STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (Case Digests and Doctrines)
Professor: ASG Sarah Jane T. Fernandez
Caltex (Philippines), Inc. vs Palomar
18 SCRA 247
FACTS: For privilege to participate, no fee or consideration is required
to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products required to be made.
Foreseeing the extensive use of mails, petitioner sought clearance from
the Postal Authorities justifying that the contest does not violate the
Anti-Lottery provisions of the Postal Law. The Post Master, herein
respondent, declined to grant the request. A reconsideration was made
but was declined as well, on the ground that “though it does not
involve consideration, it is classified as gift enterprise” and threatened
petitioner that if it pursued with the contest, a Fraud Order would be
issued against them. Petitioner then filed before the trial court a
Petition for Declaratory Relief against respondent, praying that the
contest be declared not violative of the Postal Law. Trial court grants
the petition. Hence, this appeal.
HELD: Trial court’s decision affirmed. For a scheme to be considered a
lottery, it must have the elements of: (1) consideration, (2) prize, and
(3) CHANCE. The contest does not have the first element. In a gift
enterprise, a “purchaser” is given a chance to win, thus, consideration is
still essential. The contest falls under gratuitous distribution of property
by chance.
RCBC vs IAC
320 SCRA 279
FACTS: BF Homes filed before the SEC a Petition for Rehabilitation and
for Declaration of Suspension of Payments on September 1984. On
October 1984, petitioner, one of the former’s creditors, requested the
sheriff to foreclose its real estate mortgage. A TRO was issued then; the
auction was re-scheduled on January 1985. After the sale, delivery was
suspended by the SEC. On March 1985, the SEC appointed a
Management Committee. Petitioner filed a Writ of Mandamus before
the trial court for the delivery of the titles, which was granted. BF
Homes sought for annulment of judgment invoking PD 902-A before
the IAC, which was granted. Hence, this petition.
HELD: Petition granted. PD 902-A is clear and unambiguous. When a
Management Committee ** is appointed, all actions for claims ** shall
be suspended accordingly. Said PD applies, not on the filing of the
Petition, but on the appointment of a Management Committee.
RATIONALE: Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more
meanings, of being understood in more than one way, or of referring to
two or more things at the same time.
China Banking Corp. vs Ortega
49 SCRA 355
FACTS: The case of Vicente Acaban vs B&B Forest development Corp
was ruled in favor of the plaintiff. To satisfy the decision, it required
garnishment of the bank deposit of the defendant from China Banking
Corp, herein petitioner. The bank’s cashier invokes RA 1405 which
prohibits disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits.
Nevertheless, he was still directed to comply, otherwise he will be
arrested. Hence, this petition.
HELD: Petition denied. In the discussion of the conference committee
regarding RA 1405, it was not the intention of the lawmakers to place
bank deposits beyond reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment.
Moreover, the garnishment was not to examine but just to inform the
court W.O.N. B&B had a deposit in that bank.
Regalado vs Yulo
61 Phil. 173
FACTS: Petitioner is a Justice of the Peace of Molinao. Upon reaching 65
years of age, with the instructions from the Secretary of Justice, he was
replaced by Esteban Villar. Petitioner surrendered under protest.
Petitioner insists that Sec. 203 of the Administrative Code is clear, thus,
needs no interpretation.
HELD: Petition granted. At the time Act 3899 took effect, petitioner was
one of the present Justices of the Peace. On November 1931, when the
Act took effect, petitioner was not yet 65 years old thereby excluding
him from the phrase “have completed 65 years of age”. On January
1933, petitioner had not yet turned 65 years old as well. Petitioner only
turned 65 on September 1934, thus, petitioner could not be included
under the said law which requires Justices of the Peace (65 years of age
or turning 65) to cease to hold office on January 1933.
Matabuena vs Cervantes
38 SCRA 284
Felix Matabuena and Petronila Cervantes entered into a common-law
relationship, during which a donation was made between them on
February 1956. Subsequently on March 1956, they were married. Not
too long, Felix died intestate. Petitioner, Felix’ sister, then sought to
annul the donation made under Article 133 considering donations
between spouses during the marriage as void. The trial court denied on
the ground that donation was made before the marriage. Hence, this
appeal.
