover, the records of the present case clearly show that

respondent court's decision is amply supported by evidence and
it did not err in its findings, including the reason for the
retrenchment:

When defendant-appellant was faced with the world-wide

recession of the airline industry resulting in a slow down in the
company's growth particularly in the regional operation (Asian
Area) where the Airbus 300 operates. It had no choice but to
adopt cost cutting measures, such as cutting down services,
number of frequencies of flights, and reduction of the number of
flying points for the A-300 fleet (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, pp. 17-18). As
a result, defendant-appellant had to lay off A-300 pilots, including
plaintiff-appellee, which it found to be in excess of what is
reasonably needed.14

All these considered, we find sufficient factual and legal basis to

conclude that petitioner's termination from employment was for
an authorized cause, for which he was given ample notice and
opportunity to be heard, by respondent company. No error nor
grave abuse of discretion, therefore, could be attributed to
respondent appellate court.1âwphi1.nêt

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The decision

of the Court of Appeals in C.A. CV No. 34476 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO,
LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
THE CASE
This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to review the Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA
No. 10-1 09(DC) of the COMELEC First Division dated 5 October
201 0 is being assailed for applying Section 44 of the Local
Government Code while the Resolution2 of the COMELEC En
Banc dated 2 February 2011 is being questioned for finding that
respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco (respondent
Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for
public office despite his continued use of a U.S. passport.
FACTS
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However,
as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of
the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship.
Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225
before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso,
USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on 10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of
Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was
issued in his favor.5
The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and
defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and
obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare that
I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I
impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.6
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign
citizenship, which states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely
and perpetually renounce all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I divest myself
of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of
the United States of America.
I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and
correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.7
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy
for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, which contains, among
others, the following statements:
I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.
I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign
country.
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. I
will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities.
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.8
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another
mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or
to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010
local and national elections.9
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching
thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated
23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-
American."10To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US
citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-
generated travel record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that
Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in
entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows
that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25
June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in
the Philippines on 24 November 2009.
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of
Immigration dated 23 April 2010, certifying that the name "Arnado,
Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer
Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April
2010, with the following pertinent travel records:
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 05778270012
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an
Order13 requiring the respondent to personally file his answer and
memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare
him in default and to present evidence ex-parte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the
2010 elections where Arnado garnered the highest number of
votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate
for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified
answer, submitting the following documents as evidence:14
1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines dated 03 April 2009;
2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia
Branzuela, Leoncio Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of
Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-time resident of
Kauswagan and that he has been conspicuously and
continuously residing in his family’s ancestral house in
Kauswagan;
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion,
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated 03 June 2010 stating that
Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay and that Arnado
went to the United States in 1985 to work and returned to the
Philippines in 2009;
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local
Government Operations Office of Kauswagan stating that Dr.
Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from
January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979 to 15 April
1986; and
5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan
certifying that Arnado has been a registered voter of Kauswagan
since 03 April 2009.
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of
a certificate of candidacy based on misrepresentation, 15 the
COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification.
Balua’s contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States
was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua failed to present any
evidence to support his contention,"16 whereas the First Division
still could "not conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year
residency requirement under the Local Government Code."17
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First
Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino
citizen.18
We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially
complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s act of
consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US
citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of
Renunciation.
xxxx
Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication
that Arnado had no real intention to renounce his US citizenship
and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable
him to run for office. We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring
inconsistency between Arnado’s unexplained use of a US
passport six times and his claim that he re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship and renounced his US citizenship. As noted by the
Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a passport is defined as an
official document of identity and nationality issued to a person
intending to travel or sojourn in foreign countries." Surely, one
who truly divested himself of US citizenship would not continue
to avail of privileges reserved solely for US nationals.19
The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the
COMELEC
First Division reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for
disqualification and/or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of
Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnado’s
proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby ANNULLED. Let the order
of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of
1991 take effect.20
The Motion for Reconsideration and
the Motion for Intervention
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the
COMELEC En Banc on the ground that "the evidence is
insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution
is contrary to law."21 He raised the following contentions:22
1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by
the evidence consisting of his Oath of Allegiance and the Affidavit
of Renunciation, which show that he has substantially complied
with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225;
2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of
his American citizenship is not tantamount to a repudiation of his
Filipino citizenship, as he did not perform any act to swear
allegiance to a country other than the Philippines;
3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of
the issuance of his Philippine passport, and that he used his
Philippine passport after he obtained it;
4. Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado
was filed out of time, and the First Division’s treatment of the
petition as one for disqualification constitutes grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction;23
5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as indicated by his
winning the elections;
6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the
COMELEC from jurisdiction over the case; and
7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a
petition for quo warranto, which should have been filed within ten
days from his proclamation.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another
candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second
highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the
case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for
Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s
Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that
while the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of
succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is
not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the
cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of his
proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who
obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be
proclaimed as the winner.
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion
for Intervention and his Motion for Reconsideration. Arnado
opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention
is prohibited after a decision has already been rendered, and that
as a second-placer, Maquiling undoubtedly lost the elections and
thus does not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the final
adjudication of the case.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held
that under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the Commission
"shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest even after the proclamation of the candidate whose
qualifications for office is questioned."
As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which allows intervention in
proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no final
judgment has been rendered, but went on further to say that
Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be prejudiced by the
outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of
the Resolution of the First Division allowing the order of
succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code to
take effect.
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First
Division of the petition as one for disqualification, and ruled that
the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by
law,24 having been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than 11
May 2010, the date of proclamation.
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the
ruling of the First Division and granted Arnado’s Motion for
Reconsideration, on the following premises:
First:
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225,
the respondent embraced his Philippine citizenship as though he
never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time,
April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure Philippine
Citizen again.
xxxx
The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his
status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no law
saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not
operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on renounced. The
First Division’s reliance in the case of In Re: Petition for Habeas
Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The
petitioner in the said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking
his oath as a naturalized Filipino, applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the conduct of
citizens who are not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by
choice, thus discarding their original citizenship. The Philippine
State expects strict conduct of allegiance to those who choose to
be its citizens. In the present case, respondent is not a
naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who chose greener
pastures by working abroad and then decided to repatriate to
supposedly help in the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply
for a US passport after his renunciation. Thus the mentioned case
is not on all fours with the case at bar.
xxxx
The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of
his US passport. Although he applied for a Philippine passport,
the passport was only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was
not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport so that he
was actually able to get it about three (3) months later. Yet as
soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the
respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels
abroad. This fact is proven by the respondent’s submission of a
certified true copy of his passport showing that he used the same
for his travels on the following dates: January 31, 2010, April 16,
2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010, March 31, 2010 and June 4,
2010. This then shows that the use of the US passport was
because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet
issued to him for his use. As probably pressing needs might be
undertaken, the respondent used whatever is within his control
during that time.25
In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto
Brillantes cited that the use of foreign passport is not one of the
grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of
citizenship is more appropriate in this case. Under said principle,
once a person becomes a citizen, either by birth or naturalization,
it is assumed that he desires to continue to be a citizen, and this
assumption stands until he voluntarily denationalizes or
expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant case respondent after
reacquiring his Philippine citizenship should be presumed to
have remained a Filipino despite his use of his American passport
in the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of
expatriation. Accordingly, all doubts should be resolved in favor
of retention of citizenship."26
On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented,
thus:
Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and
wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to the United States.
The latter’s continued use of his US passport and enjoyment of all
the privileges of a US citizen despite his previous renunciation of
the afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary to his declaration
that he chose to retain only his Philippine citizenship.
Respondent’s submission with the twin requirements was
obviously only for the purpose of complying with the
requirements for running for the mayoralty post in connection
with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections.
Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are
continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during his
incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a
candidate is not a citizen at the time he ran for office or if he lost
his citizenship after his election to office, he is disqualified to
serve as such. Neither does the fact that respondent obtained the
plurality of votes for the mayoralty post cure the latter’s failure to
comply with the qualification requirements regarding his
citizenship.
Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of
the law, his having received the highest number of votes does not
validate his election. It has been held that where a petition for
disqualification was filed before election against a candidate but
was adversely resolved against him after election, his having
obtained the highest number of votes did not make his election
valid. His ouster from office does not violate the principle of vox
populi suprema est lex because the application of the
constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a
matter of popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life to the
sovereign will of the people who expressed it when they ratified
the Constitution and when they elected their representatives who
enacted the law.27
THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of
declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office despite his
continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be
proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on
the part of the COMELEC En Banc for ruling that Arnado is a
Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US passport,
Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding of the COMELEC En
Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public office.
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En
Banc or to affirm the First Division’s disqualification of Arnado,
Maquiling also seeks the review of the applicability of Section 44
of the Local Government Code, claiming that the COMELEC
committed reversible error in ruling that "the succession of the
vice mayor in case the respondent is disqualified is in order."
There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court
which will be addressed seriatim as the subsequent questions
hinge on the result of the first.
The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a
disqualification case.
The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign
passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to undoing
a renunciation earlier made.
A better framing of the question though should be whether or not
the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship
affects one’s qualifications to run for public office.
The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the
Local Government Code is applicable to this case.
OUR RULING
Intervention of a rival candidate in a
disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when
respondent Arnado filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the First
Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As the
candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes,
Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the disqualification
case filed against Arnado, considering that in the event the latter
is disqualified, the votes cast for him should be considered stray
and the second-placer should be proclaimed as the winner in the
elections.
It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the
COMELEC is one for cancellation of the certificate of candidacy
and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and the
COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the petition as one for
disqualification.
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of
R.A. No. 6646:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has
been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for
any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.
Mercado v. Manzano28
clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that
case, the Court said:
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the
proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is
clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate
who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted.
If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court
or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may
be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election
if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.29
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The
fact that the COMELEC En Banc has already ruled that Maquiling
has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the
second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC30 are present
and therefore would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the
case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter
before this Court.
Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as the
original petitioner and respondents therein have not appealed the
decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The
elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining
finality. It is only after this Court has ruled upon the issues raised
in this instant petition that the disqualification case originally filed
by Balua against Arnado will attain finality.
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign
citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to
one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino
citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective
position.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act
of 2003 provides:
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this
Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.
x x x31
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for
a public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and renounced his
foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing
these twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No.
9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003,
he became eligible to run for public office.
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but
twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when he applied for repatriation
before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco,
USA, and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution
of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At
the time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship.
Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his
American citizenship by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation,
thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public
office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be
solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such
renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.32
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently
and is open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign
citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his
continued possession of a foreign citizenship.33
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack
when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to
use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before
filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The
pivotal question to determine is whether he was solely and
exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for public office.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign
citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he
used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the
affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his
foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented
himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration
authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with
all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United States of
America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that
can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next
day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the
foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political
rights granted by the foreign country which granted the
citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the
Court declared:
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his
undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there
are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu
v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the
country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a
naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport and declared in commercial documents executed
abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can
be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship,
renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some
act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts
enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting
renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless
an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for
a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to
be qualified to run for a local elective position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just
eleven days after he renounced his American citizenship, he
recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and
perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that he "divest(s) himself of full
employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the
United States of America."38
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a
foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino
citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by
representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily
and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen.
Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant
Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his
US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s
foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it
effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective
local position.
Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign
citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying for
naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens
by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of
renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy
already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign
citizenship.39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand,
are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce
foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public
office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November
2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges
of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but
by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code,40 he was not qualified to run for a local
elective position.
In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only
for a period of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April
2009, on which date he first used his American passport after
renouncing his American citizenship.
This Court has previously ruled that:
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and
must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or
election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire
tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title
may be seasonably challenged. x x x.41
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a
continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the
renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act
which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship
issue to attack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division
that "Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport
effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This does
not mean, that he failed to comply with the twin requirements
under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.
It was after complying with the requirements that he performed
positive acts which effectively disqualified him from running for
an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual
citizens from running for any elective public office would be
thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced
his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself
as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.
Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the
explanation that he was not notified of the issuance of his
Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was
only able to obtain his Philippine passport three (3) months
later.43
The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the
Portuguese national who sought naturalization as a Filipino
citizen and later applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport. That Arnado did not apply for a US passport after his
renunciation does not make his use of a US passport less of an
act that violated the Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a
positive act of representation as a US citizen before the
immigration officials of this country.
The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as
soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the
respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels
abroad."44 We cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months
from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used his Philippine
passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he would not
have used his US passport on 24 November 2009.
Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport
does not correct the fact that after he renounced his foreign
citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used
his US passport. In the same way that the use of his foreign
passport does not undo his Oath of Renunciation, his subsequent
use of his Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use of his
US passport.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity
that comes with attendant civil and political rights accorded by
the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty
to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who
acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of
suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office
are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving
of the public trust. Holding public office demands full and
undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after
renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath
of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government
Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from
holding the public office but even from becoming a candidate in
the May 2010 elections.
We now resolve the next issue.
Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v.
Paredes45 which is the jurisprudential spring of the principle that
a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an
election contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its
soundness once again put to the test to address the ever-
recurring issue that a second-placer who loses to an ineligible
candidate cannot be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
The Facts of the case are as follows:
On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus,
Province of Cavite, to fill the office of municipal president. The
petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad,
were opposing candidates for that office. Topacio received 430
votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the election upon the sole
ground that Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the
second time to the office of the municipal president on June 4,
1912, without the four years required by Act No. 2045 having
intervened.46
Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of
a statutory prohibition for seeking a second re-election absent the
four year interruption.
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath
of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to
any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the
one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."47
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter
dictum. The Court was comparing "the effect of a decision that a
candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or
irregularities in the elections x x x with that produced by
declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."
The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a
comparison and contrast between the two situations, thus:
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to
the office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections is
quite different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible
to hold such an office. In the former case the court, after an
examination of the ballots may find that some other person than
the candidate declared to have received a plurality by the board of
canvassers actually received the greater number of votes, in
which case the court issues its mandamus to the board of
canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that
the manner of holding the election and the returns are so tainted
with fraud or illegality that it cannot be determined who received a
plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no question
as to the correctness of the returns or the manner of casting and
counting the ballots is before the deciding power, and generally
the only result can be that the election fails entirely. In the former,
we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the
opposing parties are striving for supremacy. If it be found that the
successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers)
obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another
candidate was the real victor, the former must retire in favor of
the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a
contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an
ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the
legally cast ballots. In the one case the question is as to who
received a plurality of the legally cast ballots; in the other, the
question is confined to the personal character and circumstances
of a single individual.48 (Emphasis supplied)
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In
the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest" in
contrast to the earlier statement, "In the former, we have a contest
in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties
are striving for supremacy."
The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that
"the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible
candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast
ballots."
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that
since the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction to try a
disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who
obtained the highest number of votes in the election, its
jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the
contestants has been duly elected" the judge exceeded his
jurisdiction when he "declared that no one had been legally
elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general
election held in that town on 4 June 1912" where "the only
question raised was whether or not Topacio was eligible to be
elected and to hold the office of municipal president."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that
Abad as the second placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead. The
Court therein ruled:
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that
the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in declaring in
those proceedings that no one was elected municipal president of
the municipality of Imus at the last general election; and that said
order and all subsequent proceedings based thereon are null and
void and of no effect; and, although this decision is rendered on
respondents' answer to the order to show cause, unless
respondents raised some new and additional issues, let judgment
be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So ordered.49
On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions
does not even have a legal basis to stand on. It was a mere
pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with another
and explaining the effects thereof. As an independent statement,
it is even illogical.
Let us examine the statement:
"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an
ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the
legally cast ballots."
What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the
ineligible candidate to another candidate?
When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility
of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots and
ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops the Court from
adjudging another eligible candidate who received the next
highest number of votes as the winner and bestowing upon him
that "wreath?"
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes
is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, he could not
even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the
lack of material time or any other intervening circumstances, his
ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election
date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold
himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified
candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the
elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged.
Ineligibility does not only pertain to his qualifications as a
candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office.
The number of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of
failure to qualify with the substantive legal requirements of
eligibility to run for public office.
The popular vote does not cure the
ineligibility of a candidate.
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory
requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be
possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by
persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those
qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate.
When a person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually
garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the
electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in
the qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample
upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. We might as
well write off our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the
sole determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy
elective positions in our republic.
This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo
v. COMELEC50 when we pronounced:
x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon
does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting
public office and employment only to the citizens of this country.
The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased
by the electorate alone.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot
cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed,
as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this
rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of
citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the
Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only,
abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other
state.51 (Emphasis supplied)
This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v.
COMELEC52 where the Court ruled that the ruling in Quizon and
Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest
"Election victory x x x becomes a magic formula to bypass
election eligibility requirements."53
We have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election
may be considered a sufficient basis to rule in favor of the
candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves
defects in the candidate’s certificate of candidacy. We said that
while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are
mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as
regards election laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain
steps before elections will be construed as directory after the
elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in
Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC:
The present case perhaps presents the proper time and
opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling. We say this with the
realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and application
of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous significance for the
rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For one, such
blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law
that effectively negates election requirements aimed at providing
the electorate with the basic information to make an informed
choice about a candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office.
The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is
made is Section 39 of the LGC which specifies the basic
qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of
being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out
what should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may likewise be
emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to
cancel or deny due course to a COC can render a Section 78
petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins. To state
the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC
qualifications if they know that an election victory will cure any
defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a
magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements.
(Citations omitted)
What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a
seemingly valid COC, concealing any disqualification, and
employing every strategy to delay any disqualification case filed
against him so he can submit himself to the electorate and win, if
winning the election will guarantee a disregard of constitutional
and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates?
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice
through the ballot by ensuring that its exercise respects the rule
of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to
trump constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications
and disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or
republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are
disregarded and only the electorate’s voice spoken through the
ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an open
invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.1âwphi1
Maquiling is not a second-placer as
he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.
With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the
winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of votes
from among the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and
Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void COC cannot produce any legal
effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not
considered at all in determining the winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded,
the will of the electorate is still respected, and even more so. The
votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the
sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast
in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that
voice and must also be respected.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine
the qualifications and disqualifications of those who are allowed
to participate as players. When there are participants who turn
out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is
awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the
disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the
rules to be eligible as candidates.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v.
COMELEC56 that when the voters are well aware within the realm
of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their
votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate
obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed
elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated
the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to
ineligible ones.
The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is
not a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the
candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance
makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a
candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified
candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be
proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is
actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and
has assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent
disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior
to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC
but also the proclamation.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:
It could not have produced any other legal effect except that
Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior
to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition when
the elections were conducted already and he was already
proclaimed the winner.
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the
prohibitory character of the disqualification which Arnado
possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification, although made long
after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the
May 201 0 elections.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should
not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore,
the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will not
apply.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED.
The Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane dated 2 February 2011
is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL
ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any local
elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby
DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.
This Decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties
and the Commission on Elections.

No pronouncement as to costs.
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who
has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for SO ORDERED.
any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.

There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended

under this rule because Arnado failed to file his answer to the
petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer
on 15 June 2010, long after the elections and after he was already
proclaimed as the winner.

The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy

involves his citizenship. It does not involve the commission of
election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section
68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to
disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he
has already been elected, from holding the office.

The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his

citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino and
an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He
was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office based on
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are

disqualified from running for any elective local position." The
prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under
any of the enumeration from participating as candidates in the
election.

With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his

certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning.

G.R. No. 188314 January 10, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
KHADDAFY JANJALANI, GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay,
ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu Khalil, GAPPAL BANNAH ASALI
a.k.a. Maidan or Negro, JAINAL SALI a.k.a. Abu Solaiman,
ROHMAT ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Jackie or Zaky, and other JOHN
and JANE DOES, Accused,
GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu
Khalil, and ROHMAT ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Abu Jackie or
Zaky, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated 30 June 2008, which affirmed the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 05-
476 and 05-4777 dated 18 October 2005. The latter Decision
convicted the three accused-appellants – namely, Gamal B.
Baharan a.k.a. Tapay, Angelo Trinidad a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and
Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky – of the complex
crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder, and
sentenced them to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection.
The CA modified the sentence to reclusion perpetua as required
by Republic Act No. 9346 (Act Abolishing the Imposition of Death
Penalty).
Statement of Facts
The pertinent facts, as determined by the trial court, are as
follows:
On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its usual
southbound route, from its Navotas bus terminal towards its
Alabang bus terminal via Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA).
Around 6:30 to 7:30 in the evening, while they were about to move
out of the Guadalupe-EDSA southbound bus stop, the bus
conductor noticed two men running after the bus. The two
insisted on getting on the bus, so the conductor obliged and let
them in.
According to Elmer Andales, the bus conductor, he immediately
became wary of the two men, because, even if they got on the bus
together, the two sat away from each other – one sat two seats
behind the driver, while the other sat at the back of the bus. At the
time, there were only 15 passengers inside the bus. He also
noticed that the eyes of one of the men were reddish. When he
approached the person near the driver and asked him whether he
was paying for two passengers, the latter looked dumb struck by
the question. He then stuttered and said he was paying for two
and gave PhP20. Andales grew more concerned when the other
man seated at the back also paid for both passengers. At this
point, Andales said he became more certain that the two were up
to no good, and that there might be a holdup.
Afterwards, Andales said he became more suspicious because
both men kept on asking him if the bus was going to stop at Ayala
Avenue. The witness also noticed that the man at the back
appeared to be slouching, with his legs stretched out in front of
him and his arms hanging out and hidden from view as if he was
tinkering with something. When Andales would get near the man,
the latter would glare at him. Andales admitted, however, that he
did not report the suspicious characters to the police.
As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala
Avenue and EDSA, the two men insisted on getting off the bus.
According to Andales, the bus driver initially did not want to let
them off the bus, because a Makati ordinance prohibited
unloading anywhere except at designated bus stops. Eventually,
the bus driver gave in and allowed the two passengers to alight.
The two immediately got off the bus and ran towards Ayala
Avenue. Moments after, Andales felt an explosion. He then saw
fire quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out of the bus towards a
nearby mall. After a while, he went back to where the bus was. He
saw their bus passengers either lying on the ground or looking
traumatized. A few hours after, he made a statement before the
Makati Police Station narrating the whole incident.
The prosecution presented documents furnished by the
Department of Justice, confirming that shortly before the
explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf Group – Abu
Solaiman – announced over radio station DZBB that the group
had a Valentine’s Day "gift" for former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. After the bombing, he again went on radio and
warned of more bomb attacks.
As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN
News Network an exclusive interview some time after the
incident, confessing his participation in the Valentine’s Day
bombing incident. In another exclusive interview on the network,
accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the bombing
incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview,
confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices for the 14
February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified the
accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the
two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14
February.
Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group – namely Khaddafy Janjalani,
Gamal B. Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, Gappal Bannah Asali, Jainal
Asali, Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, and other
"John" and "Jane Does" – were then charged with multiple
murder and multiple frustrated murder. Only Baharan, Trinidad,
Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the other accused remain
at-large.
On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge (Crim. Case
No. 05-476), Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all entered a plea of
guilty. On the other hand, upon arraignment for the multiple
frustrated murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-477), accused Asali
pled guilty. Accused Trinidad and Baharan pled not guilty.
Rohmat pled not guilty to both charges. During the pretrial
hearing, the parties stipulated the following:
1.) The jurisdiction of this court over the offenses charged.
2.) That all three accused namely alias Baharan, Trinidad, and
Asali admitted knowing one another before February 14, 2005.
3.) All the same three accused likewise admitted that a bomb
exploded in the RRCG bus while the bus was plying the EDSA
route fronting the MRT terminal which is in front of the Makati
Commercial Center.
4.) Accused Asali admitted knowing the other accused alias
Rohmat whom he claims taught him how to make explosive
devices.
5.) The accused Trinidad also admitted knowing Rohmat before
the February 14 bombing incident.
6.) The accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all admitted to
causing the bomb explosion inside the RRCG bus which left four
people dead and more or less forty persons injured.
7.) Both Baharan and Trinidad agreed to stipulate that within the
period March 20-24 each gave separate interviews to the ABS-
CBN news network admitting their participation in the
commission of the said crimes, subject of these cases.
8.) Accused Trinidad and Baharan also admitted to pleading guilty
to these crimes, because they were guilt-stricken after seeing a
man carrying a child in the first bus that they had entered.
9.) Accused Asali likewise admitted that in the middle of March
2005 he gave a television news interview in which he admitted
that he supplied the explosive devices which resulted in this
explosion inside the RRCG bus and which resulted in the filing of
these charges.
10.) Finally, accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted that
they are members of the Abu Sayyaf.1
In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked
whether accused Baharan and Trinidad were amenable to
changing their "not guilty" pleas to the charge of multiple
frustrated murder, considering that they pled "guilty" to the
heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an apparent
inconsistency in their pleas. Defense counsel conferred with
accused Baharan and Trinidad and explained to them the
consequences of the pleas. The two accused acknowledged the
inconsistencies and manifested their readiness for re-
arraignment. After the Information was read to them, Baharan and
Trinidad pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated murder.2
After being discharged as state witness, accused Asali testified
that while under training with the Abu Sayyaf in 2004, Rohmat,
a.k.a Abu Jackie or Zaky, and two other persons taught him how
to make bombs and explosives. The trainees were told that they
were to wage battles against the government in the city, and that
their first mission was to plant bombs in malls, the Light Railway
Transit (LRT), and other parts of Metro Manila.
As found by the trial court, Asali, after his training, was required
by the Abu Sayyaf leadership, specifically Abu Solaiman and
Rohmat, to secure eight kilos of TNT, a soldering gun, aluminum
powder, a tester, and Christmas lights, all of which he knew
would be used to make a bomb. He then recalled that sometime in
November to December 2004, Trinidad asked him for a total of 4
kilos of TNT – that is, 2 kilos on two separate occasions. Rohmat
allegedly called Asali to confirm that Trinidad would get TNT from
Asali and use it for their first mission. The TNT was allegedly
placed in two buses sometime in December 2004, but neither one
of them exploded.
Asali then testified that the night before the Valentine’s Day
bombing, Trinidad and Baharan got another two kilos of TNT from
him. Late in the evening of 14 February, he received a call from
Abu Solaiman. The latter told Asali not to leave home or go to
crowded areas, since the TNT taken by Baharan and Trinidad had
already been exploded in Makati. Thirty minutes later, Trinidad
called Asali, repeating the warning of Abu Solaiman. The next
day, Asali allegedly received a call from accused Rohmat,
congratulating the former on the success of the
mission.3 According to Asali, Abu Zaky specifically said, "Sa
wakas nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo."
Assignment of Errors
Accused-appellants raise the following assignment of errors:
I. The trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-appellants’
plea of guilt despite insufficiency of searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the
said plea.
II. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the guilt of accused-
appellants for the crimes charged had been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.4
First Assignment of Error
Accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad argue that the trial
court did not conduct a searching inquiry after they had changed
their plea from "not guilty" to "guilty." The transcript of
stenographic notes during the 18 April 2005 re-arraignment
before the Makati Regional Trial Court is reproduced below:
Court : Anyway, I think what we should have to do, considering
the stipulations that were agreed upon during the last hearing, is
to address this matter of pleas of not guilty entered for the
frustrated murder charges by the two accused, Mr. Trinidad and
Mr. Baharan, because if you will recall they entered pleas of guilty
to the multiple murder charges, but then earlier pleas of not guilty
for the frustrated multiple murder charges remain… [I]s that not
inconsistent considering the stipulations that were entered into
during the initial pretrial of this case? [If] you will recall, they
admitted to have caused the bomb explosion that led to the death
of at least four people and injury of about forty other persons and
so under the circumstances, Atty Peña, have you discussed this
matter with your clients?
………
Atty. Peña : Then we should be given enough time to talk with
them. I haven’t conferred with them about this with regard to the
multiple murder case.
………
Court : Okay. So let us proceed now. Atty. Peña, can you assist
the two accused because if they are interested in withdrawing
their [pleas], I want to hear it from your lips.
Atty. Peña : Yes, your Honor.
(At this juncture, Atty. Peña confers with the two accused, namely
Trinidad and Baharan)
I have talked to them, your Honor, and I have explained to them
the consequence of their pleas, your Honor, and that the plea of
guilt to the murder case and plea of not guilty to the frustrated
multiple murder actually are inconsistent with their pleas.
Court : With matters that they stipulated upon?
Atty. Peña : Yes, your Honor. So, they are now, since they already
plead guilt to the murder case, then they are now changing their
pleas, your Honor, from not guilty to the one of guilt. They are
now ready, your Honor, for re-arraignment.
………
INTERPRETER: (Read again that portion [of the information] and
translated it in Filipino in a clearer way and asked both accused
what their pleas are).
Your Honor, both accused are entering separate pleas of guilt to
the crime charged.
COURT : All right. So after the information was re-read to the
accused, they have withdrawn their pleas of not guilty and
changed it to the pleas of guilty to the charge of frustrated
murder. Thank you. Are there any matters you need to address at
pretrial now? If there are none, then I will terminate pretrial and
accommodate…5
As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled
that "all trial judges … must refrain from accepting with alacrity
an accused's plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy
administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in
seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands
fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable
conviction."6 Thus, trial court judges are required to observe the
following procedure under Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. —
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court
shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require
the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.
(Emphasis supplied)
The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so
in cases of re-arraignment. In People v. Galvez, the Court noted
that since accused-appellant's original plea was "not guilty," the
trial court should have exerted careful effort in inquiring into why
he changed his plea to "guilty."7 According to the Court:
The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of guilt,
especially in a case involving the death penalty, is imposed upon
the trial judge in order to leave no room for doubt on the
possibility that the accused might have misunderstood the nature
of the charge and the consequences of the plea.8
Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should
not be deemed satisfied in cases in which it was the defense
counsel who explained the consequences of a "guilty" plea to the
accused, as it appears in this case. In People v. Alborida, this
Court found that there was still an improvident plea of guilty, even
if the accused had already signified in open court that his counsel
had explained the consequences of the guilty plea; that he
understood the explanation of his counsel; that the accused
understood that the penalty of death would still be meted out to
him; and that he had not been intimidated, bribed, or threatened.9
We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a
searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are
mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had
not been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a
misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and consequences
of their guilty plea.10 This requirement is stringent and
mandatory.11
Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under which
the re-arraignment was conducted or of the factual milieu
surrounding the finding of guilt against the accused. The Court
observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled
guilty to another charge – multiple murder – based on the same
act relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge. The
Court further notes that prior to the change of plea to one of guilt,
accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other confessions of
guilt – one through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive
television interviews, as stipulated by both accused during
pretrial), and the other via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation).
Considering the foregoing circumstances, we deem it
unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the "searching inquiry"
in this instance. Remanding the case for re-arraignment is not
warranted, as the accused’s plea of guilt was not the sole basis of
the condemnatory judgment under consideration.12
Second Assignment of Error
In People v. Oden, the Court declared that even if the requirement
of conducting a searching inquiry was not complied with, "[t]he
manner by which the plea of guilt is made … loses much of great
significance where the conviction can be based on independent
evidence proving the commission by the person accused of the
offense charged."13 Thus, in People v. Nadera, the Court stated:
Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside
only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court
relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused,
the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated
not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence
proving his commission of the offense charged.14 (Emphasis
supplied.)
In their second assignment of error, accused-appellants assert
that guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. They pointed
out that the testimony of the conductor was merely
circumstantial, while that of Asali as to the conspiracy was
insufficient.
Insofar as accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad are
concerned, the evidence for the prosecution, in addition to that
which can be drawn from the stipulation of facts, primarily
consisted of the testimonies of the bus conductor, Elmer
Andales, and of the accused-turned-state-witness, Asali. Andales
positively identified accused Baharan and Trinidad as the two
men who had acted suspiciously while inside the bus; who had
insisted on getting off the bus in violation of a Makati ordinance;
and who had scampered away from the bus moments before the
bomb exploded. On the other hand, Asali testified that he had
given accused Baharan and Trinidad the TNT used in the
bombing incident in Makati City. The guilt of the accused Baharan
and Trinidad was sufficiently established by these corroborating
testimonies, coupled with their respective judicial admissions
(pretrial stipulations) and extrajudicial confessions (exclusive
television interviews, as they both stipulated during pretrial) that
they were indeed the perpetrators of the Valentine’s Day
bombing.15 Accordingly, the Court upholds the findings of guilt
made by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Anent accused Rohmat, the evidence for the prosecution
consisted of the testimony of accused-turned-state-witness Asali.
Below is a reproduction of the transcript of stenographic notes on
the state prosecutor’s direct examination of state-witness Asali
during the 26 May 2005 trial:
Q : You stated that Zaky trained you and Trinidad. Under what
circumstances did he train you, Mr. Witness, to assemble those
explosives, you and Trinidad?
A : Abu Zaky, Abu Solaiman, Khadaffy Janjalani, the three of
them, that Angelo Trinidad and myself be the one to be trained to
make an explosive, sir.
Q : Mr. witness, how long that training, or how long did it take that
training?
A : If I am not mistaken, we were thought to make bomb about
one month and two weeks.
………
Q : Now, speaking of that mission, Mr. witness, while you were
still in training at Mr. Cararao, is there any mission that you
undertook, if any, with respect to that mission?
………
A : Our first mission was to plant a bomb in the malls, LRT, and
other parts of Metro Manila, sir.16
The witness then testified that he kept eight kilos of TNT for
accused Baharan and Trinidad.
Q : Now, going back to the bomb. Mr. witness, did you know what
happened to the 2 kilos of bomb that Trinidad and Tapay took
from you sometime in November 2004?
A : That was the explosive that he planted in the G-liner, which
did not explode.
Q : How did you know, Mr. witness?
A : He was the one who told me, Mr. Angelo Trinidad, sir.
………
Q : What happened next, Mr. witness, when the bomb did not
explode, as told to you by Trinidad?
A : On December 29, Angelo Trinidad got 2 more kilos of TNT
bombs.
………
Q : Did Trinidad tell you why he needed another amount of
explosive on that date, December 29, 2004? Will you kindly tell us
the reason why?
………
A : He told me that Abu Solaiman instructed me to get the TNT so
that he could detonate a bomb
………
Q : Were there any other person, besides Abu Solaiman, who
called you up, with respect to the taking of the explosives from
you?
A : There is, sir… Abu Zaky, sir, called up also.
Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you when he called you up?
A : He told me that "this is your first mission."
Q : Please enlighten the Honorable Court. What is that mission
you are referring to?
A : That is the first mission where we can show our anger towards
the Christians.
………
Q : The second time that he got a bomb from you, Mr. witness, do
you know if the bomb explode?
A : I did not know what happened to the next 2 kilos taken by
Angelo Trinidad from me until after I was caught, because I was
told by the policeman that interviewed me after I was arrested that
the 2 kilos were planted in a bus, which also did not explode.
Q : So besides these two incidents, were there any other
incidents that Angelo Trinidad and Tapay get an explosive for
you, Mr. witness?
………
A : If I am not mistaken, sir, on February 13, 2005 at 6:30 p.m.
Q : Who got from you the explosive Mr. witness?
A : It’s Angelo Trinidad and Tapay, sir.
………
Q : How many explosives did they get from you, Mr. witness, at
that time?
A : They got 2 kilos TNT bomb, sir.
Q : Did they tell you, Mr. witness, where are they going to use that
explosive?
A : No, sir.
Q : Do you know, Mr. witness, what happened to the third batch of
explosives, which were taken from you by Trinidad and Tapay?
………
A : That is the bomb that exploded in Makati, sir.
Q : Why did you know, Mr. witness?
A : Because I was called in the evening of February 14 by Abu
Solaiman. He told me not to leave the house because the
explosive that were taken by Tapay and Angelo Trinidad
exploded.
………
Q : Was there any other call during that time, Mr. Witness?
………
A : I was told by Angelo Trinidad not to leave the house because
the explosive that he took exploded already, sir.
Q : How sure were you, Mr. witness, at that time, that indeed, the
bomb exploded at Makati, beside the call of Abu Solaiman and
Trinidad?
A : It was told by Abu Solaiman that the bombing in Makati should
coincide with the bombing in General Santos.
………
A : He told it to me, sir… I cannot remember the date anymore,
but I know it was sometime in February 2005.
Q : Any other call, Mr. witness, from Abu Solaiman and Trinidad
after the bombing exploded in Makati, any other call?
………
A : There is, sir… The call came from Abu Zaky.
Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you, Mr. witness?
A : He just greeted us congratulations, because we have a
successful mission.
………
A : He told me that "sa wakas, nag success din yung tinuro ko
sayo."
………
Q : By the way, Mr. witness, I would just like to clarify this. You
stated that Abu Zaky called you up the following day, that was
February 15, and congratulating you for the success of the
mission. My question to you, Mr. witness, if you know what is the
relation of that mission, wherein you were congratulated by Abu
Zaky, to the mission, which have been indoctrinated to you, while
you were in Mt. Cararao, Mr. witness?
A : They are connected, sir.
Q : Connected in what sense, Mr. witness?
A : Because when we were undergoing training, we were told that
the Abu Sayyaf should not wage war to the forest, but also wage
our battles in the city.
Q : Wage the battle against who, Mr. witness?
A : The government, sir.17
What can be culled from the testimony of Asali is that the Abu
Sayyaf Group was determined to sow terror in Metro Manila, so
that they could show their "anger towards the Christians."18 It can
also be seen that Rohmat, together with Janjalani and Abu
Solaiman, had carefully planned the Valentine’s Day bombing
incident, months before it happened. Rohmat had trained Asali
and Trinidad to make bombs and explosives. While in training,
Asali and others were told that their mission was to plant bombs
in malls, the LRT, and other parts of Metro Manila. According to
Asali, Rohmat called him on 29 December 2004 to confirm that
Trinidad would get two kilos of TNT from Asali, as they were
"about to commence" their "first mission."19 They made two
separate attempts to bomb a bus in Metro Manila, but to no avail.
The day before the Valentine’s Day bombing, Trinidad got another
two kilos of TNT from Asali. On Valentine’s Day, the Abu Sayyaf
Group announced that they had a gift for the former President,
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. On their third try, their plan finally
succeeded. Right after the bomb exploded, the Abu Sayyaf Group
declared that there would be more bombings in the future. Asali
then received a call from Rohmat, praising the former: "Sa wakas
nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo."20
In the light of the foregoing evidence, the Court upholds the
finding of guilt against Rohmat. Article 17 of the Revised Penal
Code reads:
Art. 17. Principals. — The following are considered principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by
another act without which it would not have been accomplished
Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the second
paragraph, or the provision on "principal by inducement." The
instructions and training he had given Asali on how to make
bombs – coupled with their careful planning and persistent
attempts to bomb different areas in Metro Manila and Rohmat’s
confirmation that Trinidad would be getting TNT from Asali as
part of their mission – prove the finding that Rohmat’s co-
inducement was the determining cause of the commission of the
crime.21 Such "command or advice [was] of such nature that,
without it, the crime would not have materialized."22lawphi1
Further, the inducement was "so influential in producing the
criminal act that without it, the act would not have been
performed."23 In People v. Sanchez, et al., the Court ruled that,
notwithstanding the fact that Mayor Sanchez was not at the crime
scene, evidence proved that he was the mastermind of the
criminal act or the principal by inducement. Thus, because Mayor
Sanchez was a co-principal and co-conspirator, and because the
act of one conspirator is the act of all, the mayor was rendered
liable for all the resulting crimes.24 The same finding must be
applied to the case at bar.
The Court also affirms the finding of the existence of conspiracy
involving accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Rohmat. Conspiracy
was clearly established from the "collective acts of the accused-
appellants before, during and after the commission of the crime."
As correctly declared by the trial court in its Omnibus Decision:
Asali’s clear and categorical testimony, which remains unrebutted
on its major points, coupled with the judicial admissions freely
and voluntarily given by the two other accused, are sufficient to
prove the existence of a conspiracy hatched between and among
the four accused, all members of the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf,
to wreak chaos and mayhem in the metropolis by indiscriminately
killing and injuring civilian victims by utilizing bombs and other
similar destructive explosive devices.
While said conspiracy involving the four malefactors has not
been expressly admitted by accused Baharan, Angelo Trinidad,
and Rohmat, more specifically with respect to the latter’s
participation in the commission of the crimes, nonetheless it has
been established by virtue of the aforementioned evidence, which
established the existence of the conspiracy itself and the
indispensable participation of accused Rohmat in seeing to it that
the conspirators’ criminal design would be realized.
It is well-established that conspiracy may be inferred from the
acts of the accused, which clearly manifests a concurrence of
wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime (People v.
Lenantud, 352 SCRA 544). Hence, where acts of the accused
collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a
common design towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident and all the perpetrators
will be held liable as principals (People v. Ellado, 353 SCRA 643).25
In People v. Geronimo, the Court pronounced that it would be
justified in concluding that the defendants therein were engaged
in a conspiracy "when the defendants by their acts aimed at the
same object, one performing one part and the other performing
another part so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of
the same object; and their acts, though apparently independent,
were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of
personal association, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments."26
Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible
pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It is true that
under the rule, statements made by a conspirator against a co-
conspirator are admissible only when made during the existence
of the conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled in People v.
Buntag, if the declarant repeats the statement in court, his
extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission, making
the testimony admissible as to both conspirators.27 Thus, in
People v. Palijon, the Court held the following:
… [W]e must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial
confessions. An extrajudicial confession may be given in
evidence against the confessant but not against his co-accused
as they are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him. A
judicial confession is admissible against the declarant’s co-
accused since the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-
examine the former. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to
testimony at trial where the party adversely affected has the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Mercene’s admission
implicating his co-accused was given on the witness stand. It is
admissible in evidence against appellant Palijon. Moreover, where
several accused are tried together for the same offense, the
testimony of a co-accused implicating his co-accused is
competent evidence against the latter.28
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, as affirmed with modification by
the Court of Appeals, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015 threatened that there would be loss of life if they persisted in
harvesting the abaca. Cabero reported the incident to Anecita
Pacate and the police.11
MONICO LIGTAS, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent. On July 2, 2000, Cabero and Cipres went back to the plantation
and conducted a survey on the condition of the plantation. They
DECISION found that 1,000 kilos of abaca, valued at P28.00 per kilo, were
harvested by Ligtas.12
LEONEN, J.: On July 3, 2000, Ligtas and Anecita Pacate confronted each other
before the Sogod Police Station.13Ligtas admitted to harvesting
"Bakit niya babawiin ang aking saka?" tanong ni Tata Selo. the abaca but claimed that he was the plantation owner.14
"Dinaya ko na ba siya sa partihan? Tinuso ko na ba siya? Siya
ang may-ari ng lupa at kasama lang niya ako. Hindi ba't kaya The defense presented three (3) witnesses during trial: Ligtas;
maraming nagagalit sa akin ay dahil sa ayaw kong magpamigay Pablo Palo, his neighbor; and Delia Ligtas, his wife.15 According
ng kahit isang pinangko kung anihan?" to Ligtas, he had been a tenant of Anecita Pacate and her late
husband, Andres Pacate since 1993.16 Andres Pacate installed
Hindi pa rin umaalis sa harap ng istaked si Tata Selo. Nakahawak him as tenant of the 1.5 to two hectares of land involved in the
pa rin siya sa rehas. Nakatingin siya sa labas ngunit wala siyang criminal case.17
sino mang tinitingnan.
Ligtas allegedly "made his first harvest in 1997."18 He then gave
"Binabawi po niya ang aking saka," sumbong ni Tata Selo. "Saan Anecita Pacate her share to the harvest.19 However, he could not
papo ako pupunta kung wala na akong saka?" remember the exact amount anymore.20 Previously, Ligtas and
Pablo Palo were workers in another land, around 15 hectares,
Habang nakakapit sa rehas at nakatingin sa labas, sinasabi owned by Anecita Pacate and Andres Pacate.21
niyang lahat ay kinuha na sa kanila, lahat, ay! ang lahat ay kinuha
na sa kanila. Ligtas alleged that on June 28, 2000, Anecita Pacate sent workers
to harvest abaca from the land he cultivated. Ligtas prevented the
men from harvesting the abaca since he was the rightful tenant of
- "TataSelo" (1963) by Rogelio R. Sikat the land.22

The uncontested declaration of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board that Monico Ligtas was a tenant
negates a finding of theft beyond reasonable doubt. Tenants
having rights to the harvest cannot be deemed to have taken their
own produce.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals Decision2 dated
March 16, 2010 and the Resolution3 dated February 2, 2012.4 The
Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision5 of the Regional Trial
Court finding Monico Ligtas (Ligtas) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of theft.6
Ligtas was charged with the crime of theft under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code.7 The Information
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Furthermore, Ligtas denied harvesting abaca at the plantation on
June 29, 2000. He claimed that he was with Cabero and Cipres
attending a barangay fiesta at Sitio Hubasan, San Juan, Sogod,
Southern Leyte, when the alleged harvesting happened.23
Meanwhile, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sogod, Southern
Leyte for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession on November 21,
2000.24 On January 22, 2002, the DARAB rendered the
Decision25 ruling that Ligtas was a bona fide tenant of the land.26
While records are bereft as to when the DARAB Decision was
formally offered as evidence before the trial court, records are
clear that the DARAB Decision was considered by both the trial
court27 and Court of Appeals28 and without any objection on the
part of the People of the Philippines.29

In the Decision dated August 16, 2006, the Regional Trial Court
That on or about the 29th day of June 2000 at Sitio Lamak, held that "the prosecution was able to prove the elements of
Barangay San Juan, Municipality of Sogod, Province of Southern theft[.]"30 Ligtas' "defense of tenancy was not supported by
Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable concrete and substantial evidence nor was his claim of harvest
Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain, entered into sharing between him and [Anecita Pacate] duly corroborated by
the abaca plantation belonging to one Anecita Pacate, and once any witness."31 His "defense of alibi cannot prevail over the
inside the plantation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and positive identification ... by prosecution witnesses."32
feloniously harvested 1,000 kilos of abaca fibers, valued at
Php29,000.00 at Php29.00 per kilo, without the consent of said The dispositive portion of the Decision
owner, Anecita Pacate, to her damage and prejudice in the reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
aforestated amount of Twenty Nine Thousand Pesos
(Php29,000.00), Philippine currency.
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Monico Ligtas guilty beyond
CONTRARY TO LAW.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft, this court hereby renders
judgment, sentencing him:

Ligtas pleaded not guilty.9

1. To suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years,
The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses during trial: Efren nine (9) months and ten (10) days as minimum to eight
Cabero (Cabero), Modesto Cipres (Cipres), Anecita Pacate, SPO2 (8) years and eight (8) months as
Enrique Villaruel, and Ernesto Pacate.10 maximum;cralawlawlibrary
2. To indemnify the offende[d] party:
According to the prosecution witnesses, Anecita Pacate was the a. The amount of P29,000.00 for the value of the
owner of an abaca plantation situated at Sitio Lamak, Barangay abaca stole[n];cralawlawlibrary
San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte. On June 29, 2000, Cabero, the b. The amount of P5000.00 as moral
plantation's administrator, and several men, including Cipres, damages;cralawlawlibrary
went to the plantation to harvest abaca upon Anecita Pacate's c. The amount of P10,000.00 as litigation
instructions. At about 10:00 a.m., Cabero and his men were expenses/attorney's fees;cralawlawlibrary
surprised to find Ligtas harvesting abaca at the plantation. Ligtas
was accompanied by three (3) unidentified men. Allegedly, Ligtas
 3. To pay the costs. WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the
assailed Decision dated . . . August 16, 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court of Sogod, Southern Leyte, Branch 39, in Criminal Case No.
SO ORDERED.33ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
R-225, finding accused-appellant Monico Ligtas guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Code, is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.