HELD: Appeal granted. Common-law relationship, with regards to the
donation in dispute, falls within the prohibition as contrary to public
policy. Omission must be remedied by adherence to its avowed
objective.
RATIONALE: What is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as
what is written.
Cagayan Valley Enterprise, Inc. vs CA
179 SCRA 218
FACTS: La Tondeña, Inc. filed a civil case for Injunction and damages
against petitioner for the use of LTI marked bottles, for its liquor
products sold, without the former’s consent. The trial court dismissed
the case on the ground that LTI had no cause of action due to its
omission of “property of” in its marked bottles. On appeal, the CA
reversed the trial court’s decision and rendered petitioner liable.
Hence, this petition.
HELD: Petition denied. “Names or other marks of ownership” as
provided in RA 623 means: name of the applicant, or his principal or of
the product, or other marks of ownership. The omitted words “property
of” are not of vital indispensability. As for the claim of hard liquor
excluded under the phrase “other lawful beverages”, this refers to all
beverages not prohibited by law. Hard liquor is regulated, not
prohibited. Moreover, the conclusions were supported by the Phil.
Patent Office.
RATIONALE: In Statutory Construction, though not binding, Executive
Construction are entitled to great weight and consideration because
such construction comes from the particular branch of the government
called upon to implement the particular law involved.
Basbacio vs Office of the Secretary of Justice
238 SCRA 5
FACTS: Petitioner and his son-in-law were convicted of frustrated
murder. On appeal, petitioner was acquitted because prosecution failed
to prove conspiracy. Hence, petitioner’s claim for compensation as
provided by RA 7309, which was denied on the ground that it is to be
considered that there is bad blood which finds petitioner “probably
guilty”. On appeal, the Secretary of Justice denied as well on the ground
that petitioner’s acquittal is not based on his innocence but a finding of
reasonable doubt. Hence, this petition.

HELD: Petition denied. Petitioner’s professed canon of construction
omitting “unjustly” is contrary to Sec. 3(a) of RA 7309 which provides
for those unjustly, accused, convicted, imprisoned, then acquitted. The
fact that his conviction is reversed and the accused is then acquitted is
not itself proof that the previous conviction was unjust.
Floresca vs Philex
136 SCRA 142
FACTS: Petitioners are heirs of the victims deceased due to a cave-in
while working for Philex. Not satisfied with the compensation granted
by WCA, petitioners filed before the court a civil case for damages,
which was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction (Workmen
Compensation Committee has sole jurisdiction for labor claims). Hence,
this petition.
HELD: Petition granted. Justice Herrera, in his dissenting opinion,
stressed the exclusivity of the compensation right under the WCA.
RATIONALE: A cardinal rule in interpretation of statutes is that the
meaning and intention of the lawmaking-body must be sought, first, in
the words of the statute itself, read and considered in their natural,
ordinary, commonly-accepted and most obvious significations
according to good and approved usage and without resorting to forced
or subtle construction.
JMM Promotions vs NLRC
228 SCRA 129
FACTS: Respondent dismissed petitioner’s appeal for failure to post
required appeal bond. Petitioner contends that the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion in applying Art. 223 of the Labor Code and
Sec. 6, Rule 6 of the NLRC, regarding appeal bonds, to the decisions
rendered by the POEA.
ISSUE: W.O.N. petitioner is still required to post an appeal bond to the
NLRC having posted a bond as required by the POEA.
HELD: Petition denied. Petitioner is required to post both bonds as
required by the POEA and the NLRC.
RATIONALE: In interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every
part be given effect. Construction that would reneder a provision
inoperative should be avoided, and inconsistent provisions should be
reconciled whenever possible as parts of a harmonious whole.
Bello vs CA
56 SCRA 509
FACTS: Petitioners spouses were charged for estafa before the City
Court of Pasay for allegedly having misappropriated a lady’s ring with a
value of P1000 received by them from Atty. De Guzman for sale on
commission basis. Petitioners appealed before the CFI of Pasay which
ordered the dismissal, instead of elevating such to the CA.
HELD: SC granted relief of Mandamus to compel city court to elevate
appeal to the CA as the proper court. As being within the context and
spirit of Sec. 3 of Rule 50, which provides for certification to proper
court by the CA of appealed cases erroneously brought to it.