SO ORDERED.52ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I

Ligtas filed a Motion for Reconsideration,53 which the Court of

Appeals denied on February 2, 2012.54
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial
court.34 According to it, "the burden to prove the existence of the
tenancy relationship"35 belonged to Ligtas. He was not able to II
establish all the essential elements of a tenancy agreement. 36

The Court of Appeals declared that Ligtas' reliance on the DARAB

On April 4, 2012, Ligtas filed this Petition assailing the Court of
Decision "declaring him as a bonafide tenant of the . . . land is
Appeals Decision and Resolution.55 This court required People of
irrelevant in the case at bar":37
the Philippines to file its Comment on the Petition within 10 days
from notice.56
Jurisprudence is replete with cases declaring that "findings of or
certifications issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his The issues for consideration of this court are:
authorized representative, in a given locality concerning the
presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between the First, whether questions of fact may be raised in a petition for
contending parties, are merely preliminary or provisional and are review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
not binding upon the courts.["]38ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Court;cralawlawlibrary

Second, whether the DARAB Decision, finding petitioner Monico

As to the ownership of the land, the Court of Appeals held that Ligtas as tenant of the land owned by private complainant Anecita
Ligtas had taken conflicting positions. While he claimed to be a
Pacate and located at Sitio Lamak, Barangay San Juan, Sogod,
legitimate tenant, Ligtas also assailed Anecita Pacate's title over Southern Leyte is conclusive or can be taken judicial notice of in
the land. Under Rule 131, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a tenant a criminal case for theft; and
cannot deny the title of his or her landlord at the time of the
commencement of the tenancy relation.39 Third, whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error
when it upheld the conviction of petitioner Monico Ligtas for theft
The Court of Appeals remained unconvinced as to Ligtas' under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.
allegations on ownership. "He claims that the parcel of land
owned by [Anecita Pacate] is different from the subject abaca
The Petition is meritorious.
land. However, such assertion was based merely on the
testimony of the municipal assessor, not an expert competent to
identify parcels of land."40 III

More importantly, the Court of Appeals ruled that Ligtas

committed theft by harvesting abaca from Anecita Pacate's
Petitioner argues that the findings of fact of both the trial court
plantation.41 Ligtas had constructive possession of the subject of
and Court of Appeals must be revisited for being "conclusions
the theft without the owner's consent.42 "The subject of the crime
without citation of specific evidence on record and premised on
need not be carried away or actually taken out from the land in
the supposed absence of evidence on the claim of petitioner [as]
order to consummate the crime of theft."43
tenant."57
Furthermore, Ligtas' argument that the abaca did not constitute
Only questions of law are allowed in a petition for review under
as personal property under the meaning of Article 308 of the
Rule 4558 of the Rules of Court.59 Factual findings of the Regional
Revised Penal Code was erroneous.44 Following the definition of
Trial Court are conclusive and binding on this court when
personal property, the abaca hemp was "capable of appropriation
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.60 This court has differentiated
[and] [could] be sold and carried away from one place to
between a question of law and question of
another."45 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding
fact:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
that about 1,000 kilos of abaca were already harvested.46 Hence,
all the elements of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code were sufficiently established by the prosecution. A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns
the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of
The Court of Appeals ruled that Ligtas' defense of alibi could not facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the
excuse him from criminal liability.47 His alibi was doubtfully probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood
established. "[W]here an accused's alibi is established only by of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt
himself, his relatives and friends, his denial of culpability should or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when
be accorded the strictest scrutiny."48 the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering
mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and
Ligtas' attack on the credibility of the witnesses did not relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their
prosper.49 He failed to show that the case was initiated only relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the
through Anecita Pacate's quest for revenge or to ensure that situation.61 (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Ligtas would be evicted from the land.50
Petitioner admits that the Petition raises substantially factual
The Court of Appeals dismissed Ligtas' appeal and affirmed the
issues that are beyond the scope of the Rule he seeks redress
trial court's Decision finding Ligtas guilty beyond reasonable
from.62 However, there are exceptions to the rule that only
doubt of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. 51 The
questions of law should be the subject of a petition for review
dispositive portion of the Decision
under Rule 45:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,

surmises or conjectures, (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible, (3) when there is are actually pending before the same judge.77(Citation
grave abuse of discretion, (4) when the judgment is based on omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
misapprehension of facts, (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting, (6) when in making its findings, the CA went beyond
Moreover, according to respondent, petitioner invokes conflicting
the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
defenses: that there is a legitimate tenancy relationship between
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee, (7) when the
him and private complainant and that he did not take the abaca
CA's findings are contrary to those by the trial court, (8) when the
hemp.78Nevertheless, respondent maintains that petitioner failed
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
to prove all the essential elements of a tenancy relationship
which they are based, (9) when the acts set forth in the petition as
between him and private complainant.79 Private complainant did
well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed
not consent to the alleged tenancy relationship.80 Petitioner also
by the respondent, (10) when the findings of fact are premised on
failed to provide evidence as to any sharing of harvest between
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
the parties.81
evidence on record, or (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
We hold that a DARAB decision on the existence of a tenancy
properly considered, would justify a different
relationship is conclusive and binding on courts if supported by
conclusion.63 (Emphasis supplied, citation
substantial evidence.
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Generally, decisions in administrative cases are not binding on
This court has held before that a re-examination of the facts of the criminal proceedings. This court has ruled in a number of cases
case is justified "when certain material facts and circumstances that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
had been overlooked by the trial court which, if taken into
account, would alter the result of the case in that they would
It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that
introduce an element of reasonable doubt which would entitle the
administrative cases are independent from criminal actions for
accused to acquittal."64
the same act or omission. Thus, an absolution from a criminal
charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice
The issue of tenancy, in that whether a person is an agricultural
versa. One thing is administrative liability; quite another thing is
tenant or not, is generally a question of fact.65 To be precise,
the criminal liability for the same act.
however, the existence of a tenancy relationship is a legal
conclusion based on facts presented corresponding to the
....
statutory elements of tenancy.66
Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as
The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in its assailed
well as the procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in
Decision when it held that all the essential elements of the crime
criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and
of theft were duly proven by the prosecution despite petitioner
conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the
having been pronounced a bona fide tenant of the land from
other. Notably, the evidence presented in the administrative case
which he allegedly stole.67 A review of the records of the case is,
may not necessarily be the same evidence to be presented in the
thus, proper to arrive at a just and equitable resolution.
criminal cases.82 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
IV
However, this case does not involve an administrative charge
stemming from the same set of facts involved in a criminal
Petitioner claims that private complainant's filing of criminal proceeding. This is not a case where one act results in both
charges was motivated by ill will and revenge.68 The charges were criminal and administrative liability. DARAB Case No. VIII-319-SL-
designed to remove petitioner from the land he has legitimately 2000 involves a determination of whether there exists a tenancy
occupied as tenant.69 Telling is the fact that petitioner filed his relationship between petitioner and private complainant, while
Complaint before the DARAB on November 21, 2000, while the Criminal Case No. R-225 involves determination of whether
Information for Theft was filed on December 8, 2000.70 petitioner committed theft. However, the tenancy relationship is a
factor in determining whether all the elements of theft were
Petitioner argues that he has sufficiently established his status as proven by the prosecution.
private complainant's tenant.71 The DARAB Decision is entitled to
respect, even finality, as the Department of Agrarian Reform is the In its Decision dated January 22, 2002, the DARAB
administrative agency vested with primary jurisdiction and has found:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
acquired expertise on matters relating to tenancy relationship.72
All the necessary requisites in order to establish tenancy
The findings of the DARAB were also supported by substantial
relationship as required in the above-quoted Supreme Court
evidence.73 To require petitioner to prove tenancy relationship
ruling, has been established by the evidence submitted by
through evidence other than the DARAB Decision and the
plaintiff; And these evidences were not controverted by any
testimonies of the witnesses is absurd and goes beyond the
evidence submitted by the respondent.
required quantum of evidence, which is substantial evidence. 74
In fine, this board found plaintiff a bonafide tenant of the land in
Also, according to petitioner, the DARAB Decision has attained
question and as such is entitled to a security of tenure, in which
finality since private complainant did not file an appeal. The
case he shall not be dispossessed of his holdings by the
DARAB's finding as to the parties' tenancy relationship
landowner except for any of the causes provided by law and only
constitutes as res judicata.75
after the same has been proved before, and the dispossession is
authorized by the Court and in the judgment that is final and
On the other hand, respondent argues that the Court of Appeals
executory[.]83 (Citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
correctly disregarded the DARAB Decision.76 The trial court could
not have taken judicial notice of the DARAB
Decision:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary The dispositive portion of the DARAB Decision
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
While the DARAB . . . ruled that petitioner is a bonafide tenant of
Pacate, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the WHEREFORE, premises being considered, judgment is hereby
contents of the records of other cases even when such cases rendered, finding Monico Ligtas a bonafide tenant of the land
have been tried or are pending in the same court, and subject in this case and well described in paragraph three (3) in
notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or the complaint, and ordering as follows, to wit:
 1. The respondent and all other persons acting for and in
her behalf to maintain plaintiff in the peaceful
possession of the land in dispute;cralawlawlibrary
2. The MARO of Sogod, Southern Leyte, and concurrently
the cluster Manager of Sogod Bay DAR Cluster to call
the parties and assist them in the execution of a
leasehold contract covering the land in dispute, and for
the parties to respect and obey such call of the said
MARO in compliance with the legal mandate.
3. Ordering the respondent to pay plaintiff the amount of
Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos representing the
expenses incurred by plaintiff in vindicating his right
and other actual expenses incurred in this litigation.
Other relief sought are hereby ordered dismissed for lack of
evidence.
No cost.
84
SO DECIDED. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Private complainant did not appeal the DARAB's findings.
Findings of fact of administrative agencies in the exercise of their
quasi-judicial powers are entitled to respect if supported by
substantial evidence.85 This court is not tasked to weigh again
"the evidence submitted before the administrative body and to
substitute its own judgment [as to] the sufficiency of evidence."86
V
The DARAB is the quasi-judicial tribunal that has the primary
jurisdiction to determine whether there is a tenancy relationship
between adverse parties.87 This court has held that "judicial
determinations [of the a DARAB] have the same binding effect as
judgments and orders of a regular judicial body."88 Disputes
under the jurisdiction of the DARAB include controversies
relating to:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship
or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including
disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or
seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements.89ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Salazar v. De Leon,90 this court upheld the Department of
Agrarian Reform's primary jurisdiction over agrarian disputes,
which includes the relationship between landowners and
tenants.91 The DARAB Decision is conclusive and binding on
courts when supported by substantial evidence.92 This court ruled
that administrative res judicata exists in that
case:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Significantly, respondent did not appeal the Decision dated 17
November 1995 of the DARAB in DARAB Case # II-380-ISA'94;
consequently, the same has attained finality and constitutes res
judicata on the issue of petitioner's status as a tenant of
respondent.
Res judicata is a concept applied in the review of lower court
decisions in accordance with the hierarchy of courts. But
jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of administrative res
judicata: "The rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once
judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to
the judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public, executive or
administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction
as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers. It
has been declared that whenever final adjudication of persons
invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the
citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error
or a certiorari , such final adjudication may be pleaded as res
judicata." To be sure, early jurisprudence was already mindful
that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be said to apply
exclusively to decisions rendered by what are usually understood
as courts without unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof;
and that the more equitable attitude is to allow extension of the
defense to decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have
been conferred.93 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Encinas v. Agustin, Jr.,94 this court clarified that res
judicata applies only to decisions rendered by agencies in judicial
or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to purely administrative
proceedings:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res
judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and
not to the exercise of administrative powers. Administrative
powers here refer to those purely administrative in nature, as
opposed to administrative proceedings that take on a quasi-
judicial character.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves (a)
taking and evaluating evidence; (b) determining facts based upon
the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision
supported by the facts proved. The exercise of quasi-judicial
functions involves a determination, with respect to the matter in
controversy, of what the law is; what the legal rights and
obligations of the contending parties are; and based thereon and
the facts obtaining, the adjudication of the respective rights and
obligations of the parties.95 (Citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
We find it necessary to clarify the two concepts of res judicata:
bar by prior judgment and conclusiveness of judgment. In Social
Security Commission v. Rizal Poultry and Livestock Association,
Inc., et al.,96 this court discussed and differentiated the two
concepts of res judicata:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as
enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of Civil
Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39,
Section 47(c).
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case
where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is
sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter,
and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first
case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second
cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is
conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly
controverted and determined and not as to matters merely
involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as
"conclusiveness of judgment." Stated differently, any right, fact
or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in
the determination of an action before a competent court in which
judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the
parties and their privies, whether or not the claim, demand,
purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.
Thus, if a particular point or question is in issue in the second
action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that
particular point or question, a former judgment between the same
parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if
that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the
first suit. Identity of cause of action is not required but merely
identity of issue.
The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar
the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a
judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first
and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes
of action. Should identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of
action be shown in the two cases, then res judicata in its aspect
as a "bar by prior judgment" would apply. If as between the two
cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but not identical
causes of action, then res judicata as "conclusiveness of
judgment" applies.97 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Martillano v. Court of Appeals,98 the DARAB Decision finding
for the existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties
was declared by this court as conclusive on the parties. 99 As in
this case, the DARAB Decision100 in Martillano attained finality
when the landowner did not appeal the Decision.101 This court
ruled that the doctrine of res
judicata applies:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Under the afore-cited sections of RA 6657, the Department of
Agrarian Reform is empowered, through its adjudicating arm the
regional and provincial adjudication boards, to resolve agrarian
disputes and controversies on all matters pertaining to the
implementation of the agrarian law. Section 51 thereof provides
that the decision of the DARAB attains finality after the lapse of
fifteen (15) days and no appeal was interposed therefrom by any
of the parties.
In the instant case, the determination of the DARAB in DARAB
Case No. 062-Bul '89, there being no appeal interposed therefrom,
attained finality. Accordingly, the matter regarding the status of
Martillano as a tenant farmer and the validity of the CLT and
Emancipation Patents issued in his favor are settled and no
longer open to doubt and controversy.
....
We recall that DARAB Case 062-Bul '89 was for the cancellation of
petitioner's CLT and Emancipation patents. The same effect is
sought with the institution of DARAB Case No. 512-Bul '94, which
is an action to withdraw and/or cancel administratively the CLT
and Emancipation Patents issued to petitioner. Considering that
DARAB Case 062-Bul '89 has attained finality prior to the filing of
DARAB Case No. 512-Bul '94, no strenuous legal interpretation is
necessary to understand that the issues raised in the prior case,
i.e., DARAB Case No. 062-Bul '89, which have been resolved with
finality, may not be litigated anew.
The instant case is complicated by the failure of the complainant
to include Martillano as party-defendant in the case before the
adjudication board and the DARAB, although he was finally
impleaded on appeal before the Court of Appeals.
The belated inclusion of Martillano as respondent in the petition
will not affect the applicability of the doctrine of bar by prior
judgment. What is decisive is that the issues which have already
been litigated in a final and executory judgment precludes, by the
principle of bar by prior judgment, an aspect of the doctrine of res
judicata, and even under the doctrine of "law of the case," the re-
litigation of the same issue in another action. It is well established
that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined
by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains
unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in
privity with them. The dictum therein laid down became the law of
the case and what was once irrevocably established as the
controlling legal rule or decision, continues to be binding
between the same parties as long as the facts on which the
decision was predicated, continue to be the facts of the case
before the court. Hence, the binding effect and enforceability of
that dictum can no longer be resurrected anew since said issue
had already been resolved and finally laid to rest, if not by the
principle of res judicata, at least by conclusiveness of
judgment.102 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Co v. People, et al.,103 this court held that "the doctrine of
conclusiveness of judgment also applies in criminal
cases."104 Petitioner in that case was charged with the violation of
Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, for the alleged non-
remittance of Social Security System contributions.105 This court
upheld the findings of the National Labor Relations Commission
in a separate case, which declared the absence of an employer-
employee relationship and had attained finality.106 This court held
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The reasons for establishing the principle of "collusiveness of
judgment" are founded on sound public policy. ... It is allowable
to reason back from a judgment to the basis on which it stands,
upon the obvious principle that where a conclusion is
indisputable, and could have been drawn only from certain
premises, the premises are equally indisputable with the
conclusion. When a fact has been once determined in the course
of a judicial proceeding, and a final judgment has been rendered
in accordance therewith, it cannot be again litigated between the
same parties without virtually impeaching the correctness of the
former decision, which, from motives of public policy, the law
does not permit to be done.
Res judicata has two concepts. The first is bar by prior judgment
under Rule 39, Section 47 (b), and the second is conclusiveness
of judgment under Rule 39, Section 47 (c). Both concepts are
founded on the principle of estoppel, and are based on the
salutary public policy against unnecessary multiplicity of suits.
Like the splitting of causes of action, res judicata is in pursuance
of such policy. Matters settled by a Court's final judgment should
not be litigated upon or invoked again. Relitigation of issues
already settled merely burdens the Courts and the taxpayers,
creates uneasiness and confusion, and wastes valuable time and
energy that could be devoted to worthier cases.107 (Citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In VHJ Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,108 this court ruled that tenancy relationship must be duly
proven:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[A] tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be
evidence to prove this allegation. The principal factor in
determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent.
Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what
the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal
relationship.109 (Citation omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The DARAB, in DARAB Case No. VIII-319-SL-2000, held that all the
essential elements of a tenancy relationship were proven by
petitioner.110 It found that there was substantial evidence to
support petitioner's claim as tenant of the land.111 In rendering the
Decision, the DARAB examined pleadings and affidavits of both
petitioner and private complainant.112 It was convinced by
petitioner's evidence, which consisted of sworn statements of
petitioner's witnesses that petitioner was installed as tenant by
Andres Pacate sometime in 1993.113 Petitioner and Andres Pacate
had an agreement to share the produce after harvest.114 However,
Andres Pacate had died before the first harvest.115 Petitioner then
gave the landowner's share to private complainant, and had done
so every harvest until he was disturbed in his cultivation of the
land on June 29, 2000.116
We emphasize that after filing her Answer before the DARAB,
private complainant failed to heed the Notices sent to her and
refused to attend the scheduled hearings.117 The DARAB even
quoted in its Decision the reason offered by private complainant's
counsel in his Motion to Withdraw as
counsel:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That as early as the preliminary hearings of the case, the
respondent has already shown her intention not to participate the
proceedings of the case for reasons known only to
her;cralawlawlibrary
That despite the advi[c]e of the undersigned, respondent stood
pat with her decision not to participate in the proceedings of the
case;cralawlawlibrary
That in view of this predicament, the undersigned can do nothing
except to withdraw as he is now withdrawing as counsel for the
respondent of the above-entitled
casef.]118ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is true that trial courts are not mandated to take judicial notice
of decisions of other courts or even records of other cases that
have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the
same judge.119 In declaring that the DARAB's findings on the
tenancy relationship between petitioner and private complainant
are immaterial to the criminal case for theft, the Court of
Appeals120 relied on Rollo, et al. v. Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc.,
et al.121
In Rollo, petitioners, who were farmers of a 21-hectare agricultural
land in Tarlac that was principally devoted to sugar and rice and
who claim the rights of their predecessors-in-interest, filed
separate Complaints before the Provincial Adjudication Board of
Region III in Tarlac, Tarlac. They claimed that when the registered
owner of the land, Josefina Roxas Omaña, sold the land to
respondents, respondents were aware of the tenancy relationship
between petitioners and Josefina Roxas Omaña.122
Respondents offered a compensation package to petitioners in
exchange for the renunciation of their tenancy rights under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. However, they failed to
comply with their obligations under the terms of the
compensation package.123 Petitioners then filed a series of
Complaints before the DARAB. The cases were consolidated and
resolved by the Provincial Adjudicator.124
The Provincial Adjudicator ruled, among other things, that "there
was no tenancy relationship [that] existed between the
parties."125 He found that petitioners and their predecessors-in-
interest were mere hired laborers, not tenants. Tenancy cannot be
presumed from respondents' offer of a compensation package.126
On appeal, the DARAB reversed the Decision of the Provincial
Adjudicator. It found that there was an implied tenancy between
the parties. Petitioners were deemed tenants of the land for more
than 30 years. They were entitled to security of tenure. 127
The Court of Appeals reversed the DARAB Decision and
reinstated the Provincial Adjudicator's Decision. It held that there
was no substantial evidence to prove that all the requisites of
tenancy relationship existed. However, despite the lack of
tenancy relationship, the compensation package agreement must
be upheld.128
This court affirmed the Court of Appeals Decision.129 It held that
petitioners failed to overcome the burden of proving the existence
of a tenancy relationship:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
At the outset, the parties do not appear to be the landowner and
the tenants. While it appears that there was personal cultivation
by petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest of the subject
landholding, what was established was that petitioners' claim of
tenancy was founded on the self-serving testimony of petitioner
Rodolfo Rollo that his predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the landholding for more than 30 years and had
engaged in a "50-50" sharing scheme with JOSEFINA and
JOSEFINA's grandmother, the previous owner thereof. Self-
serving statements in pleadings are inadequate; proof must be
adduced. Such claims do not suffice absent concrete evidence to
support them. The burden rests on the shoulders of petitioners to
prove their affirmative allegation of tenancy, which burden they
failed to discharge with substantial evidence. Such a juridical tie
must be aptly shown. Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative
of the issue has the burden of proof, and from the plaintiff in a
civil case, the burden of proof never parts. The same rule applies
to administrative cases. In fact, if the complainant, upon whom
rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a
satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the
respondent is under no obligation to prove his exception or
defense....
Neither was it shown to the satisfaction of this Court that there
existed a sharing of harvests in the context of a tenancy
relationship between petitioners and/or their predecessors-in-
interest and JOSEFINA. Jurisprudence is illuminating to the effect
that to prove such sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other
evidence must be presented. None was shown. No receipts were
presented as testaments to the claimed sharing of harvests. The
only evidence submitted to establish the purported sharing of
harvests was the testimony of petitioner Rodolfo Rollo. The
sharing arrangement cannot be deemed to have existed on the
basis alone of petitioner Rodolfo Rollo's claim. It is self-serving
and is without evidentiary value. Self-serving statements are
deemed inadequate; competent proof must be adduced. If at all,
the fact alone of sharing is not sufficient to establish a tenancy
relationship.
We also sustain the conclusion reached by the Provincial
Adjudicator and the Court of Appeals that the testimony of Araceli
Pascua, an employee of the DAR in Victoria, Tarlac, that the
subject landholding was tenanted cannot overcome substantial
evidence to the contrary. To prove the alleged tenancy no reliance
may be made upon the said public officer's testimony. What
cannot be ignored is the precedent ruling of this Court that the
findings of or certifications issued by the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, or his authorized representative, in a given locality
concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy relationship
between the contending parties, are merely preliminary or
provisional and are not binding upon the courts. This ruling holds
with greater effect in the instant case in light of the fact that
petitioners, as herein shown, were not able to prove the presence
of all the indispensable elements of tenancy.130 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Thus, in Rollo, this court did not categorically hold that the
DARAB's findings were merely provisional and, thus, not binding
on courts. What was deemed as a preliminary determination of
tenancy was the testimony of the Department of Agrarian Reform
employee stating that the land involved was tenanted. Further, the
tribunals had conflicting findings on whether petitioners were
bona fide tenants.
In this case, records are bereft as to whether private complainant
appealed the DARAB Decision. Thus, it is presumed that the
Decision has long lapsed into finality.131 It is also established that
private complainant participated in the initial stages of the
DARAB proceedings.132 Therefore, the issue of the existence of a
tenancy relationship is final as between the parties. We cannot
collaterally review the DARAB's findings at this stage. The
existence of the final Decision that tenancy exists creates serious
doubts as to the guilt of the accused.
VI
According to petitioner, the elements of theft under Article 308 of
the Revised Penal Code were not established since he was a bona
fide tenant of the land.133 The DARAB's recognition of petitioner
as a legitimate tenant necessarily "implie[d] that he ha[d] the
authority to harvest the abaca hemp from [private complainant's
land]."134 This shows that petitioner had no criminal intent.
As to the existence of another element of theft—that the taking
was done without the consent of the owner—petitioner argues
that this, too, was negated by his status as private complainant's
tenant:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The purported lack of consent on the part of the private
complainant as alleged by the prosecution, is misplaced. In fact, it
was even improper for Anecita Pacate to stop or prevent
petitioner from harvesting the produce of the landholding
because as tenant, petitioner is entitled to security of tenure. This
right entitled him to continue working on his landholding until the
leasehold relation is terminated or until his eviction is authorized
by the DARAB in a judgment that is final and
executory.135 (Citation omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner argues that the constitutional presumption of
innocence must be upheld:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Well-settled is the rule that where "inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of
which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the
other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill
the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction." In acquitting an appellant, we are not saying that he
is lily-white, or pure as driven snow. Rather, we are declaring his
innocence because the prosecution's evidence failed to show his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. For that is what the basic law
requires. Where the evidence is insufficient to overcome the
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, then his
"acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental
law."136 (Citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the findings of the
trial court finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
theft.
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE. 308. Who are Liable for Theft. — Theft is committed by
any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against
or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take
personal property of another without the latter's consent.
doubts as to whether the plants taken by petitioner were indeed
planted on private complainant's lot when petitioner had planted
her own plants adjacent to it.143 Thus, it was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt that the property belonged to private
complainant. This court found that petitioner "took the sugarcane
and bananas believing them to be her own. That being the case,
she could not have had a criminal intent."144
In this case, petitioner harvested the abaca, believing that he was
entitled to the produce as a legitimate tenant cultivating the land
owned by private complainant. Personal property may have been
taken, but it is with the consent of the owner.
No less than the Constitution provides that the accused shall be
presumed innocent of the crime until proven guilty.145 "[I]t is
better to acquit ten guilty individuals than to convict one innocent
person."146Thus, courts must consider "[e]very circumstance
against guilt and in favor of innocence[.]"147 Equally settled is that
"[w]here the evidence admits of two interpretations, one of which
is consistent with guilt, and the other with innocence, the
accused must be given the benefit of doubt and should be
acquitted."148
In view of petitioner's acquittal based on reasonable doubt, we
find it unnecessary to discuss further the other errors raised by
petitioner.