RATIONALE: The court cautioned against “narrowly interpreting a
statute as to defeat the purpose of the legislator”. And stressed that “it
is the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes as to avoid such
deplorable result” and that therefore “a literal interpretation is to be
rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results”
Salaria vs. Buenviaje
81 SCRA 722
FACTS: Petitioner had been staying on the land of Cailao as lessee,
agreeing to pay a monthly rent of P6.00 which was later raised to
P10.00 without agreement as to the duration. The land was then sold
to Mendiola for P500, who wrote a letter to petitioner to vacate or a
suit would be filed against him. He failed, thus a complaint for unlawful
detainer was filed in the city court of Iriga on the ground of personal
use of the property by the owners or lessors or their families. The court
ruled in favor of Mendiola. Petitioner invokes Sec. 4 of PD 20 which
suspends Par. 1 of Article 1673 of the Civil Code which provides for
instances when a lessor may judicially eject the lessee: (1) Period
agreed upon, or fixed by Art. 1682 & 1687, expired; (2) Lack of payment
of price stipulated; (3) Violation of conditions; and (4) Devotes to any
use not stipulated. Hence, this appeal.
HELD: SC reversed the decision of the city court. It is clear and explicit
that Sec. 4 of PD 20 suspends Art. 1673 par. 1. The ground relied upon
by the lessor is not one of the causes for judicial ejectment enumerated
in Art. 1673. Moreover, memorandum circular 970 clarifying PD 20 is
given great weight and consideration. Sec. 4 of RA 6126 also suspends
Par. 1 of Article 1673.
RATIONALE: Construction by Executive Branch of government of a
particular law although not binding upon courts must be given great
weight as the construction comes from that branch of government
called upon to implement the law.
City Government of San Pablo Laguna vs Reyes
305 SCRA 353
FACTS: Act. 3648 granted Escudero Electric Service Co. legislative
franchise to maintain and operate in San Pablo and nearby
municipalities, provided: Sec. 10 Tax of 2% of gross earnings due
quarterly. All taxes of any kind expressly exempted. Franchise was then
transferred to Meralco under RA 2340 (PD 551 provided the same). RA
7160, LGC, took effect. It authorizes the province/ city to impose tax at
a rate not exceeding 50% of 1% of the gross annual receipts (Ord. No.
56 of San Pablo provided the same). The city treasurer then demanded
payment in which respondent paid under protest P1.8M. Respondent
sought to declare null and void Ord. No. 56 before the RTC. RTC ruled in
favor of respondent on the ground that the LGC did not expressly/
impliedly repeal the exemption granted. Petitioner contends that the
LGC expressly repealed Act. 3648, RA 2340 and PD 551.
HELD: SC ruled in favor of the petitioner. Meralco’s tax exemption had
been withdrawn by Sec. 137: “Notwithstanding exemptions granted,
province may impose tax” and Sec. 193 “Withdrawal of tax exemption,
except (1) local water districts, (2) cooperatives under RA 6938, and (3)
Non-stock and non-profit hospital and educational institutions…”
RATIONALE: It is the basic precept of statutory construction that the
express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all
others as expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius
People vs Macarandang
106 Phil. 715
FACTS: Respondent was convicted of the crime of illegal possession of
firearms in the CFI of Lanao. On appeal, he admits ownership but
invokes appointment by Governor Dimakuta as “Secret Agent”
HELD: Respondent acquitted. The duty of a secret agent falls within the
category of a peace officer (equivalent to a municipal police) which is
exempt from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to
possess firearms, as provided by Sec. 879 of the Revised Administrative
Code
People vs Mapa
20 SCRA 1164
FACTS: Respondent was convicted of the crime of illegal possession of
firearms. On appeal, he invokes appointment as “secret agent” by
Governor Leviste.
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HELD: Appeal denied. There is no provision made for a “secret agent”.