Theft is likewise committed by: WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated March 16, 2010 and the Resolution dated February
2, 2012 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Monico Ligtas
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to is ACQUITTED of the crime of theft under Article 308 of the
deliver the same to the local authorities or to its Revised Penal Code. If detained, he is ordered
owner;cralawlawlibrary immediately RELEASED, unless he is confined for any other
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the
lawful cause. Any amount paid by way of a bailbond is
property of another, shall remove or make use of the ordered RETURNED.
fruits or object of the damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field
SO ORDERED.
where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another
and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish
upon the same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or other
forest or farm products.

The essential elements of theft are: (1) taking of personal

property; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking
was done without the owner's consent; (4) there was intent to
gain; and (5) the taking was done without violence against or
intimidation of the person or force upon things.137

Tenants have been defined as:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

persons who — in themselves and with the aid available from

within their immediate farm households — cultivate the land
belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent,
for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the
landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the
landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or money
or both under the leasehold tenancy system.138 (Citation
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Under this definition, a tenant is entitled to the products of the

land he or she cultivates. The landowner's share in the produce
depends on the agreement between the parties. Hence, the
harvesting done by the tenant is with the landowner's consent.

The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of

tenancy between petitioner and private complainant negates the
existence of the element that the taking was done without the
owner's consent. The DARAB Decision implies that petitioner had
legitimate authority to harvest the abaca. The prosecution,
therefore, failed to establish all the elements of theft.

In Pit-og v. People,139 this court acquitted petitioner of theft of

sugarcane and banana crops on the basis of reasonable
doubt.140 The prosecution failed to prove lack of criminal intent on
petitioner's part.141 It failed to clearly identify "the person who, as
a result of a criminal act, without his knowledge and consent, was
wrongfully deprived of a thing belonging to him."142 There were
G.R. No. 172953 April 30, 2008
JUNIE MALILLIN Y. LOPEZ, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions cannot by its lonesome overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence. Evidence of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt and nothing else can eclipse the hypothesis of
guiltlessness. And this burden is met not by bestowing distrust
on the innocence of the accused but by obliterating all doubts as
to his culpability.
In this Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
Junie Malillin y Lopez (petitioner) assails the Decision2 of the
Court of Appeals dated 27 January 2006 as well as its
Resolution3 dated 30 May 2006 denying his motion for
reconsideration. The challenged decision has affirmed the
Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon City,
Branch 525 which found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride,
locally known as shabu, a prohibited drug.
The antecedent facts follow.
On the strength of a warrant6 of search and seizure issued by the
RTC of Sorsogon City, Branch 52, a team of five police officers
raided the residence of petitioner in Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon
City on 4 February 2003. The team was headed by P/Insp. Catalino
Bolanos (Bolanos), with PO3 Roberto Esternon (Esternon), SPO1
Pedro Docot, SPO1 Danilo Lasala and SPO2 Romeo Gallinera
(Gallinera) as members. The search—conducted in the presence
of barangay kagawad Delfin Licup as well as petitioner himself,
his wife Sheila and his mother, Norma—allegedly yielded two (2)
plastic sachets of shabu and five (5) empty plastic sachets
containing residual morsels of the said substance.
Accordingly, petitioner was charged with violation of Section
11,7 Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, in a criminal
information whose inculpatory portion reads:
That on or about the 4th day of February 2003, at about 8:45 in the
morning in Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon City, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession, custody and control two (2) plastic
sachets of methamphetamine hydrochloride [or] "shabu" with an
aggregate weight of 0.0743 gram, and four empty sachets
containing "shabu" residue, without having been previously
authorized by law to possess the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
Petitioner entered a negative plea.9 At the ensuing trial, the
prosecution presented Bolanos, Arroyo and Esternon as
witnesses.
Taking the witness stand, Bolanos, the leader of the raiding team,
testified on the circumstances surrounding the search as follows:
that he and his men were allowed entry into the house by
petitioner after the latter was shown the search warrant; that upon
entering the premises, he ordered Esternon and barangay
kagawad Licup, whose assistance had previously been requested
in executing the warrant, to conduct the search; that the rest of
the police team positioned themselves outside the house to make
sure that nobody flees; that he was observing the conduct of the
search from about a meter away; that the search conducted
inside the bedroom of petitioner yielded five empty plastic
sachets with suspected shabu residue contained in a denim bag
and kept in one of the cabinets, and two plastic sachets
containing shabu which fell off from one of the pillows searched
by Esternon—a discovery that was made in the presence of
petitioner.10 On cross examination, Bolanos admitted that during
the search, he was explaining its progress to petitioner's mother,
Norma, but that at the same time his eyes were fixed on the
search being conducted by Esternon.11
Esternon testified that the denim bag containing the empty plastic
sachets was found "behind" the door of the bedroom and not
inside the cabinet; that he then found the two filled sachets under
a pillow on the bed and forthwith called on Gallinera to have the
items recorded and marked.12 On cross, he admitted that it was he
alone who conducted the search because Bolanos was standing
behind him in the living room portion of the house and that
petitioner handed to him the things to be searched, which
included the pillow in which the two sachets of shabuwere
kept;13 that he brought the seized items to the Balogo Police
Station for a "true inventory," then to the trial court14 and
thereafter to the laboratory.15
Supt. Lorlie Arroyo (Arroyo), the forensic chemist who
administered the examination on the seized items, was presented
as an expert witness to identify the items submitted to the
laboratory. She revealed that the two filled sachets were positive
of shabu and that of the five empty sachets, four were positive of
containing residue of the same substance.16 She further admitted
that all seven sachets were delivered to the laboratory by
Esternon in the afternoon of the same day that the warrant was
executed except that it was not she but rather a certain Mrs.
Ofelia Garcia who received the items from Esternon at the
laboratory.17
The evidence for the defense focused on the irregularity of the
search and seizure conducted by the police operatives. Petitioner
testified that Esternon began the search of the bedroom with
Licup and petitioner himself inside. However, it was momentarily
interrupted when one of the police officers declared to Bolanos
that petitioner's wife, Sheila, was tucking something inside her
underwear. Forthwith, a lady officer arrived to conduct the search
of Sheila's body inside the same bedroom. At that point, everyone
except Esternon was asked to step out of the room. So, it was in
his presence that Sheila was searched by the lady officer.
Petitioner was then asked by a police officer to buy cigarettes at a
nearby store and when he returned from the errand, he was told
that nothing was found on Sheila's body.18 Sheila was ordered to
transfer to the other bedroom together with her children.19
Petitioner asserted that on his return from the errand, he was
summoned by Esternon to the bedroom and once inside, the
officer closed the door and asked him to lift the mattress on the
bed. And as he was doing as told, Esternon stopped him and
ordered him to lift the portion of the headboard. In that instant,
Esternon showed him "sachet of shabu" which according to him
came from a pillow on the bed.20 Petitioner's account in its
entirety was corroborated in its material respects by
Norma, barangay kagawad Licup and Sheila in their testimonies.
Norma and Sheila positively declared that petitioner was not in
the house for the entire duration of the search because at one
point he was sent by Esternon to the store to buy cigarettes while
Sheila was being searched by the lady officer.21Licup for his part
testified on the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the
plastic sachets. He recounted that after the five empty sachets
were found, he went out of the bedroom and into the living room
and after about three minutes, Esternon, who was left inside the
bedroom, exclaimed that he had just found two filled sachets.22
On 20 June 2004 the trial court rendered its Decision declaring
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
Petitioner was condemned to prison for twelve years (12) and one
(1) day to twenty (20) years and to pay a fine of P300,000.00.23 The
trial court reasoned that the fact that shabu was found in the
house of petitioner was prima facie evidence of
petitioner's animus possidendi sufficient to convict him of the
charge inasmuch as things which a person possesses or over
which he exercises acts of ownership are presumptively owned
by him. It also noted petitioner's failure to ascribe ill motives to
the police officers to fabricate charges against him.24
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal.25 In his Appeal
Brief26 filed with the Court of Appeals, petitioner called the
attention of the court to certain irregularities in the manner by
which the search of his house was conducted. For its part, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) advanced that on the
contrary, the prosecution evidence sufficed for petitioner's
conviction and that the defense never advanced any proof to
show that the members of the raiding team was improperly
motivated to hurl false charges against him and hence the
presumption that they had regularly performed their duties
should prevail.27
On 27 January 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
decision affirming the judgment of the trial court but modifying
the prison sentence to an indeterminate term of twelve (12) years
as minimum to seventeen (17) years as maximum.28 Petitioner
moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the
appellate court.29Hence, the instant petition which raises
substantially the same issues.
In its Comment,30 the OSG bids to establish that the raiding team
had regularly performed its duties in the conduct of the
search.31 It points to petitioner's incredulous claim that he was
framed up by Esternon on the ground that the discovery of the
two filled sachets was made in his and Licup's presence. It
likewise notes that petitioner's bare denial cannot defeat the
positive assertions of the prosecution and that the same does not
suffice to overcome the prima facie existence of animus
possidendi.
This argument, however, hardly holds up to what is revealed by
the records.
Prefatorily, although the trial court's findings of fact are entitled to
great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal, this rule does
not apply where facts of weight and substance have been
overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied in a case under
appeal.32 In the case at bar, several circumstances obtain which, if
properly appreciated, would warrant a conclusion different from
that arrived at by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs
necessitates that the elemental act of possession of a prohibited
substance be established with moral certainty, together with the
fact that the same is not authorized by law. The dangerous drug
itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the
fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of
conviction.33 Essential therefore in these cases is that the identity
of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt.34 Be that as it
may, the mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to
create in a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to
sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of possession,
the fact that the substance illegally possessed in the first place is
the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be
established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite
to make a finding of guilt. The chain of custody requirement
performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.35
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule
requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what
the proponent claims it to be.36 It would include testimony about
every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up
to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every
person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from
whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while
in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received
and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the
chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions
taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of
the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.37
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard
because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken
chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the
item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily
identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is
critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its
uniqueness.38 The same standard likewise obtains in case the
evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering,
contamination39 and even substitution and exchange.40 In other
words, the exhibit's level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration
or tampering—without regard to whether the same is advertent or
otherwise not—dictates the level of strictness in the application
of the chain of custody rule.
Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect
to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that
has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form
to substances familiar to people in their daily lives.41 Graham vs.
State42 positively acknowledged this danger. In that case where a
substance later analyzed as heroin—was handled by two police
officers prior to examination who however did not testify in court
on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it was
in their possession—was excluded from the prosecution
evidence, the court pointing out that the white powder seized
could have been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or
baking powder. It ruled that unless the state can show by records
or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least
between the time it came into the possession of police officers
until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition,
testimony of the state as to the laboratory's findings is
inadmissible.43
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not
readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis
to determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot
reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the
possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the
same there could have been tampering, alteration or substitution
of substances from other cases—by accident or otherwise—in
which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence
was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the
same, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases
involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a
more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item
with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that
the original item has either been exchanged with another or been
contaminated or tampered with.
A mere fleeting glance at the records readily raises significant
doubts as to the identity of the sachets of shabuallegedly seized
from petitioner. Of the people who came into direct contact with
the seized objects, only Esternon and Arroyo testified for the
specific purpose of establishing the identity of the evidence.
Gallinera, to whom Esternon supposedly handed over the
confiscated sachets for recording and marking, as well as Garcia,
the person to whom Esternon directly handed over the seized
items for chemical analysis at the crime laboratory, were not
presented in court to establish the circumstances under which
they handled the subject items. Any reasonable mind might then
ask the question: Are the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from
petitioner the very same objects laboratory tested and offered in
court as evidence?
The prosecution's evidence is incomplete to provide an
affirmative answer. Considering that it was Gallinera who
recorded and marked the seized items, his testimony in court is
crucial to affirm whether the exhibits were the same items handed
over to him by Esternon at the place of seizure and acknowledge
the initials marked thereon as his own. The same is true of Garcia
who could have, but nevertheless failed, to testify on the
circumstances under which she received the items from
Esternon, what she did with them during the time they were in her
possession until before she delivered the same to Arroyo for
analysis.
The prosecution was thus unsuccessful in discharging its burden
of establishing the identity of the seized items because it failed to
offer not only the testimony of Gallinera and Garcia but also any
sufficient explanation for such failure. In effect, there is no
reasonable guaranty as to the integrity of the exhibits inasmuch
as it failed to rule out the possibility of substitution of the
exhibits, which cannot but inure to its own detriment. This holds
true not only with respect to the two filled sachets but also to the
five sachets allegedly containing morsels of shabu.
Also, contrary to what has been consistently claimed by the
prosecution that the search and seizure was conducted in a
regular manner and must be presumed to be so, the records
disclose a series of irregularities committed by the police officers
from the commencement of the search of petitioner's house until
the submission of the seized items to the laboratory for analysis.
The Court takes note of the unrebutted testimony of petitioner,
corroborated by that of his wife, that prior to the discovery of the
two filled sachets petitioner was sent out of his house to buy
cigarettes at a nearby store. Equally telling is the testimony of
Bolanos that he posted some of the members of the raiding team
at the door of petitioner's house in order to forestall the likelihood
of petitioner fleeing the scene. By no stretch of logic can it be
conclusively explained why petitioner was sent out of his house
on an errand when in the first place the police officers were in fact
apprehensive that he would flee to evade arrest. This fact
assumes prime importance because the two filled sachets were
allegedly discovered by Esternon immediately after petitioner
returned to his house from the errand, such that he was not able
to witness the conduct of the search during the brief but crucial
interlude that he was away.
It is also strange that, as claimed by Esternon, it was petitioner
himself who handed to him the items to be searched including the
pillow from which the two filled sachets allegedly fell. Indeed, it is
contrary to ordinary human behavior that petitioner would hand
over the said pillow to Esternon knowing fully well that illegal
drugs are concealed therein. In the same breath, the manner by
which the search of Sheila's body was brought up by a member of
the raiding team also raises serious doubts as to the necessity
thereof. The declaration of one of the police officers that he saw
Sheila tuck something in her underwear certainly diverted the
attention of the members of petitioner's household away from the
search being conducted by Esternon prior to the discovery of the
two filled sachets. Lest it be omitted, the Court likewise takes
note of Esternon's suspicious presence in the bedroom while
Sheila was being searched by a lady officer. The confluence of
these circumstances by any objective standard of behavior
contradicts the prosecution's claim of regularity in the exercise of
duty.
Moreover, Section 2144 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 clearly outlines the post-seizure
procedure in taking custody of seized drugs. In a language too
plain to require a different construction, it mandates that the
officer acquiring initial custody of drugs under a search warrant
must conduct the photographing and the physical inventory of
the item at the place where the warrant has been served. Esternon
deviated from this procedure. It was elicited from him that at the
close of the search of petitioner's house, he brought the seized
items immediately to the police station for the alleged purpose of
making a "true inventory" thereof, but there appears to be no
reason why a true inventory could not be made in petitioner's
house when in fact the apprehending team was able to record and
mark the seized items and there and then prepare a seizure
receipt therefor. Lest it be forgotten, the raiding team has had
enough opportunity to cause the issuance of the warrant which
means that it has had as much time to prepare for its
implementation. While the final proviso in Section 21 of the rules
would appear to excuse non-compliance therewith, the same
cannot benefit the prosecution as it failed to offer any acceptable
justification for Esternon's course of action.
Likewise, Esternon's failure to deliver the seized items to the
court demonstrates a departure from the directive in the search
warrant that the items seized be immediately delivered to the trial
court with a true and verified inventory of the same, 45 as required
by Rule 126, Section 1246 of the Rules of Court. People v.
Go47 characterized this requirement as mandatory in order to
preclude the substitution of or tampering with said items by
interested parties.48 Thus, as a reasonable safeguard, People vs.
Del Castillo49 declared that the approval by the court which issued
the search warrant is necessary before police officers can retain
the property seized and without it, they would have no authority
to retain possession thereof and more so to deliver the same to
another agency.50 Mere tolerance by the trial court of a contrary
practice does not make the practice right because it is violative of
the mandatory requirements of the law and it thereby defeats the
very purpose for the enactment.51
Given the foregoing deviations of police officer Esternon from the
standard and normal procedure in the implementation of the
warrant and in taking post-seizure custody of the evidence, the
blind reliance by the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the
presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is
manifestly misplaced. The presumption of regularity is merely
just that—a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and
which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as
binding truth.52 Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot
preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if
not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.53 In the
present case the lack of conclusive identification of the illegal
drugs allegedly seized from petitioner, coupled with the
irregularity in the manner by which the same were placed under
police custody before offered in court, strongly militates a finding
of guilt.
In our constitutional system, basic and elementary is the
presupposition that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused
lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its own
evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. The rule is
invariable whatever may be the reputation of the accused, for the
law presumes his innocence unless and until the contrary is
shown.54 In dubio pro reo. When moral certainty as to culpability
hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably
becomes a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 27 January 2006 affirming with modification the judgment
of conviction of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon City, Branch
52, and its Resolution dated 30 May 2006 denying reconsideration
thereof, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Junie Malillin y
Lopez is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and is accordingly
ordered immediately released from custody unless he is being
lawfully held for another offense.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to
implement this Decision and to report to this Court the action
taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179029 August 12, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
FELIMON PAGADUAN y TAMAYO, Appellant.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review the decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 01597 which affirmed in toto the decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya, in Criminal Case No. 4600, finding appellant Felimon
Pagaduan y Tamayo (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of illegal sale of shabu, under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.
BACKGROUND FACTS
The prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC with
violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 under an
Information that states:
That on or about December 27, 2003 at about 4:30 o’clock (sic) in
the afternoon, in the Municipality of Solano, Province of Nueva
Vizcaya, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell, trade, dispense, deliver and give
away 0.01 gram, more or less, of methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu), a dangerous drug, as contained in a heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet to PO3 Peter C. Almarez, a member of
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) who posed as a
buyer of shabu in the amount of ₱200.00, to the damage and
prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Trial on the
merits, thereafter, followed.
The evidence for the prosecution reveals the following facts.
After having received information that the appellant was selling
illegal drugs in Nueva Vizcaya, Captain Jaime de Vera called, on
his cellular phone, PO3 Peter Almarez and SPO1 Domingo Balido
– who were both in Santiago City – and informed them of a
planned buy-bust operation. They agreed to meet at the SSS
Building near LMN Hotel in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya. 4 On their
arrival there, Captain de Vera conducted a briefing and
designated PO3 Almarez as the poseur buyer. Thereafter, Captain
de Vera introduced PO3 Almarez to the police informant
(tipster),5and gave him (PO3 Almarez) two ₱100 bills (Exhibits "D"
and "E") which the latter marked with his initials.6
After this briefing, the buy-bust team went to Bintawan Road,
Solano, Nueva Vizcaya to conduct the entrapment operation.7 PO3
Almarez and the informant rode a tricycle, while Captain de Vera
and SPO1 Balido followed on board a tinted van.8 The buy-bust
team arrived at the target area at around 4:30 p.m., and saw the
appellant already waiting for the informant. The informant
approached the appellant and introduced PO3 Almarez to him as
a buyer. PO3 Almarez told the appellant that he needed shabu
worth ₱200, and inquired from him (appellant) if he had a "stock."
The appellant replied in the affirmative, and then handed one
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance to PO3 Almarez. PO3 Almarez, in turn, gave
the two pre-marked ₱100 bills to the appellant.9 Immediately after,
PO3 Almarez made the pre-arranged signal to his companions,
who then approached the appellant. Captain de Vera took the
marked money from the appellant’s right pocket, and then
arrested him.10 PO3 Almarez, for his part, marked the sachet with
his initials.11 Thereafter, the buy-bust team brought the appellant
to the Diadi Police Station for investigation.12
At the police station, Captain de Vera prepared a request for
laboratory examination (Exh. "C").13 The appellant was transferred
to the Diadi Municipal Jail where he was detained.14 Two days
later, or on December 29, 2003, PO3 Almarez transmitted the
letter-request, for laboratory examination, and the seized plastic
sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory, where they were received by
PO2 Fernando Dulnuan.15 Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Alfredo
Quintero, the Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory,
conducted an examination on the specimen submitted, and found
it to be positive for the presence of shabu (Exh. "B").16
On the hearing of August 13, 2004, the prosecution offered the
following as exhibits:
Exhibit "A" – the shabu confiscated from the appellant
Exhibit "B" – the report by the PNP Crime Laboratory
Exhibit "C" – the request for laboratory examination
Exhibits "D" and "E" – the buy-bust money
Exhibit "F" - the request for laboratory examination received by
Forensic Chemist Quintero
The defense presented a different version of the events,
summarized as follows:
At around 4:30 p.m. of December 27, 2003, Jojo Jose came to the
appellant’s house and informed him that Captain de Vera was
inviting him to be an "asset." The appellant and Jojo boarded a
tricycle and proceeded to the SSS Building where Captain de Vera
was waiting for them.17 As the tricycle approached the Methodist
Church along Bintawan Road, Jojo dropped his slippers and
ordered the driver to stop. Immediately after, a van stopped in
front of the tricycle; Captain de Vera alighted from the van and
handcuffed the appellant. Captain de Vera brought the appellant
inside the van, frisked him, and took ₱200 from his
pocket.18 Afterwards, Captain de Vera took the appellant to the
SSS Building, where he (Captain de Vera) and the building
manager drank coffee. Captain de Vera then brought the appellant
to the Diadi Municipal Jail where he was detained for almost two
days.19
On the morning of December 29, 2003, the appellant was
transferred to the Provincial Jail. He signed a document without
the assistance of a lawyer after being told that it would result in
his immediate release.20
The RTC, in its decision21 of August 16, 2005, convicted the
appellant of the crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment. The RTC likewise ordered the
appellant to pay a ₱500,000.00 fine.
The appellant appealed to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 01597. The CA, in its decision22 dated May 22, 2007, affirmed
the RTC decision.
The CA found unmeritorious the appellant’s defense of
instigation, and held that the appellant was apprehended as a
result of a legitimate entrapment operation. It explained that in
inducement or instigation, an innocent person is lured by a public
officer or private detective to commit a crime. In the case at bar,
the buy-bust operation was planned only after the police had
received information that the appellant was selling shabu.
The CA also held that the failure of the police to conduct a prior
surveillance on the appellant was not fatal to the prosecution’s
case. It reasoned out that the police are given wide discretion to
select effective means to apprehend drug dealers. A prior
surveillance is, therefore, not necessary, especially when the
police are already accompanied by their informant.
The CA further ruled that the prosecution was able to sufficiently
prove an unbroken chain of custody of the shabu. It explained
that PO3 Almarez sealed the plastic sachet seized from the
appellant, marked it with his initials, and transmitted it to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for examination. PSI Quintero conducted a
qualitative examination and found the specimen positive for the
presence of shabu. According to the CA, the prosecution was
able to prove that the substance seized was the same specimen
submitted to the laboratory and presented in court,
notwithstanding that this specimen was turned over to the crime
laboratory only after two days.
In his brief,23 the appellant claims that the lower courts erred in
convicting him of the crime charged despite the prosecution’s
failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He harps on
the fact that the police did not conduct a prior surveillance on him
before conducting the buy-bust operation.
The appellant further contends that the prosecution failed to
show an unbroken chain of custody in the handling of the seized
drug. He claims that there was no evidence to show when the
markings were done. Moreover, a period of two days had elapsed
from the time the shabu was confiscated to the time it was
forwarded to the crime laboratory for examination.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters with the
argument that the chain of custody of the shabu was sufficiently
established. It explained that the shabu was turned over by the
police officers to the PNP Crime Laboratory, where it was found
by the forensic chemist to be positive for the presence of shabu.
The OSG likewise claimed that the appellant failed to rebut the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties by
the police. The OSG further added that a prior surveillance is not
indispensable to a prosecution for illegal sale of drugs.24
THE COURT’S RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to acquit the appellant for the
prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Specifically, the prosecution failed to show that the police
complied with paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165,
and with the chain of custody requirement of this Act.
The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act: A Brief Background
R.A. No. 9165 was enacted in 2002 to pursue the State’s policy to
"safeguard the integrity of its territory and the well-being of its
citizenry particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of
dangerous drugs on their physical and mental well-being, and to
defend the same against acts or omissions detrimental to their
development and preservation."
R.A. No. 9165 repealed and superseded R.A. No. 6425, known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Realizing that dangerous drugs
are one of the most serious social ills of the society at present,
Congress saw the need to further enhance the efficacy of the law
against dangerous drugs. The new law thus mandates the
government to pursue an intensive and unrelenting campaign
against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs and other
similar substances through an integrated system of planning,
implementation and enforcement of anti-drug abuse policies,
programs and projects.25
Illegal Sale of Drugs under Section 5
vis-à-vis the Inventory and Photograph
Requirement under Section 21
In a prosecution for illegal sale of a prohibited drug under Section
5 of R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution must prove the following
elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object,
and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment therefor. All these require evidence that the sale
transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti, i.e., the body or substance of the crime that
establishes that a crime has actually been committed, as shown
by presenting the object of the illegal transaction.26 To remove
any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized
drug, evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug
presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered
from the appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for possession or
for drug pushing under R.A. No. 9165 fails.27
The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is
embodied in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165,
which states:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of
the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof[.]
This is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165, which
reads:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph
shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of
the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case
of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]
Strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is required
because of the illegal drug's unique characteristic rendering it
indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering,
alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise.28 The
records of the present case are bereft of evidence showing that
the buy-bust team followed the outlined procedure despite its
mandatory terms. The deficiency is patent from the following
exchanges at the trial:
PROSECUTOR [EMERSON TURINGAN]:
Q: After you handed this buy-bust money to the accused, what
happened next?
[PO3 ALMAREZ:]
A: When the shabu was already with me and I gave him the
money[,] I signaled the two, Captain Jaime de Vera and SPO1
Balido, sir.
xxxx
Q: After you gave that signal, what happened?
A: Then they approached us and helped me in arresting Felimon
Pagaduan, sir.
Q: After Pagaduan was arrested, what happened next?
A: After arresting Pagaduan[,] we brought him directly in Diadi
Police Station, sir.
Q: What happened when you brought the accused to the Police
Station in Diadi?
A: When we were already in Diadi Police Station, we first put him
in jail in the Municipal Jail of Diadi, Nueva Vizcaya, sir.
Q: What did you do with the shabu?
A: The request for laboratory examination was prepared and was
brought to the Crime Lab. of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, sir.
xxxx
Q: After making the request, what did you do next[,] if any[,] Mr.
Witness?
A: After submission of the request to the Crime Lab.[,] we
prepared our joint affidavit for submission of the case to the
Court, sir.29
From the foregoing exchanges during trial, it is evident that the
apprehending team, upon confiscation of the drug, immediately
brought the appellant and the seized items to the police station,
and, once there, made the request for laboratory examination. No
physical inventory and photograph of the seized items were taken
in the presence of the accused or his counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice, and an elective
official. PO3 Almarez, on cross-examination, was unsure and
could not give a categorical answer when asked whether he
issued a receipt for the shabu confiscated from the appellant.30 At
any rate, no such receipt or certificate of inventory appears in the
records.
In several cases, we have emphasized the importance of
compliance with the prescribed procedure in the custody and
disposition of the seized drugs. We have repeatedly declared that
the deviation from the standard procedure dismally compromises
the integrity of the evidence. In People v. Morales, 31 we acquitted
the accused for failure of the buy-bust team to photograph and
inventory the seized items, without giving any justifiable ground
for the non-observance of the required procedures. People v.
Garcia32 likewise resulted in an acquittal because no physical
inventory was ever made, and no photograph of the seized items
was taken under the circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165 and
its implementing rules. In Bondad, Jr. v. People,33 we also
acquitted the accused for the failure of the police to conduct an
inventory and to photograph the seized items, without justifiable
grounds.
We had the same rulings in People v. Gutierrez,34 People v.
Denoman,35 People v. Partoza,36 People v. Robles,37and People v.
dela Cruz,38 where we emphasized the importance of complying
with the required mandatory procedures under Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165.
We recognize that the strict compliance with the requirements of
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 may not always be possible under
field conditions; the police operates under varied conditions, and
cannot at all times attend to all the niceties of the procedures in
the handling of confiscated evidence. For this reason, the last
sentence of the implementing rules provides that "non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall
not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items[.]" Thus, noncompliance with the strict directive of
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal to the
prosecution’s case; police procedures in the handling of
confiscated evidence may still have some lapses, as in the
present case. These lapses, however, must be recognized and
explained in terms of their justifiable grounds, and the integrity
and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to
have been preserved.39
In the present case, the prosecution did not bother to offer any
explanation to justify the failure of the police to conduct the
required physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs.
The apprehending team failed to show why an inventory and
photograph of the seized evidence had not been made either in
the place of seizure and arrest or at the nearest police station (as
required by the Implementing Rules in case of warrantless
arrests). We emphasize that for the saving clause to apply, it is
important that the prosecution explain the reasons behind the
procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized
evidence had been preserved.40 In other words, the justifiable
ground for noncompliance must be proven as a fact. The court
cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.41
The "Chain of Custody" Requirement
Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering
exactitude be observed in establishing the corpus delicti - the
body of the crime whose core is the confiscated illicit drug. Thus,
every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established.
The chain of custody requirement performs this function in buy-
bust operations as it ensures that doubts concerning the identity
of the evidence are removed.42
Black’s Law Dictionary explains chain of custody in this wise:
In evidence, the one who offers real evidence, such as the
narcotics in a trial of drug case, must account for the custody of
the evidence from the moment in which it reaches his custody
until the moment in which it is offered in evidence, and such
evidence goes to weight not to admissibility of evidence. Com. V.
White, 353 Mass. 409, 232 N.E.2d 335.
Likewise, Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No.
1, Series of 2002 which implements R.A. No. 9165 defines "chain
of custody" as follows:
"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals
or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of
each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized
item shall include the identity and signature of the person who
held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time
when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final
disposition[.]
In Malillin v. People,43 the Court explained that the chain of
custody rule requires that there be testimony about every link in
the chain, from the moment the object seized was picked up to
the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person
who touched it would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and performed. This presumption, it must be emphasized, is not
the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the conclusive.45 It cannot, by itself, overcome the constitutional
chain. presumption of innocence. Any taint of irregularity affects the
whole performance and should make the presumption
unavailable. In the present case, the failure of the apprehending
In the present case, the prosecution’s evidence failed to establish
team to comply with paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No.
the chain that would have shown that the shabu presented in
9165, and with the chain of custody requirement of this Act
court was the very same specimen seized from the appellant.
effectively negates this presumption. As we explained in Malillin
v. People:46
The first link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure of the
heat-sealed plastic sachet from the appellant. PO3 Almarez
The presumption of regularity is merely just that - a mere
mentioned on cross-examination that he placed his initials on the
presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when
confiscated sachet "after apprehending" the appellant. Notably,
challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth.
this testimony constituted the totality of the prosecution’s
Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot preponderate over
evidence on the marking of the seized evidence. PO3 Almarez’s
the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by
testimony, however, lacked specifics on how he marked the
proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case the lack of
sachet and who witnessed the marking. In People v. Sanchez, we
conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from
ruled that the "marking" of the seized items – to truly ensure that
petitioner, coupled with the irregularity in the manner by which
they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually
the same were placed under police custody before offered in
the ones offered in evidence – should be done (1) in the presence
court, strongly militates a finding of guilt.
of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation. In
the present case, nothing in the records gives us an insight on
the manner and circumstances that attended the marking of the We are not unmindful of the pernicious effects of drugs in our
confiscated sachet. Whether the marking had been done in the society; they are lingering maladies that destroy families and
presence of the appellant is not at all clear from the evidence that relationships, and engender crimes. The Court is one with all the
merely mentioned that the evidence had been marked after the agencies concerned in pursuing an intensive and unrelenting
appellant’s apprehension. campaign against this social dilemma. Regardless of how much
we want to curb this menace, we cannot disregard the protection
provided by the Constitution, most particularly the presumption
The second link in the chain of custody is its turnover from the
of innocence bestowed on the appellant. Proof beyond
apprehending team to the police station. PO3 Almarez testified
reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce
that the appellant was brought to the Diadi Police Station after his
moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of
arrest. However, he failed to identify the person who had control
those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome this
and possession of the seized drug at the time of its transportation
constitutional presumption. If the prosecution has not proved, in
to the police station. In the absence of clear evidence, we cannot
the first place, all the elements of the crime charged, which in this
presume that PO3 Almarez, as the poseur buyer, handled the
case is the corpus delicti, then the appellant deserves no less
seized sachet – to the exclusion of others - during its transfer
than an acquittal.
from the place of arrest and confiscation to the police station. The
prosecution likewise failed to present evidence pertaining to the
identity of the duty desk officer who received the plastic sachet WHEREFORE, premises considered, we
containing shabu from the buy-bust team. This is particularly hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the May 22, 2007 Decision of
significant since the seized specimen was turned over to the PNP the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01597. Appellant
Crime Laboratory only after two days. It was not, therefore, clear Felimon Pagaduan y Tamayo is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of
who had temporary custody of the seized items during this the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is
significant intervening period of time. Although the records show ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless he is
that the request for laboratory examination of the seized plastic confined for another lawful cause.
sachet was prepared by Captain de Vera, the evidence does not
show that he was the official who received the marked plastic
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of
sachet from the buy-bust team.
Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The
Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report the
As for the subsequent links in the chain of custody, the records action he has taken to this Court within five days from receipt of
show that the seized specimen was forwarded by PO3 Almarez to this Decision.
the PNP Crime Laboratory on December 29, 2003, where it was
received by PO2 Dulnuan, and later examined by PSI Quintero.
SO ORDERED.
However, the person from whom PO3 Almarez received the seized
illegal drug for transfer to the crime laboratory was not identified.
As earlier discussed, the identity of the duty desk officer who
received the shabu, as well as the person who had temporary
custody of the seized items for two days, had not been
established.

The procedural lapses mentioned above show the glaring gaps in

the chain of custody, creating a reasonable doubt whether the
drugs confiscated from the appellant were the same drugs that
were brought to the crime laboratory for chemical analysis, and
eventually offered in court as evidence. In the absence of
concrete evidence on the illegal drugs bought and sold, the body
of the crime – the corpus delicti – has not been adequately
proven.44 In effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove the
elements of the crime charged, creating reasonable doubt on the
appellant’s criminal liability.

Presumption of Regularity in the Performance of Official Duties

In sustaining the appellant’s conviction, the CA relied on the

evidentiary presumption that official duties have been regularly
GR No. 180284, Sep 11, 2013
NARCISO SALAS v. ANNABELLE MATUSALEM
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
The factual antecedents:
On May 26, 1995, Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) filed a
complaint for Support/Damages against Narciso Salas (petitioner)
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofCabanatuan City (Civil Case
No. 2124-AF).
Respondent claimed that petitioner is. the father of her son
Christian Paulo Salas who was born on December 28, 1994.
Petitioner, already 56 years old at the time, enticed her as she was
then only 24 years old, making her believe that he is a widower.
Petitioner rented an apartment where respondent stayed and
shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their child, including
the cost of caesarian operation and hospital confinement.
However, when respondent refused the offer of petitioner's family
to take the child from her, petitioner abandoned respondent and
her child and left them to the mercy of relatives and friends.
Respondent further alleged that she attempted suicide due to
depression but still petitioner refused to support her and their
child.
Respondent thus prayed for support pendente lite and monthly
support in the amount of P20,000.00, as well as actual, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
Petitioner filed his answer[4] with special and affirmative defenses
and counterclaims. He described respondent as a woman of loose
morals, having borne her first child also out of wedlock when she
went to work in Italy. Jobless upon her return to the country,
respondent spent time riding on petitioner's jeepney which was
then being utilized by a female real estate agent named Felicisima
de Guzman. Respondent had seduced a senior police officer in
San Isidro and her charge of sexual abuse against said police
officer was later withdrawn in exchange for the quashing of drug
charges against respondent's brother-in-law who was then
detained at the municipal jail. It was at that time respondent
introduced herself to petitioner whom she pleaded for charity as
she was pregnant with another child. Petitioner denied paternity
of the child Christian Paulo; he was motivated by no other reason
except genuine altruism when he agreed to shoulder the
expenses for the delivery of said child, unaware of respondent's
chicanery and deceit designed to "scandalize" him in exchange
for financial favor.
At the trial, respondent and her witness Grace Murillo testified.
Petitioner was declared to have waived his right to present
evidence and the case was considered submitted for decision
based on respondent's evidence.
Respondent testified that she first met petitioner at the house of
his "kumadre" Felicisima de Guzman at Bgy. Malapit, San Isidro,
Nueva Ecija. During their subsequent meeting, petitioner told her
he is already a widower and he has no more companion in life
because his children are all grown-up. She also learned that
petitioner owns a rice mill, a construction business and a housing
subdivision (petitioner offered her a job at their family-owned Ma.
Cristina Village). Petitioner at the time already knows that she is a
single mother as she had a child by her former boyfriend in Italy.
He then brought her to a motel, promising that he will take care of
her and marry her. She believed him and yielded to his advances,
with the thought that she and her child will have a better life.
Thereafter, they saw each other weekly and petitioner gave her
money for her child. When she became pregnant with petitioner's
child, it was only then she learned that he is in fact not a widower.
She wanted to abort the baby but petitioner opposed it because
he wanted to have another child.[5]
On the fourth month of her pregnancy, petitioner rented an
apartment where she stayed with a housemaid; he also provided
for all their expenses. She gave birth to their child on December
28, 1994 at the Good Samaritan Hospital in Cabanatuan City.
Before delivery, petitioner even walked her at the hospital room
and massaged her stomach, saying he had not done this to his
wife. She filled out the form for the child's birth certificate and
wrote all the information supplied by petitioner himself. It was
also petitioner who paid the hospital bills and drove her baby
home. He was excited and happy to have a son at his advanced
age who is his "look-alike," and this was witnessed by other
boarders, visitors and Grace Murillo, the owner of the apartment
unit petitioner rented. However, on the 18th day after the baby's
birth, petitioner went to Baguio City for a medical check-up.
He confessed to her daughter and eventually his wife was also
informed about his having sired an illegitimate child. His family
then decided to adopt the baby and just give respondent money
so she can go abroad. When she refused this offer, petitioner
stopped seeing her and sending money to her. She and her baby
survived through the help of relatives and friends. Depressed, she
tried to commit suicide by drug overdose and was brought to the
hospital by Murillo who paid the bill. Murillo sought the help of the
Cabanatuan City Police Station which set their meeting with
petitioner. However, it was only petitioner's wife who showed up
and she was very mad, uttering unsavory words against
respondent.[6]
Murillo corroborated respondent's testimony as to the payment
by petitioner of apartment rental, his weekly visits to respondent
and financial support to her, his presence during and after
delivery of respondent's baby, respondent's attempted suicide
through sleeping pills overdose and hospitalization for which she
paid the bill, her complaint before the police authorities and
meeting with petitioner's wife at the headquarters.[7]
On April 5, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision[8] in favor of
respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant to give as monthly support of
TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS for the child
Christian Paulo through the mother;
2. Directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P20,000.00 by way of litigation expenses; and
3. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Petitioner appealed to the CA arguing that: (1) the trial court
decided the case without affording him the right to introduce
evidence on his defense; and (2) the trial court erred in finding
that petitioner is the putative father of Christian Paulo and
ordering him to give monthly support.
By Decision dated July 18, 2006, the CA dismissed petitioner's
appeal. The appellate court found no reason to disturb the trial
court's exercise of discretion in denying petitioner's motion for
postponement on April 17, 1998, the scheduled hearing for the
initial presentation of defendant's evidence, and the motion for
reconsideration of the said order denying the motion for
postponement and submitting the case for decision.
On the paternity issue, the CA affirmed the trial court's ruling that
respondent satisfactorily established the illegitimate filiation of
her son Christian Paulo, and consequently no error was
committed by the trial court in granting respondent's prayer for 2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
support. The appellate court thus held: PRONOUNCING THAT PETITIONER WAS AFFORDED THE FULL
MEASURE OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND IN
UPHOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT GRAVELY
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
Christian Paulo, in instant case, does not enjoy the benefit of a
JURISDICTION WHEN IT DECIDED THE INSTANT CASE WITHOUT
record of birth in the civil registry which bears acknowledgment
AFFORDING PETITIONER THE RIGHT TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE
signed by Narciso Salas. He cannot claim open and continuous
IN HIS DEFENSE.
possession of the status of an illegitimate child.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
It had been established by plaintiff's evidence, however, that
THAT THE FILIATION OF CHRISTIAN PAULO WAS DULY
during her pregnancy, Annabelle was provided by Narciso Salas
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 175 IN RELATION TO
with an apartment at a rental of P1,500.00 which he paid for (TSN,
ARTICLE 172 OF THE FAMILY CODE AND EXISTING
October 6, 1995, p. 18). Narciso provided her with a household
JURISPRUDENCE AND THEREFORE ENTITLED TO SUPPORT
help with a salary of P1,500.00 a month (TSN, October 6, 1995,
FROM THE PETITIONER.[11]
ibid). He also provided her a monthly food allowance of P1,500.00
(Ibid, p. 18). Narciso was with Annabelle at the hospital while the
latter was in labor, "walking" her around and massaging her belly
(Ibid, p. 11). Narciso brought home Christian Paulo to the rented We grant the petition.
apartment after Annabelle's discharge from the hospital. People
living in the same apartment units were witnesses to Narciso's
delight to father a son at his age which was his "look alike". It was
It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal actions
only after the 18th day when Annabelle refused to give him
are fixed for the convenience of the plaintiffs and their witnesses.
Christian Paulo that Narciso withdrew his support to him and his
Equally settled, however, is the principle that choosing the venue
mother.
of an action is not left to a plaintiff's caprice; the matter is
regulated by the Rules of Court.[12]
Said testimony of Annabelle aside from having been corroborated
by Grace Murillo, the owner of the apartment which Narciso
rented, was never rebutted on record. Narciso did not present any
evidence, verbal or documentary, to repudiate plaintiff's evidence. In personal actions such as the instant case, the Rules give the
plaintiff the option of choosing where to file his complaint. He can
In the cases of Lim vs. CA (270 SCRA 1) and Rodriguez vs. file it in the place (1) where he himself or any of them resides, or
CA (245 SCRA 150), the Supreme Court made it clear that Article (2) where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may
172 of the Family Code is an adaptation of Article 283 of the Civil be found.[13] The plaintiff or the defendant must be residents of
Code. Said legal provision provides that the father is obliged to the place where the action has been instituted at the time the
recognize the child as his natural child x x "3) when the child has action is commenced.[14]
in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father". However, petitioner raised the issue of improper venue for the
first time in the Answer itself and no prior motion to dismiss
In fact, in Ilano vs. CA (230 SCRA 242, 258-259), it was held that based on such ground was filed. Under the Rules of Court before
the 1997 amendments, an objection to an improper venue must be
made before a responsive pleading is filed. Otherwise, it will be
"The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket provision
deemed waived.[15] Not having been timely raised, petitioner's
that practically covers all the other cases in the preceding
objection on venue is therefore deemed waived.
paragraphs. 'Any other evidence or proof' that the defendant is
the father is broad enough to render unnecessary the other
paragraphs of this article. When the evidence submitted in the
action for compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet [the] As to the denial of the motion for postponement filed by his
requirements of the first three paragraphs, it may still be enough counsel for the resetting of the initial presentation of defense
under the last paragraph. This paragraph permits hearsay and evidence on April 17, 1998, we find that it was not the first time
reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court, with petitioner's motion for postponement was denied by the trial
respect to illegitimate filiation." court.