Those that are not covered by the requirement are “officers, soldiers,
sailors, or marines [AFP], the Philippine Constabulary, guards of Bureau
of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, etc. for use in the
performance of their duties” (Expressly stated)
RATIONALE: Construction and interpretation come only after it has
been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate
without them
People vs Santayana
74 SCRA 25
FACTS: Respondent was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession
of firearms and sentenced for 1 year and 1 day to 2 years, and costs. On
appeal, respondent assigned two errors: (1) the jurisdiction of
municipal court and (2) appointment as “special agent” exempts him.
HELD: Respondent acquitted. The CFI of Manila which equally took
cognizance of this case had jurisdiction, in all criminal cases in which
the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than 6 months or
a fine more than P200.00. Moreover, the doctrine then prevailing is the
case of People vs Macarandang.
Malinias vs COMELEC
390 SCRA 480
FACTS: Petitioners Malinias, a candidate for governor, and Pilando, for
representative, filed a complaint with the COMELEC for violation of Sec.
25 of RA 6646 and Sec. 232 & 261 of BP. 881 against Dominguez,
incumbent congressman, Corpuz, PNP provincial director, and Tangilag,
chief of police. Petitioners alleged that the police checkpoint blocked
them together with their supporters and prevented them to reach the
canvassing area, violating Sec. 25 of RA 6646 which provides for a right
to be present during canvass. Malinias maintains that Corpus and
Tangilag entered the canvassing room, violating Sec. 232 of BP. 881
which provides for persons not allowed inside the canvassing room.
COMELEC pointed out that Sec. 25 of RA 6646 is not included in Sec. 27
of the said RA which specifies election offenses. Second, Sec. 232 is not
explicitly enumerated in Sec. 261 and 262 of BP. 881 which enumerates
other election offenses.
HELD: Petition dismissed. There is no ground to order the COMELEC to
prosecute respondents for alleged violation of Sec. 232 because this is a
non-criminal act under the rule of expressio unius es exclusio alterius
Lung Center of the Philippines vs Quezon City
433 SCRA 119
FACTS: Petitioner is a non-stock and non-profit entity established by
virtue of PD 1823. City Assessor of Quezon City assessed for real
property taxes in the amount of P4M. Petitioner filed a claim for
exemption from said taxes invoking it is a charitable institution.
Petitioner was denied. It then filed before the QC-LBAA, which held
petitioner liable of the taxes as well. On appeal before the CBAA, it
ruled the petitioner is not a charitable institution and its real properties
were not actually, directly, and exclusively used for charitable purposes.
Petitioner sought relief from the CA, but CA affirmed the decision of the
CBAA.
ISSUE: W.O.N. the petitioner is a charitable institution within the
context of PD 1823, 1973 and 1987 Constitution, and Sec. 234 of the
LGC and W.O.N. its real properties are exempt.
Charitable institution within the context of 1973 and 1987 Constitution:
1. Statute creating the entity
2. Corporate purpose
3. Constitution and By-laws
4. Methods of administration
5. Nature of work performed
6. Character of service
7. Indefiniteness of beneficiaries
8. Use and occupation of properties
Test: Whether it exists to carry out a purpose reorganized in law as
charitable or if it is for gain, profit or private advancement.
HELD: Petitioner is subject to real property taxes with regards to its
lands used for private purpose other than the hospital which are not
actually, directly, and exclusively used for charitable purposes, as
provided by Sec. 28 (3) of Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover,
under the rule of expressio unius es exclusio alterius, property tax is not
enumerated in Sec. 2 of PD 1823 which provides exemption of “all
donations, contributions, endowments, and equipment and supplies
from income and gift taxes”. Petitioner shall be exempt from taxes
imposed by government with respect to “equipment purchases”. It is
also stressed that tax exemption are strictly construed against the
taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing power.
Gomez vs Ventura
54 Phil. 726
FACTS: Petitioners license to practice medicine and surgery was
revoked by the Board of Medical Examiners of the Philippine Islands
due to the use of Opium, contrary to RA 2493. Petitioner contends that
said RA expressly provides the causes for revocation of medical
licenses. Therefore it necessarily excludes all others. “Unprofessional
conduct” shall be construed to include the following acts: (1) procuring
abortion, (2) advertising in any obscene manner, (3) habitual
intemperance or addiction to drugs, (4) conviction of a crime involving
dishonorable conduct, and (5) betraying professional secrets.
HELD: Petition denied.