Records disclosed that after the termination of the testimony of

As a necessary consequence of the finding that Christian Paulo is
respondent's last witness on November 29, 1996, the trial court as
the son of defendant Narciso Salas, he is entitled to support from
prayed for by the parties, set the continuation of hearing for the
the latter (Ilano vs. CA, supra).
reception of evidence for the defendant (petitioner) on January
27, February 3, and February 10, 1997. In the Order dated
December 17, 1996, petitioner was advised to be ready with his
It "shall be demandable from the time the person who has the evidence at those hearing dates earlier scheduled. At the hearing
right to recover the same needs it for maintenance x x." (Art. 203, on January 27, 1997, petitioner's former counsel, Atty. Rolando S.
Family Code of the Philippines).[10] Bala, requested for the cancellation of the February 3 and 10,
1997 hearings in order to give him time to prepare for his defense,
which request was granted by the trial court which thus reset the
hearing dates to March 3, 14 and 17, 1997. On March 3, 1997, upon
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by
oral manifestation by Atty. Bala and without objection from
the CA.
respondent's counsel, Atty. Feliciano Wycoco, the trial court
again reset the hearing to March 14 and 17, 1997. With the non-
Hence, this petition submitting the following arguments: appearance of both petitioner and Atty. Bala on March 14, 1997,
the trial court upon oral manifestation by Atty. Wycoco declared
their absence as a waiver of their right to present evidence and
accordingly deemed the case submitted for decision.[16]
1. THE VENUE OF THE CASE WAS IMPROPERLY LAID BEFORE On July 4, 1997, Atty. Bala withdrew as counsel for petitioner and
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CABANATUAN CITY Atty. Rafael E. Villarosa filed his appearance as his new counsel
CONSIDERING THAT BOTH PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT ARE
on July 21, 1997. On the same date he filed entry of appearance,
ACTUAL RESIDENTS OF BRGY. MALAPIT, SAN ISIDRO, NUEVA Atty. Villarosa filed a motion for reconsideration of the March 14,
ECIJA. 1997 Order pleading for liberality and magnanimity of the trial
court, without offering any explanation for Atty. Bala's failure to
appear for the initial presentation of their evidence. The trial court
thereupon reconsidered its March 14, 1997 Order, finding it better
to give petitioner a chance to present his evidence. On August 26,
1997, Atty. Villarosa received a notice of hearing for the
presentation of their evidence scheduled on September 22, 1997.
On August 29, 1997, the trial court received his motion requesting
that the said hearing be re-set to October 10, 1997 for the reason
that he had requested the postponement of a hearing in another
case which was incidentally scheduled on September 22, 23 and
24, 1997. As prayed for, the trial court reset the hearing to
October 10, 1997. On said date, however, the hearing was again
moved to December 15, 1997. On February 16, 1998, the trial court
itself reset the hearing to April 17, 1998 since it was unclear
whether Atty. Wycoco received a copy of the motion. [17]
On April 17, 1998, petitioner and his counsel failed to appear but
the trial court received on April 16, 1998 an urgent motion to
cancel hearing filed by Atty. Villarosa. The reason given by the
latter was the scheduled hearing on the issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction in another case under the April 8, 1998
Order issued by the RTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Branch 36 in Civil
Case No. 1946. But as clearly stated in the said order, it was the
plaintiffs therein who requested the postponement of the hearing
and it behoved Atty. Villarosa to inform the RTC of Gapan that he
had a previous commitment considering that the April 17, 1998
hearing was scheduled as early as February 16, 1998. Acting on
the motion for postponement, the trial court denied for the
second time petitioner's motion for postponement. Even at the
hearing of their motion for reconsideration of the April 17, 1998
Order on September 21, 1998, Atty. Villarosa failed to appear and
instead filed another motion for postponement. The trial court
thus ordered that the case be submitted for decision stressing
that the case had long been pending and that petitioner and his
counsel have been given opportunities to present their evidence.
It likewise denied a second motion for reconsideration filed by
Atty. Villarosa, who arrived late during the hearing thereof on
December 4, 1998.[18]
A motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of
right, but a request addressed to the sound discretion of the
court. Parties asking for postponement have absolutely no right
to assume that their motions would be granted. Thus, they must
be prepared on the day of the hearing.[19] Indeed, an order
declaring a party to have waived the right to present evidence for
performing dilatory actions upholds the trial court's duty to
ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal
to proceed on the part of one party.
Atty. Villarosa's plea for liberality was correctly rejected by the
trial court in view of his own negligence in failing to ensure there
will be no conflict in his trial schedules. As we held in Tiomico v.
Court of Appeals[21]:
Motions for postponement are generally frowned upon by Courts
if there is evidence of bad faith, malice or inexcusable negligence
on the part of the movant. The inadvertence of the defense
counsel in failing to take note of the trial dates and in belatedly
informing the trial court of any conflict in his schedules of trial or
court appearances, constitutes inexcusable negligence. It should
be borne in mind that a client is bound by his counsel's conduct,
negligence and mistakes in handling the case.[22]
With our finding that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial
court's denial of the motion for postponement filed by petitioner's
counsel, petitioner's contention that he was deprived of his day in
court must likewise fail. The essence of due process is that a
party is given a reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit
any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. Where a
party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the
proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of
deprivation of due process. If the opportunity is not availed of, it
is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional
guarantee.[23]
We now proceed to the main issue of whether the trial and
appellate courts erred in ruling that respondent's evidence
sufficiently proved that her son Christian Paulo is the illegitimate
child of petitioner.
Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on
the same evidence as legitimate children.
Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states:
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or
a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation
shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child;
or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. (Underscoring supplied.)
Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth[24] (Exhibit "A-
1") of Christian Paulo Salas in which the name of petitioner
appears as his father but which is not signed by him. Admittedly,
it was only respondent who filled up the entries and signed the
said document though she claims it was petitioner who supplied
the information she wrote therein.
We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying
the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when
there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of the certificate.[25] Thus, if the father did not sign in
the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother,
doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of
paternity.[26] Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a
recognition in a public instrument[27] and it has no probative value
to establish filiation to the alleged father.[28]
As to the Baptismal Certificate[29] (Exhibit "B") of Christian Paulo
Salas also indicating petitioner as the father, we have ruled that
while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents,
they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the
sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily
competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect
to the child's paternity.[30]
The rest of respondent's documentary evidence consists of
handwritten notes and letters, hospital bill and photographs taken
of petitioner and respondent inside their rented apartment unit.
Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the
alleged father are inconclusive evidence to prove
paternity.[31] Exhibits "E" and "F"[32] showing petitioner and
respondent inside the rented apartment unit thus have scant
evidentiary value. The Statement of Account[33] (Exhibit "C") from
the Good Samaritan General Hospital where respondent herself
was indicated as the payee is likewise incompetent to prove that
petitioner is the father of her child notwithstanding petitioner's
admission in his answer that he shouldered the expenses in the
delivery of respondent's child as an act of charity.
As to the handwritten notes[34] (Exhibits "D" to "D-13") of
petitioner and respondent showing their exchange of affectionate
words and romantic trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to
establish Christian Paulo's filiation to petitioner as they were not
signed by petitioner and contained no statement of admission by
petitioner that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these
notes were authentic, they do not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-
à- vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent
evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a
private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.[35]
Petitioner's reliance on our ruling in Lim v. Court of Appeals[36] is
misplaced. In the said case, the handwritten letters of petitioner
contained a clear admission that he is the father of private
respondent's daughter and were signed by him. The Court therein
considered the totality of evidence which established beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner was indeed the father of private
respondent's daughter. On the other hand, in Ilano v. Court of
Appeals,[37] the Court sustained the appellate court's finding that
private respondent's evidence to establish her filiation with and
paternity of petitioner was overwhelming, particularly the latter's
public acknowledgment of his amorous relationship with private
respondent's mother, and private respondent as his own child
through acts and words, her testimonial evidence to that effect
was fully supported by documentary evidence. The Court thus
ruled that respondent had adduced sufficient proof of continuous
possession of status of a spurious child.
Here, while the CA held that Christian Paulo Salas could not claim
open and continuous possession of status of an illegitimate child,
it nevertheless considered the testimonial evidence sufficient
proof to establish his filiation to petitioner.
An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed
filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws," like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a
family Bible in which his name has been entered, common
reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.[38] Reviewing the records,
we find the totality of respondent's evidence insufficient to
establish that petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo.
The testimonies of respondent and Murillo as to the
circumstances of the birth of Christian Paulo, petitioner's
financial support while respondent lived in Murillo's apartment
and his regular visits to her at the said apartment, though replete
with details, do not approximate the "overwhelming evidence,
documentary and testimonial" presented in Ilano. In that case, we
sustained the appellate court's ruling anchored on the following
factual findings by the appellate court which was quoted at length
in the ponencia:
It was Artemio who made arrangement for the delivery of
Merceditas (sic) at the Manila Sanitarium and Hospital. Prior to
the delivery, Leoncia underwent prenatal examination
accompanied by Artemio (TSN, p. 33, 5/17/74). After delivery, they
went home to their residence at EDSA in a car owned and driven
by Artemio himself (id. p. 36).
Merceditas (sic) bore the surname of "Ilano" since birth without
any objection on the part of Artemio, the fact that since
Merceditas (sic) had her discernment she had always known and
called Artemio as her "Daddy" (TSN, pp. 28-29, 10/18/74); the fact
that each time Artemio was at home, he would play with
Merceditas (sic), take her for a ride or restaurants to eat, and
sometimes sleeping with Merceditas (sic) (id. p. 34) and does all
what a father should do for his child bringing home goodies,
candies, toys and whatever he can bring her which a child enjoys
which Artemio gives to Merceditas (sic) (TSN, pp. 38-39, 5/17/74)
are positive evidence that Merceditas (sic) is the child of Artemio
and recognized by Artemio as such. Special attention is called to
Exh. "E-7" where Artemio was telling Leoncia the need for a "frog
test" to know the status of Leoncia.
Plaintiff pointed out that the support by Artemio for Leoncia and
Merceditas (sic) was sometimes in the form of cash personally
delivered to her by Artemio, thru Melencio, thru Elynia (Exhs. "E-
2" and "E-3", and "D-6"), or thru Merceditas (sic) herself (TSN, p.
40, 5/17/74) and sometimes in the form of a check as the Manila
Banking Corporation Check No. 81532 (Exh. "G") and the
signature appearing therein which was identified by Leoncia as
that of Artemio because Artemio often gives her checks and
Artemio would write the check at home and saw Artemio sign the
check (TSN, p. 49, 7/18/73). Both Artemio and Nilda admitted that
the check and signature were those of Artemio (TSN, p. 53,
10/17/77; TSN, p. 19, 10/9/78).
During the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living as husband
and wife, Artemio has shown concern as the father of Merceditas
(sic). When Merceditas (sic) was in Grade 1 at the St. Joseph
Parochial School, Artemio signed the Report Card of Merceditas
(sic) (Exh. "H") for the fourth and fifth grading period(s) (Exh. "H-
1" and "H-2") as the parent of Merceditas (sic). Those signatures
of Artemio [were] both identified by Leoncia and Merceditas (sic)
because Artemio signed Exh. "H-1" and "H-2" at their residence in
the presence of Leoncia, Merceditas (sic) and of Elynia (TSN, p.
57, 7/18/73; TSN, p. 28, 10/1/73). x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
When Artemio run as a candidate in the Provincial Board of
Cavite[,] Artemio gave Leoncia his picture with the following
dedication: "To Nene, with best regards, Temiong". (Exh. "I"). (pp.
19-20, Appellant's Brief)
The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to
offset the totality of the evidence indubitably showing that the
signature thereon belongs to him. The entry in the Certificate of
Live Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was falsely stated therein as
married does not mean that Leoncia is not appellee's daughter.
This particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio himself
in order to avoid embarrassment.[39]
In sum, we hold that the testimonies of respondent and Murillo,
by themselves are not competent proof of paternity and the
totality of respondent's evidence failed to establish Christian
Paulo's filiation to petitioner.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof
is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for
recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or
may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it
must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear
and convincing evidence.[40
Finally, we note the Manifestation and Motion[41] filed by
petitioner's counsel informing this Court that petitioner had died
on May 6, 2010.
The action for support having been filed in the trial court when
petitioner was still alive, it is not barred under Article 175 (2)[42] of
the Family Code. We have also held that the death of the putative
father is not a bar to the action commenced during his lifetime by
one claiming to be his illegitimate child.[43] The rule on
substitution of parties provided in Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, thus applies.
SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a
pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it
shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty
(30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the
name and address of his legal representative or representatives.
Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground for
disciplinary action.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in
Article 173, except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for
the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor
or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for
the minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or

representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of
thirty (30) days from notice.

If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the

deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within
the specified period, the court may order the opposing party,
within a specified time to procure the appointment of an executor
or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall
immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court
charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the
opposing party, may be recovered as costs.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.

The Decision dated July 18, 2006 and Resolution dated October
19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CV No. 64379 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 2124-AF of the
Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 26
is DISMISSED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 209588 February 18, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ERIC ROSAURO y BONGCAWIL, Accused-Appellant.
PEREZ, J.:
For the consideration of the Court is an appeal of the
Decision1 dated 19 June 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00552- MIN, which affirmed the Judgment2 dated
24 November 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cagayan de
Oro City, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 2004-856, finding
accused-appellant Eric Rosauro y Bongcawil (accused-appellant)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu under
Sec. 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165) or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and ordering him to pay a
fine of ₱500,000.00.
In an Amended Information dated 21 February 2005,3 accused-
appellant was charged with violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R. A. No.
9165, to wit:
That on the 3rd day of July, 2004at about 5:30 o’clock in the
afternoon, more or less, at Purok 3, Barangay Poblacion,
Municipality of Villanueva, Province of Misamis Oriental, Republic
of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law to
possess and to sell any dangerous drugs, knowingly, willfully and
feloniously, did then and there, sell and convey to a third person,
who acted as a decoy in a buy bust operation, one (1) sachet of
shabu, containing 0.04 grams (sic) of shabu, which when
examined gave POSITIVE result to test for the presence of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.4
Upon re-arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged.5 Thereafter, pre-trial and trial on the merits
ensued.
Based on the records, the prosecution’s version of the facts is as
follows:
On October 13, 2002, on the basis of unconfirmed reports that
accused-appellant Eric Rosauro (Rosauro for brevity) was selling
and distributing drugs, the Provincial Drug Enforcement Unit of
Misamis Oriental conducted a test-buy operation in the
Municipality of Villanueva, Misamis Oriental using a confidential
agent. The confidential agent bought shabu from Rosauro at
Purok 2, Barangay Katipunan, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental. The
substance bought from Rosauro was examined by the PNP crime
laboratory and yielded a positive result for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (commonly known as shabu).
On July 3, 2004, the police authorities received information that
again drugs were being distributed at Purok 3, Barangay
Poblacion, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental. Thus, at 5:30 o’clock in
the afternoon, the Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation
Task Unit (PAID-SOTU) elements led by SPO4 Lorenzo Larot and
PO3 Juancho Dizon positioned themselves in the house of their
confidential agent.
There, the PAID-SOTU elements saw Rosauro negotiate with the
confidential agent. In exchange for the one (1) sachet of shabu
given by Rosauro to the confidential agent, the latter gave him a
marked 100-peso bill with serial number YZ7 12579.
After the transaction, Larot and Dizon came out of their hiding
place and arrested Rosauro. Thereafter, the confidential agent
handed the sachet to Larot, who taped it, mark edit with the
marking "Exhibit A", and placed it inside his pocket. He also took
pictures of Rosauro and the drugs. In the police station, he
prepared a Certificate of Inventory and a Request for Laboratory
Examination. Both the drugs and Rosauro were then turned over
to the Crime laboratory.
On the basis of the request made by Larot, Police Chief Inspector
Ma. Leocy Mag-abo, the Forensic Chemical Officer of PNP Crime
Laboratory conducted a laboratory examination on the contents
of the sachet, on accused-appellant, and the marked money. The
examination of the seized item yielded positive result for
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu); while the accused-
appellant and the marked money tested positive for the presence
of ultra-violet fluorescent powder.6
For his part, accused-appellant claims that he was merely a victim
of instigation:
Accused-appellant Rosauro, on the other hand, tells a different
tale. He testified that on July 3, 2004, the police asset went to his
house four (4) times and convinced him to do an errand for him.
Rosauro refused to buy shabu as he did not know where to buy
one. It was the confidential informant who told him to buy the
prohibited drug from a certain "Kael" and to deliver it to the
former’s house.It was also the informant who gave the money to
Rosauro to buy the shabu. But Rosauro was not able to meet or
buy directly from Kael because it was a young man who got and
handed to him the shabu on the road. When Rosauro went to the
house of the confidential informant as instructed, he was arrested
by SPO4 Larot and Dizon. The sachet of shabu was not even
recovered from him but from the confidential informant.7
Finding the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to establish the
guilt of accused-appellant, the RTC rendered a judgment of
conviction, viz.:
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, this Court hereby renders
Judgment finding accused ERIC ROSAURO y BONGCAWIL,
"guilty" beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
information for selling and delivering a sachet of shabu to the
poseur buyer a Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 and
imposes a penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand (PhP 500,000.00) Pesos and to pay the cost.
The accused ERIC B. ROSAURO who has undergone preventive
imprisonment shall be credited in the service of his sentence
consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which
he has undergone preventive imprisonment if the detention
prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the same
disciplinary rule imposed upon convicted prisoners, except those
disqualified by law.
The sachet of shabu, Exh. "A" is confiscated and forfeited in favor
of the government to be destroyed in accordance with law.8
Accused-appellant appealed before the CA, assigning a lone
error:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHEN HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.9
After a review of the records, the CA affirmed the RTC Judgment.
The appellate court ruled that what transpired in the case at bar
was an entrapment and not an instigation;10 that all the elements
of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs were duly
proven;11 that the non-presentation of the confidential agent in
court is not fatal;12 that the inconsistencies in the testimony of the
lone witness of the prosecution do not affect the result of the
case;13 and that the apprehending team was able to preserve the
integrity of the subject drug and that the prosecution was able to
present the required unbroken chain in the custody of the subject
drug.14 Thus, the CA held:
WHEREFORE, the Judgment dated November 24, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City in Criminal
Case No. 2004-856 is hereby AFFIRMED.15
Accused-appellant is now before the Court seeking a review of
his conviction.
After a thorough review of the records, however, we dismiss the
appeal.
It is apropos to reiterate here that where there is no showing that
the trial court overlooked or misinterpreted some material facts or
that it gravely abused its discretion, the Court will not disturb the
trial court’s assessment of the facts and the credibility of the
witnesses since the RTC was in a better position to assess and
weigh the evidence presented during trial. Settled too is the rule
that the factual findings of the appellate court sustaining those of
the trial court are binding on this Court, unless there is a clear
showing that such findings are tainted with arbitrariness,
capriciousness or palpable error.16
The RTC and the CA both found the arrest of accused-appellant to
be the result of a legitimate entrapment procedure, and we find
nothing in the records as to warrant a contrary finding. In People
v. Bartolome,17 we had the occasion to discuss the legitimacy of a
"decoy solicitation," to wit:
It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its
commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the
criminal act was done at the "decoy solicitation" of persons
seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning
complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting its
commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where
the office is one habitually committed, and the solicitation merely
furnishes evidence of a course of conduct.
As here, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the informant
utilized by the police merely furnishes evidence of a course of
conduct. The police received an intelligence report that appellant
has been habitually dealing in illegal drugs. They duly acted on it
by utilizing an informant to effect a drug transaction with
appellant. There was no showing that the informant induced the
appellant to sell illegal drugs to him.1âwphi1
Similarly, the presentation of an informant as witness is not
regarded as indispensable to the success of a prosecution of a
drug-dealing accused. As a rule, the informant is not presented in
court for security reasons, in view of the need to protect the
informant from the retaliation of the culprit arrested through his
efforts. Thereby, the confidentiality of the informant’s identity is
protected in deference to his invaluable services to law
enforcement. Only when the testimony of the informant is
considered absolutely essential in obtaining the conviction of the
culprit should the need to protect his security be disregarded.18 In
the present case, as the buy-bust operation was duly witnessed
by the Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Unit
(PAID-SOTU) elements led by SPO4 Lorenzo Larot (SPO4 Larot)
and PO3 Juancho Dizon, their testimonies can take the place of
that of the confidential informant.
As to whether accused-appellant’s guilt was established beyond
reasonable doubt, we rule in the affirmative.
In a catena of cases, this Court laid down the essential elements
to be duly established for a successful prosecution of offenses
involving the illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs, like
shabu, under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, to wit: (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment
therefor. Briefly, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer
and the receipt of the marked money by the seller successfully
consummate the buy-bust transaction. What is material,
therefore, is the proof that the transaction or sale transpired,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti.19
Verily, all the elements for a conviction of illegal sale of
dangerous or prohibited drugs were proven by the prosecution:
the identity of accused-appellant as the seller, and that of the
confidential informant as poseur-buyer were established, as well
as the exchange of the sachet of shabu and the marked money. It
was also ascertained that the seized item was positive for shabu,
a dangerous drug, and that the same item was properly identified
in open court by SPO4 Larot. Moreover, the ₱100.00 bill with
serial number YZ712579, or the subject marked money, as well as
the living body of the accused-appellant revealed a positive result
for ultraviolet fluorescent powder.
Accused-appellant avers that the prosecution was not able to
prove the corpus delicti, and that the statutory safeguards
provided for in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not followed.
Indeed, as we held in People v. Torres,20 equally important in
every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited
drugs is the presentation of evidence of the seized drug as the
corpus delicti. The identity of the prohibited drug must be proved
with moral certainty. It must also be established with the same
degree of certitude that the substance bought or seized during
the buy-bust operation is the same item offered in court as
exhibit. In this regard, paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R. A.
No. 9165 (the chain of custody rule) provides for safeguards for
the protection of the identity and integrity of dangerous drugs
seized, to wit:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered,
for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of
the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
However, this Court has, in many cases, held that while the chain
of custody should ideally be perfect, in reality it is "almost always
impossible to obtain an unbroken chain." The most important
factor is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. Hence, the prosecution’s failure to
submit in evidence the physical inventory and photograph of the
seized drugs as required under Article 21 of R. A. No. 9165, will
not render the accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized from
him inadmissible.21
The chain of custody is not established solely by compliance with
the prescribed physical inventory and photographing of the
seized drugs in the presence of the enumerated persons. The
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R. A. No. 9165 on the
handling and disposition of seized dangerous drugs states:
x x x Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.22 (Italics,
emphasis, undescoring omitted)

In the case at bar, after the sale was consummated, the

confidential informant gave the seized item to SPO4 Larot who
placed tape on the sachet and marked it "Exhibit A." Upon
reaching the police station, SPO4 Larot executed the Certificate of
Inventory, as well as the request for laboratory examination. The
request, the specimen, as well as the marked money and
accused-appellant were then brought to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination. They were received. by SPO2 Ricardo
Maisog, the Receiving Clerk of the PNP Crime Laboratory Office,
who then forwarded them to Police Inspector Ma. Leocy Jabonillo
Mag-abo, the Forensic Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime
Laboratory.23 Moreover, the seized item was duly identified by
SPO4 Larot in open court as the same item seized from accused-
appellant.

Accused-appellant's guilt having been established, we likewise

affirm the penalty imposed by the RTC and the CA. Under the law,
the offense of illegal sale of shabu carries with it the penalty of
life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos
(₱10,000,000.00), regardless of the quantity and purity of the
substance.24 Thus, the RTC and CA were within bounds when
they imposed the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is

DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 203984 June 18, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from the January 1 7, 2012 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04069, affirming in toto
the July 23, 2009 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City, Branch 127, finding accused-appellant Medario
Calantiao y Dimalanta (Calantiao) guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
On November 13, 2003, Calantiao was charged before the RTC of
violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 in an
Information,3 the pertinent portion of which reads: That on or
about the 11th day of November, 2003 in Caloocan City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without any authority of law,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control two (2) bricks of dried marijuana
fruiting tops with a total weight of 997 .9 grams, knowing the
same to be a dangerous drug.
The facts, as synthesized by the RTC and adopted by the Court of
Appeals, are as follows:
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION
On November 13, 2003[,] at around 5:30 x x x in the afternoon,
while PO1 NELSON MARIANO and PO3 EDUARDO RAMIREZ were
on duty, a certain EDWIN LOJERA arrived at their office and
asked for police assistance regarding a shooting incident. Per
report of the latter, it appears that while driving a towing truck
and traversing along EDSA, Balintawak, Quezon City, he had a
traffic dispute (gitgitan) with a white taxi cab prompting him to
follow said vehicle until they reached along 8th Avenue Street
corner C-3 Road, Caloocan City. Thereat, the passengers of said
taxi cab, one of them was accused Calantiao, alighted and fired
their guns. Surprised, Lojera could not do anything but continued
his driving until he reached a police station nearby where he
reported the incident.
The police officers on duty then were PO1 NELSON MARIANO
and PO3 EDUARDO RAMIREZ. PO1 Mariano testified that they
immediately responded to said complaint by proceeding to 5th
Avenue corner 8th Street, Caloocan City where they found the
white taxi. While approaching said vehicle, two armed men
alighted therefrom, fired their guns towards them (police officers)
and ran away. PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez chased them but
they were subdued. PO1 Mariano recovered from Calantiao a
black bag containing two (2) bricks of dried marijuana fruiting
tops and a magazine of super 38 stainless with ammos, while PO3
Ramirez recovered from Calantiao’s companion [a] .38 revolver.
The suspects and the confiscated items were then turned over to
SPO3 PABLO TEMENA, police investigator at Bagong Barrio
Police Station for investigation. Thereat, PO1 Mariano marked the
bricks of marijuana contained in a black bag with his initials,
"NM". Thereafter, said specimen were forwarded to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. The result of the
examination conducted by P/SINSP. JESSSE DELA ROSA
revealed that the same was positive for marijuana, a dangerous
drug.
The foregoing testimony of PO1 MARIANO was corroborated by
PO3 RAMIREZ who testified that he personally saw those bricks
of marijuana confiscated from the accused. He confirmed that he
was with PO1 Mariano when they apprehended said accused and
his companion and testified that while PO1 Mariano recovered
from the accused a black bag containing marijuana, on his part,
he confiscated from accused’s companion a .38 revolver.
MR. CRISENDO AMANSEC, the driver of the taxi where the
suspects boarded was also presented in open court and testified
as to what he knows about the incident. He confirmed that on that
date, two (2) persons boarded on his taxi and upon reaching C-3
Road, they alighted and fired three (3) shots and ran away.
Aside from the oral testimonies of the witnesses, the prosecution
also offered the following documentary evidence to boost their
charge against the accused:
Exh. "A" – Request for Laboratory Examination dated November
12, 2003
Exh. "B" – Physical Sciences Report No. D-1423-03 dated
November 12, 2003
Exh. "C-1" – Picture of First brick of marijuana fruiting tops
Exh. "C-2" – Picture of Second brick of marijuana fruiting tops
Exh. "D" – Referral Slip dated November 12, 2003
Exh. "E" – Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay dated November
12, 2003 of PO3 Eduardo Ramirez and PO1 Nelson Mariano
Exh. "E-1" – Their respective signatures
Exh. "F" – Sinumpaang Salaysay of Crisendo Amansec
(Erroneously marked as Exh. "E")
EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENSE
The accused offered a different version of the story. According to
his testimony, this instant case originated from a traffic mishap
where the taxi he and his companion Rommel Reyes were riding
almost collided with another car. Reyes then opened the window
and made a "fuck you" sign against the persons on board of that
car. That prompted the latter to chase them and when they were
caught in a traffic jam, PO1 Nelson Mariano, one of the persons
on board of that other car alighted and kicked their taxi. Calantiao
and Reyes alighted and PO1 Mariano slapped the latter and
uttered, "Putang ina mo bakit mo ako pinakyu hindi mo ba ako
kilala?" Said police officer poked his gun again[st] Reyes and
when Calantiao tried to grab it, the gun fired. Calantiao and Reyes
were then handcuffed and were brought to the police station.
Thereat, they were subjected to body frisking and their wallets
and money were taken. PO1 Mariano then prepared some
documents and informed them that they will be charged for
drugs. A newspaper containing marijuana was shown to them and
said police officer told them that it would be sufficient evidence
against them. They were detained and subjected to medical
examination before they were submitted for inquest at the
prosecutor’s office.4
Ruling of the RTC
On July 23, 2009, the RTC rendered its Decision giving credence
to the prosecution’s case. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring accused MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA, GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the offense of Violation of
Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165, for illegally possessing997.9
grams of marijuana fruiting tops. Henceforth, this Court hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a
fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php500,000.00).5
In convicting Calantiao, the RTC held that the illegal drug seized
was admissible in evidence as it was discovered during a body
search after Calantiao was caught in flagrante delicto of
possessing a gun and firing at the police officers. Moreover, the
RTC found all the elements of the offense to have been duly
established by the prosecution.6
Aggrieved, Calantiao appealed7 his conviction to the Court of
Appeals, assigning the following errors:
I
THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 11, ARTICLE II, REPUBLIC ACT NO.
9165, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE ALLEGEDLY
SEIZED ITEMS ARE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
II
THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICERS’
PATENT NON-COMPLIANCE WITHTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS.
III
THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE
TO PROVE THE PROPER CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE SEIZED
DANGEROUS DRUGS.8
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals found no reason to overturn Calantiao’s
conviction. It found that there was sufficient reason to justify a
warrantless arrest, as the police officers were acting on a
legitimate complaint and had a reasonable suspicion that the
persons identified at the scene were the perpetrators of the
offense. Likewise, the Court of Appeals held that the search and
subsequent seizure of the marijuana in question was lawful and
valid, being incidental to a lawful arrest.9 Finding that all the
elements of the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs
to be present and duly proven,10 the Court of Appeals, on January
17, 2012, promulgated its Decision, affirming in toto the RTC’s
ruling.
Undaunted, Calantiao is now before this Court praying for an
acquittal, adding the following arguments in support of his
position:
First, the plain view doctrine is not an exception to a search
incident to a valid warrantless arrest.
xxxx
Second, Calantiao did not waive the inadmissibility of the seized
items.
xxxx
Finally, the seized items’ custodial chain is broken.11
In essence, Calantiao is questioning the admissibility of the
marijuana found in his possession, as evidence against him on
the grounds of either it was discovered via an illegal search, or
because its custodial chain was broken.
Ruling of this Court
This Court finds no merit in Calantiao’s arguments.
Search and Seizure of
Marijuana valid
This Court cannot subscribe to Calantiao’s contention that the
marijuana in his possession cannot be admitted as evidence
against him because it was illegally discovered and seized, not
having been within the apprehending officers’ "plain view."12
Searches and seizure incident to a lawful arrest are governed by
Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
to wit:
Section 13.Search incident to lawful arrest.– A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission
of an offense without a search warrant.
The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure
incident to a lawful arrest is "to protect the arresting officer from
being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a
concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying
evidence within reach."13 It is therefore a reasonable exercise of
the State’s police power to protect (1) law enforcers from the
injury that may be inflicted on them by a person they have
lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence from being destroyed by the
arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and
the integrity of the evidence under the control and within the
reach of the arrestee.
In People v. Valeroso,14 this Court had the occasion to reiterate
the permissible reach of a valid warrantless search and seizure
incident to a lawful arrest, viz:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer
to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapon that
the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.
Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the
arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the
arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the
arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or
destruction.
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right
of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not
only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible
area within the latter’s reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest
allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on
the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate
control. The phrase "within the area of his immediate control"
means the area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a drawer
in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the
arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person
arrested. (Citations omitted.)
In Valeroso, however, the Court held that the evidence searched
and seized from him could not be used against him because they
were discovered in a room, different from where he was being
detained, and was in a locked cabinet. Thus, the area searched
could not be considered as one within his immediate control that
he could take any weapon or destroy any evidence against him.15
In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in
Calantiao’s possession and within his immediate control. He
could have easily taken any weapon from the bag or dumped it to
destroy the evidence inside it. As the black bag containing the
marijuana was in Calantiao’s possession, it was within the
permissible area that the apprehending officers could validly
conduct a warrantless search.
Calantiao’s argument that the marijuana cannot be used as
evidence against him because its discovery was in violation of
the Plain View Doctrine, is misplaced.
The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the
inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspect’s person and
premises under his immediate control. This is so because
"[o]bjects in the ‘plain view’ of an officer who has the right to be
in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence."16 "The doctrine is usually applied where
a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused,
but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object x x x. [It] serves to supplement the prior justification –
whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search
incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for
being present unconnected with a search directed against the
accused – and permits the warrantless seizure."17
The Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in Calantiao’s
situation because the police officers purposely searched him
upon his arrest. The police officers did not inadvertently come
across the black bag, which was in Calantiao’s possession; they
deliberately opened it, as part of the search incident to
Calantiao’s lawful arrest.
Inventory and Chain of
Custody of Evidence
Calantiao claims that even if the search and seizure were validly
effected, the marijuana is still inadmissible as evidence against
him for failure of the apprehending officers to comply with the
rules on chain of custody, as the item was marked at the police
station.18
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 9165 provide as
follows:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized,
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of
the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
Its Implementing Rules and Regulations state:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of
all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph
shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of
the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case
of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]
(Emphasis supplied.)
This Court has held that the failure to strictly comply with Section
21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, such as immediately
marking seized drugs, will not automatically impair the integrity of
chain of custody because what is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of
the guilt or innocence of the accused.19
Section 21 and its IRR do not even mention "marking." What they
require are (1) physical inventory, and (2) taking of photographs.
As this Court held in People v. Ocfemia20:
What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not
expressly specify is the matter of "marking" of the seized items in
warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence seized upon
apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and
photography when these activities are undertaken at the police
station rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the
"chain of custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized
items – to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the
chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence – should be
done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2)
immediately upon confiscation.
The prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the
seized marijuana from the time the police officers confiscated it,
to the time it was turned over to the investigating officer, up to the
time it was brought to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination.21 This Court has no reason to overrule the RTC and
the Court of Appeals, which both found the chain of custody of
the seized drugs to have not been broken so as to render the
marijuana seized from Calantiao inadmissible in evidence.
Furthermore, unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill
will, or tampering of the evidence, the presumption that the
integrity of the evidence has been preserved will remain. The
burden of showing the foregoing to overcome the presumption
that the police officers handled the seized drugs with regularity,
and that they properly discharged their duties is on Calantiao.
Unfortunately, Calantiao failed to discharge such burden.22
It is worthy to note that these arguments were only raised by
Calantiao on his appeal. He himself admits this.23 His theory, from
the very beginning, was that he did not do it, and that he was
being framed for having offended the police officers. Simply put,
his defense tactic was one of denial and frame-up. However,
those defenses have always been frowned upon by the Court, to
wit:
The defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed
by this Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a
common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation
of Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defenses of
denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing
evidence. In the cases before us, appellant failed to present
sufficient evidence in support of his claims. Aside from his self-
serving assertions, no plausible proof was presented to bolster
his allegations.24

Hence, as Calantiao failed to show clear and convincing evidence

that the apprehending officers were stirred by illicit motive or
failed to properly perform their duties, their testimonies deserve
full faith and credit.25

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby AFFIRMS

the January 17, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 04069.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199689 March 12, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
HERMANOS CONSTANTINO, JR. y BINAYUG, a.k.a.
"JOJIT," Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This appeal challenges the Decision1 dated July 29, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03353, affirming the
Decision2 dated April 15, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (R TC),
Branch 5 of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, in Criminal Case No.
10516, which found accused-appellant Hermanos Constantino, Jr.
y Binayug, a.k.a. "Jojit" (Constantino), guilty of the crime of illegal
sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly known
as shabu, under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.
The Information3 filed before the R TC charged Constantino, as
follows:
That on January 20, 2005, in the City of Tuguegarao, Province of
Cagayan and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without authority of law and without
permit to sell, transport, deliver and distribute dangerous drugs,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell,
transport, distribute and deliver two (2) heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachets containing 0.14 gram of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu", a dangerous drug to
a member of the PNP, Tuguegarao City who acted as a poseur-
buyer; that after receiving the two (2) plastic sachets, the poseur-
buyer simultaneously handed to the accused the marked money
consisting of one (1) piece of FIVE HUNDRED PESO BILL
(₱500.00) with Serial No. Q₱278070 and five (5) pieces of ONE
HUNDRED PESO BILL with Serial Nos. SM989053, PS724429,
XM484584, BB048002, and EK6900025 or a total of ₱1,000.00 and
this led to the apprehension of the accused and the confiscation
of the dangerous drug together with the buy-bust money by the
said apprehending law enforcers of the Tuguegarao City Police
Station who formed the buy bust team in coordination with the
PDEA.
When arraigned on July 8, 2005, Constantino pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged.4 Thereafter, pre-trial and trial on the merits
ensued.
Evidence for the prosecution presented the following version of
events:
On January 20, 2005, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, Police
Superintendent (P/Supt.) Mariano Rodriguez (Rodriquez), the
Chief of Police of Tuguegarao City, received a report from a
confidential informant (CI) that a certain Jojit was selling illegal
drugs in the said city. P/Supt.
Rodriguez immediately formed a buy-bust group composed of
Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Noel Taguiam (Taguiam), SPO2
Alexander Tamang (Tamang), SPO1 Arthur Blaquera (Blaquera),
Police Officer (PO) 3 Edwin Hernandez (Hernandez), and PO3
Rolando Domingo (Domingo). PO3 Domingo was designated as
the poseur-buyer. The buy-bust money, consisting of one ₱500.00
bill and five ₱100.00 bills, were dusted with fluorescent powder
and their respective serial numbers were recorded in the police
blotter.5
Around 8:00 in the evening of the same day, the team proceeded
to Reynovilla St., Caritan Centro, Tuguegarao City, the place
where, according to the CI, Jojit was selling shabu. PO3 Domingo
positioned himself beside a street light while the rest of the team
hid behind a nearby concrete fence. After waiting for about 45
minutes, Constantino arrived on board a tricycle. PO3 Domingo
recognized Constantino as the Jojit described by the CI. PO3
Domingo approached Constantino and asked him if he was Jojit.
When Constantino replied in the affirmative, PO3 Domingo next
asked, "Mayroon ka bang stuff?" ("Do you have stuff?") In
response, Constantino inquired of PO3 Domingo how much he
wanted to buy. PO3 Domingo said he wanted to buy ₱1,000.00
worth of shabu, simultaneously handing over the buy-bust money
to Constantino, who, in turn, handed two plastic sachets to PO3
Domingo. Thereupon, PO3 Domingo turned his cap backwards,
the pre-arranged signal for the consummated sale. Upon seeing
the signal, the other members of the buy-bust team approached
the scene at once and arrested Constantino, from whom SPO2
Taguiam recovered the buy-bust money.6
Thereafter, Constantino was brought to the police station where
the recovered drugs and money were turned over to the
investigator, SPO2 Tamang.7 The recovered drugs were then
marked with the initials "A-1" and "A-2." The incident was
recorded in the police blotter with an inventory of the recovered
drugs and money.8
Later that evening, at around ten o’clock, P/Supt. Rodriguez and
SPO2 Tamang submitted to the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory Services, Camp Marcelo Adduru, Tuguegarao
City, a request for laboratory examination of two plastic sachets
with white crystalline substance marked as "A-1" and "A-2" to
determine the presence of dangerous drugs;9 as well as both
hands of Constantino, one piece ₱500.00 bill, and five pieces
₱100.00 bills, to determine the presence of the ultra violet
powder.10 Per Chemistry Report No. D-08-200511 and Physical
Identification Report No. PI-04-2005,12 prepared by Police Senior
Inspector (P/SInsp.) Mayra Matote Madria,13 Forensic Chemist, the
contents of the two plastic sachets tested positive for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride; while the other specimens
tested positive for the presence of bright-yellow ultraviolet
fluorescent powder.
Constantino denied the accusation against him and asserted that
he was merely framed-up.
According to Constantino, at around 8:00 in the evening on
January 20, 2005, he was enjoying a joyride with his friend, Jeff
Abarriao, on the latter’s motorcycle, within the vicinity of Caritan
Centro. After 30 minutes, Constantino decided to go home. While
walking along Reyno or Reynovilla St., two vehicles suddenly
stopped, one in front and the other behind him. Five men, all in
civilian clothes, alighted from the two vehicles. Two of the men
held Constantino’s hands, while another poked a gun at him,
asking him where he came from and ordering him to bring out the
shabu. Constantino answered that he did not know what the men
were talking about. The men then forced Constantino into one of
the vehicles. Inside the vehicle, one of the men frisked and
searched Constantino, and told him that he was being arrested
for selling shabu. The men, who were now apparently police
officers, brought Constantino to the Tuguegarao City Police
Station. At the police station, the police officers took
Constantino’s cellphone and wallet. Also at the police station, one
of the arresting police officers brought out two pieces of plastic
sachets and money and turned it over to one of his companions.
At around 9:30 in the evening, the police officers brought
Constantino to the PNP Crime Laboratory, but nothing happened
because he heard that the person who was supposed to conduct
the examination was not around, so, Constantino was brought
back to the police station.14
The following day, January 21, 2005, the police officers again
brought Constantino to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Along the way,
one of the police escorts forced Constantino to hold a certain
amount of money. Constantino tried to resist but he could not
really do anything because he was handcuffed. After his
examination, Constantino was detained and was told that he was
suspected of selling shabu.
The RTC promulgated its Decision on April 15, 2008, finding
Constantino guilty as charged. The trial court rejected the
arguments of the defense, thus:
1. The Prosecution failed to give a detailed account of the
arrangement with the accused for the purchase of the shabu.
The Court’s response: The testimony of PO3 Domingo was
detailed enough, corroborated by other witnesses. It is the
defense that has failed to show in what crucial detail the
prosecution’s account is wanting.
1 He went on a joy-ride that night with his friend aboard
a motorcycle;
2 Tiring, he alighted and started to walk along Reyno
Villa Street;
3 He was accosted by police officers who, at the time, he
did not know to be police officers;
4 They took him to the police station and produced the
sachets;

2. The police officers categorically admitted that they did not

5 Next day, while on the way to the Crime Lab, they
personally know the accused until they were at the alleged place
forced him to hold marked bills, although he was cuffed.
of transaction.