RATIONALE: Expressio unius es exclusio alterius cannot be applied when
it will defeat the plain indicated purpose of the legislature.
Go Tiaco vs Union Ins. Society of Cantos
40 Phil. 40
FACTS: Petitioners filed an action on a policy of marine insurance upon
a cargo of rice which was damaged by sea water due to a defect in one
of the drain pipes of the ship, thus, not covered. Trial court ruled in
favor of the insurer. The policy purports to insure the following among
other risks: “perils of the seas, men, of war, fire, enemies, pirates,
rovers, jettisons, thieves, barratry of the master and mariners, and all
other perils, losses and misfortunes that have come to hurt, or damage
said goods and merchandise or any part thereof. “All other perils, losses
and misfortunes” are to be interpreted as covering risks which are of
like kind (ejusdem generis) with the particular risks enumerated in the
preceding part of the same clause of the contract.
HELD: Judgment affirmed.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs Social Security Commission
1 SCRA 10
FACTS: Petitioner filed before the respondent a request for exemption
from compulsory coverage of RA 1161 “Social Security Law of 1954”
which was denied. Petitioner contends that said act is a labor law and
does not cover religious and charitable institutions but is limited to
businesses and activities organized for profit. Moreover, following the
principle of ejusdem generis the term “employer” as defined in the law
should be limited to those who carry on “undertakings or activities
which have the element of profit or gain, or which are pursued for
profit or gain”, because the phrase “activity of any kind” in the
definition is preceded by the words “any trade, business, industry,
undertaking”.
HELD: Petition denied. In the case at bar, the definition of the term
“employer” is sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and
charitable institutions or entities not organized for profit within its
meaning. This is made more evident by the fact that it contains an
exception in which the Government and any of its political subdivisions,
branches or instrumentalities, including all corporations owned or
controlled by the Government are not included.
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RATIONALE: The rule of ejusdem generis applies only where there is
uncertainty. It is not controlling where the plain purpose and intent of
the Legislature would thereby be hindered or defeated.
Mutuc vs COMELEC
36 SCRA 228
FACTS: Respondent sent a telegram to the petitioner informing him
that his certificate of candidacy was given due course but prohibited
him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems
and loud speakers, an order which, according to the petitioner is
“violative of his constitutional right to freedom of speech. The
prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional
Convention Act, which made it unlawful for candidates “to purchase,
produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda
gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights,
athletic goods or material, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches,
cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.
HELD: Petition granted. COMELEC is enjoined from banning the use of
taped jingles. Under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the
general words following any enumeration being applicable only to
things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. It is
quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the
distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of
inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for
its distribution.
NOTE: Ejusdem generis doctrine - where a statute describes things of a
particular class or kind, accompanied by words of generic character
preceded by the word “other”, the generic words will usually be limited
to things of a kindred nature with those particularly enumerated,
unless there is something in the context or history of the statute to
repeal such interference.
PNOC Shipping and Transportation Corporation vs CA
297 SCRA 402
FACTS: Petroparcel, which was acquired by petitioner, collided with
M/V Efigenia XV. Petroparcel, founded to be at fault, was liable to pay
the latter a sum of P6M for damages taking into account the
documentary evidence presented. Petitioner contends that the lower
court erred in holding it liable for damages. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the decision. Petitioner questions the admissibility of the said
documentary evidences which it regards as hearsay evidence. Such
evidence has no probative value unless the proponent can show that
the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule.
HELD: CA decision modified to P2M as nominal damages. Under Sec.
45, Rule 130, a document is a commercial list if: (1) it is a statement of
matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation; (2) such
statement is contained in a list, register, periodical or other published
compilation; (3) said compilation is published for the use of persons
engaged in that occupation; and (4) it is generally used and relied upon
by persons in the same occupation. Under the principle of ejusdem
generis, the price quotations do not fall under one of the exceptions
“commercial lists and the like” for these do not belong to the category
of “other published compilations. Damages may not be awarded on the
basis of hearsay evidence. However, nominal damages may be awarded
in every obligation arising from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or
omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts, or in every case where
property right has been invaded.
Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs CA
293 SCRA 26
FACTS: Petitioner and Pacific Cement Company entered into a contract
whereby Pacific undertook to supply 4300 metric tons of oil cement, in
consideration of $477,300 from petitioner. Delivery was not satisfied.
An award amounting to $900,000 was granted by an appointed arbiter
in favor of petitioner, in which Pacific refused to pay. Petitioner filed
before the RTC of Surigao City a complaint for enforcement of the
award. RTC dismissed said complaint on the ground that the foreign
courts lack jurisdiction. Clause 15 of the contract provides for exclusive
jurisdiction of the court which the supply order is situated and not
Clause 16 which call for an appointed arbiter. On appeal, the CA
affirmed RTC’s decision. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
HELD: Petition granted. The three matters which may be submitted to
arbitration are: questions and disputes relating to the design, drawing,
instructions, specifications or quality of the materials of supply
order/contract; and execution or failure to execute supply
order/contract. The non-delivery of oil well cement is definitely not in
the nature of a dispute arising from the failure to execute the supply
order/contract design, drawing, instructions, specifications or quality of
the materials. Thus, limited by the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, Clause
16 pertains only to matters involving the technical aspects of the
contract. However, it must be taken into account that what was
referred to arbitration was no longer the mere non-delivery at the first
instance but also the failure of the replacement cargo to conform to the
specifications of the contract, a matter clearly within the coverage of
Clause 16. Petitioner ordered to pay amount adjudged in the foreign
judgment subject of said case.
RATIONALE: The doctrine of noscitur a sociis is applicable in the
ascertainment of the meaning and scope of vague contractual
stipulations.
Magtajas vs Pryce Properties Corp, Inc
234 SCRA 255
FACTS: PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro
City. Thus, reacting swift and hostile, its Sangguniang Panlunsod
enacted Ord. No. 3353 prohibiting issuance of business permit for the
operation of casino and Ord. No. 3375-93 for its penalty. Respondents
sought to declare said ordinances invalid before the CA, which ruled in
favor of the respondents. Petitioner contends that the CA erred in
holding, among others, the phrase “gambling and other prohibited
games of chance” found in Sec 458 (a) of RA 7160 could only mean
“illegal gambling”. Petitioner invokes the principle that when the law
does not distinguish, we should not distinguish therefore said section
meant all forms of gambling without distinction.
HELD: Petition denied. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, the word
“gambling” is associated with “and other prohibited games of chance”
thus referring to only illegal gambling.
Romulo, Mabanta vs HDMF
333 SCRA 777
FACTS: Sec. 19 of PD 1752, as amended by RA 7742, provides for
exemption from Pag-ibig fund coverage of an employer and/or
employee-group who, at the time of effectivity have their own
provident and/or employee-housing plan. Petitioner, a law firm, filed an
application for waiver but was disapproved by the HDMF on the ground
that the requirement that there should be both a provident plan and
housing plan. On appeal, the HDMF Board of Trustees and CA denied as
well. Petitioner contends that the requirement for exemption from
coverage is the existence of either of the provident plan or the housing
plan and not the concurrence of both plans.
HELD: Petition granted. Sec. 19 of PD 1752 intended that an employer
with a provident plan or a housing plan may obtain exemption. If the
law had intended the employer to have both, it would have used “and”
instead of “and/or”
People vs Manatan
5 SCRA 684
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with a violation of Sec. 54 of the Revised
Election Code which prohibits officers from electioneering. Petitioner
contends that justices of the peace are not comprehended among the
officers enumerated, under the rule of casus omisus.
HELD: Petition denied. Judge is defined as “all officers appointed to
decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including
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justices of the peace...” The legislative development/ history of Sec. 54
include justices of the peace: Act 1582 Sec. 29, Act 1709 Sec. 6, Sec 449
of the Administrative Code, then Act 3387 Se. 2636. However, in
Commonwealth Act 357 Sec. 48, it provided for “justice, judge”. The
legislature availed itself of the more generic and broader term “judge”
intended to comprehend all judges.
The rule of casus omisus does not apply, unless the omission has been
clearly established. The obvious intention was to include in the scope of
the term not just one class of judges but all judges.
Abangan vs Abangan
40 Phil 476
DOCTRINE: The laws on the subject should be interpreted in such a way
as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one
must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to
restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an
interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation
whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely
unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator’s last will, must be
disregarded
Ong Chua vs Rep
328 SCRA 749
DOCTRINE: It is settled that naturalization laws should be rigidly
enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against
the applicant
Mla. Railroad Co. vs Collector of Customs
52 Phil 950
DOCTRINE: It is the general rule in the interpretation of statutes levying
taxes or duties not to extend their provisions beyond the clear import
of the language used. In every case of doubt, such statutes are
construed most strongly against the Government and in favor of the
citizen, because burdens are not to be imposed, nor presumed to be
imposed, beyond what the statutes expressly and clearly import
CIR vs CA
271 SCRA 605
DOCTRINE: The hornbook doctrine in the interpretation of tax laws
states that “(a) statute will not be construed as imposing a tax unless it
does so clearly, expressly and unambiguously. xxx (A) tax cannot be
imposed without clear and express words for that purpose.
Accordingly, the general rule of requiring adherence to the letter in
construing statutes applies with peculiar strictness to tax laws and the
provisions of a taxing act are not to be extended by implication.
Parenthetically, in answering the question of who is subject to tax
statutes, it is basic the “in case of doubt, such statutes are to be
construed most strongly against the government and in favor of the
subjects or citizens because burdens are not to be imposed nor
presumed to be imposed beyond what statutes expressly and clearly
import
Bañas, Jr. vs CA
325 SCRA 259
DOCTRINE: It also bears noting that a tax amnesty, much like a tax
exemption, is never favoured nor presumed in law and if granted by
statute, the terms of the amnesty like that of a tax exemption must be
construed strictly against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the
taxing authority
Sequenze vs CA
137 SCRA570, 430 SCRA128
DOCTRINE: The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid
and technical sense. The rules of procedure are used only to help
secure not override substantial justice
Pablo vs Castillo
337 SCRA176
DOCTRINE: It is a basic rule of statutory construction that if a statute is
clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without any interpretation. Not only that; in the matter of
interpretation of laws on probation, the Court has pronounced that
“the policy of liberality of probation statutes cannot prevail against the
categorical provision of the law”
It is well-settled that the probation law is not a penal statute and
therefore, the principle of liberal interpretation is inapplicable. And
when the meaning is clearly discernible from the language of the
statute, there is no room for construction or interpretation
Ursua vs CA
256 SCRA147
DOCTRINE: Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be
construed in the light of the purpose to be achieved and the evils
sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its
enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed
with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may
consider the spirit and treason of the statute, where a literal meaning
would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the
clear purpose of the lawmakers
Mla. Railroad Co. vs Rafferty
40 Phil 225
DOCTRINE: Repels of laws by implication are not favored; and mere
repugnance between two statutes should be very clear in order to
warrant the court in holding that the later on tie repeals the other,
when it does not in terms purport to do so.
It is well-settled that a special and local statute, providing for a
particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent
statute, general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the
intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general
act are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law.”
The rule is but the application of the larger rule that a statute is not to
be deemed repealed by implication, by a subsequent Act upon the
same subject unless the two are manifestly inconsistent with, and
repugnant to, each other, or unless a clear intention is disclosed on the
face of the later statute to repeal the former one.
It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its
terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily
not affect the special provision of such earlier statute.
Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general--
the terms of the general broad enough to include the matter provided
for in the special--the fact that one is special and the other is general
creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining
an exception to the general, one as a general of the land, the other as
the law of a particular case
Laguna Lake Development vs CA
251 SCRA 42
DOCTRINE: It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a
later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have
repealed a special law. It is well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that “a
special statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not
repealed by a subsequent statute, general in it terms, provisions and
application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the
terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases
embraced in the special law.
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute,
the special statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent
more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be taken as
an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances
forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because implied repeals are not
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favored and as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments
of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or
altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication

Arenas vs City of San Carlos

82 SCRA 318

DOCTRINE: The primary purpose of a proviso is to limit the general

language of a statute. When there is irreconcilable repugnancy
between the proviso and the body of the statute the former is given
precedence over the latter on the ground that it is the latest expression
of the intent of the legislatuure

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