All told, it is a story that is meant to endeavor to explain the

The Court’s response: Substantive law does not require this; the
circumstances around the accused’s arrest and apprehension.
rules of evidence do not. Did they know he was Jojit? Yes, from
For one thing, it is self-serving; for another, we are not told any
the description given the informant. Domingo asked whether he
reason why the police officers should have wanted to apprehend
was Jojit. He answered "Yes".
him – a supposedly guiltless man; third, the Court never heard
the testimony of his friend with whom he was supposed to have
3. The arresting officers failed to comply with the requirements of had a joy-ride that night. In sum, his story does not convince this
Article II, Section 21 of R.A. 9165 that requires that an inventory Court.15(Citations omitted.)
be taken and that photographs be taken of the items seized.
The RTC imposed the following sentence upon Constantino:
The Court’s comment: The Police Blotter Entry No. 0270
enumerates the items seized. This, the Court holds to be
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond
substantial compliance. Even assuming, without admitting, that
reasonable doubt of Violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165 and
not all the requirements may not have been complied with, these
sentences him to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a
omissions do not operate to exclude the evidence nor to cause
fine of ₱500,000.00.16
suppression thereof. They are directory, not mandatory
provisions.
Maintaining his innocence, Constantino appealed to the Court of
Appeals, arguing that:
4. The chain of custody was not established with certainty.

1. The trial court gravely erred in giving full credence to

The Court’s comment: The chain is not difficult to trace, and has
been established by evidence, thus:
a. Exhibit "B": The police blotter recording that on 20
January 2005 at 2100 hours, mentioning the two sachets
of shabu which according to the blotter the accused
admitted he handed over to Domingo; Domingo had
testified that the markings A-1 NBT and A-2 NBT were
placed on the sachets by Investigator Alexander
Tamang;
b. Exhibit "F": Dated January 20, 2005, a request to the
PNP Crime Lab Services for the examination of "two
plastic sachet (sic) with white crystalline substance
marked A1 and A2";
c. Exhibit "D": Chemistry Report No. D-08-2005
completed 21 January 2005 reporting a qualitative
examination of the contents of two heat-sealed sachets
marked as A1 NBT and A2 NBT and identifying the
substance as "Methamphetamine Hydrochloride".
5. There was no prior coordination with PDEA.
The Court’s response: None was needed. Exhibit "H" clearly
evidences that SPO1 Blaquera was authorized to conduct anti-
drug operations. Domingo also answered the question about
coordination with PDEA when he testified: "During that time 3
representatives of the Intelligence Operatives were deputized in
the PDEA in the persons of Noel Taguiam, Arthur Blaquera and
the Chief of Police."
Hermanos testified in his behalf and his testimony can be
reduced to the following story:
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses despite the
patent irregularities in the conduct of the buy-bust
operation.
2. The trial court gravely erred in convicting accused-
appellant despite the prosecution’s failure to establish
that chain of custody of the drug specimens allegedly
confiscated from the accused-appellant.
3. The trial court gravely erred in convicting the
accused-appellant despite the prosecution’s failure to
establish the identity of the prohibited drugs
constituting the corpus delicti of the offense.
In its Decision dated July 29, 2011, the Court of Appeals affirmed
in toto the judgment of conviction of the RTC against
Constantino. The appellate court held that Constantino’s defense
of frame-up was not worthy of credence as his version of the
incident was not at all corroborated.
Constantino was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu to PO3
Domingo, who acted as the poseur-buyer, therefore, he was
legally arrested without a warrant. The appellate court also found
that the chain of custody of the shabu had been preserved from
the time said drugs were confiscated from Constantino to the
time the same drugs were delivered to the crime laboratory and
thereafter retrieved and presented as evidence before the trial
court. Lastly, the appellate court stressed that between the
positive and categorical declarations of the prosecution
witnesses, on one hand, and the unsubstantial denial or negative
statements of the appellant, on the other hand, the former
generally prevails; and that negative averments, unsubstantiated
by clear and convincing evidence, deserve no weight in law,
especially vis-a-vis the time-tested presumption of regularity of
performance of official duty on the part of the apprehending
officers.
In the end, the Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Tuguegarao City, Branch 5, dated 15 April 2008, in Criminal Case
No. 10516, is AFFIRMED.17
Consequently, Constantino comes before this Court seeking the
reversal of his conviction by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals.
In his Supplemental Brief, Constantino contests his conviction,
averring inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, particularly, on the circumstances of the marking of
the two plastic sachets containing shabu allegedly confiscated
from him. Different people claim to have made the marking "NBT"
on the two plastic sachets and gave various explanations as to
what the initials "NBT" stand for. In short, Constantino argues
that the prosecution failed to establish a crucial link in the chain
of custody of the shabu in this case.
The appeal is impressed with merit.
Admittedly, denial is an inherently weak defense, consistently
viewed with disfavor by the courts, being a self-serving negative
evidence. In view, however, of the constitutional presumption that
an accused is innocent until the contrary is proven beyond
reasonable doubt, the burden lies on the prosecution to
overcome such presumption by presenting the required quantum
of evidence. In so doing, the prosecution must rest on its own
merits and must not rely on the weakness of the defense.18
In a prosecution for the sale of a dangerous drug, the following
elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor. Simply put, "[in]
prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu, what is material is the proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence."19 And in
the prosecution of these offenses, the primary consideration is to
ensure that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs and
other related articles have been preserved from the time they
were confiscated from the accused until their presentation as
evidence in court.20
Article II, Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 lays down the
procedure to be followed in the seizure and custody of dangerous
drugs:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized,
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of
the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
Article II, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165 describes in more
detail how the foregoing procedure is to be applied:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of
all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph
shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of
the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case
of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]
While police officers are enjoined to strictly comply with the
procedure prescribed by law, the IRR also explicitly excuses non-
compliance under justifiable grounds, but only if the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items have been properly
preserved by the apprehending officers. The integrity and
evidentiary value of seized items are properly preserved for as
long as the chain of custody of the same are duly established.
Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, series
of 2002,21 defines "chain of custody" as follows:
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals
or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of
each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized
item shall include the identity and signature of the person who
held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time
when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final
disposition.
In Mallillin v. People,22 the Court discussed how the chain of
custody of seized items is established:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule
requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what
the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about
every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up
to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every
person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from
whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while
in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received
and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the
chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions
taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of
the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same. (Citations omitted.)
Thus, the following links must be established in the chain of
custody in a buy-bust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turn over of the illegal drug
seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
third, the turn over by the investigating officer of the illegal drug
to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the
turn over and submission of the marked illegal drugs seized from
the forensic chemist to the court.23
After a careful scrutiny of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, the Court finds glaring inconsistencies affecting the
integrity of the shabu purportedly confiscated from Constantino.
The inconsistent testimonies of PO3 Domingo, PO3 Hernandez,
and P/SInsp. Tulauan as to who, when, and where the two plastic
sachets of shabu were marked lead the Court to question whether
the two plastic sachets of shabu identified in court were the very
same ones confiscated from Constantino. The doubtful markings
already broke the chain of custody of the seized shabu at a very
early stage.
To recall, the first crucial link in the chain of custody is seizure
and marking of the illegal drug. In this case, PO3 Domingo, as
poseur-buyer, received two plastic sachets of shabu from
Constantino in exchange for ₱1,000. However, PO3 Domingo
himself did not put any markings on the two plastic sachets of
shabu. Instead, upon arrival of the buy-bust team with
Constantino at the police station, PO3 Domingo turned over the
two plastic sachets of shabu to the investigator, SPO2 Tamang,
who was also a member of the buy-bust team. PO3 Domingo
testified that it was SPO2 Tamang who put the marking "NBT" on
the said sachets of shabu. Below are the excerpts from PO3
Domingo’s testimony:
Q If that plastic sachets which was sold to you by Hermanos
Constantino is shown to you will you be able to identify the
same?
A Yes, ma’am.
Q How were you able to identify the plastic sachets?
A There is an initials (sic), ma’am.
Q What initials are you referring to?
A A-1 initial NBT and A-2 initial NBT.
Q Who placed those initials in the plastic sachets?
A The Investigator, ma’am.
Q And who is the investigator?
A Alexander Tamang, ma’am.
Q Where did he place those initials?
A In the police station after the apprehension, ma’am.24 (Emphasis
supplied.)
However, PO3 Hernandez, another member of the buy-bust team,
categorically pointed to SPO2 Taguiam, also a member of the
buy-bust team, as the one who put the marking "NBT" on the
plastic sachets upon the team’s return to the police station, thus:
PROS. NICOLAS:
Q During the buy bust operation you stated that the accused
handed to the poseur buyer in the person of PO3 Rolando
Domingo two plastic sachets containing as you claimed
methamphetamine hydrochloride, have you seen these plastic
sachets at that time when they handed to PO3 Rolando Domingo?
A Yes, sir.
Q If these two plastic sachets will be shown to you again today
will you be able to tell that these two plastic sachets were the
same plastic sachets that were handed by the accused to PO3
Rolando Domingo?
A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to you these two plastic sachets kindly tell us if
these are the plastic sachets that were handed to PO3 Rolando
Domingo?
A These are the ones, sir.
Q Why do you say that these are the two plastic sachets handed
by the accused?
A Because I was there and I saw the accused handed the two
plastic sachets to PO3 Rolando Domingo, sir.
Q Why do you know that these are the same plastic sachets?
A These are the ones, sir.
Q Mr. Witness, there are markings on these two plastic sachets,
do you know whose markings are these?
xxxx
A It was Noel B. Taguiam, sir.
The witness is pointing to the marking NBT partly hidden.
COURT:
Q Who is Noel B. Taguiam?
A A member of the buy bust team also, sir.
PROS. NICOLAS:
Q You stated this NBT was placed by one Noel B. Taguiam, why
do you know that he was the one who placed this?
A Because I was present during that time when he placed his
initial, sir.
Q Do you know when this Noel B. Taguiam placed those initials
on those two plastic sachets?
A After we conducted the buy bust operation, sir.
Q How soon Noel B. Taguiam placed those initials after the
conduct of the buy bust operation?
A After a few hours, sir.
Q Where did he place those initials?
A In our office, sir.25 (Emphasis supplied.)
To complicate things even further, P/SInsp Tulauan,26 the
Forensic Chemist, also declared before the trial court that the
marking "NBT" on the two plastic sachets of shabu were made by
SPO3 Nelson B. Tamaray (Tamaray), the duty officer who received
the specimens at the crime laboratory. P/SInsp. Tulauan testified:
PROS. ISRAEL:
Q When you received these two specimens Madam Witness, will
you please tell us the physical appearance of these items when
you received the same?
A They were heat-sealed and with markings "A-1" and "A-2," your
Honor.
B And will you please point to us these markings "A-1" and "A-2"
when you received these items Madam Witness?
A This is the markings "A-1" and "A-2," Ma’am.
INTERPRETER:
The witness is pointing to the markings "A-1" and "A-2" with the
use of a black pentel pen.
PROS. ISRAEL:
Q There is another marking in this plastic sachet Madam Witness
marked as NBT, what is this marking all about?
A That is the marking of SPO3 Nelson B. Tamaray, Ma’am.
Q Is he authorized to make the necessary marking which was
requested to be examined Madam Witness?
A Yes, Ma’am because he is the one who received the specimen
from the one who deliver it, Ma’am.
Q In this second plastic sachet Madam Witness which you
identified earlier, that there is a marking "A-1," there is another
marking NBT, what is this marking all about Madam Witness?
A That is the marking of SPO3 Nelson B. Tamaray,
Ma’am.27 (Emphases supplied.)
On cross-examination, P/SInsp. Tulauan confirmed her previous
declaration that SPO3 Tamaray had claimed making the marking
on the sachets of shabu:
Atty. Aquino
Madam Witness, with respect to that marking made which are
"A1" and "A-2", they are not your markings, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q And with respect also to that NBT marked and placed in that
exhibit which you have earlier identified, you did not see this duty
officer placed his markings thereon, is it not?
A Yes sir but I asked him who placed that marking and he said
that he was the one who placed the initial NBT, sir.28
The Court already emphasized in People v. Zakaria29 the
importance of marking the seized item right after seizure:
Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the
seized dangerous drugs or other related items immediately after
they are seized from the accused, for the marking upon seizure is
the starting point in the custodial link that succeeding handlers of
the evidence will use as reference point. Moreover, the value of
marking of the evidence is to separate the marked evidence from
the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time of
seizure from the accused until disposition at the end of criminal
proceedings, obviating switching, "planting" or contamination of
evidence. A failure to mark at the time of taking of initial custody
imperils the integrity of the chain of custody that the law
requires.1âwphi1 (Citation omitted.)
Herein, the prosecution is completely silent as to why PO3
Domingo, the poseur-buyer, despite having immediate custody of
the two plastic sachets of shabu purchased from Constantino,
failed to immediately mark the seized drugs before turning over
the custody of the same to another police officer. This lapse in
procedure opened the door for confusion and doubt as to the
identity of the drugs actually seized from Constantino during the
buy-bust and the ones presented before the trial court, especially
considering that three different people, during the interval,
supposedly received and marked the same. To clarify the matter,
the prosecution could have presented as witness either SPO2
Tamang or SPO2 Taguiam to directly validate the marking in
court, but unfortunately, the prosecution chose to dispense with
the testimonies of both officers. This omission diminished the
importance of the markings as the reference point for the
subsequent handling of the evidence. As a consequence, an
objective person could now justifiably suspect the shabu
ultimately presented as evidence in court to be planted or
contaminated.30
The failure of the prosecution to establish the evidence’s chain of
custody is fatal to its case as the Court can no longer consider or
even safely assume that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated dangerous drug were properly preserved.31
In light of the foregoing, Constantino is acquitted of the crime
charged, not because the Court accords credence to his defense
of frame-up, but because the prosecution failed to discharge its
burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated July
29, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03353,
affirming the Decision dated April 15, 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 5 of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, in Criminal Case
No. 10516, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Hermanos
Constantino, Jr. y Binayug, a.k.a. "Jojit," is ACQUITTED for failure
of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
and is ORDERED to be immediately released from detention
unless he is confined for another lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
[ GR No. 212171, Sep 07, 2016 ]
PEOPLE v. MERCURY DELA CRUZ ALIAS 'DEDAY
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
We resolve the appeal, filed by accused-appellant Mercury Dela
Cruz alias "Deday," from the 27 September 2013 Decision [1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01103.
[2]
In a Decision dated 27 November 2008, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 58, Cebu City, found the accused-appellant guilty
of illegal sale of shabu under Sections 5, Article II of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9165[3] and sentenced him to suffer the penalty life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
The RTC gave full credence to the testimonies of Senior Police
Officer (SPO) 2 Alejandro Batobalanos, Police Officer (PO) 1
Angsgar Babyboy A. Reales, and PO1 Leopoldo Bullido who
conducted the buy-bust operation against the accused-appellant,
and rejected the self-serving defenses of denial and alibi of
accused-appellant and her live-in partner. The RTC noted that the
categorical affirmation of accused-appellant and her live-in
partner that the arresting officers did not demand anything from
them in exchange for the accused-appellant's liberty created the
presumption that the arresting officers were performing their
official functions regularly.[4]
On intermediate appellate review, the CA affirmed in toto the
RTC's ruling. The CA agreed with the RTC in giving weight to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, and held that the
arresting officers complied with the proper procedure in the
custody and disposition of the seized drugs.
Our Ruling
We dismiss the appeal and affirm the accused-appellant's guilt.
We find no reason to reverse the RTC's findings, as affirmed by
the CA. In the same manner as the lower courts, we give full
credit to the positive, spontaneous and straightforward
testimonies of the police officers pointing to accused-appellant as
the seller and possessor of the confiscated shabu.
We have consistently held that in order to secure a conviction for
illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it is necessary that the
prosecution is able to establish the following essential elements:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale
and its consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and its
payment. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti as evidence. The delivery of the illicit drug to
the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked
money successfully consummate the buy-bust
transaction.[5] Here, all the aforesaid elements necessary for
accused-appellant's prosecution have been sufficiently complied
with, indubitably establishing that she has indeed committed the
crime. PO1 Reales testified in detail how he was introduced by the
confidential informant to accused-appellant. The confidential
informant, thereafter, manifested to the accused-appellant their
intention to buy worth P200.00. Upon giving the accused-
appellant the 2 marked P100.00 bills, she, in return, handed to
PO1 Reales a small plastic containing white crystalline
substance. The plastic sachet later on tested positive for the
presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride. The testimony
given by PO1 Reales was corroborated by SPO1 Batobalonos and
PO1 Bullido in all material details. It is therefore clear beyond any
shadow of doubt that the buy-bust operation had been
substantially completed and consummated. The fact that
accused-appellant was able to evade the arrest immediately after
the sale and that she was arrested only after, by virtue of a
warrant of arrest, did not change the fact that the crime she
committed earlier had been consummated.
We agree with the lower courts that in the absence of any intent
or ill-motive on the part of the police officers to falsely impute
commission of a crime against the accused-appellant, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is
entitled to great respect and deserves to prevail over the bare,
uncorroborated denial and self-serving claim of the accused of
frame-up.[6]
Also, we reject the appellant's contention that the police officers
failed to comply with the provisions of Section 21, paragraph 1 of
R.A. No. 9165,[7] which provides for the procedure in the custody
and disposition of seized drugs.
After a careful perusal of the records, we agree with the CA that
the prosecution had established the unbroken chain of custody
over the seized drugs. This was established through the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, to wit: "At around 7:15
o'clock in the evening of November 10, 2006, PO3 Batobalonos,
PO1 Reales, PO1 Bullido and their civilian asset proceeded to
Sitio Cogon, A. Lopez St., Barangay Labangon. When the team
went inside the interior portion of Sitio Cogon, PO1 Reales
together with the civilian asset approached the house of Dela
Cruz, while PO3 Batobalonos and PO1 Bullido were strategically
hidden more or less ten (10) meters away. The civilian asset
called Dela Cruz and told her that they will buy shabu worth
P200.00. Thereafter, Dela Cruz handed PO1 Reales a small plastic
containing white crystalline substance and in exchange he
handed to the former the P200.00 bills. Upon getting hold of the
money, PO3 Batobalonos and PO1 Bullido, who saw the
consummation of the transaction rushed to the scene. When PO3
Batobalonos got hold of Dela Cruz, the latter shouted for help and
resisted arrest. Dela Cruz was able to run and so the team chased
her, however, her neighbor Arthur Tabasa Ortega ("Ortega")
blocked their way. The team introduced themselves as policemen
but Ortega did not listen, so PO3 Batobalonos fired a warning
shot as the people likewise started to gather around them.
Meanwhile, Dela Cruz was able to evade arrest. The team then
arrested Ortega for obstruction of justice.
On their way to the police station aboard their patrol car, PO1
Reales handed to PO3 Batobalonos the small plastic containing
white crystalline substance which he purchased from Dela Cruz.
Thereafter, upon arrival at the police station, PO3 Batobalonos
marked the seized item with "DDM 11/10/06."
Afterwards, a Request for Laboratory Examination of the seized
item was prepared by PO3 Batobalonos. The Request and the
seized item were delivered to the Regional Crime Laboratory
Office-7, Camp Sotero Cabahug, Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City by
PO1 Reales at around 1:10 o'clock in the morning of November
11, 2006.
Thereafter Forensic Chemist PCI Salinas issued Chemistry Report
No. D-1771-2006,"[8] with the finding that the specimen gave
positive result for the presence of Methamphetamine
hydrochloride.[9]
The confiscated dangerous drug which also constitutes
the corpus delicti of the crime was validly considered by the
courts in arriving at the decision despite the fact that the forensic
chemist who examined it did not testify in court. The relevant
portion of the RTC decision reads:
The presentation of the testimony of Forensic chemist PSI
MUTCHIT G. SALINAS was dispensed with, the defense
having ADMITTED: the existence of the Letter Request dated
November 10, 2006 from the PNP Station 10; the existence of one
(1) small plastic pack containing white crystalline substance
which is the subject for examination, however DENIED as to the
ownership of said evidence; the existence and due execution of
the Chemistry Report No. D-1771-2006 executed by witness
Mutchit G. Salinas; that the intended witness is and expert
witness who examined the specimen found to contain the
presence of Methylamphetamine hydrochloride locally known as
shabu, a dangerous drug.[10]
Anent accused-appellant's contention that the drugs were marked
not at the place where she was apprehended but at the police
station and that there was no physical inventory made on the
seized item nor was it photographed, we find the same untenable.
The alleged non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was
not fatal to the prosecution's case because the apprehending
team properly preserved the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized drugs.[11]
Relevant to the instant case is the procedure to be followed in the
custody and handling of the seized dangerous drugs as outlined
in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 9165, which states:
The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved
unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the
evidence has been tampered with. Accused-appellant bears the
burden of showing that the evidence was tampered or meddled
with in order to overcome the presumption of regularity in the
handling of exhibits by public officers and the presumption that
public officers properly discharged their duties.[17] Accused-
appellant in this case failed to present any plausible reason to
impute ill motive on the part of the arresting officers. Thus, the
testimonies of the apprehending officers deserve full faith and
credit.[18] In fact, accused-appellant did not even question the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses. She simply anchored her
defense on denial and alibi.
We affirm the penalties imposed as they are well within the
ranges provided by law. Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
prescribes a penalty of life imprisonment to death[19] and a fine
ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 for the sale of any
dangerous drug, regardless of the quantity or purity involved.

WHEREFORE, the decision dated 27 September 2013 of the Court

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01103 is hereby AFFIRMED.
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph
shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of
the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case
of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]

The last part of the aforequoted issuance provided the exception

to the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165. Although ideally the prosecution should offer a
perfect chain of custody in the handling of evidence, "substantial
compliance with the legal requirements on the handling of the
seized item" is sufficient.[12] This Court has consistently ruled that
even if the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with the
requirements under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, such procedural
lapse is not fatal and will not render the items seized inadmissible
in evidence.[13] What is of utmost importance is the preservation
of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the
same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.[14] In other words, to be admissible in
evidence, the prosecution must be able to present through
records or testimony, the whereabouts of the dangerous drugs
from the time these were seized from the accused by the arresting
officers; turned-over to the investigating officer; forwarded to the
laboratory for determination of their composition; and up to the
time these are offered in evidence. For as long as the chain of
custody remains unbroken, as in this case, even though the
procedural requirements provided for in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165
were not faithfully observed, the guilt of the accused will not be
affected.[15]

In the instant case, the failure to strictly comply with the

requirements of Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was satisfactorily
explained by the apprehending officers. They testified that a
commotion erupted when accused-appellant resisted and
shouted for help while she was being arrested. The commotion
eventually gave accused-appellant the opportunity to run and
elude arrest. The arresting officers further alleged that the people
who gathered around them were already aggressive prompting
them to decide to immediately proceed to the police station for
their safety.[16] In fact, the arresting officers even had to fire a
warning shot and arrest Arthur Tabasa Ortega, the person who
intervened in the arrest of accused-appellant, in order for them to
pacify the people around them.